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Or, How to Keep Hunkering Down from Running Amok?

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Executive Summary

Current Soviet policy toward the United States is paradoxical. The Russians assert that U.S.-Soviet relations are worse than at almost any time since 1917, but that 1970s-style detente can and should be readily rebuilt; yet neither of these contradictory statements seems justified by existing circumstances. The Soviets insist they are eager to parley but broke off important talks with Washington (and with Peking as well). Moscow has avoided risky confrontations as carefully as it has productive negotiations. It is unclear to what extent Foreign Minister Gromyko's willingness to meet with President Reagan in September 1984 signals a change in this situation.

Some observers, President Reagan among them, have concluded that the USSR has been "hunkering down." But if so, why and for how long? To what extent has the Reagan administration itself, with its harsh rhetoric, and its rearmament program, been responsible? Or should Soviet behavior be traced to internal sources such as the on-going succession struggle in the Kremlin? Under what conditions might U.S.-Soviet relations drastically deteriorate or, on the other hand, take a significant turn for the better? What might be the effect of the 1984 election?

This report explores for answers to these questions by comparing the current situation to two moments in the past--1953-1954, when a Republican administration whose Soviet policy was strikingly akin to President Reagan's, confronted a hunkering-down Kremlin, and 1960-1961, when Moscow set out to improve relations with the recently elected John F. Kennedy only to trigger instead two of the worst crises of the whole post-war era.

Neither historical parallel is precise. But the points of continuity are not accidental. The USSR's American policy has been remarkably consistent over the years; besides the episodes examined in this report, Moscow has hunkered down several other times, for example, in 1948-1949 when Stalin abandoned an abortive detente of his own in favor of a quasi-isolationist stance, and in 1964-1965 when political uncertainty at home combined with international conditions to produce another Soviet retreat. Moreover these are not barely remembered historical events for a man like Andrei Gromyko, who was at the elbow of Stalin in the late 1940's, Molotov in 1953-1954, Khrushchev in 1960-1961, and Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1965. As for Washington's Soviet policy, it has been more inconsistent than Soviet American policy, but it, too, has a certain cyclical quality. The Reagan administration's deep skepticism about the prospects for worthwhile, long-lasting agreements with the Soviets clearly echoes that of John Foster Dulles.
This report's first historical case study compares both sides' efforts, in 1953-1954 and 1984, to arrange talks on their own terms. It argues that Moscow's 1953 decision to hunker down was shaped by a Reagan-like American challenge including harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, a far-reaching military build-up, an attempt to encircle the USSR with a string of declared and de facto alliances, and covert operations designed to destabilize the Soviet camp. But it also concludes that the Soviets had their own internal reasons for adopting a damage-limiting rather than agreement-optimizing or trouble-maximizing stance.

Those internal reasons reflected what Nikita Khrushchev called the "complex and difficult situation" that followed Stalin's death in March 1953. The Soviet leadership faced a variety of pressing domestic problems, prime among them its own internal divisions which put a premium on standing up to the Americans. A key Khrushchev ally against Malenkov was Molotov who shared (or rather, reversed) Dulles' view that no serious business could be done with the other side. Molotov, of course, was soon defeated by Khrushchev, who then reversed his field by pursuing a species of detente with the Eisenhower administration. But the report raises the possibility that Molotov's views have retained their appeal, that a version of his hunkered-down approach appealed to Frol Kozlov-led critics of Khrushchev in 1963, and that another version of Molotov's line may animate some in the Kremlin today.

The report's second case study traces Khrushchev's turn from seeking detente to hunkering down (between May and November 1960), and then his all-out effort in the winter of 1960-1961 to establish with Kennedy the kind of relationship he had with Eisenhower before the U-2 was shot down. The report recounts a series of informal messages to JFK (described in several recently declassified memoranda of conversation), and argues that these reflected Khrushchev's almost desperate need for foreign policy victories to compensate for setbacks at home and abroad. It shows that JFK failed to get the message Khrushchev intended, instead responded with moves that unintentionally provoked Khrushchev, and thus contributed to a vicious cycle of misunderstanding leading to crisis. The report identifies an alternative line of U.S. policy, suggested at the time by U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson, that might (or might not) have deflected the on-coming Berlin, and perhaps even Cuban, crises.

In its final section, the report compares and contrasts the current situation with the earlier cases, canvassing elements of change as well as continuity. Among new developments are a more formidable set of constraints on U.S. policy, one of which is enhanced Soviet military power. These changed circumstances offer the Kremlin more scope than in 1953 to respond in kind to American pressure. But other conditions reminiscent of 1953—lack of resources necessary to build both the civilian economy and the armed forces at an optimum pace, a clash of forces pro and con reform, and most important, a new succession
struggle—all argue for hunkering down, for venturing neither the kind of concessions necessary to satisfy the Reagan administration nor the sort of adventures likely to provoke it.

Other implications for U.S. policy today include the following: First, that Washington is not solely or even mainly responsible for the Soviet decision to hunker down. Second, that insofar as the U.S. can shape Soviet policy, the Reagan emphasis, at least until recently, on harsh rhetoric and rearmament has promoted Soviet abstention from both productive talks and dangerous adventures. And third, that a combined carrot-and-stick strategy holds out the best prospect for fostering a constructive Soviet-American relationship. The report contends that President Reagan is potentially well equipped to implement such a strategy, but for any American president to get very far with it, the Soviet leadership will have to be more disposed to East-West agreement than Molotov was in 1953-1954, and will have to communicate its favorable disposition more clearly than Khrushchev did in 1960-1961.
Current Soviet policy toward the United States is paradoxical. According to Soviet officials, relations between Moscow and Washington are at their lowest post-war ebb, worse even than during the depths of cold war in the 1940s and 1950s. Yet the same officials insist that the USSR remains committed to detente, and that the warmer East-West ties of the 1970's can and should be readily rebuilt. Not only are these two strands of the party line contradictory; neither seems justified by the circumstances. Although President Reagan has huffed and puffed, he hasn't come near enough to blowing the Soviet house down to justify the Kremlin's apparent anger and alarm. On the other hand, the tensions and strains of recent years have been sufficient to raise disturbing questions in some Soviet minds: Is a return to 1970s-style detente really possible or desirable? Was that detente but a fleeting interlude between cold war eras? Does Reaganism mark a lasting shift in the American political landscape? Is the American political system capable of sustaining a coherent and consistent foreign policy of any kind?

The Soviets insist they are anxious to parley, but not long ago they broke off the strategic and intermediate range missile negotiations, and they have required, as preconditions for resuming those talks, American concessions so unlikely as to
suggest that Moscow hasn't wished to resume at all. Nor is the pattern confined to dealings with Washington. One might have expected the Kremlin to compensate for strained U.S. ties by warming up to Peking, especially when Sino-American tensions offered an inviting opportunity to do so. Instead, having arranged for deputy prime minister Ivan Arkhipov to visit Peking for what was to have been the highest-ranking visit in years, the Soviets abruptly called off those talks too.

If Soviet-American relations are as bad as Moscow asserts, one might expect the USSR to take aggressive action in defense of its interests, action offering the additional dividends of proving that the leadership can stand up to the Americans, distracting popular attention from domestic troubles, and taking advantage of what the Reagan administration itself has been warning is a Soviet edge in the balance of power. But so far the Russians have avoided dangerous confrontations as carefully as they have productive negotiations.

In late September 1984, the situation developed a new twist. The Politburo's willingness to have Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet with the President (and with Walter Mondale as well) sparked speculation that it had at last decided to do business with a Reagan administration that itself seemed ready, for the first time, to do business with it. But the signals coming out of Gromyko's tough U.N. speech and his more amicable talks with Shultz and Reagan were decidedly mixed.
Some observers, President Reagan among them, have tried to resolve the Soviet puzzle by saying that Moscow has been "hunkering down." But such a label raises more questions than it answers. Why hunker down? For how long? Have the Soviets been as upset as they seem? Or has their anger deliberately contrived? Has President Reagan been to blame for the tensions because he spurned early Soviet offers, and because his rhetoric and his rearmament program forced the Kremlin into a corner? Or should Soviet behavior be traced to internal causes such as a succession struggle that puts a premium on standing up to the Americans, or deep-seated economic and social problems that demand highest priority? Will the Russian bear yet lash out in anger or frustration? Will the American election prompt an improvement in relations? What can the United States do to minimize chances for a crisis and maximize prospects for a constructive relaxation of tensions?

To these important questions there has been no shortage of answers, all based, of necessity, on more or less educated guesswork about the present and the future. But there is another way to explore for answers. It is to compare the present to two moments in the past—1953-1954, when a hunkering-down Kremlin confronted a Republican administration whose Soviet policy was strikingly akin to President Reagan's, and 1960-1961, when Moscow set out to build a better relationship with a new Democratic president, only to trigger instead two of the worst crises of the whole post-war era.
There is an uncanny resemblance between John Foster Dulles' image of the USSR and the view which, at least until recently, has seemingly animated President Reagan's approach. Both see the USSR as an evil empire intent on world domination, as ominously powerful yet morally rotten, as lulling the West with visions of a false detente, as incapable of lasting agreements on central East-West issues, as equipped, at best, for temporary settlements of marginal problems, as respectful only of strength, which the U.S. must therefore build up relentlessly, despite charges that it is precisely such build-ups that make the Soviets so angry and ornery. This view is very different from that of presidents from Kennedy to Carter, all of whom thought it possible, after very tough bargaining, to reach meaningful agreements with the Soviets, agreements which Moscow might enter for its own reasons but which would be in the American national interest as well.¹

Similarities between 1953 and the early 1980's on the Soviet side are also striking. Then as now a long period of stagnation had left a dual legacy—a pressing need for reform clashing with entrenched interests opposed to change. Then as now shaky East European clients threatened, in their economic and political weakness, to drag the Soviets down. "Objectively," as the Soviets like to say, the USSR needed (as it does now) a relaxation of U.S.-Soviet tensions in order to reduce the defense burden and make possible increased East-West trade. But it was not clear that the Kremlin, any more than the Americans, "subjectively" wanted detente, if only because a raging struggle for power required scoring points against Washington.
In 1953, most Soviet leaders shared (or rather, reversed) Dulles' view of the world; they, too, saw little or no chance of a lasting Soviet-American accommodation. That outlook, which was particularly associated with then Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, later gave way to a Soviet version of the evolving American conviction that significant agreements could in fact be reached with the other side. Another question today is whether the Soviet leadership still holds that more hopeful view, or has reverted to its 1953-1954 approach.

The years 1960-1961 provide material for a second instructive case study. By then, having consolidated power in the Kremlin, Nikita Khrushchev had pursued a species of detente with Eisenhower, only to have it go down in flames when the President took personal responsibility for Francis Gary Powers' ill-fated U-2 spy flight. In the summer and fall of 1960, Khrushchev, like Chernenko and company until very recently, decided to have as little as possible to do with the recalcitrant American president. Instead, he awaited the American election in the hope that the Democratic candidate would win. Within hours of John F. Kennedy's victory, Khrushchev began to try to convert him to the kind of cooperation that Eisenhower had forsaken. But JFK never understood what Khrushchev wanted and probably couldn't have delivered it even if he had understood. Whereupon, thwarted in his diplomatic courtship, the Soviet leader shifted to intimidation, thus triggering just the kind of vicious cycle of miscalculation leading to crisis that one would hope to avoid in 1985.
Neither parallel (1953-1954 or 1960-1961) is precise. Times have changed too much to allow any straight-line extrapolations; moreover, although we know more about past cases than we do about the present, our sources on previous periods are not all that good either. Still, the USSR's American policy has been remarkably consistent over the years; Mosocw has hunkered down several other times besides those examined here, for example, in 1948-1949 when Stalin abandoned an abortive detente of his own in favor of a quasi-isolationist stance, and in 1964-1965, when a succession conflict at home combined with international conditions to prompt another retreat. Moreover, these are not barely remembered historical episodes for the men in the Kremlin; Andrei Gromyko, currently a Politburo member as well as foreign minister, and said by some to be in charge of Soviet foreign affairs, was at the elbow of Stalin in the late 1940's, Molotov in 1953, Khrushchev in 1961, and Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1965. It would help a lot to know which of his former mentors inspires Gromyko today.

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When Stalin died on March 5, 1953, his successors, like Leonid Brezhnev's, launched a brief but intensive peace offensive. Like the Reagan administration, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles at first resisted talks by putting forward proposals practically impossible for the Soviets to accept. Pressed by allied and domestic opinion (and apparently prompted as well by the President's deep commitment to peace),
the administration finally agreed to negotiate with the Russians. But as in 1984, the Soviets refused at first to take yes for an answer; and once talks began (at the Berlin foreign ministers' conference in early 1954), they acted as if their purpose were to prevent agreements rather than reach them.

The Soviet peace offensive of 1953 featured both words (such as Georgi Malenkov's March 15 declaration that there was "no litigious or unsolved question that could not be settled by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement with the countries concerned."), and deeds (among them an end to the Korean war, plus an effort to improve relations with countries including Turkey, Greece, Israel, India and Japan). But Eisenhower and Dulles demanded further proof of Soviet sincerity, proof including such unlikely steps as allowing East European nations "free choice of their own forms of government." When British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed an early East-West summit meeting, saying, "It would be a mistake to think that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything can be settled," Washington counter-proposed a four-power foreign ministers meeting with a narrow agenda--only the German and Austria questions--that the Soviets were sure to find unappealing.

The American proposal gave the Soviets an opening to make more tempting offers of their own. Instead, they suggested a five-power (the People's Republic of China was the fifth) conference that the United States was sure to reject. This pattern of refusible offers was the reverse of 1984 (when Moscow
has been pushing for talks on weapons in space, with Washington trying to start, or rather, re-start broader arms control discussions), but otherwise the minuet was similar. When the Western powers rejected the five-power meeting, the Soviets countered with two conferences, one a five-power get-together on general matters of international relations, the other a four-power affair on Germany. To this the West gallantly replied (rather closer to its 1984 line) that although its agenda focussed on Germany and Austria, the Soviets would of course be free to speak on anything. Foreign Minister Molotov noted equally helpfully that whereas any question could come up at the broader conference his government was proposing, not all such questions necessarily would do so. At this point, in late November 1953, the two sides fell to arguing, much as in 1984, over who was insisting on which preconditions as a way of avoiding talks altogether. In 1953 it was the Soviets who yielded first, agreeing, in late November, to talk about a five-power conference at a four-power conference, and even proposing a place, Berlin. This left Washington to hail as a victory the very Soviet agreement to talks which it had been trying to avoid for some time.6

Against such a backdrop, it is not surprising that the Berlin conference turned out to be a propaganda circus. Dulles portrayed the talks as a public test of whether Moscow's Stalinist policies and tactics had really changed. But his own behavior at the conference--consisting largely of name calling and scoring points at Molotov's expense, plus assuring the Soviet
foreign minister that a Germany reunited in the Western camp would not threaten Soviet security—minimized the chances that Molotov would reply in anything but kind. And he didn't.7

Actually, Molotov responded with considerable patience and personal charm (as attested by American delegates who had expected few smiles from Stalin's former henchman) while making substantive proposals that matched Dulles' in their obvious, even ludicrous, non-negotiability. In the case of Andrei Gromyko, then Molotov's deputy and second-in-command at the conference, style was more in tune with substance, for he struck his American interlocutors as looking like "death taking a holiday."8 Under the heading of European security, Molotov suggested that the best way to promote that noble aim would be for the West to scrap both the European Defense Community (an an idea whose time had not yet quite come and in the end never did) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to boot.

Writing from Berlin on February 10, 1954, C.D. Jackson (Eisenhower's specialist on psychological warfare) captured the flavor of the conference when he relished "the danger of looming booby traps and...the thrill of coming through with the enemy visibly shaken." He described the "beauty" of "nailing" Molotov as "not just the satisfaction of scoring in the meeting. The real victory is that in one package he has been made to alienate East and West Germans...plus the French, plus the British, plus anybody who wants to listen." At one point, when Molotov conceded that the U.S. could be an "observer" (along with Red China) of a proposed European security pact from which the United States was
to be otherwise excluded, the American delegation laughed in his face, taking the Russians by surprise and completely depriving them, according to the gleeful Jackson, of their "momentum." 9

Equally barren Soviet-American exchanges marked the months following the Berlin conference. Dulles hammered home the object lesson of Soviet intransigence. And the Russians, despite private signs of flexibility (including a plea from the then counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, that the Americans emphasize the positive aspects of Berlin), continued to make Washington look good by trying to make it look bad. 10 Moscow did manage to capitalize on intra-Western divisions by, among things, having Malenkov declare that a nuclear war of the sort that Dulles seemed willing to risk could destroy civilization. But Malenkov was almost immediately forced by his Kremlin colleagues to recant (reverting to the old Soviet formula that only capitalism would surely perish in a nuclear war), and the most attractive other concessions the Soviets could dream up were to allow the Americans to take part in a European security pact after all, and to offer to join NATO themselves. To the latter, Anthony Eden replied with admirable British understatement that Moscow's membership would not by itself be of sufficient assurance to NATO's members. 11

In the spring of 1955, as Khrushchev defeated Malenkov and began to move against Molotov as well, Soviet policy exhibited a new activism culminating in the four-power Geneva summit conference in July. Although the latter proved no more productive substantively than the Berlin conference had been,
Khrushchev would soon mount a drive for his more ambitious brand of detente. In the meantime, had Eisenhower and Dulles missed a chance, as Reagan's critics charge he has, to reach worthwhile agreements with the Soviets? Charles Bohlen, then U.S. ambassador to Moscow, later came to regret that Eisenhower did not "take up Churchill's call for a 'meeting at the summit.' I think I made a mistake in not taking the initiative and recommending such a meeting." 12 Historian Robert A. Divine adds that the administration "may well have missed a genuine opportunity for detente in the months following Stalin's death," and John Lewis Gaddis agrees, saying the "the Soviet leadership underwent a period of uncertainty which the West might have exploited to its advantage, particularly on issues of disarmament and German unification, had it been more confident of its strength and more willing to employ the normal processes of diplomacy." 13

Instead of inviting serious negotiations in 1953-1954, Eisenhower and Dulles flung at Moscow a four-part, Reagan-like challenge: harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, a far-reaching strategic nuclear build-up, alliances designed to encircle the Soviets, and "covert operations" seemingly directed at destabilizing Soviet clients and perhaps even the Soviet Union itself. 14 During the 1952 presidential campaign, the Republicans engaged in a lot of loose talk about "rolling back" Communism and "liberating" Eastern Europe. Once in office, Dulles crowed publicly over the Berlin uprising of June 1953, and again when Soviet secret police chief and contender for supreme power, Lavrenti Beria, was
deposed, seeing in both events further evidence of Soviet moral decay. In November 1953, Dulles gloated, as did Reagan early in his term, that the Soviet system was "doomed to collapse." 

The USSR broke the American atomic monopoly in 1949 (several years earlier than had been predicted in the West) and exploded its first hydrogen bomb about the same time the Americans did, but the U.S. was far ahead in deliverable nuclear weapons in early 1953, and it increased its lead substantially during the Eisenhower administration. Only after Stalin's death, two leading Western experts report, did Soviet leaders begin "to grapple in earnest with the impact of nuclear and long-range weapons on military strategy and organization." Only in 1954 did nuclear weapons start "to be integrated into the Soviet armed forces and taken into account in military training." The first Soviet nuclear strike forces, which became operational during this period, were strictly of regional range. As late as 1955, the USSR possessed no operational intercontinental weapons, whether missiles or bombers, to match the 1,309 U.S. intercontinental bombers and more than 500 U.S. and NATO regional-range, "forward-based" planes and missiles, that is, weapons based around the periphery of the USSR and capable of hitting Soviet targets.

Nor was the Eisenhower administration shy about threatening to use these awesome weapons. Besides promising to retaliate massively against Soviet aggression at a time and place of Washington's own choosing, Dulles practiced "brinksmanship" to make his threats seem real. The administration threatened to use
nuclear weapons in Korea, assumed that it would use them in Indochina (had Eisenhower decided to intervene to save the French at Dien Bien Phu), and apparently came even closer to using them in crises over Quemoy and Matsu. The fact that the President Eisenhower himself was deeply ambivalent about nuclear weapons (believing that their use was in no nation's interest, and yet that if war came they must be employed no differently from conventional weapons) was not clear to the Soviets, at least not in 1953-1954. 17

The administration's strategy of encircling the USSR with pacts and alliances (CENTO and SEATO on top of NATO) was defensive in motive, that is, designed to deter Soviet attack on or subversion of its neighbors. Moreover, many in the West came to see Dulles' "pactomania" as a liability rather than a contribution to deterrence. But the irony was largely lost on the Soviets, especially given the nuclear weapons based on the territory of so many of America's allies.

As for covert operations directed against Communism, they go back at least to 1947, but under the Eisenhower administration they too came to full flower. Overthrow of governments sympathetic (or potentially so) to the USSR (e.g., Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954), infiltration of refugees into Eastern Europe, extensive and obvious aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union and other Communist states--it is not likely that these and other operations added to Moscow's peace of mind. 18
Were American policies and ploys like these responsible for Moscow's hunkering down in 1953 and 1954, for Soviet avoidance of serious negotiations and dangerous confrontations as well? Partly, I would say, but not entirely. What Washington did and didn't do made the Soviets more insecure, and hence more cautious. But the Russians had their own compelling internal reasons to opt for a damage-limiting rather than an agreement-optimizing, or trouble-maximizing stance.

Those internal reasons reflected what Nikita Khrushchev later called "the complex and difficult situation" that followed Stalin's death. According to Khrushchev, Stalin's successors faced "a plateful" of domestic problems at a time when the leadership itself was bitterly divided. Khrushchev and colleagues assumed, typically though incorrectly, that the Western powers knew all about Soviet troubles and deployed their policies (both aggressive and seemingly conciliatory) in order to take advantage of Soviet vulnerability. Khrushchev contends that Churchill proposed an early summit conference "before we were really ready" in order to "wring some concessions out of Stalin's successors before we had our feet firmly on the ground." The West knew, Khrushchev continues, that "the leadership Stalin had left behind was no good because it was composed of people who had too many differences among them. The capitalists knew that we were still engaged in the reconstruction of our war-ravaged economy and could ill afford the additional burden of heavy defense costs." "When Stalin died," Khrushchev continues, "we felt terribly vulnerable."
To sue for peace, or even for a respite from cold war, from that sort of weakness would have been anathema to the Kremlin even if American diplomacy had been more forthcoming. One can, indeed various Western scholars have, reconstructed an "operational code" of the Politburo from Marxist-Leninist axioms (such as the inevitability of conflict between capitalism and communism), Russian political culture (with its view of politics as a dog-eat-dog struggle) and the Soviet leaders' own formative experiences in Stalinist-era political infighting where weakness was an invitation to disaster and only the strong and ruthless survived. Such a code would clearly have warned in 1953-1954 against any more concessions than were absolutely necessary to keep the enemy off balance, thus insulating the succession struggle and other Soviet problems until the Kremlin could get them under control.

A charismatic leader like Lenin, or an absolute dictator like Stalin, could sometimes ignore even the most axiomatic of Soviet axioms; even the weaker Khrushchev, once he had defeated his rivals in 1957, dared to press for detente from Soviet weakness, although even he had to conceal that vulnerability beneath a barrage of bluster and bluff. But during a heated struggle for power, the risks of breaking with orthodoxy were high. Both Beria, and later Malenkov, reached for supreme power with the help of a distinctly soft-line foreign policy; Beria may even have flirted with the idea of selling out East Germany to the West. Although neither man lost out only or even mainly for foreign policy reasons, Khrushchev beat them both with a
platform that included a hard-line approach to foreign affairs. Khrushchev championed military-heavy industrial spending, as against Malenkov's campaign for consumer goods, in part to gain the support of Molotov whom he considered "to be very experienced, especially in matters of foreign policy." And since Molotov, according to Roy and Zhores Medvedev, "considered his position in the party to be insufficiently influential and so sought to keep Khrushchev away from the area of foreign affairs," that meant that Molotov's was a dominant, perhaps, the decisive, foreign policy voice in 1953-1954.

Molotov's post-1953 policy premises can be deduced not just from his negotiating behavior, but from charges levelled against him once he was defeated by Khrushchev in 1957. The main charge was that Molotov "overestimated" the forces of imperialism and "underestimated" the strength of the socialist camp. Of course, Molotov never said so publicly in so many words. But he did so esoterically in his 1955 ideological formulation, which he was later forced to retract, that only "the foundations of socialist society have already been built" in the Soviet Union. It followed from this seemingly dry concept that the Soviet camp was not sufficiently powerful, as Khrushchev would soon claim it was, to deter imperialist aggression, to prevent the capitalists from interfering with revolutionary change, to allow Moscow to reduce tensions from seeming strength and not weakness—in short to make the world safe for peaceful coexistence as practiced by Khrushchev.
Molotov's unfavorable view of the correlation of forces led logically to an almost minimalist foreign policy of neither adventures nor concessions. According to Anastas Mikoyan, Molotov reduced peaceful coexistence to "nothing more than the state of peace or rather the absence of war at a given moment," and thus approximated "the views of foreign opponents of peaceful coexistence who interpret it as a variant of 'cold war,' as a state of armed peace." Mikoyan left such opponents unnamed, but the Chinese fit his description nicely, as did John Foster Dulles for whom Molotov was in some ways the perfect partner.

The conventional Kremlinological wisdom is that once Molotov was defeated in 1957 his views were discredited. But were they? Although Molotov was banished (as Ambassador to Mongolia, and later Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna), he continued to express his opinions, going so far as to send a letter criticizing Khrushchev to the XXII Party Congress meeting in the fall of 1961. Moreover, the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev echoed Molotov; Peking attacked Khrushchev's Cuban missile policy as "adventurism followed by capitulationism"—the opposite of Molotov's policy of avoiding both extremes. After the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev appears to have encountered new opposition from his Kremlin colleagues Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov. According to William Hyland and Richard Shryock, Kozlov favored a quasi-isolationist foreign policy that, reminiscent of Molotov's, emphasized aggressive imperialist designs, the consequent need to strengthen Soviet defenses, and the importance of avoiding moves provocative to the
United States. If so, a version of Kozlov's approach may be alive and well in Moscow in the 1980s.27

It would be wrong to see Kozlov and Suslov (or Chernenko and Gromyko today) as "Molotovites." If Suslov and Kozlov, who supported Khrushchev against Molotov in the 1957 showdown, later turned against him, it was because Khrushchev took his pursuit of detente to what they regarded as dangerous extremes. Suslov later backed Brezhnev's steadier brand of detente-from-strength, as did Chernenko and Gromyko. Today's Politburo's willingness to parley with Reagan in the midst of the American election campaign suggests that it has been hunkering down temporarily, rather than as a part of the long-term strategy Molotov favored. Even so, it may not be accidental, as the Soviets say, that Molotov himself recently has been rehabilitated and restored to the ranks of the Communist Party.

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Our second case study (1960-1961) begins with the collapse of Khrushchev's post-1957 effort to establish a U.S.-Soviet relationship featuring frequent summit meetings, broadened East-West trade, and agreements on Germany and Berlin—in short, a kind of detente not unlike that obtained by Brezhnev a decade later. Just how far Khrushchev would have gone is not clear since Washington was not yet ready for what it later accepted. What is clear is that by May 1960, Khrushchev's would-be detente was foundering on the rock of American and Soviet domestic resistance. In January 1960, Khrushchev announced a far-reaching
Soviet troop cut defensible only on the assumption, articulated in a Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee, that "the world has now entered a phase of negotiations on the settlement of fundamental, disputed international issues." But troop cuts justified in that way, plus the prospect of Eisenhower's upcoming June visit to the USSR, gave rise to widespread public expectations that the East-West struggle was coming to an end, and those expectations apparently alarmed Khrushchev's more cautious colleagues in the Presidium. That may explain why the Soviet leader began backing away from his most optimistic rhetoric as early as January 1960. By April 1960, when several Eisenhower administration spokesmen warned against expecting too much from the Paris summit scheduled for May, Khrushchev sounded quite discouraged. And when Eisenhower refused to feign ignorance of plans for Powers' U-2 flight, or to apologize for it, the Soviet leader ended his dealings with the American president.

Khrushchev underlined both his break with Eisenhower and his characteristic impatience to approach Ike's successor by barring further summit talks for a mere six to eight months. By suggesting a timetable pegged to the November election, the Soviet leader betrayed his ignorance of American politics. No president-elect could begin such talks before taking office, nor immediately afterwards either. But Khrushchev was a man in a hurry (both by personal temperament and in order to buttress his position at home), a man, furthermore, who had the power to get his way in the Kremlin.
What followed in the summer and early fall of 1960 was the explosive Khrushchev's incongruous version of hunkering down. He promised to adopt a low diplomatic profile ("We shall do nothing to aggravate the international situation and to take it back to the worst days of the cold war."), but could not resist stirring the global diplomatic pot until it nearly boiled over. The highlight of the autumn was his lengthy, angry, shoe-pounding stay at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Even then, Moscow was longer on nasty rhetoric than on aggressive action, but with tensions rising, even relatively minor events (like Moscow's downing of another American plane, the RB-47) became burning international issues.

Behind the scenes however, the Soviets were already focussing on the American election and the new possibilities it might offer. Unlike Reagan in 1984, Eisenhower was a lame duck leader—which meant that unlike Chernenko, Khrushchev had no incentive to overcome his personal distaste and seek a new beginning with the president before the election. And since John F. Kennedy's chances seemed fairly good (which is to say rather better than Walter Mondale's seemed in September 1984), the Soviet leader felt free to favor Kennedy over that arch anti-Communist, Richard Nixon—even after Henry Cabot Lodge assured Khrushchev that Nixon was not what he seemed, and other Republicans sent word through diplomatic channels that Nixon would order a full review of Ike's policies once he took office. Just before the election, a high-ranking Republican asked the Russians to release the RB-47 crew members, but Khrushchev
refused so as not to give Nixon a much-needed electoral nudge.\textsuperscript{30}

Khrushchev could hardly contain his delight at Kennedy's victory. The Soviet leader's congratulatory message expressed the hope that U.S.-Soviet relations would recapture the friendliness of the Roosevelt era, and foresaw no obstacle to doing so. Almost immediately, a barrage of private, informal messages from Khrushchev began arriving, messages which reflected a seemingly desperate eagerness to get down to serious negotiations.

--November 11, 1960: Alexander Korneichuk, a Ukrainian writer/politician and longtime family friend of Khrushchev tells Kennedy advisor, Averell Harriman, that the Soviet leader wants "to make a fresh start, forgetting the U-2 incident and all the subsequent gyrations." Harriman suggests that release of the RB-47 fliers would be gesture "of first importance" toward improved relations.\textsuperscript{31}

--November 14, 1960: Soviet Ambassador to the United States Mikhail Menshikov gives Harriman a personal message from Khrushchev underlining his belief that a return to Roosevelt-era good relations is "not only desirable but possible."\textsuperscript{32}

--November 16, 1960: Ambassador Menshikov brings a long message to Adlai Stevenson in New York. Khrushchev wants to move toward disarmament. He agrees "we cannot do it overnight," but wants to "lay foundations by agreements 'at the top.'" He urges off-the-record, informal talks because official language has so many "reservations" and because, when "on the rostrum," both
sides have to repeat "old accusations." Khrushchev hopes for a nuclear test ban "in a short time" after Kennedy's inauguration. Hinting perhaps at improvements in his political position at home, Khrushchev says that the time is coming when it will be "easier to reach an understanding and that he has a sincere desire to do so." Menshikov adds the extraordinary (for 1960) comment that although Moscow cannot "be helpful" in getting China to renounce its claim to Taiwan, the Soviets would be "glad to help" on the "expansion" of China elsewhere.33

--November 21, 1960: Menshikov calls on Harriman in New York. He says that the Soviet leadership has discussed Harriman's views, including the idea of releasing the fliers, and is "sympathetic." It would now "be useful if Mr. Harriman were authorized to state the views of President Kennedy himself."34

--December 14, 1960: Menshikov presses another American (not identified in the declassified memorandum of conversation) for talks with the incoming administration. When the American explains that there would be no administration until the inauguration, and hence no official policies until then, the ambassador asks for informal talks, insisting Khrushchev wants such talks as soon as possible.35

--December 15, 1960: Harrison Salisbury reports meeting Menshikov, who repeats urgently, again and again, that "no time should be lost." It is crucial to act, he says, at a time when "Mr. Khrushchev is in a position to make agreements." "Already a year has been lost," Menshikov continues, referring to the
post-U-2 delay. "What is needed now is a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the earliest possible time, before those who would like not to see agreement have had a chance to act and prevent it." "There is more to be gained by one solid day spent in private and informal talk between Khrushchev and Kennedy than all the meetings of underlings taken together."36

This is far from a full list of signals and contacts between Kennedy's election and inauguration. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. mentions other similar messages flashed to Robert Kennedy and Chester Bowles, as well as a talk between Menshikov and veteran diplomat David Bruce whom JFK, uneasy about all the indirect approaches, had asked to find out exactly what the Soviets had in mind. Menshikov gave Bruce a formal document which George Kennan (to whom Kennedy showed it) found "considerably stiffer and more offensive" than Menshikov's own remarks. Weighing this document, plus anti-American propaganda then emanating from Moscow, against all the much warmer informal signals, Schlesinger finds that the evidence as to whether Khrushchev wanted "to cooperate or make trouble" was "conflicting." Kennedy's inauguration brought another warm greeting from Khrushchev, and shortly thereafter, the release of the RB-47 fliers. But just before the inauguration, on January 6, 1961, the Soviet leader delivered an apparently hard-line speech (about which more in a moment) that Kennedy took not only as a challenge to the United States, but a calculated personal test to which he replied by devoting his inaugural address almost entirely to foreign policy.37
What did all these signals mean? Why did Khrushchev send them? The full story will probably never be known. But it seems clear that Khrushchev's eagerness was real, and that it had roots in his deteriorating political situation at home. Not that the Soviet leader's formal political power was threatened; all the evidence (of which there isn't very much) suggests that Khrushchev's colleagues in the Politburo were still content to follow his lead, some even slavishly so, in 1960-1961. But Khrushchev's authority, that intangible mandate to rule made up in large part of personal prestige built on successes at home and abroad, was unravelling. Domestic failures, particularly of agricultural policies with which he was personally identified, were mounting up. And in foreign policy, which Khrushchev had counted on to make up for domestic setbacks, his repeated failures to settle the German problem, or to score some compensating triumph in another field, were impossible to ignore. This is not to say that Khrushchev's foreign policy was entirely a function of his internal problems; his insistence on solving the Berlin problem clearly reflected, among other things, the hemorrhaging of refugees from East Germany which threatened the stability of the DDR. Nor is it to say that Khrushchev was desperate enough to accept any deal the Americans might have offered; indeed, making the wrong kind of concessions to Washington would do him more harm than good. What he did need, I believe, was the right sort of diplomatic movement, that is, the credible appearance of progress toward a resolution of the German and Berlin situations on something resembling Soviet terms.
If this is what Khrushchev wanted, Kennedy did not get the message. Instead, he got another signal that the Soviet leader had not intended—in response to which JFK took steps that provoked Khrushchev. That January 6, 1961 speech of Khrushchev's, along with Kennedy's agitated reaction to it, helped set the vicious circle in motion. Khrushchev was reporting to the Soviet people on a unity statement adopted by 81 Communist parties meeting in Moscow in November 1960. He could not reveal that the statement was a compromise papering over widening Sino-Soviet differences of which the world knew relatively little, nor that some of the passages that most alarmed Kennedy were partly designed to promote detente. The Soviet leader's seeming certainty that Communism was riding the crest, that the imperialists were in retreat, that while world war and local wars must be avoided, "wars of national liberation" could safely be supported by the USSR—these sentiments were real, but they were also a way of restating Khrushchev's long-standing argument that the world was safe for peaceful coexistence, a cause which Khrushchev endorsed at some length in the same speech.38

Should Kennedy be blamed for failing to comprehend Khrushchev's situation and the signals that reflected it? How could JFK possibly have understood what the Soviet leader went to great lengths to obscure? The case against basing American policy on speculation about the secret politics of the Kremlin or the hidden messages in Soviet speeches is a powerful one, even though American intelligence analysts had a suprisingly good
gauge on Khrushchev's dilemma, as well as on the story behind his January 6 speech. What perhaps can be said is that in his determination to set a virile, new tone to American policy, Kennedy seized on a seemingly threatening speech that was ambiguous in its message, and underrated a string of private messages that was remarkable in its scope and intensity. Actually, the offending Khrushchev speech only added to the incoming administration's conviction that the U.S. needed to demonstrate strength and resolve to the Russians. Although the alleged missile gap in the Soviets' favor, which the Democrats had used against the Republicans in the 1960 campaign, was already in doubt, Kennedy launched a vast strategic, conventional, and even unconventional arms build-up. As early as March 28, 1961, when JFK asked Congress for an extra $650 million for defense, and later in May, when he requested even more, the Soviets knew they were up against it. For unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviet intercontinental missile force, which some American experts had once projected to be as great as 2000 by 1962, in fact numbered a grand total of four.39

To make matters worse, from Khrushchev's point of view, the administration had barely begun to reply to the Soviet leader's repeated calls for serious, private talks. It was only when U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson returned to the the USSR in March, after consultations in Washington, that he reported Kennedy's considered reaction to Khrushchev's many messages. Moreover, what Thompson reported, especially on the most pressing issue of Germany and Berlin, was not at all what Khrushchev wanted to
hear. According to Schlesinger, Khrushchev had earlier indicated to Thompson that "he had made commitments about Berlin, his prestige was engaged, and he had waited long enough." Thompson, who recognized Khrushchev's situation better than most, had proposed an American course of action that took it into account. Thompson did not advocate caving in to Khrushchev, and he explicitly opposed appeasing the Soviet leader out of a fear that any alternative leader would be worse. Thompson proposed that the Western powers provide Moscow with just enough movement on the German question to save Khrushchev's face; specifically, he suggested an interim Berlin solution that improved Western access to the city, plus an Anglo-American declaration (similar to one DeGaulle had made on his own) reassuring the Soviets on German frontiers, plus a 7 to 10 year deferral of further steps toward German reunification.

Such a proposal was open to the obvious counter-argument that it was better to let Khrushchev stew in his own dilemma than reward him with concessions. There was no guarantee that Thompson's package would have satisfied the Kremlin. It might only have increased Khrushchev's diplomatic appetite, along with his confidence that the U.S. could be pressured into satisfying it. There would have been howls from Konrad Adenauer and a political price to pay in Washington. In any event, Kennedy did not follow Thompson's advice. It is not even clear that the ambassador had a formal position on Berlin to report when he finally caught up with Khrushchev on March 10, 1961 in Siberia (where the peripatetic leader was on one of his many agricultural
tours). Kennedy did, of course, have something to say about Berlin and Germany when he met Khrushchev at the summit in Vienna in early June, but by that time it was in response to a new Soviet ultimatum: either sign a German peace treaty or the USSR would sign one alone, thus cancelling Western occupation rights and establishing West Berlin as a "free city" with access to it controlled by the East German regime. By this time, Kennedy had concluded that Moscow was trying "to neutralize West Germany as a first step in the neutralization of Western Europe." So that when Khrushchev tried to bully the young President at Vienna (not, it should be added, an unusual tactic but only par for the Soviet leader's course), Kennedy was more worried than ever that Khrushchev would underestimate his nerve, more determined than ever to demonstrate his resolve.

Following Vienna, Khrushchev stepped up the pressure even more. On June 22, the twentieth anniversary of Hitler's attack on the USSR, Khrushchev warned that the imperialists were making the German question into "a test of strength" with the Soviet camp. "You can't bully us, gentlemen," Khrushchev warned on June 28. "A peace treaty will be signed." On July 9, insisting that "we threaten no one," he announced an increase in defense spending along with suspension of previously announced troop cuts. Having tried to browbeat the West into a German settlement by threatening Western rights in Berlin, Khrushchev now insisted that Western defense of those rights threatened him--to which he responded with more threats of his own, all the while denying that he was threatening anyone.
On July 25, declaring that "We cannot and will not permit
the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by
force," President Kennedy called up certain reserve and National
Guard forces, requested an extra $3.25 billion for defense, and
expanded civil defense programs.\textsuperscript{47} Whereupon Khrushchev echoed
Kennedy's warning against appeasement: "If we abandoned our
intention of concluding a peace treaty they would take this as a
strategic breakthrough and would in no time broaden the range of
their demands." "Experience of history teaches this: when an
aggressor sees he is not being rebuffed, he grows more insolent,
and when, on the contrary, he is rebuffed, he calms down."\textsuperscript{48}

Khrushchev himself calmed down only after having carried out
one more coup, the sudden construction of a wall dividing Berlin.
Fearing that there was now "one chance out of five of a nuclear
exchange,"\textsuperscript{49} and lacking ready means to tear down the wall, the
president acquiesced. Since the wall allowed Khrushchev to
achieve his minimum aim in the Berlin crisis--stanching the
embarrassing flow of East German refugees--he was soon prepared
to let the immediate crisis fade away.

Here we cease our account of Soviet-American tensions, even
though the tensions did not cease. Although Khrushchev withdrew
his Berlin ultimatum in October 1961, it seems likely that his
great Cuban gamble was partly designed to advance his German
aims. But the oft-told story of the Cuban missile crisis need
not be retold here in order to compare these cold war case
studies with the situation in 1984.
I have already noted the resemblance between Reagan's and Dulles' views of the Soviet Union. Has there been any current-day counterpart to Dwight Eisenhower who, despite backing Dulles' hard line, could never repress his hope for a meeting of minds with Moscow that would somehow get the world beyond the cold war? Reagan's defenders might insist that he has combined Ike's sincerity with Dulles' rhetoric, while noting as well that he softened his rhetoric in the fall of 1984; others might point first to Alexander Haig, and then to George Shultz as moderating influences at the top. Less important, in any event, than what Americans say has been the Soviets' insistence that the Reagan administration is the most hard-line they have dealt with since World War II.

But if Reagan's anti-Soviet stance has exceeded even Eisenhower's, the constraints on Presidential action have also grown since 1953. Both public opinion and Congress are now much more favorable toward, even insistent on, East-West agreements to reduce the threat of nuclear war, as are the allies. The British, who were more dovish than the Americans in the early 1950's, have been joined by the French and, most important, the West Germans. In the 1950s, Chancellor Adenauer's opposition to talks, except as a forum for demanding reunification of Germany via free elections, loomed large in Washington's calculations. Nowadays, whether its government is led by Social or Christian Democrats, Bonn is as anxious as any ally to get U.S.-Soviet
detente back on the rails.

Until quite recently, these two sets of changes (more militance in the White House, less in the country and the alliance) have tended to cancel each other out. The president might have liked, as he put it in his pre-radio broadcast blooper, to "outlaw the USSR forever," but the Congress and the allies (not to mention the Red Army) haven't let him. The administration may have scared the Soviets enough to get their backs up, but not enough to bring them to their knees. The political strength of the President's opponents has reassured Moscow, but not compelled the administration to offer the Kremlin the basis for an acceptable deal. The approach of the 1984 election seemingly tipped the balance toward talks. Not only did the Reagan administration suddenly become anxious to talk; equally abruptly, the Politburo did too. Which raises the question of whether Moscow will now be willing to reach meaningful agreements with Washington, or whether the Soviets are likely to hunker down once again, or even lash out instead.

The lack of a strong leader like Khrushchev, who had the power and the will to act decisively, argues for Moscow's venturing neither the kind of concessions Reagan has demanded, nor the sort of adventures that would provoke Washington. Despite the Soviets' best efforts to obscure the current succession struggle, it seems tamer than that which followed Stalin's death, partly because the leaders have learned that internecine warfare can do damage to their cause, and also because the contenders have been lesser figures personally as
well as politically. Still, the jockeying has been sufficiently intense to demand foreign policy caution once again. The leaders recognize their need for detente but dare not pay too high a price for it. They would have liked to face down Reagan in one of the many areas he arrogantly (as they see it) declared vital to American interests, but that would also be too dicey. A latter-day Khrushchev might indulge both these instincts at the same time by saying to the Americans, as Adam Ulam once summarized his approach, "Be my friend or I'll break your neck." But the current collective leadership, which seems likely to remain in power into 1985, will almost certainly prove more patient and polite than Nikita Sergeevich in the 1960-1961 winter of his discontent. It will doubtless explore possibilities, along the lines of Gromyko's September 1984 talks with Shultz and Reagan, but it will insist that Washington ante up more than Reagan has offered so far.

For the Soviets will be fortified by their sense that the international correlation of forces has altered dramatically in their favor since the 1950s. Militarily, the gain is greatest and most unambiguous. From painful strategic nuclear inferiority in 1953, the Soviets have reached parity, at the least. Combined with their long-standing conventional military advantage around the USSR's vast periphery (which includes so much of the world), this strategic gain gives the Soviets the right, as they see it, to "equality and identical security" with the United States. The Reagan administration's apparent non-recognition of this right has galled the Soviets all the more by implying that their
hard-earned gains have produced so little fruit. The Soviets will drive a hard bargain even when they confront an administration more receptive to their call for renewed detente. If anyone in Washington thinks that the U.S.-Soviet relationship of the early 1970s can be easily recreated, he is mistaken. Why should Moscow accept now what it settled for then--especially since, in its view, the Americans welshed on their promises in the past?

The overall balance of power includes economic and political dimensions in which Moscow has not done nearly as well as it has militarily. Economically, the USSR is significantly weaker than the United States. In absolute terms they are way ahead of where they were in 1953, and that applies to the standard of living, too, although it remains embarrassingly low. But even the Kremlin's relentlessly up-beat leaders must feel more than a little discouraged. They know enough to avoid Khrushchev-like promises (e.g., to catch up and overtake American agricultural output in a few short years), but they must also envy Khrushchev his optimism even as they avoid his errors. Soviet economic troubles, along with East European problems, plus the need to avoid a two-front cold war with China and the West, all provide ample motive for a renewal of detente. But political as well as military strengths will offer other options.

That the Soviet model has lost its luster in the eyes of its own people as well as around the world, constitutes a serious political setback. But if the Russians have proved less effective at making friends than Khrushchev, for one, hoped they
would be, they have done rather well at influencing people, especially those impressed by military power and strength. Some Americans may derive comfort from the fact that the Soviets have been thrown out of such places as Egypt and Somalia, but to a veteran like Gromyko, who remembers how isolated Moscow was when Stalin died, the more impressive fact by far is that the Soviets were in Egypt and Somalia in the first place and that they retain many other forward positions of which Stalin could only dream. Given their increased strength, the Soviets ought to be more relaxed about their security, and thus willing either to reach an accommodation with a reelected Reagan or to wait him out for another four years. But the same strength offers possibilities, not available in 1953 or even 1961, for countering American pressure with Soviet pressure as a befits a superpower which now feels truly equal and insists on being treated that way.

What all this means is that Washington is not solely or even mainly responsible for the Soviet hunkering down, but insofar as the U.S. can shape Soviet behavior, the Reagan emphasis on harsh rhetoric and rearmament has promoted Kremlin abstention from both productive talks and dangerous adventures. The American strategy that holds out the best hope for fostering a constructive Soviet–American relationship is to marry strength and resolve with a determination to explore such possibilities for accommodation as the situation in Moscow allows. In some ways, President Reagan has been ideally equipped to deploy carrot and stick in this way. With right wing support, and with a weakened opposition on the left, he credibly threatened just the sort of
unpleasantness the Kremlin would pay a price to avoid. But for too long, the President asked too high a price. A reduced price, plus the addition of some positive inducements, must tempt the Soviets. For agreements entered into by Reagan would have the virtue, in Soviet eyes, of having a good chance to get through Congress (Moscow's assumption being that liberal legislators would support them in any event but that conservatives would not without some persuasion by the White House).

All this suggests that the current Soviet leadership may yet prove to be more disposed to agreements with the United States than its predecessors were in 1953-1954. But if so, will they also communicate their favorable disposition more clearly than Khrushchev did in 1961? Unless the Politburo fulfills both these conditions, and unless its American partner in the White House musters a more effective combination of strength, flexibility and discernment than in 1953 and 1961, then the prospect for avoiding pitfalls of the past in the future is not very bright.
Footnotes


6. These exchanges are chronicled and documented in *ibid*, pp. 42-112.


32. Harriman letter to Kennedy, November 15, 1960, Kennedy Library.


41. American Embassy in Moscow telegrams, nos. 1839 (February 4, 1961), and 22099 (March 16, 1961), Kennedy Library.

42. CBS News so reported on the basis of a leak that greatly disturbed the State Department--as reported in State Department telegram, no. 1518 (March 17, 1961), and Moscow Embassy telegram, no. 2219 (March 18, 1961), Kennedy Library.


