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Intellectuals and the Development of Nationalism in Kazakhstan

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Intellectuals and the Development of Nationalism in Kazakhstan

Executive Summary*

The findings of this study suggest that the Soviets may, through a combination of lucky accident and design, have created a potentially workable model for maintaining a stable multinational society. None of the participants in that process are likely to view the current status quo as ideal. Still it is stable. The disaster scenario of widespread fundamentalist religious revival seems unlikely to occur in Kazakhstan. More likely, the Soviet regime will be required to continually balance Moscow's needs with the aspirations of those Kazakhs who have already been integrated into the Soviet system.

Throughout Soviet history, Kazakh intellectuals have attempted to define Kazakh national identity within the context of a Soviet multi-national state. Such efforts have focused upon the preservation of Kazakh cultural traditions in a manner not inconsistent with the basic teachings of Communism, as interpreted by Moscow. This process has frequently been difficult. Nonetheless something approaching a livable solution has been achieved for the present as the Kazakhs have not been wholly, nor even largely, assimilated by Russians.

The Kazakhs have managed to preserve their cultural traditions despite the profound influence of Soviet rule. One can argue that their cultural legacy has been distorted, and of course in a certain sense it has. The existence of repression and censorship and the anticipation of their application are not conducive to the free flowing exchange of ideas necessary to invigorate a national legacy and identity. Both repression and censorship define political reality in the Soviet Union and that reality is the only reality that contemporary Kazakh intellectuals have experienced.

However, the Kazakhs' relationship to the Soviet regime has not been solely negative. The Kazakhs-- as is the case with other Soviet Muslim minorities-- have long been exposed to 'civilization' via external mediators: Russian Imperial emissaries followed by a Russian dominated Soviet hierarchy. This mediation became not only a potential source of antagonism but also a primary source of enlightenment. After all, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Kazakhstan remained remote from the rest of the Muslim world and Kazakhs were excluded from the dominant intellectual currents of that world.

*Prepared by the staff of the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research
As a result of these complex processes, today's Kazakh culture retains some of its traditional values and certainly its symbolic values. Kazakh culture has become preoccupied with a romantic (and distant) nomadic past, with a sympathetic presentation of life in the aul and its wise elder. Rural Kazakhs observe many traditional customs and, perhaps more importantly, Kazakhs with attenuated ties to traditional rituals stress their importance. Such articulation of a distinct Kazakh cultural heritage protects the Kazakhs from assimilation. However, this memory remains fragmented as it has been molded both by Soviet censorship and by the lessons of sixty years of life in the Soviet Union. The secular Kazakh culture of today is undoubtedly quite different from a culture which might have developed had Kazakh autonomy—the Kazakh nationalists' dream—been victorious. Nevertheless, this culture is still Kazakh, i.e., not Russian, not Kirgiz, nor Uzbek.

To explore how such a segmented national identity developed, this report traces the rise and integration of a Kazakh Soviet elite—the generation of Kazakh intellectuals and apparatchiki born after 1917 who reached intellectual maturity under Soviet rule and are now rising to prominent positions. The report does not so much chronicle the careers of the Kazakh intellectuals as it tries to isolate and express their political ideology and political culture. Given the obvious constraints of publishing in the Soviet Union, both official and those that are self-imposed, this venture must be a deductive one. Still, some tentative assertions can be made about the mental set of the Kazakh elite, from which inferences can be drawn about the potential parameters of Soviet "nation-building" and the attempt to create the "New Soviet Man" in non-Russian settings.

Kazakh intellectuals embody both Soviet politics and Kazakh culture. They were raised in the hardships of the twenties and thirties, but witnessed the purges more as observers than potential victims. Their political socialization occurred at a time when Stalinist norms of politics and culture dominated, and because of this they gained a vitiated view of the potential importance of their non-Russian history and non-Russian culture. In the post-Stalin period, however, the Kazakh intellectual elite took advantage of a more open political environment to reassert elements of a distinctively Kazakh national identity. Particularly those Kazakh intellectuals in and around the so-called Zhuldyz group have been instrumental in the maintenance of Kazakh national traditions through their efforts at revitalization of traditional forms of epic poetry and historical novels.
Beyond the preservation of Kazakh national traditions, the Kazakh intellectual must come to terms with his Muslim heritage, something which cannot be excised and extricated as easily as atheist propagandists formerly maintained. Although Islamic doctrine and teachings were completely interwoven with traditional Kazakh life, Islam was not all-encompassing and all-pervasive. Kazakh Islam is heavy on ritual and weak on dogma. It is adaptive and resilient due to an absence of an entrenched religious hierarchy. For these reasons Islam is an unlikely focus for political opposition. Kazakhs have worked out for themselves definitions of Islam and communism which can be held simultaneously. Each individual resolves the tension between the competing belief systems for himself. At least at present the majority of educated Kazakhs see no implicit irresolvable tension between communism— the ideology of the state, Islam— their religious tradition, and their desire to advance the cause of the Kazakh people (and of course their own careers as well).

Given the persistence of Kazakh religious and cultural traditions, Soviet social engineers appear less successful in the molding of the "New Soviet Man" than they had hoped. Nonetheless, Soviet policies have been more effective than Western critics suggest. The Soviet regime has achieved more than might have been expected of its sometimes harsh and bumbling efforts. It has succeeded both in giving the Kazakhs a stake in "the system" through greater involvement in managing their own republic and in gaining fuller use of Kazakhstan's abundant natural and human resources critical to Soviet economic performance. Moreover, the Soviet regime has provided opportunities for Kazakh intellectuals to shape a Kazakh Soviet culture that imperfectly resembles the desired end-product of Stalin's classic formula: "national in form and socialist in content." This synthesis remains imperfect. Kazakhness (Qazagshylyk) reasserts itself not only in molding Kazakh national culture, but in forming the socialist content of that culture as well.
Intellectuals and the Development of Nationalism in Kazakhstan
I. INTRODUCTION

The Kazakh people have been subjected to two effective foreign rulers in the past century and a half, the Tsarist government and the Communist Party. The aims of these two authorities both of them Russian, were seemingly quite different, but in actuality had much in common. Both sought to end Kazakh nomadism and turn the Kazakh into a more effective citizen of a Russian dominated multi-ethnic state.

Russian Imperial policy attempted to accomplish this by gaining control of the Kazakh land and settling several million Russian peasants upon it who by their example would turn the Kazakhs into farmers. The policy was partially successful, Kazakh pastoral nomadism became anuviable economic form, but no substitute for it was introduced. Thus the average Kazakh was in worse shape at the time of the revolution than he had been at the beginning of colonial rule. Moreover the period of Tsarist rule had introduced real social strains in the Kazakh community, the clanic and religious authorities could not easily adapt themselves to serve the Russian state, and so a new rival elite, the graduates of the secular schools, developed and sought to fill the role of intermediaries between the Kazakh masses and the Russian state.

But they had not acquired any real legitimacy within the Kazakh community, although they most certainly filled functional roles in the state bureaucracy (serving as teachers, translators, and state inspectors) and in "modern" society as journalists, writers and even revolutionaries. However, neither the new or the old elites were able to serve their community well, the new because it lacked legitimacy to the masses and the old because it lacked legitimacy to the government. And, as the violent and widespread uprising of 1916 made vividly apparent the
Kazakhs were fractious rather than loyal subjects.

The new Russian rulers, the Bolsheviks, were generally viewed with suspicion. But most Kazakhs were primarily interested in seeing war-time conditions brought to an end and some semblance of economic stability reintroduced. And particularly after the Alash Orda, (the Kazakh nationalist party) were brought into the new Soviet government seemingly as full partners, most Kazakhs were willing to make do and sit back and give the new government a chance to redress their economic grievances.

But the Kazakhs quickly had reaffirmed all their old prejudices against the Russians. Not only did it soon become apparent that Kazakh participation in their republic was more symbolic than real, but by the late 1920s the entire structure of Soviet federalism was exposed as a sham with Moscow making it abundantly clear that they controlled the right to set the developmental strategy for the entire state. Moreover the strategy chosen favored the needs of the center over the periphery, industrialization over agriculture, and of course Russians over Kazakhs. The particular strategy chosen, collectivization and the nationalization of almost all property in the rural sector, was especially devastating to the Kazakhs. The private ownership of livestock, the relationship a man had to his animals, was the key element in traditional Kazakh culture, it in essence defined what it was to be a Kazakh. Thus the Kazakhs strongly resisted this policy and sacrificed their lives and the lives of their animals in the process. The Kazakh community which survived this onslaught was a dispirited one, its traditional leadership weakened and stripped of many of their age old functions. But it was this very quality that rendered them more malleable and hence more loyal Soviet citizens.

For those Kazakhs willing to participate, and having the prerequisite technical skills and a suitably unblemished past, the post-purge period presented almost
unprecedented opportunity for upward mobility. Party membership virtually assured a young Kazakh a safe sinecure for life, and more aggressive and hard working individuals could expect to rise as high as their ambition inspired them. No longer need the children of simple shepherds feel constrained to share their fathers' fates. But the costs of participation were nonetheless high as those seeking to rise within both party and state had to subscribe formally to the official ideology, an ideology which asserted the primacy of Moscow over national loyalties.

This formula has not really changed over time. The Kazakh aspirant who wants to rise in prominence in oblast, republic or all-union politics must still be Russian speaking, (ideally, fluent), and must look and deport himself as a Russian does. He need not be assimilated but he should appear assimilated, and should not "stick out" in Russian-dominated settings any more than his unusual facial characteristics make necessary. Moreover the Kazakh candidate for advancement should work harder than his Russian competitor and try to show himself to be even more loyal. He must demonstrate a commitment to Moscow's goals and endorse its developmental strategy as the only way that true Kazakh development could be expected to be achieved, i.e., on the Russian paved road to communism.

This strategy worked in the past and seems to be working still today. But the conditions that were operative in the late 1930s when this arrangement was defined do not still exist. Many of the structural features of both party and state bureaucracies still date from Stalin's day, but the personalities who dominate these hierarchies increasingly do not. A new generation is rising to positions of importance composed of individuals born and raised under Soviet rule. Moreover because of the purges and cultural policies of the Stalin years many of these people had little direct contact with the pre-revolutionary Kazakh world, and learned about their past, not as children, but as adults during the "Khrushchev thaw."
In recent years the Kazakhs have had more access to their past than at any time since the early 1920s, and for writers and historians this has meant unprecedented opportunities to confront those cultural and historical themes that have long intrigued them; the meaning of being Kazakh, albeit in the context of the modern Soviet state. There are quite obviously limitations imposed by Moscow upon such attempts at intellectual self-discovery, but for many Kazakhs the drive to do so is really compelling, a need to understand one's past to understand oneself. In Kazakhstan the writers, and most particularly the group of men around Olzhas Suleimenov, have dominated the cultural establishment, and have revitalized both the epic poem and the historical novel as a means of articulating a Kazakh world view.

The remainder of this report is devoted to the study of these men, sometimes referred to as the Zhuldyz group, who constitute the leading figures in the contemporary Kazakh cultural establishment. These include most prominently Olzhas Suleimenov, Anuar Alimzhanov, Dukhanbai Doszhanov, Il'ias Esenberlin, Tumanbai Moldagaliev, Kadyr Murzaliev, and Satimzhan Sanbaev. These men come from various social backgrounds, but had very similar socializing experiences. They were all, with only one exception, born in the purge or post-purge period, and none published their writings until after Stalin's death. They are Soviet writers, individuals whose intellectual training is firmly rooted in the post-revolutionary period. One grew up in a state home, four others on collective farms. All saw higher education as their means of self-betterment, and because of their education were able to get jobs as journalists or in the literary establishment. They are a prolific group of men; and their extensive literary output provides a rich source for studying their world view. Of particular interest is how they resolve the potential ideological tensions implicit in Kazakh life; how they frame a political consciousness which integrates their seemingly contradictory heritages, Kazakh pastoralism,
Islam and Soviet Communism. The report reviews the writings of this group and tries to assess the relationship of the authors both to the broader Kazakh society and to officialdom in Moscow and Alma Ata.

The individuals under consideration are consciously participating in the system; they are writing for publication and not for the drawer. And unlike their predecessors who wrote elegies of Lenin and Stalin using the traditional structure of the Kazakh epic, they appear to be responding to a creative impulse and not just fulfilling a bureaucratic task.

The Zhuldyz group sees itself as the heirs of the early Kazakh intellectuals. The debt owed to the Kazakh nationalists, the Alash Ordists, is not acknowledged, nor are their writings accessible. But today's writers claim inspiration from such predecessors as Saken Seifullin, Il'ias Dzhansugurov, and Beimbit Mailin, individuals who combined artistic creativity with social activism and paid the price for this involvement in 1938. The artistic legacy of these three is now completely available, as is that of those who knew them intimately, most prominently Mukhtar Auezov, but also lesser Kazakh writers and critics have been able to make the 1920s and early 1930s come alive again. Suleimenov and the writers of the 1960s and 1970s have thus been indirectly exposed to a model different from the quiescent one of the leading Kazakh writers of their youth. Someone like Dzhambul dragged in direct from the steppe to fill a cultural/political void could be spurned as a rather bitter joke but the more serious novelists of the late Stalin period Mukanov, Musrepov and Mustafin; the venerated "elders" of Kazakh literature all consciously opted to present Kazakh history in a light which flattered both their Soviet masters and Russians more generally. There was another curious similarity about Mukanov, Musrepov and Mustafin; all three were graduates of secular schools, the colonial Russian-Kazakh aul schools. However, the purged writers, Mailin, Dzhansugurov and Seifullin, although anti-Alash Orda
reformers, all had a more traditional Islamic education.

Today's Kazakh writers include sycophants and party hacks to be sure, but those individuals under consideration here and Suleimenov in particular, have shown a brazenness and a sense of self-assurance that distinguishes them from their predecessors. Although rooted in the same intellectual tradition as men like Mukanov and Musrepov, they have reached maturity in a different and far more optimistic environment. In some senses they are the new Soviet man, Kazakh version. They experience the hardships of Soviet rule more as a "natural" disaster - the famine of collectivization - than as the political repression of the purges. The purge occurred, to be sure, but the rehabilitation of many Kazakh heroes and the more general "thaw," the easing of cultural and political conditions which accompanied it help distance the post-Stalin regimes from their predecessor, and give reason for optimism concerning a possible Kazakh cultural revival. This sense of optimism was shared with the other minority peoples in the Soviet Union and with the Russians as well.

Moreover these individuals already had some positive impressions about Soviet rule, to put alongside the more negative tales they may have had recounted in youth. All these writers came from the countryside, and were educated and "civilized" at the expense of the state. The relationship between Kazakh culture and Russian culture, between Kazakhs and Russians, is complex. The Kazakhs did initially, in the eighteenth century, entreat support from the Russian Empress Anna Ioanovna, and although most were displeased at the forcible exertion of colonial control in the nineteenth century, the Russians had earlier been a "lesser evil" than Islam. Moreover because many Kazakh intellectuals were only nominal Muslims they turned to Russia as a source of "enlightenment" instead of seeking their cultural renaissance through Islam and their neighbors to the Southwest. After the Revolution the cultural dependency upon the Russians became even greater.
ethnic antagonism might exist between Kazakh and Russian neighbors, between Kazakh underlings and their Russian superiors; but Russians, and most precisely the Russian-dominated Soviet education system were the major link between the Kazakhs and world culture. It is easy to be cynical when Mukhtar Auezov writes of the great writers who influenced him and includes in their number individuals like Sholokov and Fadaev, who in the West are regarded as socialist realists of at times indifferent quality. However to Auezov, whose literary exposure was limited to those works printed in Kazakh or Russian that made their way to the Steppe, these works may well have proved inspirational as examples of complex prose. It is hard to place oneself in the mental set of the Kazakhs and see the world, and most importantly the historical process, from his point of view.

But like intellectuals in the developing world more generally, the Kazakhs want their cultural and political development to be an interactive process. The Soviets have found that it is one thing to create a Kazakh elite but another to control it. As they have become better educated the Kazakhs have become less willing to accept the view of their past that Moscow has tried to construct for them. What has been deemed especially objectionable is the need to deny Kazakh history and culture a place other than in Russia's shadow.

Increasingly Kazakh intellectuals are showing an aggressive pride in their identity. Moreover many have been too well socialized because they believe that the party's avowed goals of national development have given the Kazakhs the right to fulfill their cultural aspirations as long as this is done within the confines of Marxism humanist theory. The cultural leaders in Kazakhstan have been the writers, who have tried to fill the void created in Kazakh self-awareness created by the cautious style of Kazakh historians. Olzhas Suleimenov has spoken quite openly about his personal sense of mission:

...Things were bad for us with historiography and we
Kazakh writers wrote historical novels and poems, we dug in the archives, and we tried, if only this way to get our historians going, to show them ways to look, the areas to study. Essentially the enormous epoch in the life of my republic before the twentieth century remained unstudied, without systematization. I expended twenty years on historiography since I considered it absolutely essential for the normal functioning of an organism of contemporary culture.24

By encouraging the Kazakhs to study the entirety of their history Suleimenov threatens Moscow's role as cultural arbitor, the role of Russians as the central actors of history and of historical study. And this is his intention. He wants the Kazakhs to emerge as equals, to have a "fruitful partnership" with the Russians.25 But Suleimenov himself and the recent Kazakh cultural renaissance have received something far less than Moscow's wholehearted endorsement. But Moscow's "response" and some possible explorations of it are best left for the concluding sections after the various "manifestations" of the cultural revival are discussed.

II. THE PERVERSIVENESS OF THE KAZAKH PAST
IN THE KAZAKH PRESENT

The task that Suleimenov chooses for Kazakh writers is a complex one, to synthesize a Kazakh past which honors their traditions while affirming the positive role of the revolution in creating the conditions necessary for the development of a modern Kazakhstan. It might seem at first glance that to synthesize the traditional nomadic and Islamic past with the atheistic communistic present is an impossible task - that the two must be in contradiction. Certainly if one travels through Kazakhstan the impact of the revolution is everywhere obvious. Kazakh society shows the impact of education, electrification and improved health care and sanita-
tion. Soviet penetration is quite evident, particularly since the introduction of the Virgin Land program.26 But the changes that have occurred have not brought either the Russification of the Kazakhs nor the end of their nomadic heritage. Social change has been both slower and less complete than the regime desired.

In much of Kazakhstan traditional social practices long associated with the pastoral economy still remain quite strong. The good father, good son, and most importantly good herdsman are to be respected; and a good herdsman is someone with "keen knowledge of folk meteorology . . . phenological observations, signs, herbage peculiarities accumulated by the people during the centuries,"27 and not necessarily the graduate of some technical training school. And although technical education has increased among the Kazakhs faster than among the Central Asians there is nonetheless still a shortage of trained cadre, in part because many Kazakhs remain reluctant to seek higher and specialized secondary education if it means leaving their communities.28 It is still common for three generations to reside together, even among party members and kolkhoz officials.29 The role of the elder is a revered one and is often confirmed by awarding him the post of kolkhoz chairman or brigade leader. Parental authority is still quite strong and a marriage usually receives parental approval30 before being consecrated. Many Islamic marriage practices have been retained as well. Payment of a kalym (bride price) is outlawed, but the practice of the groom's family giving costly gifts (mostly livestock) to the bride's father has been retained. The union of a young couple is almost always celebrated by a religious ceremony. Women leave school early31 and marry young, by eighteen or nineteen (but marriage of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old girls is not uncommon), and have large families. Levirate and sororate are both still encountered.32

Kazakh communal loyalties (awareness of clan and often even of tribe) have proven pervasive. Clan identity appears as a matter of pride, a means of establishing continuity with one's ancestors, and no longer serves a divisive role within
the community. As respondents in a recent ethnographic survey pointed out, "It already makes no difference who is from what tribe . . . Argyn, Kipchak, Kerli are one Kazakh nation." Most Kazakhs and virtually all those living in the countryside are aware of their tribal heritage. Each clan has its own historian to preserve the tales and genealogies of the community; and the communal ties remain interwoven with religious practice as each clan retains its own mullah, burial grounds and holy sites. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of clan identification is not a phenomenon of the countryside alone. A 1971 study done of Kazakh college students in the Kzyl Orda oblast showed that the overwhelming majority of respondents not only were aware of their clan origins but considered this to be part of their national tradition.

Probably more threatening from the point of view of the regime is the continued pervasiveness of Islam. It is difficult to gauge how widespread the practice of Islam is, but if recent materials are at all accurate it has shown itself to be resilient; and up to fifty percent of the population in some rural areas are practicing Muslims. Moreover most people are willing at least to attribute a ceremonial importance to religion, and turn to religion to commemorate birth, marriage and death; and circumcision, the Muslim mark of manhood, is universal. The major Muslim holidays are still major feast days, and may still be commemorated by ritual slaughters. Islam is a particularly vital force in southern Kazakhstan where thousands of pilgrims come annually to visit the mausoleum of Hodja Akhmet Sultan in Chimkent oblast, or to pray at one of several shrines in Dzhambul oblast.

It is very difficult to isolate the impact of Islam on the political belief system of the individual who identifies himself as a Muslim. This difficulty is compounded by the problem of defining what it is to be a Muslim. The political scientist, and especially the Soviet analyst, cannot be restricted to a theological definition but must treat Islam as a moral and cultural system. Self-identification would already imply some impact of Islam on one's beliefs and attitudes. Hence, it
seems useful to categorize into three broad groups answers to the question: "What is a Muslim?" A Muslim is someone of Muslim heritage; a Muslim is someone who shares cultural and moral values of the Islamic tradition; a Muslim is someone who believes in Allah and lives his life according to the teachings of Muhammad. In Kazakhstan and throughout Central Asia one would find all three responses present. The first is the most common, and virtually all Kazakhs would identify themselves as Muslims, but this does not imply that they are practitioners of the faith. For present purposes it may be useful to view each response as delineating a distinct analytic group.

The distinctions are rather crude as the Islamic faith (as any other religious belief) may be understood as a dynamic, an almost infinite arrangement of religious values which range from faith as all-encompassing to an identity one gives lip service to, and a particular individual may be located anywhere along the attitudinal continuum. But these three general categories seem useful as a way to classify people when trying to understand the potential political impact of their religious faith.

The most devote group "Muslims by understanding the doctrinal revelations" of Muhammad are by far the smallest of the three. Virtually the only people left in Kazakhstan with any sort of formal religious education are those associated with the "Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan" in Tashkent, the "official clergy" and the graduates of the two madressehs. This is a very small group as there are only a handful of state-authorized mosques in Kazakhstan, and only a dozen or so applicants from Kazakhstan are accepted annually in state-sponsored religious schools, although reports are that requests for admission are mounting. Moreover the education that the Soviet Muslim seminarian receives is somewhat extraordinary by Muslim standards. He is schooled in the fundamentals of Islam, the Quran and hadiths of traditional (Sunnah)law as well as in the writings of the great medieval Central Asian religious thinkers, like al-Bukhari, or Yasavi, (Sultan
Ahmed Hoja); but at the same time he is trained to see the potential unity between church and state in the Soviet state, that Islam can exist and even prosper in a communist society.

This has given a highly particularistic tinge to their preachings, one that has raised eyebrows among Muslims outside of the USSR. On the one hand, they argue that not only are Islam and Soviet rule compatible but the Soviet state has come to embody many traditional Muslim teachings. To quote a recent sermon:

Islam from the moment of its birth became a religion of friendship and piety. Sixty years ago the Soviet land made its first step under this slogan. The slogan of Islam has today become the slogan of all citizens of the Soviet government.

But on the other hand there has been an explicit linkage by the Muslim clergy of Islam and secular nationalism. This is an appeal which emphasizes the cultural distinctness of Central Asians, and seeks to encourage the non-believer to discover the religious teachings which explain and form many of his traditional cultural practices. The Soviets have taken strong objection to the argument that the Muslim umma (community) is a nation, arguing that the Central Asian clergy give their people a false consciousness which reduces their loyalty to their "true" nations; and at least one prominent scientific atheist has argued that because of their late conversion the linkage of Islam and nationalism among the Kazakhs is particularly strong.

Thus although the official religious authorities in Kazakhstan are a few in number their potential influence should not be discounted. They appear to be highly respected individuals who try to use their positions to influence and affect the behavior of the Central Asians and Kazakhs, and they appear to be increasingly successful in this regard. The official religious hierarchy are not mere puppets of the regime used
primarily for propaganda purposes abroad. The substantial increase in the amount of anti-religious publications directed toward the sermons and teachings of the clergy shows that the regime takes them seriously as well. Furthermore, these clerics are not party hacks but often times come from families which have served as Central Asian religious leaders for generations. The official religious establishment is, however, composed of political realists who accept the legitimacy of Soviet power and reflect this in their speeches. But they are committed to a life dominated by the Quran and Sunnah and believe that this is possible within the confines of Soviet life. This is the message that they preach as they urge the intellectual and party elite that Islam was an important component of their national history and cultural heritage and as such worthy of preservation or at least special treatment at the hands of the regime.

One must also include the "unofficial" clergy and their followers among the ranks of devout believers. But it is very difficult to get any sense of the numbers involved. The most important component of this group are Sufis, and although there are no studies of Kazakh Sufism per se, other more general studies of Sufism suggest that Sufi orders continue to survive in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the fact that Sufi shrines like the mausoleum of Sultan Ahmed Hodja (Yasavi) in Turkestan and the several holy sites around Taraz (Dzhambul oblast) still draw thousands of pilgrims annually allows us to infer something about the continued importance of Sufism in Kazakhstan. Nonetheless the near total absence of anti-Sufi anti-religious literature in Kazakhstan, (in sharp distinction to the large amount of such literature for the North Caucasus) gives striking evidence that there is no great fear of the spread of an unofficial doctrinal and hence potentially oppositionary Islam in Kazakhstan.

The persistence of pilgrimages to Sufi shrines, as well as the popularity of Islamic ritual more generally, appear to be sustained by Muslim practitioners who are not really knowledgeable about the doctrinal teachings of Islam, but observe the
ritual and pray on a regular basis. It is hard to know precisely how many people fall into this group but among the rural masses a conservative estimate would be to classify fifty percent of the population as "believers by tradition." The Muslim festivals of Kurban-bairam and Uraz-bairam are times of public celebration when the mosques are filled, and during Ramadan work in the rural areas is disrupted often for religious observances. As mentioned earlier Muslim marriage practices remain widespread, among both believers and non-believers, the latter preserving them as national traditions. Not only is circumcision still practically universal but many other Muslim customs celebrating the birth and naming of the child are still observed as well.

Islamic funeral practices are still widespread. Anti-religious workers are constantly being chided into doing more in this area; but if recent reports are indicative it really is a case of asking them to swim upstream against the current, because these practices are sustained by collusion between official and unofficial religious leaders and party officials.

It is very difficult to estimate the percentage of practicing Muslims among the urban population; reports of large crowds at the mosques during Ramadan provide some evidence of religious practitioners in the cities, as do articles from Muslims of the Soviet East which recount requests for the opening of new mosques in smaller cities throughout Central Asia and Kazakhstan. It is assumed that the percentage of Muslim practitioners is lower among the urban than among the rural population but a recent study of Kazakh factory workers in Omsk gives startling evidence of widespread and strong ties to Islamic practice among urban working-class Kazakhs. Of those surveyed 46% responded that marriage should be according to the norms of Shari'a law, 58% believed in the need for circumcision, 50.5% observed Mawlid (Muhammed's birthday), 78% observed Uraz-bairam and 79.3% Kurban bairam.

Moreover as this study shows, the practice of Islam is not confined simply
to the elderly or older generation, but middle-aged and younger people as well. Most dangerous, from the point of view of the Soviet authorities, is the seeming increase in religiosity among Kazakh youth, allegedly in part as a result of the negative influence of their grandparents who often are responsible for rearing them. One Kazakh sociologist has gone so far as to argue that many Kazakh youth are turning to Islam in response to fill a perceived moral void, that man needs an ethical faith and if not provided by ideology it will be found in religion instead.57

The continued prevalence of religion is something that clearly disturbs the regime and a theme which Kunaev addressed in his speech to the most recent Kazakh party congress. He maintained that Islam was not declining in influence, and even more problematic was the fact that many party members not only accepted this but condoned it by their own participation, and cited the example of an official, one Baizhabaginov, from Dzhezkazgan oblast charged with supervising religion, who had himself sent to Alma Ata for a mullah to bury a relative.58

In making this attack Kunaev is highlighting not only the religiosity but the universality of the third type of believer, the "Muslim by identity." For all intents and purposes this category consists of all those Kazakhs who are not "doctrinal" or "ritual" believers. To be a Kazakh is to be a Muslim. To paraphrase one anti-religious worker... "there has been a symbiosis between the Islamic religion and the ethnic society."59 To identify as a "Muslim" need not mean one is either observant or knowledgeable about the Muslim faith, but it does imply a certain pride in one's Islamic heritage, and consequently a general reluctance to persecute the faithful.

Kunaev's attack on comrade Baizhabaginov from Dzhezkazgan is neither isolated nor exceptional. Kunaev's speeches are filled with references to the poor quality of anti-religious propaganda; and party officials are attacked for their willingness not only to condone the activities of religious practitioners, but sometimes to
engage in such themselves. As one leading atheist propagandist summed up the more general situation after attacking a nation cultural worker in Enbekshildersk who slaughtered a black ram to end a drought:

Many responsible leaders of the nation are confused, and identify the national and popular with the religious. From this comes the false opinion that all is in order with regard to religion and it is not necessary to conduct effective anti-religious propaganda.

Kunaev responded to the linkage of Islam and nationalism when he rebuked a raikom secretary from Burliutiubinsk who claimed that "the Muslim religion holds no threat to us" in reference to the Kazakh Communist party. But such rebukes notwithstanding it is by no means clear that the regime considers Islam a direct or short-term political threat in Kazakhstan. At a time when attitudes toward many sects of Christian religious believers appear to be hardening several prominent scientific atheists in Kazakhstan seem reluctant to argue that Islam in the Kazakh context is necessarily subversive. In fact the inference of their argument is exactly the opposite, that although an atheistic state is desirable it must be accepted that traditional Islamic practices will inevitably be slow to die out, but this in itself need not impede the larger social goals of the regime. One recent study concluded that:

... collating the results of local studies of religiosity allows one to affirm that an absolute majority of those considering themselves believers have non-religious orientations. Muslim value orientations including moral ones ceased to serve as a form of deciding such questions of life as the choice of professions, education, starting a family; and do not greatly influence their productive activity.

There appears to be a tacit, if new-found, acceptance on the part of the regime
that the Kazakhs appear likely to retain many Islamic rituals for the foreseeable future. Anti-religious propaganda is targeted primarily at youth in an attempt to prevent the spread of Islam. Moreover, religious activists in the republic appear to be far more concerned with Christian fundamentalist believers than with Muslims.67

By all accounts the quality of anti-religious propaganda among the Kazakhs is quite poor. There is no republic house of atheism (there are three local "houses"), many institutes of higher education do not have sectors of scientific atheism, and much of the anti-religious material dispersed in the republic is not in Kazakh but in Russian.68 There is no hard evidence to indicate that increased investment in this area is to be forthcoming, and for the moment it appears that Kunaev would be satisfied if the existing anti-religious propagandists would do their jobs, i.e. perceive religious survivals as worth suppressing.69

Thus the Kazakh writers who are seeking to recapture their past have a living legacy with which to deal. Collectivization and the Virgin Lands policy may have ended Kazakh nomadism, but there is more continuity between past and present than the oft-used phrase of "vestiges" might imply or than Kazakh scholars previously claimed.70 Most Kazakhs are rural and, although rural life is much changed, clan identity and livestock-based lore are very much alive, as are many pre-revolutionary legends. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that many customary and religious rituals retain their popularity, preserved often in further diluted form when the Kazakh moves to the city. The Kazakh writer coming from such a tradition may well be looking to the past to help provide some sort of framework to superimpose upon the more fragmented present.

III. THE PROBLEM OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

Any Kazakh writer who wishes to depict the Kazakh past inevitably confronts the problem of how to describe the history of the long Kazakh association with
the Russians. The post-revolutionary period is easy: Soviet rule must of course be depicted as a positive and inevitable advance; but the pre-revolutionary period is far trickier as the Kazakh scholar or writer must conform with the general dictates of Soviet historiography when depicting Kazakh resistance to the Russian advance and subsequent annexation of Kazakh territory. Was this conquest or voluntary submission? In the 1920s and 1930s there was considerable vascillation on this question; by the late 1940s it became obvious that no leeway in the historical interpretation of the positive nature of Russian colonialism was to be permitted, and only the most obviously "peasant" uprisings were fit subjects of historical studies.71 This was made abundantly clear to Caucasian Muslims in the Shamil controversy in 1950, but the Kazakhs were delevered their warning nearly three years earlier after the publication in Alma Ata of E.B. Bekmakhanov's Kazakhstan in the 1820s-1840s,72 a history of Khan Kenisary Kasimov's revolt against the Russians in the 1830s-1840s. This book initially (in 1947) received favorable reviews in the Kazakh press, but was attacked in Pravda the following year for glorifying a feudal leader and paying insufficient attention to the positive role of the Russian "elder brother." Bekmakhanov, a Professor of History at the Kazakh State University and Director of the Institute of History, Demography and Archeology of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, came under strong attack; and in October 1951 he was stripped of his titles and degrees,73 and subjected to public attack by his own students. But what was at stake was not simply an interpretation of the history of Kazakh-Russian relations but the ability of the Kazakhs to define a science of history in their republic. Bekmakhanov's study74 was revolutionary, by far the most sophisticated study by a Kazakh historian then written; and opened up the whole question of the study of Kazakh state and society in the nineteenth century, by revealing the existence of hundreds of more books and archival sources from this period. Moreover the nineteenth-century Kazakh society he depicted was much more complex than that presented
in earlier histories and the resistance of Kenesary shown as not only more widespread, but more articulate than had previously been credited. Furthermore the history was intended to serve as a model for the new generation of Kazakh historians. And in a way it did, for although they all attacked him, several including S. Tolybekov, V. Shakhmatov and T. Shoinbaev contented themselves with publishing rather inconsequential formulaic journal articles and saved their major theoretical contributions for the 1960s and 1970s when freer conditions characterized Kazakh academic life.

In recent years Kazakh historians have shown a strong interest in expanding the existing (i.e. published in Soviet period) body of knowledge about Kazakh history. Olzhas Suleimino has served as an important catalyst in this effort in the 1970s and 1980s, seeking constantly to broaden the fields of enquiry. He first publically raised the issue at the Sixth Congress of the Kazakh Union of Writers in 1971, and expanded this speech into an essay which appeared in Prostor the following year. He argued that "history does not tolerate blank spots;" that villains as well as heroes must be studied. Russian history, he points out, has both; everyone knows that there could be no Russian history without both Peter I and Ivan the Terrible; the Kazakhs should have the same opportunity to study the entirety of their history:

... A people coming to the twentieth century on a difficult and tragic many thousand year path, through gloomy defeat and fiery victory carrying their living soul and preserving their great land from Chinese, Mongol and Muslim emperors, all of whose fields and depths today serve communism, such a people is worthy of knowing its own biography, and this biography deserves respect. 75

In the past decade there have been a large number of serious studies written primarily in Russian by Kazakh scholars, some of whom had been silent since the
late 1940s. These include two excellent studies on sixteenth-century history; one on the formation of a Kazakh nation and the other about the civilization in the early cities. Several volumes of materials from pre-revolutionary archives have appeared as well, including one which reproduces Eastern language materials in modern typescript. There have also been several notable studies on the pre-revolutionary Kazakh economy which seek to go beyond the strictly ideological tenor which characterized earlier studies and provide detailed analysis of the settlement of the Kazakh nomads, the introduction of agriculture and the creation of a Kazakh-Russian trade network. These studies, written of course from a Marxist perspective, make extensive use of archives, reflect an exhaustive survey of contemporary published sources and have considerably expanded the current state of knowledge on these problems.

There has also been a revitalization in the study of Kazakh intellectual history. Most of the recently published materials have focused on the pre-revolutionary activities of the secular reformer, although some studies have provided careful examination of the writings of the Muslim or Pan-Turk reformers as well. To date this literature has avoided mention of the post-revolutionary activities of these people but has provided a rather complete chronology of the developments of 1905-1917, including detailed accounts of the content of the Kazakh language press for this period. By and large these Kazakh historians have escaped official criticism for their writings, although there have been rumors circulating in the academic community that at least one of these authors is in official disgrace for having overstepped his bounds in refuting the "feudal" character of nomadism.

An equally important indicator of the growing Kazakh interest in national themes is how much more sophisticated and all inclusive the literary history of the Kazakhs has become. Kazakh literary critics have been increasingly concerned
to show how rich and longstanding the Kazakh literary tradition is. Although the Kazakh only began to develop a literary language in the middle of the nineteenth-century recent anthologies of Kazakh poetry include the leading sixteenth- and seventeenth-century akyns and zhyraus (singers and poets) of the Kazakh Khans, even though these individuals wrote in chagatai. Kazakh literary criticism has long made the connection between Kazakh and Russian literature, acknowledging the former's great debt to the latter. A more recent development is to place the development of Kazakh literature within the framework of the traditions of Eastern (i.e. Islamic) literature; but a growing number of Kazakh literary critics are making just such an assertion and although direct reference to Islam is omitted, the reference to "Eastern humanism" implies an obvious debt to Islam. To quote one Kazakh critic:

"It is well known that in the rich Kazakh folklore, where the entire spiritual life of the people is concentrated, there are preserved many traces of the cultural connections with other peoples, and first of all with the peoples of the East."

Moreover literary critics, like the author of the above statement, are concerned with expanding the horizons of Kazakh literary criticism not only by broadening the themes included, but also by "correcting" some long-standing assumptions of Kazakh literary history, especially the assertion that the early Kazakh realists, the alleged "fathers" of modern Kazakh literature, Abai Kunanbaev, and the "first pedagogue" Ibrahim Altynsaryn were simple Russophiles. Current literary scholarship is concerned with depicting them as critical of blind attachment to Islam but nonetheless concerned that the Kazakhs should not forsake their Eastern heritage as they accept a European (i.e. Russian) one.

The history of development of Kazakh literature in the nineteenth century has changed substantially in recent years. Kazakh literary critics have become
more willing to confront the relationship between Islam and the Kazakh intellectual renaissance of the nineteenth century. And both Kazakh and Russian language poetry anthologies include poems by a number of Kazakh poets whose works have not been published since 1922. The poems of pre-revolutionary poets who were strongly influenced by religious themes are still available only in fragmentary or incomplete editions and their essays not at all, but their writings appear to be preserved in their entirety in the rare book collection of the Kazakh Academy of Science, and have already been made accessible to a handful of scholars.

There is not yet agreement among Kazakh scholars as to how to treat such pre-revolutionary writers as Muhammad Salim Kashimov, Shakarim Kudaiberdiev and Mashur Zhusup Kopeev (1857-1913) who considered themselves as Islamic reformers. Some literary critics are not fearful of crediting their contribution to literature, but historians of Kazakh philosophy strongly condemn them as clericalists and religious mystics.

Most twentieth-century Kazakh literary figures have fared better at the hand of both historians and literary critics. Virtually all those who were purged in the 1930s have been posthumously rehabilitated. The only twentieth century literary figures who are still banned are nationalists, those who were actively identified with the Alash Orda, such as Bukeikhanov, Dulatov, and Baitursunov, and it is not known whether all of their works are even preserved. The works of Kazakh poets who were active on the staffs of Aikap and Qazaq but who subsequently served the Bolshevik regime and died before the purges of Alash Orda party members, men like Sultan Mahmud Toraigirov (1893-1920) and Sabit Donentaev (1894-1933), have been reprinted, initially in Kazakh and now in Russian as well. Modern Kazakh literary critics have labelled them "poet-democrats," important for their contributions to the Kazakh tradition of literary realism. Several Kazakh poets responsible for the early policies of the Kazakh branch of the Writers Union, who were killed in the purges of the late 1930s, have also been posthumously
rehabilitated. The two most accomplished poets of this group are Saken Seifullin and Il'ias Dzhansagurov. Seifullin's posthumous rehabilitation has meant the first wide distribution of his major prose piece, *Ternisty put* (Moscow, 1975) a memoir of the Civil War in novel form.

However although the amount of material presently available about the Kazakh past is greater than any time since the 1920s, Moscow has nonetheless clearly not relinquished control over determining the acceptable parameters of study, and in the early 1970s, and again last year on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the "voluntary union" of Kazakhs and Russians the "dean" of Kazakh historians published articles that reaffirmed the positive and allegedly peaceful process of unification.

This notwithstanding the Kazakh historians have managed to broaden the subject matter of the history of their people. The most recent official history is five volumes long, and while it breaks no new ground in interpretive historiography it is a far more comprehensive treatment than was previously available, especially for the history of the period prior to the Russian conquest. And the story of the "unification" of the Kazakh people, although obviously told from a pro-Russian view, offers a more complete, albeit critical, account of Kazakh resistance to annexation than was available in earlier post-World War II accounts. This seems to be the current official attitude. Even Kunaev in his address commemorating the "250th Anniversary of the Unification of Kazakhs and Russians" noted that while there was an unbreakable and ardently mass-supported friendship between Kazakhs and Russians, the history of the unification process between the two peoples should not be oversimplified.

However the expansion of historical study in Kazakhstan has well-defined limits. The teleological viewpoint adopted must always be Russocentric, i.e. periodizing time according to events that matter not only in Kazakh history but in Russian history. To violate this is to depart from acceptable scholarly norms. A clear case in point is the furor created when Olzhas Suleimenov published his
Az i ia (Alma Ata, 1975) which retold the "Igor's tale" from a Turkic viewpoint. Following the publication of the book, Suleimenov was subjected to an officially-organized attack made at a joint meeting of the sections of History, and Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Accusations of Suleimenov's alleged injustices to history were made by no less an authority than the renowned Medievalist, Academic Likhachev. But, although the book has been nearly entirely removed from circulation, no public apology has ever been made by Suleimenov. He was removed, it is rumored at Kunaev's insistence, from his post as Minister of Culture. He personally has weathered the storm and in 1981 returned to the Kazakh Council of Ministers as head of the Kazakh film industry. And as we will see in the next section, the moral of Suliemenov's story, which has not been lost on the Kazakh intellectual establishment, is that controversial historical themes are best tackled in works of fiction.

IV. THE LITERARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE DEPICTION OF THE KAZAKH PAST

It is not my purpose here to survey the entire Kazakh literary scene. The Kazakhs like all other Soviet peoples have their share of hack writers, party apologists, and career literary administrators who occasionally pen a poem or short story to demonstrate their capacity to do creative work. Dzhuban Muldagaliev, the current head of the Kazakh writers Union, is one such figure. But there appears to be rather general agreement that the Kazakhs also possess a group of talented writers. O. Suleimenov heads virtually everyone's list, followed by Anuar Alimzhanov, S. Sanbaev, D. Doszhanov, A. Kekilbaev and Il'ias Esenberlin. Consequently in my study of Kazakh literature I concentrated on these people. The first three named write in Russian and the latter three in Kazakh, highlighting the rather unique relationship that exists for the Kazakhs between language and national culture, a theme which is treated at
greater length in Section V. Not only do these writers all write about common themes, but they also perceive themselves as constituting a literary circle or clique, and are recognized as such by Kazakh critics; and as a group they owe much to the inspiration of Chingis Aitmatov. To paraphrase a recent Kazakh literary critic, the contribution of this group is in further popularizing the historical novel, and in helping to develop a genre of psychological fiction which mixes myth and reality. The former writing serves as a valuable addition to Kazakh history, the latter gives us good insight into the personal philosophies of the authors themselves.

Despite the fact that the authors write about common themes, and the strong similarity between these various prose pieces, it is nevertheless difficult to talk about a distinct Kazakh literature, a literature which draws on uniquely Kazakh themes and treats these themes in a distinctive fashion. The Kazakhs write about much the same themes as the Kirghiz and the Turkmen; their writings are often focused around the beauty and solitude of the steppe and the folkways of the past. They also write about epic tales and historical heros. The Kazakh historical novel was first popularized in the 1950s by A. Nurpeisov's trilogy about the Aral fishermen during the Civil War, and there are numerous examples of subsequent novels dealing with the revolution and the early years of Soviet rule, novels which, because they are set in the period before collectivization are able to depict traditional society and often do so in a rather romantic fashion. Such novels have both increased in number and increased in popularity in recent years.

But several Kazakh writers have made their reputations by treating even more daring historical themes, the pre-revolutionary history of the Kazakhs; and often have been able to do this with far less restraint than scholars writing history have encountered. It is almost as if literature while expected to be "realistic" is exempted from the exactitudes of "scientific" truths that are expected of
historians, or it may be that literary censorship is conducted by different and less rigorous critics than history. But regardless of the cause the writers of historical novels have been able to provide a far more "Kazakh-centered" picture of the pre-revolutionary period than have the historians. The Russians are not depicted harshly, although a stupid chinovnik or two may be worked into the plot, but they are not the focus of the stories. These novels are about events that are important in Kazakh history, told from a viewpoint sympathetic to the Kazakhs, and sometimes introduce unlikely "heroes."

Probably the most interesting example of contemporary Kazakh historical fiction is Il'iias Esenberlin's Kochevniki, a three-volume "fictional" history of the Kazakh people from the time of the formation of the Kazakh Khanate in the mid-fourteenth century through the revolt of Khan Kenisary Kasymov in the 1830s. The last volume, which deals with the revolt was published separately under the title Khan Kenel. Esenberlin's purpose is to provide a history of the rise and fall of the Kazakh Khanate from the vantage point of the Kazakh nomads. His concern with exploring the impact of great events on common people is his only real concession to the traditional concerns of Soviet prose, and his writings quite clearly fall within the domain of the "realistic" tradition.

Esenberlin defines his task as providing a new type of history, one which makes far greater use of ethnographic, and literary sources and especially folklore, as a means to enhance the traditional written and archival sources, which he uses as well. The result of Esenberlin's efforts is a far richer portrait of Kazakh society in the first half of the century than previously existed, not only the lives of the common people but the aristocracy as well. Most interesting is his portrayal of Kenisary Kasimov, which is at odds not only with current historiography but with the summary at the front of the book.

Esenberlin's Kenisary is not the same cruel and despotic figure that most
Soviet authors are wont to portray. He is certainly a flawed character but at times he is almost a sympathetic one, defeated not only by the superiority of Russian military force but by his own refusal to compromise and accept the amnesty the Russians offered him. To persist in the dream of recreating the Kazakh Khanate is depicted as naive, and may well have been because the Russians were already deeply entrenched in the Steppe when Kenisary's revolt began; and they were obviously committed to use their superior forces in pursuit of an expansionist policy. Esenberlin's novel is remarkably apolitical, given the implicit constraints of the subject matter. Kenisary's goal of uniting the Kazakhs is depicted as foolish but the premise is not attacked as cruel, feudal or in any other way morally reprehensible. Rather the Russian advance is depicted as inevitable and Kenisary the author indicates that should have perceived it. But the conquest is not lauded nor colonial rule praised. The Kazakhs, not the Russians, are the subjects of _Kochevniki_. In a society where the periodization of history is acutely political to organize a book not around events like "colonization" or "the Revolution and Civil War" the yardsticks by which Russians measure and record history is unusual, and to go even further and orient the time span of a book around events that only have meaning to the Kazakhs, the creation and lost dream of their khanate is in itself a political statement. Esenberlin is asserting the Kazakhs, right to preserve all their "heroes," those who were relatively flawless, and those who, like Kenisary Kasymov must to the Soviet reader be portrayed as flawed; and while doing this has encountered relatively few attacks and a great deal of praise.

Kazakh-Russian relations is only one of the controversial themes explored in Kazakh fiction. Those interested in the development of Kazakh culture have been concerned with depicting the many sources of civilization in the Steppe, Eastern as well as Russian. A number of prominent Kazakh novelists have built their
reputations writing about the period prior to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate. Dukenbai Doszhanov is the best known writer of this type of fiction, and his most widely reviewed book Shelkovyi put', is set in the Steppe during the Chingsid period, i.e. before the formation of the Kazakh state. He thus avoids the problem of how to depict Russians, as there were none around, but he still must confront an equally controversial theme, the role of Islam. In Shelkovyi put', Doszhanov downplays the question by paying little attention to the religious practices of his characters. But the very choice of this theme reaffirms the notion that the Kazakhs are a Muslim people who feel a part of the history of Muslims in Central Asia more generally.

Most writers of historical fiction follow Doszhanov's lead and avoid direct discussions of Islam and Islamic philosophy; and of course any direct discussion of religion would demand a critical posture. But novels and tales that center on life in the ancient cities of Otrar, Sairam or Taraz or on the lives of a "classical" figure like al Farabi are designed for an audience that finds Islamic history interesting, and highlights the Islamic heritage of the Kazaks. But it would be a mistake to assume that the authors of such novels are believers, i.e. practicing Muslims, who see their writing as a form of subtle propaganda to spread the true faith. Certainly in the case of the Kazakh writers there is no evidence for this conclusion. Moreover the descriptions of Islamic faith in many of these historical novels are very flat, unidimensional, in some cases reflect little understanding of Islamic dogma, or possibly even a subtle contempt for it.

Given both the late and rather incomplete conversion of the Kazakhs it is not surprising the religion is expressed in both ambiguous and ambivalent terms. The Kazakh writers in question have not had a religious education and the knowledge of the faith of their fathers is indirect at best. A good example of the literary treatment accorded Islam is found in Anuar Alimzhanov's novel Strela Makhambet.
a novellization of the life of Makhambet Utemisov (1804-1846), the poet-fighter who recorded the "peasant" revolt of Isatai Taimanov of the Bukeev Horde (1836-1838). Although most pre-revolutionary scholarship and even materials from the 1920s take for granted that part of the motivation for the revolt was religious, this theme is underplayed by Alimzhanov. The Islam of the Bukeev Kazakhs that he portrays is almost a folk religion and is linked to a materialistic rather than a spiritual world view. The poetry of Makhambet reproduced in the novel are his more secular works, and the concerns of his circle are clearly depicted as the economic welfare of the Kazakh masses and not their spiritual well-being. To quote one of the Isatai's fighters:

... I will tell you that an oath with bread or grain in the hands is holier and more awesome than an oath with the Quran. Kazakhs say you can step on the Quran but you cannot leave a drop of bread or pour a drop of milk on the ground.\textsuperscript{123}

Alimzhanov's depiction of Islam is typical of the genre more generally. He accords Islam an important symbolic role in Steppe life, but religion is not represented as a motivating or inspirational force. It is a fact of life but not the central focus. However the Kazakh writers under consideration do not seem to feel it appropriate to attack the role of religion in the nineteenth century, nor do they glorify it, but rather ignore its doctrinal content and treat popular practice of religious ritual as just one feature of Kazakh life. A striking example of this is found in the novel \textit{Ognennaja strela}\textsuperscript{124} about the life of Turar Ryskulov.\textsuperscript{125} The first volume of the book deals with his father Ryskul, a simple nomad who became anti-Russian and ultimately ended his life as a political exile in Eastern Siberia. Ryskul is depicted as a wholly admirable character, but no attempt is made to minimize his faith. The author, Sherkhan Murtazaev depicts
Ryskul as he prepares to leave young Turar and go off in exile:

... Ryskul was silent, unable to lift his tear-and hate-filled eyes from the ground. In his soul bubbled and gurgled his old song-prayer. Fate is turning away. You can't hold a wild horse on a twisty, slippery, steep and damned road.

Give only to Allah the strong answer of courage, only to Allah.126

Those authors who write about life under Soviet rule are more cautious in their discussions of religion, and generally only the elderly are described as active believers. In many of the stories the characters are clearly Muslim, but this is signalled in unobtrusive ways, they exchange traditional greetings, occasionally invoke the name of Allah, and don't work on Fridays,127 but their religiously is not a focus of the story. However this downplaying of religion may be more tactical than ideological. Olzhas Suleimenov, admittedly the most daring of his circle, hints at a far more complex relationship between the Kazakh intellectual and his faith than literary criticism often asserts. One place the complexity of the relationship is implied is in the poem "Spor lektora s mulloi v kolkhoze imeni Dzhambula," a discussion between an ignorant mullah and a lecturer on evolution. By the end of the poem the lecturer leaves the mullah querying the obsolescence of Islamic ritual, but he wonders who is ultimately better off - he the descendant of an orangutan or the mullah, a son of God.128

Suleimenov raises the issue of religion in several other poems,129 but nowhere is the complex cultural heritage of the Kazakhs better expressed than in "Analein."130 The Kazakhs are depicted as nomads, tribesmen and Muslims; Asiatics playing a role in a European dominated world, accepting the conventions of European (i.e. Russian) civilization but nonetheless always remaining somewhat outside it. To paraphrase from the final stanza:
I migrate through the black and white world
People advise me to build a two-story house...
In my pocket again -
I have not a spear;
with a spear it starts -
once again to the horse!
The last member of the hordes
to the last sea!
On the map -
there are bays, savannahs, and mountains!
While they buried us—with our feet to the West
Billions lie—with their feet to the West
Under the yellow cover of the Mongol Steppe
Tumans of Nogais, Naimans, Kazakhs
Not knowing that
Asia is more Western than
the West
The West -
is more Eastern than the Chinese sea...

The poem expresses the complexity of the Kazakh heritage, the meaning of Kazakh identity in highly abstract and symbolic fashion. Several contemporaries of Suleimenov have attempted to express similar sentiments in more popularly accessible form. These works belong to the genre of psychological fiction. Two worthy of more serious consideration are "Kogda zhazhudt mifa" by Satimzhan Sanbaev, and "Most Karasunkara" by Anuar Alimzhanov. Both rely heavily on Kazakh myth and legend and seek to elucidate the present through an exploration of continuities with the past.
The Alimzhanov novella is the last of a cycle of stories that deal with the travels of Zhomart, a celebrated Kazakh academic, a cycle designed to show "the historical and spiritual biography" of his people. In this story he journeys to a remote Kazakh village to help Kazakh high-school students dig up kurgans (ancient burial mounds). After travelling around Asia and Africa Zhomart goes into the countryside to find the roots of his culture. He declares:

... I have wandered much about the world. The symbols of the motherland are the dearest of all. But where is the motherland? Is it where you were born. Where you are respected as a person, or where they respect your past and future. Many people wander the world in search of a motherland.

While attempting to dig up the kurgans Zhomart meets, and comes into conflict with Karasunkara, an elderly herdsman who has taken it upon himself to protect these Muslim graves. Karasunkara is an unusual hero for a Soviet story. He is a deeply religious man, whose belief led to the greatest folly of his life, migration to China after the revolution at the behest of a mullah. He returned to Soviet Kazakhstan, portrayed here as a nirvana in comparison with Communist China, and has become a fervent advocate of sticking with your own people on your ancestral land through any adversity:

... A dog tries to go where he is well fed while a dzhigit tries to go where he was born. The ancestors were right. What use is it to be a sultan in a foreign land, better to remain simple folk in one's native aul near one's hearth.

The novella focuses on the attempt by Karasunkara to dissuade Zhomart and Askar (the teacher of the students) from disturbing the bones of their ancestors. There is a lengthy argument between Karasunkara and Askar on the meaning of respect. Askar does not perceive himself as committing a sacrilege, rather he is trying to
"open the secret of the dead..." to let them "tell their own story."

Ultimately Askar and Zhomart assure Karasunkara that they too are devoted to the Kazakh cause, and that the kurgans can be opened. The inflexibility of religious dogma is cast aside by the traditional herdsman (Karasunkara) and as a sign of trust and common cause, as he is dying, he gives Zhomart his ring which bears the same tamga (tribal sign) as was on the kurgan. Zhomart eulogizes him, stressing not their differences but what he shares with this simple shepherd, a nostalgic vision of the glorious Kazakh (and more broadly nomadic) past:

... ours right here right here in this great steppe at the beginning of which we stand, always lived our people. This is their civilization... We have also been called Komans and Polovtsians; or by the names of our tribes Kipchaks, Naimans; or by the names of our brother people, Kirghiz. But we remained Kazakhs and lived in that land which lies between East and West. We were taciturn in life and in battle. Our ancestors wrote little, remembered more. We have no written histories. There is land and memory... Karasunkara was the preserver of the secrets of these graves. He wandered a long time beyond the Blue Mountains. His feeling for the motherland became sharpened one hundred-fold. It always happened thus. Our ancestors wandered about the world a great deal. For that reason they were called nomads. In Egypt they were called Mamelukes, in Iran they made them into Sarts, in India they crowned them Moghuls. The only treasure for them on foreign soil was dry clump of dzhusan (grass)... So as not to forget about their land, their motherland, and always to preserve in their memory the scents of its history.
Sanbaev's story treats an almost identical theme: In "Kogda zhazhdut mifa" Bulat, a young architect moves to the country to study the ancient ruins which are preserved in the Mangystau region. He too is forced to confront the meaning of the past as revealed by an old shepherd Elin, who through a series of lengthy flashbacks tells Bulat the story of Shakpak the Seljuk artist who was responsible for the temple whose ruins still stand in the cave above Elin's settlement. By telling this history Elin is imparting wisdom to Bulat and fulfilling his part in continuing the Kazakh chain of being:

... The songs preserved by man must be sung, otherwise they will explode in your heart. Legends are entrusted to people. Your wisdom must be gained by others. In youth you gather legends in order to free yourself a son of the earth, but in old age everything must be left to people in order to part easily from the living. 139

And with the knowledge that he gains Bulat is able in his dream to not only know but to spiritually experience the Kazakh past:

... My dream is to try to find out through the artistic monuments preserved in Mangystau in what way my ancestors lived. Everybody knows only what is written and said about the ancient battles and wars, but I want to know the spiritual side of the steppe-dwellers lives'. Governments perhaps are even founded by wars but the highest origin of life probably was art. 140

In this story, even more than in Alimzhanov's tale, there is a conspicuous absence of the teleological structure centered around the Russian Revolution and the advent of communism which typically characterizes Soviet literature. On the contrary the view of history that is conveyed is almost episodic. The Kazakhs
have lived through both good and bad times, these are good ones; but there is
no sense that future well-being is definitionally assured. On the contrary,
particularly in Sanbaev's tale there is a strong sense conveyed that the source of
complacency and well-being is internal, almost spiritual, conveyed by communion
with one's forefathers 141 and cannot be given by an external agent like the state.

Despite the heavy nationalist undertones Alimzhanov's tale has met with
critical acclaim but Sanbaev's has been a subject of controversy. Shortly after
its appearance Literaturnoe obozrenie carried two critical articles on "Kogda
zhazhdut mifa" and another Sanbaev novella, Kop Azhal. 142 In a short concluding
piece, the editors of the journal left no doubt as to the errant ways of Sanbaev
who was criticized for the non-Marxist glorification of the past for its own sake:

In 'Kop-Azhal' the hero tries to tell us that fidelity
to the traditions of the eagle hunter has helped him to become
a hero of the Great Patriotic War. Tradition is tradition.
But the heroic feats of Soviet man are produced by the force
of Soviet patriotism and not by the inertia of tradition. 143

However Sanbaev and his contemporaries strongly disagree with the argument
that Soviet patriotism is in conflict with a respect for the traditions of the
past. In "Kop-Azhal" Sanbaev argues exactly the opposite position; that reverence
of the past is part of patriotism:

... Perhaps the way of the aul was not always the exact way,
the way that Mankas had sought, but neither was it ever the easy
way. And now the aul was marching side by side with the whole
of my multi-national country, was living a real life, a full
and constructive life, striving to understand its past, and
certain of its future. 144

Kazakh writers have continued to explore these themes, although they know it
provokes official displeasure. Nor has this "displeasure" generally been used to prevent the publication of works of the Suleimenov (or the Zhyldyz) school in Russian and Kazakh-language editions in Alma Ata and in Moscow. The most prominent Kazakh authors Anuar Alimzhanov, Il'ias Esenberlin, and Olzhas Suleimenov are not only widely read by the Kazakhs, but have developed a readership throughout the Soviet Union. They have established the theme of nomadism and life in the aul as the dominant theme in their works, and one which their young disciples are emulating. A recent anthology of Kazakh literature, Kogda ukhodiat pleiady, brought together a representative collection of these works, which were applauded as representing the best in contemporary Kazakh literature. The literary critic who edited the volume, I. Kramov, argued quite forcefully that the Kazakh writers were not simply writing genre pieces but that they were exploring a theme that was inextricably tied to their sense of self and is a critical component in their spiritual well-being.

At this time we see an attempt to portray the steppe as a peculiar spiritual phenomenon. The steppe has placed an indelible stamp on the conditions of popular life; in its expanses built upon from generation to generation, and in habits and customs which helped the steppe dwelling nomads to survive in the severe battle for existence. The novellas give an idea about daily life and about morals and customs of the steppe, but not only, or more exactly not so much in this is the problem and goal of today's novella. The novella has as well a higher role, connected as it is with efforts to scrutinize the profound sources of national culture and to expose the living (though occasionally obscured for a contemporary) direct connection of the present with the past, near or more remote, extending into the depths of the ages.
The Kazakh writers whose works are collected in this volume, the leading representatives of Kazakh literature, are committed to recapturing their past and integrating it with the realities of present-day life. It is in this context that Kazakh traditional society, Islam, but especially the more secular heritage of pastoral nomadism, has a political impact today and one of potential importance for the future of the Kazakhs and possibly the Soviets more generally. Once the Kazakhs became settled, and especially for those who left the rural setting, the glorification of their past became critical, and Kazakh nomadism became the logical expression of their uniqueness. One group of Kazakh intellectuals have chosen to create a coherent yet unique culture from the disparate and often contradictory cultural and ideological forces to which the Kazakhs have been subjected -- their traditional nomadic culture, Islam, Russian culture and the communist ideology of the Soviet state.

One very striking thing about these writings is the almost total absence of concern with the future. Socialist realism is founded in a teleological vision of history, with the full actualization of man to come in a communist future. These writers are not concerned with depicting this future, nor is there any shared sense of what it will be like. More importantly there is an almost tacit assertion that to preserve the link between present and past is more important than to strive to realize a utopian vision of the future. The preoccupation with one's past has long been understood as a manifestation of national consciousness. One danger is that the current Kazakh literary and historical revival may strengthen the linkage between a Kazakh secular identity (which is permitted) and a Kazakh Muslim identity. The connection has already been made once, when the Kazakh nationalists tried to unify the population at the time of the revolution. It could be that it will be made again, that "Qazaqshylyk" (Kazakhness) may take on a more explicitly Muslim component.

At present the relationship between the intellectual elite and the religious elite appears to be a marriage of convenience, particularly from the point of
view of the intellectuals whose views seem tame in comparison to the strong cultural exclusionism preached by the Muslim clergy. However, over time it is difficult to know which group the regime will find most threatening, the clergy or the intellectuals. The preachings of the Muslim mullahs can always be dismissed by Moscow as definitionally anti-Marxist and representative of a vestige of the past which will fade with time. But philosophy of the Kazakh intellectuals is far more difficult to categorize, and may ultimately be more dangerous.

The danger that the Soviet leadership faces today is not that of a lone horseman in the Steppe who defies location and will not be subjected to Soviet rule. He is long gone and his successors on the kolkhozy and sovkhozy of Kazakhstan seem reasonably content with the merger of past and present which has occurred. The potential threat comes from the Kazakh who separated from the countryside, who looks to the nomadic past as a romantic period which defines his uniqueness. He is an articulate and aware citizen who has seen the Kazakh intellectual establishment struggle to define for itself the meaning of being a Kazakh Soviet citizen, a citizen who is a communist, i.e. a supporter of the main goals of the regime, but is also a Kazakh. This challenge to the center is not an oppositionist one but is made by individuals who have taken official rhetoric as a statement of intent and are trying to get the regime to live up to the stated goals of Soviet national development as they understood them. A dangerous precedent has been created by the appearance of the sort of literature that glorifies their past and which although in the tradition of socialist realism, deals explicitly with themes that the center disapproves of. It also points to a failure to create a true multi-national culture, and demonstrates that natural and cultural differences withstand the disappearance of the economic institutions that allegedly cause them. It indicates that Moscow has ceded some limited power to the periphery on cultural issues, and at least implicitly signalled that its exclusive control
of ideology may be erodible. By helping to bring this about, Kazakh nomadism or more accurately its symbolic legacy, may ultimately have its greatest political impact.

V. THE RESPONSE

Olzhas Suleimenov and the intellectual coterie which surrounds him, the so-called Zhuldyz group, seem to be accepted but not really encouraged by Soviet officialdom. Whereas it is true that literary criticism within Kazakhstan is generally quite supportive of Suleimenov and the type of literature which dominates in Zhuldyz and Prostor, the Kazakh criticism that is reproduced in Moscow, especially in party-dominated organs, tends to be far more critical, stressing divisions within the Kazakh literary community. The following quote is from an article which appeared in Pravda, and is written by a Kazakh:

... through closer acquaintance with the varied literary output in the historical genre one can easily tell that the original idea of integrally examining the past in terms of its causal relations with the present has not been realized. The stress has shifted in the direction of primary attention to the past itself. In other words history has entered literature, but the principles of historicism have not yet been genuinely affirmed in it.

There certainly are members of the Kazakh intellectual community -- writers, critics and historians -- who are willing to do Moscow's bidding; and in their writings these individuals continue to stress the ways that Kazakh cultural and political life has been enriched through contact with the Russians. The head of the Kazakh Union of Writers, Dzhaban Muldagaliev, is one such individual. But even he has not succeeded in redirecting the focus of Kazakh literature back...
to more conventional Soviet themes, nor is there any evidence that he has considered doing this a particular priority, and if anything Kunaev was more critical of the Kazakh artistic establishment in his address to the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1981 than he had been at the Fourteenth Party Congress five years earlier when Alimzhanov still presided over the Writers Union. He criticized the republic's leading literary figures for an excessive preoccupation with the past at the expense of a proper respect for the accomplishments of the present:

Other writers and the cinematographers as well are still migrating in caravans, galloping on coursers, along the ancient silk road, not noticing that in our cosmic era this road is in the distance, and from the time of the Turksib (our road) has become the mainline of stormy progress.

However beyond the appointment of Muldagaliev little has been done in recent years to exert stronger control. Anuar Alimzhanov, although replaced as head of the Writers Union, remains quite prominent in the republic, appears often in Literaturnaya gazeta and was recently honored with the publication of a two-volume collection of his works. And in April 1981 Olzhas Suleimenov, who five years previously had been removed as Minister of Culture, allegedly at Kunaev's personal insistence, was placed in charge of the errant Kazakh film industry, and once again assumed a seat on the Kazakh Council of Ministers.

In general there appears to be an increasingly stronger control exerted by Kazakhs over the media and literary outlets in their republic; and this control is reputed to be continually increasing. The director of Kazakh State Television is a Kazakh, and much to the dismay of his Russian "technical advisers", he has refused to play the part of a figurehead. Although the number of hours of television available in Kazakh has not increased, the quality of Kazakh broadcasting allegedly has, and certainly careful study of the television listings in Kazakhstanskaya pravda reveals
that the Kazakh viewer is able to see the best of national theater, music, ballet and movies; with the Russian language presentations generally being of more limited appeal.

Even more striking is the increase in the amount of literature being published in Kazakh, both original works and literature in translation. But although the number of works published in Kazakh is increasing, some Kazakh literary critics have attacked the relative thinness of the Kazakh language used by some of the authors. This has been an oft-repeated theme in Qazag adebieti in recent years, as has been complaints about the declining linguistic standards of the Kazakh media. Kazakh authors have been particularly chided for the use of Russian geographical terms to describe Kazakh places in Kazakh language texts.

Even the authors cited in the present study have not been exempt from criticism. A recent issue of Prostor carried an article, translated from Kazakh, defending Suleimenov from the charge that he is not a Kazakh poet because his poems are written in Russian; and the author defended him arguing that although Rabindranat Tagor wrote many of his works in English he is nonetheless considered an Indian writer. Educated Kazakhs have a tradition of bilingualism which goes back over a hundred years, and this distinguishes them from the other central Asian nationalities. Over fifty percent of the Kazakhs claimed to speak Russian fluently in the 1979 census, and there is no reason to suspect the accuracy of this figure. Certainly in the case of the Kazakh's linguistic assimilation should not be confused with cultural assimilation. The Kazakhs who write in Russian are obviously acculturated; they feel comfortable not only using the Russian language but comporting themselves in Russian society. However this does not mean that their Kazakh self-identity is diminished; and at least one Russian ethnographer has argued that in some cases it is heightened.

Those authors considered in this study who write in Russian, (people like Suleimenov,
Alimzhanov and Sanbaev) seem no less preoccupied with Kazakh national themes than those who wrote in Kazakh. Moreover there is a large group of writers and poets, led by Dzhaban Muldagaliev, who write in Kazakh yet seem content to reaffirm the dependent quality of Kazakh culture. At least in the Kazakh case the choice of language of composition is not any sort of predictor of the political or ethnic undertones of the writings. However although the generation of intellectuals that are dominant in the elite today are satisfied with this situation the successor generation need not be, and there appears to be growing pressure within Kazakhstan to preserve the Kazakh language for the next generation by improving the quality of Kazakh language education from kindergarten through high school. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The emergence of an articulate, politically self-aware, Kazakh elite is in part a consequence of the strategy of social development that was opted for under Stalin and has remained operative through the present. Whereas the regime has been concerned with the political socialization of the entire population, it has been even more interested in creating sufficient cadres to run the system. Thus Moscow has concentrated its efforts in creating a loyal elite, and although the social transformation of the masses has been viewed as desirable, sufficient resources have been devoted to make the achievement of this likely. Schools have been built, although rural education has long lagged behind urban, and these differences are particularly striking with regard to the national schools. But education and the state's anti-religious policy, (the closing of mosques and religious schools, and dramatically limiting the number of Muslim clergy) were as great an effort as has been made. The anti-social influence of the family and traditional culture was criticized but not attacked head on, as the regime opted for a strategy which effectively
saw the Kazakhs (and other Muslims) as second class but stable, and a minimal commitment to the regime was both demanded and received.

However this strategy only worked if minimal demands were made upon this population; but with the changing demographic parameters of the Soviet Union it may not be able to be continued. As the Russian population fails to replace itself and the Muslim population greatly expands the latter is likely to be called upon to take a more active role in the technical area of the economy and in the armed services. But as Western analysts have long maintained\textsuperscript{161} and as the Soviets themselves seem to be becoming increasingly aware,\textsuperscript{162} it is impossible to encourage economic and social change without encouraging political development as well. Nor is it easy to channel political aspirations entirely. Many of the most interesting intellectual debates in the Soviet Union in recent years have focused on problems of national identity and the formation of national consciousness. The format for several of these discussions was set by Iulian Bromlei, head of the Institute of Ethnography, who offers a theory of \textit{ethnos}. According to Bromlei, ethnic consciousness may exist on one of three social levels. An individual may perceive himself as a part of a tribe, a nationality (\textit{narodnost'}), a nation (\textit{natsiia}), or all three. Bromlei's key idea is that regardless of the level of national consciousness, the individual \textit{perceives} himself as belonging to a distinct cultural (and often linguistic) group. Thus the critical factor for ethnic identity (\textit{ethnos}) is self-selection, that the individual \textit{perceives} himself as a member of an ethnic community.\textsuperscript{163}

While ethnic or national identity may be pervasive it would nonetheless be a mistake to minimize the effect that over sixty years of Soviet rule has had on political development in Kazakhstan. The Soviet model of political socialization;
saturation of all media with propaganda and the introduction of a strong political component in education from nursery school through higher education has dramatically modified political attitudes in Kazakhstan, and has resulted in a popular commitment to many of the communal (i.e. socialist) values that are stressed by the state.

But as is becoming clear, it is virtually impossible to cut a people off entirely from their past, or for a "foreign" agent to totally restructure that past to fit their own "alien" liking. The Soviet strategy has certainly been successful in so far as they have achieved not only mass literacy but a relatively well educated and technologically sophisticated population, and a new Kazakh soviet elite to staff the party and state organizations. But though loyal to their Soviet fatherland this elite, Kunaev's successes notwithstanding, has not proven itself as malleable as the Soviet leadership would like, especially in the academic and artistic establishments that have been engaged in constant struggles with Moscow over the rights of Kazakh self-expression and the definition of cultural conformity.

The seemingly harmless demands for greater Kazakh cultural self-determination have the potential to be quite disruptive of the status quo. First, although in search for a pro-Kazakh present the intellectuals have so far restricted their demands to cultural issues, this need not always be the case. The regime does not seem to be terribly threatened by the Kazakh demands themselves. Some of the Kazakh requests seem even to have been met, and Moscow's attack on the errant Kazakhs has been relatively low-key. It is likely that a much stronger response would be forthcoming if the Kazakhs demanded greater control of their economic and political lives. Although there is no evidence that this is forthcoming, it would not be an illogical next step.

There is yet another threat posed by the writings and teachings of the current generation of Kazakh intellectuals. This is the challenge to the exclusivity of
ideological control which is exerted by the leadership in Moscow. What Suleimenov and his followers are implicitly arguing is that ideology is a dynamic, that the official Russo-centrist view is not definitional to either Marxism or communism. This challenges the power of the regime at its core. The party elite have regulated doctrinal purity as a logical extension of Marxist-Leninism. Now as in the 1920s some Kazakhs and other Central Asians seem to be asking to interpret ideology in a way that makes it more in harmony with their own cultural values including some of the cultural and moral values of Islam. Yet today, unlike the 1920s, the Muslims are not easily contained. The percentage of Muslims is growing steadily and will within the next generation be between a quarter and a third of the Soviet populace. Furthermore, as a result of Soviet educational policies, the writings of the Central Asian intellectuals are able to reach a far larger audience than ever before. The Russian leadership is thus caught in a bind. Today when faced with imminent minority status, in theory at least the Russians should assert cultural superiority to reinforce their political control. Instead, they are fighting to keep from losing ground as the national minorities, as we see in Kazakhstan, are challenging the regime by attempting to reclaim their histories and reassert their rights to cultural determination.

It is hard to know precisely what impact the existence of a tradition of Kazakh secular nationalism has on present day political developments in Kazakhstan. But it is clearly not accidental that the Kazakhs, although a minority in their own republic, have managed to exert a strong control not only over their political life but on cultural, social and religious affairs as well. They have politicized cultural issues in a way that other Central Asian nationalities have not and as a result have managed to preserve at least part of their history from complete reinterpretation by the Soviets. Their literature bears a strong imprint of the writings of the pre-revolutionary period, and although a school of heavily
ideological hack writing has developed, it has not overshadowed the accomplishments of the large group of serious Kazakh writers.

The Kazakhs are a national minority in a multi-ethnic state, and with this comes certain implicit difficulties. In the pre-revolutionary period the Kazakh nationalists had sought to resolve the conflict which confronted all the Muslim minorities; i.e., what place to accord their own culture against that of the dominant culture of the Russians. The Kazakhs, largely because of the unique and relatively circumscribed role accorded Islam, did not opt for cultural exclusivity. They chose instead to modify their culture, and have managed to survive as a culturally distinct people, and one which might compete with the Russians for control of their own lives. This lesson of the secular nationalists has served their descendants well and the present Kazakh intellectual elite seems committed to this same strategy of cultural adaptation to achieve cultural survival, with the ultimate goal of achieving control. And if Moscow loses control over this Kazakh elite, it will certainly face grave problems, not only in Kazakhstan, but in the Soviet Union more generally.

Moreover at least for the moment the regime appears willing to tolerate ideological deviation of the type the Kazakh intellectuals who were the focus of this report represent. During Brezhnev's final years the Soviet leadership appears to have moved further away from the advocacy of sblizhenie i sliianie, the optimistic formulas of Khruschev's 1961 Party Program, although the end product of this policy, the creation of a culturally uniform Russified Soviet people, may still be seen by some as desirable. Soviet social scientists have reported that this goal might well be unattainable; that cultures are not infinitely malleable. National consciousness is complex and consists of traditional cultural values as well as more socially advanced political ones.164

To achieve even an approximation of cultural homogeneity would require mammoth investment, a veritable social and cultural revolution in the non-Russian areas
Rather than engage in such a costly and potentially destabilizing policy, Brezhnev and his followers scaled down their expectations as to what sorts of nationality policies were likely to succeed under the given circumstances, conditions in which vast cultural, social and even economic differences prevail among the various Soviet nationalities. Thus, at least as an interim goal, the Soviet leadership has introduced the idea of a united Soviet people in which political, economic and social ideals are shared, but ethnic and cultural differences persist.

To the outside observer, and perhaps to Soviet specialists as well, this approach has the appearance of being a compromise. The Russo-centric segment did not gain what they wanted, but the leading role of the Russian people has been preserved in the all-Soviet culture. The national minorities have been able to retain some degree of cultural autonomy, but in return they have accepted unequal status; Russian is the "international" language and Russian culture the dominant culture, and its social customs accepted by anyone who has aspirations of achieving prominence in Moscow or even in his republic.

Moreover, the Kremlin would not have moved in this direction if the political loyalty of the Muslim population was in doubt, or conversely if Moscow believed their assimilation to be likely in the foreseeable future. The understanding of the national problem which developed during Brezhnev's rule, is a more pragmatic one, and is well suited to addressing instrumental tasks.

Brezhnev's address to the 26th Party Congress stressed several of these tasks, including the achievement of bilingualism for all non-Russians, the development of the natural resources in Central Asia, better use of the rural manpower resources in the Muslim area, and reducing the influence of traditional social practices.

Now these tasks confront his successors. They are interconnected, complex, and potentially volatile politically. The parochial world view of the Muslim
nationalities and especially those in rural areas must be broken down through better education and a greater stress on Russian language training, and they must be encouraged to leave the countryside. Before this can occur the pattern of poor performance in both building and staffing rural schools must be reversed. As for the more ambitious goal of changing traditional social practices, only movement to the city seems to exert a strong positive influence, but here there is a real problem of cause and effect, because only those who have already undergone some sort of attitudinal change seem willing to leave the countryside.

The national question in the U.S.S.R. was clearly not "resolved" by Brezhnev, nor is it likely that it will be by his successors in the near future. But while Brezhnev was in power the regime appears to have achieved a more pragmatic understanding of the national problem, one which focused on achieving political integration and bolstering of Soviet patriotism, rather than assimilating and completely Russifying the non-Russian peoples. The short-term advantages of this strategy are obvious. It allows the state to address the pressing economic tasks of better resource and manpower allocation which confront it, while at the same time encouraging the "equalization" and "flourishing" of the nationalities.

In theory the economic and ideological goals of the regime should reinforce each other in the Muslim regions. Better educated, Russian speaking economically developed cadres should be more loyal and better integrated politically, grateful to Moscow for all they have received. But this is only one possible scenario. The lessons learned by the British in India and the French in Algeria cannot be forgotten. Natives are not always grateful to their alleged cultural superiors who orchestrate developmental scenarios that purport to be in their (the natives') interest. The Soviet Union is a multi-national state and the national minorities show all signs of retaining their identity as distinctive groups for the foreseeable future.
The Brezhnev regime seems to have grappled with some of the ideological implications of this, and accepted a more culturally-heterogeneous definition of the "Soviet people." Moreover given what we know about Andropov from both the ideological pronouncements released since he replaced Suslov, and the statements and personnel decisions (especially the promotion of Aliev) that have been made since he became General Secretary, it is likely that the thrust of Brezhnev's nationality policy of recent years will be sustained and the emphasis on the Soviet Union as a multi-national state may even be strengthened. But the political implications of the multi-national state will still remain as a challenge to Andropov, and he will have to confront the increasingly more numerous and more articulate national elites of the Muslim republics; individuals who perceive themselves as both loyal and politically integrated seek a greater involvement in political decision-making both at home and in Moscow.

The leadership in the Kremlin will then be faced with a continual test of both their racial tolerance and their ideological flexibility. For the continued political stability of the multi-national Soviet state may some day hinge on the ability of its Russian leaders to admit non-Russians and non-Europeans into full partnership, and for Moscow to permit the republic elites sufficient regional autonomy to convince them the center and periphery do share common "international" and "Soviet" goals.
EPILOGUE

Some General Implications of the Present Study

The present study describes a Kazakh intellectual elite which is generally supportive of the regime's goals, but largely because it perceives itself as fostering the development of the Kazakh people. Such an elite, according to some Soviet definitions which have recently been offered, may be seen as loyal and patriotic. But this patriotism seems to be predicated on the perceived confluence of interests between Soviet and Kazakh goals; if the two loyalties should come into conflict it would seem that the elite that this report has focused on would favor the latter over the former. This despite the fact that several of the men studied are party members and all have held positions of responsibility in official literary or government establishments.

The group under consideration here are distinct from the generation they are replacing; individuals like Mukanov, Musrepov and Mustafin who reached prominence under Stalin and who were required to place the interests of serving their Russian masters above serving the Kazakh people. It would be injustice to consider Suleimenov or his friends either lackeys or toadies. All seem quite genuinely committed to a glorification of the Kazakh past and an enrichment of the cultural life of contemporary Kazakhstan; and see this as consistent with having a Marxist, and even a pro-Soviet world view. But they do not uncritically fulfill all that is asked of them, and although they have been influenced by Moscow they are not likely to accept being poured into a rigid mold. They are loyal, but their loyalty is predicated on a perception of involvement and shared responsibility in helping to formulate the parameters of the Kazakh future. In many ways both their loyalty and their independence is the logical product of the Soviet
education and socialization network; they have been educated as to the require-
ments of citizenship but simultaneously been sensitized both as to the accomplishments
of their own past, and to their competence to affect the future. If the current
elite appear independent and show signs of a strong ethnic self-identification
the succeeding generation is likely to be even more so. The next generation, now
in their twenties and thirties may appear on the surface to be more Russified,
i.e. have greater fluency in Russian, but they are also likely to be more aware
and proud of their ethnic uniqueness.167

The increasing national self-awareness of the Kazakhs is not just the result
of Kazakh cultural vitality but has been fostered by policy choices made by the
leadership. The regime appears to be perhaps by necessity pursuing contradictory
goals in their nationality policy. They are committed to the
economic revitalization of the country, which demands its economic integration.
Even if this is carried out under conditions of partial decentralization the goals
of each region must not only be set in the center but designed with the needs of
the entire country in mind and not the particular locality. But the regime cannot
maintain political and economic stability in Kazakhstan without sustaining the
legitimacy that an actively participating Kazakh elite provides; and the support
of such an elite is fed by the allocation of a certain degree of cultural autonomy.
Once some autonomy is granted precedence is created to demand more, and on a broader
range of issues, including economic ones where little flexibility can be permitted.

The balance that Moscow has achieved with the Kazakh elite appears to be
potentially precarious yet at the same time is their only hope for a workable
solution to the nationality problem. In the late 1960s and 1970s officials in
Moscow, whether out of ignorance, disinterest or conscious choice allowed more power
to accrue to the national minorities on cultural issues. Moreover since Andropov
has come to power there has been some sign that whereas he is clearly committed to
the ultimate merging of nationalities (sliianie) his operative strategy for dealing with them in the immediate future will be by decentralization of authority on some (as yet unspecified) cultural issues. Whether he can sustain this policy over time remains to be seen, as it is sure to be opposed by "internationalist" elements within the leadership.

If he does the regime is likely to be able to successfully withstand both the emergence of yet another generation of Kazakh elite (the post-war babies) and the shifting demographic balance which is beginning to favor the Kazakhs. The loss of Kazakh elite support is the biggest political threat facing Moscow in this region. The Kazakh masses are likely to become increasingly well educated, and given the present cultural renaissance, more aware of their national and even their religious traditions. But if these people feel adequately represented, or not abandoned, by their elite the potential remains to prevent the Kazakh national pride (and possibly even an ethnic Muslim identity) from being politicized and from becoming a source of opposition.

In a basic sense the choices rest with Moscow or for the moment with Andropov. Soviet assimilationist strategies appear to have failed. A distinctly Kazakh population remains, and it has been strongly acculturated to accept Russian manners and even to use the Russian language as a lingua franca. But they have not become Russians nor are they likely to do so. Their past is a proud one, but most of the greatest potential threats have been successfully contained. The Virgin Lands completed what nineteenth-century settlement began, i.e. the transformation of the traditional livestock breeding economy. Pastoral nomadism has been allowed to persist only in the desert regions where it is the most efficient use of resources. When the traditional economy was defeated so, too, was the traditional social structure, and clans and tribes ceased to be effective political structures in new heterogeneous sovkhoz farms. And it is in this context that customary practices and
clan identity is maintained; in an atmosphere which definitionally prohibits the reformation of the supportive socio-political substructures.

A Muslim religious revival also has the capacity to be contained, as long as the state continues its current strategy of moral dissuasion instead of the coercion of believers. Kazakh Islam has never had the strong hierarchial structure necessary to readily transform religious protest into effective political opposition. Nor is Kazakh Islam likely to find much external encouragement. The Kazakhs border on China and not a revolutionary Muslim state like Khomeini's Islam and although the world Muslim community has sometimes been critical of Soviet religious policies it has not been a particularly active lobbyist or fundraiser in defense of its coreligionists in the USSR.169

Finally, the most effective argument in favor of containment of Islam is that Kazakh society is already a Muslim society, and to engage in any sort of active anti-religious campaign would certainly disturb the present status quo, where Kazakhs who are not practitioners of Islamic ritual retain some pride in their Islamic past. To paraphrase a leading Kazakh sociologist Kazakh society under Soviet rule may have become secular, but is is not atheistic.170 Much as Moscow might like to alter this situation to try and do so would not only require a major new commitment, but would also risk major social unrest when economic concerns demand maximum public support.

The Kazakhs have demonstrated a cultural vitality which has enabled their lifestyle to be transformed, and with it their culture. Their current culture is quite obviously derived from their prerevolutionary culture but it differs from it as well, and bears a distinct imprint of over sixty-five years of Soviet rule. Cultures can change, and so must social policies if the vitality of a state is to be assured. Moscow seems to have found a strategy that at least when applied to the Kazakhs appears to promote stability; if they remain flexible in the application of ideological dogma they may be able to maintain a status quo which is
generally acceptable to the parties concerned, or sufficiently acceptable to reduce the possibility of potential opponents finding any real grass-roots support.
Footnotes

All citations appear in the language that the book is catalogued in by the Library of Congress.

1The Zhylduz group is named for the Kazakh language literary journal of the same name and includes the group of writers and poets whose careers were tied either to this journal or the associated publishing house Zhazushi.

2Olzhas Suleimenov, b. 1936 in Alma Ata, graduated from the Kazakh State University (KazGU) in 1959 and attended the Gorkii Institute of Literature in Moscow. He has worked mainly in the film industry, served as minister of culture of the Kaz SSR, and is the present head of the Kazakh State Cinema Council, and a member of the Kazakh Council of Ministers.

3Anuar Alimzhanov (originally Anuarbek Turlunbekovich Alimzhanov) b. 1930 in a village in Taldy Kurgan Oblast, and was raised in an orphanage (following the purge of his parents?). He was a water-carrier and tractor driver on a local collective farm before a teacher training institute. Alimzhanov graduated from Kaz GU and served as a journalist on several oblast and republic papers before he became Kazakh correspondent for Literaturnaia gazeta and Pravda. He was First Secretary of the Kazakh Union of Writers (1970-1979) and is presently the Head of the Kazakh Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments.

4Dukenbai Doszhanov, b. 1942 to a family of herders living in Kzyl Orda Oblast. After graduating from Kaz GU he first worked for the local press in Alma Ata and then joined the staff at Zhazushi publishing house.

5Il'ias Esenberlin b. 1915 in the city of Atbasar, graduated from the Kazakh Institute of Metallurgy and was mobilized for service in World War II. He then served as an instructor for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and was directed toward literary work. After Stalin's death he began a new career, first in the film industry and then at Zhazushi. He published
his first prose in the 1950s. Esenberlin was a secretary of the Kazakh Union of Writers in 1971-1975.

6 Tumanbai Moldagaliev, b. 1935 in a kolkhoz in Alma Ata Oblast and worked on the farm before attending Kaz GU. After graduation he went to work at Zhazushi.

7 Kadyr Murzaliev, b. 1935 to a peasant family in Uralsk Oblast. He went to Zhazushi after graduation from Kaz GU.

8 Satimzhan Sanbaev, b. 1939. The son of a school teacher, he attended the Orenburg Agricultural Institute and then worked as the head engineer on a state farm before he was employed in literary work.


10 Saken Seifullin (1894-1938); he was born to a family of nomads, in present day Karaganda Oblast. After attending the aul school, he continued his education in Akmolinsk (1908-1913) and then attended the Omsk Teachers Seminary (1913-1916). Seifullin was politically active throughout the years of the Revolution and Civil War, first with the Birlik group and after 1918 as a member of the Communist Party. Initially he worked as a journalist, serving as editor of Enbekshi Qazaq in 1922; and the became a leading figure in higher education and he wrote the first post-revolutionary Kazakh language literary history. A prolific poet in the 1920s and early 1930s, Seifullin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1936, one year before he was purged. See his Stikhotvoreniia i poemy (Moscow, 1958).

11 Il'ias Dzhansugurov (1894-1938); born in what is now Taldy Kurgan Oblast Dzhansugurov was the son of a well-respected and devout Muslim. He himself graduated from the Karagush Incomplete Middle School in 1911, and received teacher training preparation in Tashkent in 1920, but worked as a journalist. In 1925 Dzhansugurov went to Moscow for three years of advanced training and went to work in the republic's fledgeling literary establishment upon his return. His poetry was widely published in the 1920s, and in 1932 he was named the first chairman of the Kazakh Committee
of the Union of Writers, a post he held until purged in 1937. See his Poemy stiki (Moscow, 1971), and 1975 Biblioteka poeta volume Il'ias Dzhansugurov. Saken Seifullin.

12 Beimbet Mailin (1894-1938); born to a family of impoverished livestock breeders in a settlement in Aktiube, Mailin received a traditional religious education of three years study with a local mullah and a year in the Medresseh in Ufa. Mailin enjoyed some literary success before the revolution. He initially did cultural work in aul soviets, but by 1922 had embarked on a career in publishing in the republic capital. He was a member of the Presidium of the Kazakh Committee of the Union of Writers and founded and headed the journal Qazaq adibiet for a year before he was purged in 1937. See his Povesti (Moscow, 1964).

13 A good analysis of the artistic contribution of the three appears in B. Shalapbaev Istoriia kazakhskoi prozy (Alma Ata, 1968) and in Istoriia Kazakhskoi literature volume 3 (Alma Ata, 1971).

14 Mukhtar Auezov (1897-1961) was best known for his two volume historical novel Abai, reprinted in numerous languages and editions. A six volume collection of his works was published in 1974-1975.

15 See Kazhim Dzhumaliev's Zamechatelnye liudi (Alma Ata, 1970) and Muhammodjan Karataev Vershiny vpered (Moscow, 1977).

16 Dzhambul Dzhabaev (1846-1945) a simple akyn, a lyric singer who became an official Kazakh folk hero and songster in the 1930s with official support (and possible direct assistance in songwriting).

17 Sabit Mukanov (b. 1900) is best known for his semi-autobiographic trilogy Shkola zhizni about 1905-mid 1930s issued in uniform edition in Moscow in 1971.

18 Gabit Musrepov (b. 1902) works include a two volume fictional history of the formation of the working class, Probuzhdennyi krai, 2nd edition (Alma Ata, 1962) and a World War II novel Soldat iz Kazakhstana (Moscow, 1969).

Although Mukanov, Musrepov & Mustafin all wrote to help serve the political tasks of Stalin's regime, (especially short stories about collectivization and the war effort) nonetheless they had some literary talent; and so are distinct from a group of artistic "hacks" such as Dzhambul Dzhabaev (1846-1945) Abdilda Tadzhibaev (b. 1909) and Mariiam Khakimzhanova (b. 1906).

Islam did not become a mass phenomenon in Kazakhstan until the last half of the nineteenth century, being spread by Tatars in the north and Kokandi missionaries in the South; and because of the relative freedom given to religious schools in the 1920s, many of which were allowed to serve as officially sanctioned primary schools in these years, the conversion of the Kazakhs continued for nearly a decade after the revolution.


For a good example of this see Olzhas Suleimenov "Slovo o literaturnoi kritike" Prostor May, 1970 pp. 92-98.

Olzhas Suleimenov "My prikhodim, chtoby deistvovar'" Literaturnaia gazeta 2 September 1981, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 3.

See Martha Brill Olcott "The Impact of the Virgin Lands on the Kazakh Economy" unpublished manuscript.

G.F. Dakhshlieger, "Settlement and Traditional Social Institutions of the former Nomads (an example of the Kazakh People)," IX International Congress of Ethnography and Anthropology, September 1973, Chicago, p. 3.

M. Suzhikov and G. Demako, Vliiania podvizhnosti naselenia na sblizhenie natsii (Alma Ata, 1974) p. 66.


Levirate is the marriage of a widow to her dead husband's brother and Sororate is the marriage of a widower to his dead wife's sister. Kh. A. Argynbaev "O nekotorykh perezhitnykh formakh braka u Kazakhov" in Sem'ia i semeinye obriady u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (Moscow, 1978) p. 98.

O. B. Naumova, "Materialy k izucheniiia etnicheskogo samosoznaniia omskih i belagashskikh Kazakhov" in Polevye issledovaniia instituta etnografi (Moscow, 1978) p. 110.


Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo, pp. 180-190. A great deal of variation is found in Soviet sources in the percentage of the population that is considered to be believers depending upon how "believer" is defined. Saidbaev uses a loose definition and includes people who observe Muslim ritual, of whom probably only one in ten have any sort of real understanding of Muslim doctrine.


I found ample evidence of this in discussions held with Central Asians during my travels in the Soviet Union in 1975.


See N. Ashirov Islam i natsiia (Moscow, 1975) and his Musulmanskaia propoved' (Moscow, 1978).

Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo p. 80.

45 Tradition with the Quran and Shari'a law, the basis of Muslim jurisprudence.


48 Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo, pp. 180-190.

49 Ashirov, Islam i natsiia, p. 48.


51 L. A. Firshtein "O nekotorykh obychaiakh i pover'iakh, sviazannykh s rozhdeniem i vospitananiem rebenka u uzbekov Iuzhnogo Khorezma" in Sem'ia i semeinye obriad u narodov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (Moscow, 1978).


53 Muslims of the Soviet East, #2 (1938), p. 19. One reason why it is difficult to ascertain the relative strength of religion in the cities is that the ethnographic literature has by definition focused on the rural areas.

54 Omsk, the home of the "South-Siberian Kazakhs" is part of the RSFSR and not Kazakhstan.

55 5438 were surveyed, but the percent of respondents who were Muslim is unknown.
Kazakhstan and Semipalatinsk Oblasts were all mentioned as having experienced a religious revival, which were not being effectively countered.

A good example of this is the recent book by A. Sulatskov *Liki baptizma* (Alma Ata, 1982). See also A.A. Alimbaev *Molodym ateisticheskuiu ubezhdennost'* (Moscow, 1980) an anti-religious tract written by a Kazakh, but which nonetheless focuses on Christian believers.

Osipov, "Razvitie natsional'nykh . . ." p. 73, reported that in Omsk only 4-14 percent of the rural population had contact with anti-religious propaganda, and even when they did it was not likely to be in the local language.

Kazakhstanskaia Pravda 27 February 1982.


For a detailed history of this see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship* (Chapel Hill, 1969).

This statement is somewhat at odds with Tillett's interpretation, but Bekmakanov's *Kazakhstan v 20-40 gody XIX veka* (Alma Ata, 1947) was not available in the U.S. when Tillett did his research but now is and my analysis is based on a close reading of it.

He was rehabilitated in 1956 and allowed to publish a "replacement" volume *Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii* (Moscow, 1957).


The exposition of the feudal theory of Kazakh society is best seen in A. Erenov, *Ocherki po istorii feodal'nykh zemel'nykh otnoshenii u Kazakhov*


See especially the works by Beisembiev. From these works the modern scholar is able to compile a bibliography of works by these authors which still are available in Kazakh archives and rare book collections. Another important bibliographical aid is N. Sabitov, *Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' materialov po istorii Kazakhstana* (Alma Ata, 1947).


Tolybekov is reported to have been strongly censured for his views in the mid-1970s. However, what was unacceptable then is now considered merely controversial scholarship as G.E. Markov has tried to repopularize a modified version of Tolybekov's thesis in an article which appeared in *Sovetakaia etnografiia*, no. 1,
1983. (with editorial rejoinder).

85 For some examples see M.I. Fetisov Literaturnye sviazii Rossii i Kazakhstane 30-50-e gody xix veka (Alma Ata, 1956) and his Russko-Kazakhskie literaturnye otnosheniia v pervoi polovine xix veka (Alma Ata 1954), two "landmark" studies written by a Russian. See also Anuar Derbisalin, Demokraticheskie idei v kazakhskoi preoktiabr'skoi literature (Alma Ata, 1976) in Kazakh, and Zaki Akhmetov, Sovremennoe razvitie i traditsii kazakhskoi literatury (Alma Ata, 1978).

86 Sh. K. Satpaeva, Kazakhskaiia literatura i Vostok (Alma Ata, 1982); p. 7. This book is a revised version of his Kazakh language study Literaturnye sviazь (Alma Ata, 1974).

87 Ibid, pp. 103-126. Satpaeva devotes an entire chapter to this theme.


89 Poety Kazakhstana (Leningrad, 1978).

90 Including Bukhar Zhyrau (1668-1781), Shal Akyn (Tleuke Kuleke-uli) (1748-1819), Dulat Babatai-uli (1802-1871), Sherniaz Zharylgas-uli (1817-1881) and Aset Naimanbai-uli 1867-1923). It should be noted that there is a heavy overlap between those included in the Kazakh anthology and in the Russian one, some are excluded from the Russian and not the Kazakh and vice versa.

91 For example Beisembiev, Ocherki istorii obshchestvenno... cites numerous pre-revolutionary works, with appropriate archival or rare book identifications including: M.S. Kashimov, Agil Kitabi (p. 242), Sh. Kudaiberdiev, Tirshilik Zhan turali (p. 251) and M. Zh. Kopeev, Raznye sochineniia (p. 256).

92 See Muktar Magauin's introduction to Poety Kazakhstana.

93 Beisembiev, Ocherki istorii obshchestvenno ... pp. 83-100. The division over how to categorize leading 19th-century figures is probably the reason that volume 2, on the pre-Soviet period, of the official Istoriia Kazakhskoi literatury
Alma Ata, 1979) is not only brief, but appeared after volume 3, and eleven years after volume 1.

Although his post-revolutionary ethnographic studies seem again to be available. Only one former Alash Ordist who became a party member, Gabbas Togzhanov (1900-1938), appears to have been even partially rehabilitated. His biography appeared in A. Alimzhanov (ed.), Pisateli Kazakhstana 1917-1967 (Alma Ata, 1969) along with a number of other purged literary figures including: Abdola Asylbekov (1896-1937), Elzhas Bekenov (1892-1938), Mazhit Dauletbaev (1900-1938), Zhiengali Tlepbergenov (1895-1933), Kulmyra Utepov (1904-1938), and Khamza Iusupbekov (1900-1938).


This description seems to have been first applied by Beisembiev in Ideinopoliticheskie techeniya . . .

See the Biblioteka poeta volume devoted to them (Moscow, 1975).

B.S. Suleimenov, V.A. Basin and V.V. Turta, "Nekotorye voprosy sovetskoi istoriografii prisoedineniya Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana k Rossii" Izvestija AN Kaz SSR seriiia obshchestvennykh nauk, no. 1 (1972), pp. 6-12.


See Kazakhstanskaia pravda 12 June 1982, pp. 1 & 3.


Dzhuban Muldagaliev, b. 1920 in a rural settlement in what is now Uralsk Oblast, graduated from the Uralsk Agricultural Institute in 1940. A party member.
since 1942 Muldagaliev spent World War II as a correspondent at the front. After
the war he became a literary bureaucrat and worked on the staffs of several journals
in progressively more senior positions until he was named editor of Zhuldyz in 1963,
and First Secretary of the Kazakh Union of Writers (a post he held until 1971 and
was reappointed to in 1979). Muldagaliev published his first poems in 1939.


105 See Satimzhan Sanbaev, Doroga tolko odna (Moscow, 1974).

106 See Duk'enbai Doszhanov Trudnyi shag (Moscow, 1974) and Polnyi tsvety

107 See Abish Kekilbaev, "Kumys" in Belyi Araun (Moscow, 1976) and "Prizovoi
begunets" in Kogda ukhodiat pleiady (Moscow, 1980).

108 See Il'ias Esenberlin, Zolotai pritsa (Alma Ata, 1977) and Opasnaia
pereprava (Alma Ata, 1979).

109 The works of all six people are translated into Kazakh and Russian respectively;
and a representative sample of their writings have even become available in English
in The Voice of the Steppe (Moscow, 1981).

110 Kh. Sadykov, "Vozmozhnosti zhanka" Prostor, no. 9 (1982), p 168.

111 Abdizhamil Nurpeisov, Krov'i pot (Moscow, 1969).

112 See also G. Musrepov "Amengeldy" (a play), Askar Tokmagambetov, Otets i

113 See S. Sanbaev's recent short story "Vremena goda nashei zhizni" cited in
an article dealing with the popularity of this genre by S. Baymukhametov "Steppe
Song: New Books by Kazakh Writers" Oktyabr' no. 6 (June 1982) pp. 180-185,
translated as "Kazakh novels on Soviet Power in Central Asia" in JPRS 81540
Even those Kazakhs who have been criticized have had their short stories published separately by leading Moscow publishing houses like "Young Guard" or "Soviet Writer."

It consists of three novellas: "Zagovoreennyj mech," "Otchaianie," and "Khan Keni."

Khan Kene (Moscow, 1971).

Ibid., frontispiece. . . "Khan Kene, a superior man, but fond of power and heartless . . . ."

Anuar Alimzhanov's novella about Makhambet Utemisov, "Strela Makhambet" provides a good example of a nearly "flawless" nineteenth-century hero, who fought with the peasants against the Khans.

It received a mixed review in Kazakhstanskaja Pravda 10 April 1980.

Suleimenov, "Slovo o literaturnoie . . . ." p. 97 singles it out for special praise as a positive example of treating a difficult historical subject.

Shelkovyiput' (Moscow, 1980).

Novellas and stories dealing with the pre-Khanate period include A. Alimzhanov's Tron Rudaki (Moscow, 1974), and his novella about Al-Farabi, Vozvrashchenie uchitelia (Moscow, 1979); as well as several short stories in Doszhanov's collection Polynii tsvety (Moscow, 1971) which includes a tale about otrar and another about the life of al-Farabi ("Farabi"); and I. Esenberlin's "Zolotaia orda" in Prostor (1982) nos. 8, 9 and 10.

Anuar Alimzhanov, Strela Makhambe, Gonets (Moscow, 1978), p. 113.

To date two "volumes" of this cycle have been published in Prostor, part I in 1979 in issues 9, 10, and "and part II in 1982 issues 4, 5 and 6.

Turar Ryskulov (1894-1938) was a leading Kazakh communist who went to Moscow in the Civil War, served in the Sredazbiuro, and although continued to serve in the
center until the mid-1930s fell from favor in 1922.

126 "Ognennaia strela" Prostor no. 11 (1979), p. 46. (Russian translation of Kazakh original).

127 This is certainly true of the characters in rural settings in Sanbaev's stories, see especially "Kop Azhal" in Doroga tola odna, pp. 149-232.

128 In O. Suleimenov, God obeziany (Alma Ata, 1967), pp. 45-47.

129 See also his poems "Sentimental'nye mulla Rakhmetulla" and "Rassuzhdenie kandidata tekhnicheskikh nauk o krasote posle poseshcheniia kostela" in O. Suleimenov, Povtoriaia v polden' (Alma Ata, 1973).

130 In Kazakh "analein" means (as it is defined by Suleimenov) "I revolve around you."

131 To live in a two-story house, in Kazakhstan would be a telling sign of seemingly being Russified or Europeanized.

132 Suleimenov, Povtoriaia v... p. 68.

133 Alimzhanov, Strela Makhambet, p. 5.

134 A. Alimzhanov "Most Karasunkara" Kogda ukhodiat pleiady (Moscow, 1980), p. 158.

135 Ibid., p. 84.

136 Ibid., p. 105.

137 Ibid., p. 157.

138 Ibid., p. 159.


140 Ibid., p. 53.

141 In both stories there is a strong underlying theme of skipped generation, that the heros turn to their "grandfathers" generation born before the revolution, rather than to their "fathers" generation (who would have served the Stalinist regime) for advice.
The attacks, by Steklova and Kovskii, were published in Literaturnoe Obozrenie no. 3 (1974), pp. 36-40.

It should be noted that both studies were published by "Molodaia gvardiia" in the collection Doroga tol'ko odna, with an afterword by Z. Kedrina which referred to Kovsky's attack, countering it with the argument (P. 425) that "international" did not mean "without national" and that Aitmatov's works should be seen as positive justification for Sanbaev's.

Kogda ukhodiat pleiady (Moscow, 1980).

Ibid., p. 3.

N. Ashirov, Musulmanskaie propoved', pp. 64-65.

Certainly in poems like "Moia pesn' (pp. 7-9), "Na maevom kurgan" (p. 39), "Prikhodiat soldaty" (p. 44) he is willing to criticize pre-revolutionary Kazakh practices and exalt current Soviet values; yet his poems "Kazakhskii iazyk" (p. 76) and "Ob istorii" (p. 79) are apolitical statements by a seemingly simple Kazakh. All references from Dzhaban Muldagaliev Doidu do horizonta (Alma Ata, 1976).

Anuar Alimzhanov headed the Kazakh Writers Union from 1971-1979. He now is head of the"Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments."


A. Alimzhanov Izbrannoe (1979).

Information based on local native informants.

Sufficiently so that it has come to the attention of Radio Liberty. See Charles Carlson and Hassan Oraltay "Threat Seen to the Purity of Kazakh Language." RL 106182 (5 March 1982).
"Contamination of Kazakh Mother Tongue Decried." JPRS 79953 (USSR Political and Social Affairs 1212) 27 January 1982, p. 47.


159 See O.B. Naumova, "Materialy k izucheniiu etnicheskogo samosoznaniia omskikh i belagashskih Kazakhov" Polevye issledovaniia Instituta etnografii (Moscow, 1978).


161 This is almost a classic tenent of Western political development in the 1960s and 1970s. For some examples, see Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1969); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966); and David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).


163 See Iu. V. Bromlei, Sovremennye problemy etnografii (Moscow, 1981); and his Etnosi etnografii (Moscow, 1973).

164 See Martha Brill Olcott, "Yuri Andropov and the "National Question" an unpublished manuscript.


167 There is contradictory evidence in Soviet studies concerning this, depending upon the definition of ethnic identity used. For a cogent discussion of this point and related issues see "Comment: The View From Uzbekistan" by Bill Fierman, in International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 33 (1982), p. 73.

168 In his introduction to "The Voice of the Steppe" I. Kramov asserts that this is a distinct generation, with new problems and expectations.

169 After the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan relations with Soviet Muslim officials and Muslims abroad have soured somewhat; two-thirds of the invited nations failed to show up at an international conference sponsored by the Spiritual Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan held in Tashkent in September, 1980. However relations appear to be improving again and in recent months Soviet delegations have been warmly received in Syria and Jordan.

170 This appears to be Saidbaev's assumption; Islam i obschestvo, p. 80.