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TITLE: Bureaucratic Encounters in the USSR: Styles, Strategies, and Determinants

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"Even with the best of intentions, devout humanism and the utmost intelligence, the administrative authorities were unable to do more than solve instantaneous and transitory conflicts and were incapable of eliminating the permanent conflicts between reality and the principles of administration.... Even the best intentions were bound to fail in breaking through the bureaucratic relation."

Karl Marx, quoted in Andras Hegedüs, Socialism and Bureaucracy, p. 12.

"When you examine...such things as collectivization, industrialization and cultural revolution, or the struggle against political deviation... Trotskyism, cubism, cosmopolitanism, Weismannism, Morganism, modernism, and contemporary revisionism--do not overlook the humble drudge with the simple unmemorable, greedy face....And while you plan great reform programs, build castles in the air, search for mistakes in Hegel, create a line of poetry, or try to see an X chromosome through a microscope, our humble drudge, with his sharp little eyes, watches carefully to see if, under the guise of struggling against an alien ideology, he can get something from you: an apartment, a wife, a cow, an invention, a position, an academic title."

Vladimir Voinovich, The Ivankiad, p. 118.

Executive Summary

The nature of elite-mass relations in the USSR is only partially revealed by a knowledge of the formal arrangements of the political system. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the informal workings of the system are just as important, if not more so. This has been made quite clear by the Soviet press and, to a lesser extent, by Soviet scholarly literature. The large emigration of the 1970's presents us with the opportunity of learning more about how the informal system operates and interacts with the formal one.

This study describes and analyzes how Soviet citizens interact with government bureaucracies. Specifically, it focuses on how citizens in several republics go about obtaining housing, jobs, pensions, and admission to higher education. It also investigates citizen views of, and interaction with, the militia, the armed forces, deputies to soviets, the procuracy, peoples control commissions, and a number of other institutions.

Five major questions were posed by this study: 1) how do citizens evaluate several Soviet bureaucracies? 2) What strategies do they develop for dealing with these agencies? 3) What determines which strategies and styles are used by people in their encounters with the bureaucracy? 4) Do their experiences with government agencies influence or mold their attitude toward the system as a whole? 5) How do Soviet citizens subjectively perceive ethnic relations and groups in the USSR? (This question is obviously separate from the others and is only tangentially reported on here, but more

extensively elsewhere.*)

In order to address these questions, the Soviet press was examined closely for 1975-mid-1982. Soviet publications on public administration, housing, pensions and other relevant subjects were surveyed, along with Western literature. A survey of 1,161 recent (1977-1980) emigres was undertaken in Israel (n=590), the Federal Republic of Germany (n=100) and the United States (n=471), and this was complemented by 59 in-depth interviews among emigres with special knowledge.

Not surprisingly, the respondents have a generalized negative view of Soviet bureaucracy. However, they do discriminate in their evaluations of specific agencies. They also have more favorable evaluations of specific agencies than of "bureaucracy" in general. We found three categories of agencies:

1) Those toward which citizen initiative is either unnecessary, because the agency will produce the desired output, or useless, because the agency will not be responsive to citizen initiatives. The first type includes pension offices (gorsobes, raisobes), and the second, the military;

2) Agencies on which opinion was divided as to how best to approach them. The militia are one example;

3) Agencies which will not routinely produce the result desired by the citizen and therefore need a "push" by the citizens, which might involve semi-legal or illegal measures. These agencies are admissions committees in higher educational institutions, those that assign housing, hiring departments of

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*See Zvi Gitelman, "'A New Historical Community?' Ethnocentrism and Popular Perceptions of Ethnic Relations in the USSR,'" in Gail Lapidus and Gregory Massell, eds., Ethnopolitics and Political Stability in the USSR (forthcoming).

enterprises, and commissions assigning college graduates to their first post.

How the citizen attempts to influence the workings of the agencies depends largely on his level of education and which agency is involved. More highly educated people tend to be more assertive in their dealings with bureaucracies, have confidence in their ability to influence them, and strongly prefer officials who do not "go by the book" but handle each case differently. Less educated people prefer a more predictable system. The more educated favor the use of "connections," the less educated will resort more often to bribery.

Housing agencies are evaluated most negatively, and pension agencies most positively, by most respondents. This is probably due to the housing shortage, not to any differences in the structure or personnel of the agencies. Housing is also the area in which the most imaginative and unorthodox means are used by citizens to extract what they want from the agencies. Considerable corruption is involved here, as well as in admission to higher education, where ethnic and social quotas clearly exist. Corruption is involved in finding employment as well, though not in labor-short areas such as Siberia. The militia, too, can be influenced to act favorably toward the citizen, though the Germans in our sample were much less sanguine about this than the others. The style of interaction between citizen and official is similar to that of pre-revolutionary days and derives not only from tradition but also from the similarity in centralized, hierarchical structure of both the Tsarist and Soviet states.

Our respondents tried to influence the implementation of policy, but they did not think they could have influenced the making of policy. There seem to be three types of political participation in the USSR: ritualistic

involvement in activities such as voting; citizen-initiated contacts with officials in order to try and get private benefits; and attempts to influence the implementation of policy. Ironically, the more knowledgeable about politics and the more interested in it a person is, the lower his sense of being able to influence policy. The least educated and politically knowledgeable have the most faith in the formal institutions. Even Party members, the most involved in politics, do not believe they can influence policy making.

People's experiences in bureaucratic encounters do not very much influence their attitude toward the system as a whole. Numerous encounters with "street-level bureaucrats" do not cumulate into an overall affect toward the system. So our respondents' stance toward the system was influenced "Not by Bread Alone."

The Soviet system is more flexible in policy implementation than is sometimes believed in the West and it is on this phase of the political process that people concentrate their efforts. A "second polity" seems to parallel the "second economy," but the most common interactions between the citizen and the state do not follow a uniform pattern. How the citizen approaches an agency, and what he offers in return for its favors, depends largely on his education, the agency involved and, to a lesser extent, the region in which the interaction takes place. With little power to affect policy making, the citizen concentrates on influencing implementation. However, this can be done only on an *ad hoc* and *ad hominem* basis, so few systemic effects are felt. Despite the expansion of opportunities for expressing opinions, the Soviet system remains fundamentally one which is directed from above.

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Introduction

Growing knowledge of the formal aspects of the Soviet political system has led to an appreciation of the importance of its informal aspects. The Soviet press makes it clear that the system often works in ways not described in the law or the textbooks. The large emigration of the 1970's presents the West with the opportunity to discover how the informal system operates and interacts with the formal one. This study describes and analyzes how Soviet citizens go about obtaining what they want from several Soviet bureaucracies. The study concentrates on the means of obtaining housing, admission to higher education, jobs, and pensions. It also investigates how people interact with the police, the military and several other Soviet bureaucracies, primarily on the local level.

Four major questions were posed by this study: 1) how do citizens evaluate different bureaucracies? 2) What strategies do they develop for dealing with the different bureaucracies? 3) What are the determinants of these strategies and of individuals' styles in bureaucratic encounters? 4) Do their experiences with the government agencies influence their view of the system as a whole? In other words, do bureaucratic encounters weaken, strengthen or have no impact on diffuse support for the Soviet system?

In order to address these questions, several methods were used. The Soviet press was examined closely for the period 1975-mid-1982. Soviet academic writings on public administration, housing, pensions and other relevant topics were surveyed, as was the Western literature in these areas. A large survey of recent Soviet emigres was undertaken in Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. This was complemented by 59 in-depth interviews among emigres with specialized knowledge.

The results of this study are being made available in several places in addition to this report. Three articles have been published or accepted for publication, two conference papers will be presented in the fall, 1982, and several other publications are planned.

Bureaucracy and the Citizen in the USSR

In the Soviet political system the physical and psychological distances between the top elite and the mass of citizens are greater than in most democratic, and perhaps other "socialist," states. This is due to the size of the country, to Russian traditions of physical, cultural and political separation between rulers and masses, to a pervasive distrust of the masses and insecurity about them that grows out of Leninist fears of "spontaneity," and to the multi-layered hierarchical organization of every aspect of public life. Since the Soviet politician's career depends not on electoral success but on bureaucratic politics, he is not compelled to "go to the people" or "press the flesh" except on a few carefully orchestrated occasions. On the other hand, in the absence of any private sector, it is the government which controls many of the basic desiderata of life--jobs, housing, higher education, for example--which in other systems are only marginally or indirectly affected by the state. Therefore, government-citizen contacts are much more frequent than they are in, say, the American system. These contacts are most often at the local level, between citizens and lower-level employees of the various branches of the state administration. This makes the local officials "the target for citizen demands which in another regime might be handled by non-political subsystems."[1] Not only does this place a very heavy work load on local officials, but it also means that the Soviet citizen's most frequent and

most meaningful contact with the political system is as a client, indeed a supplicant, making demands and requests of lower level officials who are empowered to speak in the name of the state. Soviet legal sources assert that civil servants "always act by commission of the state and in its name,"[2] but they insist that since there is an identity of interests between the state and its citizens, civil servants simultaneously represent the interests of the citizenry. This contrasts with "bourgeois" civil servants who are divorced from the masses, serve the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie, and constitute a "privileged caste."[3]

Despite such legalistic assertions, some social scientists in the USSR admit that there might be an adversary relationship between government officials and the citizens they are supposed to serve. As one Soviet student of administration puts it delicately, "Administrative relations are perhaps the most flexible of social relationships....Administrative relations...lie in the sphere of subjective relations and are much more liable to be influenced by people than other social relationships."[4] Thus, there is room for maneuver, for kindness or abuse, for flexibility or rigidity, for satisfaction or frustration, in the myriad contacts between Soviet officials and Soviet citizens. Most Western studies of Soviet officialdom have concentrated on such important questions as the activities of bureaucracies as interest groups; politics within and between the elites of various bureaucracies; the relationship of state bureaucracies to the Party; the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of various hierarchies; and, most broadly, whether or not those hierarchies are "functional" and "dysfunctional."[5] This report concentrates on the relationship between some state hierarchies and Soviet citizens, largely from the perspective of the citizens. The aim is to gain insights,

not only into Soviet people's evaluation of specific bureaucracies, but also into their relationship with the Soviet state on the mundane, but vitally important, level of "daily life."

The ability of an organization, private or public, to satisfy the desires of its clients, would seem to depend on three things: 1) The material resources available to the organization and decisions about their allocation; 2) the structure of the organization, which may speed or impede effective delivery of its goods or services; 3) the quality and attitudes of the organization's personnel. Most clients are in no position to distinguish between the latter two; harrassed clerks who treat clients brusquely and cannot meet their demands may be well intentioned and even highly competent, but a lack of funds or an inefficient structure may frustrate their attempts to serve their public. On the other hand, employees may effectively sabotage an organization whose resources and structure are satisfactory. One can also conceive of the opposite situation -- a client who does not achieve his goal may still be positive toward the organization if he comes away with the feeling that its employees did their best for him but that only objective limitations prevented them from delivering the goods. This leads to a consideration of bureaucratic <u>style</u>, the way in which employees deal with clients. In market economies, employees of private organizations, and, to a lesser extent, of public bureaucracies, are taught to be friendly, courteous, understanding, and at least to pretend that "the customer is always right." This is clearly not the norm in the USSR. A former prime minister of socialist Hungary puts it this way:

> The 'client' is conceived as some kind of strange outsider, or even some downright malevolent person, over whom the administration, as the representative of the whole society, holds power....This mystified social interest represents a much greater power for the individual official than it did for a king ruling by divine right or any

> capitalist company. And to make the situation more grotesque and complicated, this tendency to make a derived power absolute often penetrates much more deeply into the lower ranks of the hierarchy than into the upper ones. The lower ranks are inclined to take out on the client their lack of a substantial deciding voice in the administrative system.[6]

This behavior is explained by structural factors, such as the lack of a capitalist incentive to attract customers, and by historical and cultural ones. Themselves only a generation or two removed from the peasantry or the proletariat, Soviet employees are acutely conscious of their powerlessness vis-a-vis their bureaucratic superiors, on the one hand, and their power over hapless citizens, on the other. In many instances their authority is so limited that they cannot satisfy the desires of the citizens even if they want to, but the citizen sees them as the representative of the all-powerful state who should be meeting their needs. Realizing the limited jurisdiction of lower level employees, more sophisticated Soviet citizens almost automatically demand to "see your supervisor," a demand often made of employees dealing with Soviet immigrants in Western countries. The combination of very narrow jurisdiction and insistent demands for service frustrate the official, who takes it out on the citizen. After all, the citizen by his very request reminds the employee of the latter's powerlessness. This pattern was well established in tsarist times and was reinforced in the Stalinist period.[7] Fear and bureaucratic paralysis have dissipated in the past thirty years, but over-centralization and the tendency to avoid decisions by referring matters higher up the bureaucratic ladder still characterize the system.

Since official agencies provide the basic necessities of life in the USSR, contacts with them are vitally important to Soviet people. How these contacts are evaluated may tell us not only about people's attitudes toward particular agencies but also about their overall affect toward the entire system.

Moreover, the ways in which Soviet people go about obtaining what they want from these agencies may differ from the formal patterns which are prescribed. A description of the actual strategies employed by citizens will provide insights into the informal workings of the system, of how citizens "work the system." Therefore, we shall deal here with three questions: 1) How do former Soviet citizens evaluate some Soviet urban service agencies and their personnel? 2) How did they "work the system" -- what strategies and tactics did they employ to extract what they wanted from the system? 3) Do different groups of people deal with the bureaucracies in different ways? In other words, do views of the bureaucracies vary significantly and consistently by republic, sex, age, education, occupation or other variables? Perhaps the bureaucracies themselves operate differently in different republics, indicating that the Soviet system is less monolithic and its administrative practices less uniform than often assumed in the West.

Two problems of method should be addressed. First, "Bureaucracy is a word with a bad reputation. If you ask people to supply an adjective to go along with the noun, their choices will almost inevitably be pejorative....Complaints about government bureaucracies have probably been commonplace at every period of history and in every country."[8] But people do not inevitably give a negative assessment when asked to evaluate a public bureaucracy in the light of their own experience. In fact, a major study of interactions between citizens and American public bureaucracies found that two-thirds of the respondents were satisfied with their most important "bureaucratic encounter." True, private agencies were seen more favorably, and people had a more positive picture of the way a personal experience was handled and a more negative generalized attitude toward government agencies.[9] Soviet emigres, too,

have differentiated attitudes toward bureaucracies and, despite a generalized hostility, are prepared to speak favorably about individual experiences. Our respondents' evaluations of individual agencies are consistently more favorable than their evaluations of Soviet bureaucrats and bureaucracies generally. Even in cases where there is a generalized hostility to bureaucracy, people will be induced to differentiate among degrees of hostility. In a Soviet survey involving 1,500 citizens and 1,000 local administrators, significant differences emerged in the views of the two groups on the proper and actual roles of citizens and administrators.[10]

The second problem of method is the use of emigre informants as substitutes for Soviet citizens who, of course, cannot be systematically interviewed by Western scholars. The problem of using emigres as sources of information about the Soviet system has been dealt with extensively,[11] and, in my opinion, successfully. Whether or not one can use an emigre sample to generalize to the Soviet population as a whole, in this study we shall be comparing <u>within</u> an emigre group and will observe <u>relative</u> differences which are more significant than the absolute answers to questions about the bureaucracies. Furthermore, as Inkeles and Bauer pointed out twenty years ago, it is likely that "comparable groups in the Soviet population will stand in the same relationship to each other as do members of our sample." [12]

It is often mentioned that, aside from its statistical unrepresentativeness, the emigration is likely to be more biased against the Soviet system than the population it left behind. In light of the fact that many people left the Soviet Union for personal, economic and family reasons, rather than because of political, cultural or ethnic disaffection, and that some unknown, but considerable proportion are "secondary migrants" who made

no independent decision to leave but did so as dependents of all generations, the assumption of bias is not necessarily correct, though it is impossible to test it empirically.

In our sample,23 per cent gave as their primary reason for leaving the fact that they had relatives abroad or that they were following spouses, parents, or children who had decided to leave. Many of them left reluctantly and resent having been "pulled along" by others' decisions. Another 23 per cent cited their desire to live among people of their own ethnic group. Only 15 per cent cited "political reasons" or "hatred of the Soviet system" as their reason for leaving. Often, idiosyncratic reasons were given: "Soviet life had become boring;" "My sister in Israel fell ill, and I felt I had to come and help her;" "Everyone was going, so we went too;" "I was looking for something new in my life." Moreover, there are areas where problems of bias can be minimized. For example, concrete, detailed questions about personal experiences could elicit factual information with less evaluative coloring than attitudinal questions and with more reliable information than that obtained by asking people about matters where they had no direct experience (e.g., experiences as consumers cf. how foreign policy decisions are made). Even without a representative sample, if large numbers of people with a particular characteristic exhibit patterns of behavior or outlook which are strikingly and consistently different from those displayed by parallel groups, it seems reasonable to conclude that there are real differences between the two groups. Finally, the ethnic imbalance of the present emigration need not color this study. The dominant emigre ethnic group, Jews, are quite diverse, speaking different languages, coming from vastly different geo-cultural areas, and representing several levels of

education and many occupations. For many purposes ethnicity will be less important than, say, level of education or republic of residence. For example, the way Georgian Jews interact with a local bureaucracy more likely resembles the way non-Jewish Georgians do so than the way Ukrainian or Lithuanian Jews do.

The Sample

A group of 1,161 ex-Soviet citizens, almost all of whom had left the USSR in 1977-80, were interviewed between April 1980 and March 1981. The interviews were condicted in Israel (n=590), the Federal Republic of Germany (n=100) and the United States (n=471). The sample was drawn in line with some hypotheses that led to a certain distribution by age, sex, education, nationality, and republic of residence. Six hundred women and 561 men were interviewed, the youngest being 22 (to insure that respondents would have had at least some personal dealings with Soviet bureaucracies). Most reached maturity in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras.

TABLE 1

PERIOD OF BIRTH OF RESPONDENTS

1893-1917	1918-1929	1930's	1940's	1950's
173	185	259	320	215

About 40 per cent of the Soviet immigrations to Israel and the United States has claimed some form of Soviet higher education. This is reflected in the educational profile of our respondents, 47 per cent of whom had higher education, with 38 per cent having secondary and only 15 per cent elementary

schooling. In the sample, 77 per cent (n=889) had been registered as Jews on their internal Soviet passports. There were 129 registered as Russians, 98 as Germans, 18 as Ukrainians, and 27 of other nationalities. The areas in which the respondents lived most of their lives are as follows:

TABLE 2

RESPONDENTS' AREA OF RESIDENCE* IN USSR[13]

RSFSR	Ukraine	Moldavia	Baltic	Georgia	Central Asia
330	247	120	174	120	165

*The area of residence of 5 respondents was not clear.

The men and women are quite evenly distributed by age and region, but males dominate the blue collar professions and females the white collar ones, despite very similar educational levels (48 per cent of the men and 46 per cent of the women have higher education). As might be expected, there are more young people from Georgia and Central Asia, where birth rates are higher, than from the other regions. Educational levels are highest among those from the RSFSR (69 per cent have higher education--72 per cent of the ethnic Russians are highly educated), followed by the Baltic, Ukraine and Georgia. Those from Moldavia and from Central Asia, have the lowest educational levels (only 23 per cent of the Moldavian Jews and 18 per cent of the Central Asians have higher education). They also have the lowest proportion of Communist Party members, though among ethnic Germans, where only 16 per cent have higher education, there is only one ex-Party member. Those from the Baltic report having had the highest incomes, whether by family unit or per capita, followed by the RSFSR and the Ukraine.

The Moldavians had the lowest incomes of the European groups, and on a per capita basis were outranked by the Georgians. The Central Asians had the lowest incomes of any group.

These people were interviewed in Russian or Georgian by native speakers. There were remarkably few refusals to be interviewed, though the average interview lasted between two and three hours. In addition to the standard questionnaire which was administered to the entire group, 59 "in-depth" interviews were conducted with people who themselves had been officials of the Soviet government agencies we investigated, or who seemed to have unusual savoir-faire and knowledge of how things were done in their respective republics.

General Evaluations of the Soviet Bureaucracy

Not surprisingly, the emigres interviewed have a somewhat negative view of Soviet bureaucracy in general. Two-thirds do not think that most Soviet government offices "work as they should." They take a somewhat more charitable view of the workings of government offices in the countries to which they have immigrated.[14] Their most frequent complaints about bureaucracy in general focus on both structure and personnel; the main problems are said to be waste of time caused by the procedures, being shuffled back and forth among offices, and officials who do not want to understand them.[15]

Nine sets of adjectives, each ranging from a positive to a negative quality and describing "the majority of government officials in the USSR," were presented to respondents who were asked to indicate where along a seven point scale they would place these officials. On every set but one the modal response was in the middle, but on every set of adjectives more

people, though not a majority in all cases, favored the negative end of the scale. The Israeli sample, which included all the Georgians and most of the Central Asians, rated the officials higher than the American sample did, and the German group rated them lowest of all, with most of their modal responses distinctly on the negative side of the scale. This is consistent with the finding that despite their relatively low level of education which is correlated with more positive assessments among the other nationalities, 92 per cent of the Germans do not think that most Soviet government offices run as they should.

In a further probe of generalized attitudes toward officialdom, eleven occupations were given to respondents to evaluate. These included physician, worker, teacher, scientist, military officer, "brigadier" in a factory, and five kinds of officials. Employees of the Communist Party ranked lowest of all the occupations, and housing officials were next lowest. Pension officials were seen more favorably, and those in charge of admissions to higher education were evaluated even more positively, outranking brigadiers and ordinary workers. Older, less educated people and Central Asians evaluate the officials more positively, and, again, it is the Germans who take the dimmest view by far of Soviet officials.[16] As we shall see, from among the agencies we have focussed on (these do not include the Party), those dealing with housing are seen most negatively, and this is reflected in the rankings of various occupations.

Thus, while the overall disposition of the ex-Soviet citizens toward Soviet local officials is generally negative, it is not undifferentiatedly so. People do distinguish among bureaucracies, and different groups of emigres evaluate the bureaucracies differently. We shall explore this further by

examining evaluations of particular bureaucracies and the methods Soviet citizens use to deal with them.

Remembrance of Bureaucratic Encounters Past

The emigres were asked to recall their experiences with certain Soviet bureaucracies, about which they were questioned in some detail. We found three categories of administrative agencies. The first includes bureaucracies toward which citizen initiative is either unnecessary, because the agency will most often produce the desired output without special efforts by the client, or it is useless, because the agency will not be responsive to such efforts. The great majority of respondents who had personal experience with pension agencies (gorsobes, raisobes) did not find it necessary to undertake any extraordinary initiatives in order to receive their pensions (though some "improved" their pensions by various means). Asked what a person should do if he did not receive a pension to which he was entitled, over half the respondents said that a letter to a higher authority should suffice. Another 20 per cent recommended that the person simply wait patiently, for he would surely get the pension. There was also widespread agreement that in the armed forces it would be useless to try and change one's assignment and get around orders. The best one could expect was that official regulations would be equitably applied.

Opinions were divided as to the best way to handle traffic police. Some see the police applying the law rigidly and uniformly, while others, on the basis of their own experience or what they had heard from family and friends, expressed the opinion that citizen initiatives could influence actions by the police. Thus, 45 per cent thought that a woman stopped by

a policeman for speeding would have no choice but to accept the penalty, but nearly a quarter suggested offering a bribe. A young woman from Tashkent assured us that her father, a taxi driver, never had a problem with the police as long as he had a five ruble note handy. Three quarters of the respondents from Georgia, but only 51 per cent of those from the RSFSR, thought that they could bribe a policeman to forget a minor infraction they had committed. This suggests that views of the police depend on the region involved, and that this hierarchy, at least, differs in its modus operandi from republic to republic, or, at least, there are different perceptions of the hierarchy in the various republics.

The third category of agency includes admissions committees in higher educational institutions, agencies that assign housing, hiring departments of enterprises, and raspredelenie commissions, whose job it is to assign higher education graduates to their first post. In these institutions, it is widely felt, the routine workings of the system were highly unlikely to produce the desired result without a special "push" by the citizen, one which might involve semi-legal or illegal measures. Thus, two-thirds of the respondents suggested bribery or using connections (sviazy) to avoid an undesirable job assignment, and three-quarters suggested the same tactics for gaining admission to a university or institute of higher education.

Working the System

How Soviet citizens attempt to influence actively the implementation of policy seems to vary according to two factors: their own education, and the particular agency involved. Regional differences are not as great as might be supposed. Sex and age are not important in differentiating styles

of confronting and dealing with the bureaucracy.

The respondents with higher education tend to be more assertive in the family, at school, and in the workplace than the others, but they do not present themselves as more assertive personalities than the others (how sure they are of themselves and their decisions, whether they prefer to be the boss or an employee, etc.). Higher education is linked to greater confidence in social situations, including bureaucratic encounters, but not necessarily to more aggressive personalities. This is manifest in responses to the question, "Which type of government official would you prefer -- the one who treats everyone equally regardless of circumstances or the one who treats each case individually, taking account of its special characteristics?"

TABLE 3

Bureaucratic Style Preferred, by Education
(n=1,113)

Preference	Education		
	Grade School	Secondary	Higher
Equal treatment	21.9	14.8	5.9
Sometimes equal, sometimes differentiated	30.9	24.7	17.4
Differentiated	36.5	55.7	73.8
Don't know, no answer	10.7	4.8	3.0

The preference of the most educated people for a case-by-case differentiation is striking. As an engineer from Kharkov expressed it, "Taking each case on its own merits means that the opportunity to use blat ("pull") or znakomstvo (connections) is present, and that's the only way to survive in

the USSR. In the U.S., on the other hand, I prefer that state employees treat everyone the same." In the country of immigration, in other words, the engineer felt disadvantaged and no longer had confidence in his ability to swing things his way in bureaucratic encounters. But in the Soviet Union educated people may think that their education gives them status greater than that conferred on the bureaucrat by his position. It also gives them a savoir faire which they can use to their advantage. Less educated people have no such illusions. They defer to the status conferred on the official by his position, making no judgments about the person. The educated look at the person and figure they can handle him because they are better educated. The less educated look at the position and are not prepared to challenge it.

However, this does not mean that they will meekly accept whatever fate, speaking through the bureaucrat, will ordain. Many people, irrespective of their educational background, try to influence the implementation of policy and the decisions of administrators, though the more educated are more likely to take an activist posture even in "rigid" bureaucracies such as the armed forces and the OVIR, which regulates emigration. But the tactics of the more and less educated differ. Less educated people are more inclined to bribery, while more educated ones will "pull strings" and use personal connections to extract what they want from a bureaucracy. Obviously, the highly educated are more likely to know people in high places, how to get to them and how to approach them. This tactical difference has probably been the pattern in Russia and elsewhere for centuries; the best the peasant could do to gain the favor of the all-mighty official was to bring him a chicken or some moonshine, whereas the educated and

the wealthy were more likely to mix socially with the official and, probably, his superiors.

Reading the Soviet press one gets the impression that bribery and corruption are concentrated in the southern and Central Asian republics. It is well known that these reached such proportions in Georgia and Azerbaizhan, involving the highest echelons of the Party and state in those republics, that in the 1970's the First Secretaries of the Party in each were purged, along with perhaps hundreds of associates. One might assume that in bureaucratic encounters in those areas there would be a greater tendency to use illegal means than in the other areas of the country.

Our data do not entirely support this assumption. To be sure, there are differences in style among people from different regions. Europeans are twice as likely as Georgians and Central Asians to initiate contacts with official bodies for the satisfaction of various claims. Georgians and Central Asians seem more passive and are more persuaded of the fairness of officials generally. Perhaps because of their lower educational levels, the political cultures of their regions, or both, the Central Asians, and, especially, the Georgians, place more emphasis on the importance of money generally and on the role it can play in bureaucratic transactions specifically. When asked what is the most important factor for success in the USSR, 12 to 18 per cent of the Europeans and 21 per cent of the Central Asians identified money, but 48 per cent of the Georgians did so. Europeans emphasized connections distinctly more than either Asians or Georgians, with the latter two identifying ability as a precondition for success more often than the Europeans. Between 4 and 8 per cent of the Europeans, 12 per cent of the Asians, and 8 per cent of the Georgians

singled out education as the most important factor. As mentioned earlier, three-quarters of the Georgians thought it possible to bribe a policeman to forget a minor infraction, but only 51 per cent of former RSFSR residents thought so. Central Asians, Balts and Moldavians resembled each other very closely on this question -- about 64 per cent of each thought a bribe would be possible -- and those from Ukraine gave replies similar to the RSFSR group.

However, there was no significant variation by region in answer to the question of what proportion of Soviet employees take graft. More significantly, there was no such variation in the responses to seven situations described in which respondents had to choose a course of action that they thought would have been effective. These actions included legal steps, appeals, looking for connections, bribery, and so on. There was no tendency in any of the situations for a particular regional group to recommend a course of action different from that of the other groups. It is not clear, therefore, that there are consistent differences among regional styles of bureaucratic interaction.

What does emerge very clearly is that different agencies evoke different kinds of behavior on the part of the clients, probably not because of differences in the structure and personnel of the agencies so much as differences in the availability and nature of the services they provide.

Among the policy implementing bureaucracies, housing agencies (most frequently the _zhilotdel_, or housing department of the local soviet) are evaluated most negatively, and those providing pensions (local or district social security administrations, the _gorsobes_ and _raisobes_) are evaluated most positively. The contrast in evaluations of housing and pension agencies

is made obvious by the following table which show overall evaluations of the agencies, followed by evaluations of specific attributes. From the table immediately below, we can also see that housing agencies rank the lowest of five on which we have data.

TABLE 4

OVERALL EVALUATION OF HOW AGENCIES HANDLED RESPONDENT'S CASE

	Housing (n=196)	Pension (n=231)	Raspredelenie* (n=314)	Jobs** (n=832)	Admissions Committees in Higher Education (n=597)
Very Well	4.1%	8.2%	11.1%	9.4%	9.3%
Well	30.1	74.0	61.5	78.4	75.0
Poorly	48.5	14.7	18.2	8.4	12.0
Very Poorly	17.3	3.0	9.2	3.8	3.7

*Job assignment to graduates of higher educational institutions.
**Jobs which were obtained other than through _raspredelenie._

Respondents were asked specific questions about their treatment by the agencies and what their impressions were about their operations and personnel. Had they been treated with respect? Did they think that the agency operated efficiently and fairly? Was everyone treated equally by the agency? In the table below the responses to these questions are combined and compared. (The percentage displayed is that of the affirmative answers given, and the figures in parentheses are the number of respondents.)

TABLE 5

CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE AGENCIES* AS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS

	Housing	Raspredelenie	Pensions
Respectful	51% (309)	80% (299)	78% (241)
Efficient	17% (304)	53% (277)	75% (236)
Fair treatment given	10% (296)	34% (282)	NA
All are treated equally	9% (257)	NA	74% (171)

*Not all the same questions were asked in regard to the other agencies in Table 4.

On nearly every dimension housing ranks lowest and the pension agency the highest, with a very wide gap between the two. Perhaps it is inevitable that when an agency cannot satisfy the demands of most clients it will be thought of as inefficient, unfair and biased in favor of some groups. Whether or not the harsh judgment of the housing agencies is "objectively" justified is of little importance for our purposes, because we are dealing with the perceptions and evaluations of the clientele.

Soviet sources provide ample evidence that the pension agencies are plagued by poorly trained personnel and inefficient procedures,[17] and yet we find that our respondents evaluate the agency and its personnel favorably, and that the great majority see no need to resort to any special tactics in order to receive their pensions. The apparent paradox is explained by the

fact that, on one hand, older people are more docile and willing to accept what the state provides,[18] and, on the other, that almost all who are entitled to pensions receive them, whereas the housing problem is perhaps the most difficult one in the daily life of the Soviet citizen. Despite the fact that since 1957 the USSR has been building 2.2 million housing units annually, in the mid-1970's the average per capita living space in urban areas was only 8 square meters (10 in Moscow). An estimated 30 per cent of urban households still shared apartments, and it is not uncommon for people to wait as long as ten years to get an apartment.[19] Even getting on the list is a problem, as only those with less than nine square meters of living space (a minimum standard set in the 1920's) are eligible. Twenty per cent of our respondents had been on a waiting list for an apartment. There are significant disparities in housing space across the republics, especially if measured on a per capita basis. In 1976, for example, housing space per capita was 15.1 square meters in Estonia but 9.0 in Uzbekistan, and in the RSFSR the larger cities have been benefitting more than the smaller ones from new construction.[20] This does not necessarily mean that housing conditions are better in, say, Estonia than in Uzbekistan. Central Asian houses, often privately owned, are built around courtyards which increase the amount of space actually used by a household. Moreover, as Michael Rywkin points out, per _family_ space is much higher in Uzbekistan than in the RSFSR, though per _capita_ space is lower, and "a six-person family does not need exactly double the space of a three-person one."[21] Among our own respondents we find that 86 per cent of the Europeans had _less_ than 60 meters of living space per household, whereas 64 per cent of the Asians had _more_ than 60 meters, and 36 per cent had more than 100 meters.

In Georgia, 74 per cent had more than 60 meters! These differences are the likely explanation for the fact that the Asians and Georgians are more kindly disposed toward housing officials than the Europeans, rating them higher on efficiency, fairness of treatment, and the efforts they make on behalf of clients.

The scramble to obtain housing is a fairly general one, and not a few short stories, feuilletons, and even novels have been written on the subject.[22] Small wonder that the most imaginative tactics are devised to obtain even the most modest apartments. An informant who worked in two housing administrations in Moscow in the late 1940's and 1950's, when housing was especially short, notes that bribery to obtain an apartment was so widespread that "people did not ask each other 'did you give' but only 'how much.'" Party officials, those with "responsible posts," those who had other favors to trade or simply had relatives and friends working in the housing administration were advantaged in the struggle for a dwelling. Though the situation has improved markedly in recent decades, nearly two-thirds of our respondents report that they tried to advance their position on the waiting list, either through appealing to a higher Soviet organ or, less frequently, using illegal tactics. The intervention of one's supervisor at work is often sought. Of those who went through the appeal process (n=129), just over half report that the appeal was successful and they obtained the apartment. Those who do not appeal successfully use other tactics, and enter what Morton calls the "subsidiary housing market" (private rentals, cooperatives, exchanges of apartments and private houses).[23] Exchanging apartments is the remedy most often prescribed by our respondents for those who have been unsuccessful in getting one from the official lists,

but bribery is the second best. The official list is quite "flexible," as Soviet sources explain. "Too often the decisive factor is not the waiting list," Pravda commented, "but a sudden telephone call...[after which] they give the flats to the families of football players, and the whole queue is pushed back."[24] Even to purchase a cooperative apartment involves waiting lists.

A "Bukharan" Jewish woman from Tashkent we interviewed grew up in an eight-room private house with her own room. After marriage, she applied for a coop because all her mother's children and grandchildren were registered as living in the big house, making it look like crowded conditions. The Uzbek clerk could not read Russian well and asked her to fill out the application for the coop, and then asked her to have it typed. "When I brought the typed version I put a bottle of vodka on the desk. He didn't take money, only vodka. Uzbeks don't take money. They are very humane people. He took vodka because, as an Uzbek, he is not allowed to drink. He can't go into a store to buy vodka because the clerks are Uzbeks and it would be embarrassing. So they get vodka from us, the 'foreigners.'"

Getting a pension rarely involves this much chicanery, though the press reports numerous instances of bureaucratic snafus connected with pensions, and there are occasional reports of pension officials making money from "dead souls" in the Gogolian tradition.[25] But some pensioners also monkey with the system, especially since many pensions are very low (we have reports from Central Asia of pensions as low as 24 rubles a month, and many instances in the European USSR of pensions around 60 rubles, the latter being roughly one-third the average urban wage in the 1970's). A bookkeeper from a small town in Moldavia explained that since pensions are based on

average salary in the last years of employment, "sometimes to help out a worker who was going on pension the administration would promote him to a vacancy with a higher pay scale, even if he was not qualified for the job." Bonuses and overtime pay would be calculated into the figures for average salary in order to inflate the pension. All of this, she claimed, was assumed to be legal.

Getting into higher education is a far more complicated matter, especially for Jews in the periods 1948-1958 and from 1971 to the present. Though some respondents indicate that blat rather than bribery is used to gain entrance to higher education, two former members of admissions committees recall the widespread use of bribery and one woman from the Ukraine frankly said that she was admitted only because her mother paid a 3,000 ruble bribe. Another person who was on the admissions committee of a polytechnic in Leningrad reports that in his institute the bribes ran about 500 rubles, but into the thousands for the pediatric faculty and the First Medical Institute in Leningrad. But other forms of chicanery are more prevalent. A Georgian Jew tells how he paid 100 rubles in Kulashi to have his nationality changed from Jew to Georgian so that he would be admitted to the pediatric institute in Leningrad. (This trick having worked, he returned as a pediatrician to Kulashi. But when he went to change his nationality back to Jew -- "everyone knew me there and it was silly to be registered as a Georgian" -- "the boys" demanded 200 rubles, for, they explained, since the Jews were getting out of the country it was now worth more to be a Jew!) Our Leningrad informant, who was himself helped in getting into the school of his choice because he was a basketball player, tells us that athletes and residents of Leningrad were favored for admission, as were children of faculty. Admissions

committee members in Leningrad got written instructions not to admit anyone to the journalism faculty without recommendations from the Party raikom. Certain specialties even in the philological faculty were explicitly closed to Jews. In such cases, bribery, connections and other tactics will not work, except very rarely, and people learn quickly to give up on these institutions.

The other side of this is an "affirmative action" program designed to increase the number of natives in the republic's higher educational institutions. Two Soviet authors assert that "It is understood that in socialist societies objectively there can be no discrimination against any national group. Soviet educational practice knows no such examples...." At the same time, they say that "It must be assumed that the more the proportion of a nationality in higher education corresponds to its proportion in the population as a whole, the more the system of higher education lives up to the democratic ideal of equal educational opportunity for all people irrespective of nationality." To achieve this "one can permit...conditional influence of a variable such as the nationality of an individual" on admissions decisions.[26] Indeed, informants from two cities in Moldavia reported independently that in the 1970's they were told quite openly not to bother applying to Kishinev Polytechnical Institute because that was being reserved for ethnic Moldavians. Central Asian respondents portray admissions officials desperately trying to fill ethnic quotas. One woman draws a perhaps exaggerated picture of Uzbek officials scouring the countryside for young Uzbek women who could be persuaded to attend a pedagogical institute training music teachers for elementary schools. "Before September 1 many teachers would drive from village to village and simply collect girls

who had nothing to do with music, who had not finished music schools like other European girls and myself, and who had no musical ability, simply in order to fill the quota of students of the local nationality." Other informants report that in the Ukraine and Moldavia, at least, rural students were favored for admission to institutes and were eagerly recruited, and this is confirmed as policy by official sources.

For those departments and schools which are realistic possibilities for Jews, the way in is not always a direct one. A common practice is to hire a tutor for the applicant, not so much to prepare the applicant, as to prepare the way with the admissions committee. Often, the tutor is a member of the faculty and he will see to it that his student gets in, sometimes by turning over some of his fees to his colleagues (reported in Moscow, Kharkov, Leningrad). One operator told parents: "I'll get your child into the institute for 1,000 rubles. Give me 300 now and the rest only if he gets in." The advance would be used to bribe clerks to put the child's name on the list of those admitted, bypassing the admissions committee, and then the rest was pocketed by the "fixer." One admissions committee member admitted frankly that he gave higher admission grades to students who had been tutored by his friends.[27]

If citizens and members of admissions committees fool with the system, so, of course, does the Party. A woman who taught in several pedagogical institutes reports that at the final meeting of the admissions committee a representative of the Party _raikom_ and another of the _obshchestvennost_ (usually someone working with the Party) would come and express their opinions freely. They would insure that certain ethnic distributions were achieved and that certain individuals were admitted or turned down.

In Kharkov, it is claimed, there are three lists of applicants: those who must be admitted; those who must not be; and the rest. In the Kharkovite's experience, the Party did not directly participate in the admissions process, but did so indirectly by approving members of admission committees, making up the above-mentioned lists, and providing written guidelines for admission policies.

The Soviet press does not hide the fact that the struggle for admission to higher education is a fierce one, and that all kinds of means are employed in it. "Every summer when the school graduates boom starts and the doors of vuzy (higher educational institutions) are blocked by lines of applicants, ripples of that wave sweep over editorial staffs as well. Parents and grandparents of school graduates call up and come in person (the person who failed the exams never comes). With great inspiration they tell what profound knowledge their child has, how diligent he was, how well he replied to each question, but the perfidy of the examiner was beyond all expectations." The writer notes, however, that "the majority of complaints are quite just."[28]

The intelligentsia is especially anxious to have its children gain higher education. In Azerbaizhan none other than the first secretary of the republic Party organization, candidate member of the Politburo G. Aliev, complained that in the law faculty of the local university "The overwhelming majority of the students are children of militia, procurators, judges, law professors and employees of Party and state organs....We were concerned with the threat of nepotism and 'heredity' within the administrative organs." He complained also about the "fashion" of the 1960's when senior officials "arranged" to receive higher degrees, commenting sardonically on a popular

saying that "A scholar you might not be, but a kandidat you surely must become."[29]

If one gets into the institute or university and then graduates, a raspredelenie commission will normally assign the graduate his or her first job. Very often this is an undesirable position in an even less desirable location. For example, it is common practice to assign teachers or physicians, many of whom are single women, to rural areas in Siberia and Central Asia. To avoid such assignments, some will simply take a job outside their field, others arrange fictitious marriages with spouses who have residence permits in desirable locations. Still others appeal the decision and try to get a "free diploma," that is, a diploma without a specific job assignment, which leaves them to their own devices. In only one instance were we told of a bribe being used (in the West Ukraine) to get a good assignment. Several informants report being assigned to jobs in Central Asia, only to find upon arrival that there was no need for them, that the local institutions had not requested them, and the local authorities were not eager to have non-natives take jobs there. Despite the inconvenience, such contretemps were welcomed because they freed the person from the assignment. In 1979 nearly 30 per cent of assigned jobs were not taken,[30] and in some rural areas the proportion of those who did not show up to their assignments was higher.[31] Of course, some graduates try to use blat, to try and pull strings with the job assignment commission, and this is reported to work fairly well. The other use of blat is to get some "big boss" to specifically request the graduate as an employee of his institution.

Getting non-professional jobs is less complicated. The most frequent way of finding a job is through a friend or relative and, as in

the United States, we have instances of three generations employed in the same factory. However, payoffs are sometimes involved. A former teacher from Transcarpathian Ukraine, who later worked in construction, found a teaching job in a small Ukrainian city, but the principal made it clear that a "tax" would have to be paid, and not for him alone. (The "tax" was paid but returned within days because the "higher-ups" would not accept it as they did not want the teacher employed under any circumstances.) For a construction job that paid 190 rubles a month the man had to pay 260 in advance, and this was shared by the director, chief engineer, supplies chief and other bosses in the kombinat. Later, the cashier automatically deducted a small sum from his monthly pay and everyone understood that it was going to "the kombinat." This particular kombinat also had "dead souls" on the payroll whose salaries went to people very much alive. When our informant moved to Siberia, he found that practices were quite different. Money bribes were not given in labor-hungry Siberia, but appreciation was expressed, at most, with a bottle of vodka.

Ethnicity does enter into employment. A former polytechnic instructor in Kharkov reports that in the personnel department he once saw each employee's nationality listed after the surname, with the nationalities color-coded for faster recognition: red for Russians, green for Ukrainians, blue for Jews. It seems that in many regions people will try to hire others of their own ethnic group. A man from Kokand (Uzbekistan) related that the dental polyclinics there were heavily staffed by Armenians and Jews, so, in line with current nationality policy, the pressure was on to hire Uzbeks. Only by pulling strings did this Jew get hired, and then only for a half-time job. But he did not

mind very much because under a khozraschet system he was paid for full time. Moreover, he could make substantial sums in private practice. As he puts it, "Over there when you find a job you don't ask 'what will my salary be' but 'how much will I have on the side?'" In fact, the likelihood of substantial illegal income made him avoid Party membership, for which he was recommended when in the army. A Party member would have to be on his good behavior and so he claimed that his grandfather was fanatically religious and would not allow him to join the Party. Significantly, this excuse was immediately accepted in Central Asia where the patriarchal family and religious traditions are more familiar than in the European areas.

Finally, we see how the respondents regard the militia (police). The characterization of the militia is different from that of the other employees and a remarkable consensus was elicited by this open question. Asked what type of people joined the militia in the localities of their residence, nearly a third answered "peasants, people from the countryside" who were using militia work to gain urban residence permits, and 23 per cent mentioned "uneducated, uncultured people." Another 20 per cent described them as people with little education who sought to avoid factory work. But only a third said the militia had been unfair in their personal contacts with them and the majority assert that police would treat them like anyone else if they were, say, stopped for a traffic violation. Thus, the attitude towards the militia seems to be one of condescension and even contempt, but not hatred or fear. However, most people feel that, in general, the police would discriminate in favor of Party members and others with important positions or "good connections," and against the poor, drunkards, Jews, and, especially Germans. The latter group is the most negative in its view of the militia,

perhaps because of the Germans' experiences in the 1940's and 1950's and continued popular discrimination against them. Germans see the militia as arbitrary, and they see little sense in appealing a policeman's action. If stopped for a traffic violation, to a greater extent than Jews or Russians they will simply pay the fine or try to bribe, but they will not argue or appeal. Every German respondent with elementary education feels the militia do not treat people equally, though the more highly educated have a more differentiated view. Among Jews, on the other hand, the relationship between education and feelings about the militia is reversed: it is the highly educated Jews who perceive the militia as treating people unequally.

The difference between European and Georgian-Central Asian perceptions can be seen in the following table.

TABLE 6

RESPONDENTS' WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THEIR CHILDREN BE MILITIA MEN
(n=1053)

	Europeans	Asians-Georgians
Unwilling	93.4%	77.3%
Willing	6.6%	22.7%

gamma = .61

Of course, for the less educated Asians-Georgians, especially Asians, service in the militia is a channel for upward mobility, as it has been for immigrant and underprivileged groups in other countries. But the differences we observe may also reflect different feelings toward the militia among the regional groups.

We see, then, that different agencies elicit different types of behavior. Some, like pension and military hierarchies, seem relatively immune to extra-legal and informal procedures. But in regard to other agencies, bribery, and, especially, the use of blat and protektsiia, are so widespread that they are regularly discussed and condemned in the press. One detailed analysis of "protectionism" raised both principled and pragmatic objections to it. Protektsiia is said to be objectionable because it violates the socialist principle of "from each according to his capabilities, to each according to his work." On the practical level, protektsiia rewards the incompetent, discourages hard work and initiative, allows people to make buying and selling favors their profession, and promotes calculations of self-interest "incompatible with communist morality."[32] The resort to protektsiia arises, it is suggested, because social norms are not well defined and because of the "underdevelopment of certain branches of our economy." The law is said to be too vague for curbing the use of protektsiia. Unlike bribery, using protektsiia is not generally considered a crime except if "substantial harm is done to state or public interests, or to the rights of individuals."[33]

As this argument implicitly acknowledges, the use of protektsiia--and in some areas and under certain circumstances, even of bribery--is socially acceptable and not discouraged by law or custom. It is in line with age-old traditions in many areas of the USSR.[34] Soviet authors decry "survivals of the past" which are said to contradict "socialist morality and way of life." Some Western observers see not just "survivals" but a Soviet failure to resocialize the population to Marxist-Leninist norms. One student of Soviet political culture asserts that "'New Soviet Man,' in short, does not exist; Soviet citizens remain overwhelmingly the product of their

historical experience rather than of Marxist-Leninist ideological training."[35] This is an exaggeration--there has been successful resocialization in many areas of life--but it is true that pre-revolutionary styles and practices survive in certain spheres, even among third and fourth generation Soviet citizens. The relationship between the government official and the citizen closely resembles pre-Communist forms in the USSR and other socialist countries. Kenneth Jowitt is correct in asserting that ". . . In their attempt to critically redefine society, Marxist-Leninist regimes simultaneously achieve basic, far-reaching, and decisive change in certain areas, allow for the maintenance of pre-revolutionary behavioral and attitudinal political postures in others, and unintentionally strengthen many traditional postures in what for the regime are often priority areas."[36] Jowitt shows that in Romania, pile (pull, connections) is no less prevalent than blat in the USSR. These practices "obstruct the development of a political culture based on overt, public, cooperative, and rule-based relationships. Instead they reinforce the traditional community and regime political cultures with their stress on covert, personalized, hierarchical relationships involving complicity rather than public agreements."[37]

The prevalence of blat should not be attributed to some mystical staying power of pre-revolutionary political culture. Rather, it is supported by present-day structural factors which are themselves continuations of tsarist practices. The highly centralized and hierarchical administrative structure of tsarist days has been continued and reinforced by its heirs, so the kind of tactics used to ameliorate the harshness of tsarist administration are well suited to the present day as well. The absence of rational-legal authority and the non-existence or weakness of interest groups in both tsarist and Soviet periods have left the average

citizen without influence over policy making and with little legal protection against administrative arbitrariness or even the mindless application of what is construed as the law. The citizen is left to devise individual strategies and tactics which will not change the making of the law but will, he hopes, turn its implementation (or non-application) in his favor.

"Working the System" as a Form of Political Participation

As the Soviet system has "thawed" in the last 25 years, so have Western views of it changed. The view of the Soviet system as a "command polity," where political orders were given from above to a completely subordinated population, has been modified. We now think of more interactive politics with regularized, legitimated exchanges, however uneven, of political ideas and influence between elites and non-elites. The roles of public opinion, interest groups, and citizen participation in the formulation of Soviet policies have been much discussed.[38] The focus has been on the "input" side of the system: in what ways do Soviet people make demands of and provide supports for the Soviet polity? The first instinct of Western political scientists is to look for answers in the institutions of the system and in the informal mechanisms of policy making. Assuming an idealized version of a Western democracy as the norm, one turns to voting, interest group activity, representative organs, local government and so on as the locus of interaction between the leaders of the polity and its rank-and-file members. It is assumed that the crucial question to ask is "how and by whom is policy made?"

However, I would argue that the question of policy making is a foregone conclusion to the great majority of Soviet people, and that the

more important question to them is "how is policy implemented." Most Soviet people do not think they can make or even influence policy, and are not even interested in doing so. Even among those who are interested, the majority probably sees no realistic chance of doing so. That is why I have chosen to investigate how policy is implemented and how Soviet citizens try to influence its implementation. Of course, there are Western scholars who think that citizen participation in the formal institutions of policy making has more than symbolic value. Jerry Hough, impressed by the growth in statistical indicators of participation, argues that it "remains an open question" as to whether "citizen participation in public policy discussions is not decisive in shaping major Soviet policies."[39] In later formulations he is a bit more cautious. He speaks of "large numbers of Soviet citizens" who "are engaged in activities that *would seem* to give them *at least the potential* of influence on *some types* of decisions" as well as of "organized group activity of a kind that *can entail potential involvement* in various levels of decision-making."[40] (Italics added.) But the overall impression Hough conveys is of increasing and very large numbers of Soviet citizens participating meaningfully in political decision making.

A different picture is drawn by Theodore Friedgut, who does not deny the quantitative indicators of participation adduced by Hough, but imputes a very different qualitative nature to participation.

> Wherever we have been able to examine empirical findings regarding the Soviet citizen's public activity, whether from conversations with emigrants, from Soviet field surveys, or from some of the more frank and penetrating discussions published by Soviet scholars, we note a distinct lack of the dimension of citizen initiative. We find chronic recurrence of formal activity devoid of content. . . . The

> activization of participatory institutions has not eliminated the subject element so prominent in Soviet political culture. Conformity rather than initiative still guides the Soviet citizen. Administrative raison d'etat is served before community self-determination, and preserves its primacy through control of both the form and content of the participatory structures of the community.[41]

Seweryn Bialer offers a synthesis of the two positions. He distinguishes between "high politics"--the major political issues and the actions of leaders--and "low politics"--"the decisions that directly touch the citizen's daily life, the communal matters, and the conditions of the workplace."[42] The "average Soviet citizen" is indifferent to "high politics" and feels that it's none of his business. "The average person considers politics a separate way of life, a profession for which one is trained and paid." However, "low politics" involves a "very high proportion" of the citizenry and it is "the very substance of the Soviet system of political participation."[43]

I believe this research project demonstrates that in addition to "high" and "low" politics there is a third dimension where policy making is not the issue but policy implementation is. Here politics becomes individualized and privatized. People do not seek to promote or retard policies which will affect large groups, but only to have policies applied to themselves in the most beneficial way possible. In order to do this they enter into political relationships either with "input side" institutions--deputies to soviets, Party members, the procurator, etc.--or, more frequently, with government officials on the "output side"--administrators or "bureaucrats." Soviet politics on this level is the interaction between the citizen as client or supplicant looking for private benefit and the representative of the system interpreting and implementing

policy for this individual. Having explored some of these interactions, we can now try to explain why to most Soviet citizens they are probably more significant forms of participation than the conventional forms of activity in the institutions of nominal representations (soviets, trade unions, civic meetings, etc.) or even than the citizen--initiated contacts with government representatives.

Some forms of participation in Soviet institutions are so patently ritualistic and without influence on outcomes that they need not be taken seriously as forums for the exercise of power or influence by citizens. Ninety-nine per cent of the Soviet electorate votes not because they think they are choosing and changing leaders, but because of peer pressure or fear of the social and political consequences of not voting; or because they welcome this opportunity to reaffirm their identification with the political system; or they march off to the polls with no feelings one way or another, but simply because this is one of the many rituals of life one performs without much thought as to its intrinsic meaning. In an earlier survey we did of 148 Soviet immigrants to Israel, nearly 90 percent expressed the opinion that their participation in Soviet elections had no meaning to them, but one or two said "it gave me a chance to show my solidarity with the Party."[44] None thought it was effective as a means of choosing leaders. One of our respondents, an elderly woman from Leningrad, worked as a "non-staff instructor" of a district executive committee (raiispolkom), and also served as secretary of the electoral commission for the raion soviet. She disliked the "agitation work" connected with elections. "It was most unpleasant, especially when people realized how absurd this show was." The commission was always headed by a Party member, and its members were told that their primary obligation was to

see that every resident of the district would turn out to vote. Since the polls closed at midnight, at around 10 or 11 p.m. messengers would be dispatched to the homes of those who had not yet voted.

Voting is not the only activity of this nature. Participation in political rallies and discussions or in some of the voluntary associations which abound in Soviet life may be similarly motivated, though the latter may offer symbolic and material rewards which are the prime motivation for joining and participating.[45]

Several groups of Soviet emigres display profound skepticism about the ability of their nominal representatives to solve their problems and make the system deliver desired outputs. In a 1976 study in Detroit we found that 44 per cent of the sample ignored conventional answers to the question of how they would have solved an administrative problem in the USSR. Instead of writing letters to newspapers, or approaching the Party, the local government or a deputy of a soviet, they suggested the use of _blat_ and connections.[46]

In our current sample, 60 per cent "strongly agreed" and 30 per cent "agreed" with the statement that "People like me had no say about what the Soviet government does." Interestingly, both in this group as well as in the earlier studies, those with less education and less political knowledge tend to attribute more importance to formal institutions and representative bodies than the others. They seem to take the myths of the

system at face value to a greater extent than those who had more direct experience with it. This implies that education may not progressively socialize people to the myths of the system but may lead them to take the myths less seriously.

This can be seen by examining some of the data in detail. It turns out that knowledge about the Soviet political system, interest in it, and participation in it in the form of citizen-initiated contacts are correlated with each other, but these are <u>inversely</u> related to one's sense of being able to influence the course of political life. When analyzed by region, the respondents rank in the following order on our summary measure of participation:

High Participation	RSFSR and the Ukraine
	Baltic republics
	Moldavia
	Central Asia
Low Participation	Georgia

Much the same order is found in summary measures of political interest and knowledge, as shown in Table 7. The Europeans have quite similar scores, though the Moldavians are substantially lower, as might be expected from one of the less developed and less urbanized European republics. The scores of Georgians and Central Asians are markedly lower. And yet, it is the Georgians and Central Asians--those who are less interested and less knowledgeable about the system, and who engage less in self-initiated political acts--who display greater feelings of efficacy regarding inputs into the system. On four out of five questions measuring their ability to

influence political decisions the Asians and Georgians express greater confidence than do the Europeans.

Table 7

Mean Scores of Political Interest and Political Knowledge, by Region

	Mean Score	Standard Deviation
RSFSR		
Political interest	1.9182	.64218
Political knowledge	1.8030	.95840
Ukraine		
Political interest	1.7449	.75211
Political knowledge	2.1215*	.94214
Moldavia		
Political interest	1.5111	.84894
Political knowledge	1.6750	1.0139
Georgia		
Political interest	1.2639	.76805
Political knowledge	1.5250	1.1665
Central Asia		
Political interest	1.3212	.85531
Political knowledge	1.2364	1.0870

*Those from Ukraine score high because one question was about the Ukraine.

It is probably the substantially different levels of education among these regional groups that explain these differences, rather than differences in the political sub-cultures of their respective areas. Thus, we find a very high correlation between education and citizen-initiated participation (tau b=.41, gamma=.62, p<.00000), and between education and political interest (tau b=.36, gamma=.57, p<.0000). Knowing more about the system and following it more closely does not increase one's confidence in his ability

to influence it. It is the less educated who tend more to accept at face value what they are taught about how the system works.

Even the 64 former Communist Party members in our group are not sanguine about their ability to influence the course of Soviet politics. Naturally, they score far higher on measures of participation than do the non-Party majority. They are also much better informed on politics -- 42 per cent achieve the highest score, whereas only 29 per cent of the non-Party people did. They followed and discussed politics more than the others and read considerably more "agitprop" material. But this did not translate into greater adherence to the participatory myths of the system. Party members are more confident that they will receive proper treatment by bureaucrats and policemen, and they are more willing than the non-Party people to assert themselves at the workplace, and even in the family. They are confident, politically well informed people, but they do not seem to be ideologues, committed to the myths of the system. Why they joined the Party we cannot say for sure, but it is likely that career considerations were more important than ideological fervor.

Respondents went out of their way to impress on the interviewer their feelings of helplessness to influence political life in the USSR. To a "closed" question about whether Soviet politics were too complicated to understand, at least 20 people spontaneously added unsolicited remarks such as, "What went on in the country I understood, but for me to change anything was impossible;" or, "I could discuss and analyze political events, but I could not influence them." An engineer from the Transcarpathian Ukraine explained that "There was no place for us to decide anything. Everything was decided from above....They think people like us don't understand, but it's not so." (The reference to "they" is entirely typical -- it is very often used without

specification or explanation to indicate the decision-makers, from whom the respondents apparently feel quite distant and estranged.)

People so dubious of their ability to influence political decisions should not participate extensively in political life. Goodin and Dryzek point out the obvious: "Were politically relevant resources concentrated...in the hands of a few, it might be rational for the powerful few to participate (knowing they can win) but it would be daft for the powerless masses (who can only lose) to try to challenge them....Under conditions of inequality... participation should be low since most people have no rational reason for participating, at least not in the individualistic ways which get coded under 'democratic development.'"[47] Assuming that our ex-Soviet respondents are no less rational than anyone else, we must conclude that their formal participation in Soviet political life was of the sort that Robert Sharlet has designated "involvement," where the attributes of efficacy, voluntarism, and responsiveness are absent.[48] Their participation in elections, meetings, and some organizations was of the "mobilized" or ritualistic type. Its purpose was not to give them a voice in decision making -- on this they and the regime were agreed -- but to socialize them to its practices, promote their loyalty to it, demonstrate that loyalty to domestic and foreign audiences, and, perhaps, reassure the leadership that their political house was in order.

There are other forms of participation, presumably more voluntary, possibly more efficacious, and potentially evoking non-symbolic responses from the authorities. These are citizen-initiated contacts which, in the Soviet system, include approaches to soviet deputies and Party officials on several levels, to the procuracy, the Peoples Control Commission, officials of the government executive committees (*ispolkomy*), and writing letters to newspapers.

This kind of participation requires a great deal of initiative by the citizen and it is not surprising that only minorities of our sample engaged in them. But can these uncoerced forms of participation, entered into by a citizen because he believes it might bring a concrete outcome, serve as indicators of people's subjective relationship to the system? Are those who participate more favorably disposed to the system, and, therefore, can we look to quantitative indicators of participation for clues to the support it enjoys? Soviet publications often point with pride to the increase in letters to the editor, approaches to various officials and the like as proof that the system is working and the citizens have confidence in it.[49] However, we find that there is no relationship between this kind of participation and adherence to the ideals of the system or expressed evaluation of it. Using three composite measures of affect toward the system, we found no relationship with the degree of their participation in it. Perhaps a non-emigre sample would show a more positive relationship between efficacy, participation, and affect toward the system, but we can only speculate on this.

The absence of a relationship between participation and affect toward the system can be understood by taking account of the nature of the citizen-initiated contacts. They are designed, in almost all cases, not to provide supports for the system, but to make individual demands upon it. People seek housing, jobs, pensions, favors. Participation of this sort is designed to wrest from the system that which it has not yielded automatically. Neither this activity nor ritualistic involvement are expected by the participants to influence policy making. Neither do the two types of participation tell us anything about the individual's feelings about the system. The first type is done mechanically by so many, and the second type is designed to serve

private purposes, so that whatever one's feelings toward the system and its ideals may be, they cannot be discerned from these two modes of participation. Perhaps they can be discovered from the participatory mode we have discussed in detail, that is, attempts to influence implementation. The question then becomes whether bureaucratic encounters have a cumulative impact on one's view of the system.

Bureaucratic Experiences and Affect Toward the Soviet System

At the twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev commented on the need to improve the service sector of the economy. "Stores, dining rooms, laundries, dry cleaning -- people go there every day. What can they buy? What kind of reception do they get? How do the employees speak to them?...It is according to how these questions are answered that people largely judge our work. They judge it strictly, exactingly. And, comrades, this must be borne in mind."[50] The implication was that people's experiences in day-to-day transactions with service agencies -- and the Party Secretary might have included government bureaucracies along with economic establishments -- influence their attitude toward the system as a whole.

It has often been noted that the distinction between policy making and policy implementation is not all that sharp. A student of American bureaucracies asserts that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out.... [Public policy] in important ways...is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers."[51] Even in the extremely centralized (and terrorized) Stalinist administrative system economic

administrators were able to make policy in the course of implementing it.[52] Jerry Hough and Thane Gustafson both acknowledge the ability of Soviet bureaucracies to distort, obstruct, and change policy. Hough thinks this should lead us to "consider Soviet data in the light of more pluralistic images of...bureaucratic policy making."[53] Gustafson, however, rejects the idea of an institutionalized devolution of decision-making authority to pluralistic bureaucracies and concludes that the distribution of power in the system has not changed much since the 1950's.[54]

Whether or not the administrators have independent and institutionalized power, they are the representatives of the system with whom the people have most frequent contact. So it might be reasonable to suppose that people form their opinion of the system as a whole on the basis of their numerous, repeated encounters with the "street-level bureaucrats" who administer its outputs.

This turns out <u>not</u> to be the case among our respondents. We correlated individual's evaluations of particular bureaucracies with their evaluations of the system as a whole, and then developed overall measures of their affect towards bureaucracies and toward the system. The relationship between the two sorts of evaluations was weak or non-existent. For example, out of 24 possible correlations between variables measuring the evaluation of the <u>raspredelenie</u> commission and those measuring affect toward the system as a whole, in only four instances were there correlations of any significance. Only with questions about housing was there a fair number of correlations with system-affect measures (in 19 of 56 correlations), but that is due to the generally negative evaluations connected with housing and the generally negative skew of the system evaluations. So experiences with individual agencies are not well correlated with evaluations of the political system.

However, evaluations of concrete, individual encounters with most agencies are remembered more favorably than generalized images of Soviet bureaucracies and the people who run them. There are some people - mostly older ones - who seem to make the transfer between bureaucratic experiences and evaluation of the system, but they are relatively few in number.[55]

In the following table one can see the weakness of the relationship between specific bureaucratic experiences and affect toward the system. It can be seen that in the successively more negative groups on the dimension of system affect there is a tendency to somewhat more negative evaluations of bureaucratic experiences, but the changes are much more modest than the changes in affect toward the system. Thus, marked changes in affect toward the system are associated with weaker changes in affect toward individual bureaucracies. The large number of relationships we tested, where we found weak correlations, are summarized in the table below.

Table 8

Evaluation of Specific Agencies and of the Soviet System*

Affect Toward the System

Mean Scores of Affect Toward Agencies	Enthusiastic(n=19)	Positive(n=152)	Mildly Negative(n=670)	Strongly Negative(n=320)
Housing	1.6905(.3350)** n=4	1.8504(.5544) n=40	2.1784(.5231) n=216	2.3075(.5192) n=94
Raspredelenie	1.3333(.5774) n=3	1.4048(.6148) n=35	1.6134(.5590) n=191	1.8213(.6615) n=83
University admissions	1.2917(.2500) n=4	1.4590(.4753) n=67	1.4597(.4640) n=376	1.5600(.5099) n=168
Pensions	1.1667(.1179) n=2	1.3007(.2877) n=35	1.4143(.3758) n=130	1.5686(.5437) n-77

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*The table shows mean scores representing respondents' evaluations of individual administrative agencies. We stratified the sample by their affect toward the system as a whole. The higher the mean score, the more negative the evaluation of the agency in question.

**Standard deviation

Perhaps the number of bureaucratic experiences one has had has something to do with how he or she evaluates them. The table below shows overall evaluation of all bureaucracies broken down by the number of such experiences, and then displays these evaluations by the overall affect toward the system.

Table 9

Evaluation of Bureaucratic Experiences and of the Soviet System*

Affect Toward the System

Mean Scores of Affect by Number of Bureaucratic Experiences	Enthusiastic	Positive	Mildly Negative	Strongly Negative
One or more	1.3088(.2220)** n-17	1.4725(.3880) n-137	1.5323(.3547) n-625	1.6358(.4172) n=300
Two or more	1.2500(.2500) n=3	1.4578(.3606) n=77	1.5259(.3339) n=417	1.6526(.4096) n=198
Three or more	1.2500(.3536) n=2	1.3678(.2892) n=23	1.5192(.3401) n=124	1.6775(.3770) n=62

*Means are combined scores of respondent's evaluations of all bureaucratic agencies with which they had experiences.

**Standard deviation

It can be seen that, except among the group with the most negative attitude toward the system, the more experiences people had with administrative agencies, the more positive their evaluations of the agencies. Secondly, there are slight changes in the evaluation of bureaucratic agencies as one moves from one category of affect toward the system to another. As hostility toward the system increases, there is a slight tendency toward a less positive evaluation of bureaucratic experiences. Again, a minority are making the transfer from their bureaucratic experiences to their evaluation of the system as a whole. By and large, however, the tendency to generalize attitudes toward the Soviet system from the evaluation of one's experiences with its policy-implementing agencies is a rather weak one. The people in our sample seem to base their stance toward the system on something other than their experiences with its bureaucracies. Even Soviet Man lives "Not by Bread Alone," as Vladimir Dudintsev pointed out in his "thaw" novel.

We cannot be sure what criteria have been used to reach a general evaluation of the system. Especially among the Jews and Germans in the group, ethnic distance from a society dominated by other nationalities, or discontents resulting from ethnic discrimination and cultural deprivation, may be the most important factor in the formation of one's overall attitude toward the system. Dissatisfaction with the standard of living, fueled by a knowledge, especially among those with connections to the West, that Western standards are higher, may be another major determinant of attitudes toward the system. Dissatisfaction with Soviet culture or with the political system are other possibilities. Less obvious is a factor that was mentioned spontaneously by several respondents. They complained of the "falsehood, fraud, lie" (_lozh'_) that, they maintained, characterized the whole system.

They pointed specifically to the institutions of nominal democratic participation -- elections, "spontaneous" demonstrations, mass rallies, "voluntary" organizations -- not only as frauds, but as insults to their intelligence and to their maturity. "They treat us like children," said a hydroelectric engineer from Leningrad. The feeling was expressed by some that it would be better to have an outright dictatorship without the trappings of a democracy, for the latter served only to emphasize the hypocrisy and cynicism of the system, "rubbing in" the fact that the ordinary citizen had little or no say about the political course of his country. Thus, the facade of genuine participation is for some counterproductive: instead of fooling them, they resent being made fools of. Paradoxically, then, the myths of the system become the catalysts of alienation and disillusion.

Conclusion

The Soviet system is not as rigid nor as monolithic as is sometimes assumed. Its resources are limited, its procedures often clumsy, and its personnel not necessarily more qualified than their counterparts in other countries, but it is a permeable, even flexible system. Obviously, some of its bureaucracies are more flexible than others. In those sectors where the bureaucracy cannot be responsive to the demands of its clients, the latter prove to be inventive, imaginative and hard fighters for what they need from the system. Scarcity promotes corruption, but even where the question of scarcity does not arise, as with the militia, Soviet people seem to have evolved understandings and practices which make life more livable for clients and authorities alike. The former get more or less what they want, and the latter make an extra ruble and perhaps have the satisfaction of doing a

kindness to a fellow human being. There seems to be a "second polity" which parallels the "second economy." Just as the latter makes the economy work in ways not described by the textbooks -- whether or not this is a "good thing" is a matter of contention -- so too do the informal practices of bureaucrats and citizens operate the political-administrative system. The nature of the bureaucratic encounters varies both by the bureaucracy as well as by the clientele. This means that the most common interactions between the citizen and the state do not follow a uniform pattern.

We have also seen that the "second polity" has more meaning for our respondents, at least, than the more formal aspects of the system. Respondents displayed little faith in the power of ritualized participation to influence policy. Though a substantial number did contact official representatives and institutions, most were not greatly pleased with the outcome of these contacts, and many expressed skepticism about their utility. More confidence was expressed in the ability of the ordinary citizen to influence the process of policy implementation. Though some bureaucracies were judged quite impervious to citizen influence or manipulation, and others were found to operate so routinely that such manipulation was rarely necessary, several agencies were seen as not producing outcomes favorable to the client unless he made efforts to influence the way officials interpreted and applied policy. The citizen approached the agency either as a supplicant pleading for particular treatment, or as one who had something to exchange -- favors, influence, even money -- in return for favorable bureaucratic action.[56] How the citizen approaches the organization and what he offers in return for its favors depends largely on his education, the organization involved, and, to a lesser extent, the region in which the interaction occurs.

The attitudes and behavior of both citizens and bureaucrats, as reported not only by our sample but also widely by the Soviet press, bear a striking resemblance to those of their pre-revolutionary ancestors. This is the case in other socialist countries as well. This is not the result simply of social and psychological inertia, but derives also from the similarity in structure between pre- and post-revolutionary systems. It is centralization, hierarchy, and the denial of policy making influence to the citizen that make the kind of behavior described here sensible or "rational."

As in other countries, the bureaucrats have a poor general image. Irrespective of their backgrounds, our respondents see Soviet bureaucrats in a negative light. However, their evaluations of specific, personal experiences with bureaucratic agencies are more positive. Among the emigres, the greater the number of bureaucratic experiences, the more positive their evaluation of the agencies involved. Nevertheless, this evaluation is not transferred to the system as a whole. Despite the frequency -- and one might say, intensity -- of encounters with official agencies in the USSR, the generally positive evaluation of these encounters does not translate into a favorable assessment of the system. A cumulation of favorable experiences with agencies that deliver some of the most important goods and services does not lead to a positive attitude toward the Soviet political system. These people, then, do not judge the system solely by what they have obtained from it in the way of basic material necessities, or education, or employment. Where one stands vis-à-vis the system is determined by something more than that. Perhaps even the perception that approved forms of citizen political participation are a charade contributes to skepticism about the system as a whole.

Soviet people may concentrate their uncoerced efforts on the output side of the political equation, on the implementation, not the making, of policy. In a critique of Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture, a distinguished Polish social scientist, who has considerable first-hand experience with the workings of his country's political system, notes that "Some social groups feel...that their chances of performing effectively within the system are minimal or nil; in this case political apathy may be interpreted in terms of the critical evaluation of the existing system rather than in terms of the psychological characteristics of inactive citizens." Jerzy Wiatr suggests that Almond and Verba err in their "tendency to explain discrepancies between normative standards of democracy and political reality in terms of psychological deficiencies rather than structural conditions within the system."[57] Though Wiatr makes these points with regard to Western democracies, they seem equally applicable to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Rational political behavior in the USSR should involve pro forma participation in the system's rituals, occasional contacting of approved agencies in approved ways in order to influence policy implementation in individual cases, and more frequent transactions with officials charged with policy implementation for the same purpose. Ritualistic participation is rational, not because it influences policy, but because it protects one against charges of non-conformity and "anti-social attitudes," and for some it may provide emotional satisfaction. For others, however, the effect is to emphasize the gap between rhetoric and reality and to reinforce political cynicism.[58] Despite the Khrushchevian rhetoric of the "state of the whole people" succeeding the "dictatorship of the proletariat," only the formal franchise has been broadened in the last

decades. The citizen has little influence on policy making, but does have some ability to influence the implementation policy. Since this can be done only on an ad hoc and ad hominem basis, almost no systemic effects and changes are felt. Despite the expansion of opportunities for formal participation and the grudging increase in opportunities for expressing opinions, the Soviet system remains fundamentally one which is directed from above. As Verba and Nie comment in their analysis of political participation in America:

> Particularized contacts can be effective for the individual contactor but they are inadequate as a guide to more general social policy....The ability of the citizen to make himself heard...by contacting officials...represents an important aspect of citizen control. Though such contacts may be important in filling the policy gaps and in adjusting policy to the individual, effective citizen control over governmental policy would be limited indeed if citizens related to their government only as isolated individuals concerned with their narrow parochial problems. The larger political questions would remain outside popular control. Therefore, though electoral mechanisms remain crude, they are the most effective for these purposes.[59]

For the foreseeable future the "larger political questions" will remain the domain of the verkhushka; it is left to the citizen to grapple as best he can with those "smaller"questions of daily life which he and those who administer the system must solve together.

Notes

1. Theodore H. Friedgut, "Citizens and Soviets: Can Ivan Ivanovich Fight City Hall?" Comparative Politics vol. 10, no. 4 (July, 1978), p. 462. See also the pioneering article by James H. Oliver, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System," American Political Science Review LXIII, 2 (June, 1969).

2. See, for example, V. M. Manokhin, ed., Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo (Moscow, 1977), pp. 121-122; Manokhin, Sovetskaia gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (Moscow, 1966), p. 83; A. M. Lunev, Administrativnoe pravo (Moscow, 1966), p. 136.

3. G. I. Petrov, Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo: Chast' obshchaia (Leningrad, 1960), pp. 199-200.

4. V. G. Afanasyev, Nauchnoe upravlenie obshchestvom (Moscow, 1971), p. 121.

5. The literature on these subjects is considerable and familiar to students of Soviet politics. Much of it is cited in Karl W. Ryavec, "The Soviet Ministerial Elite: 1964-1979, A Representative Sample," Program in Soviet and East European Studies, University of Massachusetts, Occasional Papers Series, No. 6, 1981. Among the most important works are Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, MA, 1969); H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, 1971); John Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York, 1959) and his "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and West European Comparisons," American Political Science Review LIX, 3 (September, 1965); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," Problems of Communism XV, 1 (January-February, 1966).

6. Andras Hegedus, Socialism and Bureaucracy (New York, 1976), p. 25.

7. On over-centralization in the 1930's, see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York, 1960), p. 364. On the historical development of the bureaucracy, see Walter M. Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, Russian Officialdom (Chapel Hill, 1980).

8. Carol H. Weiss, "Efforts at Bureaucratic Reform," in Weiss and Allen H. Barton, eds., Making Bureaucracies Work (Beverly Hills, CA, 1979), pp. 7-8.

9. Daniel Katz, Barbara Gutek, Robert Kahn and Eugenia Barton, Bureaucratic Encounters (Ann Arbor, 1975), pp. 114-115, 120.

10. R. A. Safarov, Obshchestvennoe mnenie i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie (Moscow, 1975).

11. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citizen (New York, 1968).

12. Ibid., p. 27.

13. Of those from the Baltic, 99 lived in Latvia, 49 in Lithuania, and 26 in Estonia. The Central Asians include 87 from Uzbekistan, 39 from Kazakhstan, 25 from Kirghizia and Turkmenistan, and 14 from Tajikstan.

14. Of those in Israel, 60 per cent think the government offices do not work as they should; of those in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38 per cent; and of those in the United States, 25 per cent (though 47 per cent of the Americans expressed no opinion). In all cases, the more educated the immigrant, the more critical he is of the immigrant country's government offices. This is also true regarding the Soviet bureaucracy, except that those who were themselves its employees are more sympathetic to it than the (less educated) manual workers.

15. Understandably, the least educated are most bothered by the necessity of filling out forms, while the most educated are most disturbed by the waste of time and failure of officials to understand them.

16. Thus, 67 per cent of the Germans rate housing officials negatively, compared to 43 per cent of the Jews; 87 per cent of the Germans are negative on Party officials, cf. 45 per cent of the Jews. Even pension officials are rated negatively by 61 per cent of the Germans, but by only 34 per cent of the Jews.

17. See, for example, E. Azarova, "O zashchite pensionnykh prav grazhdan," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 2, 1979. The author notes that more than two-thirds of district and city social security inspectors in the Russian republic have neither higher nor secondary specialized education. She strongly criticizes red tape, "illegal acts of employees," and the appeals process, whereby citizens are supposed to get a hearing on the size of their pensions. She goes so far as to imply quite clearly that the administration of pensions in the USSR is inferior to that in other socialist countries, citing specific examples.

    Other articles along these lines are V. A. Tarasova, "Okhrana subiektivnykh prav grazhdanin v oblasti pensionnogo obespecheniia," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 8, 1976; and Irina Tosunian, "Vot dozhivëm do pensii," Literaturnaia gazeta, September 30, 1981, p. 11. The latter describes some of the pension officials: "...Often the nature of the bureaucrat does not depend on his appearance. For some, rudeness and caddishness are the way they treat all visitors. Others are polite, well-mannered, speak softly to everyone, but they are nevertheless capable of confusing the simplest cases. Many experienced employees are well versed in the nuances of their job, but they use their knowledge, however strange it may sound, not to benefit but to harm their clients."

18. See V. I. Maksimovskii, Upravlenie sotsial'nym obespecheniem (Moscow, 1974), p. 35. The author points out that older people are frequently more ignorant of their rights and less able to defend them.

19. Henry Morton, "Who Gets What, When and How? Housing in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies XXXII, 2 (April, 1980), pp. 235-236.

20. See Carol R. Nechemias, "Welfare in the USSR: Health Care, Housing and Personal Consumption," unpublished paper, pp. 30-31.

21. Michael Rywkin, "Housing in Central Asia: Demography, Ownership, Tradition. The Uzbek Example," Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Occasional Paper Number 82, December 1979, p. 5.

22. Examples include, B. Plekhanov, "Order na kvartiru," Literaturnaia gazeta, July 25, 1979, p. 12; Ia. Ianovskii, "O sudebnoi praktike po grazhdansko-pravovym sporam mezhdu grazhdanami i zhilishchno-stroitel'nymi kooperativami," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 1, 1967; "Fiancees with Dowries," Pravda, January 20, 1979, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 31, 3 (February 14, 1979); "Discussing an Urgent Problem: An Apartment for the Newlyweds," Sovetskaia Rossia February 14, 1979, translated in CDSP 31, 8 (March 21, 1979). A well known novel on the subject is by the recently emigrated Vladimir Voinovich, The Ivankiad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977).

23. See Morton, pp. 242 ff. for colorful descriptions of how these operate.

24. Pravda, February 16, 1973, quoted in Morton, p. 250.

25. See "Embezzlers," Trud October 16, 1980, translated in CDSP 32, 42 (November 19, 1980).

26. D. N. Prikhodko and V. V. Pan, Obrazovenie i sotsial'nyi status lichnosti: tendentsii internatsionalizatsii i dukhovnaia kultura (Tomsk: izdatel'stvo tomskogo universiteta, 1974), pp. 70, 61.

27. Corruption is involved in admissions even to military schools. Krasnaia zvezda reports a case where a general got his relatives admitted despite their poor grades and admits this is not an isolated case. "When applications to the military school are being considered the admissions committee is besieged with phone calls....There are really two competitions for admission: the regular competition and the competition of relatives." V. Filatov, "Plemianniki: K chemu privodit protektsiia pri priëme v voennoe uchilishche," Krasnaia zvezda, November 12, 1980.

28. N. Loginova, "Chervi kozyri, "Literaturnaia gazeta, January 23, 1980, p. 11.

29. Interview with G. Aliev, Literaturnaia gazeta, November 18, 1981, p. 10.

30. See Uchitel'skaia gazeta, January 15, 1980, report translated in CDSP 32, 6 (March 12, 1980), p. 9.

31. S. Troian, "They Never Arrived for Their Assigned Jobs," Izvestiia, June 11, 1980, translated in CDSP 32, 23 (July 9, 1980), p. 16. In Orel province in 1979 only 179 of 323 graduates of agricultural institutes showed up to their assigned jobs. Some "'signed in' only to vanish immediately afterward....In all fairness it must be said that not all farm managers create proper conditions under which young specialists can work....In other cases they simply 'forget' to provide them with apartments...leave them on their own to solve all the problems of everyday life."

32. V. P. Kiselev, "O povyshenii deistvennosti prava v bor'be s protektsionizmom," Sotsiologicheskie issledovanie No. 1, 1981, p. 152.

33. Ibid., p. 154. See also the frank article by the first secretary of the Georgian writers' union, Tengiz Buachidze, "Protektsiia," Literaturnaia gazeta, January 8, 1975, p. 12.

34. See the examples brought from Georgia by T. M. Dzhafarli, "Izuchenie obshchestvennogo mneniia - neobkhodimoe uslovie priniatiia pravil'nnykh reshenii," Sotsiologicheskie issledovanie, No. 1, 1978, p. 72. See also A. Verbitsky, "Vziatki, vziatki, vziatki," Novoe Russkoe slovo, August 4, 1981.

35. Stephen White, in Archie Brown and Jack Grey, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), p. 49. See also White's Political Culture and Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

36. Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," American Political Science Review, LXVIII, 3 (September, 1974), p. 1176.

37. Ibid., p. 1183. On continuity and change in aspects of administration, see David Christian, "The Supervisory Function in Russian and Soviet History," Slavic Review, 41, 1 (Spring 1982). See, more broadly, Cyril E. Black, ed., The Transformation of Russian Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) and Ernest J. Simmons, ed., Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955).

38. Some of the better known works on these subjects are: James Oliver, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System," American Political Science Review 62, 2 (June 1969); Walter Connor and Zvi Gitelman, eds., Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems (New York: Praeger, 1977); H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and William Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," World Politics 28, 4 (July 1976); Jerry Hough, "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies XXVIII, 1 (January 1976); Theodore H. Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Donald Schulz and Jan Adams, eds., Political Participation in Communist Systems (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

39. Hough, ibid., pp. 7, 15, 19.

40. Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 298, 299.

41. Friedgut, op. cit., p. 302

42. Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 166.

43. Ibid., p. 167.

44. For details, see Zvi Gitelman, Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants (New York: Praeger, 1982).

45. See, for example, William Odom, The Soviet Volunteers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). On the hollowness of membership in Polish voluntary organizations, see Christine Sadowski, "The Fragile Link: Citizen Voluntary Association and Polity in People's Poland," doctoral dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1979.

46. The study is described in "Recent Emigres and the Soviet Political System: A Pilot Study in Detroit," Slavic and Soviet Series (Tel Aviv University) II, 2 (Fall 1977).

47. Robert Goodin and John Dryzek, "Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power," British Journal of Political Science 10, 3 (July 1980), pp. 286, 290.

48. Robert Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," Canadian Slavic Studies I, 4 (Winter 1967).

49. See, for example, Jan Adams, "Critical Letters to the Soviet Press: An Increasingly Important Public Forum," in Schulz and Adams, Political Participation in Communist Systems.

50. Report to the 26th Party Congress, February 23, 1981, translated in CDSP, Current Soviet Policies VIII (Columbus, OH, 1981), p. 20.

51. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), p. xii.

52. See Timothy Dunmore, The Stalinist Command Economy (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 145-146.

53. Jerry F. Hough, "The Bureaucratic Model and the Nature of the Soviet System," in Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 69.

54. Thane Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 6 and pp. 143-148.

55. For elaboration on this point, see Zvi Gitelman, "Politics on the Output Side: Citizen-Bureaucrat Interaction in the USSR," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982.

56. On the concept of the citizen-bureaucrat encounter as an "exchange relationship," see Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Daniel Steinmetz, "Client-Official Encounters in Social Service Agencies," in Charles Goodsell, ed., The Public Encounter: Delivering Human Services in the 1980s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). See also Hasenfeld, "Client-Organization Relations: A Systems Perspective," in Rosemary Sarri and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, eds., The Management of Human Services (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). More broadly, see Elihu Katz and Brenda Danet, eds., Bureaucracy and the Public (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

57. Jerzy J. Wiatr, "The Civic Culture from a Marxist-Sociological Perspective," in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 116-117.

58. Aryeh Unger's interviews with 46 former Soviet political activists of the Party and Komsomol lead him to conclude that "they did not believe their own participation to be effective....The combination of compulsion and formalism which characterizes participation in the Komsomol and party arenas clearly provides no scope at all for the development of a sense of efficacy. Indeed, one may well hypothesize that it has the opposite effect, that the induction of the individual into the 'spectacle' of Komsomol and party activities impresses upon him the utter futility of his participation and in consequence produces not a sense of efficacy but of inefficacy, not subjective competence but subjective incompetence." "Political Participation in the USSR: YCL and CPSU," Soviet Studies XXXIII, 1 (January, 1981).

59. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 113.