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As distributed by the Council, each individual report will contain this Preface, the Contents, the Editor's Introduction for the pertinent division (I, II, or III) of the volume, and the separate paper itself.
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I. Trends in Soviet Society

The non-coercive aspects of social control in the Soviet Union have comprised a very strong leitmotif in Vera Dunham's work throughout her career. Most evident in her pioneering work, *In Stalin's Time*, her focus on state-society interaction has also been apparent in numerous scholarly articles and lectures. Professor Dunham has used the phrase "Big Deal" to describe one important use of positive social control under Stalin.

The Big Deal refers to the Soviet regime's tacit alliance with the new "middle class" of engineers, administrators, and managers who were vital to the rebuilding effort after World War II. Rather than relying on coercion, as might be expected in the aftermath of the Great Purges of the 1930s, the regime tried a new tack. This amounted to an accommodation of the personal, materialistic longings of this group of people whose expertise and skills were in critical demand. The goal of the Big Deal was to garner support of these experts and administrators by offering the incentives they wanted most: housing, consumer goods, and leisure time. The conversion of these private aspirations to acceptable public values was the key component of the Big Deal.

While Professor Dunham's analysis of the Big Deal has been confined to the postwar period, the use of accommodation by the regime to deal with the middle class was evident already in the mid-late 1930s and extended well beyond the immediate postwar years. This characteristic of the Soviet system tends to go unnoticed, however, especially in studies of the Stalinist era. Recent refer-
ences to the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire" have also clouded the existence of other than the negative aspects of social control. However, as the revolutionary ethos recedes further into the background, the use of positive levers to attain many economic and social goals has become more important. Paradoxically, positive, materialistic levers have been used to bolster the political stability of a political system whose very legitimacy is based upon a radical restructuring of society. A thorough examination of the implications of this paradox, an examination continued in the essays that follow, is Professor Dunham's primary contribution to the study of Soviet society.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews the information available on the uses of leisure time in urban, post-Stalin Russia, with emphasis on the stability of its patterns over time, and concludes that its usual portrayal as evidence of social problems has been exaggerated.

What Russians do when they can do what they want is associated, of course, with other characteristics of Soviet society. To say that urban Russians exhibit in their leisure activity a strong preference for informal and spontaneous interaction is merely to confirm longstanding views on Russian personality and values. It is more significant, though perhaps not surprising, that those leisure values have persisted despite wrenching social changes; crash industrialization and rapid urbanization is less than a universal solvent. It is also noteworthy that traditional leisure values have persisted in the face of regime efforts to tame them; leisure behavior remains autonomous, and since the realm of leisure has expanded so has the realm of personal autonomy. What merits emphasis in the present context, however, is not the possible political implications of
leisure behavior—these implications are mostly of the regime's own making—but the cultural conflict that is involved in the Soviet effort to subdue, and in the Soviet and Western academic study of, traditional leisure culture.

Soviet sociologists and regime spokesmen want to change popular leisure behavior not just for utilitarian reasons, but also because of cultural bias. In a revealing remark, the eminent Soviet sociologist Boris Grushin complained that the traditional leisure culture ignores "vitally important elements of culture, lacking which one cannot conceive of the development of the human spirit," and he gave as examples participation in sports, visiting museums, attending concerts and literary readings, participation in the amateur arts, and hobbies. The even more eminent Gordon and Klopov object not only to traditional leisure culture, but also to the modern mass culture, which provides increasingly standardized leisure activities that "reduce the level of people's creative activity" and distort their "personal development"; they refer specifically to the "alloyed, simplified, even pseudo-culture" that dominates Soviet TV.

That sort of culture criticism can be found in all modern societies. As summarized by Herbert Gans, Western high culture criticism makes four charges: popular culture has a negative effect on society by debasing the general level of culture; it harms its audience by providing spurious and perhaps emotionally damaging gratification; it damages high culture by diverting creativity from high to low culture; and it is undesirable because it is mass-produced by profit-minded entrepreneurs. Soviet sociologists and culture critics make precisely the same charges against Soviet popular culture—even that producers of cultural goods, such as the record company "Melodiia", ignore high culture and pander to the popular
taste in quest of the consumer ruble, and that concert managers slight classical performers in favor of more profitable popular music.\textsuperscript{43} Surely Gordon and Klopov must have been distraught to learn that the Soviet TV classic, "A nu-ka, devushki" (amateur hour for working girls), was kept on the air not just because of its extraordinary popularity, but also because a survey found that watching the girls perform helped young viewers choose their future careers.\textsuperscript{44} We can add that Soviet intellectuals who speak of the degeneration of the village and of traditional Russian culture follow in the footsteps of Western culture critics who contrast pristine folk culture with debased mass culture.

We are overly inclined to accept the judgements of the Soviet Grushins for objective assessments of the state of Soviet leisure culture; Grushin's values are, after all, values that most of us think we share.\textsuperscript{45} But in fact the "problems" of Soviet popular leisure culture are problems in large part because we so define them. It is indicative, for example, that although there is good evidence for the association of crime and drink in Soviet society, the only published statistical correlation casts doubt on the supposition that rising per capita consumption of alcohol is associated with a rising crime rate: while per capita consumption of alcohol increased steadily in Taganrog during the 1960's, arrests for hooliganism and drunkeness did not increase. Yet so strong is the high culture bias against traditional drinking patterns that the Soviet sociologists who provide the statistics nevertheless assert that increased drinking--indeed, the very persistence of unreformed traditional leisure culture--spawns anti-social conduct.\textsuperscript{46}

The Taganrog statistics may well be unrepresentative or distorted, and they certainly cannot be used to build a case for the
independence of the crime rate from the drinking rate. It is obviously true that excessive drinking—if only we could define excessive—is a personal and familial problem, that deaths from alcohol poisoning have increased, and that rising alcohol consumption has a negative impact on economic performance. Leisure behavior may be socially and economically dysfunctional—but the conclusion that this is so is unsupported until the personal good of drinking for pleasure is assigned a value that can be compared with the economic bad of reduced labor productivity. In any case, we should remember that increased alcohol consumption need not translate into increased drunkenness or alcoholism, or necessarily mean that social distress is increasing—unless we insist that the drinker's stubborn refusal to do something more elevated with his time is itself a social problem. Similarly, the propensity to walk about rather than go to movies and theaters need not mean that facilities are lacking, the shows dull, or the walkers dim (there is reasonably good evidence that the lack of facilities is not the problem it is assumed to be), it may only mean that progulki are the preferred activity—and why shouldn't they be? There is no reason to deny urban Russians the right to a leisure culture of their own choice, no reason to require that they conform to our own cultural values, no reason to mistake pastimes for problems.
The temptation to diagnose the ills of a society from its leisure behavior is strong. At one time or another guardians of public morality have denounced dancing, drinking, pulp literature, TV, and video games for exciting base passions or inducing stupor, for generating deviance or producing conformity. Social critics, appalled that so few share their high-culture tastes, have seen in popular pastimes the impending doom of true civilization. Even (or should that be especially?) sociologists project their own values into the study of leisure behavior: Western sociologists detect an increasing "privatization" of Soviet leisure, Soviet sociologists speak of increasing social engagement, and both point to the prominence of television in Soviet leisure time budgets to support their judgements. If Western and Soviet sociologists endorse, for different reasons, Soviet TV, they are more inclined the find fault with ordinary leisure pursuits, and they generally agree on which activities are undesirable—drinking, hanging out on the streets, and so forth. But, the force of personal and social values being what it is, they trace these undesirable activities to quite different sources. Soviet sociologists, for instance, view drinking as evidence of an as yet underdeveloped capacity to use leisure productively—a penalty for Russia's historic backwardness. Western commentators see drinking as a response to current social distress, one more piece of evidence with which to indict Soviet society.

No doubt leisure behavior does tell us something about the temper
of society at large. However, historical analysis of leisure activities in urban Russia discloses that leisure preferences of today are determined less by the current condition of society than by the preferences of yesterday. Urban Russia entered the 1950's with a leisure culture—a stable configuration of leisure activities—that was relatively homogeneous and had changed little since the early 20th century. During the 1950's and 1960's a number of distinct leisure subcultures emerged, but among the present species of leisure culture that which is descended most directly from the traditional genus remains in many ways preeminent. Urban leisure culture has changed, but more slowly than Soviet society—the distinguishing features of urban Russian leisure culture are its stability and relative autonomy, not its variability. It may be that the lag between social and leisure change constitutes a social problem, in the form of traditional behavior inappropriate to the smooth functioning of modern urban society. But that is a very different conclusion than one which links current leisure behavior directly to social ills. It may also be, however, that the problems sociologists identify with leisure behavior are evidence less of the condition of Soviet—or any other—society than of the sociologists’ own high-culture bias.

Traditional urban leisure activities derived from peasant culture, and peasant leisure involved primarily personal interaction with other peasants. The extent and forms of this interaction were age-, gender- and season-specific, but there were two basic modes of companionship: visiting in homes, and gathering on village streets and outside the village. The precise activities in cottage and street were less important than the simple fact of personal interaction. Relatively unstructured leisure activity shaded into relatively structured socializing associated with seasonal (and religious)
rituals linked to the agricultural cycle.  

In the cities, too, informal personal interaction was the basis of prerevolutionary leisure culture, but urbanites more clearly differentiated leisure from non-leisure activity than did peasants. Those who had roots in the city were more likely than peasants, or recent peasant migrants, to make space for leisure recreations. For peasants, leisure other than that associated with seasonal rituals was a residual; work was a continuum stretching from labor in the fields to puttering in hut or garden, leisure was the time when further work was impossible. The urban style was to assign a value to leisure time, to reduce puttering, and to increase recreation. Strumilin's time-budget studies of the early 1920's captured by implication the difference between urban and rural attitudes toward leisure. On an annual basis, peasants spent less time on work and work-related activities than did urban workers, but they also spent 70 percent less time on recreation. Male peasants spent about 65 percent, and female peasants over 500 percent, more time on "inactive rest" than male and female workers. And male peasants spent 150 percent more time "unaccounted for" than male workers. Strumilin attributed the latter difference to the slow pace of routine peasant labor, which involved frequent pauses (he counted time spent moving from one task to another under working time). Peasants evinced little inclination either to maximize non-working time or to exploit that time for recreation. On the other hand, the urban work schedule—with the day partitioned into distinct blocks of working and non-working time—facilitated the emergence of attitudes that underlay the urban leisure culture. 

There was also a slight difference in the substance of prerevolutionary urban and rural leisure. Visiting still consumed much leisure time in the city, but the street—broadly construed—was
more important than in the village. This was due in part simply to the expansion of leisure activity, which spilled increasingly out of the house, in part to the greater entertainment value of city streets. Yet most activities on city streets did not differ much in principle from activities on village streets: drinking, cards and other games, or simply walking around, were the basic forms of urban out-of-home recreation. All of these activities are covered by the Russian term "progulka," and the range of meanings associated with the word guliat' (to walk about) and its derivatives testifies to the central role of the street in traditional Russian leisure culture. Guliat' may refer to courting and to premarital or extra-marital sex; it can mean goofing off, skipping work, getting drunk, or—most broadly of all—having a good time. Traditional urban leisure activities, in short, involved primarily indoor visiting (obshchenie) and outdoor personal interaction (progulki).

Such was the state of leisure culture in urban Russia as of the early 20th century, and such it remained into the era of the time-budget study. Strumilin's data on worker leisure activities in 1923-24 indicate that progulki (the term he used) and obshchenie ("visiting friends," "entertaining guests") accounted for 67 percent of the time spent on recreation (exclusive of reading*) by male workers, 83 percent of the recreation time of female workers; if we count the time

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* Strumilin itemized time spent reading (newspapers, books, magazines) under "study and self-education." The time employed males spent reading during the (winter) week was greater than the time they spent on what Strumilin counts as recreations (8.9 hours vs. 8.18 hours). Employed women and housewives spent much less time reading than they did on other leisure activities—2.25 hours and 1.03 hours, vs. 5.58 hours and 6.38 hours, respectively. Given the drive for worker education in the 1920's, it is not clear how much of this reading should be assigned to leisure activity. For men, at least, much reading must have been a genuine leisure activity, so that the dominance of progulki and obshchenie in male leisure is not so great as Strumilin's system of classification would indicate. However, reading was a part of urban leisure culture from at least the late 19th century.
male workers spent on chess, checkers and cards—frequently outdoor activities associated with *progulki*—we have accounted for 82 percent of their recreation. Workers spent little time dancing, hunting, participating in sports, singing, playing musical instruments, or going to movies, theaters, bars or buffets. Interestingly, workers spent almost as much time doing nothing (*besdeiatel'nyi otdykh*) as they spent on classifiable recreations. One suspects that much of this inactive leisure would have been spent on the street had Strumilin not conducted his survey in the winter. Strumilin did not itemize the leisure activities of white collar workers (*sluzhashchie*)—ranging in his sample from petty clerks to high office functionaries—but the distribution of the time they spent within broad categories (recreation, inactive rest, etc.) is so similar to the distribution for workers that there is no reason to doubt that white collar and blue collar leisure activities were similar.

Secondary school pupils 15 and older—surveyed at the same time as the workers and surely bound, most of them, for white collar careers—spent 81 percent of their leisure time on *progulki* and *obshchenie*, almost identical to the rate for workers. There was a difference between student and worker leisure, but it was generational: while workers spent almost twice as much time socializing in the home as on the street, students spent almost three times as long socializing on the street as in the home.5 But the traditional recreations taken together bulked equally large in all substantial urban social groups.

The forced industrialization that began in the late 1920's altered Russian society and the lives of the urban classes in countless ways, but had no impact at all on urban leisure behavior. The data from time budget studies of urban workers carried out in 1930, at the beginning of the industrialization drive, do not permit
us to isolate in-home visiting and activities on the street from other recreations, but the gross data is at least compatible with a presumption of the continued predominance of these traditional leisure activities. That this is more than a presumption is confirmed by the fragmentary published data of a time-budget study carried out in 1936, which reveals that workers were spending somewhat more time, both absolutely and proportionately, on "meetings with friends, entertaining guests, dancing and other such recreations"--the traditional progulki and obshchenie--than they had before (see Table I). After 1936, time-budget research shared the fate of all Soviet statistical analysis--a generation passed before the next study was conducted in 1957. The time-budget studies of the late 1950's were few and inadequate, but if statistical evidence is lacking there is abundant impressionistic evidence that during the 1950's urbanites from all walks of life sought entertainment and relaxation on the street, just as they had in the 1930's, the 1920's, and before the Revolution.

There were good reasons for the stability of urban leisure culture into the 1950's. First, the work week increased and available leisure time declined during the 1930's and 1940's, with leisure time remaining substantially below the level of the 1920's until 1960. Second, because peasant migrants accounted for the bulk of urban growth into the 1950's the modal social background of the urban population remained constant. While such social indices as educational level improved, they remained quite low: as of 1939, only 22 percent of the urban population over age 10 had better than a primary education. Third, the regime did little that might have changed the leisure behavior of the urban population; exhortations to acquire "culture" were numerous, the wherewithall for acquiring it
scarce. However, this is not so important as it may appear to be: there is scant indication that there was a substantial repressed demand for other kinds of leisure activity, or even—as so often asserted—that overcrowded housing was responsible for putting leisure on the street. The urban population passed its leisure time in a way that it considered natural and appropriate.

That hanging out on the street was (and still is) felt to be a desirable recreation by all age-groups merits reiteration, because the motivation for progulki has been so frequently misunderstood. Virtually every non-Russian who has commented on post-war leisure behavior has asserted that Russians spend time on the street because they have nowhere else to spend it, housing being too overcrowded to afford privacy. This, surely, is a culturally biased perception: since non-Russian observers would not themselves willingly seek recreation on the streets, they have explained Russian behavior in terms appropriate to their own national (and middle class) cultures. However, asked in 1963 how leisure time could best be improved (two choices could be given), only 7.3 percent of the respondents to a Soviet national survey mentioned better housing and "bytovye usloviia" (which would include public services and the urban infrastructure); the most frequent responses were more free time (45.3 percent) and more facilities for leisure activities (33.6 percent). While housing was certainly less crowded in the mid-1960's than in the mid-1950's, it still fell far short of Western norms and would have been considered a serious obstacle to desire leisure activity in the West—but that simply was not the case for Russians, who spend leisure time on the street as a matter of choice. A 1965 poll of 4,000 young employed persons (workers and professionals) in Leningrad found that the second most desired leisure activity was progulki; spending time
at home or visiting friends and relatives—traditional obshchenie—ranked first. Behavior conformed to stated preference, because "the majority of young men and women spend a large part of their free time in the courtyards and streets."  

Despite the continued vitality of the traditional leisure culture, since the 1950's there have been substantial changes in the factors influencing leisure behavior. The time available for leisure has expanded. By 1960 the 48-hour, 6-day work week had given way to the 41-hour, 6-day week, this expanding free time—the time left after work and work-related activities, physiological requirements, and housework—by about 20 percent (and raising it somewhat above the level of the early 1920's). By the end of the 1960's the 40-hour, 5-day week had become standard, this resulting in another 15 percent increase in free time. Simultaneously, disposable income rose, the quantity and quality of housing and services increased, the average level of education rose, and the proportion of peasant migrants in the urban population rose rapidly.  

These and other environmental changes have had a major impact on leisure activities, both by increasing the time available for leisure activities and by providing the social and material base for a new leisure culture. Soviet sociologists have reported with pride a great expansion of book-reading, theater- and movie-going, and participation in sports and the amateur arts during the 1950's and 1960's.  

SEE TABLE I pp. 9-10

There are, of course, no relevant (or competent) studies of leisure activity between the mid-1930's and the late-1950's, but the expansion of non-traditional leisure activities cannot be plausibly located in any period other than the late 1950's or thereafter. The fragmentary evidence at hand suggests that the introduction of
TABLE I

LEISURE ACTIVITIES OF WORKERS (MALES AND FEMALES) IN MAJOR
CITIES IN EUROPEAN (except in 1961) USSR (hours per week)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reading newspapers</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reading books and magazines</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV, radio</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>film, theater, and other public performances</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amateur arts and hobbies</td>
<td>...3</td>
<td>...3</td>
<td>...3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exercise, sports, hunting, fishing and out-of-town excursions</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meetings with friends, visiting, dances and similar recreations (NB: including progulki)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1The figures for 1961 were not calculated by the same method as the figures for the other years and are generally less reliable; they are included only for the sake of gross comparisons. (The figures for 1961 apparently include time spent by all employed persons, rather than by workers alone.)

2Estimate provided by the source.

3The figures for this item are lumped together with study in 1923/24 and 1961; no data is provided for 1936.

4Includes time spent at the beach.

5Includes the following categories: dancing, singing, playing musical instruments (0.2); visiting (1.4); domestic games (1.3); and one half of "other" (1.7). The latter is included because Petrosian (perhaps because he is Armenian) provides no figure for progulki or their equivalent. On Petrosian's arbitrary exclusion of "purposeless" activity from free time (and therefore from leisure), see note 9. Including only half of his figure for "other" activities is in fact conservative.

COVERAGE

1923/24: Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Kostroma, Vladimir, Brianak, Ekaterinoslav, Tula, Tambov, Simbirsk, Arkhangel'sk.

1936: Moscow, Rostov, Novorossiisk, Groznyi, Krasnodar, Iaroslavl', Viatka, Sormova, Orel, Murom, Novgorod, Maikop.


1963: Gorkii, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Ivanovo.

1965-68: Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozh'e, Odessa, Kostroma.

1967-70: Taganrog.
10.

SOURCES

1961: G.S. Petrosian, Vnerebochee vremia trudiashchikhia v SSSR, M., 1965, p. 162. The figures are presumably based on weighted averages (which Petrosian employed for other composite statistics).

All other years: L.A. Gordon, E.V. Klopol, L.A. Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticcheskogo obraza zhizni: byt gorodskikh rabochikh vchera, segodnia i zavtra, M., 14-16, 149. The statistics from the sources on which the authors draw have been recomputed to reflect the structure of the work force in the years surveyed.
the 7-hour work-day in 1959-60 triggered a substantial increase in non-traditional activities, the social base for that increasing having taken shape in the preceding decade. Workers at a Moscow tire factory, for instance, responded to the one-hour reduction of the work-day by spending 30 percent more time on movies, 20 percent more time on TV, 18 percent more time on sports, and 23 percent more time on reading (other than newspapers). Those increases were so dramatic that one suspects they were due partly to the well-known effect of desired activity increasing when a group knows that it is being studied. However, approximately the same findings were reported from a comparison of leisure activities of Moscow factory employees in 1958 and 1961, while miscellaneous figures on the number of readers at libraries, number of newspaper subscriptions, and so forth (some of the measurements dating from within a few months of the introduction of the 7-hour day) also indicated that the reduction of the work-week in 1959-60 substantially broadened the range of leisure activities.

Soviet researchers saw in the expansion of non-traditional leisure activities the triumph of active over passive recreation, socially-involved over socially-isolated leisure, the New and Cultured Soviet Man over his lamentably uncouth forebearers. In fact, the new leisure did not squeeze out the old. As the more sophisticated Soviet sociologists have noted, there remains a very large segment of the urban population that almost never takes part in the officially preferred leisure activities. As of the early 1970’s—when the flood of time-budget studies ended—there was an 85-90 percent rate of abstention from sports and other physical recreations among young males, and an equally high rate of abstention from the amateur arts by young females; all other groups participated in these activities at an even lower rate. Between 40 and 50 percent of the urban population
had infrequent contact with books and movies and almost never went to the theater. Regular participation in non-traditional leisure activities, in other words, though substantial, is confined to a limited part of the urban population. Rather than the relatively homogeneous leisure culture that persisted into the 1950's, urban Russia now has two distinct leisure cultures. The only non-traditional leisure activity that both leisure publics engage in and which has therefore become nearly universal is watching television—and Soviet commentators are no longer certain that this is a good thing.

Of course, neither the modern nor the traditional leisure cultures are entirely homogeneous. Audience surveys reveal, not surprisingly, that the modern leisure culture consists of a cluster of subcultures. At the very least, there are (to employ terminology from the 1950's) a middle culture and a mass culture, with the mass audience larger than the middle audience. Urban Russians prefer pop concerts to classical music, light theater and musical comedy to "serious" drama, and popular to serious literature; when they watch television they prefer variety shows and made-for-TV movies. We cannot, unfortunately, establish with any precision the configurations of the different non-traditional leisure subcultures, since Soviet sociologists have not attempted to correlate rates of participation in different kinds of leisure activity with each other. For that matter, we cannot establish the size of the modern leisure public, though we do know that it is centered in the college-educated population.

The traditional leisure culture is not monolithic, either, and it has in some ways adapted to the new leisure movement. Soviet ethnographers have pointed out that although there is still a great
deal of guliand in its most venerable forms, for the younger
generation going to clubs and dances has partly supplanted simple (or
not so simple) congregation on the streets, while strolling about
continues to predominate in the progulki of older generations.25 The
difference is, in fact, largely generational. While organized dancing
and club-centered activities have increased, even before the
Revolution young people's progulki included dancing and partying.

Soviet time-budget studies do not reveal the details of the
traditional leisure culture in its present form, because Soviet sociologists dislike progulki—which they take to be unorganized,
largely pointless, and a potential source of anti-social behavior—and they are unhappy about the time taken up by simple visiting. What can be discerned from these studies is nonetheless striking: the time allocated to progulki (broadly construed) and obshochenie has not on average declined since the 1950's—and has declined only slightly since the 1920's—despite the increased time allocated to other leisure activities (see Table I). Groups without a higher education allocate more time to progulki and obshochenie than they do to books and magazines, movies, theater, amateur arts, sports, and other physical recreation taken together. Behind the averages lurks the fact that most of those without a higher education spend most of their leisure time in the traditional manner. While those with a higher education spend appreciably more time on the newer than the traditional leisure activities, they nevertheless participate in traditional recreations almost as frequently as those without a college education.26 Even leisure modernists, in other words, find satisfaction and participate in the traditional leisure culture. Searching for something positive with which to redeem the admitted fact that there is little difference between the character of the progulki and obshochenie of the best and
worst educated workers, Soviet sociologists have asserted that there is now greater freedom of choice in this sort of socializing: less of the traditional association with relatives and neighbors, more association based on mutual interests.\textsuperscript{27} If true, this is in a way a manifestation of "privatization"--not escape from official control, as Western writers would have it, but relaxation of traditional communal controls even as traditional activities continue.

Further evidence of the vitality of the traditional leisure culture is that urban Russians generally did not use the time gained from the introduction of the five-day week in the late 1960's to change their leisure habits. Female workers in Novosibirsk who were put on the 5-day week in 1964 used the extra time to increase substantially their progulki and obshchenie (Table II).

\textit{SEE TABLE II p. 15}

In Taganrog, engineers and technical personnel on a five-day week reduced their book-reading and theater-going, and increased their attendance at sports events.\textsuperscript{28} Some studies indicate greater gains by non-traditional than traditional leisure activities, but the general import of the available statistics is that the extra time did not have much of an impact on the way urban Russians used their leisure.\textsuperscript{29} While it is trivial to conclude that when given extra time Russians do more of what they prefer to do, it is noteworthy that so many genuinely value progulki and obshchenie. Soviet commentators, at least, were appalled at this outcome and were forced to recognize that the strength of the traditional leisure culture lies in its intrinsic appeal--or, as they put it, in the backwardness of traditional leisure tastes.\textsuperscript{30}

Whether their preferences be backward or not, we do not really need studies of leisure time budgets and participation rates to know
TABLE II. USE OF LEISURE BY FEMALE WORKERS AT THE NOVOSIBIRSK COTTON COMBINE WORKING 5-DAY AND 6-DAY WEEKS, 1964
(Hours and minutes on the two days off, or the day off and the preceding working day.)

**UNMARRIED WOMEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-day</td>
<td>5-day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio, tv, theater, movies</td>
<td>5-07</td>
<td>4-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>progulki</strong></td>
<td>1-43</td>
<td>1-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visiting</td>
<td>0-00</td>
<td>4-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beach, out-of-town excursions</td>
<td>0-00</td>
<td>0-00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MARRIED WOMEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>radio, tv,</td>
<td>theater,</td>
<td>movies</td>
<td>1-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>progulki</strong></td>
<td>0-12</td>
<td>0-41</td>
<td>0-11</td>
<td>0-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visiting</td>
<td>0-25</td>
<td>1-16</td>
<td>0-38</td>
<td>2-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beach, out-of-town excursions</td>
<td>0-00</td>
<td>0-00</td>
<td>5-22</td>
<td>9-02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that sitting in the kitchen with friends and going for walks appeal to all Russians, or that vodka and boardgames are part of the leisure culture of workers and intellectuals alike. Of course, the reverse is also true: modern leisure activities have to some extent penetrated the traditional leisure culture, though leisure traditionalists frequently use movies, the theater, and TV as new settings for progulki and obshchenie rather than as sources of esthetic culture. It is interesting to learn, for instance, that in the early 1960's fully 31 percent of the small group in Sverdlovsk w—a preferred the theater to movies did so because the theater provided greater contact with the rest of the audience and a more festive atmosphere.31. The two leisure cultures are quite different, but the barrier between them is permeable.

Traditional leisure culture has done more than endure, it has also expanded into social and temporal vacuums. Since the early 1960's, for instance, there has been a concerted official effort to develop new civic rituals and festivals—"aktivnoe prazdnikotvorchestvo," as two Soviet ethnographers put it.32 The purpose of prazdnikotvorchestvo is clear: to effect social control and social integration through rituals and festivals that are themselves not overtly utilitarian. It is easy to dismiss the many days—the day of the miner, the day of the tractor driver—and the ceremonies associated with the first paycheck, being drafted, getting a passport, and so on, as so many pro forma exercises, of little emotional appeal to those who must go through them. On the other hand, the initiative for some of the new festivals seems to have come in part from Soviet citizens themselves. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, people in some industrial cities in the Urals began organizing, on a neighborhood basis, posidelki and prazdniki ulitsy
(akin to sewing bees and block parties). From the evidence reported it appears that citizen initiative preceded sponsorship by local officials, that these events were barely modified versions of traditional leisure activities, and that they were genuinely popular. It may also have been the case that it was this popular desire to recover old leisure traditions—just when leisure time was considerably augmented, be it noted—that stimulated official praznikotvorchestvo. Furthermore, some of the major new civic festivals that seem to enjoy genuine popularity—the mid-winter Praznik russkoi zimy and the spring Praznik russkoi berezki—are modified versions of traditional festivals such as maslenitsa (carnival) and involve traditional narodnoe gulian'e. Inclusion of narodnoe gulian'e, in fact, ensures some popular involvement even in the most artificial of the new festivals. 33

If traditional popular preferences and official desiderata partly coincide on the matter of neighborhood and public festivities, other features of the traditional leisure culture are deeply troubling to Soviet officialdom. Drinking, for instance, is a part of traditional leisure culture, in particular of kitchen table obshchenie and male progulki. 34 And drinking has increased as rapidly as the number of new civic festivals. The statistics on alcohol consumption are well known: a Soviet public source and a Soviet dissident source estimate that per capita consumption of alcohol doubled between 1940 and 1960, then doubled again by 1970; Treml's estimate is that urban consumption per capita of those 15 and older increased by about 60 percent between 1957 and 1972. 35

One reason why drinking has increased so rapidly is that since the late 1950's improvements in housing have opened a window of opportunity for male progulki. In the past, men bore the burden of
cutting and hauling wood for the stove (and to a lesser extent, hauling water) and much of the heavy physical household labor, while women tended to cooking and child care. Beginning in the 1950's, male-specific domestic chores declined as a rapidly rising percentage of apartments came equipped with central heating and piped in gas: from almost no housing with gas at the beginning of the 1950's, the proportion of urban housing with gas reached about 1/3 in 1960 and about 2/3 in 1970. Instead of stoking the fire at supper time, men can now drink *na troikh*. A survey in Taganrog in the late 1960's, for instance, found that 8 to 10 percent of all adult males in the city drank on the streets during the evening hours. Precisely which hours of the evening were devoted to drinking is not reported, but the visual evidence from cities farther north is that the heaviest consumption occurs between the end of work and supper.

The conversion to central heating and gas stoves is certainly not the only explanation for increased alcohol consumption. The secular increase in leisure time is also relevant, as is the increase in disposable income. In any case, it is quite as likely that the increase in drinking is the predictable result of rapidly expanding opportunity for indulgence in a traditional leisure activity as that it is an outgrowth of mushrooming despair and anomie. Indeed, given the social characteristics of Russian drinking culture—Russians never drink alone—one might plausibly argue that the increase in consumption of alcohol, however dysfunctional in socio-economic terms, is a good index of an increase in social intercourse and perhaps, inferentially, of pleasure.

The foregoing outline of the development of leisure culture in urban Russia has left some important assumptions unexamined, and has ignored nuances that become apparent when one looks at age-specific
and gender-specific variation in leisure behavior. A more
discriminating analysis would also reveal flux where I have stressed
stability. The wall-to-wall fistfight disappeared from urban lower
class leisure culture in the 1920's, while dominoes have increased in
popularity since the 1920's. The recent surge in auto tourism and
hobbies (khobbi entered the Russian language in the mid-1960's) merit
examination. Finally, westernisms have invaded both traditional and
non-traditional leisure culture, and their impact should be assessed.
In sum, the analysis is not exhaustive and does not take all of the
ingredients of post-Stalin leisure culture into account. Yet the
principal landmarks in the history of urban leisure culture are so
prominent that no amount of qualification would obscure them: the
traditional leisure culture—based on progulki and obshchenie—
was unrivalled until the 1950's; substantial differentiation began in
the late 1950's; but the traditional leisure culture is still vital
and in some ways expanding.

What Russians do when they can do what they want is associated,
of course, with other characteristics of Soviet society. To say that
urban Russians exhibit in their leisure activity a strong preference
for informal and spontaneous interaction is merely to confirm
longstanding views on Russian personality and values. It is more
significant, though perhaps not surprising, that these leisure values
have persisted despite wrenching social changes; crash
industrialization and rapid urbanization is less than a universal
solvent. It is also noteworthy that traditional leisure values have
persisted in the face of regime efforts to tame them; leisure behavior
remains autonomous, and since the realm of leisure has expanded so has
the realm of personal autonomy. What merits emphasis in the present
context, however, is not the possible political implications of
leisure behavior--these implications are mostly of the regime's own making--but the cultural conflict that is involved in the Soviet effort to subdue, and in the Soviet and Western academic study of, traditional leisure culture.

Soviet sociologists and regime spokesmen want to change popular leisure behavior not just for utilitarian reasons, but also because of cultural bias. In a revealing remark, the eminent Soviet sociologist Boris Grushin complained that the traditional leisure culture ignores "vitaly important elements of culture, lacking which one cannot conceive of the development of the human spirit," and he gave as examples participation in sports, visiting museums, attending concerts and literary readings, participation in the amateur arts, and hobbies. The even more eminent Gordon and Klopov object not only to traditional leisure culture, but also to the modern mass culture, which provides increasingly standardized leisure activities that "reduce the level of people's creative activity" and distort their "personal development"; they refer specifically to the "alloyed, simplified, even pseudo-culture" that dominates Soviet TV. That sort of culture criticism can be found in all modern societies. As summarized by Herbert Gans, Western high culture criticism makes four charges: popular culture has a negative effect on society by debasing the general level of culture; it harms its audience by providing spurious and perhaps emotionally damaging gratification; it damages high culture by diverting creativity from high to low culture; and it is undesirable because it is mass-produced by profit-minded entrepreneurs. Soviet sociologists and culture critics make precisely the same charges against Soviet popular culture--even that producers of cultural goods, such as the record company "Melodiia", ignore high culture and pander to the popular
taste in quest of the consumer ruble, and that concert managers slight classical performers in favor of more profitable popular music.\textsuperscript{43} Surely Gordon and Kloпов must have been distraught to learn that the Soviet TV classic, "A nu-ka, девушки" (amateur hour for working girls), was kept on the air not just because of its extraordinary popularity, but also because a survey found that watching the girls perform helped young viewers choose their future careers.\textsuperscript{44} We can add that Soviet intellectuals who speak of the degeneration of the village and of traditional Russian culture follow in the footsteps of Western culture critics who contrast pristine folk culture with debased mass culture.

We are overly inclined to accept the judgements of the Soviet Grushins for objective assessments of the state of Soviet leisure culture; Grushin's values are, after all, values that most of us think we share.\textsuperscript{45} But in fact the "problems" of Soviet popular leisure culture are problems in large part because we so define them. It is indicative, for example, that although there is good evidence for the association of crime and drink in Soviet society, the only published statistical correlation casts doubt on the supposition that rising per capita consumption of alcohol is associated with a rising crime rate: while per capita consumption of alcohol increased steadily in Taganrog during the 1960's, arrests for hooliganism and drunkeness did not increase. Yet so strong is the high culture bias against traditional drinking patterns that the Soviet sociologists who provide the statistics nevertheless assert that increased drinking—indeed, the very persistence of unreformed traditional leisure culture—spawns anti-social conduct.\textsuperscript{46}

The Taganrog statistics may well be unrepresentative or distorted, and they certainly cannot be used to build a case for the
independence of the crime rate from the drinking rate. It is obviously true that excessive drinking—if only we could define excessive—is a personal and familial problem, that deaths from alcohol poisoning have increased, and that rising alcohol consumption has a negative impact on economic performance. Leisure behavior may be socially and economically dysfunctional—but the conclusion that this is so is unsupported until the personal good of drinking for pleasure is assigned a value that can be compared with the economic bad of reduced labor productivity. In any case, we should remember that increased alcohol consumption need not translate into increased drunkenness or alcoholism, or necessarily mean that social distress is increasing—unless we insist that the drinker's stubborn refusal to do something more elevated with his time is itself a social problem. Similarly, the propensity to walk about rather than go to movies and theaters need not mean that facilities are lacking, the shows dull, or the walkers dim (there is reasonably good evidence that the lack of facilities is not the problem it is assumed to be), it may only mean that прогулки are the preferred activity—and why shouldn't they be? There is no reason to deny urban Russians the right to a leisure culture of their own choice, no reason to require that they conform to our own cultural values, no reason to mistake pastimes for problems.
Notes


There are, of course, many other sources on peasant leisure activity. What stands out in the above sources—covering all of European Russia (except the far north) and Siberia, and the period from the late 18th to the early 20th century—is the relative uniformity of peasant recreation.

2. On peasants not having a concept of leisure, see the 1964 Soviet source quoted by Paul Hollander, "Leisure: The Unity of Pleasure and Purpose," in Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society*, N.Y., 1968, p. 441—and this is said to be characteristic even of the modern Soviet peasantry. A similar statement on the place of leisure in traditional peasant culture is in L. Gordon and E. Klopov, *Man After Work*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 211-12. Gordon and Klopov, *ibid*, pp. 215-16, also note the existence of an urban leisure subculture different from traditional peasant leisure culture (because it does in fact contain a place for leisure), but they call it a "pseudo-urban" culture—by which they mean that it has little
to do with the consumption of approved "culture." This is, in fact, the traditional urban leisure culture.


4 M.G. Rabinovich Ocherki etnografii russkogo feodal'noho goroda. Gorozhane, ikh obshchestvennyi i domashnii byt, M., 1978, pp. 122-32, 153-74; M.G. Rabinovich, "Otvety na programmy Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva kak istochnik dlia izucheniiia etnografii goroda," Trudy Instituta etnografii, v. 95, 1971, pp. 49-50, 53; V.Iu. Krupianskaia and N.S. Polishchuk, Kul'tura i byt rabochikh gornozavodskogo Urala. Konets XIX-nachalo XX v., M., 1971, pp. 157-170; L.A. Anokhina and M.N. Shmeleva, Byt gorodskogo naseleniia srednei polosi RSFSR v proshlom i nastoialchem, M., 1977, pp. 268-82. Anokhina and Shmeleva note that there were differences in the leisure activities of different social groups, but similarities predominated. Even the rounds of visiting and restaurant-hopping characteristic of St. Petersburg high society (which struck foreign observers as unusual) were in some ways analogous to the leisure behavior of the common folk; Francis H.E. Palmer, Russian Life in Town and Country, N.Y., 1902, pp. 249-50, 254-5, 263. Though obviously a special case, the leisure culture of Tsarist officers was likewise based on obshchenie (in the mess) and the bottle; see John Bushnell, "The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency," American Historical Review, V. 86, no. 4, Oct. 1981, pp. 755-57.

There was certainly more involved in the difference between rural and urban leisure culture than I have indicated.
There is a consensus among American analysts of popular culture (the consensus is succinctly summarized by Herbert J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture. An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste*, N.Y., 1974, pp. 52-3, and Thomas Cripps, "The Folklore of Industrial Man," *Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 1978, pp. 87-91), that popular culture (leisure culture included) is inherently urban: folk culture gave way to popular culture when peasants moved to cities and, with disposable time and income, became consumers of commercial cultural commodities. That distinction between folk and popular is reasonable (though based on a rather narrow conception of popular culture), but when one examines leisure activities rather than consumption one sees that folk and popular—at least in Russia—were quite closely connected. On the other hand, the Russian penny press of the early 20th century, with its serialized novels for workers, did not have a true analogue in the peasant culture (even though urban tastes and artifacts were at the same time spreading to the village); see Jeffrey Brooks, "The Kopeck Novels of Early Twentieth Century Russia," *Journal of Popular Culture*, v. 13 no. 1, Summer 1979, pp. 85-97.


For time-budget studies of students at two teachers colleges in the mid-1920's, see Jiri Zuzanek, *Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union. A Time-Budget Analysis*, N.Y., 1980, pp. 190-91; time expenditures on *progulki* and *obshchenie* are not categorized separately, but from the categories employed it appears that those two activities did account for 60-65 percent of leisure activity (after eliminating "socio-
political participation" from the free time rubric). Data
from the time-budget studies conform to the impressionistic
description of leisure activities in the 1920's provided by
V. Iu. Krupianskaia, et. al., Kul'tura i byt gorniakov i


7 See the table in L.A. Gordon, E.V. Klopov, and L.A. Oniko,
Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni: byt gorodskikh
rabochikh vcheria, segodnia, zavtra, M., 1977, p. 149; ibid.,
pp. 56-7, asserts (presumably on the basis of unpublished data
from the same study) that rates of participation in reading, and
in attendance at movies and the theater, did not change from the
1920's to the 1930's. There is a dearth of evidence on
leisure behavior during the 1930's, but the random comments of
those living among the Russian people do suggest that progulki
remained the preferred leisure activity: John Scott, Behind
the Urals. An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel,
Bloomington, Indiana, 1973 (originally published in 1942), pp. 210,
236 (in contrast to the popularity of walking and sitting in the
Magnitogorsk park, the average adult in Magnitogorsk went to the
movies only twice a year, with movie attendance averaging 20,000
per month in a theater with a seating capacity of 1000; unless
the theater were open only 2 days out of 3, and for only one show
per day, Magnitogorsk adults were not storming the cinema for
every available seat); and Harry and Rebecca Timbres, We Didn't
Ask Utopia. A Quaker Family in Soviet Russia, N.Y., 1939,
pp. 9-11, 30-31.

8 David Allchurch, "Diversions and Distractions: Beyond the
p. 50; Jeremy Azrael, "Notes on Soviet Urban Attitudes Toward Leisure," Social Problems, v. 9 no. 1, Summer 1961, pp. 70, 72-3; Jereszy Kosinski ("Joseph Novak"), The Future is Ours Comrade, N.Y., 1964, pp. 36-48. The Soviet sociologist Igor Bestuzhev-Lada has also noted the prominence of progulki ("streets crowded with people out for an evening stroll") and obshchenie in the leisure activities of the 1950's; Bestuzhev-Lada, "Soviet People: Their Social Image," Soviet Life, Sept. 1981, p. 29. The time-budget studies of the late 1950's throw almost no light on the use of leisure earlier or even at the time they were made: they generally provide too little information, or group activities unsatisfactorily (e.g., lumping together time spent studying with time spent reading, or grouping time spent on exercise and sports with time spent on progulki--this latter was an intentionally misleading grouping of the data, designed to mask the minimal public participation in sports, and perhaps also designed to conceal the large amount of time spent on progulki).

Changes in the length of the work week and available free time are summarized in Zuzanek, Work and Leisure, pp. 149-50, 383-4. G.S. Petrosian, Vnerabochee vremia trudiashchikhsia v SSSR, M., 1965, p. 78, provides a table purporting to show that free time for urban workers on working days increased from 2 hours 44 minutes (males) and 1 hour 18 minutes (females) in 1923-24 (averages from 12 cities) to 3 hours 36 minutes and 1 hour 51 minutes, respectively, in 1959-61 (12 cities, different set). Petrosian takes his figures for 1923-24 from Strumilin (Izbrannye, v. 3, p. 206), but has--as he says--excluded from free time Strumilin's figures on "inactive rest" (as well as
religion) because it does not accord with his concept of free
time; on the other hand, he has added such categories as "care
for children" (ukhod za det'mi), in accordance with the
modern Soviet conception that time spent with children is a free-
time activity (other Soviet studies differentiate between
vospitanie detei--part of free time--and ukod, a domestic
chore, but Strumilin's tables did not permit such a
differentiation). In any case, Petrosian's manipulation of
Strumilin's data greatly understates the amount of time available
for leisure activities in the early 1920's. A far more accurate
comparison is of totals for free time and "other" (which is
where Petrosian hid Strumilin's figures on "inactive rest").
Using Petrosian's table, one can then see that the increase in
free time was quite small: from 3 hours 50 minutes (men) and
2 hours 6 minutes (women) in 1923-24, to 3 hours 53 minutes and
2 hours 34 minutes, respectively, in 1959-61. However, Petrosian's
figures for 1959-61 reflect the introduction of the 7-hour work
day, which was well under way in 1959 (in particular, in some of
the cities and factories that provide a part of Petrosian's
composite figures) and complete in 1960. Since the reduction
of the work-day resulted in roughly a 20 percent increase in
free time (see note 14), up to 1959 Soviet workers had considerably
less free time than they had had in the early 1920's.

Between 1927 and 1938, migration from the villages accounted
for 62.8 percent of urban growth, territorial expansion of the
cities (absorbing a largely rural population) accounted for 19.4
percent of growth, natural increase for only 17.8 percent of
urban growth. For 1939-58, the comparable figures are 62.1, 17.7,
and 20.2. However, much of the post-war increase from migration
was due to the reurbanization of those who had taken refuge in the villages during the war. Moreover, while in 1927-38 an average of 34.3 of every 1000 persons in any given year were migrants from the village, by 1939-58 the annual average of village migrants per 1000 population had fallen to 15.4. In other words, although the flow of migrants contributed almost as much to urban growth in 1939-58 as in 1927-38, migrants represented a continually decreasing share of the total urban population; M.V. Kurman, Aktual'nye voprosy demografii. Demograficheskie protsessy v SSSR v poslevoennyi period, M., 1976, pp. 127-31.

Though the flow of migrants to the city prior to the inauguration of crash industrialization must have been much smaller, during the 1920's urban workers (and almost certainly the urban lower classes in general) continued as before the revolution to move seasonally between city and village, thus maintaining the traditional urban-rural nexus; N.V. Iukhneva, "Voprosy formirovaniia, polozheniia i oblika rabochego klassa Peterburga-Leningrada. (Zametki etnografa po povodu knigi 'Istoriia rabochikh Leningrada," t. I i II)," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1974 no. 3, p. 164.

11 Gordon, Klopo and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, p. 49.

12 Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, p. 117.

13 "Recreation Facilities, Liquor and Youth's Leisure," Current Digest of the Soviet Press (henceforth, CDSP), v. 17 no. 46, Dec. 8, 1965, pp. 14-15. Instead of "young men and women," CDSP uses "boys and girls," which is inappropriate for employed young people. CDSP also translates progulki as "hikes"—a mistranslation, and misinterpretation, frequently found in Western studies of Soviet leisure. For a more detailed presentation of the results of this

One of the few published studies that permits direct measurement of the impact of the reduced work week on leisure time is a study comparing weekly time budgets of employed persons in Krasnoiarsk Krai in 1959 (before the 7-hour day) and 1963; male free time increased by 38 percent, female free time by 36 percent (though the absolute magnitudes for males were much higher than those for females); V.A. Artemov et. al., Statistika biudzhetov vremen trudiaashchikhsia, M., 1967, p. 135. According to data from "a number" of time budget surveys, the average industrial employee gained 8.9 hours of free time during the years of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), and half of the increment resulted from the shorter work week, the other half from improved services and utilities (which reduced domestic chores); ibid, p. 134. If the same proportion held in Krasnoiarsk Krai (where male workers gained 9.7 hours and females gained 6.1 hours between 1959 and 1963), than both sexes gained about 20 percent in free time because of the shortening of the work week. The data from various studies in the late 1950's and early 1960's--though they do not permit direct comparison--suggest that the pattern in Krasnoiarsk Krai was typical, at least in the proportional increment in free time and in the partitioning of that increment between reduced work week and improved infrastructure; these studies are summarized in tables in Michael Paul Sacks, Women's Work in Soviet Russia, Continuity in the Midst of Change, N.Y., 1976, pp. 113, 115, 188-91. For the comparison with the early 1920's, see note 9 above.

A comparison of the time budgets of workers with 5 8-hour work days and workers with a 6-day 41-hour week in four cities in 1965
demonstrated that both male and female workers with 5-day work weeks had 17 percent more free time than workers with 6-day work weeks; L.A. Gordon and N.M. Rimashevskaja, *Piatidnevnaia rabochaia nedelia i svobodnoe vremia* (Taganrogskie issledovaniia), M., 1972, pp. 24-5. In July 1964, married male workers working a 5-day week at a textile mill in Novosibirsk had 4 hours 26 minutes more free time on weekends than married male workers in the same plant working a 6-day week (19 hours 35 minutes vs. 15 hours 46 minutes). (In March 1964, male workers on a 5-day week had one hour less free time on weekends, but a 4-hour increase in domestic chores; this was certainly a function of the seasons.) For married women at the same mill, the gain in free time was from 5 hours 46 minutes to 11 hours 26 minutes in March, from 10 hours 46 minutes to 17 hours 24 minutes in July. For unmarried women, the gain was from 13 hours 8 minutes to 19 hours 13 minutes in March, 14 hours 24 minutes to 20 hours 5 minutes in July; Artemov et. al., *Statistika biudzhetov vremeni*, pp. 150-56. Unfortunately, there is no published data on the total weekly free time in this mill; obviously, some of the weekend gain must have been offset by workday loss, but this would have effected married women the most, so the average weekly gain was probably on the order of 12-17 percent (composite of both sexes). Workers in 4 cities where, during a survey in 1965-68, the "overwhelming majority" were on a 5-day work week had 7 percent more free time than workers, clerks, technicians and engineers in 4 different cities in 1963; (when the 6-day week was universal) Gordon and Klopow, *Man After Work*, pp. 25-7. The two samples are not, of course, comparable, and the comparison almost certainly understates the magnitude of the increase in free time achieved through conversion to the 5-day week.
By the end of the 1950's, 47 percent of the urban population over 10 had at least an incomplete secondary education, the proportion rising to 68 percent in 1975; Gordon, Kloprov and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, p. 49. Between 1959 and 1969, natural increase accounted for 40.5 percent of urban growth (as opposed to 20.2 percent between 1939 and 1958), while an annual average of 14 persons per thousand were village migrants between 1959 and 1969 (as against 17.7 between 1938 and 1958); Kurman, Aktual'nye voporsy demografii, pp. 130-31 (see also note 10 above).

For some suggestive observations on the socio-cultural differences between the 1920's-30's and the 1950's, and the "cultural stabilization" that occurred in the 1950's and 1960's, see Iukhneva, "Voprosy formirovaniia," pp. 158-61.

The most explicit statement to the effect that it was precisely in the 1950's and 1960's that the emergence of modern leisure activities occurred is provided by Gordon, Kloprov and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 56-8.

P. Maslov, "Vnerabochee vremia v usloviakh perekhoda ot sotsializma k kommunizmu," Voprosy ekonomiki, 1961 no. 12, pp. 63-64.

The figures are taken from Gordon and Rimashevskaia, Piatidnevnaia rabochaia nedelia, pp. 60-62, 79; and from Gordon, Klopop and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 62, 70, 84-6. They are derived from data on time-budget studies and from responses to questions about participation in different activities in a specified time period (the month or week preceding the survey). What these scholars mean by "infrequent" participation is less than one visit to a theater in a year, going to a movie less than once a month, and reading less than one book a month.

Somewhat higher participation rates are reported in B. Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia. Aktual'nye voprosy, M., 1967, pp. 76-7, 81, 89-90. The method in Grushin's study was to ask respondents to rate how frequently they participated in general (i.e., do you read a book once a month, rather than did you read a book in the last month). As Gordon and Gruzdeva point out, respondents exaggerate their participation in activities that enjoy social prestige when they are asked to evaluate frequency of participation in general, but are more willing to admit a low level of participation in some specified period of time; L.A. Gordon and E.B. Gruzdeva, "Rasprostranennost' i intensivnost' chteniia v gorodskoi rabochel srede," Problemy sotsiologii i psikhologii chteniia, M., 1975, p. 49. James Riordan reports the findings of a Komsomol survey of the early 1970's, according to which only 10 percent of young workers and "farmers" regularly engaged in sports, and this is in accord with the findings of Gordon et. al. But Riordan, not unexpectedly for an admitted sports enthusiast who associated with Soviet sports-lovers, asserts that sports has broad appeal in the Soviet Union. Some of the very high local participation rates in sports
that Riordan reports have been plausibly explained by Soviet sociologists as the result of double counting and other questionable procedures indulged in by Soviet sports societies; Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society. Development of Sport and Physical Education in Russia and the USSR, Cambridge, Eng., 1972, pp. 187, 192, 232. A 1966 study of the film audience sponsored by the Central Committee of the CPSU found that one-third of collective farmers, one-fifth of factory workers, and one-third of the "intelligentsia" went to movies irregularly or not at all; Felice D. Gaer, "The Soviet Film Audience: A Confidential View," Problems of Communism, v. 23 no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1974, p. 65. As for theater, one calculation has it that in the late 1960's only 12 percent of the adult population in RSFSR cities with permanent theaters went to the theater once a year or more; Mikhail Deza and Mervyn Matthews, "Soviet Theater Audiences," Slavic Review, v. 34 no. 4, Dec. 1975, p. 716 (unfortunately, the authors do not provide a source for this figure, and it may be that the theater to which they refer is dramatic rather than theater of all sorts).

Murray Yanowitch notes that as of the early 1960's Soviet sociologists expressed approval at every increase in TV viewing; Yanowitch, "Soviet Problems of Time Use and Concepts of Leisure," Soviet Studies, v. 15 no. 1, July 1963, pp. 34-5. As Gordon and Klopow note, watching television is to a great extent a function of the life-cycle: married persons watch TV far more than unmarried because marriage and children constrain leisure time and produce an emphasis on home-bound activities. As a cultural phenomenon, Gordon and Klopow give TV mixed marks: on the one hand, it is modern both as an appliance and as an activity (workers in small towns with a traditional leisure culture watch TV half as much as
workers in large cities even though the proportion owning TV's is about the same), but the character of the culture consumed via TV is "lower" than the culture displaced (reading and so on). However, comparison of the leisure activities of those who own and do not own TV's reveals a surprisingly small difference, with reading and similar pursuits suffering the greatest degradation; Gordon and Klopov, *Man After Work*, pp. 121-2, 200-1, 286-7. For a reasoned caution against excessive pessimism with respect to the cultural degeneration presumed to flow from excessive TV viewing, see B.M. Firsov, *Televizion glazami sotsiologa*, M., 1971, pp. 141-57.

22 "Mass" and "middle" culture are clearly inadequate terms, as there is no reason to presume homogeneity in either the "mass" or "middle" Soviet publics. Herbert Gans has argued persuasively that "popular culture" falls into a number of different subcultures (and the characteristics that he suggests for the different subcultures in the United States are based largely on differences in leisure activities and tastes); Herbert Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture*, N.Y., 1974, pp. 69-94. For tastes in reading, see "The Detective Story as an Ideological Weapon," *CDSP*, v. 16 no. 36, 22 July 1964, pp. 13-16; Jenny Brine, "Reading as a Leisure Pursuit in the USSR," in Jenny Brine, et. al., eds., *Home, School and Leisure in the Soviet Union*, London, 1980, pp. 239-69; and Gordon and Klopov, *Man After Work*, pp. 127-8 (80 percent of journal subscriptions are for light entertainment and popular science, only 5-6% are subscriptions to serious literary journals, and of these the semi-serious *Iunost* is the most popular). On TV: Firsov, *Televizion*, pp. 127-40 (analysis of a 1967 survey of the Leningrad TV audience). Film: M.I. Zhabskii, *Sotsiologiya kino: opyt i
problems, "Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1977 no. 4, p. 106.

Music: V.S. Tsukerman, Muzyka i slushatel'. Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia, M., 1972, pp. 77, 80-81, 96, 116-17, 119-21, 134, 142 (these are the most relevant tables; see passim for fascinating details). On theater: a survey in Sverdlovsk in the early 1960's revealed that 68 percent went "infrequently" (less than once every 3 months, the lowest frequency category reported), which seems in fact a reasonably high rate of attendance, but apparently most theater goers attended light genres (such as comedy) and musical comedy: "Theatergoers Polled on Preferences and Wishes," CDSP, v. 16 no. 48, 23 Dec. 1964, pp. 10-14; the results of an RSFSR theater survey conducted in 1967-8 as reported by Dez and Matthews, "Soviet Theater Audiences," are not particularly revealing, but they tend to confirm the Sverdlovsk findings.

23 Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, pp. 141-2, notes the absence of research on configurations of leisure activities, but reports that Hungarian sociologists have established that there is a positive correlation between attending the theater and movie-going and book-reading, while participation in sports correlates negatively with theater and other activities. The outlines of a middle culture configuration may be discerned in the leisure activities of the college-educated population (see note 24), but the reported figures do not discriminate between different sorts of books, different stage genres, and the like. A few hints about Russian leisure groupings can be found in V.N. Pimenova, Svobodnoe vremia v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve. Teoreticheskii analiz sootnoshenii svobodnogo vremeni obshchestva i lichnosti, M., 1974, pp. 192-200; and Zhabskii, "Sotsiologia kino," pp. 105-6, 109.
On the association between educational level and participation in "high" or "middle" culture activities, see Gordon and Rimashevskaia, *Piatidnevnaia rabochaia nedelia*, pp. 83-4, and Gordon and Klopop, *Man After Work*, pp. 303-5. Grushin, *Svobodnoe vremia*, pp. 91-4, notes that for a group of 24 leisure activities, participation rates vary strongly with level of education and socio-professional group (but not by gender), though the greatest variation is associated with city size. Some of these differences are illustrated in *ibid.*, pp. 81, 88-9. On the social characteristics of the theater audience in the RSFSR ("middle class" and well-educated), see Deza and Matthews, *Soviet Theater Audiences,* pp. 720-22, and "Theatergoers Polled on Preferences and Wishes."

Anokhina and Shmeleva, *Byt gorodskogo naseleniia*, p. 330. Anokhina and Shmeleva count going to movies among the activities that have supplanted simple *progulki*, but though the young provide most of the regular movie-goers as many young people do not go regularly as do; Zhabskii, "Sotsiologiiia kino," p. 106.


The most thorough study of the impact of the 5-day week is by
Gordon and Rimashevskaia, Piatidnevnaia rabochnaia nedelia, pp. 38-9, 44, 46-7, 52-3, 59, 62, 80, and accompanying tables. B.M. Levin, "Svobodnoe vremia i razvitie bytovikh obshchnostei," Sotsial'nye issledovaniia, no. 7, M., 1971, p. 115, reports an increase in participation in approved activities such as reading, going to movies and watching TV, but says nothing about participation rates in traditional recreations.

Rather direct statements of the existence of an unreformed leisure tradition are made by Gordon and Rimashevskaia, Piatidnevnaia rabochnaia nedelia, pp. 22, 71, 76, 78, 80; Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, pp. 87-90, 145-6, 148, 103-8, 110-11, 113-15, 120-23; and V.I. Tolstykh, Sotsialisticheskoe obshchestvo. Sotsial'nofilosofske problemy sovremennogo sovetskogo obshchestva, M., 1976, pp. 272-3 (Tolstykh calls for "closing the gap between high culture and life").

The Sverdlovsk finding is reported in "Theatergoers Polled on Preferences and Wishes," p. 10. Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, p. 125, and Gordon and Klopov, Man After Work, p. 13, note the use of non-traditional recreations for traditional purposes. An unpublished study of the Soviet movie audience in 1966 found that of collective farmers who prefer movies to TV 9 percent do so because of a desire to be among the public (the most frequent reason given--27 percent--was "the novelty of films"); other social groups rated the former reason lower, the latter reason higher. Of the total sample, the most frequent reason given for preferring films to TV was "simple relaxation" (32 percent). Unfortunately, we do not know whether the question was open or closed, so it is difficult to assess the significance of the numbers. Gaer, "The Soviet Film Audience," p. 65.
32. O. R. Budina, M. N. Shmeleva, "Obshchestvennye prazdniki v sovremennom bytu russkogo gorodskogo naseleniia," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1979 no. 6, p. 3.

33. The most revealing account of the development of neighborhood festivals in the Urals is provided by N.S. Polishchuk, "o nekotorykh novykh chertakh kollektivnogo otdykha gorniakov i metallurgov Nizhnego Tagila," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1963 no. 4, pp. 35-45. A good overview of civic ceremonies, rituals and festivals is provided by O.R. Budina and M.N. Shmeleva, "Obshchestvennye prazdniki v sovremennom bytu russkogo gorodskogo naseleniia," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1979 no. 6, p. 3-17.

There is an extensive Soviet literature on this subject, much of it at best descriptive and at worst crudely assertive. Even after heavily discounting the exaggerated claims of the meaningfulness of the new rituals and festivals, it is evident that the claims for narodnoe gulkan'e are based on fact (and sometimes on statistical evidence); personal observation also plays a part in my judgement. The early Soviet literature is surveyed in L.M. Saburova, "Literatura o novykh obriadaskh i prazdnikakh za 1963-66 gg.," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1967 no. 5, pp. 173-81, and N.P. Lobacheva, "O formirovanii novoi obriadnosti u narodov SSSR (Opyt etnograficheskogo obobshcheniia)," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1973 no. 4, pp. 14-24. See also S.E. Stetsenko, "Razvitie novoi sovetskoi obriadnosti v Ukrainskoi SSR," Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1978 no. 6, pp. 3-13; V.E. Ostrozhinskii, Obriadnost' v nashei zhizni. Opyt utverzhdeniia novoi sotsialisticheskoi obriadnosti, M., 1980; and N.M. Zakovich, Sovetskaia obriadnost' i dukhovnaia kul'tura, Kiev, 1980. Two recent non-Soviet studies are Christel Lane, The Rites of Rulers. Ritual in Industrial Society--The

34 Gordon, Klopov and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 141-2, note the central role of drink in leisure obshchenie and report that a survey in Taganrog found that almost half of the respondents (males and females in the same proportion) considered it "unseemly" not to provide vodka when entertaining friends and relatives. 10 percent of the women and 20 percent of the men considered it normal hospitality to provide each person with a half-liter of vodka. For a good description of males drinking in city squares (and police ignoring them), see Zh. Mindubaev, "Slezotochivyi portvein," Izvestiia, no. 224, 24 Sept. 1975, p. 4. The number of sources that could be cited here is extremely large.

35 Gordon, Klopov and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 91-2, 141, provide this estimate, citing as their source only the annual economic statistics for 1972; the figures they cite do not in themselves provide the basis for the estimate. However, using the same figures and explaining how to handle them, the pseudonymous A. Krasikov, "Vodka: Commodity Number One," Dissent, Fall 1977, pp. 365-8, 375, arrives at the same estimate. See also Vladimir G. Treml, "Production and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in the USSR. A Statistical Study," Journal of Studies on Alcohol, v. 36 no. 3, pp. 285-320.

Treml posits that per capita consumption of alcohol in urban and rural areas is identical, and calculates statistics on samogon production on the basis of that assumption; his statistics
indicate that legal purchases of alcohol have increased far more rapidly in rural than in urban areas, so that samogon provides for a declining proportion of rural consumption. The central question is whether it is logical to assume that samogon production has risen by the amount necessary to sustain rural per capita consumption at a level equal to urban per capita consumption. In fact, it would seem more logical to view the rapidly increasing legal sales as a straight substitution for samogon, especially given the peasants' declining interest in private plot production. It is interesting that Treml has found that a different method of calculating rural consumption produces lower per capita figures than for urban areas, but there is inadequate data to construct a national time series; ibid., p. 311. It is, in the final analysis, simply impossible to calculate per capital consumption of alcohol in rural areas.

36 The statistics cited are drawn from Gordon, Klopow and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 32, 34, and I.I. Travin, Material'noveschnaia sreda i sotsialisticheskii obraz zhizni, L., 1979, p. 43. For figures on publicly-administered housing with gas (the proportion is higher), see V.P. Korchagin, Trudovye resursy v usloviakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii, M., 1974, p. 137. Travin, ibid., p. 48, draws attention to the great importance of piped-in gas for changing the male role in housework, and this is born out by the available statistics. In the early 1920's, male workers spent 7.66 hours per month providing firewood (female workers spent 2.35 hours per month, non-working housewives 2.87 hours per month); Strumilin, Izbrannye, v. 3, p. 218. Data on the changes in male housework in Krasnoiarsk between 1959 and 1963 also provide indirect
evidence of the importance of the substitution of gas for wood. The total housework of males fell by 9.8 percent (vs. 2.9 percent for females), but it fell in only 3 of 8 itemized categories; there is no direct evidence of the decline of wood-hauling, but it can be hidden only in those 3 categories—preparation of meals (which fell by 22.7 percent for men, vs. 4 percent for women), care for housing and furniture (fell for men by 34.7 percent, vs. 14.3 percent for women), or "other" (fell by 19.4 percent for men, vs. 6.7 percent for women). Preparation of meals is, from the male point of view, most likely to have gained from gas.

According to Gordon and Klopop, Man After Work, p. 285, male workers who in the late 1960's lived in housing without utilities spent 17 percent more time on housework proper than male workers living in apartments with utilities (64 percent more time if gardening, repairs, and so forth are counted); at the same time, they spent only half as much time on proguiki (including visiting parks, restaurants, cafes and dances) as male workers in apartments with utilities. Of course, this partly reflects a preference for gardening and a propensity not to find time for leisure. Other utilities also reduced housework more or less substantially—for example, in the 1920's an average of 46 hours per year per capita were spent hauling water (the same as the per capita time spent baking bread); Maslov, "Vnerabochee vremia," p. 67. This could not have declined much until the 1950's, but hauling water was a chore split evenly between men and women.

Petrosian, Vnerabochee vremia, p. 110, provides statistics on the reduction of housework time brought about by adding utilities—exclusive and inclusive of gas—but does not distinguish between male and female chores.
If, to return to the question addressed in note 26 above, it could in fact be established that rural per capita consumption of alcohol has increased as rapidly as urban consumption, are there factors analogous to urban gas at work in the village? The data is much more fragmentary, but since the 1920's male peasant time budgets have reflected a constantly declining participation in housework--less time hauling wood and water and so forth. If this data is representative, the same opportunity for progulki s vodkoi has been presented to rural as to urban males. See Strumilin, Izbrannye, v. 3, p. 182, and Biudzhet vremeni sel'skogo naselenia, M., 1979, pp. 42, 44, 125, 234-64.

37 Gordon, Klopo and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, p. 141. The fact that drinking increases when free time increases has been frequently observed. See, for example, a letter supported by an article in Komsomol'skaia pravda, A. Alexandrov, "The Loftiest Reckoning: Survey of Readers' Letters," CDSP, v. 16 no. 47, 16 Dec. 1964, p. 17; and Arkadii Likhachev, "A kak zhe v dni otdykha?," Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 50, 13 Dec. 1967, p. 12, who reports that after the introduction of the 5-day work week the sale of alcoholic beverages increased by 24.6 percent in Moscow oblast'.

38 My argument runs counter to all recent analysis of Soviet consumption of alcohol--which is too frequently equated with alcoholism--so it should be recognized that the argument locating increasing consumption of alcohol in increasing social distress is strong, but not empirically verifiable. Gordon, Klopo and Oniko, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza zhizni, pp. 144-6, suggest, plausibly enough, that peasant migrants in the
city were no longer subject to tradition social controls over drinking, that this contributed to "dezorganizatsiia byta" (social disorientation) and that the ensuing excessive drinking then became an established tradition with momentum of its own. It is indeed possible that consumption is higher in the city than in the village, but whether this amounts to a social pathology is another matter. Western commentators are prone to see not urbanization per se as the cause of drink (always excessive), but the specific character of Soviet society. This is, for instance, the argument of Walter Connor, "Alcohol and Soviet Society," Slavic Review, v. 30 no. 3, Sept. 1971, pp. 576-77, who—despite an excellent description of traditional Russian drinking culture—insists that the resort to drink must also be due to Soviet social conditions, e.g. frustration over blocked mobility and the absence of other mechanisms of escape from frustration. Obviously this must play a part in the drinking patterns of some, but to use this explanation to account for the rapid increase in consumption one would have to presume an equally rapid increase in social frustration. Connor has addressed this question in "Workers, Politics, and Class Consciousness," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, eds., Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R., N.Y., 1979, pp. 317-29, and seems to conclude that frustration, though present, has not grown dramatically, at least among the working class. Connor's assessment of Soviet drinking patterns is in any case reasoned and balanced, and certainly relevant to some—how much is open to question—of the increased alcohol consumption. The more alarmist assessments of Soviet drinking that have of late become fashionable are adequately represented by recent articles by George Feifer, "Moscow's Angry Silence," The Sunday Times.
Feifer speaks of present-day drinking as "a devastating addiction" and "a kind of plague" (Sunday times), and this is the opinion of his informants, primarily Soviet intellectuals. My own view is that it is not so much that drinking has become much more of a problem than before—indeed, present opinions on Soviet drinking merely repeat what was said a century and more ago about Russian drinking—but that the perception of drinking has changed, especially among Soviet intellectuals. As I have argued elsewhere ("The 'New Soviet Man' Turns Pessimist," in Stephen Cohen, et. al., Soviet Society Since Stalin, Bloomington, Ind., 1980), the Soviet middle class, and intellectuals above all, are increasingly inclined to view Soviet society with a jaundiced eye; it is therefore natural that they should now see in traditional drinking patterns a national disaster, while 15 or 20 years ago they would have seen it as little more than tradition. I do not wish to deny that excessive drinking is a social problem; but it is too frequently forgotten in recent discussions that the Soviet Union is 12th, not 1st, in per capita consumption of alcohol, that the Soviet rate of increase is 5th, not 1st, and that the proportion of distilled spirits in total consumption has steadily fallen; Treml, "Production and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in the USSR."


Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, p. 87. See ibid., pp. 135-8, for an argument to the effect that the ultimate goal of leisure should not be increased labor productivity but the development of
the human personality.


E. Shirokov, "I stolknovenie menii," *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, no. 6, 17 Jan. 1978, p. 5. Shirokov is director of youth programming for radio and TV and he reports that audience surveys do shape programming.

A good example of Western high culture bias in the evaluation of
Soviet leisure culture is provided by Jeremy Azrael, who in an article that is on the whole quite perceptive informs us that Soviet "propensities of taste do not reveal an unduly high level of sophistication," that "the Soviet citizen to a remarkable extent seeks 'amusement' and is incapable of self-initiated utilization of leisure, or recreation in the literal, and also genuine, sense," and that "the most popular Soviet card games have a 'childish' quality"; Azrael, "Notes on Soviet Urban Attitudes Toward Leisure," pp. 71-2. If there were an agreed standard of sophistication, Azrael's judgement on that score might be granted, as indeed it might be granted with respect to most people in most countries. His remarks on the absence of "self-initiated" leisure and recreation stem from the application of inappropriate standards to a leisure culture quite different from his own; and it is the opinion of a good many people that all card games are childish. Azrael was writing at the height of the high culture alarm over mass culture in the West, but the tendency to use the yardstick of a unique "genuine" leisure culture lingers on. Anita Glassl, for instance, remarks that Soviet workers abstain from "meaningful cultural activities" such as opera, theater and art exhibits; she concedes that the same is true of Western workers, but holds that workers in the West are rescued from complete leisure degradation by their ability to take weekend trips (which would seem in fact to be the unconscious application of a German leisure standard that does not prevail everywhere in the West); Glassl, "The Free Time of the Soviet Worker," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, v. 16 no. 1, 1969, p. 27.

Complaints about the unavailability of facilities are quite frequent in discussions of leisure and its problems by Soviet sociologists and the Soviet press. Almost as frequently, however, one finds complaints that available facilities are underutilized, or not used at all. A sampling of such complaints is provided by Allchurch, "Diversions and Distractions," p. 53; Glassl, "The Free Time of the Soviet Worker," p. 26; Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, pp. 121-3; Hollander, "Leisure: The Unity of Pleasure and Purpose," p. 441; and Zh. Mindubaev, "Slezotochivye portvein," Izvestiia, no. 224, 24 Sept. 1975, p. 4. Soviet commentators invariably attribute this to poor organizational work, but one wonders whether the apathy of organizers might not reflect the apathy of the public whom they are supposed to serve. There is, in fact, reasonably good evidence that the presence or absence of recreational facilities, once a certain threshold has been achieved, has little impact on leisure activities, Soviet public opinion notwithstanding. In a 1965 national survey, lack of facilities was cited as the second most important obstacle to desired leisure activities (38.6 percent, second only to lack of free time, 45.3 percent, and far ahead of lack of income, 14 percent). The only exception to this pattern was the group of respondents from Moscow, who rated lack of facilities as the 6th of 7 obstacles (only 9 percent of the Muscovites mentioned it). Clearly, there are more facilities available in Moscow than elsewhere, so the pattern of responses seems quite reasonable. However, the participation rate of Muscovites for 7 of the 9 activities surveyed that required special facilities (and 1 of those, movies, is not reported in the relevant table) was not significantly different from the national urban average. Of the
reported activities, only visits to museums were an activity in which Muscovites enjoyed a distinct advantage. The Muscovites were somewhat below the national average in attending classical concerts and literary readings, specially organized dances, and amateur arts; they participated somewhat more frequently than the national average in pop concerts, attendance at sports events, participation in sports, and going to restaurants, cafes and beer halls. Respondents from cities with populations over 500,000 (excluding Moscow), and 100-500,000 did better than the national average (by somewhat smaller percentages) in 6 and 4 of the 8 reported activities, respectively (as against 5 of 8 for the Muscovites); the availability of facilities, in short, is a secondary factor in leisure behavior in all but small cities. With the single exception of museums, middling to large Soviet cities have a threshold density of facilities sufficient to ensure participation rates close to those in Moscow. The obverse of this conclusion is that Moscow has more facilities than needed to service its population, a proposition that finds support in visual evidence of the small audiences at most plays and most movies most of the time. For the statistics, see Grushin, Svobodnoe vremia, pp. 88-9, 112, 117.