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Executive Summary

Development Issues in Recent Soviet Scholarship

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier

This report deals with the Soviet scholarly writings on development issues. The new trends in scholarship have more than academic implications, for they parallel the new trends in Soviet aid-trade policies, no longer cast exclusively in terms of competition for the resources and allegiances of the Third World.

The emerging new development model bears little resemblance to the one contained in the CPSU Program adopted in 1961:

The young sovereign states . . . constitute that part of the world which is still being exploited by the capitalist monopolies. As long as they do not put an end to their economic dependence on imperialism, they will . . . remain objects of semi-colonial exploitation.

That outlook still guides the works of older ideologues of academe, like R. Ulianovsky, who continue to argue that all the issues of underdevelopment can be solved only through a decisive break with the capitalist system of exchange and production. But an entirely new spirit animates many younger specialists. Their cognitive reorientation dates back to 1974 with the appearance of two books. Published by the Institute of Oriental Studies and Institute of World Economy (IMEMO), the books sought to correct the prevailing method of investigating in a deterministic manner the transition of the newly independent countries to socialism. They opened up fresh vistas at a time when the fuel crisis presented both the LDCs and the industrialized states with a very different set of problems from those that had marked the initial post-colonial period. As a result three views that modify the traditional normative assumptions about development have gained wide acceptance. First, the recognition of the wide economic differentiation among the newly independent countries calls into question the former theory of unrelieved imperialist exploitation. Second, the acceptance of integration with the world market as essential to development undermines the former equation of "economic liberation" with progress. Third, a coming
to terms with the fact of the fluid, multi-level nature of Third World economies and societies permits scholars to study the complexity and specificity of the LDCs with greater attention to their diversity and less adherence to an imposed uniformity.

Against this background many development issues are being discussed in a new and different light.

The value of incremental change, as against decisive breaks, is now recognized. Ever since the dramatic, serial collapses of radical regimes began in 1965, Soviet scholars have been wary of economic extremism. But only in 1975 did N. Simoniya present a sustained analysis of how inadequate attention to economic preconditions caused the failure of numerous national liberation movements. It argued cogently that Marx saw economic and political development as firmly sequential: socialism could only be the product of a developed and advanced economic system. Hence, capitalist production relations could not be replaced with socialist institutions at will, but only after industrial production, managerial skills, and labor discipline had attained sufficient levels to ensure a smooth transition to a more progressive system.

Other scholars are similarly concerned about the proper economic policies to assure genuine and lasting progress. They express alarm that it is the least developed countries—those plagued by overpopulation, unemployment, and chronic payments problems—which tend to embark on the socialist path. Conversely, the more moderate and economically rational plans of the last decade that many countries adopted after an initial experimentation with radicalism receive approbation.

There is a certain degree of pluralism in the discussion of development models. The Soviet model itself has first of all undergone considerable modification. L. Reisner's 1976 work presents the NEP, with its tolerant policies toward private agriculture, small entrepreneurs, and Western concessions, as being more relevant to the needs of the LDCs than the subsequent construction of socialism in one country and the forced industrialization drive. Industrialization is no longer the panacea. Much is written on how the modern sector tends to form an enclave which, instead of invigorating the rest of the economy, manages to produce urban overpopulation, unemployment, and a lumpenproletariat. These works propose that small-scale industry, large-scale public works, and the processing of agricultural products will offer more of a "trickle-down" effect.

But no one has as yet clearly formulated a theory of alternate models. The ground is prepared though by A. Levkovsky's writings on the sui generis nature of the socio-economic processes in the Third World that preclude repeating Western patterns. Similarly, the extensive research by O. Svanidze and others on agriculture is close in spirit to the peasant-oriented strategies advanced by the Third World theorists.

The recognition of the Western presence in the LDCs as a necessary component of development represents a radical change in Soviet outlook.
Many specialists, like A. Dinkevich, L. Gavrilov, Y. Yashkin and A. Medovoi, argue that the study of development cannot be limited to denunciations of foreign domination. They investigate the changes and advances resulting from the penetration, diffusion, and interaction of Western capital, such as the destruction of ossified social relations, the initiation of speedy development in some sectors, the contribution to capital accumulation, and inclusion in the world market. Those authors who take a positive view of the Western presence also maintain that the old-type subordination is being replaced by a new relationship based on partnership and mixed-enterprise.

Economists who work seriously on development strategy consider the utilization of Western capital, know-how, and technology as an absolute necessity. (It is another matter that there is considerable disagreement over the type and degree of local control, ranging from stringent curbs to reasonable regulations.) Probably the most graphic expression of this change is the new outlook on the role of the multinationals. Some economists treat them as creatively resourceful economic systems motivated by the logic of efficiency that make a significant contribution to development.

The former faith in the capacity of the state sector to generate development is over. There is considerable discussion of demonstrable failure as well as objective discussion of the effects of government ownership and regulation. Economists like E. Bragina and A. Elianov analyze the difficulties that the state orchestration of development encounters. Both consider premature expansion of public ownership and excessive dirigisme as injurious and discuss a variety of feasible policies, ranging from the nationalization of the basic means of production and centralized planning to reliance on the private sector and indicative planning.

A small theoretical school, led by A. Levkovsky, questions the propriety of equating state controls with socialist production relations. For them the prominence of the state sector in the Third World is due to historical circumstances and economic necessity, and they criticize the conservative specialists who equate state ownership and management with the dawning of socialism.

There is a definable pattern to the various reconsiderations of development strategy. To one degree or another, overtly or covertly, free enterprise and foreign investment are now accepted as necessary components of progress. Rather than analyze the extent to which the LDCs institute socialist production relations, Soviet specialists have come to terms with the mixed economy. Nothing illustrates this shift more dramatically than the acceptance of a mixed economy even for states of "socialist orientation." The concept of socialist orientation came into use in the late 1960s to denote states whose path of development offered a "socialist perspective." At the start, the formula called for radical political reforms, an anti-Western foreign policy, crippling restrictions on local private capital and foreign business, as well as an active cooperation with the Soviet Bloc involving elements of a socialist division of labor. At present, the Soviet stance on domestic politics and diplomacy remains basically unchanged, but the interpretation of economic policies has been altered
radically. Soviet specialists now advise and condone moderation on local free enterprise, foreign aid, and Western investment. All three are seen as indispensable to provide further stimulus to the national effort, to introduce the needed technology and specialists, to increase employment, to improve services, and to expand the food supply.

There are academic, ideological and political implications of the ongoing reassessment of development issues.

In scholarship, the new trends denote departures from deductive methodology and deterministic schemes. Analytical tools are being refined and the principle of free inquiry is being established. Though criticized, the innovative authors are not silenced or demoted, and their constructs enter the universe of discourse. The spirit and the evolution of inquiry offer encouraging prospects of considerable liberalization in academic research.

The new theoretical constructs have a bearing on ideology as well. They modify the traditional Marxist-Leninist assumptions about the ubiquitously maleficent role of imperialism and capitalism. They are formulated in response to the changing configuration of forces in world economy, the growing role of science as the crucial factor in progress, and the indigenous processes in the LDCs. As yet, the updated and realistic outlook has not substantially altered official statements on Third World issues. Still, its existence should chasten our conventional wisdom that all Soviet analysis is based on crude political assumptions.

Although official Soviet pronouncements keep stressing that the ideological struggle for the minds and the political allegiances of the Third World will persist despite peaceful diplomatic coexistence, the recent specialized thinking on the economic problems of the LDCs suggests a loss of conviction that socialism and the USSR can provide both the alternative model and the necessary means for overcoming backwardness. The interest in incremental change in the LDCs, which abandons the former hostility to private and foreign capital, allows for a productive dialogue on some highly explosive issues facing the Third World and possibly for some cooperation with the West on the economic level as well.
A new spirit is manifest in Soviet studies of the Third World. Recent writings by the younger generation of scholars bear little resemblance to the development model set forth in the CPSU Program adopted in 1961:

The young sovereign states do not belong either to the system of imperialist states or to the system of socialist states. But the overwhelming majority of them have not yet broken free from world capitalist economy even though they occupy a special place in it. They constitute that part of the world which is still being exploited by the capitalist monopolies. As long as they do not put an end to their economic dependence on imperialism, they will be playing the role of a "world countryside," and will remain objects of semi-colonial exploitation.

This view still guides the older ideologues of academe, like Rostislav Ulianovsky, who continue to argue that all problems of underdevelopment can be solved only through the elimination of the capitalist system on the domestic and international levels. But the development strategy adumbrated by many younger specialists is no longer guided by the categories spelled out in the CPSU Program almost twenty years ago. It is being cast in the matrix of global processes and gradual change, not of irreconcilable antagonisms and decisive breaks. They discuss issues of dependence and development in terms of what obtaining now in the late 20th century, even if it does not always square with what Lenin had to say about the nature of imperialism some 65 years ago. Their investigations, however, are not
directed at questioning the validity of Marxism-Leninism, but rather at modernizing the updating it.²

In addition, many younger scholars treat Marxism-Leninism as an open-ended system of analysis, not as a predetermined schema that provides ready and correct answers for all possibilities.

The field is ready for renovation. A plurality of views is aired at frequent conferences and in pages of specialized journals. The aim of these exchanges is not to arrive at consensus and eliminate divergent interpretations, but to improve methodology and refine assumptions. Thus new concepts enter academic discourse and in turn stimulate further redefinition and refinement. In consequence, many Soviet books and articles no longer present the Western reader with dreary and fairly predictable litanies but engage his interest with unexpected and challenging propositions. By now, the schools of thought on economic issues facing the Third World are sufficiently disparate so that one can no longer speak of a "Soviet theory of development," at least as far as the academic community is concerned. (As I cannot adequately deal with the full range of views, I confine myself in this report mainly to those that redefine the role of capitalism.)

Before proceeding to the important features of the recent academic reassessment, two books should be mentioned that, by Soviet accounts, inaugurated the new phase in Third World studies. Both appeared in 1974. Their very titles marked a departure from former conceptual constructs: The Developing Countries: Regularities, Tendencies, Perspectives and The East Beyond Our Borders and Contemporary Times. They superseded works that were entitled, respectively, Class and Class Struggle in the Developing
Countries, and The National Liberation Movements in Asia and Africa. Further, their introductions stated that the books were intended as correctives to one-dimensional interpretations which, instead of investigating the problems at hand, dealt in more-or-less deterministic fashion with the transition of the newly independent countries to socialism. 3

Both volumes not only posed new questions but stressed the unresolved nature of many issues and the lack of consensus among the contributors. Each discussed the Third World from a different perspective. The Developing Countries, produced by the research staff of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), treated Asia, Africa and Latin America as a unit, subject to global processes. In contrast, The East Beyond Our Borders, published by the Oriental Institute, took an approach predicated on the domestic particularities of Asian and Near Eastern societies. Both books made tentative departures from seeing the development process as preventing capitalist take-over and regarding LDC backwardness as the counterpart to the affluence of the industrial West.

The simultaneous appearance of two such works infused Third World studies with a new life. They opened up fresh vistas and stirred up discussion on the respective merits of the global versus the particularistic approaches at a time when tremendous changes in the wake of the fuel crisis presented both the industrialized states and the LDCs with problems that differed markedly from those of the initial post-colonial period.
Since 1974 three views that modify the traditional normative assumptions about development have gained wide acceptance. First, the recognition of the wide economic differentiation among the newly independent countries calls into question the former theory of unrelieved imperialist exploitation. Second, the acceptance of a global division of labor as essential to development undermines the former equation of "economic liberation" with progress. Third, a coming to terms with the fluid, multi-level nature of Third World economies and societies permits scholars to study the complexity and specificity of the LDCs with greater attention to their diversity and less adherence to a pre-ordained uniformity.

Economic differentiation

The collective IMEMO volume noted the confusion of criteria used in analyzing development. It called attention to the indiscriminate mixture of socio-political and technical-economic categories, as well as the habit of treating the entire Third World as an undifferentiated unit. As a remedy, it proposed a wider and more stringent use of statistics to "separate that gigantic mass of Asian, African and Latin American countries into smaller groups and subgroups," and a comparative analysis of economic development.  

The first purely economic typology of the LDCs, written by a group of mathematicians, economists and political scientists, appeared in 1976. Reviews praised it for departing from the existing "intuitive-heuristic" approach and for using a mathematical, multi-dimensional taxonomy devised by Rudolph Rummel in the early 1960s and since amplified by Frederick Harbison
and others. The novelty, it was noted, consisted not merely in using the latest computerized analysis but in applying this methodology to all non-socialist countries alike. No distinction was drawn between the capitalist West and the developing East: the same 31 indicators were applied to all 85 states in the study. Such an approach made possible a more exact analysis of the present-day world where—under the impact of the scientific revolution of the newly independent countries—a considerable relocation of economic, technological and political forces had taken place.6

As a result, economic typology has gained acceptance on a par with the hitherto prevalent political typology.7 Different systems of grouping are proposed, but, broadly speaking, four basic categories are recognized: the poorest land-locked countries (mostly in Tropical Africa), the relatively advanced nations of North Africa and Asia, the oil-rich states, and Latin America. This classification is distinct and separate from the one used to analyze the class nature or foreign policy of Third-World regimes. For that purpose, they are now grouped into capitalist-oriented and socialist-oriented countries.

There is no agreement on what constitutes the most reliable system of indicators for including a country in one or another economic grouping. While most of the disagreements concern the components of development—for example, the relative importance of income per capita as against a well-rounded integration of the entire economy—the discussions range further than that. They do not stop with the static system of classification established by the 1976 volume on typology but touch upon the dynamics of development or, more specifically, what degree of
progress can be acknowledged and what accounts for it.

In this respect the liveliest disputes concern the characterization of capitalist development. The more traditional interpretations hold that the Third World can develop only within the framework of "dependent" capitalism, while the innovators want to dispense with political categories altogether and press for the recognition of "semi-developed capitalism." With recourse to statistics and logic, they argue that objective indicators show the more backward areas of Europe (i.e., Portugal, Greece, southern Italy) to be on the same level as the more developed countries of Latin America (i.e., Mexico, or Brazil) and should be grouped together as countries that have reached a level of semi-developed capitalism. These arguments are opposed by the more traditional-minded economists who insist that, despite the enormous differentiation, the Third World nevertheless is a definable politico-economic category and, no matter how far some countries manage to advance, they can never transcend the limits of dependence.

An International Division of Labor

Only recently have the Soviet scholars come to the conclusion that participation in a world-wide division of labor is essential for overcoming economic backwardness. This outlook is a 180-degree change: it departs from the former preference for import-substitution policies meant to curtail the Western presence; it modifies the once prevalent contention that only relations and integration with the Soviet Bloc could offer truly advantageous and equitable exchanges; and it allows for a more objective analysis of the West's role in engendering development.

The first book to offer the new interpretation of the international
division of labor frankly admitted that the "perfect" system of Soviet-LDC exchanges was not an operative but only a hypothetical situation. As for the present, technological progress had created a world market that in turn dictated the adjustment of national development to integration. Having made his innovative suggestion, the author did not theorize but concentrated on discussing the advantages of specific measures designed to bring maximum returns from adjusting production to international trade.

A more weighty book appeared two years later in 1976. Written by V. Tiagunenko, a doyen of post-war experts on the Third World and a Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, it was edited for publication, after Tiagunenko's untimely death, by a prestigious economist, V. Rymalov. It provided a theoretical justification for the present-day operation of the world economy and the place of the LDCs in the international division of labor. Tiagunenko held that it was impossible to study the "preconditions, nature and consequences . . . of concrete social and economic changes" without taking into account "world-wide forces with which these processes are closely connected and intertwined."

The book was hailed as a synthesis of the workings of the world economy that enabled Soviet scholarship to advance to a new stage. Indeed, it gave the imprimatur to research on Third-World problems with reference to the global forces operating independently of either socialism or the USSR.

The need of the LDCs to intertwine with the world market (which, after all, is dominated by the capitalist economies) is by now accepted by all scholars. Although this has considerably moderated the traditional hostility to the Western presence in the LDCs, there is certainly no
unanimity on the consequences. Controversy persists as to where the benefits of interdependence end and the costs of dependence begin. The conservatives regard the interaction of the LDCs with the West as a necessary evil that should be eliminated as fast as possible. Representatives of the rearguard, such as R. Ulianovsky, keep reiterating that exploitation remains the root economic problem of the Third World, and it can be eradicated only by drastic "rupture with the capitalist way of production and exchange."  

Specialists of mid-range persuasion pay obeissance to the "exploitation" theme but devote the bulk of their work to providing masses of factual data that speak for themselves and amply demonstrate the economic advantages resulting from the internationalization of production.  

But there also are outspoken proponents of the international division of labor who address the subject much less gingerly. In the words of one economist, "foreign capitalist enterprise . . . is also one of the forms of 'penetration' of modern production methods into backward countries, one of the forms of economic ties linking them up with the world capitalist economy."  

Multiplicity, or mnogoukladnost'  

The intransigent complexity of the Third World's social and economic structures has for a long time bedeviled Soviet experts. The problem was first acknowledged and threshed out in early 1964 during a conference held at IMEMO. At first, much was made of the flexible official formula of non-capitalist development, devised at the 1960 meeting of the Communist Parties in Moscow to permit departures from a strict revolutionary timetable. But until the early 1970s scholars wrote about economic progress
primarily in terms of a slow zig-zag movement toward proto-socialist institutions. Currently, the concept of the multi-structural nature (mnogoukladnost') of society and economy in the Third World is being increasingly used to cope with the inescapable condition of diversity. But again, although a new theory has gained acceptance, it is subject to different interpretations, and sharp disagreements rage on the bounds of the new concept.

The traditionalists interpret mnogoukladnost' as in no way deflecting the course of general historical development from one economic order dominated by a single class and mode of production to another, i.e., as "an organic part of the evolution within the system of formations." They see the simultaneous existence of various modes of production as resembling the situation that Lenin saw in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s when he talked about the concurrent operation of patriarchal, small-commodity, capitalist, state-capitalist, and socialist uklady. But they insist that research and analysis should be directed at locating the leading economic structure that determines the evolution of the country toward the capitalist or socialist formation.

A. I. Levkovsky, a prominent specialist on India, is a leading exponent of the open-ended interpretation of mnogoukladnost'. He argues that economic diversity is so pervasive and so complex that at the present time it is counterproductive to try to figure out which of the Marxist formations the LDCs are moving toward. LDCs are passing through a separate "interformation" period of extremely long duration. While the conservatives object that Levkovsky's theories deviate from historical materialism, other like-minded scholars welcome them as new analytical tools that have "rescued" the field from "oversimplifications which tried to fit the whole
historical development of the Afro-Asian world into strictly deterministic cells of a linear construction obligatory for all." They deny the traditionalists' contention that Lenin interpreted multiplicity as mere variations on the theme—all being part of the predetermined scheme of "from here to there." They maintain that, on the contrary, he recognized multiplicity as an objective factor. And in support they cite Lenin's words: "The future revolutions in the immensely populated and socially variegated countries of the East will, without doubt, bring up . . . much more originality (svoeobrazie) than did the Russian revolution."  

The concept of mnogoukladnost' is doggedly pursued by the research staff of the Institute of Oriental Studies. As well as having critics among the conservatives, they face the opposition of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The specialists of IMEMO, given their global and somewhat technocratic outlook, express little interest, understanding or patience for a theory that focuses on local peculiarities and deviations from the general pattern. Thus, IMEMO treats capitalist relations in the Third World as a reflection of world-wide processes, while the Institute of Oriental Studies interprets them as a phenomenon that is different from the classic West European model and shows at present many elements sui generis.  

III

Now that economic heterogeneity among the LDCs, the global division of labor, and local diversity are accepted terms of discourse, many old issues in the development process are being re-examined and new issues are
addressed. The findings, the re-interpretations, the new formulations however tentative—and their implications—constitute the new spirit that is discernible in Soviet Studies of the Third World.

**Stability**

First of all, economic development is now often analyzed in terms of ensuring political and social stability. Ever since the dramatic and serial collapses of radical regimes, beginning with Ben Bella's in 1965, Soviet scholars have been wary of economic "extremism." However, their post-mortems on these regimes remained scattered in separate articles and chapters, never examined in a systematic and sustained manner. Finally, in 1975, N. Simoniya published a book pinpointing the reason for the failure of numerous national liberation movements in Africa and Asia—namely, the economic preconditions for success were insufficiently established. Simoniya cogently began with one of Lenin's quotations from Marx, "our teaching is not a dogma." A correct reading of the Marxist-Leninist classics, he argued, demonstrated their belief that stable and lasting political change derives from a properly matured economic basis. Marx saw economic and political development as firmly sequential: socialism had to be the product of a developed and advanced economic system. Should revolution occur in a "weak link," as it had in Russia, then the situation demanded special attention to economic policies to bring industrial production, managerial skills and labor discipline up to par with the requirements of the advanced political systems. More specifically, Simoniya argued, such a regime had to rely on and develop the economic institutions left by the predecessor in order to create a firm foundation for its own
survival. It could not abolish them forthwith and replace them with socialist production relations until capitalist production relations had developed sufficiently to make this possible. 23

Simoniya's study offered so many unorthodox and fresh interpretations that a special review session was called to assess their merit. Most of the participants, however, talked not about the book's "mistakes" but endorsed its contention that before genuine socialist revolutions or changes could take place in the East, an intermediate preparatory period of economic build-up and reconstruction was essential. As for countries of "socialist orientation," it was held that they would be unable to proceed toward genuine socialism unless they first overcame backwardness. 24

Of course, on one level the book dealt with topical political issues --it was an argument against Chinese and other Leftist development theories--and that fact spared it from excessive criticism. As a scholar, however, Simoniya was concerned about something far less transitory: to get away from the prevalent ad hoc political evaluations of economic policies and to define the place of economics in assuring genuine and lasting progress. In pursuing this line of interest in more recent publications, he has contrasted the relative failures of the radical economic policies that characterized the first decade of independence (1955-65) with the success of the more moderate, "more rational" programs of the succeeding decade. He has argued that it is methodologically correct to analyze the present phase of economic development not in terms of dependence but as an "essential transitional stage of accumulating elements for the future independent economic structure." 25

Other specialists view economic development in similar light. At
academic conferences, concern is evident about the fact that it is the most backward countries, burdened by overpopulation, unemployment, low living standard, a chronic payments problem, etc., that are on the verge of social and political upheavals. From a somewhat different angle, others argue that if one persists in treating the economic situation in the Third World solely in terms of "dependence" and "exploitation," then revolution is the only way out.

Models

The concern for stable, balanced economic progress has in turn brought the investigation of less rigid patterns of development. As a result, the view on what is the Soviet model has changed considerably and other, alternate models are being taken into account.

Recently, scholars have started discussing the NEP as being more relevant to the needs of the LDCs than the forced industrialization drive of the late 1920s and the subsequent reliance on heavy industry. (The New Economic Policy, introduced by Lenin in 1921, left the state in control of the "commanding heights" but permitted small-scale private enterprise, private agriculture, and foreign concessions.) L. Reisner's study of the theory of economic growth contains the most detailed discussion of specific NEP policies that could be useful today, such as: considering agriculture the basis for capital formation; promoting light industry to provide employment and income for the peasantry; undertaking measures to end agrarian overpopulation; building up labor-intensive industries; balancing consumption with accumulation; creating a domestic industrial complex; engaging in extensive economic and technical cooperation with the advanced states.
More than that, Reisner ascribed the success of Western development theories in gaining acceptance among the LDCs to the fact that this valuable early Soviet experience has been "overshadowed" by the subsequent policy which posited "forced industrialization as the only basis, method and strategy for overcoming backwardness." 28

As one economist has written of alternate models, what is needed is a "new model for development that history has not yet known and could not have known, to . . . bring about a technical-economic and subsequently a socio-economic transformation." No single comprehensive study of the subject has as yet appeared, although its elements are often touched upon in books and articles. Reisner, for example, has blamed the failures and malfunctioning of India's first three Five Year Plans on the direct transfer of advanced economic patterns to an underdeveloped society. 30 Others have written more extensively on how the modern sector tends to form an isolated enclave that does not invigorate the rest of the economy but nevertheless produces such undesirable side-effects as urban overpopulation, unemployment, and a lumpenproletariat. 31

Although there is heightened concern for social stability, Soviet scholars, thus far, have not favored solving "basic human needs" through redistribution—a "utopian" solution that ignores the over-all development needs. They propose building up other forms of production (such as small-scale industry, large-scale public works, or the processing of agricultural products) that will offer more of a "trickle down" effect than does heavy industry. 32

Agriculture is undoubtedly the best researched and thought-out component of what could become the basis for an alternate model, although
various peasant-oriented plans in the Third World have, for obvious ideological reasons, not received explicit endorsement. Gone are the days when the agrarian problem was discussed in terms of radical reforms that would dispossess the propertied classes, revolutionize the countryside, and organize large-scale production on state farms or cooperatives. Despite persistent ritual bows in the old direction, no serious work is being done on the traditional topics nowadays. Land ownership and tenure have not been forgotten, but they are secondary to such top-priority issues as food sufficiency, rural employment, and capital accumulation. The concentration on agricultural development in countries with political systems as different as Angola's and the Ivory Coast's is accepted as a viable strategy. Similarly, the high productivity of small individual peasant plots in Malaysia and Ceylon is analyzed as one successful method of dealing with the agrarian crisis.33

Science

An exaggerated respect for science as the motive force of change (capsuled in the phrase "the scientific-technological revolution," or the STR) has undermined the traditional Soviet concepts of what generates progress. For many specialists science is the crucial factor in economic development. Further, they do not draw any distinction between "socialist" and "capitalist" science, writing about it as a genuinely international phenomenon that operates over and above the existing political systems. Science, developing and changing faster than any other sphere of human activity, determines the character of our time. Some go as far as to say that economic history proceeds through the primitive, the industrial and
the scientific-technological stages. It is scientific advances that generate and shape the whole process of change which the Third World is undergoing in the 1970s. This outlook leads to a new definition of the crux of underdevelopment:

On the world scale the economies [of the LDCs] have already begun to be transformed into a subordinate link of the new scientific-technological production forces, while at the same time, within their own framework, they face the problem of moving from the pre-industrial to the industrial modes of production.34

Serious study of the role of science in the Third World began in the late 1960s. The first substantial publication appeared in 1970, and a theoretical conference convened in 1971 marked a considerable step forward by posing new questions.35 These early publications, however, were excessively concerned with Western methods of transferring technology in a manner intended to perpetuate dependence. Since then, much of the subject has become remarkably free of ideological overtones.

The work of G. Skorov represents the optimistic strain that predominated at the start. His first publications argued that because the LDCs did not have to start ab ovo they were not put at a disadvantage or at the mercy of the industrialized states. On the contrary, they could thus skip the preliminary stages and start modernizing their economies with the help of the latest advances of world science. This initial enthusiasm was tempered somewhat in a book published in 1975, which investigated why, despite the unprecedented availability of new means for speeding up economic development, the potentials offered by modern technology had been to a very large extent unrealized. The focus of the book, however was on finding the appropriate local and international administrative measures to facilitate the transfer of technology.36
The work of R. M. Avakov, representing the more pessimistic strain, concentrates on analyzing the obstacles to absorbing modern, advanced technology presented by archaic societies and backward economies. In sum, he holds that technology cannot be simply grafted onto backwardness, questions the wisdom of supplying the ambitious and affluent LDCs with the most advanced hardware, and favors greater attention to intermediate technology. 37

Recent research tends to fall into the latter, pessimistic category. The outlook is to some extent conditioned by the current concern for social and political stability. Advanced technology not being labor-intensive does not help alleviate the pressing problem of unemployment and underemployment. Consequently, there is a more forthright discussion of intermediate technology adapted to the conditions and needs of the LDCs. 38

Neo-colonialism

While official pronouncements keep denouncing Western activities in the Third World, many scholars are probing the extent and in what ways the operations of neo-colonialism have changed. The more conservative or cautious still marshall their arguments according to the formula that although the economic appearance of many LDCs has changed noticeably, their position in the world capitalist economy has not undergone any fundamental transformation. 39 Others concede some advance, proceeding from the premise that "the great historic changes in the world . . . have imposed certain limits on the pursuit of imperialist policy toward the periphery." Since underdevelopment acts as a brake on the expansion and profits of monopolies, they have been forced to transfer some industries (mainly labor-intensive and environmentally harmful ones) to the Third World. These
authors acknowledge that the LDCs have advanced from being mere raw-material suppliers to semi-industrial, though still dependent, status. 40

Still others examine the role of Western business and capital not so much in terms of more efficient, up-to-date methods of exploitation as of the positive contributions. (This approach, it may be noted, in no way contravenes Marx, who recognized the progressive role of the colonial powers in introducing advanced production methods to their overseas possessions.) These specialists argue that one cannot limit the study of Third World development to stressing the baneful, negative influence of the West. Rather, the positive aspects—such as the erosion of ossified social relations, the initiation of speedy development in some sectors of the economy, inclusion in the world market—equally deserve study as part of the development process. Accordingly, books now investigate the contributions of foreign capital to local development plans, to capital formation, and to the implementation of social programs. 41

Moreover, these specialists do not treat the LDCs as the perpetual, helpless victims of the imperialist cabal. Some stress that nationalization of foreign property, increased local control over natural resources, changes in capital flows and in the world price structure, the building of national industries have contributed to the "collapse of . . . dependent and exploitative relations." Others maintain that many LDCs have even attained a partnership status in international exchanges; as such, they both invite foreign capital and themselves invest abroad. 42

As yet no one has done a major, comprehensive study of how and why the position of the LDCs has changed in this respect. What is being written about the degree of economic differentiation and about the
international division of labor bears much on this issue. But in describing the actual situation these works deal more with facts than with theory. Thus far, the liberal proponents of mnogoukladnost' have offered the most cogent theoretical arguments for dispelling the bogey of foreign and domestic capital—the basic problem that has to be surmounted if development is not to be examined exclusively in terms of systemic recipes. Their description of the Third World economies as consisting of numerous indeterminate, ever-changing, transitional uklady that defy traditional classification makes the point that both foreign and local capital is diffused throughout the various components and interacts on many levels, and accordingly defies easy or exact identification and hence eradication. Rather than concentrate on foreign domination or the expansion of domestic capital, they find it more rewarding to investigate the changes and advances resulting from the multidimensional diffusion and interaction. And it is on this very point that they have been most severely criticized by the conservatives, who object that this interpretation of mnogoukladnost' removes the guilty party from the scene.

Multinationals

Since opinions differ about the nature of neo-colonialism, there are inevitably disagreements about the multinationals. Some authors concentrate on denouncing the multinationals as instruments of capitalist or neo-colonialist exploitation. Without bothering to go into any details about their evolution or operations, they simply keep citing total figures on Western overseas investment and profits, and consider their case conclusively demonstrated. Others, less obscurantist in their censure, admit
that the multinationals have instituted a new international division of labor, allocating some of the processes in the production cycle to the LDCs. Still, on balance, the change is no more than a new form of exploitation. However, not all the negative views are mere political argumentation. A. Kovalevsky, for example, has analyzed dispassionately the operations of the multinationals in terms of Raymond Vernon's "product cycle" theory and concludes that the LDCs play too passive and limited a role in this process.

There is a further sizable body of opinion that regards the multinationals as an inevitable aspect of the growing extent of the internationalization of production. Included in this group are those economists who appreciate the skill of these companies in devising new management methods to maximize efficiency and profit. Their analysis concentrates on the practical lessons that can be learned from the operations of the conglomerates, and minimally on how these operations affect the less developed countries and regions.

And finally there are those who either imply or openly acknowledge the large contribution of the multinationals to economic development. Ye. Primakov has written that over the past 10 years these companies have relinquished complete control over local firms and increasingly cooperate with both the state and the private sector. Another attempt at a less Manichean view of the multinationals is that of N. Volkova, who points out that the Third World is by no means the main theater of their operations; but to the extent to which the transnationals are active in these parts, they help to integrate them into the world economy.

I. Ivanov has produced probably the most outspoken positive appraisal
of the multinationals to appear in print thus far. He sees them as a creatively resourceful new economic system, motivated by the logic of efficiency, that transcends geographic boundaries. As far as the Third World is concerned, they are the source of capital and technology which provide the means for overcoming backwardness: "It would be wrong to deny, while taking a realistic view, that the multinationals are in principle incapable of making a contribution to development."51

It goes without saying that all Soviet authors favor, in some degree or another, national control over the operations of the transnationals. While the conservatives advocate stringent curbs ("full control"), the liberal moderates envisage a reasonable dialogue leading to mutually acceptable regulations that serve the interests of both parties.52

Role of the State

That article of faith—the capacity of the state to generate economic development and to effect the transition to socialism—has been considerably eroded in recent years on both practical and theoretical grounds. The limits to what public ownership can accomplish have been recognized, and the propriety of equating state controls with socialist production relations has been questioned.

At present three different schools of thought are discernible. The conservatives have not given up crediting the size of the public sector, the degree of control over private and foreign capital, and the comprehensiveness of planning with paving the way for the advent of socialism. But they now recognize the practical limits to these aspirations. These days, not even the most confirmed traditionalists will suggest indiscriminate
nationalization as the most efficacious method to build up the state sector, accumulate funds, and strengthen the central authority. Similarly, the former penchant for total planning has been moderated, but that does not mean that the credit rating of unregulated spontaneous processes has gone up. The aim remains to control and to limit the private sector through appropriate and progressively stricter planning and allocations.53

Although the objective or practical school does not directly challenge the above constructs, it concentrates on analyzing the difficulties that the state's orchestration of development encounters and on discussing flexible policies that bring better economic results. Two important books have generalized their findings. Ye. Bragina's volume on industrial policy focuses on the stumbling blocks facing state management in the Third World, such as the shortages of administrative talent, of expert knowledge, and of experience. Emphasis here is shifted from scale to efficiency, and economic feasibility demonstrates that a "striving for excessive statism, unrelated to economic conditions, can lead to serious disruptions of economic life, a fall in production, and the growth of unemployment. . . . The process of state ownership in the LDCs has its objective limits."54

A. Elianov's book on economic growth and the market is the first Soviet work to analyze the interaction between state planning and market processes. It accepts private enterprise as a necessary and useful part of a national economy, recommends the peaceful coexistence of the public and private sectors, and regards market forces as an essential indicator of the general efficiency for both supply and demand. Like Bragina, Elianov considers the premature expansion of state ownership and excessive 

\textit{dirigisme} as injurious to development. Within that context he discusses
the feasibility of a variety of policies, ranging from nationalization of the basic means of production and centralized planning to reliance on the private sector and indicative planning. 55

Last, there is a small theoretical school that treats the state sector not as one among several components of LDC economies but as comprising the entire set of production relations. A. Levkovsky has written that the state's prominence in the Third World is due to economic necessity and has criticized the orthodox specialists for equating state ownership and management with the dawning of socialism. He believes that the public sector, at present and for a long time to come, fulfills general national tasks that attend to the interests of the various social groupings. It is the emanation of the amorphous multi-sectoral economy and society that are Levkovsky's object of research. Other scholars concentrate on the totality of the state's role, and to categorize that situation have coined the phrase "étatism" (etakratiya), or use the term "state sector" (gosudarstvennyi uklad), as designating the entire set of production relations; in other words, as being a historic formation. 56 In some respect these views are related to the theory of the Asian mode of production, not so much in detail as in the general approach that sees the East as having institutions which differ wholly from those of the West; consequently the East cannot repeat Western patterns.

The arguments of the latter specialists are so extremely convoluted that they are not easy to summarize. In reference to economic development, they signify an attempt to create new theoretical constructs to permit a fresh analysis of the role of the state in the Third World--an analysis more in keeping with the realities of the modern world than with the old
political theories. On the international level, they argue, the relations between the industrial West and the developing East are not those of exploitation, but rather between two contending monopolists, i.e., the Western multinationals on one side and the statist monopolies of the LDCs on the other. On the domestic level, the issue of exploitation also becomes irrelevant, since both the managers and labor are state employees. Similarly, state policies have to be analyzed in a different light since they are neither purely capitalist nor purely socialist.

What type economy?

With all this rethinking of development strategy, what do the Soviet scholars now accept as the best workable system for the Third World? There definitely is a common thread to their deliberations: to one degree or another, covertly or overtly, free enterprise and foreign investment are accepted as necessary components of progress. The answer inescapably points to a mixed economy.

As yet, that term is not widely used; most economists refer to it indirectly by arguing that capitalism has not yet exhausted its potential for generating growth. But, surprisingly enough, the mixed economy is mentioned most often in discussions of the appropriate policies for countries of socialist orientation. It is the program the Soviets now propose to spare these states the costly and counterproductive excesses of premature socialist measures.

The concept of socialist orientation came into use in the late 1960s to denote states whose path of development offered a "socialist perspective." (Although it was meant to replace the concept of non-capitalist development,
the two terms are now used interchangeably, and there is no agreement on what, if anything, differentiates them.) At the outset, the formula called for radical political reforms, an anti-Western foreign policy, crippling restrictions on local entrepreneurs and foreign investment, as well as active economic cooperation with the Soviet Bloc (involving elements of a socialist division of labor.) At present, the Soviet stance on domestic politics and diplomacy remains basically unchanged, but the interpretation of economic policies suitable for countries of socialist orientation has been altered substantially.

To begin with, it is recognized that both the capitalist- and the socialist-oriented countries remain in the world capitalist market, and no one seriously considers integration with the Soviet Bloc as a precondition for the non-capitalist path. "A specific feature of the development of [these] countries . . . is that even after their choice of the non-capitalist way they are still in the orbit of the world capitalist system." On the domestic level, the survival of capitalist relations is also recognized: "All economically backward countries, including those which politically adhere to the most advanced and progressive positions, pass through some phase of capitalist development."59

When the economic malfunctioning of the radical states first became the subject of published commentary, most authors blamed the burgeoning bureaucracy for excessive costs and poor administration. At present, specialists increasingly advise more moderate policies on local free enterprise, foreign aid, and Western investment. Separately and together, all three are seen as indispensable to provide further stimulus to national efforts, to introduce the needed technology and specialists, to increase employment,
to improve services, and expand the food supply. 60

Significantly, no specific set of economic policies is now designated as being essential for a socialist orientation, other than the vague enough theory about the state being the controlling agent. This is as much a "socialist" doctrine as it is an acceptance of what actually prevails in the Third World anyway. The more orthodox specialists like to dwell on what the state power in these countries can accomplish:

A mixed economy in the countries of socialist orientation . . . permits the utilization of capitalist elements (uklady) for the development of the production forces under state control in ways that prevent the transformation of these elements into the ruling capitalist system but create the preconditions for the victory of the state and cooperative sectors. 61

Those specialists who concentrate more on economic performance than on political labels envision the operations of a mixed economy in less manipulative terms. Recognizing the weakness of the state apparatus, they speak about the "coexistence" of state and private sectors and quote from Engels that the state can successfully manage economic development only when it does not act as the sole agent but relies on the private sector. 62

As for foreign capital, again realities are recognized. It is admitted that the West provides as much as 70% of aid and credit to many radical regimes, 63 and no one urges the doctrinaire nationalization or exclusion of Western investment. On the contrary, even the orthodox specialists argue that the socialist-oriented state should attract foreign capital and work out "such a system of regulation . . . that will guarantee the interests of the radical regimes and grant sufficient advantages to foreign investors to attract them." 64
IV

What are the academic, ideological and political implications to the reassessment of development issues? Some of the implications are more marked than others; still others are quite tentative.

In scholarship, the new trends denote an abandonment of the deductive methodology and deterministic schemes. What interests many innovating specialists is not merely the refinement of analytical tools but the principle of open-ended inquiry. Sometimes they plead that "one should not limit oneself in advance to some obligatory framework, [for] the world of the 80s will be more complex than the world of the 70s, and the world of the 90s more so than that of the 80s." At other times and in other contexts, they accept the indeterminate nature of research, as did L. Reisner when he prefaced his book on the theory of development with reference to Niel Bohr's principle of complementarity. This spirit, having already enriched the field with solid research into new subjects and a variety of challenging interpretations, offers prospects of much more to come.

New theoretical constructs and new fields of research have a bearing on ideology as well. To regard science as the motive force of progress, to advise the LDCs to integrate with the world market, to acknowledge that private enterprise and foreign investment contribute much to development, to investigate the undefined yet distinct nature of Third-World economies --all these arguments modify the traditional Marxist-Leninist assumptions about the ubiquitously maleficent role of imperialism and capitalism. They take into consideration the changing configuration of forces in the world economy, general advances in knowledge, and the indigenous processes
in the LDCs. To be sure, the updated and realistic outlook among scholars has not altered official statements on Third-World issues. Still, its existence should chasten our conventional wisdom that all Soviet analysis views the economic problems of the LDCs from a purely political standpoint, as the consequences of an imperialist plot.

Inherent in the new interpretations of development issues is the recognition that the non-socialist world and its economic operations offer some dynamic solutions, and that in many respects the LDCs are not ready for socialism. Although official Soviet pronouncements keep stressing that the ideological struggle for the minds and the political allegiances of the Third World will persist despite peaceful diplomatic coexistence, the recent specialized thinking on economic problems of the LDCs suggests a loss of the former confidence that socialism and the USSR can provide both the alternative theory and the necessary means for overcoming backwardness. The interest in incremental change in the LDCs, posited on the recognition of the non-antagonistic nature of capitalist relations and foreign investment, implies a changing outlook. And it allows for a productive dialogue on some highly explosive problems facing the Third World and possibly for some cooperation with the West on the economic level as well.


4. Razvivayushchieia strany: zakonomernosti, p. 133. Zarubezhnyi Vostok also called for detailed statistical studies of different regions and separate countries to introduce greater precision, p. 256.

5. Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran (opyt mnogomernogo statisticheskogo analiza narodnykh khoziaistv) [Typology of the Non-Socialist Countries; an Attempt at Multidimensional Statistical Analysis of National Economies] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). It was more than six years in the making. See the first discussion of this collective undertaking by V. Tiagunenko, L. Gordon and L. Fridman in Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, nos. 11 and 12 (November and December), 1970, 151-57, 142-49. Henceforth cited as MEMO.


7. One should add, however, that the objective economic typology is not accepted by the entire academic community. Among fairly typical reservations one might cite Professor L. Klochkovsky's statement made in a discussion of the levels of capitalist development in Latin America. He held that the purely quantitative approach lost sight of the qualitative analysis that would indicate not only the levels of development but also the degree of persisting or increasing exploitation on the part of monopoly capital or the multinationals. "Kak otsenivat'
Another dispute is brewing about monopoly capitalism in the Third World, which, according to strict Marxist-Leninist definition, would put countries where it prevails on a par with states that are designated as imperialist. Also, there is no agreement on whether the Third-World capitalism will repeat the classical pattern.

There are many contributions to this dispute. The concept was outlined by V. Sheinis in "Strany srednego kapitalizma" [Countries of Middle-level Capitalist Development], MEMO, no. 9 (September), 1977, 105-24. It was subjected to public discussion and criticism at an academic conference in June 1978, "Kak otsenivat' osobennosti i uroven' razvitiya kapitalizma v Latinskoi Amerike" (fn. 7), 53-100. V. Davydov, "O stepeni zrelasti i osobennostiakh kapitalizma 'latinsko-amerikanskogo' tipa" [On the Maturity and Peculiarities of the 'Latin-American' Type of Capitalism], MEMO, no. 3 (March), 1979, 116-29, provided a good summary of various positions and tried to pour oil on troubled waters by maintaining that the concept of dependence and development are by no means mutually exclusive.

E. Ya. Obminsky, Razvivayushchiesia strany i mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda [The Developing Countries and the International Division of Labor] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1974).

V. Tiagunenko, Mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda i razvivayushchiesia strany [International Division of Labor and the Developing Countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 9-10.

S. Tiul'panov, "Poiskovaya teoreticheskaya rabota" [An Innovative Theoretical Work], MEMO, no. 5 (May), 1977, 143-46.


This was Tiagunenko's line. It is also observable in V. Rymalov's Strukturnye izmeneniya v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve [Structural Changes in the World Capitalist Economy] (Moscow: Mysl', 1978).


"Sotsializm, kapitalizm, razvivayushchiesia strany. Diskussiya" [Socialism, Capitalism, the Developing Countries. A Discussion], MEMO, nos. 4 and 6 (April and June), 1964, 116-31, 62-81.
The expression is a composite of two words *mnogo* (many) and *uklady* (structures). The English translation of *uklad* (singular of *uklady*) presents problems. Being part of Marxist theory, its meaning cannot be adequately rendered by one word. To put it simply, *uklady* are the various types of production relations that make up a country's economy. In a fully mature society they coalesce into a formation—feudal, capitalist or socialist. But until that is achieved, they constitute separate, interacting and ever evolving structures or components.

18. S. Tiul'panov, "Obshchestvo perekhodnogo tipa" [Transitional Society], MEMO, no. 1 (January), 1979, 144-46.


20. A. U. Roslaev, "Eshche raz o te'orii 'mnogoukladnosti' v stranakh 'Tret'ego mira'" [Once Again About the Multi-sectoral Theory in the Countries of the Third World], Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir, no. 1 (January-February), 1977, 136-45, is an excellent expression of the conservatives' opinions and objections.


22. See the discussion between the two Institutes, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'-noe dvizhenie: nekotorye voprosy differentsiatsii" [The National Liberation Movement: Some Problems of Differentiation], Aziya i Afrika segodnia, no. 6 (June), 1978, 28-35.


26. "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie i politicheskie posledstviya differentsiatsii razvivayuschchiksa stran" [Socio-economic and Political Consequences of the Differentiation among the Developing Countries], MEMO, no. 10 (October), 1977, p. 128.

27. "Kak otsenivat' osobennosti i uroven' razvitiya kapitalizma v Latinskoii Amerike" (fn. 7), 72.
28. L. M. Reisner, Razvivayushiesia strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta [The Developing Countries: Outline of the Economic Growth Theory] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 51-72, 321. Simoniya's 1975 book also discussed the applicability of the NEP, though in more general terms. Given that book's thesis, the Soviet experience of the early 1920s offered the LDCs the example of how a socialist government was strengthened by resorting to economic policies arising out of the preceding economic formation.


30. Razvivayushchiesia strany (fn. 3), 321.


32. For a favorable assessment of the changes introduced in Indian development policies, see Ye. Bragina, "Osnovnye napravleniya vnutrennei ekonomicheskoi politiki Indii" [Basic Direction of Indian Domestic Economic Policy], MEMO, no. 2 (February), 1979, 134-42. However, there are indications that the egalitarian ideal and measures are beginning to get a sympathetic hearing. See the report on a round table conference, "Klassovya bor'ba i kontseptsiya egalitarizma v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Class Struggle and the Concept of Egalitarianism in the Developing Countries], Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6 (November-December), 1978, 3-19.


34. V. Krylov, "Osobennosti razvitiya proizvoditel'nykh sil i vosproizvoditel'nogo protsessa v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [The Peculiarities of the Development of the Production Forces and Process in the Developing Countries], in Reisner (fn. 25), 183. See also, M. A. Cheshkov, "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza gosuklada" [The Methodological Problems in the Analysis of the State Sector], in Ibid, 324-51.


38. See the contributions of L. I. Reisner and V. G. Khoros to the round-table discussion on egalitarianism, Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6 (November-December), 1978, 10-12, 12-14.

39. B. G. Gafurov, Aktual'nye problemy sovremennogo natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya [Topical Problems of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), and "Velikii katalizator natsional'no osvoboditel'noi bor'by" [The Great Catalyst of the National Liberation Struggle], MEMO, no. 7 (July), 1977, 23-36.

40. The discussion "Neo-Colonialism--a New System of Dependence and Enslavement?" International Affairs, no. 11 (November), 1978, 65-93, from which this quote is taken (66), is a good example of this level of analysis.

41. L. V. Gavrilov, Eksport kapitala v razvivayushchiesia strany Afriki [The Export of Capital into the Developing Countries of Africa] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), was among the first works to be written in this spirit. While most books tend to be factual, A. I. Levkovsky raises the discussion to a theoretical level (fn. 15).


43. This view is specifically defined and defended by Levkovsky in the introduction to the 1977 book he edited (fn. 15). Simoniya (fn. 25) expresses it in more general terms.
44. To the horror of Roslavlev, the leading critic of the concept of "monogoukladnost", Levkovsky has even written about the "dying out" (ugasanje) of the foreign capitalist enterprise (fn. 20), 144-45.

45. N. A. Sergeev, "Razvivayushchiesia strany protiv neo-kolonializma sverkh-monopolii" [The Developing Countries against the Neo-Colonialism of the Multinationals], Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 5 (September-October), 1977, 83-96, presents a fairly typical argument.

46. R. A. Ulianovsky, "Ekonomicheskii front bor'by protiv neokolonializma" [Economic Front of the Struggle against Neo-Colonialism], MEMO, no. 4 (April), 1978, 3-17.

47. "Vozmozhnosti tekhnologicheskogo transfera v eksportnye otrasi razvivayushchisia stran" [The Possibility of Technical Transfer to the Export Sector of the Developing Countries], in Reisner (fn. 25), 7-21.


49. "Nekotorye problemy razvivayushchisia stran" [Some Problems of the Developing Countries], Kommunist, no. 11 (July), 1978, 81-91.

50. "Nekotorye aspekty deyatel'nosti mnogonatsional'nykh korporatsii v razvivayushchisia stranakh" [Some Aspects of the Activities of the Multinationals in the Developing Countries], in Levkovsky (fn. 15), 52-65.


53. This view is well summarized by G. Smirnov, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi sushchnosti gosudarstvennogo sektora v razvivayushchisia stranakh" [On the Socio-Economic Essence of the State Sector in the Developing Countries], Aziya i Afrika segodnia, no. 5 (May), 1979, 34-37. G. Smirnov headed the joint Soviet-East European team of economists who produced Planning in Developing Countries: Theory and Methodology for the UNITAR in 1978. While the volume is under review at the UN, it has been published in Russian in Moscow.


56. Levkovsky, 1978 (fn. 19), 148-73. Cheshkov (fn. 34); see also his "Biurokratiya i 'etatratiya' v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Bureaucracy and 'Etatism' in the Developing Countries], in Obshchestvo, elity i biurokratiya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh Vostoka (Moscow, Nauka, 1974), 3-29. V. Yashkin, "Gosudarstvennyi uklad v mnogoukladnoi ekonomike" [The State Sector in Multi-Sectoral Economy], Aziya i Afrika segodnia, no. 3 (March), 1979), 40-44.


62. Yashkin (fn. 56), 41.

63. Kiva (fn. 60), 28.

64. Starushenko (fn. 61), 51.

65. "Kak otsenivat' osobennosti i uroven' razvitiya kapitalizma v Latinskoj Amerike" (fn. 7), 69-70.

66. Fn. 25, 6.