The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a resolution that not only accepted a long-term strategy for reducing emissions but also excluded language intended to prevent unilateral application of EU legislation on emissions reduction to non-EU states. This exclusion was significant because the U.S. and Canada had proposed keeping the existing language (which had originally been adopted in 2007 and required “voluntary consent” by Member States to their involvement in emissions schemes—the EU’s scheme being the understood target). It was also impressive, considering that the EU is not even a member of ICAO (which is a UN specialized agency and therefore composed exclusively of nation-states).

The dispute between the EU and the non-EU members of ICAO is mainly about jurisdictional competition, but it repays study for two reasons. First, while it involves only industrialized countries, the dispute has raised issues of liability for emissions and their reduction that are central to the broader, long-standing disagreement between industrialized and developing countries about preventing climate change. Secondly, and more analytically, the dispute illuminates vividly the problems of achieving international regulatory agreements in a globalized economy. Air transport is crucial to globalization; it is, indeed, the quintessential international industry. But it is also a uniquely mobile polluter: unlike the main sources of atmospheric pollution, airliners cross many borders and fly through many regulatory jurisdictions. Such characteristics make air transport a particularly appropriate and very challenging subject for global environmental regulation. The globalization of the industry’s activity implies a global environmental problem and therefore the need for a global solution. [Continue to page 7]
Calendar of Events

**Tuesday, November 16th**
Student International Relations Society: Roundtable Discussion on the Global Economy
Dr. James Maloy and Dr. Alexis Leon, from Pitt’s economics department will join Dr. Kimberly Gleason from the Katz School of Business to weigh in on the current state of the global economy. Differences of opinion within the panel should make this a very intense and dynamic moderated discussion. Pizza will be provided. **6:00 p.m. - 7:30 p.m., 4130 Posvar Hall.** For more information, please contact Steve Lund at slund@pitt.edu. Sponsored by: European Union Center of Excellence, European Studies Center, Department of Political Science.

**Thursday, November 18th**
Pizza & Politics: “Moving On Up? Parties and Representation Beyond the National Level”
Andrea Aldrich, PhD student in Political Science, will present this lecture exploring whether the institutionalization of the European Parliament (EP) has led to an increase in supranational party power in the EP that reflects representation on a higher level than the national party. **12:00 noon, 4217 Posvar Hall.** For more information, please contact Karen Lautanen at kal70@pitt.edu. Sponsored by: European Union Center of Excellence, European Studies Center.

**Thursday, November 18th**
Colloquium: “The Humanities as a Foreign Language”
This colloquium will feature Humanities Center short-term fellow Geoff Harpham with responses by Dennis Looney, Nancy Glazener, and John Beverley. **12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m., 602 Cathedral of Learning.** For more information, please contact Victoria Duerr at vad16@pitt.edu. Sponsored by: Humanities Center.

**Monday, November 29th**
Videoconference: “Innovation in Diplomacy: The European External Action Service”
His Excellency, Mr. Pierre Vimont, Ambassador of France to the U.S. and newly appointed Secretary-General of the EU’s new diplomatic corps, will be featured in this videoconference lecture and discussion. **4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m., location TBD.** For more information, please contact Karen Lautanen at kal70@pitt.edu. Sponsored by: European Studies Center, European Union Center of Excellence.
Atlantic Crisscrossings: Syphilis in New York, Paris, and Buenos Aires

by Julien Comte, PhD Candidate, Department of History

My dissertation examines the transatlantic circulation of medical knowledge on syphilis before the advent of penicillin in the 1940s. Because New York City, Paris, and Buenos Aires were important nodes in this transatlantic system of scientific exchange, I have chosen to study first and foremost the connections between the U.S., France, and Argentina. While attending to the impact of European ideas in the U.S. and Argentina, I also address creativity in the Americas by examining American and Argentine original work on syphilis. Highlighting American and Argentine contributions to the international scientific community allows me to question older diffusionist interpretations that present North and South American scientists as passive recipients of European science.

Thanks to a grant from the EUCE/ESC, I spent the summer in Paris, where I examined French medical journals and the archives of the French Society of Dermatology and Syphiligraphy (SFDS in French), a collection mostly untouched by historians. French medical journals offer concrete evidence of transatlantic connections between French doctors and their American and Argentine colleagues. French dermatologists often mentioned and cited foreign work, and those who did not keep up with German, Argentine, American, or Italian research risked falling behind their more internationally-inclined colleagues. To make this task easier, journals like the Annales de dermatologie et de syphiligraphie and the Annales des maladies vénériennes included extensive bibliographies at the end of every issue, thus keeping their readers informed of advances in other countries. We know from occasional messages from the editors of these journals that French readers did consult these bibliographies and found them useful. Foreign work also dominated the extensive review sections that constituted an important part of most French medical journals.

The archives of the SFDS complement these journals by laying bare the selection process for foreign corresponding members. The society only inducted the most talented nominees, and letters between SFDS members show how foreign dermatologists were either accepted or rejected based on the quality of their work. These letters therefore allow us to gauge the status of American and Argentine doctors on the international stage. By inducting them as foreign corresponding members, the SFDS recognized the work of key American and Argentine physicians like Prince Morrow, Hugh Young, Barker Beeson, Charles J. White, Pedro Baliña, Maximiliano Aberastury, Edouard Jonquières, and Pacifico Diaz. The more personal nature of these archival sources (as opposed to the published obituaries of foreign doctors, for instance) suggests that the words of praise for foreign colleagues that appeared in French medical journals generally reflected what was said behind closed doors. [Continue to page 11]
A special grant from the EUCE enabled me to participate in the European Social Science History Conference in April 2010 in Ghent, Belgium, where I presented a summary of my now completed doctoral dissertation on the anarchist movement among Italian and Jewish immigrants in the U.S. This project, based on multilingual sources archived in both the U.S. and Europe, uses both a transatlantic and comparative analysis to delve into the origins, activities, and influence of these much-misunderstood radicals.

Prior to the Second World War, anarchism in the U.S. was almost entirely a movement of immigrants and their children. By the turn of the century, the two largest groups represented in its ranks were Yiddish-speaking Jews from Eastern Europe and Italians. Each group contributed approximately 20,000-30,000 activists and sympathizers to the movement at their respective peaks in the 1910s and 1920s. As libertarian socialists, they believed that both capitalism and the political state were unjust and corrupt institutions that needed to be abolished. They proposed an alternative highly decentralized society in which work, wealth, and decision-making would be shared equally and no group would hold coercive power over another. Surprisingly, I discovered that the great majority of these immigrant radicals had not been anarchists in Europe prior to their migration. Instead, for most it was the conditions they faced as immigrant laborers in America—low wages, economic insecurity, ethnic prejudice, poor living conditions, etc.—that first led them to anarchism.

Four characteristics, shared by both the Italian and Jewish immigrant communities, seem to have played a role in bringing tens of thousands of their members into the anarchist fold. First, the anarchist movement was overwhelmingly urban and working-class in composition. Second, it usually emerged in communities where religious belief and traditional religious authority were significantly diminished. Third, it was often strong among immigrant groups that lacked an independent nation-state of their own, came from only recently consolidated nation-states, or had yet to be incorporated into the political systems of their home countries. Fourth, it tended to appeal to members of immigrant groups that faced ethnic discrimination in the U.S. However, none of these factors alone, nor all of them combined, was necessarily sufficient to make an anarchist out of an immigrant.

Human agency and historical contingency, I argue, were the deciding factors. Disillusioned immigrants had to encounter anarchist ideas, recognize the anarchist critique as corresponding with their own experiences, and find in the anarchist program a plausible agenda for change to bring about a future society they deemed desirable.
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Fellowships and Opportunities

Fellowships & Opportunities

The Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies
The Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies offers 10-12 months of research support at the Freie Universität Berlin. The fellowship competition is open to scholars in all social science and humanities disciplines, including historians working on modern and contemporary German and European history. For more information, please visit http://www.fu-berlin.de/bprogram. The deadline is December 1, 2010.

Faculty Grant Competition for Research on Europe
The European Studies Center offers full-time faculty affiliated with the EUCE/ESC an opportunity to apply for a grant for research on Europe not focused on the EU. The competition will award grants for research-related activities to be carried out during the academic year, although the end date of the activity is negotiable, with awards ranging from $500 to $1,500. Awards are intended to supplement other research funds. For more information, please visit http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/faculty/funding/EuropeanGrant.html. Questions may be directed to Timothy Thompson, Associate Director, at tst@pitt.edu. The deadline is December 3, 2010.

Faculty Grant Competition for Research on the EU
The European Union Center of Excellence, with partial funding from the European Commission, offers grants for research related to post-WWII European integration for University of Pittsburgh faculty in any department or school. The grants typically range in size from $2,500 to $7,500. For faculty with minimal expertise in the EU, participation at a conference that will begin their study of the EU may be part of a faculty member’s proposal. On-site field work is preferred for more established EU scholars. Applicants are expected to secure matching funds from their department or school. For more information, please visit http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/faculty/funding/EUCEGrant.html. Questions may be directed to Timothy Thompson, Associate Director, at tst@pitt.edu. The deadline is December 10, 2010.

2011 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition
The 2009-2011 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce the 2011 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition, an annual fellowship for graduate student EU-related dissertation research. Thanks entirely to contributions to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies, launched in June 2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) we will offer at least one unrestricted fellowship of $1,500 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2010-2011. For more information about requirements and how to apply, please visit http://www.eustudies.org/. The deadline for receipt of applications is January 7, 2011. [Continue to page 6]
EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper

The EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper will be awarded in 2011 to an outstanding paper presented at the 2009 Biennial Conference in Los Angeles. All those who presented an original paper at the Conference are eligible, excepting persons who are current members of the EUSA Executive Committee and persons who have already won the EUSA Best Conference Paper Prize. The prize carries a cash award of $100. To submit a paper for consideration, send an electronic version in Microsoft Word to eusa@pitt.edu. Please put “Best 2009 Conference Paper Prize” in the subject line. The deadline is January 7, 2011.

EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation

The EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation in EU studies will be awarded in 2011 to a dissertation written in English on any aspect of European integration between September 1, 2008 and August 31, 2010. The student must have defended and deposited the final dissertation and graduated (been awarded the PhD degree) during this period as well. The prize carries a cash award of $250. For more information about requirements and how to apply, please visit http://www.eustudies.org/. The deadline is January 7, 2011.

EUSA Book Prize

The 2003-05 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association established the EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded at each biennial EUSA conference, for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies and published in the two years prior to the EUSA Conference. This prize carries a cash award of $300 to the author(s). For the 2011 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Los Angeles, books published in 2009 and 2010 will be eligible. For more information about requirements and how to apply, please visit http://www.eustudies.org/. The deadline for receipt of the books by the committee members is January 7, 2011.

Call for Papers: Interdisciplinary Conference at the University of Pittsburgh, November 10-12, 2011: “The Idea of France” / “L’Idée de la France”

We welcome abstracts from all fields (literature, history, political science, sociology, anthropology, law, religion, art, music, cultural studies, film studies, gender studies, etc.) that treat the question of the idea of France or Frenchness in any time period from the middle ages to the twenty-first century. Papers may be delivered in English or French. Please send 150-250 word abstracts (English or French) to idfr@pitt.edu. For further information, contact Todd Reeser, conference coordinator, at reeser@pitt.edu. The deadline is January 10, 2011.
But the multiplicity of jurisdictions traversed daily by commercial aircraft means that the search for such a solution must involve many parties and accommodate a daunting variety of political and commercial interests. The jurisdictional competition between ICAO and the EU concerns authority to regulate aircraft emissions. In 1997, ICAO acquired responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol for developing a global scheme to regulate jet emissions from aircraft operating cross-border services (emissions from domestic flights are normally the responsibility of national governments).

When it was clear that ICAO was moving very slowly in developing a proposal for such a scheme, the European Commission (under pressure from European environmental NGOs) decided to move on its own by adding commercial aviation to the industries covered by its cap-and-trade Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The related legislation passed through the EU’s institutions with relatively little opposition from the airline industry and Member States (though with some criticism from environmentalists). It will take effect in January 2012, after which all airlines operating flights to and from EU airports will be subject to an individually-allocated annual cap on CO2 emissions and will have to buy extra CO2 allowances in the carbon market if they exceed their allocations.

The EU’s legislation is contentious on two counts. First, the leadership of ICAO and many member states (including the U.S.) regard it as usurping the mandate given to ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol (which makes no provision for regional regulatory schemes). Secondly, application of its rules to all aircraft flying “to and from EU airports” necessarily means that many non-EU airlines will be included in their implementation—an inclusion that non-EU countries and their airlines regard as an improper extraterritorial assertion of authority. Extraterritoriality is especially sensitive when it impinges on sovereignty over airspace. Since before World War I, such sovereignty—absolute and unconditional—has been (mainly for security reasons) the basis for all international regulation of flight. It can be invoked unilaterally and instantaneously to exclude foreign aircraft (as happened on the morning of September 11, 2001 when the U.S. closed its airspace, resulting in thousands of transatlantic passengers becoming unwilling but temporary residents of Newfoundland and Labrador).

The objections of non-EU states have been sharpened by how the legislation defines “geographical scope”—that is, the portion of a flight for which the operating airline is liable for emissions. In its drafting, the European Commission decided that such liability should be based on the entire distance flown on a given service, rather than just on the portion of the flight occurring in the airspace of one or more EU Member States. Thus, for example, liability for a flight from New York to London would apply to the roughly 3,500 miles covered while typically passing through U.S., Canadian, and international airspace over the Atlantic, plus the few hundred miles flown within the airspace of EU Member States (the UK and perhaps Ireland).
The European Commission defended this “route-based” definition of geographical scope on the grounds that it was permissible in international law, would be easier to apply than an “airspace-based” definition (which would require gathering data for every flight outside the EU), and would be environmentally more effective (perhaps the clinching argument). To its critics, the Commission pointed out that non-EU airlines would have emissions allowances based on such extended mileages and that EU airlines would be subject to the same requirements. The EU airlines—which depend heavily on long-haul routes for any profits they make—had insisted that their foreign competitors should be included because otherwise EU airlines would be put at a competitive disadvantage through being liable to purchase allowances when these competitors did not.

The operation of the cap-and-trade system itself also raised objections. According to one school of lawyers, it would lead the EU to breach international law. If a non-EU airline were to exceed its allocation of CO2 emissions, it would be required to buy the appropriate number of extra allowances in the carbon market—a requirement that critics regard as breaking a prohibition in international law on taxing international aviation.

In this dispute, neither side has given ground. While several American airlines have filed a suit (now before the European Court of Justice) claiming that inclusion of non-EU airlines in the ETS regime is illegal, the Commission has moved ahead with its implementation (with non-EU airlines complying reluctantly). The dispute has complicated ICAO’s already drawn-out efforts to produce a global formula for containing aviation emissions and has led to inclusion in a resolution passed by ICAO’s 2007 assembly of the provision (promoted by the U.S.) that countries could only be included in an emissions scheme “by mutual consent.”

Far greater complication and delay has been caused by the fundamental and continuing argument between industrialized and developing countries over responsibility for reducing CO2 emissions. This argument surfaced during the negotiations leading to the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 and resulted in adoption of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) for reducing CO2 emissions. This principle reflects the insistence of developing countries that the now-industrialized countries should, because of their historical responsibility for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, make the most radical cuts in emissions, thus allowing developing countries to industrialize and raise living standards. Consequently, Kyoto (in implementing CBDR) imposed greater obligations for CO2 abatement on the thirty-seven so-called “Annex 1” signatories (36 industrialized states and the EU) than on countries categorized as “developing.”
This unequal distribution of burdens—which prompted the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol—has prompted the industrialized states within ICAO (including the EU) to resist application of CBDR in any scheme for reducing aircraft emissions. While the EU and the U.S. find themselves on the same side on this issue, the U.S. has been more vocal than the EU—not surprisingly, given the EU’s long-standing and more aggressive commitment to cutting CO2 emissions. Within ICAO, China has been the most aggressive advocate of CBDR, using the issue to acquire leadership of the developing countries. In response, the industrialized countries (including those in the EU) say that CBDR contradicts the UN principle that all its member states are equal in rights and obligations.

Predictably, the ICAO plan for controlling aviation emissions, presented only months before last December’s Copenhagen conference on climate change, was a lowest-common-denominator formula, greeted with derision by the environmental NGOs. It neither proposed a global emissions trading scheme nor set targets or deadlines for reducing emissions (both of which are in the EU’s scheme). Instead, it suggested that, in pursuit of an “aspirational” goal of improving fuel efficiency annually by up to two percent, every state should choose measures “appropriate to its circumstances” from a basket including air traffic management, aircraft design, greater operational efficiency, and better use of infrastructure. States could also consider developing their own emissions reduction scheme (perhaps including emissions trading).

Less predictably, the airline industry had by late 2009 adopted proposals of its own that were more radical and concrete than ICAO’s proposals. The industry’s policy-making (through the International Air Transport Association [IATA]) was partly shaped by a desire to improve its public relations (so bad, one airline official remarked, that air transport was in danger of succeeding Big Tobacco as “Public Enemy Number One”). Fearing that the environmental NGOs would use the Copenhagen conference to ensure more radical treatment for aviation in a successor to Kyoto, IATA formed a marriage of convenience with the ICAO Member States. This turned out to be pointless, since the Copenhagen conference made no decision on aircraft emissions. But, more importantly, the airlines offered a “global sectoral plan” under which their output of CO2 would level off from 2020 onward (achieving “carbon neutrality”). The plan also provided for the eventual creation of a global cap-and-trade system managed by the industry itself (rather than by states).

Driving the industry’s production of this plan was its anxiety that failure to create a global emissions scheme would, by default, lead to a “regulatory patchwork” of regional and even national schemes. This anxiety was intensified by ICAO’s delegation of responsibility to national governments. This “patchwork” scenario would be the worst possible outcome for a global industry with thousands of operations crossing regulatory jurisdictions.
every day (consider, for example, the extra transaction costs just for one flight from Paris to Sydney). The best option in this context would be a single global scheme, especially one designed and managed by the industry itself that would simultaneously erase the industry’s reputation for dragging its heels in the face of climate change.

In Montreal, ICAO adopted a scheme that blends elements of the IATA plan with elements of ICAO’s own 2009 proposals. Adoption of this scheme helps ICAO to claim (in the face of continuing criticism of its delay and internal bickering) that it has now achieved consensus on a strategy that may ultimately even involve global emissions trading. ICAO’s action (though leaving the environmental NGOs totally underwhelmed) has the political merit of side-stepping the impasse over CBDR. The industry, for its part, can boast that it is the first industry to reach agreement on a global framework for reducing emissions. Moreover, by dropping the earlier insistence on “mutual consent,” the bargaining leading up to this consensus has apparently elicited a symbolic concession to the EU (“apparently,” since the EU and the U.S. disagree about whether any concession has occurred). But, while the EU is reportedly now willing to reduce the emissions liability of non-EU airlines under the ETS, it has not swerved from its determination to implement its legislation. Whether the legislation ultimately covers non-EU airlines now depends on a judgment by the European Court of Justice.

Martin Staniland is the author of “Government Birds: The State and Air Transport in Western Europe” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) and “A Europe of the Air? Air Transport and European Integration” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).

Funding for Professor Staniland’s research comparing the EU’s approach to aviation emissions with the approaches adopted by the U.S. and other non-EU states was provided by a grant from the European Union Center for Excellence at the University of Pittsburgh. The author thanks the Center for its support.
American, French, and Argentine doctors were familiar with each other’s work because of how easily information circulated within the Atlantic world. The history of calomel ointment, an anti-venereal lotion, illustrates this phenomenon. After World War I, calomel ointment came to the attention of some Argentine physicians operating in Buenos Aires. Some of these men held little regard for calomel ointment, while others championed its use in the Argentine capital. All, however, turned to recent events in Europe to make their case for or against the prophylactic. During World War I, the U.S. military routinely administered calomel ointment to its soldiers stationed in France and England. The practice caught the attention of Argentine doctors, who later debated the newfound merits of calomel ointment and whether to make it available to all men in free prophylactic stations. But the particular formula that Americans helped popularize during their stay in France had actually originated at the Institut Pasteur in Paris. In fact, French dermatologists never missed an opportunity to point out that it was Emile Roux and Elie Metchnikoff who, in 1906, had demonstrated calomel ointment’s effectiveness as an individual prophylactic. Despite these promising results, however, a handful of negative studies had succeeded in damaging the ointment’s popularity in France and Argentina. Only after positive results in the American armed forces emerged did both countries reconsider their position on calomel ointment and debate how to promote it within the civilian population.

In sum, support from the EUCE/ESC has allowed me to shed light on the transatlantic networks that linked key dermatological centers in Paris, New York, and Buenos Aires. The sources I surveyed this summer demonstrate that French dermatologists did not regard their Argentine and American colleagues as peripheral. As a result, my dissertation will engage with the work of Marcos Cueto and others Latin Americanists who have found evidence of “excellence in the periphery.” These scholars challenge the older historiography that, borrowing the language of dependency theory, emphasized the asymmetrical relationship between peripheral scientific communities and traditional centers of medical innovations in Europe and later the United States. As my research indicates, international collaboration was so extensive that the image of core and periphery is ill-suited to a study of syphiligraphy in the modern Atlantic world.
For this to occur, a large number of migrants from a given ethnic group had to be exposed to articulations of anarchism in a language and a cultural system they understood, and which spoke to their specific conditions and experiences. Intellectuals and activists who translated, adapted, and propagated anarchism were therefore of the utmost importance. In the case of Jewish anarchism this role was initially fulfilled by German immigrant anarchists, and then by radicalized Yiddish-speaking intellectuals. In the case of Italians, it was first fulfilled by a small but influential cadre of anarchist exiles and emigrants who actively recruited among their fellow immigrants, creating a new generation of radicalized Italian immigrant intellectuals and activists.

Interestingly, linguistic and cultural differences largely isolated these two groups from one another, leading to divergent paths of development. By the turn of the century, the Yiddish movement, centered in New York’s Lower East Side, had eschewed violent tactics and rhetoric and developed an evolutionary vision of social change based around educational projects, cooperatives, and labor unions, as well as the development of a radical secular Yiddish culture among Jewish immigrants. Italian American anarchism, meanwhile, was far more factionalized and included a persistent current of those supporting violent revolutionary action, as well as a countervailing current that focused on building militant, revolutionary trade unions capable of one day paralyzing the existing order and ushering in a new one.

The Yiddish movement peaked just before the First World War, while the Italian movement reached its zenith in the 1920s, in part due to its prominent role in the Italian American anti-Fascist movement. Significantly, in both cases these movements in the U.S. were about twice the size of the corresponding anarchist movements in the immigrants’ countries of origin. A number of factors contributed to the decline of American anarchism, including state repression, the rise of competing ideologies like Communism, Zionism, and Fascism, and the defeat of the anarchist-supported Popular Front coalition in the Spanish Civil War. Most important of all, however, were the severe restrictions placed on immigration in 1924, which cut off these movements’ stream of potential new members, dooming ethnic anarchism to a slow decline. But in its heyday, this movement contributed a great deal to many immigrants’ struggles to improve their lot and assert their dignity and vision of an alternative world.

The European Social Science History Conference was a fantastic forum in which to share my research with an international audience of scholars, who proved very interested in the subject and eager to make suggestions. I was able to incorporate many of these into the final draft of my dissertation. The trip—unexpectedly extended due to the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull—provided an invaluable opportunity for me to engage and network with scholars from across the globe.