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TITLE: THE BORDERLANDS IN THE MIND
OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES
1801-1881

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The explosive potential of the nationalities question in the USSR today is not a new phenomenon; it derives from events long antedating the annexation of the Baltic states and eastern Moldavia in 1940, the assignment of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaidzhan in 1923, or the suppression of an independent Ukrainian state in 1920. The national problem is deeply rooted in the very nature of the Soviet multi-ethnic society, in the processes by which that society came into being between the mid-sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries, and in the way the dominant Russians have perceived their society. My research during the term of the contract is part of an ongoing study focussing on the last point--the formation in the nineteenth century of a climate of opinion in regard to the minority nationalities that in many respects persists today despite seven decades of official teaching about the brotherhood of Soviet nationalities.

America's multi-ethnic society has been formed by successive waves of immigrants 1) whose settlement pattern right across the continent was one of intermingling, as individuals or as ethnic communities or neighborhoods, with immigrants from other backgrounds and 2) whose identification with their new homeland very largely replaced any attachment to their countries of origin. In the Soviet case, by contrast, a multi-ethnic society was formed through the territorial expansion of Russia into contiguous lands;

the annexed peoples continued to live in and identify with their ancestral homelands, although in some cases colonization by Russians followed Russian political control.

Although the resulting Russian Empire, substantially restored as the USSR after the interregnum of 1917-20, is often likened to the early modern and modern colonial empires of Spain, France, and England, the comparison is more misleading than informative. Not only were the colonial dependencies of the West European powers separated from their respective metropolises by thousands of miles of ocean; equally important, the empires in question were established by peoples who had already virtually completed the process of defining themselves politically (as states) and culturally (as nations). In Russia's case, however, the state's frontiers continued to push outward until the late nineteenth century, adding ever more material to the ethnic mix out of which Russians were attempting to fashion a nation. The great majority of educated Russians in this period, whether in or out of government, perceived their expanding state not as a colonial empire but as a nation-state in process of formation. The ideal of a nation-state, in which the political community coincides with the cultural community, had come to Russia from the West in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars.

Russia's expansion into lands populated by peoples who were neither East Slavic in speech nor Orthodox Christian in religion was rarely seen as other than a natural continuation of the older, but ongoing, process of political unification of the East Slavs

under the rule of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The distinction between the two processes was undoubtedly blurred by 1) considerations of national security, which were a persistent driving force in Russian expansion, given the absence of natural defenses like the English Channel or the Alps, and 2) the case of the Ukraine and Belorussia.

The Ukraine and Belorussia had been fortuitously detached from the main body of East Slavdom and, before their reattachment to it in the second half of the eighteenth century (a century earlier in the case of the eastern Ukraine), had for four hundred years been subject to cultural and religious pressure from their Polish and Polonized rulers. The centuries of separation had inevitably produced significant differences between those on either side of the political frontier--differences in language, culture, and for a minority (the Uniates, who followed Orthodox practices but recognized papal authority), religion as well. If the Ukraine and Belorussia, for all their distinctiveness from Great Russia, could be perceived as integral parts of the metropole, it required only a slightly greater effort to enlarge that vision to include the lands of other neighbors who were more distinct from the Russians: those who were Orthodox but not Slavs (like the Georgians and Moldavians), Slavic but not Orthodox (like the Poles), oppressed Christians albeit neither Orthodox nor Slavs (like the Armenians), or infidel barbarians in need of the blessings of Western civilization (like the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia). This broader vision included as well

the lands that lay between Russia and the defensible frontiers that nature had intended for her, even if some of these lands (like the Baltic provinces and Finland) were inhabited by neighbors who belonged to none of the above categories and were in addition perceived as having attained a higher level of cultural and social development than the Russians themselves. All these lands were seen as by right part of the Russian national territory, and their inhabitants as candidates, sooner or later, for membership in the developing Russian nation. Nation-building in Russia is inextricably linked to the problem of Russia's national identity and her relationship to the West, a problem that is the legacy of the cultural Westernization begun by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This factor accounts, I believe, for the differentiation in Russian attitudes toward the western borderlands (Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, and the provinces formerly dominated by Poland) from the perception of the eastern and southern borderlands. Possession and integration of the western borderlands strengthened Russia's European identity and placed her physically firmly in Europe (here defined historically and culturally rather than by the arbitrary modern geographical convention whereby Europe extends to the Ural Mountains). The western borderlands were a testing ground for Russia's uneasy assertion of her cultural equality, or even superiority, vis-a-vis Europe.

In the eastern and southern borderlands the Muslims of the Crimea, the Volga, the Caucasus, and Central Asia were viewed as

the traditional enemies of Western civilization, for which Russia had historically acted as the protective shield, much to her own cost. The Muslims, like the Buddhists and animists further east, posed no threat to Russia's national identity; together with the "orientalized" Christians of Moldavia and the Caucasus, they could confidently be seen as cultural inferiors who in due course could not but be assimilated by the superior culture of their Russian rulers. Thus, no such desperate measures of coercive russification as were increasingly applied in the western borderlands were necessary in the east and south. Official policy in regard to the borderlands was not only supported very widely by educated public opinion but also reflected the nuances of attitudes toward the various non-Russian ethnic groups in the context of Russian nation-building.

The policy of russification pursued so vigorously from 1881 until the fall of the old regime in 1917 was hardly merely the misguided policy of two politically obtuse autocrats and their similarly inclined advisers and agents. It was rather a policy that grew quite naturally out of Russia's traditional political culture, which emphasized centralized control and uniform methods of administration throughout the state. Equally important, the policy drew on a deep reservoir of support among educated Russians, almost all of whom were vitally concerned with the process of Russian nation-building in the multi-ethnic environment that was the Russian Empire. However much modified by Soviet nationality policy, the attitudes developed in the nineteenth

century continue to be a factor that must be reckoned with in today's Soviet Union--a society, like the empire it replaced, ruled by Russians and in which Russian language and culture continue to be presented as norms for the entire population.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE MIND OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES, 1801-1881

The nationalities problem, and in particular the government's attempt to russify the non-Russian peoples of the empire, is widely recognized as a major factor contributing to the demise of Russia's old regime in 1917. Russification alienated from the regime hitherto loyal subjects. Given the ethnic composition of the Russian Empire (a Great Russian nucleus surrounded by non-Russian borderlands, with the Great Russians forming a bare majority of the total population in 1897), the question naturally arises as to why the regime initiated and so long persisted in such a counterproductive policy. Was it simply the political obtuseness of the last two Romanovs, blind--in this area as in so many others--to the long-range interests of their multi-ethnic empire?

In the 1880s, according to two standard Western surveys of Russian history, russification became a "general" and "official" policy of the tsarist regime for the first time.¹ Three important qualifications must be made to this observation. Firstly, what was new in the russification policy of Alexander III and Nicholas II was not that it was "general" or "official". Administrative russification as a conscious policy was more than a century old by 1881;² as a practice it was considerably older, dating to the beginning of the Muscovite period, and reflected a political culture that emphasized centralized control and uniform

methods of administration. What was new was the emphasis on the cultural (especially, linguistic and religious) assimilation of non-Russians. Such cultural assimilation, like administrative integration, is as old as Russian history itself. It began when Slavic tribes moving northeastward from the Dnepr mixed with and absorbed the indigenous Finnic peoples they encountered. Instances of cultural russification as a conscious policy had also occurred before 1881. The primary targets had been the Polish language and Catholic religion in the formerly Polish western provinces after the revolt of 1830-31 and in the former Kingdom of Poland itself after the 1863 revolt, but the German language in the Baltic provinces and the Ukrainian language were also targets in the 60s and 70s. In fact, from the 1860s, rather than the 80s, cultural assimilation was accorded equal importance with administrative integration and was applied to subject peoples who had not been guilty of disloyalty to Russia. It is worth noting that from the 1880s efforts to assimilate the Jews, going back over half a century, were abandoned, but the Jews constitute a special case that requires separate treatment.

Secondly, the new policy was applied not to all of the tsar's non-Russian subjects, but almost exclusively to the inhabitants of the western or European borderlands (Finland, the Baltic provinces Poland, and the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian lands formerly under Polish rule). An explanation of this differentiation between the western and the eastern/southern borderlands is essential to an understanding of russification.

Thirdly, the new policy of aggressive russification enjoyed extremely broad support among the most diverse groups of the educated Russian public. Russification's critics, e.g., Alexander Herzen in the case of Poland in the 1860s, are noteworthy for their isolation.

The thesis developed in this paper takes off from Riasanovsky's observation that russification was for the most part "a response to the rising nationalism of the Great Russians themselves"³ and from Seton-Watson's that it was based on "a secular ideology of state, Great Russian nationalism", which demanded loyalty no longer solely "in the name of the autocrat appointed by God", but now "in the name of the Russian nation as well."⁴ Both those in government who formulated and implemented the newly aggressive russification policy and those outside government who supported it were the carriers of this new ideology.

The new national consciousness that underlay the desire to transform the emperor's non-Russian subjects into Russians was not created overnight in the 1880s but had been developing since the early years of the century. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the ideology of nationalism reached Russia from Europe, complete with European concepts of statehood and nationhood. The defining characteristic of the nation-state--the ideal of modern nationalism--is the correspondence of the political community to the ethnic or cultural community. In the age of Nicholas I's "official nationality" a Russian nation-state became the goal of

both the regime and educated society; it remained their dream until the end of the old regime.

There were several serious obstacles to the realization of this dream. In western and central Europe in the nineteenth century the nation was in most cases assumed to be a given, and it was political frontiers that sometimes required readjustment, most notably in Italy, Germany, and the Habsburg monarchy. In Russia, by contrast, nation-building was far from being a completed process, for many peoples brought under Russian rule since the sixteenth century were still in the early stages of assimilation. State-building (both territorial expansion and administrative integration) was continuing as well, with the boundaries of the empire being enlarged throughout the nineteenth century: huge territories were annexed in the western marches over against Europe, in the Caucasus, in the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan, and in the Far East. Finally, the acquisition of these new lands enormously increased the ethnic heterogeneity of the state, thereby adding to the complexity and difficulty of the task of nation-building.

Nothing daunted, educated society in Russia by the 1880s had developed an ideology that sanctioned not only the Russian state's claim to the borderlands but also the Russian nation's claim to the borderland peoples. Unlike Westerners, who have frequently compared the Russian Empire to the colonial empires of Spain, France, and England, with the borderlands playing the role of colonies to Russia's metropole, the majority of educated Russians

of the nineteenth century preferred to view the empire as a nation-state in the process of formation. There was a certain plausibility to this point of view. Unlike the colonial dependencies of the Western powers, Russia's borderlands were contiguous to the metropole rather than being separated from it by thousands of miles of ocean. Equally important, whereas in the West the processes of state- and nation- building for the most part preceded the stage of empire- building, in Russia all these processes occurred simultaneously, making it very difficult to distinguish one from another.

Of primary importance to educated Russians in developing their national consciousness was the role played by historians of Russia who wrote for a popular audience, whether of adults or of youngsters. Such popular treatments of Russia's territorial expansion, from the first volumes of Karamzin's History of the Russian State, published in 1818, to Kliuchevskii's course in Russian history, delivered regularly at Moscow University from the early 1880s, helped shaped the way in which several successive generations of Russian readers of all ages perceived the political community in which they lived, together with its ethnically heterogeneous population. These treatments manifest a striking consensus in their presentation of the story of the formation and territorial expansion of the Russian state and in their attitude toward the relationship of the Great Russian metropole to the non-Russian borderlands. In summary, that presentation is as follows: the Russian people, themselves an ethnic amalgam of Slavic,

Finnic, and Norse components, had in the course of almost a thousand years continually extended the borders of their state in a seemingly ineluctable process of 1) demonstrating their virility, winning the respect of foreigners, and erasing shameful blots on their national honor; 2) recovering the lost parts of their ancient patrimony; 3) reaching out to the frontiers intended for Russia by nature; 4) responding to the desire for unification on the part of their kinsmen and coreligionists suffering under foreign oppression, to appeals from other neighbors for protection, and to the need of their neighbors at times to be saved from their own self-inflicted troubles; 5) satisfying the legitimate claims of their own security against hostile neighbors; and finally 6) pursuing their right to develop as a people and fulfill their national destiny by borrowing the necessary tools of civilization from the more enlightened West and using them to develop the potential of the wastes to the north, east, and south, and thereby, incidentally, conferring the blessings of civilization upon the savage peoples who inhabited these wastes. The movement of Russia's frontiers had been accompanied by the movement of her people; colonization had assisted in putting a Russian stamp upon newly acquired lands and in assimilating newly subjected peoples. Although these themes inevitably overlap, they can be treated serially.

National Pride

Karamzin's History gloried in the enormous size of the

Russian state and in the fact that it consisted of the conquests of a people endowed with a strong martial spirit. He had little sympathy for peoples who lacked such a spirit. He was condescending toward the Finns for yielding their lands without resistance to the more aggressive Russians in the Kievan period, and he castigated fifteenth-century Novgorod with such moralizing aphorisms as: "ardor for war diminishes in mercantile states as their wealth increases" and "freedom belongs to the lion, not to the lamb." A weak state, like Russia during the Time of Troubles in the first decade of the seventeenth century, inspires foreign powers at best with "curiosity or fruitless pity", while a state which demonstrates its virility through military victories resulting in the conquest of new lands earns the respect of other powers. The respect which Karamzin and his successors was most concerned to obtain for Russia was that of the West; Ivan III, Boris Godunov, Peter I, and Catherine II all earned his praise for winning the West's respect by means of their military successes. Victories over Sweden by Boris Godunov and Peter I were especially sweet, because the foe was a Western power renowned for its "preeminence in the military art." The triumphs and annexations of Peter I and especially of Catherine II won for Russia "one of the leading positions in the European state system Peter astonished Europe with his victories; Catherine accustomed her to our triumphs."⁵

The respect of other powers was also contingent upon the absence or erasure of shameful blots upon the nation's honor.

Peters's conquest of Livonia redeemed Ivan IV's ignominious surrender of that land to Poland, while Peter also forced Poland to yield the trophies carried off from Russia in the Time of Troubles.⁶ An even more ancient and rankling dishonor was erased by the gradual recovery of Russia's western and southern provinces from the Lithuanians, a "poor, savage" people who had taken advantage of Russia's weakness and disunity in the thirteenth century to throw off Russian suzerainty and form an independent state incorporating "the better half of Russia".⁷

Russia's eastward expansion was no less important for winning the respect of Europe. Karamzin took special delight in the conquest of Siberia, which he compared to the exploits of the Spanish in Latin America. In Siberia Russia "discovered a second new world for Europe"; Ermak, the late sixteenth-century Cossack adventurer, was the "Russian Pizarro"; and in Siberia, as in Mexico and Peru, "a handful of men using firearms defeated thousands armed with arrows and spears."⁸ Such comparisons bolstered Russia's claim to a past that was no less interesting or worthy of attention than the histories of Greece, Rome, or Western Europe.⁹ Perhaps the most important blot upon the nation's honor was its two and a half centuries of subjection to Asiatic rulers, a humiliating experience for a people jealous of Europe's good opinion. Ivan IV's annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan had redeemed Russia's honor by transforming the "former tributaries" of the Tatars into "rulers over Batu's descendants".¹⁰ In a similar although less catastrophic case, Peter I's campaign in the last

years of his reign along the western shore of the Caspian Sea effaced the dishonor of a costly defeat in that area by the Turks over a century earlier.¹¹

Russia's Ancient Patrimony

Russia's national honor was repeatedly linked in popular historiography to the recovery of the parts of her ancient patrimony that had been seized by foreign foes. Here again Karamzin set the tone by tracing the formation of that patrimony over two centuries until by the reign of Iaroslav the Wise "our forefathers possessed almost the whole of presentday European Russia", from the Baltic region and Lithuania southward to the borders of Hungary and Dacia (Romania) and the shores of the Sea of Azov, and eastward to the frontiers of Asia.¹² Iaroslav's realm was subsequently invariably taken in popular historiography as Russia's patrimony, and the struggle for its recovery was presented as one of the central themes of Russian history from Ivan III to Catherine II.¹³ Not only lands inhabited by Great Russians but also all lands and peoples (cultural differences notwithstanding) that had at any time recognized the authority of a Russian prince were included. The cases that received most attention were the lands at the head of the Gulf of Finland¹⁴, Livonia¹⁵, the Left-Bank Ukraine¹⁶, and (of particular concern) the western regions incorporated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries into the Grand Principality of Lithuania and subsequently into the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania--"the best

part of our fatherland", Russia's by "irrefutable right" of prior possession.¹⁷ Karamzin proudly declared: "Let foreigners condemn the [eighteenth-century] partition of Poland; we took what was ours."¹⁸ His only regret, shared by Pogodin and Ustrialov, was that Catherine's share of Poland-Lithuania had not included Red Russia (Galicia), which had been lost in the mid-eleventh century¹⁹ (and was not to be restored to Russia until 1945).

Natural Frontiers

The Arctic, Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas and the Ural and Caucasus mountains were suggested as Russia's natural frontiers in early nineteenth-century popular historiography²⁰, but only with Soloviev was the geographical factor raised to the status of a major determinant of Russia's historical development. Soloviev's influence upon the historians of Russia of the second half of the nineteenth century is comparable to Karamzin's upon those working in the second quarter of the century. According to Soloviev, Russia belongs to the category of "organic formations", which are characteristic of Europe and whose frontiers are set for them by nature at the beginning of their history, as opposed to nonorganic states like the Roman, Assyrian, and Persian empires, created by conquest. Regardless of the vicissitudes they experience, organic states will always attain or regain their natural frontiers. The territory that nature allotted to Russia was nothing less than the entire East European plain, a vast area united physically by the absence of any internal mountain barriers and by an extensive

network of navigable rivers all rising in close proximity to each other. The natural frontiers of this plain, and of the Russian state, are the four seas and two mountain ranges mentioned above, to which Soloviev added the Carpathian Mountains in the west. Following nature's dictates, Russian expansion followed the course of the rivers of the plain down to the four seas into which they flow.²¹

Thus Russia's acquisition of the Baltic provinces, the Pontic Steppe, and the middle and lower Volga had been ordained by nature. Her natural frontiers were as lodestones to which the Russian state was irresistibly drawn. In the case of the Ural and Caucasus mountains, however, "natural frontiers" did not serve even temporarily to halt Russia's expansion, whose continuation other considerations dictated.

Humanitarian Considerations

"Humanitarian" may seem to be an inappropriate qualifier for the motives behind Russian expansion, but in the story as told by Russia's popular historians, such considerations were of considerable importance. The right of the rulers of Moscow and Petersburg to reconstitute Iaroslav's realm was reinforced by their duty toward the inhabitants of the lands in question who were their own kinsmen and coreligionists. Through more than four centuries of Lithuanian and Polish rule the people of western Russia remained Russian in their faith, their language, and their laws and institutions, and allegedly never ceased to regret their

separation from their eastern brethren.²² These sentiments, Karamzin claimed, materially facilitated Moscow's efforts to reunite the western and eastern halves of Iaroslav's realm, while the efforts of Polish kings and Roman popes from the latter sixteenth century forcibly to convert the western Russians to Catholicism only strengthened their desire for deliverance at Moscow's hands.²³ The Ukrainians were depicted as children torn from their mother's arms who never forgot their faith or their parentage and finally turned to Moscow for protection in the 1650s.²⁴ Ancient ties of language and religion, added to his claims as Iaroslav's heir, gave Tsar Aleksei, according to Ustrialov, the undeniable right to intervene in the Ukraine. Aleksei's claims to the Ukraine, it was noted, were even stronger than the right of his contemporary, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, to intervene on the side of German Protestants in the Thirty Years' War--a claim Europe had universally recognized.²⁵

Pogodin expanded the notion of kinship to embrace the Poles, who, he argued, had the good fortune since 1815 to be ruled by a Slavic kinsman in place of the foreigners who had occupied the Polish throne for virtually the entire two centuries preceding the partition of 1772.²⁶ In fact the Poles, like many others of Russia's neighbors, had more than once appealed to Russia for protection. By offering their crown to Russia's rulers on several occasions from the sixteenth century on, the Poles had "repeatedly striven" to be united with Russia, finally achieving their goal at the Congress of Vienna.²⁷ Questions of kinship and the Poles' own

desires aside, Poland sorely needed Russian rule to save her from her own folly. The end of independence in 1795 was a blessing to Poland, for she had proved that "she was unable to make use of [her independence] without harming her neighbors and her own well-being."²⁸ Catherine had intervened in Poland, like the Roman Senate in Ptolemaic Egypt, to end internal strife. The wisdom of her act was proven after the Napoleonic interlude, when Poland, "having for so many years spilled its blood without profit to itself . . . settled down and finally found happiness under the beneficial rule of virtuous-hearted Alexander I."²⁹

Although Georgians had never been subjects or tributaries of Russian princes and were not Slavs, they were Orthodox Christians who were hard pressed by their Muslim neighbors and thus had a strong claim on Russia's protection, for which various Georgian princes had appealed from time to time, beginning as early as 1492.³⁰ Georgia's remoteness, however, rendered fruitless Russia's attempts to assert its power in the area until the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A similar case was Moldavia, another non-Slavic but Orthodox state, which had first appealed to Moscow for help against Turkey in the 1530s³¹; only in 1812 was Russia strong enough to take eastern Moldavia (Bessarabia) under its wing. Armenians were neither Slavic nor even Orthodox, but as a Christian people they too deserved deliverance from the mortal dangers they shared with their Georgian neighbors.

Even pagans and infidels had appealed to Russia for

protection. The Livonians were depicted as having sought the aid of Novgorod and other Russian principalities against the German and Danish invaders of their land in the thirteenth century and as having continued, after their forcible subjugation and conversion to Latin Christianity, to look to Russia for help until their rescue by Peter the Great.³² Almost all of Russia's eastern neighbors, also, had at one time or another sought her protection against enemies external or internal, including Kazan and Astrakhan in the mid-sixteenth century³³, the Kazakh Horde in 1595³⁴, the Kalmyks in the second half of the seventeenth century³⁵, and the peoples of western Turkestan in the nineteenth century.³⁶ Like Poland in the west, the eastern khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea had also sorely needed Russia's protection, whether or not they had solicited it, to save them from their own folly and inability to maintain internal order.³⁷

National Security

No theme was of more central importance in the popular presentation of the history of state-building in Russia than that of national security: the early achievement (in the tenth through twelfth centuries), sudden loss (in the early thirteenth century), and slow recovery (from the late fifteenth to early nineteenth centuries) of a secure national existence in the presence of neighbors who repeatedly gave proof of their ill will and readiness to take advantage of Russia at the first sign of weakness.

To her Latin Christian neighbors to the west, Russia, as depicted in popular historiography, was the object of fear, suspicion, envy, and greed. From the beginning of the thirteenth century the German crusading Order of Swordbearers entrenched itself in Livonia, eradicating all traces of previous Russian influence in the region, relentlessly pressing against Russia's northwestern marches, and in the mid-sixteenth century imposing an embargo upon travel to Russia by Western artisans and technicians, lest the talents of these foreigners help Russia become a major power.³⁸ From the late fifteenth to the early nineteenth century the Swedes had repeatedly tried to prevent Russia from reaching or retaining the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea and had taken advantage of Russia's Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century to seize much of the Russian northwest.³⁹

Of all Russia's Western neighbors, however, Poland was her most inveterate foe as a result of the blood feud between the two countries over the possession of the western half of Russia's ancient patrimony. The feud had become especially bitter in the latter sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when Poland tried both to impose her religion and culture upon the disputed territories and to extend her control over Muscovy itself.⁴⁰ Even in their weakness, having forfeited their right to an independent political existence because of their inability to govern themselves, the Poles continued to act on the basis of their traditional hatred of Russia--massacring the Russian peace-keeping force in Warsaw during Holy Week in 1794, joining Napoleon in his

invasion of Russia, and then acting the ingrates by rebelling against their Russian benefactors in 1830 and 1863.⁴¹

With neighbors such as these peaceful coexistence was unimaginable. The blood feud between Russia and Poland could end only with the absorption of one state into the other;⁴² Russia's legitimate interests in Livonia could not be secured without Peter's annexation of the region; and Sweden dropped her age-old hostility only after being taught a definitive lesson by losing Finland to Alexander I.⁴³

The history of Russia's relations with her eastern and southern neighbors presented a picture different in detail but not in the lessons to be drawn from it. Unlike the relatively refined and unbearably haughty Europeans in the west, the peoples in the east and south were savage and bloodthirsty barbarians and predators. The Kazan and Crimean Tatars had ravaged Russia's borders with fire and sword for centuries until their annexation in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, as Russia's frontiers moved eastward and southward, her new neighbors proved to be from the same mold as those previously incorporated into the empire. The hostility and treachery of the barbarians east of the Volga provoked Russia's advance across the Urals into western Siberia in the late sixteenth century;⁴⁵ similar behavior on the part of peoples to the east, south, and north of newly annexed Georgia led inevitably to the pacification and annexation of the rest of Transcaucasia by 1829⁴⁶ and the North Caucasus by 1864; and like causes produced

like results in Central Asia between 1864 and 1884.⁴⁷ Centuries of experience taught that the only truly effective weapon against the barbarians to the east and south was the imposition of Russian rule.⁴⁸

Fulfillment of National Destiny

Territorial expansion was a means to provide not only for Russia's security in a hostile environment but also for her cultural development. Russia needed to overcome the backwardness resulting from the long centuries of Mongol rule by reestablishing links with the more advanced society of Western Europe. For this purpose, direct and unimpeded communication with Europe via the Baltic Sea was indispensable. After many abortive attempts, blocked by her immediate Western neighbors over a period of more than two centuries, Russia under Peter I finally realized this ambition. Estonia and Livonia were extolled by one early nineteenth-century popular historian as not only the key to Russia's "mastery over . . . the Baltic" but the "right hand, with which she holds onto the political system of the European states" and without which "she would remain more an Asiatic than a European power."⁴⁹

Economic development also necessitated expansion. To the east and south there were vast under-utilized lands, and trade routes leading in all directions were vital to Russia's prosperity and had to be secured. Kazan and Astrakhan were valuable entrepots for Muscovy's trade with the east and southeast, and

along with Siberia were "rich prizes" in their own right.⁵⁰ Control of the Baltic coast and the western shores of the Caspian Sea was likewise necessary to the development of Russia's trade and industry.⁵¹ And neither her trade with the Ottoman Empire nor the economy of her southern provinces could prosper until Catherine II had secured access to the Black Sea.⁵² Although the historians of Russia's expansion never dwelled on altruism as a significant motive, they did proudly point to the benefits of Russian rule to the borderlands. Russian colonization in the European north "planted the first seeds of civilization and the Christian faith" among peoples who previously had "dwelled in silence and obscurity", "savage peoples" incapable of realizing the potential of their "forested country so richly endowed by nature."⁵³ Much the same story was told of Siberia and the Pontic Steppe, the latter until the second half of the eighteenth century a region "uninhabited since time immemorial except for transitory, semi-savage nomads"--"predatory peoples."⁵⁴ Although on a higher level of development than these areas, Kazan also benefitted from Russian rule in terms of civil order, economic prosperity, and the introduction of the true faith.⁵⁵

It was Soloviev who more precisely defined Russia's civilizing mission by presenting her as the champion of the sown against the steppe, of civilization against nomadic barbarism, of Europe against Asia. Soloviev accorded great historical significance to the division of the East European plain into two sectors. The northwest, with its rivers flowing to the Arctic

and, more importantly, to the Baltic, covered with forests and inhabited by sedentary folk, was from earliest times an integral part of Europe. The southeast, on the other hand, sloping toward the Black and Caspian seas, consisting of open grasslands, and sheltering nomadic tribes, was a transitional zone between Europe and Asia. Unlike the steppes of Asia or Africa, however, those of the East European plain were both fertile and well watered by the rivers that traversed them (the mouths of which, it will be remembered, were intended by nature to be in the possession of the state that already held their sources). On all counts, clearly, nature had indicated the plain's southeast for European civilization rather than for Asiatic barbarism. Its nomadic denizens had either to retreat into Asia or to become civilized.⁵⁶

From Soloviev on, the theme of the struggle between the steppe and the sown became a central one in popular historiography.⁵⁷ The very formation of a unified Russian people out of diverse Slavic and Finnic tribes was depicted as motivated by the need for defense against the steppe nomads.⁵⁸ For almost four centuries there was a constantly shifting but never completely upset equilibrium between Kiev Rus' and its Asiatic neighbors, but in the thirteenth century the Mongols seized the ascendancy for the steppe and for Asia and held it for 240 years. Despite her isolation under the Tatar yoke from her kinsmen in Christian Europe, Russia held on stubbornly to her identity and in the late fifteenth century was able to go over to the offensive, this time definitively, against Asiatic barbarism.⁵⁹

Russia's historic offensive against Asia began with Dmitrii of Moscow's victory on the Don River in 1380 and ended five centuries later with the pacification of the Caucasus and Central Asia. A decisive turning point in this crusade was Ivan the Terrible's conquest of Kazan, the "crucial bastion of Asia" and "Central Asia's last stronghold against Europe." Kazan's annexation enabled Russia to expand down the Volga to her natural frontier on the Caspian Sea and thereby drive a wedge between the Kazakh Steppe and its European extension.⁶⁰ The next great milestone was Catherine the Great's victories over the Ottoman Turks and her annexation of their Crimean vassal state. These triumphs were hailed as the latest chapter in the long contest between European quality and Asiatic quantity, were equated with the victories of the ancient Greeks over the Persians, and were pronounced the culmination of the struggle that began with Rome's defeat of the Huns in 451. Asia had finally been driven out of Europe.⁶¹ But Russia's task was not completed until Central Asia itself, the home of nomadism and barbarism and an area "languishing under the yoke of Muslim fanaticism, the slave trade, every type of rapaciousness, and the constant internecine wars of the local rulers", had been brought under Russian control and subjected to the civilizing influence of European culture.⁶² For Soloviev, the need to maintain the momentum of Russia's crusade against Asiatic barbarism overrode the significance of both the Urals and the Caucasus as the natural frontiers of the East European plain. The pacification of Kazan's eastern neighbors led

Russia across the Urals, whence a convenient network of rivers with interlocking tributaries facilitated her work of colonizing the virtually empty Siberian wastes and bringing Christian-European civilization to their rude inhabitants until she reached the next natural obstacle--the Pacific seacoast. In the south, once Russia had extended her protection to her Georgian coreligionists against the depredations of their Asiatic neighbors, the Caucasus was perceived as "the last refuge of Asiatic savagery", whose liquidation in the 1860s was duly celebrated by Soloviev's disciples.⁶³

The outspoken Ukrainian regionalist Kostomarov yielded nothing to Soloviev and his school when it came to Russia's role in the "age-old struggle of Christianity with Mahometanism, of Europe with Asia."⁶⁴ Despite the distinctions among the several branches of the East Slavs, which for Kostomarov were of vital importance, all Russians were united not only by cultural, political, and religious bonds, but also by the threat from their common foes, especially the steppe nomads. Kostomarov cited "the struggle of the Slavic tribe against the Turkic" as an example of those ethnic hatreds bequeathed from generation to generation, which over the centuries "give direction to a people's efforts and shape to its thoughts." This struggle had begun with the Pechenegs in the Kievan period and continued in the modern period against the "Musulman Turkish East".⁶⁵ Kostomarov praised Peter the Great not only for desiring for Russia "her proper place in the ranks of the European powers" but also for understanding "that

geography as well as history had mapped out for her in addition another road--that to the east, where Russia, the recipient of the fruits of European civilization from the West, could convey them, in her own reworking, to the eastern peoples who stood on a lower level of cultural development than she."⁶⁶ Kostomarov noted with pride that Kazan had been "transformed into a Russian town" and that Siberia, where "one Tatar nationality after another" had been subjugated, was now a pleasing picture of tilled fields, churches, villages and towns, roads and bridges.⁶⁷

Assimilation

Colonization by Russians was seen as an effective means for civilizing empty or near-empty wastes like the European north, the Siberian forests, and the Pontic and Kazakh steppes, as well as for disseminating the blessings of European civilization among rather denser populations of barbarians such as those along the Volga and in the Caucasus and Russian Turkestan. Kliuchevskii not only subscribed to this view but made of colonization the central theme, "the basic fact of our history", arguing that "the history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of being colonized." Kliuchevskii's corollary to this axiom was that the boundaries of the Russian national state had not been fixed from the beginning by nature (although he recognized "the natural geographic frontiers of the Russian plain") but rather had continually advanced "with the successes of Muscovite arms and the colonizing movement of the Great Russian people."⁶⁸

Kliuchevskii's concept of the Russian people or nation (narod) is central to an understanding of the Russian public's support for cultural russification. For Kliuchevskii, narod was a purely "political term", to be distinguished from the ethnographic term plemia (tribe).⁶⁹ Like many of his predecessors, beginning with Karamzin, Kliuchevskii pointed out that the Russian state originally comprised various Slavic and Finnic tribes which over time were amalgamated with each other and with their Viking rulers to form the Great Russian nation. That nation's political unification under Moscow in the period 1462-1533 "gave rise to the idea of the national state" in Russia. Immediately thereafter began the growth of this national state by means of military conquest, colonization, and the russification (obrusenie) of the natives (inorodtsy) encountered in the process. Conquest, colonization, and russification were thus all seen as essential factors in building the Russian state and nation.⁷⁰

For other popular historians, too, the process not merely of accumulation of disparate lands and peoples under the scepter of the tsar but of their gradual fusion into a united state inhabited by a single people bound together by faith, language, laws, and customs was central to the telling of the story of Russia's development. According to Karamzin, it all started with Riurik, one of whose "principal accomplishments" was the conquest of a number of neighboring Finnic tribes, who in due course were totally assimilated to the Russians in "customs, language, and faith."⁷¹ Polevoi and Ustrialov likewise stressed the diverse

origins of the population of Kiev Rus' and the way in which the language, religion, civil codes, and customs of the numerically dominant Slavs served by the twelfth century to bind the Norse and Finnic elements together with them into a single Russian people.⁷²

The indispensability of combining Russia's disparate regions and peoples into a unitary state is a central theme in nineteenth-century popular historiography. Through conquest and centralization the early princes founded a powerful state "on the ruins of a multiplicity of weak, quarrelsome, tribal powers." Subsequently Kiev Rus' was divided as a result of the appanage system, the political disease "which the German peoples communicated to Europe." The "resurrection" of Russia was accomplished through the miraculous rise of Moscow, the result of the wise policy of the princes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who "strengthened centralized authority with autocracy." In brief, "Russia was founded through victories and centralization of authority, perished from division of authority, and was saved by wise autocracy." Ivan III in particular recognized that Russia's independence and greatness depended on strength, which in turn required "a firm union of the parts into a whole."⁷³

The same prince was credited in popular historiography with serving as a model for subsequent rulers by following up the unification of the constituent parts of his realm with their merger into an entity with uniform laws in place of the former local privileges and liberties; "henceforth a single will, a

single faith, a single language were the indissoluble bonds" uniting the Russian land.⁷⁴ Similarly, not only Ivan III but also Ivan IV and Alexei were praised for having "understood the necessity and possibility of restoring the Russian land within its ancient boundaries, of molding it into a single entity."⁷⁵

Ustrialov's description of Russia at the beginning of Peter the Great's reign elaborated the same theme: "In Russia lived many ethnically diverse peoples; the principal [one], which was dominant in faith, language, and numbers, was the Russians, who were the sole inhabitants" of the historical core territory of Muscovy, as well as of Little Russia and the Don Cossack region. "Moreover, in all the towns conquered by the tsar's arms or founded beyond the borders of Rus' in Perm, Kazan, and Siberia", the officials and "in part even the tradespeople were Russians. All judicial proceedings were conducted in the Russian language according to Russian laws. The Russian element was dominant over the Finnic and Tatar, was gradually assimilating both of them, and was binding together the far-flung parts of Russia into a single whole."⁷⁶

Closer to their own time, the nineteenth-century popular historians lauded Catherine the Great's provincial government reform of 1775 for having "promoted the unity of the Russian people" by replacing the "varying local privileges" of the several regions with a "uniform system of administration", thus merging "all the diverse parts of our fatherland . . . into a single harmonious whole."⁷⁷ Both Peter's and Catherine's immediate

successors were castigated for not adhering strictly enough to their great precursors' policy of administrative integration in the western borderlands, while Nicholas I won praise for returning to Catherine's wise policy of integration and assimilation in Poland after the 1830 revolt.⁷⁸

For Karamzin, as for some of his successors, cultural russification was a necessary complement to administrative integration, and Russian culture was inseparable from Orthodoxy. Asserting as "indisputable" that "the foundation of the state is strengthened by the religious unity of its subjects", Karamzin nevertheless warned his readers that the achievement of such unity in a divided community "is a dangerous undertaking. It is necessary to know the character of the people, to prepare their minds, to choose the time [wisely] and act with cunning rather than with overt force; otherwise, instead of the desired good, misfortune will result."⁷⁹ In contrast to Poland, whose policy of forcibly imposing Catholicism upon her Orthodox subjects only alienated the latter and drove them into the arms of Russia, Russia had allegedly from earliest times followed a statesmanlike policy of "toleration", of "not disturbing the consciences of the vanquished", whether pagans, Muslims, or schismatic Christians. Spreading "the Divine Faith simply by setting a better example, without recourse to the violence and villainy to which other devotees of Christianity resorted in Europe and America", Russia both lessened the resistance of neighboring peoples to her expansion and hastened her own cultural progress by enlisting the

assistance of members of different faiths (e.g., presumably, the Lutheran Baltic Germans).⁸⁰ In short, cultural russification, although a worthy goal, had to be pursued with caution. Despite his reservations, Karamzin was at one with the others in equating unity with national strength and independence, and internal division with weakness and victimization by neighbors.

The influence of popular historiography upon the mid- and late-nineteenth-century Russian mind, however difficult it may be to measure with any precision, was reinforced by the writings of the publicists who dealt with various aspects of the as-yet-unnamed "nationalities question". In the discussion of contemporary issues, the publicists built on the solid base of the Russian past as depicted by the historians.

The European Threat

In discussions of the situation in the European borderlands (Finland, the Baltic provinces, Ukraine-Belorussia, and Poland) the principal theme was the danger posed to Russia's national identity and pride, and even potentially to the integrity of the Russian state, by the Germans and Poles, who were "significantly more cultured [i.e., more European] than the Russians" themselves. In contrast to the Habsburg monarchy, where the subject peoples "are less cultured and poorer" than the dominant Germans, whose rule is thus not threatened, in Russia the "Poles, Germans, and Finlanders are richer and more cultured than the Russians" and consequently posed a threat to the ruling nation.⁸¹

Russian nationalists were particularly sensitive to the situation in the Baltic provinces, where the German "immigrant" minority continued their centuries-old germanization of the region, utilizing for this purpose the German language and the Lutheran religion, in audacious disregard of the fact that the area had been part of the Russian state since the time of Peter the Great. Anxious for the integrity of the state in the face of the Baltic Germans' appeals since the 1860s to the West in general and to Germany in particular for support against threats to russify their allegedly "German country", Russian nationalists were furious over the Baltic Germans' claims to represent European civilization against "Slavic barbarism". The nationalists responded with the sarcastic query, who were the real barbarians, Russians who favored equal rights for all the inhabitants of the Baltic provinces, including the Estonian and Latvian majority (80%), or Germans who insisted on the retention of medieval privileges for themselves (a minority of 10%) and medieval restrictions on the rest of the population?⁸²

While the Germans were as yet disloyal only in word, the Poles had already proven their disloyalty and ingratitude to Russia in deed. Reduced forcibly to obedience in 1831 and 1863, they continued to threaten Russia economically and culturally, in the eyes of the nationalists. Polish manufactures, allegedly, so dominated the market that Russia had been reduced to an economic colony of Poland. Declining Russian industry needed protection against Polish economic imperialism. And the western provinces

recovered from Poland in 1772-95 were a case comparable to the Baltic region: after the better part of a century of Russian rule, they remained more Polish than Russian in culture, despite the fact that the Polish elite formed only one percent of the population. Belorussians and Ukrainians, no less than Estonians and Latvians, deserved to be protected against the tyranny of a minority which for its own selfish reasons was blocking the natural process of their assimilation to the Great Russian majority.⁸³

Whether the Germans and Poles were themselves capable of being russified was a point on which Russian nationalists differed,⁸⁴ but it was clear that these two "historic" European nations should no longer be permitted to stand in the way of the russification of the "non-historic" peoples whom they had for so long dominated. Very evident in this discussion were anxieties about the strength of Russia's own European identity--anxieties that reinforced the need for Russia to assert herself culturally within her political frontiers. No part of the Russian state must be permitted to be dominated by a foreign culture, not even--or, rather, especially not--the culture of one of Russia's indisputably European neighbors.

The Western Nation-State Model

Russian nationalists were quite explicit as to the model for the development of Russia: the modern Western nation-state, as exemplified by Great Britain, France, Italy from 1861, and Germany

from 1871. The ethnic homogeneity of these communities, while real enough, had not been achieved without the strong positive influence of the state through policies of administrative and especially cultural-linguistic integration. Berlin's policy of germanization in Alsace-Lorraine and Poznan after 1871 was but the most recent instance of a process of using the language of the rulers to create a cultural community coincident with the political community--a process that had begun in the West during the Late Middle Ages.⁸⁵

Such policies were offered as models for St. Petersburg, which had so far been much too dilatory in pursuing this goal. Swedish, German, and Polish were still the dominant languages, and vehicles of cultural influence, in the western borderlands of the empire, relegating the official state language to a humiliatingly inferior position. The case was strenuously argued that the various Slavic "dialects" in use in the region (Ukrainian and Belorussian), and even the Polish language, differed less from literary Russian than did the popular idioms and dialects in the West from their respective official state languages. If the langue d'OMI and the King's English, High German and Tuscan, had been instrumental in successful nation-building, Great Russian clearly was capable of serving a like purpose.⁸⁶ Examples more remote in space or time, but more relevant to the Russian Empire's much greater ethnic heterogeneity, were also summoned by the nationalists to their assistance--the use of English in the United States to shape a

community out of the most diverse ethnic materials, gathered from Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the use of Latin by ancient Rome to unite the disparate peoples subject to her imperial sway.⁸⁷ Could Russia afford to do less?

Colonization could be a crucial reinforcement for a more aggressive language policy. The settlement of Russian landowners and peasants would strengthen the relatively weak (not in numbers but in cultural identity) Slavic elements in the Ukraine and Belorussia against Polish and Catholic influence and go a long way toward undermining the German and Lutheran ascendancy in the Baltic provinces.⁸⁸ Both language and living individuals had a vital role to play in the cultural absorption of the European borderlands. Without such absorption their loyalty to Russia would forever remain doubtful in a world of fiercely competitive nation-states.

Russia's Civilizing Mission

When Russian publicists turned to the eastern and southern borderlands, their concerns were quite different. Here the main theme was Russia's role as the bearer of European civilization against Asiatic barbarism; Russia's cultural superiority over the diverse peoples of her Asian borderlands was unquestioned. Russia's action as civilizing force led the affected peoples through a number of stages, some of which might occur simultaneously. Firstly, Russia came to Asia as the pacifier of the warring peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia for

their own benefit as well as for Russia's own security; definitive pacification required annexation. Secondly, through the establishment or strengthening of economic ties with Russia, the newly pacified lands benefitted from the fact that commercial dependence upon a civilized power tends to have a powerful positive impact in taking the rough edges off barbaric customs and behavior. Thirdly, there were the beneficial effects of being introduced to Western knowledge and thought via the establishment of European-type schools and the activity of Christian missionaries. Fourthly, there was the exemplary impact upon the indigenous population of the settlement of Russian colonists in their neighborhood and midst. And finally, the peoples of the metropole and the borderlands would eventually be united spiritually and physically in a single civil society--an enlarged Russian nation-state.⁸⁹ No need to press the issue, for the outcome was a foregone conclusion.

In playing the role of civilizer of the barbarians, Russia was of course doing no more nor less than contemporary Britain and France, the leading empire-builders of the nineteenth century. Russian nationalists were quick to point out, however, the superiority of Russia over other European nations as the civilizer of Asia. Lacking the racial exclusiveness of the English in particular, Russians were willing to mix with the native peoples on all levels and to intermarry with them--an inestimable advantage in assimilating them into the Russian nation. Russia, moreover, had a much longer period of acquaintance with, and a

much more intimate knowledge of, Asia--the consequence of two and a half centuries of Mongol rule in Russia and Russia's geographic position on Europe's frontier with Asia.⁹⁰

To the hypothetical objection that by absorbing the peoples of the Asian borderlands into Russia, that power was denying to them the very right to an independent national development that she insisted upon for herself, one publicist responded with the assertion that any such putative right for the barbarians must yield to the right and duty of civilized nations to share their higher form of existence with the barbarians for the common good of all mankind. In short, the rights of nations apply only to civilized peoples; barbarians can participate in these rights only by becoming civilized and, in the case at hand, through assimilation to the Russian nation.⁹¹

In one case, that of the Siberian inorodtsy, russification promised salvation not merely from barbaric darkness but from physical extinction (the threatened result, admittedly, of epidemic diseases introduced by Russian colonists).⁹² Even the leading Siberian regionalists, Iadrintsev and Potanin, were firm believers in Russia's civilizing mission through russification. Their vision of a Russia of autonomous regions assumed that each region would be defined economically, not ethnically.⁹³

Perhaps the biggest single obstacle to Russia's enlightenment of the east, in the eyes of the nationalists, was Islam. A closed system keeping its followers in ignorance, hostile to change and to outside influence, incapable of internal development, Islam had

to be cracked open by external force, i.e., by the imposition of Russian rule and the introduction of Russian models for the natives to follow.⁹⁴ Islam's hold was weakest over the steppe nomads, whose faith was considered to be only superficial and who were thus deemed less resistant than sedentary Muslims to Russia's civilizing influence. For this reason it was a serious mistake for Russia to have encouraged the spreading and deepening of Islam among the Kazakhs in the late eighteenth century.⁹⁵

Conclusion: Two Faces of Russian Nation-building

With respect to the European borderlands of the empire, the attitudes of nineteenth-century Russian nationalists revealed an underlying sense of insecurity in the face of an admittedly superior culture, that of the West. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the central challenge facing Russian nationalists had been to define Russia's identity with reference to the Western standards and values imposed upon her by Peter the Great and his successors. For this reason the European borderlands, culturally a part of the West but politically subjected to Russia, posed a unique obstacle to the achievement of the dream of a Russian nation-state within the existing frontiers of the empire. Herself a latecomer to the European state system and cultural community, Russia's goal, as set by the nationalists and more or less accepted by the regime, was equal status with the older members of the community--not simply as a great power but as a ruling nation with a recognized right to impose her culture upon

the disparate ethnic minorities present within her borders, just as the English and French had done at earlier stages of their national development, and the Germans were doing at the moment.

In the Asian borderlands, on the other hand, the theme proudly proclaimed by Russian nationalists was Russia's civilizing mission. This was, of course, very much a major theme among contemporary Western colonialists, including North American expansionists; in their formulation of it, Russian nationalists were very much indebted to their Western counterparts. Central to the notion of her civilizing mission in Asia was the conviction of Russia's cultural superiority, based on her membership in the European cultural community. Herein lies the link between the two faces of Russian nation-building: the assertion of Russian cultural superiority in her Asian borderlands rested upon the assumption of equality vis-a-vis Europe; the resistance of the Baltic Germans, Poles, and Finns to Russification challenged that assumption.

This difference in Russian attitudes toward the Asian and European borderlands of the empire is vital to understanding why aggressive, official russification from the 1860s on was most urgently pursued in the latter region. It was there that Russian nation-building faced by far its most serious challenge--one upon which the entire enterprise might well founder.

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Although this paper, and the larger work of which it is part, is

limited to the nineteenth century, it deals with the formation of mental attitudes which clearly did not disappear with the Russian Revolution. To give but one example, the themes of nineteenth-century Russian popular historians have been reflected repeatedly in the writings of their Soviet successors, who also take for granted that the formation of a multi-ethnic Russian state was a positive development. Both Soloviev and Kliuchevsky, by the way, remain much more popular with the Russian reading public than any of their Soviet successors. The demand for their general histories, now in process of being republished, is such that the right to subscribe has had to be allocated by lottery. Just as the nationalities problem contributed materially to the demise of the old regime, it could do so again for the Soviet system. Behind the largely illusory facade of a federated political structure protecting the cultural autonomy of the borderland peoples persists the traditional Great Russian goal of assimilation through a common ideology, language, and mores. The goal remains, as before, the establishment of a cultural community corresponding to the existing political community.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed. (New York, 1984), p. 394; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917 (Oxford, 1967), p. 485.

2. See, for example, Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981), chs. 4 and 20.

3. Riasanovsky, p. 394.

4. Seton-Watson, p. 485.

5. N. M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, 5th ed., 12 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1842-43), I: 21-22, VI: 85, XII: 55-56, VI: 5, X: 65, XII: app., p. xlvii. The appendix to volume XII consists of excerpts from Karamzin's memorandum of 1811, "On Ancient and Modern Russia", which were first published in 1837 in Pushkin's journal, Sovremennik. The first edition of Karamzin's History was published in 1818-29; it went through six editions by 1853 and seven more by 1903. Karamzin's exultation in Russia's success at arms as a demonstration of her virility was if anything surpassed by one of his immediate successors, I. K. Kaidanov, author of several popular school textbooks.

6. Ibid., IX: 206-07, XII: 183-84.

7. Ibid., XII: app., p. xl. See also VI: 152-53 and III: 40; M. P. Pogodin, Nachertanie russkoi istorii (dlia gimnazii), 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1837), pp. 87-88; N. G. Ustrialov, Russkaia istoriia, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1837-41), I:278-80. Unless otherwise indicated, page references below to Ustrialov are to

this, the first, edition; the fifth, expanded, edition of 1855 is in two volumes. The first edition of Pogodin's textbook was published in 1835.

8. Karamzin, IX: 217-19, 226-28. See also VIII: 141 and I. K. Kaidanov, Nachertanie istorii gosudarstva Rossiiskogo (St. Petersburg, 1829), p. 124. Kaidanov's textbook went through four editions by 1834.

9. Karamzin, I: x.

10. Ibid., VIII: 96. See also VIII: 136; S. M. Soloviev, Uchebnaia kniga russkoi istorii (Moscow, 1859-60), p. 157; id., Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1959-60), VII: 413; D. I. Ilovaiskii, Istoriia Rossii, 5 vols. in 7 (Moscow, 1876-1905), II: 493. Soloviev's secondary school textbook reached its fourteenth edition in 1915; his exhaustive History was first published in 29 volumes in 1851-79 and was republished more than half a dozen times before the 1917 revolution.

11. Karamzin, XI: 43.

12. Ibid., I: 23, 124; II: 14, 84. See also XII: app., p. xxxix.

13. Especially by Kaidanov, Ustrialov, and N. A. Polevoi--the latter in his Istoriia russkogo naroda, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1829-33) and Russkaia istoriia dlia pervonachal'nogo chteniia, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1835-41). Polevoi, the only author of popular histories in the first half of the nineteenth century who was not an acknowledged follower of Karamzin, nevertheless presented the

story of Russian expansion in terms entirely consistent with the prevailing view.

14. Kaidanov, p. 257.

15. Karamzin, VI: 199-200, II: 13, I:124; Ustrialov, I: 126.

16. Ustrialov, II: 233.

17. Ibid., II: 226, I: 15-16.

18. Karamzin, XII: app., p. xlvii.

19. Ibid., II: 13, III: 108-12; Pogodin, pp. 153, 350;

Ustrialov, I: 286, 295.

20. Karamzin, XII: app., p. xxxix; Ustrialov, II: 59.

21. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii, II: 654-55, VII: 46-47; id., "O vliianii prirody russkoi gosudarstvennoi oblasti na ee istoriiu," Otechestvennye zapiski, LXIX (1850), No. 2, pp. 229-31, 236, 242-43. For the thesis of Russia's natural frontiers, argued in terms that draw directly upon Soloviev, see Ilovaiskii, Kratkie ocherki russkoi istorii, Kurs starshego vozrasta (Moscow, 1860), p. 1; id., Istoriia Rossii, I²: 289; V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, 8 vols. (Moscow, 1956-59), III: 6-7 and 91, V: 40, 46, 186-87. The first five volumes of this edition of Kliuchevskii comprise his Kurs russkoi istorii, first published in 1904-21 but consisting of lectures delivered regularly at Moscow University from the early 1880s. Ilovaiskii's Kratkie ocherki, a textbook for secondary schools, was in its 36th edition in 1912.

22. Ustrialov, I: 15, II: 21.

23. Karamzin, X: 162, 166.

24. Kaidanov, pp. 187-89.

25. Ustrialov, II: 231.
26. Pogodin, p. 376.
27. Ustrialov, IV: 139; V: 108, 110.
28. Ibid., IV: 126, 138. See also Pogodin, p. 351.
29. Kaidanov, p. 442 (written before the 1830 Polish revolt).
30. Karamzin, VI: 143, X: 38, XI: 35-40; Pogodin, p. 206;
Kaidanov, p. 97; Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, III: 160-61, 433.
31. Karamzin, VIII: 13-14; Polevoi, Istoriia russkogo naroda,
VI: 147; id., Russkaia istoriia, III: 457.
32. Karamzin, III: 85-87, 115.
33. Ibid., VIII: 138.
34. Ibid., X: 114-15.
35. Kaidanov, p. 196; Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, III: 457.
36. Ilovaiskii, Kratkie ocherki, 19th ed. (1880), p. 389;
V. A. Abaza, Istoriia Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1893), p. 321.
37. Karamzin, VIII: 138; Ustrialov, IV: 92-94.
38. Ustrialov, 5th ed., I: 245-46, II: 70. See also Polevoi,
Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 39, 382-83, 400 and Kaidanov,
p. 119.
39. Kaidanov, p. 201; Ustrialov, II: 86, 202.
40. Ustrialov, I: 15-16, II: 98-101; Polevoi, Istoriia russkogo
naroda, VI: 28.
41. Ustrialov, IV: 128, 132, V: 105-06; Kaidanov, p. 374.
42. Karamzin, VI: 144, VII: 10, IX: 134-38, X: 52-60; Polevoi,
Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 13; Ustrialov, II: 104-05, 215,
I: 16, 18-19, IV: 139.

43. Ustrialov, III: 77, 261, IV: 113-14, 284; Kaidanov, p. 424; Pogodin, p. 369.
44. Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, III: 16; Karamzin, VIII: 115; Pogodin, p. 354; Kaidanov, p. 360.
45. Karamzin, VIII: 124, 134, IX: 223; Kaidanov, pp. 124-27; Polevoi, Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 331n., 332n.
46. Ustrialov, IV: 303; ibid., 5th ed., II: 424.
47. Ilovaiskii, Kratkie ocherki, 19th ed., pp. 387-88; S. Ye. Rozhdestvenskii, Otechestvennaia istoriia. Kurs srednikh uchebnykh zavedenii, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1870), II: 222; ibid., 6th ed. (1880), II: 156-59; V. A. Abaza, Istoriia Rossii dlia uchashchikhsia, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1885), II: 141-42. Rozhdestvenskii's textbook reached its 15th edition in 1910.
48. Karamzin, II: 40-41, VII: 82, VIII: 85, 138, 147; Polevoi, Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 301, 312, 324, 381; Ustrialov, II: 16, 33-34, 59.
49. Kaidanov, pp. 293, 257.
50. Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, III: 25-26, 33, 119, 159; id., Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 366; Pogodin, p. 202, Kaidanov, p. 117; Soloviev, Uchebnaia kniga, pp. 158, 386; Rozhdestvenskii, II: 26; Abaza, Istoriia Rossii (1885), II: 35.
51. Ustrialov, III: 76, 129, 131, 133; Pogodin, p. 311; Kaidanov, pp. 257, 295.
52. Ustrialov, IV: 21-22, 71, 92.
53. Karamzin, VI: 83, 119-20, III: 22. See also Ustrialov, I: 188.

54. Ustrialov, III: 279-80, IV: 97. See also Kaidanov, pp. 131, 372-73; Soloviev, Uchebnaia kniga, pp. 483-84; id., Istoriia Rossii, V: 311, 313.
55. Karamzin, IX: 242-43, VIII: 135, I: x.
56. Soloviev, "O vliianii prirody," pp. 232, 242-43.
57. Among the more striking examples of Soloviev's influence on this point are Ilovaiskii, Istoriia Rossii, I²: 80, 377; Rozhdestvenskii, I: 1, 20, 23; I. I. Belliarminov, Elementarnyi kurs vseobshchei i russkoi istorii (St. Petersburg, 1871-72), pp. 87-88, 91, 103, 116; Abaza, Istoriia Rossii (1885), I: 1; Kliuchevskii, II: 208, 214. Belliarminov's secondary-school textbook was in its 46th edition in 1917.
58. Soloviev, Uchebnaia kniga, pp. 1, 4-5, 10.
59. Soloviev, "O vliianii prirody," p. 242; id., Uchebnaia kniga, p. 113; id., Istoriia Rossii, III: 153, VII: 8-9, 25-26; D. I. Ilovaiskii, Sokrashchenoe rukovodstvo k russkoi istorii. Dlia mladshogo vozrasta (Moscow, 1862), p. 46; id., Istoriia Rossii, II: 472. Ilovaiskii's Sokrashchenoe rukovodstvo was a primary-school textbook which ran through 44 editions by 1916.
60. Soloviev, "O vliianii prirody," pp. 238-39; id., Istoriia Rossii, I: 58, II: 657, III: 153, 474-76.
61. Soloviev, Uchebnaia kniga, pp. 471, 483-84; id., Istoriia Rossii, VII: 8.
62. Ilovaiskii, Kratkie ocherki, 19th ed., p. 389; Rozhdestvenskii, Otechestvennaia istoriia (1870), II: 222-23.
63. Soloviev, "O vliianii prirody," p. 239; Ilovaiskii, Kratkie

očerki, pp. 291-92; ibid., 19th ed., pp. 384-86; Rozhdestvenskii, Otechestvennaia istoriia (1870), II: 220-22.

64. N. I. Kostomarov, Russkaia istoriia v zhizneopisaniiakh ee glavneishikh deiatelei, 2 vols. in 7 (St. Petersburg, 1873- 88), II: 211-12. Kostomarov's history was in its eighth edition in 1915.

65. Kostomarov, "Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi" (first published in 1861), in id., Sobranie sochinenii, 21 vols. in 7 (St. Petersburg, 1903-06), I: 14, 24-25.

66. Kostomarov, Russkaia istoriia, I²: 772.

67. Ibid., I¹: 433-34, 532-33.

68. Kliuchevskii, I: 31-32; III: 6-7; II: 116.

69. Kliuchevskii, "Otvét D. I. Ilovaiskomu" (unpublished article, written 1882 or 1883), in ibid., VII: 167.

70. Ibid., Kliuchevskii, "I. N. Boltin" (first published in 1892), in ibid., VIII: 158-60; ibid., II: 113-14, 116, I: 32.

71. Karamzin, I: 74.

72. Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, I: 11-12, 57, 290; Ustrialov, I: 88 and also 37-38, 62-63, 123.

73. Karamzin, XII: app., pp. xxxix-xli, VI: 86.

74. Polevoi, Russkaia istoriia, II: 452; see also id., Istoriia russkogo naroda, VI: 27.

75. Ustrialov, II: 214.

76. Ibid., III: 19.

77. Kaidanov, pp. 380-81; Ustrialov, IV: 169-70, 175; see also Pogodin, p. 351.

78. Ustrialov, III: 203, 301, IV: 209, V: 109; Ibid., 5th ed.,

II: 449-53, 462-63.

79. Karamzin, VI: 181-82.

80. Ibid., X: 162, 166, II: 13, I: x.

81. A. A. Planson, Byloe i nastoiashchee, Vospominania (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 118, 285. Planson was a Russian noble from the Ukraine who had been in the civil service in the western provinces in the mid-nineteenth century.

82. M. N. Kharuzin, "Baltiiskaia konstitutsiia", istoriko-iuridicheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1888), pp. 3-6, 68-70.

83. Planson, pp. 39-40, 45, 119-20.

84. Both Planson and the geographer Veniukov thought not. Planson, pp. 41-42, 45; M. I. Veniukov, Istoricheskie ocherki Rossii so vremeni krymskoi voiny do zakliucheniia Berlinskogo dogovora, 1855-1878, 4 vols. in 5 (Leipzig, 1878-79; Prague, 1879-80), I: 156.

85. Veniukov, "Ocherk politicheskoi etnografii stran, lezhashchikh mezhdru Rossieiu i Indiei", in Sbornik gosudarstvennykh znaniy (St. Petersburg), V (1878): 141-42; id., Istoricheskie ocherki, II¹: 14-15; Planson, 39, 286.

86. S. P. Shipov, Vzgliad na istoriiu Zapadnoi Rusi (St. Petersburg, 1848), pp. 39n., 62; id., Rossia i Pol'sha, sviaz' ikh i vzaimnye otnosheniia (Moscow, 1860), pp. 9-10; Planson, p. 292.

87. Veniukov, Istoricheskie ocherki, II¹: 21-22.

88. Planson, pp. 44, 294; Veniukov, Istoricheskie ocherki, I: 193-94.

89. N. M. Iadrintsev, Sbornik izbrannykh statei, stikhotvorenii i fel'etonov za 1873-1884 g. (Krasnoiarsk, 1919), pp. 85-86, 92, 113-15, 120-21, 128, 130-31, 134, 136-37;

P. Slovtsov, Istoricheskoe obozrenie Sibiri, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1838-44; reprinted St. Petersburg, 1886), I: 161.

90. F. I. Lobysevich, Postupatel'noe dvizhenie v Sredniuiu Aziiu v torgovom i diplomatichesko-voennom otnosheniakh (St. Petersburg, 1900), p. 9; Iadrintsev, p. 128.

91. Veniukov, "Ocherk politicheskoi etnografii", pp. 142-43.

92. Slovtsov, I: 162.

93. Iadrintsev, pp. 86, 113-14; G. N. Potanin, Oblastnicheskaja tendentsiia v Sibiri (Tomsk, 1907), pp. 57-60.

94. L. F. Kostenko, Sredniaia Azia i vodvorenie v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti (St. Petersburg, 1871), pp. 84-87; Baron E. K. Meyendorff, Voyage d'Orenbourg M Boukhara fait en 1820 (Paris, 1826), pp. 296-97, 302-03; Shipov, O gosudarstvennom ustroistve v Rossii (Moscow, 1870), pp. 154-56; Iadrintsev, pp. 130-31.

95. Kostenko, pp. 34-35, 41-42, 54; Lobysevich, p. 53.

