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TITLE: The Division of Labor in Central Asia and its Influence upon Ethnic and Gender Conflict

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PREFACE

This report is one of 13 separate papers by different authors which, assembled, will constitute the chapters of a Festschrift volume in honor of Professor Vera S. Dunham, to be published by Westview Press. The papers will be distributed individually to government readers by the Council in advance of editing and publication by the Press, and therefore, may not be identical to the versions ultimately published.

The Contents for the entire series appears immediately following this Preface.

As distributed by the Council, each individual report will contain this Preface, the Contents, the Editor's Introduction for the pertinent division (I, II, or III) of the volume, and the separate paper itself.
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Editors' Introduction

I. Trends in Soviet Society

The non-coercive aspects of social control in the Soviet Union have comprised a very strong leitmotif in Vera Dunham's work throughout her career. Most evident in her pioneering work, *In Stalin's Time*, her focus on state-society interaction has also been apparent in numerous scholarly articles and lectures. Professor Dunham has used the phrase "Big Deal" to describe one important use of positive social control under Stalin.

The Big Deal refers to the Soviet regime's tacit alliance with the new "middle class" of engineers, administrators, and managers who were vital to the rebuilding effort after World War II. Rather than relying on coercion, as might be expected in the aftermath of the Great Purges of the 1930s, the regime tried a new tack. This amounted to an accommodation of the personal, materialistic longings of this group of people whose expertise and skills were in critical demand. The goal of the Big Deal was to garner support of these experts and administrators by offering the incentives they wanted most: housing, consumer goods, and leisure time. The conversion of these private aspirations to acceptable public values was the key component of the Big Deal.

While Professor Dunham's analysis of the Big Deal has been confined to the postwar period, the use of accommodation by the regime to deal with the middle class was evident already in the mid-late 1930s and extended well beyond the immediate postwar years. This characteristic of the Soviet system tends to go unnoticed, however, especially in studies of the Stalinist era. Recent refer-
ences to the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire" have also clouded the existence of other than the negative aspects of social control. However, as the revolutionary ethos recedes further into the background, the use of positive levers to attain many economic and social goals has become more important. Paradoxically, positive, materialistic levers have been used to bolster the political stability of a political system whose very legitimacy is based upon a radical restructuring of society. A thorough examination of the implications of this paradox, an examination continued in the essays that follow, is Professor Dunham's primary contribution to the study of Soviet society.
Geography and ethnicity are closely tied in Soviet society. Ethnic groups of Muslim heritage in the USSR are overwhelmingly concentrated in Soviet Central Asia. They also comprise the predominant population of this region. Consequently, policy affecting Central Asia has direct implications for ethnic group relations. The relatively low level of economic development of the region is a significant indicator of inequality among ethnic groups in the USSR.

There are sharp ethnic differences within Soviet Central Asia which provide even stronger evidence of this stratification. Russians and other nonindigenous ethnic groups are far more concentrated in the more industrialized sectors of the work force than are the Muslim ethnic groups. This manifests itself in the differences in ethnic composition of urban and rural areas.

The picture is further complicated by gender differences. With respect to their place in the division of labor it appears that, overall, males are to females as Russians are to Muslim ethnic groups. But, of course, gender and ethnicity are not independent dimensions. This chapter examines ways in which economic development and the social change associated with it have shaped the employment of Russian males, Russian females and the males and females of Muslim ethnic groups within Uzbekistan, the largest of the Central Asian republics. The division of labor in the past had resulted in segregation by both gender and ethnicity. In recent decades this segregation appears to be changing, and this points to significant new sources of tension and dissatisfaction.
Significant strains may be emerging in Soviet Central Asia as a consequence of new patterns in the division of labor by ethnicity and gender. The strong encouragement for childbearing and the poor employment opportunities of most women of Muslim ethnicity in Central Asia will surely continue to limit their work rates. But their growing exposure to Russian female role models could lead them to question the legitimacy of their place in rural society. Even very modest changes in female attitudes may provoke considerable male resistance if these men also feel threatened by female entry or competition in factories and the service sector.

Males of Muslim ethnicity developed distinctive patterns of employment as a consequence of low female work rates and relative isolation from modern industrial society. Change has come with increasing rapidity in the course of the twentieth century. Economic development has been associated with growing Russian presence, changes in the characteristics of traditional forms of employment, mounting population pressure in rural areas and increasing opportunities for education and social mobility. Such changes appear to increase the likelihood that the indigenous male population may begin to compete for the same jobs as those of Russian women and eventually those of Russian men. Even in rural areas the mobilization of the indigenous female population is leading to female entry in areas that had been exclusively male. Geographic segregation may no longer sustain occupational segregation by gender or ethnicity.
Available statistical data on the trends in ethnic and gender differences in employment in Soviet Central Asia are exceedingly limited. These figures are insufficient to fully understand the changes in the society and to test the predictions in this chapter. What would unquestionably be of enormous value is a Vera Dunham to read and interpret the popular literature of Central Asia and, as exemplified by In Stalin's Time (1976), show aspects of the society that can never be tapped even with the best of numbers.

Finally, it is important to view the strains in Central Asia in their proper context. In any rapidly modernizing society a wide range of new tensions are likely to arise. In many cases these are manifestations of long extant conflicts coming to the surface as power shifts. The repression of women and children becomes more difficult as the control by adult males over valued resources is reduced. Differences between social classes and between groups in cities and the country may also grow with uneven entry into the modern sector. Some groups develop a new stake in the status quo while others come to press for greater change. This chapter cannot address all the sources of stability or instability in Central Asia. It is important to recognize that ethnicity should be viewed as one important dimension among many others.
Gender, Ethnicity and Economic Development

In the course of Soviet industrial development ethnicity and gender have been very significant determinants of access to expanding economic opportunities. Males far more rapidly than females moved out of agriculture and into the modern economic sector. Although a variety of indicators of education, occupational achievement and political participation show that the gap between male and female status has surely narrowed during the twentieth century, there remains a sharp division of labor by gender both in the home and the work force and this manifests the persisting advantage of men (Sacks 1976; 1982; Lapidus 1978; McAuley 1981). These gender differences are evident throughout the USSR (as well as in other industrialized nations), but the concentration of women in agriculture or their exclusion entirely from paid labor has remained especially great among Muslim ethnic groups.

In Central Asia those benefitting from industrialization were overwhelmingly the migrants to the region from the more economically developed areas. These migrants, primarily of Russian ethnicity, had the skills and attitudes which made them readily employable in the factories. The Russians also had the political and military power to shape the emerging institutions and, thereby, the criteria according to which rewards were allocated. This is reflected in the importance of knowledge of the Russian language for higher education and career advancement (Lewis, Rowland and Clem 1976). Walker Connor (1984, p.
301) argues that there was also a strong incentive for the state to encourage Russian in-migration to "lessen the risk of an ethnic homeland developing into an effective base for antistate activities" and to "increase the likelihood of acculturation and assimilation."

Between 1928 and 1941 nearly 85 percent of the workers entering heavy industry in Uzbekistan were of nonindigenous ethnicity (Mel'nikova 1956, p. 77). This trend, as discussed below, has changed in recent years, but there continues to be relatively low representation of the local population in industry (Lubin 1984, Chapter 3). Differences in economic position coincided with sharp cultural differences -- a situation which can contribute to the perpetuation of the initial inequality and can also enhance ethnic group identification.

The pattern in Central Asia is consistent with that of other multiethnic regions of the world. It is now widely recognized that modern economic development is often associated with the persistence and even enhanced significance of gender and ethnic distinctions rather than their gradual replacement by a new social order in which the distribution of rewards is based primarily on such criteria as social class background, educational attainment, ability or intelligence (Leifer 1981; Miller et al. 1979; Sacks 1982, Chapter 1). Expanding opportunities associated with rapid economic development generally promote massive population redistribution. In multiethnic societies this can increase the contact between dominant and subordinate groups and, when combined with improved communication and rising educational attainment, can foster the perception that
individual fate is the outcome ethnic groups membership (Lewis, Rowland and Clem 1976, Chapter 10).

It is impossible for this not to have political ramifications. "If the stratification system links ethnic identity with economic status, it confers a meaning to the identity that the ethnic can hardly ignore. Ethnic identity cannot be detached from one's economic and political interests within the system" (Leifer 1981, p. 26). In Central Asia this is clearly manifested in the relationship between Russians and the Muslim ethnic groups. There is a "cultural division of labor" characterized by a "system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines" (Hechter as quoted in Leifer 1981, p.26).

The Intermediate Stratum: Russian Females and Muslim Males

Combining ethnicity and gender shows a status hierarchy in Central Asia in which Russian males, as a group, are clearly in the highest position; females of Muslim ethnic unquestionably fall at the bottom. The latter are women overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, restricted to economic activity in agriculture and/or within the family household. Rough estimates show that in 1959 females comprised between 17 and 28 percent of urban workers of Muslim ethnicity. By 1970 this figure rose to as high as about 40 percent among the Kirgiz, but closer to 30 percent among other groups.3

Their exceedingly high birth rate--at a level comparable to nations which today are economically undeveloped--is a strong
indicator not only of the persistence of a culture which severely restricts women's activity but also of the extent to which family burdens compete with female employment. Their relatively low level of educational attainment and limited access to technical training also place them at a severe disadvantage (Sacks 1982, pp. 60-64; Lubin 1984, p. 117; Jones and Grupp, Chapter 4, forthcoming).

Russian women and Muslim men appear to be in an intermediate position within the status hierarchy of Central Asia. Unfortunately, the exceedingly sparse data on occupations by ethnicity make it very difficult to assess precisely where these two groups fall. But from the material that can be pieced together, it appears that there may be considerable overlap between the two groups.

Russian women may have benefitted from the limited female labor supply in Central Asia in contrast with the great abundance of women seeking employment in the Slavic republics. 4 Low female labor supply in the nonagrarian sector may have increased the market value of women's labor. Their membership in the dominant ethnic group, their high level of education and work experience may also have allowed them to compete favorably with indigenous men.

The low supply of indigenous female labor supply must also have had direct consequences on the employment of Muslim men. Youssef (1974, p. 37) argues that in the Middle East the restrictions on male-female interaction have kept women out of occupations that "involve public activity or presuppose the contact with men." The result is that "occupations which in other countries become predominantly feminine from early industrialization onwards (such as
service occupations, domestic work, factory work, retail and clerical jobs) are in the Middle East staffed by men or by foreign women . . ." (Ibid.). A similar situation appears to exist among Muslim ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, although it is surely not as extreme. Kostakov (1976, p.131) contends that the low level of female employment in such branches as public dining, trade, housing, and communal and everyday services in Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan can in part be explained by the "heightened interest of men of indigenous nationality in work in the service sector" (see also Lubín 1984).

The "foreign women" of Central Asia were Russian female migrants. But, overwhelmingly concentrated in large cities, they could scarcely meet the labor demand of the predominantly rural population. Indigenous males entered the service sector and light industry to a far greater extent than was true of men in the Slavic and Baltic regions of the USSR.

In Central Asia the low labor force participation of Muslim women and geographic separation of employed Russian females and Muslim males may have functioned to maintain Muslim men's sense of control over the public sector in the face of the growing modernization of the society, the influx of Russians into the region, and the expansion of occupations which would normally enhance female employment opportunities outside the home.

**Occupational Integration and Geographic Segregation**
In Uzbekistan in 1970 89 percent of persons of Slavic ethnicity resided in urban areas in contrast with just over a quarter of the Muslim ethnic groups (Ts.S.U. 1973a, Tables 5 and 11). Employment figures clearly reflect these residential differences between ethnic groups. Russians comprised 39 percent of the urban employed population but only 2 percent of the rural employed population (Lubin 1984, p. 65). More detailed data on employment by ethnicity are not available, but significant features can be surmised based, in part, on this pattern of residential segregation.

Comparing the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and Uzbekistan in 1970, Table 1 shows differences in the gender and residential characteristics for four broad areas of the economy (agriculture is excluded). Differences between male and female concentration in urban areas are shown by columns 1 through 3. In Uzbekistan, females are far more likely than males to be employed in urban areas. The percentage urban among females is 13 to 22 points above that of males. In the Russian Republic in one area (education, science and public health) the pattern is the reverse (males are somewhat more likely to be found in urban areas) and in the other three areas the percentage urban among females exceeds that of males by only 3 to 7 points.

Comparing the top and bottom half of column 1 shows the substantial differences between males of Uzbekistan and males of the Russian Republic. For example, in education, science and public health the percentage urban among males of Uzbekistan is 30 points below the percentage urban among males of the Russian Republic. In
contrast the republic differences among females (column 2) are very small. As supported by a wide variety of other evidence, this leads to the conclusion that interrepublic variation in employment is largely due to difference in the work of men. What distinguishes the males of Uzbekistan is the work force participation of men of Muslim ethnicity working largely in rural areas. Especially in areas outside agriculture the employed women of Uzbekistan are overwhelmingly of Slavic ethnicity, and they work in cities.

Columns 4 to 6 of Table 1 show that, in contrast with the Russian Republic, rural nonagrarian employment for women in Uzbekistan is far more limited than urban employment. In the Russian Republic the percentage female among urban workers in the four broad areas far exceeds the figures for Uzbekistan (compare the top and bottom of column 4), and there is comparatively little difference in the Russian Republic between female representation in rural and urban areas. Again, ethnic composition must explain the pattern. In Uzbekistan, high female representation in urban employment is due to the presence of Russian women. Major differences between republics appear in rural areas due both to the absence of Russian women and the form of Muslim male participation. In rural Uzbekistan indigenous males comprise a large share of nonagrarian positions which in the Russian Republic would be amply supplied by women.

Finally, note that in rural Uzbekistan in education, science and public health (47.5 percent female) and in trade, public catering, etc. (52.5 percent female) in urban Uzbekistan there is a nearly balanced representation of males and females. These broad groupings
are clearly inadequate to judge the extent of male/female overlap in jobs. Nevertheless, as shown below, education appears to be an area where males of Muslim ethnicity may be especially prone to perceive female encroachment. Males in urban trade, public catering, etc. may be exposed to values and interaction which could have disturbing consequences. These males are almost certainly of indigenous nationality, for Russian males would not be attracted to jobs in this sector which are both low paid and female-dominated in the Russian Republic.

With these possible exceptions, Table 1 suggests that considerable overlap in the work of men and women in Uzbekistan may have been sustained because of the geographic segregation of employed male from employed females.

Assessing Individual Occupations

The picture sketched above can be further elaborated by examining detailed occupational data especially from Soviet census of 1970. Unfortunately, comparable data from the 1979 have not been published.

Census categories are divided into those requiring "primarily mental exertion" (professional and semiprofessional) and those requiring "primarily physical exertion" (nonprofessional). Females comprise a far greater proportion of the professional and semiprofessional workers, and published job categories by gender are more detailed than are those in the nonprofessional division (Sacks
1982, Chapter 2). The procedures used below to indirectly judge ethnic composition are dependent upon this detail and, thus, more information can be uncovered regarding professional and semiprofessional categories than nonprofessional occupations.

Again, the analysis is based on the assumption that men of Slavic ethnicity (overwhelmingly Russian) in Uzbekistan were unlikely to be employed very differently from males workers in the Russian Republic. Thus, occupations in Uzbekistan that contained an especially high representation of males relative to the Russian republic were occupations in which the males were likely to be largely of Muslim ethnicity. To pinpoint these occupations the ratio of the number of male workers in Uzbekistan to the number in the same category in the Russian republic was calculated for all occupational categories from the 1970 census for which data were available by gender. The ratio for females is also shown below (Table 2) to show the contrast with males.

The ratio for all nonagrarian occupations combined was .057 for males and .041 for females. (In other words, the number of nonagrarian male workers in Uzbekistan was equal to 5.7 percent of the number of nonagrarian male workers in the Russian republic; the comparable figure for females was 4.1 percent.) Occupational categories in Uzbekistan in which the number of workers was very high relative to the Russian Republic have been defined as those with a ratio in excess of twice these overall figures: Over .114 for males and over .082 for females. All such categories are shown in Table 2.
Here, again, is evidence of the greater similarity across republics in the female than the male work force structure. This is shown by the far greater variation in the male ratios (column 1) than in the female ratios (column 2). This means that the number of females in occupational categories in Uzbekistan was a relatively constant proportion of those females in the same category in the Russian Republic. Alternatively, the female work force of Uzbekistan appeared, to a large degree, to be simply a smaller version of the female work force of the Russian Republic. This was not true for males of Uzbekistan.

The exception was agriculture where the ratio for females (.187) exceeded that of males (.140) and reflects the earlier and more rapid entry of males into the nonagrarian sector which occurred throughout the USSR. The contrast between males and females would have been far greater had the category included the overwhelmingly female workers in private agriculture. The high ratio for males and females combined (.164) is indicative of the relatively low level of development of Uzbekistan.

However, in most cases the ratios for males and females combined (column 3) were not especially high. This suggests that the large number of males in Uzbekistan in these categories was due not to an overall labor demand far greater than in the Russian Republic as much as to the relatively low female labor supply.

Among typists and stenographers, nurses, and nursery directors and training personnel, the high ratios for men are not very meaningful, for few men were employed in these areas in either
republic (see columns 6 and 7). But in most cases the ratios indicate the substantially higher presence of males of Uzbekistan in occupations which in the Russian Republic were predominantly or almost exclusively female. Nine of every ten postal workers in the Russian Republic were women as compared with four of every ten in Uzbekistan. The contrast was nearly as great among food workers, sales personnel, dentists, teachers, and directors and managers of stores. The number of male textile weavers in Uzbekistan actually exceeded the number in the Russian Republic by over 20 percent (a ratio of 1.214).

With the exception of dentists, in all the aforementioned categories where male employment was significantly different from the Russian Republic the percentage of women in the category rose in Uzbekistan between 1939 and 1970 (compare across columns 4 through 6). Female presence was growing in those occupations where males of Muslim ethnicity were likely to be employed.5

The case of textile weavers is particularly striking. In 1939 nearly two-thirds of weavers of Uzbekistan were men; by 1970 this was reduced to less than one-quarter. The weavers in the Russian Republic were 92.2 percent female in 1939 and less than 2 percent male by 1970. This is surely one of many cases in which female entry into an occupation in Uzbekistan was associated with the displacement of handcrafts by industry—a process rapidly taking place even in the late 1920's (Lubin 1984, p. 76). Factory labor generally required less skill, entailed less worker control over production, and was surely viewed as having less prestige (Wallace and Kalleberg 1982).
Female entry into teaching was associated with the rapid growth of the profession in rural areas. Small religious and exclusively male institutions among the indigenous population were replaced with Soviet schools providing universal secular education. Between 1939 and 1959 the female representation among primary and secondary school teachers jumped from 27 to 44 percent. This figure has slowly risen to over 50 percent today (Tsentr'al'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie Uzbekskoi SSR 1984, p. 292).

The case of textile workers and that of teachers illustrate how women's entry was associated with the change in job characteristics associated with modernization. Males may leave or not continue to enter the occupations because the work is less attractive than in the past. But the change in gender composition may also slowly result in the perception of the jobs as no longer appropriate for men, as "women's work." Problems are likely when opportunities for alternative employment cannot keep pace with changing perceptions and aspirations.

The Mobilization of Females of Muslim Ethnicity

There is evidence that women of Muslim ethnicity are a growing proportion of those working outside of agriculture in Soviet Central Asia. As noted above, the percentage female among Muslim urban workers rose between 1959 and 1970. There have been a number of changes pointing to the "social mobilization" of women—"the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological
commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (Deutsch as quoted in Dellenbrant 1977, p.12). This change is likely to be associated with higher work rates.

Particularly significant has been the rise in female educational attainment. In rural Uzbekistan in 1926 only about 1 percent of the women were literate; in 1979 55 percent of those over age 10 had at least some secondary education (Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie Uzbekskoi SSR 1980, p. 8; Vestnik statistiki 1980, p. 52).

In higher and secondary education indigenous female representation has grown very rapidly. In 1978 one-quarter of the students in institutions of higher education in Uzbekistan were women of Muslim ethnicity (Lubin 1984, pp. 117, 125). However, women's opportunities remain far more limited than those of men (see Jones and Grupp Forthcoming, Chapter 4).

Rural Central Asia is surely becoming less insulated from outside influence. A recent survey of persons of Muslim ethnicity in rural Uzbekistan showed that among those aged 20-24 85 percent regularly watched television and 58 percent had the ability speak Russian to some degree (Arutyunyan 1980, pp. 78-79).

Important changes have occurred in marriage and childbearing. In Uzbekistan nearly one-third of the Uzbek women age 16-19 were married in 1959; by 1970 just over one in five were married (as compared with about one in ten among Russian women living in Uzbekistan)(Ts.S.U. 1973a, Table 35). Young Uzbek women are spending more years in schools and possibly more years working prior to
A study of textile factories shows that Uzbek women workers were especially concentrated among the age group under 20 (Ubaidullaeva 1980, p. 83).

Uzbek women are completing their childbearing at an earlier age and having fewer children. In Uzbekistan in 1972-73 there were 234 births per thousand women age 30-34. This declined to 183 among the same age group in 1983-84 (as compared to only 61 in the Russian republic) (Ts.S.U. 1975, p.137; Vestnik statistiki 1985, p. 78).

Uzbek women who married in the 1950's expected to have an average of 7 children, compared with 5.4 among those who married in the early 1970's. But Russian women in Uzbekistan who married in the early 1970's expected only 2.1 children (Belova et al. 1977, p.49). A 1978 survey showed that more than two-thirds of the Uzbek women age 18-47 expected to have no fewer than six children (Valentei 1985, p.26).

Clearly indigenous women's work outside agriculture continues to be restricted by heavy domestic responsibilities, by male predominance in many occupations which elsewhere are allocated to women, and by competition in urban areas from Russian women. They may comprise an expanding pool of easily exploited labor.

The problems of indigenous women are suggested by the change in a group of nonprofessional occupations that involve largely unskilled work and often require heavy physical exertion. In the Russian Republic the number of these women rose by one-quarter between 1959 and 1970, but in Uzbekistan the increase was over four fold: from 44,000 to 237,000. This was the only category other than agriculture where the Uzbekistan/Russian Republic ratio in 1970 was higher for
females than males--an important sign, as argued above, of the presence of women of Muslim ethnicity.

The Pressures on Men of Muslim Ethnicity

Men of Muslim ethnicity must be experiencing conditions which encourage them to alter their patterns of employment. There are changes in traditional nonagricultural occupations such as teaching and weaving which make these pursuits less prestigious and foster rising female participation. The geographic segregation of Russian women from men of Muslim ethnicity may be eroding as the indigenous population increases in urban areas. Between 1970 and 1979 the percentage of Uzbeks living in cities rose only 4 points to reach 29 percent. But this represented an increase from 2.3 to 3.6 million Uzbek urban residents (Kozlov 1982, pp. 100, 136; Ts.S.U. 1973a, p.27).

Other evidence of movement to cities comes from a study of the composition of workers entering into new factories of Uzbekistan. In 1976 26.1 percent came from outside the republic and 17.1 percent from rural Uzbekistan, but in 1979 only 6.3 percent came from other republics while the proportion from rural Uzbekistan grew to 32.3 percent (Valentei 1985, p. 59).

Data for Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, show that the proportion of employed persons of indigenous ethnicity doing semi- or unskilled work declined from 37 percent in the 1970's to 25 percent in the 1980's with a corresponding increase particularly in the
proportion holding higher skilled and managerial positions
(Arutyunyan 1985, p. 32). Ethnic mixing and competition is more
likely to take place when the indigenous population is less contained
within bottom level jobs.

High population growth combined with the mechanization of
agriculture is creating a labor surplus in rural areas of Central
Asia (Mirzoev and Khonaliev 1982, pp. 27-28; Lewis, Rowland and Clem
1976, Chapter 10; Feshbach 1979). This is combined with significant
increases in educational attainment especially among the male
population. Cohort differences in 1970 show this clearly.\(^9\) In rural
Uzbekistan 62 percent of males age 20-29 had at least a complete
secondary education as compared with 40 percent among those aged 30-
39 and a mere 14 percent for those aged 40-49 (the respective figures
for females were 35, 12 and 7 percent). In rural areas of the
Russian Republic the men in these age groups were less educated than
their counterparts in Uzbekistan. Only 28 percent of those age 20-29
and 20 percent of those age 30-39 had at least a secondary education.

This is probably the outcome of selective out-migration. The lack
of opportunities in rural areas of the Russian Republic appears to
have led better educated men to leave for urban employment. In rural
Uzbekistan there may be even fewer opportunities for upward mobility.

The absence of out-migration may be accompanied by rising
discontent.

One policy which is often advocated to deal with the excess
labor is to expand light and food industries in smaller cities and
even in rural areas. Some Soviet scholars argue that this will
encourage the labor force participation of the indigenous population without fostering further in-migration of Slavic ethnic groups (Valentei 1985, pp. 47-48; Kostakov 1974, pp. 167, 170; Mirzoev and Khonaliev 1982, p. 82). However, without a diversification of employment opportunities the rise in rural work rates may lead to increased male/female contact and competition. Males of Muslim ethnicity may respond by attempting to strengthen barriers to female work. This could manifest itself in their greater adherence to traditional Muslim beliefs which legitimize male domination.

Ultimately, in the face of these changes males of Muslim ethnicity may increasingly strive to enter occupations that are predominated by males of Slavic ethnicity. Relying heavily on impressionistic evidence, Lubin (1984) argues that cultural factors have led the Muslims not to value such occupations and that this has lessened the degree of ethnic conflict. "The fact that Russians dominate certain 'undesirable' sectors or jobs is often regarded with favour by the indigenous Central Asians, rather than with disdain" (p. 212). This appears more like a rationalization on the part of Russians for their continued dominance or by Muslims for their past inability to successfully compete. The substantial growth in the number of Muslim males, their rising skills and aspirations combined with changes in the characteristics and location of employment surely augur to enhance their awareness and resentment of the ethnic stratification.

The salience of ethnicity in Central Asia may also be enhanced by Soviet policy which may be giving special advantages to the
indigenous ethnic groups in both employment and education. Lubin (1985, p 229) sees this as a source of conflict:

While affirmative action has provided the indigenous Central Asians with new and wider opportunities, by its very nature, it has simultaneously made ethnic affiliation an essential ingredient, if not one of the main determinants of upward mobility in Uzbek society. ... The pride or sense of accomplishment, therefore, with which an Uzbek may regard his professional attainments is consciously and inextricably linked to his ethnic heritage, sharpening ethnic differences and animosities in the process.

Conclusion

Significant strains may be emerging in Soviet Central Asia as a consequence of new patterns in the division of labor by ethnicity and gender. The strong encouragement for childbearing and the poor employment opportunities of most women of Muslim ethnicity in Central Asia will surely continue to limit their work rates. But their growing exposure to Russian female role models could lead them to question the legitimacy of their place in rural society. Even very modest changes in female attitudes may provoke considerable male resistance if these men also feel threatened by female entry or competition in factories and the service sector.
Males of Muslim ethnicity developed distinctive patterns of employment as a consequence of low female work rates and relative isolation from modern industrial society. Change has come with increasing rapidity in the course of the twentieth century. Economic development has been associated with growing Russian presence, changes in the characteristics of traditional forms of employment, mounting population pressure in rural areas and increasing opportunities for education and social mobility. Such changes appear to increase the likelihood that the indigenous male population may begin to compete for the same jobs as those of Russian women and eventually those of Russian men. Even in rural areas the mobilization of the indigenous female population is leading to female entry in areas that had been exclusively male. Geographic segregation may no longer sustain occupational segregation by gender or ethnicity.

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Footnotes

1. Soviet Central Asia is comprised of four of the fifteen Soviet republics: Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan.
2. In 1984 there were nearly 4.8 million workers and employees in Uzbekistan. In the three other republics of Central Asia there was a total of 3.1 million workers and employees. The only republics with a larger work force than Uzbekistan were Russian Republic (67.2 million), the Ukraine (20.6 million) and Kazakhstan (6.4 million).
3. These estimates are derived by manipulating census data regarding the educational attainment of employed persons by ethnicity and gender (Sacks 1982, pp. 80-81).
4. The abundant supply of female labor in the Russian Republic, the Ukraine and Belorussia was due to a culture that placed fewer restrictions on female activity, to the greater impact of Soviet policy that both directly and indirectly fostered female employment, and to the severe decimation of the male population especially during World War II (Lapidus 1978; Sacks 1976).
5. In the field of medicine this appears to have been countered by government efforts in the USSR as a whole to increase male representation (see Dodge 1977; Sacks 1982, pp. 168-69).
6. Based on evidence of questionable origin, Feshbach (1985, pp. 191-192) shows that women aged 40-44 in rural Uzbekistan in 1979 comprised only 80 percent of the number age 20-24 as shown in the 1959 census. He concludes that this drop "may have been one of the
successes of the Soviet authorities in encouraging them to find jobs in cities, especially in light and food industries." See also Lubin 1984, p 86.

7. This category does not appear in the Soviet census. It is a residual category calculated by subtracting the number of workers in all the nonprofessional categories for which data are available by gender from the total number of nonprofessional workers (see Sacks 1982, pp. 40, 102-3).

8. This must be interpreted cautiously, for some of this rise is due to a change in the classification of population points from rural to urban.

9. Comparable data are unavailable from the 1979 census.
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Table I

Percentage Urban by Gender and Percentage Female by Residence For Branches of the Economy in 1970, Uzbekistan and the Russian Republic\(^a\)  
(Employed population only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches of the economy</th>
<th>(1) Percentage urban</th>
<th>(2) Percentage urban</th>
<th>(3) Difference(^b)</th>
<th>(4) Percentage female</th>
<th>(5) Percentage female</th>
<th>(6) Difference(^c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, public catering, material-technical supplies</td>
<td>56.9 77.8  20.9</td>
<td>29.2 52.2  23.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, science &amp; public health</td>
<td>45.6 67.6  22.0</td>
<td>47.5 69.3  21.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal housing, consumer services, administration &amp; the finance-credit system</td>
<td>68.9 81.5  12.6</td>
<td>27.7 43.2  15.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, construction, transportation &amp; communication</td>
<td>74.1 87.1  13.0</td>
<td>19.9 37.0  17.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, public catering, material-technical supplies</td>
<td>71.2 78.1  6.9</td>
<td>72.3 79.0  6.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, science &amp; public health</td>
<td>75.7 73.2  -2.5</td>
<td>74.5 72.0  -2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal housing, consumer services, administration &amp; the finance-credit system</td>
<td>81.8 85.4  3.6</td>
<td>43.3 49.8  6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, construction, transportation &amp; communication</td>
<td>83.0 86.5  3.5</td>
<td>35.8 42.1  6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Based on Ts.S.U. SSSR 1973b, Tables 13 and 16.  

\(^b\) The percentage urban among females minus the percentage urban among males.  

\(^c\) The percentage female in urban areas minus the percentage female in rural areas.
Table 2


| Occupation or division | Uzbekistan/RSFSR ratio | Percentage Female | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|---|---|
|                        | (1) Uzbekistan          | (2) RSFSR        | (3) | (4) Uzbekistan | (5) RSFSR | (6) 1939 | (7) 1959 | (8) 1970 | (9) 1970 |
|                        | Males       | Females   | Total | Uzbekistan | RSFSR | 1939 | 1959 | 1970 | 1970 |
| Nonprofessional        |                |            |      |            |     |       |       |       |       |
| Textile weavers        | 1.214        | .065      | .083 | 36.3       | 65.6 | 77.5  | 98.5  |       |       |
| Sales personnel        | .504         | .028      | .049 | 40.5       | 45.9 | 54.1  | 95.5  |       |       |
| Cooks                  | .352         | .035      | .058 | 50.6       | 63.9 | 55.6  | 92.7  |       |       |
| Waiters                | .117         | .035      | .058 | 90.5       | 97.6 | 89.5  | 96.3  |       |       |
| Postal workers         | .258         | .020      | .044 | 20.2       | 37.4 | 40.4  | 89.8  |       |       |
| Food workers           | .121         | .016      | .035 | 13.4       | 36.7 | 38.4  | 82.4  |       |       |
| Agriculture (excluding workers in the private sector) | .140 | .187 | .164 | 47.2 | 52.8 | 58.9 | 51.8 |
| Professional and semiprofessional |                |            |      |            |     |       |       |       |       |
| Agronomists            | .158         | .034      | .107 | 9.6b       | 15.5 | 13.1  | 41.1  |       |       |
| Physicians             | .123         | .051      | .067 | 55.8       | 67.6 | 58.6  | 77.4  |       |       |
| Dentists               | .136         | .031      | .049 | 69.9       | 61.3 | 52.7  | 83.1  |       |       |
| Feldshers, midwives    | .246         | .042      | .066 | 68.5       | 59.3 | 55.7  | 88.0  |       |       |
| Pharmacists            | .485         | .041      | .052 | 85.3       | 83.6 | 76.3  | 97.4  |       |       |
| Nurses                 | .427         | .065      | .067 | 94.9       | 98.3 | 96.4  | 99.4  |       |       |
| Nursery directors and training personnel | .243 | .034 | .035 | 99.5 | 99.1 | 98.1 | 99.7 |       |       |