When we were asked if we could organize this year’s academic conference for the EUCE at the University of Pittsburgh, we were already into Spring Term 2011, and crises and tensions within the European single currency zone were already hitting the news media. We decided that the crisis, huge as it was and is, would be our topic for our conference, titled “Challenges to Union and Dilemmas of Diversity: the Euro as a central, contested symbol in the EU” (July 7-9, 2011), with an added element of interest in terms of the iconic and symbolic relationships of currencies to senses of identity, primarily national identity, and the problematics of the Euro as a symbol to the peoples of Europe.

As it also turned out, the composition of our research participants was also very opportune, as we were able to obtain the participation of three scholars from Greece who all gave different and lively insights into the difficult and challenging problems in and concerning Greece. As is customary for us in organizing events, we worked with an interdisciplinary set of scholars, so as to move outside the box of a single disciplinary viewpoint. The highly animated discussions at the event were instructive, quickly revealing the political issues at stake behind the economic plight of Greece. Debt between nations is a widespread phenomenon; within the European Union, it poses problems as sharply as it does within any nation state but with the added complexity of unequal debt loads and the obligations of Eurozone currency states to one another. One aspect of attempting to resolve monetary problems within Greece has been the concomitant backlash of demonstrations and associated violent conflicts on the streets of Athens, along with arguments about defaulting on loans.

The contributions regarding Greece were matched by discussions on Poland, Lithuania, and Ireland, as well as numerous commentaries on a broader scale, with reference to the longer term financial history of Europe and the moti-
**Welcome Allyson Delnore, New EUCE/ESC Associate Director of Academic Affairs**

Dr. Allyson Delnore has joined the EUCE/ESC as Associate Director of Academic Affairs. Before coming to the University of Pittsburgh, she was assistant professor of history at Mississippi State University. She received her PhD from the University of Virginia in 2004 and has received awards from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Camargo Foundation (France), Ecole Normale Supérieure, and the German Marshall Fund. Dr. Delnore’s scholarly interests focus on modern France and issues of national/imperial identity. She is currently putting the finishing touches on her study of French deportation practices titled “Imperial Convictions: Punishment, Colonization, and the Politics of Labor in the Modern French Overseas Empire.” Her office in EUCE/ESC is 4215. She can be reached at adelnore@pitt.edu or 412-624-5404.

**EUCE/ESC Student Receives ECPR Paper Award**

Miguel Carreras, PhD student in Political Science, won the award for best paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Summer School on Political Parties in Brussels this summer. He is planning to include a European case in his dissertation, which compares the rise of outsiders in presidential systems in Latin America and in parliamentary systems in Eastern Europe. His study at the ECPR Summer School was supported by a grant from the EUCE/ESC.

**EUCE/ESC Affiliated Professor Receives NSF Grant**

Congratulations to Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Assistant Professor at GSPIA in environmental economics and policy, who recently received a National Sciences Foundation (NSF) grant in the amount of $228,000 for continuing work on the empirical assessment of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. Her research on CSR has been supported in part by grants from the EUCE and UCIS.

**The European Parliament New Edition**

The 8th edition of *The European Parliament* by Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs, and Michael Shackleton has just been released. Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament, describes it as “an invaluable guide to the institution’s history, power, and politics.” Shackleton, a recent visitor to the University of Pittsburgh, has suggested that the book may be purchased online through The Book Depository (http://www.bookdepository.com/), which offers free shipping to the U.S. The book is published by John Harper Publishing, Ltd.

**Peace-Making and the Imagination**

Prof. Andrew Strathern and Dr. Pamela J. Stewart (Strathern), EUCE/ESC Affiliated Faculty in the Department of Anthropology, have just published a new book titled *Peace-making and the Imagination* about the transformation of violent conflict in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere.
The Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: A Risk-Averse Strategy?

by Dr. A.S.M. Ali Ashraf
Assistant Professor of International Relations
University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

Among the coalition countries fighting in Afghanistan, Germany has deployed the third largest contingent of military troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Despite that, the German troops are widely criticized for adopting a risk-averse strategy. The purpose of this article is to analyze the external and domestic sources of Germany’s Afghanistan strategy from 2002 to 2010. It argues that neither the systemic nor the domestic level factors alone can explain why Germany participated in the Afghanistan War in the first place and why it gradually increased its troop commitment but appeared reluctant to take the risks of offensive military operations. It shows instead that the systemic level pressures were channeled through the domestic level factors to shape the course of Germany’s Afghan strategy.

In shaping Berlin’s Afghanistan strategy, German leaders were confronted with two systemic pressures: alliance solidarity and balance of threat. As a principal NATO member and a key U.S. ally, Germany joined the Afghanistan War by deploying its armed forces, the Bundeswehr, in 2001, and since then placing most of the soldiers under the UN-mandated ISAF command and only 100 Special Forces under the U.S.-led OEF command. Germany also played an important role when NATO assumed the command of the ISAF in August 2003. Figure 1 shows Germany’s troop contribution to Afghanistan. The increasing troop level appeared to be consistent with the U.S. and NATO expectations that Berlin assumes a large share of the burdens of coalition war in Afghanistan. In fact, NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment made it obligatory for Germany to join the Afghanistan War coalition. However, Article 5 cannot predict what specific role a NATO member would play in the coalition. Besides, it fails to explain whether a NATO member should remain supportive of the Afghanistan War coalition or gradually decline its commitment to the coalition. Germany’s alliance solidarity defined as its longstanding commitment to NATO in general and to the United States in particular provides answers to these questions. After alliance solidarity, countering the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism provided an additional incentive to support the Afghanistan War coalition. Evidence of the terrorist threat can be traced in the existence of Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell, which was responsible for the planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. Another piece of evidence comes from the resurgence of Taliban activities in the Bundeswehr-controlled northern Afghanistan.

This article shows that the systemic pressures of alliance solidarity and balance of threat were transmitted through the German domestic political process, which strongly shaped the country’s Afghanistan policy. At least three domestic level factors interacted to influence Berlin’s burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. The first concerns the constitutionally designed limits of the chancellor’s office in using the armed forces. The second focuses on elite consensus in the parliament. The third involves military doctrine and capacity gap. The German decision process on Afghanistan is presented in Figure 2.

First, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his successor Angela Merkel were bound by the constitutional limits in designing their Afghan policy. The German constitution provides for the use of force for collective security purposes but prohibits participation in a war of aggression. War is a loaded term in German political culture, which equates combat operations with a war of aggression. As a result of such constitutional restrictions and a distinctively cultural connotation of war, the German parliament, Bundestag, had to approve the force deployment decisions. This proved to be a major stumbling block for the Office of the Chancellor in shaping Berlin’s Afghan policy. In November 2001, Chancellor

Continued on page 4
Schröder confronted stiff opposition, including a vote of no-confidence, in deploying troops to Afghanistan. Subsequent decisions on military deployment were approved in the Bundestag without any major political risks for the Schröder and Merkel governments. However, the Bundestag mandate restricted the use of force for combat operations. Instead, it authorized the use of force, including firepower, only for self-defense, and support for allied troops. As a result of such restrictive mandate, the German government imposed national caveats and sold the Afghan mission to a skeptical public as a purely peace-keeping mission in a relatively safe northern Afghanistan. The effect of such restrictions was enormous. They crippled the ability of the German Special Forces, the Quick Reaction Forces, and the Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts to participate in offensive military operations led by the German or coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Second, in the Bundestag, the German government enjoyed a relatively stable elite consensus in getting the legal mandate for Bundeswehr deployment. However, due to a largely pacific political culture, the German public rejected the use of force, while providing support for a defensive reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. The German government had to strike a delicate balance in choosing between elite consensus and public opinion. This is why Chancellors Schröder and Merkel maintained a defensive stabilization role for the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. They also countered the NATO allies' pressure to redeploy the Bundeswehr troops into the restive southern Afghanistan. Figure 3 shows the German army’s area of operation in Afghanistan.

Finally, doctrinal limits and capacity gaps constrained the German forces’ contribution to coalition operations in Afghanistan. Unlike the major NATO allies, such as Britain and the United States, Germany lacked a strong military and a counterinsurgency doctrine. The imposition of tight rules of engagement further limited its ability to fight the Taliban insurgency. Such a capacity gap was compounded by the lack of political and strategic leadership needed to transform the Bundeswehr from a territorial army to a rapidly deployable force with the ability to project power in ‘out of area’ operations. However, the absence of the Berlin-based political leadership did not restrain the German soldiers to participate in combat operations, albeit on a limited scale. This was evident in several high profile tactical operations participated by the German troops.

After Operation Harekate Yolo in 2007, subsequent military operations in northern Afghanistan—Operation Karez in 2008, Operation Oqab in 2009, and Operations Chachar Dhara in 2009 and 2010—indicated the German Army’s slow move toward an offensive counterinsurgency strategy. Due to pressures from soldiers on the ground, in July 2009 Berlin began to designate its Afghan mission as a warlike situation and eliminated some of the national caveats imposed on the Bundeswehr. Such relaxed rules of engagement improved the German forces’ sustainability, interoperability, and deployability. This resulted in a changed circumstance, in which the German troops would increasingly assume the military risks of fighting the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.

Recognizing Germany’s capacity gap, in 2010 the United States sent 2,500 soldiers to northern Afghanistan.
to fight the Taliban militias, and to train the Afghan forces. The deployment of U.S. soldiers to the Bundeswehr-controlled northern Afghanistan showed the weakness in Berlin’s burden-sharing strategy. It is likely that until the much publicized 2014 deadline, when NATO forces are expected to transfer security to Afghan forces, the Bundeswehr will achieve only incremental progress in developing a full-fledged counterinsurgency capability. During this time (2011-2014), training for the indigenous Afghan forces will be the only coalition task in which the German military is likely to make an increased contribution. This is due to the fact that, unlike fighting the Taliban insurgency, rebuilding the Afghan forces can avoid inciting public outcry and poses fewer political risks for an incumbent German government. NATO allies have slowly recognized such German predicaments and adapted to the changing security situation in Afghanistan.

Author’s Note: A.S.M. Ali Ashraf can be contacted at aliasha@alumni.pitt.edu. Research for this article was supported by a dissertation fellowship from the EUCE at the University of Pittsburgh. The author wishes to thank Alberta Sbragia and Phil Williams for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.

---

**Upcoming EUCE/ESC and UCIS Grant Deadlines**

**DAAD Study & Research Scholarships**
The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) provides up to two years of funding for study and research in Germany for graduating seniors, graduate students, and recent graduates. U.S. and Canadian citizens, permanent residents, or international students who have been full-time for at least two years are eligible to apply. For more information on this award and to access the application, please visit www.daad.org. Interested applicants may direct questions to Judy Zang, Director of National Scholarships, University Honors College, at jaz36@pitt.edu. The deadline for all fields excluding music and visual & performing arts is November 15, 2011.

**EUCE/ESC Faculty Research Grant**
The European Union Center of Excellence, with support from the Office of the Provost and the European Commission, offers grants to Affiliated Faculty doing research related to any aspect of post-World War II European Integration. The grants typically range in size from $2,500 to $7,500. The purpose of the EUCE Faculty Grant Competition is to develop and strengthen faculty expertise on the European Union. For faculty just beginning work on the EU, this could involve participation at a conference, or research or collaboration with a colleague. For all faculty, on-site field work and research likely to lead to publication is preferred. For more information, please visit http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/node/41, or contact Associate Director Timothy Thompson at tst@pitt.edu or 412-624-3503. The deadline for applications is December 9, 2011.

**EUCE NEWSLETTER:**

Director: Professor Ronald H. Linden
Associate Director: Timothy S. Thompson
Editor: Juliann Tremeryn

For newsletter announcements, comments, or submissions, please email eucnews@pitt.edu.

**EUCE/ESC would like to thank the Delegation of the European Union for support for the Center.**
Continued from page 1

vations behind the initial creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). Discussions about the economic problems in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, as well as Greece, in relation to the North/South geographical and political divide in Europe were highlighted, as was the point that this divide is analytically and historically more about a Center/Periphery divide between politically more powerful, centrally located countries and less politically powerful countries positioned on the geographic periphery. The latter model does a better job of explaining why the Republic of Ireland, which geographically is in Northern Europe, is economically weaker, like countries of Southern Europe.

As research scholars with a long history of work in both Scotland and Ireland, we had undertaken to do fieldwork in County Donegal, Republic of Ireland in May 2011, prior to the conference (we thank the EUCE for its support of our Ireland fieldwork). For many years, we have seen the prominence of notices proclaiming the beneficial involvement of the European Union in development projects and also in peace-building exercises in the cross-border contexts between County Donegal and Northern Ireland (belonging to the U.K.) in which Ulster-Scots speakers were very much involved. We had also observed how the rise of the “Celtic Tiger” economy was portrayed in the media. Through our research focus on farming and farming subsidies, we had seen the troubling difficulties of smaller farmers in Less Favored Areas when in 2009 the Republic’s government announced it would have to retrench its Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) funding. These difficulties were harbingers of bigger trouble to come when in 2010-11 the Celtic Tiger disappeared into a thicket of banking and building losses and loans that could not be repaid. We also had seen the evidence of widespread building and land speculation across Donegal’s farming countryside, much of which was contested by locals.

Two things were especially interesting to us during our 2011 research trip and related closely to the topic of the conference. First, an intense media debate about what to do about the debt crisis and bank insolvencies included serious consideration by professional economists of whether Ireland should default rather than accepting European Central Bank and IMF help, with its concomitant “austerity” measures. Ireland’s government had just changed, with the Fine Gael Party coming into power because of dissatisfaction with the Fianna Fáil Party’s management of the economy. But the new Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, at once made it clear that there was no viable alternative to accepting a bailout on terms set by the leaders within the EU structure, arguing that if this compromised senses of Irish sovereignty, the problems had been generated from within and must be dealt with by internal measures.

Second, these intensive media arguments contrasted with the attitudes of local farming people and others with whom we discussed the problems. While in political terms Irish people are highly aware of the historical struggle for independence, when it comes to economics they are equally aware that as “ordinary people” they have much to endure and must find their own ways to survive through such troubles. This was not just stoicism or pessimism. They felt, on the whole, optimistic that with EU help they would in fact pull through over time. The attitude may be characteristic of rural and largely farming people. We have found similar ideas in farming communities in Scotland, expressed in the phrase Ye maun thole it (“You just have to put up with it”). The relatively quiet Irish approach contrasts starkly with the passionate responses to crisis in Greece. (Obviously, the histories of these countries are also very different.) The Irish have been particularly concerned about sovereignty; the Greeks have been more concerned with a debate about democracy vis-à-vis government, the roles of protest, including violent protest, the question of how Greece could conceivably ev-

A new large mansion in the countryside. Donegal, Republic of Ireland, near Raphoe, July 29, 2009. (Photo, Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew J. Strathern Archive)
er pay its debts, and whether Greece might become emblematic of a second (less well off) tier within the Eurozone: the “Southern question.” Similar protests have emerged in Spain, attracting wide support but remain without resolution in Spanish national politics.

As part of the “dilemmas of diversity” aspect of our conference topic, we also considered differences in how countries relate to the Euro currency. In the Lithuanian case, for example, national identity itself has been so variable that a strong popular sense of identification with a particular currency does not exist. On the one hand, this might favor an easy acceptance of the Euro, while on the other it suggests that the Euro itself is in the position of being a currency that has been adopted without any strong sense of identification with it. Like Lithuania, Poland is also in a situation of emerging from a history of external control and the contradictions that go with such an emergence, nostalgia for the past colliding with aspirations for the future. In Poland, the legacy of the Solidarity movement is being transformed into a kind of heritage for tourist consumption, among other purposes, and perhaps the Euro currency might help in this process. In general, senses of national identity are both enabled by entry into the Eurozone and undermined in cases where existing membership in it entails problems. For instance, rumors that the Greek government might revert to use of the drachma must have generated much ambivalent feeling, partly because the drachma as a symbol would link Greece to its ancient foundational status in relation to Europe, yet it would also signal a kind of exit from “Europe today.” Beneath the currency problems lies a multitude of seething policy difficulties, centering on what governments can or cannot, should or should not, do for their people.

Throughout Europe, so-called welfare state economies are under pressure. For the Eurozone, this pressure means that the future of the Euro as such is at stake. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, working with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, finally put weight behind the so-called bailout for Greece on grounds that saving the Euro was a paramount imperative for the EU project as a whole. Such a stance underlines the connection between identity and “money” which is found in earlier ceremonial economic formations in Papua New Guinea, focused historically on precious gold-lip pearl shells as items of wealth. Yet currencies and political unions can also prove transitory. The Euro itself displaced a multitude of national currencies by a collective political decision. Of course, matters are complex. Some countries, e.g. the U.K., Sweden, and Denmark, are in the EU but have kept their currency. Debt, however, links them all and ties them to a larger global world of finance including the U.S., as well as to the burdens of their own diverse national circumstances, which the Euro cannot conceal and in fact to which the Euro is hostage as well the countries themselves.

Given all this, the topic of our conference is not likely to fade away in significance in the next few years. With thanks both to our lively participants, and to the EUCE staff for their usual combination of efficiency and helpfulness, we hope that a larger conference may be convened at a later date.

In addition to co-organizing and running the EUCE “Challenges to Union and Dilemmas of Diversity” conference, we jointly presented a Keynote address titled “The Dialectics and Aesthetics of War and Peace: Extending Riches’ Triangle” at the International Conference on the “Anthropology of Political Violence” at St. Andrews University, Scotland, June 10-12, 2011.

We also traveled to Norway from August 10th-27th, 2011 to meet with students and colleagues at a number of universities, museums, and research institutes. We jointly presented 4 seminars, including two in Oslo and Bergen respectively titled “Embodiment and Personhood: On Keeping the Body” and “Aesthetics and Dynamics of Violence and Peace: Beyond the Triangle.” While in Ber-
Continued from page 7

gen we visited a public site where people expressed their grief for the tragic losses of life resulting from the violent attacks in Oslo and the island of Utøya on July 22, 2011.

Authors’ Note: Prof. Andrew J. Strathern and Dr. Pamela J. Stewart (Strathern), will also be presenting a set of lectures as the DeCarle Distinguished Lecturers in New Zealand in 2012 where they will discuss their research on peace-making, diaspora relations, and also their current writing on political actors, groups, or individuals who attempt to intimidate and silence the voices of others with what some have called “agenda driven violence.” Their book Peace-making and the Imagination (2011, University of Queensland Press) has just been published. Additional information about their work can be found on their webpage: http://www.pitt.edu/~strathern.