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Political Development and Innovation in Eastern Europe

Executive Summary*

This report concludes that change is likely to take place in Eastern Europe as a result of differentiation and adjustment to crises rather than through orderly progress. This process distinguishes Eastern European political development from that of the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Eastern Europe will most likely grow more diverse in the future rather than less so.

The report represents a summary of the available literature on the theory and practice of individual East European political systems. The resulting overview, which appears both in this report and in a larger study to be published later, has a strong methodological and theoretical bent. In the opinion of the National Council, the report's ultimate value lies precisely in its theoretical contributions.

The report begins by arguing that much can be gained from an overview of political developments throughout the region as a whole as Eastern Europe remains unique on two counts: (a) all of its governments were established at the same time; (b) they were all initially patterned after the Soviet model. Therefore, the communist states of Eastern Europe should be examined as a distinct region despite the obvious differences among regimes and nations throughout the region.

Having established the utility of viewing all eight communist regimes in Eastern Europe as constituting a single region, the report moves on to develop an analytical framework for the comparative examination of the region's regimes by identifying their dominant characteristics. It emphasizes both the shared origins in a Soviet model and the existence throughout the region of Leninist ideological one-party systems as dominant characteristics of the region's communist regimes. The latter feature leads to insistence on at least the appearance of monolithic unity; a unity which has stifled pluralistic tendencies, suppressed expressions of cultural and ideological diversity and created a pseudo-legitimacy without which the regimes might find it difficult to survive. The end result is a self-enforcing conservatism.

In addition to conservatism, forces facilitating change are evident throughout the region. The clash among varied and distinct strands of Marxism, for example, is likely to continue to shape the development of communist systems in Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future. Three patterns of evolution have already become established in the region:

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instrumental change— or minor adjustments in the Soviet model with an eye towards improving upon it; deviation in important elements of Soviet practice without the intention of altering the system as a whole; and innovation— where a conscious effort is made to depart from the Soviet model with the intent of creating a new and better system.

The report distinguishes among three basic types of regimes in the region: revolutionary, authoritarian and pluralistic. While no country functions precisely in accord with any of these ideal types, such distinctions nonetheless help to delineate differences among communist systems. Moreover, the scheme allows for change and variation within each system. To demonstrate precisely how this might be the case, the report turns to the political culture of Eastern Europe.

Nationalism, the role of traditional political culture in the political development of communist Eastern Europe and factors which remove or detract from the legitimacy of Eastern Europe are all of particular significance in determining the role of citizen attitudes and predispositions towards communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The degree of legitimacy enjoyed by East European communist states is influenced by such factors as popular attitudes towards the USSR, the method of coming to power, elite behavior and attitudes, and the status of the country as either a developing or developed nation. These factors arrange themselves differently in each of the eight states under consideration. In all four of the Balkan states, legitimacy seems based more on positive acknowledgement of the regime's right to rule while in the four 'Northern Tier' states legitimacy appears to be fragile.

Having examined the political systems themselves as well as their political cultures, the report focuses upon the problem of change in the political systems of Eastern Europe. Here, the report differentiates six periods of development through which all of the regimes of the region have, more or less, experienced: (a) the period of the takeover; (b) the Stalinist period; (c) the period of reaction to the excesses of the Stalinist period; (d) the 1960s, which were marked by rapid modernization, vigorous economic growth and some degree of economic reform; (e) the 1970s, which were marked by a renewed emphasis upon Party rule; and (f) the current period, which is marked by economic retrenchment and mounting political pressure. Taken as a whole, these periods do not conform well to any specific model of change as systemic change in Eastern Europe appears to have been conditioned largely by political developments rather than by underlying social factors and the effect of modernization.

Having completed this rapid tour d'horizon of the political systems of Eastern Europe, the report concludes with a discussion of the prospects for change in the eight systems under examination. Here, it notes that future reform could increasingly be motivated by the need to create more stable systems. Such efforts would involve striking a new balance between the interests of society and the state on terms more favorable to the former. Change will continue to take place as a result of differentiation and adjustment to crises rather than through orderly progress. It is this fact that distinguishes East European political development from that of the Soviet Union.
Political Development and Innovation in Eastern Europe

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Introduction

The politics of Eastern Europe is not uncharted terrain. For example, Western scholarship on Eastern Europe predates that dealing with the third world, and to some extent anticipates it. Yet scholars in the field of East European studies are faced with the paradox that our ever-expanding knowledge of Eastern Europe has not produced a substantial body of literature dealing with the theory and practice of East European, as opposed to Communist, political systems. As a result, the analysis of East European political systems lacks a well developed theoretical foundation.
There are, of course, no lack of generalizations about Eastern Europe and her political systems: they are (or were), captive nations; they lack legitimacy; they are Western, while the Soviet Union is Eastern. Many of these observations have become part of a body of professional folkwisdom to which the neophyte is inevitably introduced upon commencing the study of Eastern Europe. Yet the frequency with which these verities are resorted to cannot conceal the fact that there has been a reluctance to integrate our knowledge of Eastern European politics. One would imagine that the problem of how diverse Communist systems emerged in Eastern Europe (or were prevented from emerging) would be the subject of numerous studies. And yet this is not the case. One would expect some efforts to explore and define the nature of East European communism. But with a few exceptions one will search in vain for such works. Why this is so deserves comment, especially because it bears so directly on the approach to Eastern Europe that will be taken in the study.²

To some extent, the failure of Western scholarship to systematize our knowledge of the political systems of Eastern Europe reflects long-standing problems of working in many languages and being compelled to deal with inferior primary sources. While these problems can eventually be surmounted, few political scientists have devoted themselves to becoming generalists at the expense of acquiring a country expertise. The risks of such an approach are many, not the least of which is the absence of a feel for the region that can be acquired only through continual contact with one country, its culture, its
problems, and its language. The generalist also runs the risk of being distracted by the issues of the moment, cutting down drastically on the time available for contemplative research. Among the scholars of note of recent years in the field of East European political science, only a few have managed to balance these demands, and to keep us informed of current issues and problems while broadening our knowledge of the underlying issues of the field.

Yet it would be a mistake to dwell overly much on the difficulties scholars have encountered in doing research on Eastern Europe. There is something self-serving in this argument, for it overlooks the advantages afforded the East European scholar by the region's accessibility, the flood of materials produced by Radio Free Europe and other institutions (much of it translated into English), and the frequent conferences, edited volumes and the like which have facilitated the integration of our knowledge on a wide range of problems relating to Eastern Europe as a whole. We must therefore look elsewhere for an answer to our question.

Two factors, we would suggest, have contributed most to the absence of comprehensive studies of the political systems of Eastern Europe. One is the perception that the countries of the region are not free to choose their own course of political development. The second is the absence of an orderly pattern of development, or a unifying theme (modernization, for example), on the basis of which a broad gauge approach to the area could be developed. These reasons will now be discussed in turn.
The question of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe is no longer posed in the black and white terms of the Stalin period when the captive nations image of the regions was widespread. Our perceptions of the Soviet-East European relationship are today conditioned by an awareness of the bargaining power of the East Europeans in dealing with the Soviet Union, and the need of the Soviets to pursue policies which, in the words of J.F. Brown, balance "cohesion" with "viability." As this report will argue, it is easy to overlook the fact that the Soviet Union, by its very presence in Eastern Europe, has acted as a catalyst for the development of new forms of communist rule. Finally, it is by no means clear that conservative regimes in Eastern Europe owe their existence entirely to the Soviet presence, and would reform themselves overnight if Soviet support was withdrawn.

An accumulation of mitigating circumstances has thus done much to soften the captive nations image of Eastern Europe. But for all this, the Soviet influence on Eastern Europe has not turned benign, nor has political development in Eastern Europe ceased to be limited by the conservative bias of Soviet intentions toward the region. This is clear if we consider, for a moment, the status of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the "Northern Tier" of Eastern Europe and its most industrialized, strategic, and populated region. The legitimacy of these governments is low, dwindling to the vanishing point in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland. While the Communist regimes of the Northern Tier are anxious to assume responsibility for solving
their domestic problems without Soviet help, it is doubtful that any of them could act independently to introduce reforms, or to alter the system in any meaningful way, without Soviet approval.

Last but hardly least, one must acknowledge that Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968, and Soviet determination to see Solidarity crushed in Poland, altered the course of political development in Eastern Europe profoundly. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in particular was a watershed in the history of postwar Eastern Europe, a demarcation line between the experimental era of the 1950's and 1960's, and the era of the defense of the status quo of the 1970's and early 1980's. (We shall return to this subject in Part IV of the report.)

In the light of these facts, can one speak of a distinctive East European brand of Communism? And does not it remain true that Soviet actions and intentions, in the last analysis, are decisive for the direction in which Eastern Europe will develop? These questions, which will not go away, of course serve to discourage attempts to work out a theory of political development based on East European experience. Yet, as this report will argue, East European political development cannot be approached in black and white terms, and its very uniqueness requires a special effort to analyze it in its entirety. The Soviet role in Eastern Europe reflects only one part of this effort.

As to the absence of an orderly pattern of change in the region, one on which theoretical insights could be based, or models constructed, we shall argue that the postwar history of Eastern Europe can be divided into several distinct periods. But
the fact remains that the nations of Eastern Europe have not developed in an orderly and predictable fashion. For the moment there does not exist any convenient way of conceptualizing political development in Eastern Europe -- either by utilizing the modernization paradigm or by relying on the notion of pluralism. The nations of the region are simply too different to be analyzed by one approach alone.

There is no point in dismissing these problems while proclaiming the dawn of a new era of broad-gauged, theoretically oriented studies on Eastern Europe. We cannot expect the Soviet Union to allow the kind of government envisaged by the Czech reformers, at least under normal circumstances, and are thus reduced to speculating on how such a government would have looked, and how it might have functioned. The very fact that we are dealing with eight countries, each with highly distinctive political and cultural traditions, makes it unreasonable to expect that Eastern Europe would develop in an entirely predictable and uniform way following World War II (unless, indeed, she remained totally under Soviet regimentation and domination).

Nevertheless, there is much to be gained by an overview of political developments in Eastern Europe after the war. First, we may broaden our understanding of communist systems generally. Secondly, Eastern Europe remains a region with the unique attribute that all the governments of the region were set up at the same time and along very similar lines. The analysis of why
change occurred in some East European countries and not in others is therefore eminently worthwhile.

Third, there is a larger issue: the failure, to date, of the field of communist studies to meet the challenge of developing comparative approaches to the analysis of communist systems. The absence of broad-gauged studies on Eastern Europe is not due solely to the fact that not one but many countries are in question, nor is it attributable to the stubborn refusal of Eastern Europeans to direct their development along orderly lines. The fact is that most of the models of communist systems developed for comparative purposes do not fit Eastern Europe well.5 (They usually can be applied successfully to one or two East European countries, an indication of how the models in question were derived.) Why this is so, when so much of the impetus for comparative communist studies has originated with specialists on Eastern Europe, is not entirely clear, but may be related to the search for a theory of stages of development in communist systems, an approach suitable for the Soviet Union or China, but not Eastern Europe. It is the explanation of diversity and an understanding of the reasons for differentiation of communist systems which lie at the heart of the East European experience, and about which this report is ultimately concerned. Unfortunately, the lessons of this experience have not as yet been fully assimilated into our comparative approaches to communist systems. This has not prevented theories more appropriate to the Soviet Union or China from being rather carelessly applied to Eastern Europe, in turn discouraging the development of the very type of analysis from which the
comparative approach could most benefit. Breaking this vicious circle is a worthwhile objective, and it is our hope that the report will make a modest contribution to this end.

Part I: The Political Systems of Eastern Europe

The first part of this report identifies the dominant characteristics of the communist systems of Eastern Europe, and classifies these systems for comparative analysis.

The task is a formidable one. The diversity of systems in Eastern Europe makes it difficult to identify attributes common to all states of the region. Secondly, there has been no agreement on a model of communist systems. The issue of which model should guide the theoretical analysis of communist systems has been debated for well over two decades, yet is far from resolved.6

Nevertheless, the communist systems of Eastern Europe do have two common attributes: they originated in the Soviet model, and at the same time they share the essential features of what we shall call ideological one-party systems.7

To speak of the Soviet model in this context poses certain problems. Soviet institutions were for the most part forced on Eastern Europe, and as a result have functioned far less well than in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Western scholars do not agree on what constitutes a model of the Soviet system. Finally, the Soviet system copied initially by the East European regimes was Stalinist, totalitarian, and in retrospect, atypical.
Following Stalin's death, the Soviet Union limited the role of the secret police, lowered somewhat the barriers to foreign influences, and began a period of more normal development. With the exception of Albania and Yugoslavia (the latter of which had already started down the path of reform), the East European communist states after 1953 followed in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, eliminating the worst abuses of the Stalin period, and in the process, ending totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe. Thus the model to which we refer, when speaking about the Soviet system and its imitators in Eastern Europe, is that which has emerged in the immediate post-Stalin years -- one which has remained essentially unchanged up to the present time.

The concept of the ideological one-party system is developed here to differentiate communist regimes from one-party systems in third world countries and from multi-party systems in Western parliamentary democracies. The concept is not entirely novel, yet goes a step beyond what has been attempted up to now in developing a comparative framework for the analysis of communist systems. The approach is not immune to criticism. Yet, as we shall argue here, the effort to identify common elements of all communist systems is a necessary and useful one, and by focusing on the role of the ideological party and its development, a great deal can be done to overcome the shortcomings of existing models of communist systems.

We shall first consider the Soviet type of system and a number of its attributes important for an understanding of the East European systems modeled after it. Four of the eight countries with which the study will be concerned are examples of
the Soviet-type system (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania), while the remaining four reflect efforts to modify the Soviet model in some important respects, leading in one instance (Poland) to a system that is just unworkable.

The Soviet system is not longer a totalitarian one, if by this term is meant a state still reliant on terror. Yet it combines quasi-totalitarian elements with a stress on authoritarian values and a reliance on the leading role of the party. These are aspects of the Soviet system identified by Merle Fainsod some twenty years ago. Although time has brought some changes, mainly in respect to the complexity of the system, the fundamentals have remained unchanged, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. (Indeed, the lack of systemic change since the post-Stalin period may be more apparent in Eastern Europe, where most of the countries were at a more advanced stage twenty years ago than the USSR, and where progress has not been so dramatic as in the Soviet Union. This is especially true of the GDR.)

The notion that the Soviet system retains quasi-totalitarian features is controversial but, we feel, important for an understanding of how this system functions. The two important features are: the controls exercised by the party over the rest of society (which is also important when considering our second attribute, the leading role of the party), and the link between ideology and power in Leninist doctrine.

The responsibility of the party for the actions of groups and organizations in society, and the duty of these groups and
organizations to follow the party line, is a well known feature of communist systems. The fact of party control does not prevent organizations from pursuing institutional goals, and, in so doing, acting as pressure groups, sometimes contrary to the party line. Nor can one be sure that the supervision the party exercises over other groups is always effective. The fact remains, however, that party oversight of all organized social activity has a profound impact on Soviet society and on the East European systems modeled after it.

The Leninist view of what constitutes ideological truth, and the manner in which this search for ideological truth is linked to the exercise of power, have proven remarkably resistant to change since the time of the revolution. In this view, the correctness, or infallibility, of the ideology is confirmed and enhanced through the ability to seize power and bring the rest of society under party control. By the same line of reasoning, the goals of the ideology cannot be realized other than by seizing power and carrying out a revolution from above. A fundamental difference in perceptions exists between this Leninist formula and the views of those Marxists willing to strive for the ideals of socialism by a variety of means, including those of a democratic nature.

In the post-revolutionary stage in which the Soviet Union and the East European regimes of the Soviet type find themselves today, power is exercised for more prosaic ends than carrying out a revolution from above. But the notion of regime legitimacy still lies rooted in a totalist view of the ideology and its
infallibility. This view is credible only when buttressed by a system of controls which proclaims the party line to be proclaimed the only correct one, and that mobilizes institutional and mass support behind that claim.

These quasi-totalitarian techniques no longer have their former effectiveness, yet it is unwise to overlook their impact on the societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. By insisting on at least the appearance of monolithic unity, the regimes in Eastern Europe modeled after the Soviet Union have stifled pluralist tendencies, suppressed expressions of cultural and ideological diversity, and created a pseudo-legitimacy without which it might be very difficult for them to survive. These methods have not altered underlying political or cultural attitudes in Eastern Europe, as we shall note in Section II below. Still, the essence of these methods is control, not persuasion, even if the price is alienation that in practice ensures survival of pre-revolutionary values and attitudes.

Paradoxically, it is precisely these quasi-totalitarian elements of the Soviet model that have worked best in Eastern Europe, making due allowance for the negative impact of Stalinism in the region, and the destabilizing effect of the end of the totalitarian period. There was, to be sure, an abuse of personal power that resulted from linking the infallibility of the ideology to the infallibility of the leader, but this abuse is now a thing of the past. Moreover, the secret police, outside Albania, have been curbed. Still, it may not be fully appreciated today to what degree the Soviet-type systems of Eastern Europe rely on quasi-totalitarian methods to stay in
The leading role of the party is the second characteristic of the Soviet type of system which concerns us here. In Eastern Europe this principle has been tenaciously defended in the face of repeated challenges. The reasons for this insistence on party dominance are not difficult to discern. The party is the institutional foundation upon which the rest of the system is built. It is the party which interprets the ideology on which the system of power is based. In the last analysis, it is through the party that the myths, loyalties and ambitions of those who support the system are realized. Here a paradox emerges, one that is more evident in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the party is indissolubly linked to the quasi-totalitarian practices of the system, and therefore finds itself in a position of defending the status quo. On the other hand, the party is the one institution which can effect widespread change and has the best hope of adapting to changes brought about by economic reforms. In Eastern Europe, evidence of this can be seen in the emergence of a quasi-pluralist system under party control in Yugoslavia.

The completed study will analyze in some detail the circumstances under which party dominance has been challenged in Eastern Europe, as well as the conditions that permitted the party to adapt to a pluralist system in Yugoslavia. Here it is enough to note that the primacy of the party is the sine qua non of all communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the task of assuring the party's survival is the most crucial challenge these
systems face when attempting to break away from the Soviet model.

A third characteristic of Soviet-type communist systems is the determination to build up the state through acquiring military and economic power vis-a-vis the rest of the world, while inculcating respect for the authority of the state among the people. Most states pursue such ends. But in the Soviet Union the push for economic and military power has taken precedence over most other goals, while veneration of the Soviet state has come to be an important source of regime stability and strength. By stressing the the power and authority of the Soviet state, the regime has tapped a powerful strain of Russian nationalism, and has thus helped to ensure its own survival.

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe, with the notable exception of Yugoslavia, have also stressed authoritarian values and placed great emphasis on building up state power. The success of this strategy may be questioned, however. For one thing, the East Europeans cannot realistically view themselves as major actors on the world scene; this being the case, much of the rational for glorification of the state and its economic and military achievements disappears. For another, it is difficult to create a deep sense of attachment to the state when it is viewed as only partially legitimate, a problem to which we shall return later in the report.

These three elements (the quasi-totalitarian methods of control, the central role of the revolutionary party, and the emphasis on authoritarian values and a powerful state) do not exhaust the attributes of the Soviet model. The state-directed, or command economy, and the highly developed elite structure are
also essential to the functioning of the system. They are omitted from the discussion because of limitations of space and the assumed familiarity of the reader with the issues involved.

The crucial point is the innate conservatism of a system built on these elements, all of which appear mutually reinforcing. Since the abolition of institutionalized terror following Stalin's death, fundamental change has been absent in the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, the GDR and Bulgaria are notable for having resisted change, although both have shown more initiative in undertaking economic reforms than the Soviet Union.

Yet the Soviet-type system can change, as the examples of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1956 show. Even Albania undertook to alter the Soviet system in the 1960's, if in a radical way. The circumstances under which these changes took place in Eastern Europe will be examined in more detail in Section IV. Here we note those aspects of the Soviet type of system which lend themselves to change, and which in Eastern Europe proved to be the starting point for reforms.

The most important features of the Soviet-type system which have a potential for change are (i) the need for economic reform, (ii) underlying differences in approaches to the ideology, and (iii) the emergence of pluralistic tendencies within the monolithic system.

The deficiencies of the state-directed economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are familiar to all, and need not be examined here. The argument that economic reform will prove
more necessary in countries at higher levels of development does pose difficulties, however, for it suggests that the more industrialized Communist states are in greatest need of reform and should therefore be the first to initiate the necessary changes in the system. So far this has not been the case.10

There is an important linkage between the state directed economy and other elements of the Soviet system. State direction sustains the elite system and fosters party controls; efforts to meet the plan help keep revolutionary enthusiasm alive; and of course state direction builds state power. Replacing the state directed economy with a market system threatens these long-established practices and goals.

It is precisely because economic reform of a fundamental kind involves deliberate trade-offs between economic efficiency and practices deemed essential to the functioning of the system that such changes have rarely been undertaken without some alteration in the ideological outlook of those involved in making the reform. This brings us to the second aspect of the Soviet system which can lead to change: underlying differences in ideological outlook.

At first glance it may seem out of place to speak of differences in ideological outlook in conservative systems of the Soviet type. Leninist ideology aims at manufacturing truth and an aura of infallibility. Yet the party, in the last analysis, is the prisoner of an ideology which it is not free to manipulate at will. However, like any ideology, Marxism (or in this case, Marxism-Leninism) has its ambiguities. While they have not provoked outright controversy in the Soviet Union since Stalin's
day, other than in dissident circles, they have played a role in efforts in Eastern Europe to break away from the Soviet model.

We can distinguish three strands in the ideology which have had an impact on the thinking of communist leaders and elites in Eastern Europe, and in the process have either promoted or hindered consideration of reform. One is the Leninist strand, already alluded to. A second strand is anarcho-syndicalist in character; it has come to expression in the official Yugoslav Marxist ideology. While those who have pursued this strand of Marxism remain wedded to the principle of party dominance, the self-management ideology of Yugoslavia is anti-statist and has favored decentralization, economic reform, and the emergence of a quasi-pluralist system in Yugoslavia.

The third strand is the democratic and humanist one. It was expressed most forcefully in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and has inspired the revisionist school of Marxism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The clash between the Leninist and democratic-humanist strands in Marxism is fundamental. As we shall suggest in the conclusions, the conflict is likely to continue to shape the future development of the Communist systems of Eastern Europe.

Pluralism is the third factor which we have associated with tendencies toward change in the Soviet model. The contribution of pluralism to reform is nevertheless debatable. In the absence of changes in ideological outlook linked with economic reforms, pluralism is not likely to be a factor for change. Soviet type systems do contain elements of pluralism, however. They usually
manifest themselves at the moment when party control is weak and when regional or organizational interests, chafing under party controls, assert themselves. In Eastern Europe pluralism finds a potentially receptive audience, thanks to the diversity and pluralist traditions of the region. Yet it is doubtful that pluralism has developed in Eastern Europe for this reason alone. The weakening of leadership and party controls (as happened in Poland in the mid-1970's), or the introduction of elements of economic reform favoring regional and local interests, appear to have been the primary reasons for the emergence of pluralism in Eastern Europe.11

Our brief resume of factors which may lead to reform in the Soviet type of system is not necessarily all-inclusive. We have deliberately omitted reference to modernization as a factor promoting change, simply because the evidence is not strong enough, on comparative grounds, to suggest that relaxation or reform is related to levels of development. This does not rule out the possibility that changes taking place in society over time may make the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe more receptive to reform. But among the factors which we shall be considering in this study, modernization -- viewed either in terms of increased living standards, the emergence of new educated strata, or the growth of technology -- does not play a crucial role in precipitating political change.

Let us now consider the kinds of changes the East European states have undertaken in adapting the Soviet model to Eastern Europe. Generally speaking, they have been of three kinds: instrumental changes, deviations, and innovations.
Instrumental changes are minor adjustments in Soviet practice made with an eye toward improving upon the Soviet model, as well as adapting it to the needs of the country in question. One could cite as an example the economic reforms which Bulgaria and the GDR have introduced over the past two decades.

In deviations from the Soviet model an important element of Soviet practice is modified, but without the intention of altering the system as a whole. An early example of such change was the abandonment of collective farming in Poland. The cultural revolution in Albania in the mid-1960's might be considered as falling into this category, or might be treated as a case of change of a more basic kind, belonging in the category of innovation.

Under innovation, the type of change most relevant to this study, a conscious effort is made to depart from the Soviet model with the intent of creating a new and better system. This impulse was very strong in the reforms in Yugoslavia during the early 1950's, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968; it was also present, to some degree, in Hungary when the New Economic Model was introduced in the 1960's.

How greatly the Soviet system has been modified in the course of its application to Eastern Europe will be the subject of further analysis in the completed study. Many alternations of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe are not deliberate and are to be seen in the spirit in which elements of the Soviet system are applied. In the case of truly innovative change, meanwhile, we can speak of systems of a new type, ones which retain the
essential feature of party rule, but without many of the statist and quasi-totalitarian elements which characterize the Soviet model.

In the Yugoslav case, we shall call this departure from the Soviet type of system quasi-pluralistic. The Hungarian system, in our estimation, belongs among the innovative political systems of Eastern Europe, but cannot be called truly pluralist. It will be considered as a case of incomplete evolution away from the Soviet model. Czechoslovakia in 1968 was also evolving toward a version of communist pluralism, but with a decidedly democratic orientation, and belongs in a different category than Yugoslavia. One hesitates to label this system, since much of it was still in the planning stage when the Soviet invasion took place, while the reforms that were introduced between August of 1968 and the spring of 1969 seemed to have had a slightly different quality than those that had gone before.

There remain the countries whose systems are modeled after the Soviet Union (Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland and Romania), and Albania. Each of the four Soviet-type systems has its own stamp. In the case of the GDR and Bulgaria, it is the efficiency with which the Soviet model has been applied and even improved upon. The Romanian Communist system is notable for the personalistic leadership style adopted by Ceausescu. Poland has been characterized by instability, culminating in the events of 1980-1981. The Solidarity period also witnessed attempts -- largely futile -- to reform the Polish system, and the study will consider these efforts in connection with reforms adopted elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Finally, there is the case of Albania, which belongs in a special category. In Albania the revolutionary regime remains Stalinist in spirit. In the mid-1960's, innovations were made in the system along Chinese lines. Yet Albania today is in its essentials very similar to the Soviet Union of the 1930's, a reflection of Enver Hoxha's tyrannical rule and the backward state of the country.

Notwithstanding these differences, the communist systems of Eastern Europe, along with the Soviet Union, share certain basic attributes: a commitment to the ideology, a highly developed system of elites, and, last but not least, a loyalty to the party and a belief in its pre-eminent role. We have suggested that they be classified as examples of ideological one-party systems, and distinguished from multi-party systems and one party systems of the nationalist variety.

National peculiarities aside, these systems differ from one another in important ways. Three basic types can be distinguished: revolutionary, authoritarian, and pluralistic. The revolutionary system is based on the expectation of fundamental change and the transformation of society from above; the authoritarian system on the inculcation of respect for the existing social and state system; and the pluralistic system, on the encouragement of elites to express societal interests, largely those of a regional variety. All these systems, it should be noted, are authoritarian in a narrow sense, since none permit the exercise of democratic rights or a multiplicity of competing parties. Frequently communist systems have combined
revolutionary and authoritarian traits; pure revolutionary states, on the other hand, are rare.

Most but not all communist systems pass through a revolutionary phase. The system at that stage is unstable, since its ideologically determined revolutionary goals are not yet capable of attainment. The myths of the revolutionary period live on beyond this stage, however: first, in the founding myth of the party, in which the party is seen as the agent of destruction of the old order; and, second, in the belief that the party, acting through its ideology, is uniquely qualified to lead society and therefore should monopolize political power.

Today the authoritarian type of revolutionary one-party system predominates in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Its form varies somewhat from country to country, but wherever it is to be found it is marked by a synthesis of conservative principles based on respect for existing institutions and state authority, and revolutionary traditions kept alive by the party. In a certain sense these systems are "totalistic," since no institutional autonomy is tolerated outside the party or state bureaucracy. In a certain sense, these are bureaucratic systems, since the military and security forces, along with the apparatus of economic administration, constitute a form of bureaucratic government more highly developed than any known in the West. Party domination nevertheless remains the hallmark of these authoritarian regimes; rigidities ascribed to the bureaucracy in general can often be traced to the oligarchical tendencies of the party and its predilection for retaining aged party leaders.
in positions of responsibility. Within-system changes tend to reflect differences in leadership styles, rather than underlying social transformations.

Quasi-pluralist systems, while they retain the basic attributes of all revolutionary one-party systems, are characterized by quite novel relationships between the political system and society. The ideology of the party and the activities of the state become more attuned to popular needs and interests. Interest group participation, largely an expression of regional interests, broadens the scope of those who have a stake in the day-to-day operation of the system to include nonelites. While this type of system is formally authoritarian, the leadership tries to use self-interest as a way of encouraging participation in politics, thus giving the system a democratic element. The result is a political culture that stresses participation through identification with enterprise, local government, and regional interests. Such participation takes place within the context of a highly developed and often esoteric ideology of self-management. The party's claim to rule is further buttressed by repeatedly drawing attention to the party's earlier revolutionary exploits. As practiced in Yugoslavia, the quasi-pluralist system has passed through several stages, marked first by a decline, and then an resurgence, of party controls. Like the other two types of revolutionary one-party systems discussed here, the quasi-pluralist system seems to function best, economic considerations aside, when the party retains its dominant position.

These distinctions help delineate differences among types of communist systems while allowing for change and variation within
each system. Certainly the largest of the within-system changes is the transition within the authoritarian type of system from the totalitarian to the non-totalitarian phase. Other within-system differences may be attributed to national peculiarities or conditions. Of course, no country functions exactly in accord with the precepts of the dominant system, and in the case of Poland today, one hesitates to apply any of the classifications used so far.

The next section of the report will deal with the analysis of political culture in Eastern Europe. Our discussion up to this point has suggested elements of an approach to the political systems of Eastern Europe which differs in certain important respects from prevailing models. The description and classification of basic types of systems in Eastern Europe has taken priority over the analysis of evolutionary trends. In the last analysis this approach reflects the realities of Eastern Europe, where differentiation has counted for more than evolutionary change, or the orderly and predetermined development of the system from one stage to another. These are themes to which we shall return in the conclusions of the report.

Part II: The Political Culture of Eastern Europe

Attitudes and predispositions of the people play a major role in determining support for communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In this section we shall comment on a number of such
factors under the rubric of Eastern European political culture. Three problems in particular will engage our attention: nationalism, the role of the traditional political culture in the political development of communist Eastern Europe, and factors which promote or detract from the legitimacy of Eastern European regimes. These problems will be treated at greater length in the study; in particular, a chapter will be devoted to the impact of the national question on political development in Eastern Europe.

The importance of nationalism in shaping political values and influencing the course of political development in Eastern Europe is well known. Indeed, it would be difficult to overstate nationalism's impact on Eastern Europe, both before World War II and after.

Prior to World War II, nationalism was the binding force in the political culture of the states of Eastern Europe. This was reflected in the dominant role of the so-called national bourgeoisie in the politics of the interwar period. The thoroughness with which national values and national myths permeated the culture and education of the time bears comparison with the pervasiveness of communist ideology in Eastern Europe since World War II. The identification of these prewar regimes with nationalist goals -- assured by the influence of the national bourgeoisie -- was a major factor in sustaining the legitimacy of the governments of the time, even in the face of mounting economic and social problems. At the same time, the pursuit of unrealistic national goals kept national animosities inflamed and served the interests of outside powers, while the
excesses of World War II discredited national extremism and contributed to the destruction of the national bourgeoisie even before the Communists came to power. Thus the ground was laid for a new approach to the national question in Eastern Europe. This the Communists offered in their revolutionary doctrine and their wholesale condemnation of the prewar ruling classes. In the years immediately following World War II, there can be no doubt that these revolutionary doctrines had a genuine appeal, and that the failures of the prewar national paraties and ruling classes contributed to this reaction.13

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe have discovered, meanwhile, that nationalism continues to compete successfully with official ideology for popular loyalties. The view is widespread among the peoples of Eastern Europe that the Communist regimes serve Soviet, not national interests. The result has been a loss of regime legitimacy, with profound consequences for many of the East European governments. Notwithstanding almost forty years of communist rule -- and the coming of age of an entire new postwar generation -- national sentiments have remained remarkably unchanged in Eastern Europe. These sentiments continue to pose a major barrier to the acceptance of communism in the region.

All the East European communist regimes have to one degree or another recognized the need to accommodate themselves to nationalism. But the response has not been the same everywhere, and the relationship between nationalism and ideology has been a complex one. In Romania, there has been a conscious emphasis on nationalism and nationalistic symbols, short of outright
glorification of the prewar regime. In an effort to enhance legitimacy, this nationalism has been given a distinct anti-Russian tone. In Bulgaria, nationalism takes advantage of the pro-Russian sympathies of the Bulgarian people in order to generate support for the system. In Yugoslavia, the regime attempts to stimulate Yugoslav patriotism indirectly, by emphasizing the existence of external threats to Yugoslav independence and extolling the virtues of republic autonomy and the protection of national rights. In Poland, the government has appealed to the romantic strains of nineteenth century Polish nationalism and attempted to propagate its own version of Polish history, one in which the interests of Poland are seen as best served in a close union with Russia. In East Germany in recent years the emphasis has been on resurrecting national traditions of Prussian origin, and on the greater "Germanness" of the GDR, in comparison to the FRG. Albania's nationalism is defiant, isolationist and infused with praise for the heroic accomplishments of the on-going revolutionary struggle. A distinctive form of provincial nationalism is also to be found in Eastern Europe, principally in Slovakia, Slovenia and Macedonia, where, within the sheltering confines of the Czech and Yugoslav federations, a certain fusion between the communist elites and the new national bourgeoisie, or national intellectuals, has taken place.14

In brief, one gains an impression of subtle but real differences in the interplay of nationalism, ideology and the interests of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Most of
the populace of Eastern Europe has come to feel a deep hostility toward the Soviet Union, and this undercuts efforts at reconciliation between the communist regimes and the mass of the people. On the other hand, the stigma of being allied to the Soviet Union is absent in the case of Albania and Yugoslavia, and plays a lesser role in Bulgaria than in the rest of Eastern Europe. In the case of Romania one can cautiously suggest that the gap between the people and the regime has been closed, for the time being at least, thanks to Ceausescu's nationalist and anti-Soviet stand. In the GDR the force of nationalism is blunted somewhat by the realities of a partitioned Germany. In five of the eight communist countries of Eastern Europe, therefore, factors are at work which counteract or somewhat mitigate the effect of anti-Soviet nationalism among broad strata of the population.

The long-term effects of nationalism on political development are also complex, and cannot be explored in full in this brief discussion. It appears, meanwhile, that the underlying tensions between the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and national loyalties have had the effect of making these regimes more, not less rigid, and less, not more, ready to meet the people halfway in an effort to establish some form of distinctly national communism, presumably more in accord with the traditions of Eastern Europe. Behind this reluctance, we suspect, lies the issue of relations with the Soviet Union. Any concession to traditional national loyalties -- a natural byproduct of reform -- sooner or later involves an anti-Russian element. Hungary, under the peculiar conditions resulting from
spent national emotions following the uprising of 1956, was able to accomplish a reconciliation of anti-Soviet and reform impulses through the device of an unspoken social contract between Kadar and the Hungarian people. Yugoslavia's anti-Sovietism originated not in national, but in ideological conflicts with the Soviet Union. Romania alone has been able to pursue a consciously nationalist and carefully controlled anti-Soviet course; her case, however, seems to suggest that conservative, not liberal, strategies, are best suited to such an anti-Soviet stance. In brief, while nationalism has certainly played a role in orienting Eastern Europe away from the Soviet model of communism, it has also made the course of reform more difficult to pursue in practice. The origins of political innovation in Eastern Europe will not be found in nationalism, therefore. (The completed study will nevertheless argue that national elites, in alliance with reforming elements within the party, are one key to a successful reform movement.)

Nationalism may be viewed not only as an element in the reform process, but also as a legitimizing strategy. It is not uncommon to encounter the view that in the revolutionary period of their development, the Eastern European regimes eschewed nationalism, but, in the subsequent post-revolutionary (or post-mobilization) periods have had resort to nationalism as a means of gaining popular acceptance. This observation helps to distinguish the Stalinist period from the post-Stalin era in Eastern Europe, but errs in assuming the incompatibility of nationalism and revolutionary dogmatism. Those countries in
Eastern Europe which today are most dogmatic and doctrinaire are, without a doubt, among the most nationalistic (Albania, Romania, and to a lesser extent, the GDR). For countries where revolutionary fervor has been spent -- one thinks of Hungary -- the legitimizing force of nationalism expresses itself not in aggressive national posturing, but in a cautious reconciliation with groups representative of the underlying national culture. Both approaches serve to some degree to legitimize the system, but on balance one suspects that the aggressive posturing of revolutionary nationalism poses less of a threat to the regime, and may be an equally effective legitimizing device, as the tenuous live and let live policies of the post-revolutionary, post-doctrinaire type of system exemplified by Hungary.

As this brief account suggests, nationalism has had a complex impact on political development in Eastern Europe. Depending on the circumstances, nationalism has served both to legitimize and delegitimize the East European communist regimes. Notwithstanding the efforts of the communist regimes to discredit the prewar nationalist governments, identification with nationalist causes remains strong in Eastern Europe. National pride has been one motivation for considering ways to alter the Soviet model of communism in Eastern Europe, but fear of underlying nationalist animosities toward the Soviet Union has adversely affected the chances that reforms can be actually implemented. All the communist regimes of Eastern Europe have made concessions to nationalism in order to win popular support. At the same time, as we have suggested earlier, the ideological underpinnings of the political systems of communist Eastern
Europe make a clash between nationalism and Leninist principles of ideological legitimization inevitable. The Soviet approach to the problem — identifying the ideology with the building of a powerful Soviet state — is largely beyond the reach of the East Europeans. In Eastern Europe the tensions between the ideologically based party and nationalism have been partially resolved, in practice, through pursuing a policy of aggressive revolutionary nationalism, or by seeking a cautious and largely symbolic reconciliation with representatives of the traditional national culture. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, provides an example of a revolutionary party that has been able until recently to stand above the national antagonisms of a multi-ethnic state and in the process preserve the integrity of the country as a whole, ultimately to the benefit of all the constituent ethnic groups.

From nationalism we can now turn to the effect of traditional national cultures on political development in Eastern Europe. When speaking of nationalism we have sought to focus on the emotive, passionate elements of the Eastern European political culture. Now we shall be concerned with traditional values and patterns of behavior in politics generally — the mix of ideas, traditions and political relationships which serve as the basis for making comparisons between prewar and postwar types of political behavior.¹⁵

The impact of traditional national cultures on political development in Eastern Europe can be approached in two ways. It can be argued, first, that the legacy of the past creates
pressures to transform the Soviet type of system into a less oppressive form of rule, one more in accord with Eastern European traditions. Secondly, it can be suggested that the diversity of cultures and traditions of Eastern Europe is the key to an understanding of differences among the political systems of the region.

The argument that the Eastern Europeans would favor a less oppressive form of rule is indisputable. Still, it bears emphasizing that the traditional national cultures of Eastern Europe, despite their traditions of pluralism and democracy, have been kept under tight control, and that other values also shape attitudes toward the political system. This can be seen in several ways.

First, the role of elites in Eastern Europe must be emphasized. Although the ruling elites in Eastern Europe are affected by traditional national values, and are strongly attracted to the material prosperity of Western Europe, many of them have equally strong Soviet connections. Caught between two worlds, the instinctive reaction of these groups is to side with the status quo and bow to Soviet pressures to conform.

Second, public opinion polls have revealed that the attitudes of the population in Eastern Europe reflect both the traditional values of the national culture and values derived from the communist period. Kokankiewicz and Taras have called the latter "popular socialism," and points to the fact that it deviates in some important respects from traditional beliefs and Western, democratic, values.16

Third, the prewar traditions of pluralism and democracy owe
something to the attraction Eastern Europeans felt for Western Europe and the United States. This emotional attachment to the West, however, in recent years seems to have undergone some critical reassessment. It is easily forgotten, in this connection, how much the East European attachment to Western traditions reflects current assessments and perceptions of conditions in the West. Of course, disillusionment with the West would not totally transform East European attitudes; if nothing else, the underlying animosity felt toward the Soviet Union would make such a change unlikely. But Western scholars may be guilty of underestimating the role played by the favorable image of the United States and Western Europe in keeping democratic traditions alive in Eastern Europe -- thus overlooking the possibility that disillusionment with the West could result in a change in which components of the traditional national culture are emphasized.

Let us now consider the argument that the diversity of political cultures in Eastern Europe helps explain differences that have developed among the communists systems of the region in the postwar period. The point has been heard with more frequency in recent years as the popularity of the political culture approach to comparative communism has grown.17

The principal problem with this argument lies in the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between two quite different historical epochs. There are, of course, striking parallels between the prewar and postwar periods in Eastern Europe. One thinks of the tragic dilemma of Poland, caught between idealism and realism in dealing with Russia and
the Soviet Union, or the inability of Yugoslavia to escape the national question. On the other hand, there are equally many instances where political development since the war has run contrary to prewar patterns. The emphasis on decentralization which has marked Yugoslavia's political development does not seem to reflect prewar political traditions or practices. In Czechoslovakia the Prague spring was clearly inspired by the example of the democratic system in existence before the war, but the persecution of intellectuals since 1968 seems very foreign to Czech political traditions. While the dilemma facing Poland in her dealings with the Soviet Union does bear an uncanny resemblance to the plight of the Polish national movement in the nineteenth century, the Solidarity movement appears to be a truly unique phenomenon.

The problem of legitimacy will be the last to concern us in this section. The failure of communist regimes in Eastern Europe to win legitimacy has already been alluded to. Yet the issue is a complex one, for the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the East European communist states is influenced by such factors as popular attitudes towards the USSR (not all Eastern Europeans are equally hostile to the Soviet Union), the method of coming to power (with or without the assistance of the Soviet army), elite behavior and attitudes, and the status of the country as either a developing or developed nation (the north-south problem mentioned earlier). Because the combination of these factors is not everywhere the same, there are differences in respect to the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by each of the communist regimes in
Unfortunately these differences cannot be measured by objective standards. As a result we tend to rely on political behavior as a test of legitimacy -- assuming a lack of legitimacy in cases of political disorder or weakness -- with all the dangers of circular reasoning such an approach may entail. Still, these differences are real, and, making due allowance for the element of subjective judgement involved, may be briefly summarized.

In Bulgaria, the regime seems to have popular support. Poland and Czechoslovakia clearly lie at the opposite pole; in both countries there exists a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the people and the regime. The rest of the East European countries fall in a gray area where legitimacy tends to be linked to performance. In both the GDR and Hungary a tenuous legitimacy has emerged, based on the ability of the regimes in these two countries to provide a modicum of economic progress and to assure political stability. This legitimacy is nevertheless greatly influenced by negative considerations -- that is, a widespread belief in the two countries that little can be done to change the present form of rule or to assert some degree of independence from Soviet tutelage.

In the developing countries of the Balkans there is an element of naturalness to the regimes lacking elsewhere, as we have had reason to note earlier in the discussion. Still, each case has its special features. The Albanian regime enjoys a revolutionary legitimacy and, we suspect, a great deal of support for its nationalistic policies. But the country is
passing through the trauma of the closing years of Enver Hoxha's reign, and may experience far-reaching changes after the death of the revolutionary leader.

The regime in Romania has exploited nationalism and anti-Russian feeling to gain popular acceptance and, we infer, has now acquired a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the Romanian people. But one senses a growing opposition to the economic policies of the Ceausescu regime and the hardships these policies have entailed, making the regime vulnerable to a withdrawal of popular support. Yugoslavia is a special case. Western scholars have expressed widely differing opinions about the legitimacy of the regime, reflecting a confusion among the Yugoslavs themselves over where authority lies within the system. National rivalries and ideologically motivated criticisms of the state have worked to discredit the authority of the federal government. The republics, for their part, are not true states, and are not perceived as carriers of regime legitimacy. Yet, like other Balkan states, the communist regime in Yugoslavia enjoys the advantages of naturalness and can rely on the support of strongly entrenched elites in each republic. Most Yugoslavs stand behind the regime in its show of independence toward the Soviet Union and the United States, and would rally to the regime's defense if it was threatened from without.

In all four of the Balkan states, then, legitimacy seems based more on positive acknowledgement of the regime's right to rule (or to try to rule) than on a tacit social compact based on the logic of a negative or "covert" type of legitimacy. We might
go even further, and suggest that the greater legitimacy of these regimes and the strength of their entrenched elites permits these systems to countenance a rather high level of dissatisfaction and even outright opposition, unlike the more fragile and less legitimate governments in Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

We can suggest, on the basis of the preceding remarks, that some degree of legitimacy adheres to the regimes of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Poland and Czechoslovakia. A mood of resignation, the ability of the East European regimes to provide a tolerable and secure existence, and what we have referred to as the naturalness of Balkan communism have all contributed to this outcome. Yet this legitimacy is nowhere completely secure. It is affected by regime performance, historical realities, and underlying tensions between the competing principles of legitimacy of the regime and the majority of the population -- the former rooted in the ideology, the latter in the view of the state as the defender of national traditions and interests.

We shall return to the issues raised in this discussion of political culture in the conclusions of the report. We have stressed the differences in degrees of legitimation and in national coloration that exist in Eastern Europe today, and challenged the view that the path to an understanding of political development in Eastern Europe will be arrived at through the notion of political culture. At the same time, we have set up our own rather loosely-defined categories of political culture, northern and southern, and spoken in
admittedly imprecise terms of the naturalness of the latter. In brief, our analysis has provided some clues concerning major underlying differences in political cultures in Eastern Europe, but left many questions concerning the nature of political development in the region unanswered. The next step is to turn to the effect of differentiation and change on political development in the postwar period, a subject to which this report has addressed itself in several different contexts already.

Part III: Problems of Differentiation and Change

In this portion of the discussion we would like to comment briefly on problems of differentiation and change in the political systems of Eastern Europe. The subject is of great importance to the study, which will be concerned with the circumstances under which reforms have been introduced in Eastern Europe.

The problem of change in communist systems is an extraordinarily difficult one. Discussions of the subject have been marked by fundamental differences in points of view. Western scholars have long been divided into those who believe change is possible, and even inevitable, in communist systems and those who take a more pessimistic point of view, pointing to the rigidity of communist systems and their resistance to reform. These two points of view first emerged in debates in the 1950's over whether totalitarianism was capable of change; they continued in discussions of the mobilization and post-mobilization models of communist systems; and can be found today.
in differences between experts over the nature of pluralism in mature communist systems. 20

A second difficulty is the concern shown in the scholarly literature with stages of political development in communist systems. 21 Unfortunately, such theories do not adequately explain why communist regimes differ from one another, except in terms of their progress from one stage to the next, a process which, in theory, should be closely related to levels of economic development. As we have seen, it is the failure of such theories to explain why communist systems do differ that partly accounts for the interest in the political culture approach to the comparison of communist systems.

Faced with these complex issues, we propose, first, to consider the postwar history of Eastern Europe and to try to break it down into periods. From this we may be able to draw some tentative conclusions about the timing and circumstances under which differentiation and change have taken place in the region. We shall then say a few words about factors which help precipitate changes, and end our discussion on the subject of communist systems in decline. This is clearly a large order, and our remarks will only touch the surface of many of the problems involved.

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe have been in existence for just short of forty years. From an historical perspective, this is not a long period. Only now is the era of the first generation of revolutionary leaders coming to a definitive close. Yet this has been a turbulent time, marked by revolutions, the conflict between Tito and Stalin,
collectivization, the use of Soviet troops in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and, in Poland in 1980, the first general strike in Europe to bring down a government since the Russian revolution of 1905. In tracing the course of these events, one can break down the postwar era in Eastern Europe into six periods, or phases. Some are clearly identifiable, others less so; some follow one another in an orderly fashion, while others overlap. But in each period it is possible to discern a common set of problems and a common set of political trends, even among nations whose political development is seemingly going forward on separate tracks.

These six periods are: (1) The period of takeover, when the communist regimes were intent on consolidating power, lasting from 1945 to 1948. (2) The Stalinist period, marked by a reign of terror and revolutionary excess and the destruction of the prewar social order, lasting from 1948 until Stalin's death in 1953. (3) The period of reaction to the excesses of the Stalin period, lasting from 1953 with interruptions until Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, and marked by the Hungarian uprising and the Polish thaw. (4) the period of the 1960's, which overlaps with the anti-Stalinist period, and ends with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. This is a time when Eastern Europe experienced rapid modernization and vigorous economic growth, and when all the communist regimes undertook some degree of economic reform. This was also a period of centrifugal forces within the bloc, marked by the break between the Soviet Union and Albania, the emergence of an independent Romanian foreign policy, and tensions among
bloc countries. (5) The period of the 1970's, marked by a renewed emphasis on party rule and an end to economic experimentation, less rapid economic growth, and a conscious effort to improve living standards, especially of the urban working classes. The beginning of the period is marked by the Czech invasion of 1968, the Polish workers' riots of 1971, and the crackdown in Yugoslavia in the same year. (6) The period of economic retrenchment and mounting political pressures on the less stable Eastern European states in which we now find ourselves. The period begins with the crisis in the Polish economy and its well-known political aftermath, the appearance of Solidarity (1979-1981); the death of Tito (1980); and, finally, the death of Brezhnev (1982). What other changes are in store is, of course, extremely difficult to predict.

The completed study will devote a chapter to political development in postwar Eastern Europe in which these periods will be examined in more detail. What is important for the purpose of the present discussion is that these periods can be applied to the analysis of political development in countries as different as Yugoslavia, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Of course, the nations of Eastern Europe have not all moved in lockstep since World War II. Albania, in particular, seems to have pursued her revolution quite oblivious to developments elsewhere. Poland's tentative efforts at liberalization came in the early 1970's under Gierek, rather than under Gomulka in the 1960's. (The 1970's was nevertheless witness to an unsuccessful effort to strengthen the party in Poland.) Nevertheless, there has been a discernable rhythm to developments in Eastern Europe since World
War II. One must fully appreciate this setting in order to understand how change and differentiation have come about in the region.

Several points seem worth emphasizing in this connection. First, only three stages of systemic transformation or development can be identified with certainty. These are the stages of the consolidation of power; the revolutionary stage, coterminus with Stalinism in every country but Albania; and the postrevolutionary stage, in which different paths of development begin to emerge.

Second, two periods are particularly important in respect to reform: the post-Stalin period and the period of the 1960's. Both reflect a need to adjust to the excesses of the Stalin era, and both fall within the early and middle stages of a period of rapid industrial growth and modernization in Eastern Europe.

Third, attempts to identify a mobilization and post-mobilization stage in the development of the political systems of Eastern Europe are largely futile. The same can be said of efforts to pinpoint the emergence of a "mature" type of communism. There is no well-defined moment when the communist countries of Eastern Europe pass from a mobilization to a post-mobilization system, unless one focuses on the shift in economic priorities which took place in the early 1970's. But, as we have seen, this shift was accompanied by tighter party controls and was in any case only partial. By the same token, efforts to characterize the systems of Eastern Europe of the 1970's and 1980's as mature and interest-dominated seem to have been only
partially successful. First, differences among these systems remain too great (the adjective mature might apply to the GDR but hardly to Romania or Yugoslavia, and even less to Albania).

Second, the dominant trends of the last decade do not easily fit within this pattern (although the rise of pluralism can be seen in certain specific situations about which we shall have more to say shortly).

In brief, many models of change do not fare well when tested against actual experience in Eastern Europe. The theoretical postulates of these models would lead one to expect more receptivity to reform among the mature and industrially advanced systems of Eastern Europe where, presumably, the post-mobilization stage is most fully developed. As we have already noted, the onset of reform has not conformed to this pattern. Rather, it has been associated with periods of rapid economic growth and with the formative, or early stages of these systems' development.

What the history of Eastern Europe does reveal is that specific types of situations serve as catalysts, often bringing change in their wake. We shall briefly identify several.

One situation conducive to change has been conflict with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's decision to decentralize in the 1950's was prompted by a desire to differentiate her system from that in the Soviet Union following the rupture between the two countries in 1948. This set the stage for more basic reforms in Yugoslavia later on. In 1956, anti-Soviet sentiment played a major role in the Hungarian uprising and the Polish thaw. In the mid-1960's Albania was influenced by her conflict with the Soviet
Union to introduce elements of the Chinese developmental model. These examples suggest that the Soviet Union, by its very presence, acted as a catalyst for change in Eastern Europe. (With paradoxical results, this determination to act contrarily to the wishes of the Soviet Union led Romania to pursue the Soviet model of development after the Soviet Union tried to discourage the development of heavy industry in Romania along Soviet lines.)

Still, we suggest that the most powerful force for reform was the anti-Stalinism of the period of the 1950's and early 1960's. Anti-Stalinism was the initial inspiration for the Czech reform movement, a case in which the element of conflict with the Soviet Union was lacking until Soviet troops invaded the country in 1968. The conditions which prompted the anti-Stalinist outburst in Eastern Europe in the 1950's and early 1960's were unique, and closely associated with the feelings of betrayed idealism of which the revolutionaries of the time were still capable. For the East European communist regimes, this was still a formative period in their development.

A third factor which has acted as a catalyst for change in Eastern Europe is one which has appeared on a number of occasions and can reoccur. We have in mind the onset of a thaw, or a period of relaxed controls, such as occurred in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Yugoslavia in the late 1960's and early 1970's (but not in the 1950's), in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (but not earlier) and in Poland once more in 1980 and 1981. In Poland, as Bienkowski has pointed out, such changes have alternated with periods of repression in a cyclical fashion since the 1950's.
Such a thaw can pass without reform ever taking place. Yugoslavia at present seems to be passing through a period of relaxed controls accompanied by calls for reform, but as yet little has been done to meet these demands. In 1956 Poland was well on the way to instituting major reforms until Gomulka's appointment as first party secretary led to the snuffing out of the reform movement. The importance of these moments of relaxed controls should not be underestimated, however, for they are usually accompanied by a surge of popular emotion which places the regime under tremendous pressure to institute reforms. The danger, as in the case of Hungary in 1956, is that this emotion may turn into an open confrontation with the regime resulting in Soviet intervention.

The circumstances under which pressures for change have emerged in Eastern Europe are therefore quite varied, and are closely related to the region's postwar history -- its relations with the Soviet Union, cycles of relaxation and repression, the anti-Stalin campaign of the 1950's and early 1960's, and, of course, economic conditions, on which we have not dwelt under the assumption that they are well known to the reader. Systemic change, defined as the orderly transition from one stage to another, has played a more ambiguous role, and appears to have been conditioned largely by the political developments briefly alluded to in the description of the six stages of postwar develop given above, rather than by underlying social forces or the effects of modernization.

It remains to comment briefly on the possibility that the communist regimes of Eastern Europe are entering into a period of
political and economic decline, the consequence of a failure to undertake reforms under the more favorable conditions of the 1950's and 1960's. There is, indeed, evidence of a slowdown in Eastern Europe. Economic growth has tapered off, and signs of corruption and increasing reliance on the "second economy" are everywhere to be seen. Social progress resulting from modernization -- the result of increased upward social mobility, improvements in the standard of living thanks to shifts from agricultural to nonagricultural occupations, and increasing levels of education -- is no longer the dynamic process it once was. The near collapse of the communist regime in Poland suggests that the process of decline may already be underway, while in Yugoslavia political and economic conditions have deteriorated dramatically over the past year and a half.

If these trends continue there will be a strong temptation to recast our models of political development in Eastern Europe with an emphasis on those factors which contribute to political decline. The literature on Poland has for over a decade focused on themes of political ineptitude, economic failure, and loss of regime legitimacy, pointing out how these problems have reenforced one another and led to the disintegration of the system.

If such a model begins to enjoy popularity, meanwhile, it is well to remember that it will face the same problems that its predecessors have encountered. At the moment political decline is a recognized phenomenon in Poland and poses a real threat to Yugoslavia. While Poland has resisted reform, Yugoslavia has been
the leader in Eastern Europe in encouraging a decentralized system based on market socialism and permitting interest articulation. The challenge remains to distinguish between systemic and country specific factors when explaining patterns of political development in the region. The task will not grow any less complicated if the focus shifts from modernization to a concern with systemic decline.

Conclusions

We have conducted the reader on a rapid tour d'horizon of the political systems of Eastern Europe, in the process pointing out the issues with which any broad gauge study of the area must deal. The exercise has involved an attempt, provisional at best, to synthesize and categorize our knowledge, and to suggest ways in which the study of East European political systems of necessity diverges from the analysis of other communist polities. The study which will result from the research already underway (described in a separate report) will attempt to place these observations into a more solid factual and historical framework, and will benefit from material on elites, social change, and the specifics of the reform process which has been gathered but is not reflected in the present analysis.

What have we discovered, then, in this summary treatment of the East European political systems? Where has our research led us up to now, and what form should our analysis take in the future?
It would seem natural that the analysis of East European political systems should start with the element of political culture, that bedrock of unchanging attitudes which defines both what is most permanent and also unique about the region. To use the evocative term of Ghita Ionescu, the political culture of Eastern Europe encompasses the Bewusstsein of a different and presumably happier era, when the states of the region, whatever their problems, were truly their own masters, and when the natural instincts of the region for diversity, pluralism, and even conflict could be given free rein.

The approach taken in this report has been guided by a somewhat different set of priorities, concerned above all with the problem of recasting our models of communist systems in such a way as to make comparisons among East European systems, and between them and the Soviet Union, more feasible. There is the danger of formalism in the taxonomy we have employed, but avoiding the dangers of misplaced emphasis seems worth the price. In brief, it is necessary to begin the task of making comparisons in a way that suits the needs of those engaged in the analysis of the political systems of Eastern Europe. Whatever the shortcomings of the categories used in Part I of this report, they have been developed with this purpose in mind.

We have suggested that prevailing approaches to political change in communist systems assume certain scenarios which have failed to come to pass. This is perhaps unfair. The functional view of systemic change which today prevails is based on very sound insights into the accumulating difficulties facing the
ideological one-party systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as their economies become more complex, and as the systems become more concerned with the welfare of the individual, and less able to rely on the heroic traditions of the past -- or the empty claims of ideology -- to maintain themselves in power. The functional approach have never claimed that the political leaders of the communist countries would see these problems in the same light as we do. The failure of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to take timely action in bringing about reforms, and the apparent economic setbacks of recent years, serve to buttress the central contention of the functional school: reform or face the prospect of economic decline and political stagnation.

Yet we feel the point we have been trying to make, if somewhat overstated, is valid. Political development in Eastern Europe has, in actual fact, marched to the tune of a different drummer. The impetus to reform has come from economic concerns and ideological reassessments resulting in a desire to be different from the Soviet Union, and, in conjunction with such a desire, the shock of facing popular pressures manifested during a period of thaw. Anti-Stalinism played an immensely important part in this process. While not wishing to replace one dogma with another, may we not recognize that the political systems of Eastern Europe (and, while we are at it, all communist systems), seem more ready to engage in reform at an early stage of their development?

The weakness in this argument is, of course, that history has a way of taking things into its own hands. Within a decade
events may conspire to send a wave of reform spreading over Eastern Europe. The thesis that mature communist systems are of necessity most receptive to change would then appear confirmed, even if the reality of the situation was more complex.

For some readers, it may come as a surprise that this report has chosen to echo Fainsod when describing the Soviet-type system. We would argue, simply, that from the East European perspective, there is really little choice. One may, with an element of plausibility, call the Soviet system one of institutionalized pluralism, as Jerry Hough has done. But if, as comparativists interested in Eastern Europe, we establish a basic identity between the Soviet system and, for example, that of Romania, are we willing to call the latter an example of institutionalized pluralism? We must deal in broader strokes, as this report has attempted to do in distinguishing between the revolutionary, authoritarian, and pluralist types of communist ideological one-party systems.

As we have argued, this does not mean that the authoritarian systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all perform equally well, or that the former group lack unique national characteristics. The basic weakness of the authoritarian type of system in Eastern Europe, in addition to having to function in a much more uncongenial climate than in the Soviet Union, is that such a state can never hope to achieve great power status. In such a case the circle can never be squared, that is, there can never be an identity of goals between the ideology and the national ambitions of the people, expressed in the Soviet Union
through the equating of the good of socialism with the strengthening of the Soviet state. Of necessity, then, and quite apart from the need for economic reform, the East European authoritarian regimes have developed alternative strategies to enhance their prestige or to gain people's loyalties; to recount them would be to go back to the substance of the report.

The Yugoslav case is unique, and presents special problems of analysis. Creating a model from the experience of one country, as we have done with Yugoslavia, is a questionable procedure, yet we may be excused on the basis of the frequency with which this methodological error is committed in the study of communist systems. Our central point is that one need not view a pluralistic system as devoid of ideological content or a leading role for the party. What is fascinating to observe in Yugoslavia is the evolution of the system to a point where, if anything, politics plays a larger role in the economy than in the Soviet Union. Essentially, the League of Communists has become a spoils party, but one of a special type, whose loyalties, at least at the federal level, are rooted not in an ethnic bond or in class affiliations, but in the myth of the revolution and the even greater myth of self-management. Today reform has once more become a necessity in Yugoslavia because decentralization has allowed the party bosses in the republics and localities to seize control of the economy. This outcome is quite the opposite from what was foreseen in the late 1960's when market socialism was first introduced in Yugoslavia, but is the logical result of the wave of conservatism of the early 1970's, when it was decided that decentralization and party control would be combined. One
can learn a great deal from this lesson in party adaptability. Once it has been shown to be possible in one country, it cannot be entirely excluded elsewhere.

In our comments on legitimacy we have taken the position that shades of legitimacy exist against a backdrop of alienation and passivity, deepening into outright hatred in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Our revisionist stance lies in the suggestion that there are, today, two Eastern Europes, and that in the south the communist regimes are essentially operating free of the need for Soviet support (least there be any doubts, we include Bulgaria in this group). This cannot be definitively proven or disproven, for this freedom, and what we have called the greater naturalness of the regimes in the south, is accompanied by problems of an economic nature, and the challenges of dealing with corruption, abuses of power, and nationality conflicts which have always been present in the Balkans. Only Bulgaria seems to combine the advantages of belonging to this "Southern tier" with none (or few) of its disadvantages.

In this tangled web, there is perhaps no one issue that can be singled out as overshadowing the rest. Problems of economic regeneration and reform are certainly paramount in Eastern Europe; our passing over the issue seems warranted on the grounds that there is very little new that we could add on the subject in this report. Meanwhile, the history of Eastern Europe suggests that the ambiguities surrounding the application of Marxism to real life situations remain to haunt the communist regimes of the region. Like many other aspects of political
development in Eastern Europe, the phenomenon of revisionism — that is, the challenge to the validity of the Leninist approach to ideology — seems to wax and wane. Perhaps, for the younger generation of party leaders, the content of the ideology is no longer a matter of great concern. But revisionism fits the intellectual mood of Eastern Europe, and blends easily with the "popular socialism" of the masses. Leninism, for its part, seems in truth a thing of the past, to which party dogmatists can cling, but without conviction, and not forever. Such a scenario is based on a faith in the regenerative power of East European communism. In the terms used in this report, it suggests a cyclical pattern of reform and retrenchment in which change is not necessarily limited to either the formative or the mature periods of development.

We can posit different scenarios. One is the path to systemic decay (which, in time, could provoke crises leading to the party abdicating its role). A second would entail a new effort to coordinate reforms in Eastern Europe, something not accomplished up until now. These options have, of course, been discussed by others, with inconclusive results. Our analysis suggests that the motive force for change in the past has been the desire to create new, and different forms of socialism. In the future, the motive for reform could increasingly be that of creating a more stable system. This would involve striking a new balance between the interests of society and the state on terms more favorable to the former. Innovation for its own sake would no longer be given a high priority. This could encourage a desire to find common approaches to reform, a strategy which has not
been pursued up to now.

Whatever scenario seems most plausible, the history of the postwar period suggests an Eastern Europe which will grow more diverse, not less so. Change will be marked by considerable political turmoil, experimentation, and improvisation. In a word, change will continue to take place as a result of differentiation and adjustment to crisis rather than through orderly progress. In this lies the essential nature of political development in Eastern Europe, and the essential difference between patterns of change in the region and in the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES


2. The absence of a body of literature on the theory and practice of East European communist systems has made it necessary to rely on excellent, but partial accounts of the postwar period, such as Francois Fejto's A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES (New York: Praeger, 1969). Two more recent works which are helpful are Jan F. Triska and Paul M Cocks (eds.), POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE (New York: Praeger, 1977), and the monograph by Archie Brown, "Eastern Europe: 1968, 1978, 1998,"

There are no studies, to the best of our knowledge, which try to analyze the process of differentiation of political systems in Eastern Europe, although several of the works cited below do deal with aspects of the problem.

Most models meant to apply to Eastern Europe succeed only in part. The mobilization, post-mobilization distinction, utilized by several authors in the Chalmers Johnson volume cited below, does not relate well to the historical realities of Eastern Europe, as we shall argue below. Other theoretical approaches, for example, that of Kenneth Jowitt, REVOLUTIONARY BREAKTHROUGHS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) or David Lane, THE SOCIALIST INDUSTRIAL STATE (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976) have the familiar difficulty that they focus on stages of development, ignoring factors making for differentiation among communist systems.

Meanwhile a body of literature does exist which attempts to some degree to take account of the peculiarities of political development in Eastern Europe. These works have the common feature that they attempt to explain both stages of development of these systems and how and why they differ one from another. But the articles in question are quite different in approach. See, in this connection, Zvi Gittelman, "Power and Authority in Eastern Europe," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970). Gittelman suggests how different conditions can lead to different paths of development in Eastern Europe. See also Richard Lowenthal's outstanding and influential article, "On 'Established' Communist Party Regimes," STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 8 (Winter, 1974): 335-58, which makes some basic distinctions among types of communist regimes; and Andrew Janos, AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN COMMUNIST EUROPE (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1976), Chapt. 1, where one can find a rather complex taxonomy of communist authoritarian regimes bearing some resemblance to that found in this report. A very useful analysis of how the theory of modernization applies to Eastern Europe, making many of the points which are contained in this report, is to be found in Paul M. Johnson's contribution to Triska and Cocks, pp. 30-50.


4. See the introduction to Chalmers Johson (ed.), CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS, where this point is made very eloquently.
5. See our comments in Footnote 2.


7. The term "ideological" is used here in place of the more common "revolutionary" in describing these one party systems. This is in part because the latter term leads to awkward terminology, such as "revolutionary revolutionary one party systems" when communist systems are broken down into subsystems, and partly to emphasize that the essential quality of these regimes is their commitment to an ideology as a means of legitimation, rather than to broad national goals as is the case with one party systems in most third world countries. For the notion of the revolutionary one party system, see Robert C. Tucker, THE SOVIET POLITICAL MIND (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 3-19, and Samuel Huntington (ed.), AUTHORTARIAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY (New York: Basic Books, 1970), Chapter 1.

8. See Merle Fainsod, HOW RUSSIA IS RULED (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 116, for the well-known description of the Stalin period: "The great tour de force of Stalinism was the construction of a totalitarian edifice which sought to bestride the revolutionary and authoritarian heritage of Leninism, the traditional nationalism of Tsarism, the stabilizing equilibrium of conservative social institutions, the dynamics of rapid industrialization, and the terror apparatus of a full-blown police state." The recent work of Seweryn Bialer, STALIN'S SUCCESSORS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially Chapter 3, updates this view in a way similar to this report.


10. The problem is discussed by Paul M. Johnson in his contribution to the Triska and Cocks volume cited earlier. One of the best statements of the interconnection between economic and political change is to be found in Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Development and Political Change in Communist Systems," WORLD POLITICS 22 (July, 1970): 475-95.

11. The point that pluralism begins to make its appearance when party controls are weakened is made by Andrew Janos in his contribution to Huntington, AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOCIETY, Chapter 14. For a similar type of analysis which shows how pluralism arose in Czechoslovakia prior to 1968 by taking advantage of divisions within the leadership in that country, see Andrzej Korbonski, "Bureaucracy and Interest Groups in Communist Societies, the Case of Czechoslovakia," reprinted in Lenard Cohen and Jane P. Shapiro (eds), COMMUNIST SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE...
There are several good analyses of the emergence of economic interests in Poland in the mid-1970's when the Gierek leadership began to lose control over the Polish economy; see especially the contributions of Paul G. Lewis and George Blazyca to Jean Woodall (ed.), POLICY AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), pp. 76-98 and 99-128. For the thesis that a pluralism under elite control emerged in Hungary after the economic reforms, see Jeffrey D. Porro, CONTROLLED PLURALISM; IS HUNGARY THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE? (Santa Monica: Rand Report P-5386, 1975). Curiously, there is not, as yet, any authoritative account of pluralism in Yugoslavia.


14. One can see evidence of this phenomenon in other republics in Yugoslavia, and our selection of Slovenia and Macedonia as examples of provincial nationalism is somewhat arbitrary. But in Serbia, the divisions between various communist and non-communist elements is quite evident, reflecting differences going back to World War II. In Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina, hard-line party elements dominate, while in Croatia, party control is very superficial. Examples of what we loosely call provincial nationalism can probably be found in the Soviet Union — for example, in Georgia. On the question of nationalism and its impact on Eastern Europe see, addition to the author's monograph cited above, George Klein and Milan J. Reban (eds.), THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY IN EASTERN EUROPE (New York City: Columbia University, 1981); George Schopflin, "Rumanian Nationalism," SURVEY (Spring-Summer, 1974): 77-104; Melvin Croan, "East Germany," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska Harmstone (eds.), THE COMMUNIST STATES IN DISARRAY 1965-1971 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1972), pp. 89-92; Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM 32 (March-April, 1983): 47-60.


17. Note Michael Waller's excellent article advocating the political culture approach to comparative communist studies, "Problems of Comparative Communism," STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 12 (Summer-Autumn): 107-32.

18. On the question of legitimacy, see T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (eds.), POLITICAL LEGITIMATION IN COMMUNIST STATES (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982). While this excellent volume covers many aspects of the problem of legitimacy in Eastern Europe, it has little to say on the relationship of legitimacy to nationalism, and fails to explore differences in degrees of legitimacy that exist in various East European states as this report attempts to do.


20. See our discussion of models in Footnote No. 2.

21. For a critique of models of communist systems which in some ways parallels that given in this report, see S.N. Eisenstadt, "Change in Communist Systems," STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 6 (Spring-Summer, 1973): 171-83. A thoughtful discussion of the need to view the Soviet Union in terms of incremental or evolutionary change, rather than in terms of abrupt changes brought about either through the process of differentiation or the transition from one stage to another, can be found in Paul Cocks, "Rethinking the Organizational Weapon," WORLD POLITICS 32 (Jan., 1980): 228-57.

22. The notion of mobilization and post-mobilization stages in the development of communist systems is explored from different points of view by the contributors to Chalmers Johnson, CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS, and is utilized by Alexander Eckstein in his model of political and economic development in the article cited above. The argument of two stages of development in communist systems appears frequently in the writings of liberal communist economists, and even in official writings dealing with the need to make the switch from an "extensive" to an "intensive" mode of development. The view is well expressed by Ota Sik in his various writings; see Sik's THE COMMUNIST POWER SYSTEM (New York: Praeger, 1981).


