The determinants behind the political selection of officials in China have been the subject of great debate. Although factions and political connections play an important role, China’s stellar economic performance since 1978 suggests that the Communist Party’s cadre management system is still able to select and promote at least some competent individuals to hold important government positions. This paper evaluates the extent to which the Party uses economic performance, namely the growth of local fiscal revenues and GDP, as the indicators of competence when promoting local politicians. We argue that economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at the lower administrative level of government than higher level officials in China. This strategy allows the ruling elite to balance between loyalty and competence among subordinates in order to maintain political survival.

Preview of paper by Pierre Landry, Xiaobo Lu, and Haiyan Duan available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2452482