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 BREZHNEV'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET IDEOLOGY

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PREFACE

This report is one of 13 separate papers by different authors which, assembled, will constitute the chapters of a Festschrift volume in honor of Professor Vera S. Dunham, to be published by Westview Press. The papers will be distributed individually to government readers by the Council in advance of editing and publication by the Press, and therefore, may not be identical to the versions ultimately published.

The Contents for the entire series appears immediately following this Preface.

As distributed by the Council, each individual report will contain this Preface, the Contents, the Editor's Introduction for the pertinent division (I, II, or III) of the volume, and the separate paper itself.

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(Editors' Introduction)

III. The Language of Ideology

For Vera Dunham, Soviet ideology has always been part of a broader political culture, existing within a particular social and historical context and necessarily changing over time. Her sensitivity to language makes her observations on this process of evolution particularly insightful. One example is her discussion of the "pronominal shift" in Soviet poetry, illuminating important changes in Soviet political culture and regime values during the thirty years following the October Revolution.

Early post-revolutionary poetry proclaimed the invincibility of the collective, focusing on the "we" that made the revolution and destroyed the old order. Eventually, however, revolutionary ardor waned, particularly as a result of Stalin's accusations against many of the revolution's heroes. In the 1930s, at the height of the purges and Stalin's power, "he" became the most important pronoun. And there was no question in the Soviet reader's mind to whom "he" referred. During the war, when it became clear that "he" was not invincible and the very existence of Soviet society was threatened by the disaster of the war, personal values began to enter Soviet lyrics. "I" replaced "he" as the center of poetic attention. After the war, when the danger to the regime had passed, one of the goals of the cultural retrenchment headed by Andrei Zhdanov was the restoration of the centrality of regime values in literature, downplaying the focus on individual needs and extolling the virtues of the positive hero engaged in the postwar reconstruction effort.

Following Vera Dunham's example, the essays in this section examine different aspects of ideology in terms of their historical evolution and changing semantic formulation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper traces the emergence and decline of the Brezhnev ideological doctrine "Developed Socialism" as (1) an instrument of Soviet efforts to restore the primacy of the USSR in the world communist movement in the aftermath of Khrushchev's destalinization and in the face of Chinese challenge; and as (2) a vehicle of debate over the proper distance for Brezhnev policy to maintain from both the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. The author concludes that on both counts the doctrine lost its utility, by end of the 1970s in the area of Soviet primacy, and among Brezhnev's successors as a "political formula" for domestic policy debate and definition.

The author concludes that the virtual abandonment of "developed socialism" by Gorbachev suggests that a new ideological formula is being developed to serve as the theoretical basis for "restructuring" and "glasnost". While this formula will certainly maintain continuity with the de-Stalinizing policies of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, it will not contain any references to the U.S.S.R. as the center of the world communist movement. As part of Gorbachev's overall reform program, the Soviet Union is now portrayed as more or less an equal partner in the communist movement and is no longer presented as the only model for socialist development. While such "new thinking" is always subject to reinterpretation,

especially in the event of backlash to Gorbachev's policies, it appears that the Soviets are content to treat developed socialism as an historical concept appropriate to the Brezhnev era, when the stated Soviet policy regarding international communism was quite different.

**DEVELOPED SOCIALISM:
BREZHNEV'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET IDEOLOGY**

By Terry L. Thompson

In the Soviet Union, as in other Leninist systems, any policy change must be related by its makers to the broader context of official ideology. Otherwise the authority and legitimacy of the leaders supporting the policy would be brought into question. But Lenin's ideology has been modified many times by his successors, primarily because of the need to develop policy in areas not addressed in Lenin's writings. At times it has been unclear whether changes in the official ideology have resulted in policy decisions or have resulted from such decisions; more often than not it appears that new directions in policy have led to a restatement of the official ideology.

Stalin, for example, reversed the Leninist concept of a worldwide communist revolution with his notion of "socialism in one country" in the 1930s, allowing him to direct more resources to the development of a Soviet industrial base. Khrushchev, as part of his overall effort to restore normalcy to the Soviet political system after Stalin, publicized the concept of the "all-people's state" which promoted wider participation in the political system than had ever been possible under Stalin.

Like his predecessors, Leonid Brezhnev also modified the official ideology to reflect his policy preferences. His contribution to Marxism-Leninism was the concept of "developed socialism" (razvitoi sotsializm). Although this concept has been

openly discussed in the Soviet press, neither its broader significance nor the debate it stimulated among Soviet specialists were readily apparent to Soviet or Western readers. As a change to official ideology, developed socialism had both visible and less visible aspects. The more visible aspect had to do with Soviet domestic policy. As several scholars have pointed out, developed socialism was significant in terms of Soviet domestic policy and was particularly useful in providing an ideological framework for political change.¹ In my view, however, the most important use of developed socialism was to signal the reestablishment of Soviet primacy within the international communist movement. It was also used to debate the question of Stalinism within the Soviet ideological establishment. Neither of these aspects of developed socialism was discussed in Pravda editorials, but both were evident in specialist articles published in Pravda and theoretical journals such as Kommunist and Voprosy Filosofii.

According to the Soviet definition, "developed socialism" is the second stage in the transition from socialism to communism, and was attained by the USSR in the "early 1960s" and in certain countries of Eastern Europe by the "mid-1970s."² In contrast to this explanation, however, the published record reveals quite a different chronology. Although most Soviet writers have used "developed" socialism synonymously with "mature" socialism, introduced by Khrushchev at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in 1961, the USSR was not said to be a "developed socialist society"

by any of its leaders until Leonid Brezhnev first used the term in his 1967 speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Moreover, despite the Soviet claim that developed socialism originated in the U.S.S.R., the concept in fact originated in Eastern Europe, and this was the context in which it was introduced into the Soviet ideological vocabulary.

Although it did not officially become a component of Soviet ideology until the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971, developed socialism was introduced in the mid-1960s as part of a coordinated Soviet effort to restore the primacy of the USSR in the world communist movement. This became necessary because of the increasing belligerence of the Chinese and the growing assertiveness of the Eastern European communist regimes in the aftermath of Khrushchev's speeches to the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956. The turmoil in the communist movement in the subsequent eight years had brought Soviet prestige into question. Worst of all from the Soviet perspective, the erosion of Soviet authority threatened Soviet economic and political interests in Eastern Europe and, because of the Vietnam War, in Southeast Asia as well. Discussions of developed socialism in the mid- and late-1960s thus reflected a concerted effort on the part of the new Soviet leadership to reestablish Soviet domination over an increasingly rebellious communist community. The adoption of the concept into official ideology in 1971 reflected the Soviet perception that such dominance had been restored.

Besides its importance in Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev, developed socialism was also a crucial aspect of another key policy goal: distancing the Brezhnev regime from that of both Khrushchev and Stalin. This became clear in the debate about developed socialism conducted by Soviet ideological specialists in the late-1960s, after the term had been introduced into the Soviet ideological vocabulary but before it was accepted as a component of official ideology. While it comes as no surprise that the regime that ousted Khrushchev in 1964 wanted to distance itself as much as possible from his policies, it is noteworthy that a need to distance the Brezhnev leadership from Stalin's policies was so strongly perceived. Yet that is the clear implication of much of the debate about whether to declare developed socialism a new stage in socialist evolution.

Reasserting Soviet Primacy

The need to reestablish Soviet primacy among world communist parties arose from the disarray that had characterized the communist world under Khrushchev. Even before the 1956 denunciation of Stalin in his secret speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, Khrushchev had encouraged diversity for his fellow communist leaders by replacing much of the former political dependence on Stalin with a system of semi-autonomous institutional and economic arrangements, such as the Warsaw Pact and a revitalized Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The abolition of the Cominform in 1956 was another measure designed to remove the essence of Stalinist control over Eastern Europe.³

Khrushchev also made an important ideological concession in his open speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress when he acknowledged that power could be attained through other than revolutionary means, implicitly renouncing the Leninist maxim that communists must come to power through the use of force.⁴ Despite efforts by prominent Soviet ideologists such as Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev to maintain Soviet primacy after the 20th Party Congress,⁵ the combined effect of Khrushchev's de-Stalinizing policies and his relaxation of traditional ideological demands created too much strain on communist leaderships accustomed to the iron rule of Stalin. This resulted in the East German, Polish, and Hungarian events of 1956.⁶

Fears about the possible effects of the loss of Soviet authority were soon confirmed by Chinese efforts to "reconstruct a center" in the communist movement. This was significant especially in Eastern Europe where Wladyslaw Gomulka and Todor Zhivkov attempted to use Chinese ideological authority to develop policies increasing their independence from Moscow.⁷ Although the Chinese did intervene to affirm Soviet primacy at the 1957 Moscow conference of communist parties, Mao Zedong the next year launched the Great Leap Forward, designed to end Soviet ideological, economic, and military domination of the PRC. The worst aspect of the Great Leap from the Soviet perspective was its emphasis on people's communes as the foundation for communist construction. Not only did this fly in the face of the Soviet approach to communism through industrialization, it also contained the

dangerous promise that the PRC would become the first country to attain communism.⁸

The Soviet response to the Great Leap was provided in the speeches to the Twenty-first "Extraordinary" CPSU Congress in 1959. Designated the "Congress of the Builders of Communism," this meeting was devoted exclusively to discussions of the Seven-Year Plan, designed to put the USSR on the threshold of communism (thus leaping ahead of the Great Leap). Documents from the congress emphasized heavy industry as the only possible basis for communist construction, providing a vivid contrast to the Chinese notion of an agrarian economy. Statements stressing the integral relationship between industrial development and Marxism--Leninism were clearly aimed at the Chinese.⁹ The tension created by the ideological conflict was further exacerbated later in 1959 after the Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal that would have given the USSR broader control over the Chinese military in return for increased assistance in the development of China's nuclear capacity.¹⁰

The Sino-Soviet split became public knowledge in 1960 and, together with Khrushchev's failure to reach agreement with the US over the rearmament of West Germany and the deteriorating state of US-Soviet relations in general, led to a decline in Soviet prestige. This decline was emphasized at the 1960 Budapest communist conference at which the Chinese position regarding the non-peaceful transition to socialism was accepted. This contradicted Khrushchev's 1956 revision of this notion and

"conferred legitimacy on the de facto existence of two centers" of international communism in Moscow and Beijing.¹¹ The Budapest conference also signalled the beginning of open polemics between China and the Soviet Union and led to the complete abandonment of Soviet military and technical aid to the PRC.¹² Taking full advantage of their newly gained prestige, the Chinese rubbed salt into Soviet wounds by establishing "Maoist" parties in certain Third World countries.¹³

The Soviet response to this challenge to their international authority was presented at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in 1961. Renewing the social Darwinist argument first advanced at the Twenty-first Congress, Soviet ideologists expounded on the distinction between primitive and advanced societies to demonstrate that the USSR was by definition farther ahead on the road to communism. In his main speech to the congress, Khrushchev stressed particularly the contrast between Soviet and Chinese societies, proclaiming that all classes hostile to socialism had been eliminated in the USSR and that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had evolved into the "all-people's state" where millions of ordinary Soviet citizens were participating in the daily tasks of administration and government.¹⁴ Articles published after the party congress concentrated on other differences between Soviet and Chinese societies, addressing particularly the "Asiatic mode of production" characteristic of repressive oriental societies. The purpose of these discussions was to indicate that the PRC not only was not advancing towards communism

but was in fact regressing to a more primitive form of society.¹⁵

The Chinese countered these charges by condemning the Soviet "treason" against Marxism-Leninism. Mao himself responded to the concept of the all-people's state, declaring that the dictatorship of the proletariat would have to be continued for "five to ten generations or one or several centuries" in order to prevent the formation of new exploiting classes that would inevitably result from abandoning proletarian government.¹⁶

By the mid-1960s, what had begun as an ideological debate between Moscow and Beijing became a dispute about key policy issues. The lack of Soviet nuclear assistance still perturbed the Chinese, as reflected in their severe criticism of the Soviet Union for signing the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.¹⁷ The question of support to the North Vietnamese in their intensifying struggle with the United States also became a key policy concern for both countries, especially the USSR. This was crucial in terms of the broader ideological question regarding Soviet primacy in the communist movement: if the Soviets were to regain control of world communism, they would have to provide assistance to a communist regime engaged in a shooting conflict with the United States. But the provision of such assistance could not be taken for granted, particularly in light of the dismal performance of the Soviet Navy in the Cuban crisis (thus precluding supply of North Vietnam by sea) and the close relationship that already existed between Hanoi and Beijing.¹⁸ The Soviet Union would have to secure a land route through China if there were to be any

possibility of providing the quantity of supplies required by North Vietnam.¹⁹

By the time of Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964, the continuing dispute on these key issues and the large doses of ideological venom being exchanged by Moscow and Beijing made it clear that international communism had lost its former solidarity. The Sino-Soviet rift had led not only to the "decolonization" of communist states and parties, but had also provided the basis for increasing polycentrism.²⁰ To say, however, that superior Soviet economic and military strength would have prevented any Chinese attempt to claim leadership of the communist movement misses the essential point.²¹ What was important, as was clear on the question of support to the Vietnamese, was that ideological disagreement had delayed the attainment of a critical strategic objective--gaining a Soviet foothold in Southeast Asia--and that the Soviet loss of ideological (and, therefore, political) control over other communist countries could lead to similar setbacks in the future.

The initial response of the Brezhnev regime to the crisis over Vietnam was to initiate a conciliatory policy toward the Chinese.²² Ideological polemics were suspended and a series of meetings was held with Chinese leaders. Kosygin's trips to Hanoi, Beijing, and Pyongyang in February 1965 were plainly announced as part of an ongoing effort to achieve agreement over the question of unified communist support to North Vietnam.²³ The Soviet initiative evidently had the desired effect, for by March 1965 the

Chinese had granted the minimal transit rights necessary for the Soviets to supply the North Vietnamese.²⁴ This agreement was followed by a positive sign from the Soviets that relations should continue to improve. In April, Serge D. Lapin, Deputy Foreign Minister and a career diplomat, replaced Stepan V. Chervonenko, a Khrushchev appointee with no previous diplomatic experience, as ambassador to Beijing.²⁵ Other signs that relations were improving included the resumption of Sino-Soviet trade negotiations and the resolution of details leading to the resumption of technical cooperation between the two countries.²⁶

However, the renewed cordiality between the two countries was short-lived. The US escalation in Vietnam in mid-1965 led to increased tension once again and forced the Soviets to press China for direct intervention into the war, or at a minimum, for the use of Chinese bases to expedite Soviet resupply of the North Vietnamese by air. The internal conflict over this issue among the Chinese leadership was evidently intense, with a strong pro-Soviet group backing Moscow's proposals and threatening Mao's position. Stalling on a decision for over six months, Mao eventually chose neither to intervene in Vietnam nor to grant the Soviet request for bases. Instead, he launched the Cultural Revolution, presumably in order to consolidate his power within the Chinese leadership.²⁷

Although the Soviet Union remained officially cordial in public statements to and about the Chinese during this period (perhaps indicating that the Soviets hoped for continued improve-

ment despite the Cultural Revolution), by mid-1965 subtle criticism was again being directed towards Beijing. Buried in Pravda articles on the 45th anniversary of Lenin's "Left Wing Communism," the 30th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress, the 50th anniversary of the Zimmerwald Conference and other obscure dates in communist history, this criticism contained appeals for unity and warnings against diversity.²⁸ By mid-1966, when the Cultural Revolution was officially begun, Soviet comments became more direct and more blunt. The Soviets revealed, for example, that the Chinese had twice (in November 1964 and February 1965) rejected a broad program for normalizing relations.²⁹ As the rift between the two communist powers widened once more, Soviet hostility was openly stated in the press, where Chinese attempts to replace Lenin's thoughts with the ideas of Mao Zedong were attacked and ridiculed.³⁰

It was against this background of renewed Sino-Soviet hostility that developed socialism was introduced into Soviet ideology. In a Pravda article of December 1966, Fedor Burlatskii described developed socialism as it had been presented by the Bulgarians and Hungarians at their respective party congresses³¹.

He also discussed similar statements made by the East Germans, Poles, and Czechs. Generalizing from these statements and from the experience of the Soviet Union, Burlatskii presented four characteristics of a developed socialist society. Economically, it provided for the creation of an economic system that answered the demands of the scientific-technical revolution and allowed for

greater labor productivity than capitalism. It also called for raising the level of agricultural production to that of industry, thus providing greater satisfaction of the needs of the population. Socially, a developed socialist society was characterized by a strengthened role of the working class, by the unity of all peoples, and by interpersonal relations built on camaraderie and socialist morality. Politically, a developed socialist society was led by the party operating on scientific principles of leadership. It also featured much greater participation by the masses in the administration of governmental affairs. Ideologically, a strengthened and unified world view based on Marxism-Leninism was the salient feature of developed socialism.

Concentrating on East European economic development, Burlatskii established the main thrust of the discussion concerning developed socialism as it evolved during the next five years. This approach extolled the virtues of Soviet-style economic development based on industry while rejecting the Chinese model based on agriculture. To reinforce the distinction between Soviet and Chinese approaches to economic and societal development, the countries of Eastern Europe were aligned with the Soviet Union in taking the path of industrialization. Equating developed socialism with the "complete construction of socialism" (polnoe postroenie sotsializma), Burlatskii asserted that despite some differences these Eastern European countries had all been engaged in a broad process of economic reform similar to that

underway in the USSR. They had also been involved in developing new socio-political relationships resulting from the economic reforms.³² Burlatskii pointed out that this was the natural progression of socialist evolution, and that Chinese efforts to skip the "scientific" stages of historical development were destined to fail. The flaw in the Chinese approach (evident in the Cultural Revolution) was that it emphasized only the political aspects of societal development, creating an imbalance in the entire set of political, economic, and social relationships inherent in any society. In contrast, developed socialism was to be a long period of the "all-around development of socialist society," affecting not only politics but economics and culture as well.³³

Developed socialism was thus the latest iteration of the arguments presented against the Chinese at the Twenty-first and Twenty-second CPSU congresses. Directed this time against Mao and the Cultural Revolution, the contrast between Soviet and East European industrialized society and Chinese agrarian society was the same that had been used previously to discredit both the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and Chinese attempts at claiming supremacy after the Budapest conference in 1960. Soviet specialists added new elements to address specific characteristics of the Cultural Revolution. Academician T. Khachaturov, for example, accused Mao of establishing a "barracks regime" and predicted that the results of the Soviet 1966-70 Five Year Plan would fully justify the scientific, industrial type of development favored by the Soviet

Union.³⁴ Other specialists contrasted the role of the Communist Party and the growth of social democracy in the Soviet Union with the authoritarian nature of Mao's regime. The USSR and other countries that had completed the transition to socialism and "had begun or were beginning to build a developed socialist society" were utilizing the creative abilities of their citizens to build a more democratic system. The state apparatus and the party were the most important institutions for teaching citizens the values and methods of democracy and thus could not be undermined as they had been under Mao.³⁵

The threads of the economic and social relations aspects of the societal development argument were tied together by Vladislav Kelle, who later became an important advocate of developed socialism. Chief of the Historical Materialism Section of the Institute of Philosophy in the Academy of Sciences, Kelle criticized Mao for "ignoring the objective conditions and laws of societal development," and for "throwing the country far back into the past in economic and social terms." The most dangerous aspect of Mao's actions, Kelle pointed out, was that they were intended to lead to a new "essential stage in the development of socialist social relations," and to serve as a "model for other socialist countries to follow." But, as Soviet experience with agricultural communes after the October Revolution had proved, "socialist production relations cannot be developed on a backward material-technical base." The USSR had learned from this experience and had moved forward to a level characterized by

higher economic productivity and increasingly democratic social relations.³⁶ Restating the same argument a year later, Kh. Momdzhian placed the contrast between the Soviet and Chinese approaches in ideological perspective by asserting that "communism can only be built on the basis of the achievements of developed socialism." He added that "any voluntaristic attempts to jump through the essential stages of historical progress will invariably end in defeat."³⁷

Thus, developed socialism was presented as a logical step in the evolution of socialist societies. Based on industrial development and a corresponding improvement in social relations, developed socialism was presented as a necessary stage in socialist development. It could therefore not be skipped, as the Chinese had attempted to do with the Cultural Revolution. More than simply a revisiting of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute of the late 1950's, however, the use of developed socialism and especially the key point that the Soviet Union was the first to attain this necessary stage of development reflected a concerted Soviet effort to reestablish political and ideological primacy within the world communist movement.

As part of this effort, and directly connected to the ideological and policy struggle with China, the Brezhnev regime also began to revitalize economic and political ties with Eastern Europe. One of the first steps taken by the new regime was to renew bilateral treaties and initiate a series of joint meetings. Soviet treaties of friendship were signed with Bulgaria and

Hungary in 1967 and an important meeting emphasizing communist unity was held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia the same year.³⁸ Unity was the main issue in all such meetings, and was the only item on the published agenda for the Moscow International Communist Conference originally scheduled for December 1968, but subsequently postponed until June 1969. The implicit goal of using this conference to reestablish Soviet primacy was broadly hinted at many times in the Soviet press, beginning with the original call for a conference in 1967.³⁹ The measures taken towards Eastern Europe, in other words, were part of the overall Soviet effort to reestablish dominance in world communism that was signalled most visibly by the use of developed socialism to discredit the Chinese.

One of the most important tactics in the Soviet effort to reestablish the USSR as the center of the communist world was the revitalization of Problemy Mira i Sotsializma (PMS), the Prague--based theoretical journal established after the 1958 World Communist Conference.⁴⁰ Georgii P. Frantsov⁴¹ was sent to Prague as Chief Editor of PMS in 1964. Under his leadership, the journal became an important forum for discussions about developed socialism. However, problems soon emerged with these discussions.

This was not because of difficulties created by the Chinese, but because of disagreement within the Soviet ideological establishment itself. Although developed socialism was eventually acknowledged as a new stage in Marxism-Leninism, it was not until

after a thorough debate had been conducted on the subject by some of the most powerful figures in the Soviet ideological hierarchy.

The Ideological Debate

The central issue in the Soviet debate over developed socialism was whether to declare a new stage of communist evolution. Party leaders and ideological specialists in favor of developed socialism generally agreed that a new stage of Soviet ideological development had already begun, dating its origins between 1956-61, or in other words between Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the adoption of the 1961 Party Program.

Those opposed to creating a new stage based their arguments on the writings of Marx and Lenin, objecting to any alteration either to Marx's two stages of communism or Lenin's naming these stages "socialism" and "communism."⁴²

More than an esoteric dispute about ideology, however, this was in fact a debate about the proper role of Stalin in the historical and political development of the USSR. Those supporting developed socialism saw in the concept a chance to separate the Stalinist period from the post-Stalin era, thereby emphasizing the return to normalcy in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. Opponents of developed socialism saw no such boundary, insisting rather on maintaining the continuity of all regimes since Lenin. What began as an attempt to counter the Chinese and to shore up the Soviet position in the international communist

movement had suddenly formed the backdrop for a discussion of the most sensitive topic in Soviet history -- Stalinism.⁴³

Despite Burlatskii's explanation of developed socialism and the increasing use of the term by East European leaders (notably Walter Ulbricht⁴⁴), Soviet ideologists in the late 1960s were slow to adopt "developed socialism." Other phrases were instead applied to the "current stage of communist construction." As used at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress and elsewhere, these phrases ranged from the Khrushchevian "mature socialism" and "all-out building of communism" to the awkward "stage of building the material-technical basis of communism" and the bland "building the new society."⁴⁵ It was clear from the frequent criticism of ideological decline under Khrushchev that the new regime wanted to distance itself from its immediate predecessor. Presumably this meant abandoning "mature socialism" and the "all-out building of communism," both of which were used extensively during the last years of Khrushchev's rule. But these terms continued to be used because no viable alternative was available. Specialists writing about ideology were thus caught between the need to reflect "creatively" on the policies of the new regime and the demand to maintain continuity with established doctrine. It was crucial, in other words, to stress the progress made by Brezhnev while at the same time demonstrating that official ideology had remained constant since Lenin.

The discussion regarding stages of socialism was divided between two schools of thought. The first, emphasizing the

de-Stalinizing programs of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, was represented by specialists like Mikhail Iovchuk, Chief of the Historical Philosophy Section of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Iovchuk distinguished four stages of socialism. The first, "the birth of socialist ideology and the formation of the proletarian class consciousness under socialism," began in Russia during the industrial riots of 1895-96 and continued until the October Revolution. The second stage, "the development of class consciousness," included the transformation of the Soviet economy from capitalism to socialism and lasted until the "mid-1930s." The third stage, "the beginning of the transition to communism," covered the period 1936-55. This was followed by the fourth or "current stage," the "transition to the all-out building of communism." His periodization thus separated the Khrushchev and Stalin periods, in effect using Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech as the dividing line between the two. He made no distinction between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, although this was presumably because he wrote his article at about the time the new leadership was coming to power.⁴⁶

Rikhard Kosolapov, Chief Editor of Kommunist and an early and important advocate of developed socialism, also favored four stages of socialism. Writing in 1979 after the original debate on developed socialism had ended, he placed the beginning of the fourth stage in the "late 1960s," roughly coinciding with the initial use of developed socialism by Brezhnev in 1967 (see below), but disregarding the similarity between "developed" and

"mature" socialism.⁴⁷ The latest versions of this periodization have placed the origins of the developed or mature stage of socialism in the early 1960s in the USSR and in the early 1970s in some countries of Eastern Europe. This approach, which links the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, ignores the discussions on developed socialism in Eastern Europe in the 1960s and avoids mentioning that the concept in fact originated there. Most important, however, was that Kosolapov, like others wanting to declare developed socialism a new stage in Soviet socialist development, agreed on a general periodization that distinguished between Stalinist Russia and the post-Stalin period.

The second school of thought on socialist evolution ascribed no importance to the distinction between the Stalin and post--Stalin eras, much less to that between Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Spokesmen for this approach emphasized instead the integrity of Marxism-Leninism from its inception. This view, which is more of a refinement of the standard Soviet definition of socialism than a new periodization, made no allowance for temporary socio-political or economic changes of any kind. Grigorii Glezerman, for example, pro-rector of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, delineated only three stages of socialist development. The first, "the creation of the foundations of a socialist economy," presumably began with the October Revolution and ended in the "early 1930s." The second stage, "the victory of socialism," was attained in the "late 1930s." Glezerman's third phase, "the consolidation of socialism," began at the end of the 1930s and,

taken together with the two earlier periods, formed the complete stage of socialism. In other words, according to Glezerman, socialism was a "long stage of societal development" that was still in progress when he wrote about it in 1970.⁴⁸

Glezerman was supported in this approach by P. N. Fedoseev, Director of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) from 1967-71, and the most vocal opponent of developed socialism. Writing in 1968, Fedoseev especially agreed that "socialism, as foreseen by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism and as practical experience has shown, is not a brief stage on the road to communism, but a separate, comparatively lengthy stage of development."⁴⁹ Fedoseev's opposition to developed socialism was the most aggressive, and the fact that he continued to oppose the concept after Brezhnev himself used it in 1967 indicates the strength of his convictions, even if it casts doubt about the soundness of his political judgment.

As is clear from these two approaches to the periodization of Soviet socialist experience, the central question in the debate about a new stage of socialism was whether to acknowledge in theory Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, since this would be the necessary result of proclaiming a stage of socialism beginning in the 1950s or 1960s. Ideologists in favor of developed socialism were openly critical of Stalin. Iovchuk, for example, asserted that Stalin's thesis on the intensification of the class struggle that accompanied attainment of higher levels of social development caused a "basic distortion" in the proper Marxist-

-Leninist understanding of society. This distortion in turn had caused increased "ideological suspicion," "timidity" and the "absence of conflict theory" in the arts and sciences. The result of this combination was the eventual stagnation of scientific and artistic creativity.⁵⁰

In contrast, specialists who opposed introducing a new stage of socialism were less dogmatic in their judgment of Stalin and went so far as to defend Stalin in their ideological statements. F. Konstantinov, for example, formerly Chief Editor of Kommunist and from 1962-67 Director of the Institute of Philosophy in the USSR Academy of Sciences, was especially defensive on the question of Stalinism. He justified Stalin's actions as inevitable in the face of the tremendous opposition threatening to undermine the regime. According to Konstantinov, resistance came neither from enemies of the party nor from Stalin's personal enemies. It came instead from "anti-Leninists" who refused to recognize the notion of "socialism in one country," which Konstantinov claimed to be a doctrine of Lenin's. Implicitly acknowledging the ludicrousness of this statement, he went on in a remarkable piece of self-criticism to place the blame for Stalin's excesses on the party's "theoretical and philosophical cadres:"

The enemies of Leninism attacked fully armed. They had to be defeated theoretically in front of the people and the working class. Who did this? The party and its theoretical and philosophical cadres. Could this possibly have been done better, with fewer victims and at a lower cost? Yes, it is possible. But we were the first, and we had no models or historical examples. We were not free to choose the time frame for either industrialization or collectivization. In terms of industrial development, we had to cover ground in

ten years that others had covered in one hundred. Without struggling against dogmatism and various forms of revisionism, including philosophical revisionism, our Soviet country could not have achieved the victory of socialism.⁵¹

Konstantinov was apparently saying that he had once supported an important ideological revision -- socialism in one country -- only to see it used as the theoretical underpinning for the purges and Stalin's other excesses. He was therefore opposed to any more major changes in socialist theory, implicitly warning about possible negative ramifications that could return to haunt ideological specialists who had developed the theory in the first place.⁵²

The debate about developed socialism and the break with Stalinism it implied was conducted not only by individual specialists but by ideological institutions as well. The chief protagonists at this level were Frantsov's PMS in Prague and Fedoseev's IML in Moscow. Under Frantsov, PMS became a forum for advocates of developed socialism, particularly as it had evolved in Eastern Europe. Members of the Bulgarian and East German Communist Party central committees and politburos contributed numerous articles on the evolution of developed socialism and on the characteristics of this stage of communist development.⁵³ Frantsov personally supported the concept in a November 1967 Pravda article in which the USSR and "a group of other socialist countries" were said to have attained developed socialism.⁵⁴ This article and a companion piece in Voprosy Filosofii coincided with the initial use of developed socialism by Brezhnev in his

1967 speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, suggesting that this celebration was used by proponents of the new concept to orchestrate a "media blitz" to have developed socialism accepted by the entire community of ideological specialists as well as by communists throughout the world. ⁵⁵

Brezhnev's initial use of developed socialism suggests that the position advocated by PMS was supported by at least some of Brezhnev's speechwriters in the Central Committee secretariat, one of whom may have been Kosolapov.⁵⁶ In his speech, Brezhnev implicitly addressed the ideological conflict with the Chinese, particularly the aspect of that conflict dealing with social relations. As Khrushchev had done at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Brezhnev asserted that improved social relations in the Soviet Union had led to the growth of social democracy and creation of the "all-people's state" which had superceded the "dictatorship of the proletariat." He also touched on the internal Soviet debate on developed socialism. Providing support for those in favor of proclaiming a new stage of socialism, Brezhnev stated that communism could only be built on the basis of developed socialism. He also noted that developed socialism had already been achieved in the USSR, confirming that this was in accordance with the outline for development set forth in the 1961 Party Program. The last point was especially noteworthy since it placed Brezhnev's full authority on the side of those using developed socialism as an ideological framework to acknowledge the break with Stalin.⁵⁷

Despite Brezhnev's endorsement of developed socialism, Fedoseev and others in the ideological establishment remained opposed to the concept. Fedoseev's opposition was the most important because of the increased power that had been given to IML on ideological issues in 1967-8.⁵⁸ Fedoseev's (and IML's) main objection against creating a new stage of socialism was that this would alter the very foundations of Marxist-Leninist thought. Such a major change should be reserved for truly epochal discoveries, not those made "every year," but those "fundamentally transforming our ideas about reality."⁵⁹ The fact that he published this argument in PMS in 1967, at the same time the journal was publishing many articles supporting developed socialism, strongly implied that he considered the socioeconomic and political developments associated with the new stage of socialism to be routine and unworthy of recognition in official ideology.

Brezhnev's use of developed socialism did have some impact on Fedoseev, however. Several months later, he offered what amounted to a counterproposal by suggesting that the term "Leninism" be used to describe the current stage of socialist development. This idea first appeared in the theses prepared by IML for the 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, celebrated in April 1968. These theses, published in Pravda, were presented in order to demonstrate the "greatness of the scientific achievement" of Lenin's contributions to Marxism.⁶⁰ In a follow-up article entitled "Leninism is the Marxism of the 20th Century," Fedoseev

repeated much of what had been stated in the theses, emphasizing strongly that the current stage of development should be called simply "Leninism." The fact that the characteristics of Leninism as he described it -- a strengthened material-technical base, increased social democracy, improved class and nationality relations, and further development of the new man -- were identical to those offered by advocates of developed socialism indicated that Fedoseev had no quarrel with the substance of the new stage, only with its name.

In terms of the debate on developed socialism, the title "Leninism" was attractive for two reasons. First, it would credit the founder of the Soviet state with any and all ideological variations from Marxism, a position that could not be readily challenged. Second, it would preclude discussion of the sensitive issue of Stalinism. By lumping the entire Soviet experience under this rubric, the question of Stalin's, Khrushchev's, Brezhnev's or any other leader's contributions to ideology would become secondary. The problem of how to deal with the denunciation of Stalin in terms of theory would therefore disappear, for there would no longer be any need to subdivide the "comparatively lengthy stage of development" that had begun with the October Revolution. Such an approach would also be consistent with Fedoseev's argument for reserving new labels for truly epochal changes.⁶¹

Fedoseev's position was implicitly supported by Mikhail Suslov, in a way similar to that in which Brezhnev supported

Frantsov and PMS in his fiftieth anniversary speech. In his 1968 speech on the 150th anniversary of Marx's birth, Suslov emphasized that the Soviet Union was in the process of "building communism," adding that "we now understand the path to communism more clearly." Agreeing that socialism should be considered "an entire historical period in the development of communist society," he implied that developed socialism could not be treated as a new stage between socialism and communism, but only as a subphase of socialism. In a unique departure from previous periodizations, Suslov placed the beginnings of developed socialism in the 1930s and 1940s and pointed to the development of Soviet industry, the struggle for existence during the capitalist encirclement, and the fight against the Nazis in World War II as the formative elements. In his comprehensive approach to socialist evolution, Suslov used developed socialism in a more general way than those arguing whether it should be considered a new stage of socialist development. Most important, however, Suslov's approach eliminated the requirement for dealing with the question of Stalin by implicitly ascribing the origins of the concept to Stalin himself.⁶²

Suslov's speech was the last major contribution in the debate over developed socialism. By mid-1968, ideological specialists on both sides of the issue had redirected their efforts towards events in Czechoslovakia. Ideologists who formerly wrote descriptions and explanations of developed socialism switched to broader discussions of communist theory in general to emphasize

the need for unity. Iovchuk, for example, contributed an article criticizing both pluralist tendencies among Marxist parties and theories of convergence being offered by Western specialists.⁶³ I. Pomelov, who in early 1967 had described the increasing democratization of developed socialist society, was in July 1968 more concerned about delineating the "essential characteristics and principles of socialism inherent in the new society in all socialist countries."⁶⁴ Similarly, Professor S. M. Kovalev, who in 1966 had been one of the first to refer to a "developed socialist economy,"⁶⁵ examined in late 1968 the "counterrevolutionary" situation in Czechoslovakia and fully justified the "fraternal assistance" of Soviet troops to protect the integrity of socialism.⁶⁶ In a separate article he provided perhaps the most succinct theoretical justification for the Brezhnev Doctrine:

The people of socialist countries and communist parties indisputably have the freedom and must have the freedom for determining the paths of development for their country. However, their decision must not cause damage either to socialism in their own country or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries or the international workers' movement in general in the struggle to achieve socialism.⁶⁷

The end of the discussion on developed socialism was accompanied by a tightening of the ideological reins in general. The strongest evidence that a crackdown was underway occurred when Frantsov was removed from the Chief Editor's job at PMS and transferred back to Moscow, probably in 1968, where he became Fedoseev's deputy at IML. The subject of developed socialism was

not addressed under the new editor of PMS, K. Zarodov, until immediately prior to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971 when developed socialism became part of official Soviet ideology. Frantsov subsequently published a mea culpa in Pravda when he called for a unified socialist ideology that could be directed against bourgeois ideologists using Czechoslovakia as an example of the deterioration of Marxism-Leninism. In contrast to his earlier encouragement of discussions on the various paths to socialism, Frantsov now claimed that the Soviet experience contained "general rules" that must be followed by any country building socialism.⁶⁸

Soviet Primacy Restored

Developed socialism reappeared in Soviet ideological literature in 1969, probably to signal renewed Soviet strength after Czechoslovakia. There was no evidence of the previous ideological debate, suggesting that the question about recognizing a new stage of communist development had been put to rest.⁶⁹ Moreover, the debate about Stalinism that had evolved from the discussion on developed socialism disappeared from the pages of Soviet ideological and party journals. The primary use of developed socialism at this time was to call attention to the enhanced Soviet position with respect to both China and Eastern Europe as well as to signal an end to Soviet tolerance of ideological diversity. Although Soviet gains were to be eventually undermined in the mid-1970s by the more dangerous

diversity represented by Eurocommunism, in 1969-70 the Soviet Union was confident about its enhanced prestige among world communists.⁷⁰

Reflecting this confidence, Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe and China in the years immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia was characterized by increasing power and self-assurance. Having cauterized the wound opened by ideological reformism in Prague, the Soviets attempted to take advantage of their gains in Eastern Europe by pursuing a greater degree of economic integration than had previously been possible. Specific bilateral agreements on the production of key industrial goods were followed by several CMEA executive sessions emphasizing the need for overall coordination of economic planning and, in 1971, by publication of the CMEA Comprehensive Program for economic development.⁷¹ Similar progress was made in the struggle with China, whose failed attempt to gain influence in Eastern Europe after the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been compounded by the embarrassing defeat of Chinese troops by the Soviets at the Ussuri River clashes in early 1969. The subsequent Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border had the intended effect of bringing the Chinese to the negotiating table. The obvious tilt in the correlation of forces towards the U.S.S.R. after these events resulted in Chinese abandonment of their claim to leadership of world communism.⁷²

The Soviets began to publicize their enhanced prestige at the June 1969 conference of the International Communist Movement, held

in Moscow. In his speech to the conference, Brezhnev pointed with pride to the impressive achievements of the U.S.S.R. and to its status as a world power. Criticizing the Chinese severely for supporting the imperialists in time of crisis,⁷³ he accused Beijing of causing a split in communist unity through its great power chauvinism and attempts to gain hegemony over world communism.⁷⁴ He directed his strongest criticism at the decisions of the Ninth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, held in April 1969, where the Chinese had declared that the thoughts of Mao Zedong should be considered the "Marxism-Leninism of the contemporary epoch."⁷⁵ Brezhnev pledged that the U.S.S.R. would conduct a "decisive struggle against the divisive policies of Beijing" and against the PRC's "great power pretensions" in foreign policy.⁷⁶ Despite the strong case made by Brezhnev, however, any Soviet hopes that the conference would expel Beijing from the communist movement were dashed when participants refused to deal with the Chinese problem.⁷⁷ Instead, the conference focused on unity in general, on economic cooperation between CMEA members, and on threats to the integrity of socialist ideology.⁷⁸ It was in the latter that developed socialism received its most important justification.

Although Brezhnev mentioned developed socialism only once in his speech to the conference, it was significant both in terms of the revitalized Soviet international position and the former Soviet ideological debate. Echoing the societal development argument previously advanced against the Chinese and the earlier

PMS discussions on developed socialism, Brezhnev claimed that, "during the decade of the 1960s, many fraternal countries completed construction of the foundations of socialism and began to build a developed socialist society." Later in his speech, he discussed the dangers of revisionism and, in a clear reference to Czechoslovakia, asserted that no matter what problems any single country might encounter during the transition to socialism, "no difficulties could or can alter the general principles of socialist development."⁷⁹ In his emphasis on advanced societal development and ideological conformity, Brezhnev thus revealed the new Soviet formula for developed socialism: the concept would be applied to underline the unity of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (vs. China); and ideological purity would be maintained by Moscow, by force if necessary. In terms of the Soviet-East European relationship itself, developed socialism thus became the theoretical underpinning of what Sarah Terry has termed "a revamped strategy of alliance management" that became evident in the early 1970s.⁸⁰

The political undertone implied by the need for unity among communists was abundantly clear in the new emphasis on developed socialism. Brezhnev stressed this in a separate article describing the events leading up to the conference:

The task of erecting a barricade in the path of the centrifugal aspirations in the communist movement and of achieving a strengthening of unity in the ranks of fraternal parties had become urgent. Marxist-Leninist parties therefore opened the struggle for unity in the communist movement in all directions and on the broadest front.⁸¹

The renewed urgency attached to the need for unity was reflected in appeals for increased cooperation between ideological specialists in all socialist countries and in a second media blitz in all major Soviet theoretical journals. As one tactic in the new campaign, East European leaders were again encouraged in the months preceding and following the June 1969 conference to describe the achievements of their "developed socialist" societies.⁸² In a significant development regarding the origins of the concept, Soviet and East German ideologists announced in July 1969 that they had agreed on "all questions of the theory and practice of socialist and communist construction," acknowledging implicitly that despite the fact East Germany in 1967 had already published a "developed socialist" constitution, the U.S.S.R. would be credited as the first country to actually achieve developed socialism.⁸³ Pravda readers who had not been following ideological developments would not recognize that the Soviets had in fact appropriated the concept of developed socialism from the East Germans (and other East European regimes).

Other Soviet specialists responded to Brezhnev's appeal by addressing the need for unity and describing the dangers of diversity. For example, Professor Teodor I. Oizerman of Moscow State University discussed the Chinese and Yugoslav revisions of Marxism-Leninism in an article attacking the notion that there could be more than one version of official doctrine. There could be no more "various Marxisms," said Oizerman, "than there could be various physics."⁸⁴ Kh. Momdzhyan, an early supporter of

developed socialism, cautioned against using the concept of "models" of socialism in discussing measures taken by separate countries in building socialism since this was basically a Western notion that disguised efforts to destroy the unity of international communism.⁸⁵ Mikhail Iovchuk pointed out that the 1969 conference was meant to clarify the situation regarding alternative approaches to Marxism, so that there really should be no further need to discuss the issue.⁸⁶ Suslov compared the current situation with that facing Lenin, and strongly implied that Lenin's struggle against populists, legal Marxists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, Trotskyites, right opportunists, national deviationists, and others was being repeated in the Soviet efforts against revisionism. By unifying the communist movement with one ideology, Suslov implied, Brezhnev could duplicate Lenin's success in dealing with diversity.⁸⁷

While not faced with quite the broad diversity as Lenin, Brezhnev did have to contend with "democratic socialism," "socialism with a human face," "market socialism," "Maoism," and others. (There were also dangerous Western analytic notions to consider, such as "totalitarianism" and "convergence.") As is clear from the space devoted to descriptions of these variations of socialism in the most authoritative book on developed socialism published in the Soviet Union, the problems and tensions created within the communist movement by alternatives to official Soviet ideology provided an important justification for using the "new stage of socialism" (i.e. developed socialism) as a unifying

element that once again focused attention on the U.S.S.R. as the center of communism.⁸⁸

After 1969, developed socialism continued to signify the unity of communism under Moscow's ideological mantle. The Soviets were apparently confident that after more than a decade of turmoil since Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, the communist movement had been brought back into Soviet control and that the unity of theory and practice demanded in Marxist-Leninist political systems had been restored. As the prestige of the U.S.S.R. continued to grow, due in part to the "defeat of U.S. imperialism in Vietnam,"⁸⁹ developed socialism was used increasingly to identify the Soviet Union as the leader of world communism. Ideologically, developed socialism was proclaimed as the "new stage of socialist development" at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971,⁹⁰ and Soviet ideologists began to claim the concept as their own. A "Manifesto of Developed Socialism" was published in conjunction with the Twenty-fifth CPSU Congress in 1976, proclaiming the U.S.S.R. as the first socialist country to achieve developed socialism and codifying the major domestic and foreign policies associated with this historical new stage of socialist evolution.⁹¹

Decline of Developed Socialism

Despite Soviet optimism, however, and despite a temporary increase in Soviet prestige, subsequent developments in Europe had by the mid-1970s begun to bring the degree of Soviet control over

other communist parties into doubt. As described by Richard Lowenthal, Jiri Valenta, and others, the invasion of Czechoslovakia led eventually to a sharp decline in the international authority of the CPSU, especially among Western European communist parties. In the long term, in fact, the invasion of Czechoslovakia had done as much damage to the unity of the communist movement as Khrushchev's secret speech, and with more important repercussions. While Khrushchev had tarnished Stalin's image and exposed the Soviet system to intense scrutiny, the move against Czechoslovakia had damaged severely, perhaps irreparably, the broader notion of "Leninism" that had served as the central element in the Soviet model of socialism. The subsequent rejection of the Soviet model by the Spanish and Italian communist parties (termed by Lowenthal the "withering away of Leninism")⁹² demonstrated the full extent of the damage.⁹³

The challenges posed by the Western European parties threatened to affect communist regimes in Eastern Europe as well, and the appeals from Eastern European leaders to Moscow to expel the Eurocommunist parties from the communist movement indicated the gravity with which they viewed this situation.⁹⁴ The overall extent of the decline in Soviet authority was revealed at the 1976 World Communist Conference, the documents of which emphasized voluntary cooperation and non-interference by communist parties instead of focusing on the leading role of the CPSU. The failure of the 1971 CMEA Comprehensive Program also became evident by 1976, adding another blow to Soviet prestige.⁹⁵ And, while the

Soviets had attempted to shore-up the theoretical foundations of its relations with East European countries, they complicated this situation by supporting new attempts at economic reform, signalling approval for more independent efforts on the part of East European countries.⁹⁶ The cumulative result of these events was to erode the unity so widely proclaimed by the Soviets during the early 1970s. By the late 1970s, this unity had become a "facade" that obscured increasing diversity and independence within the communist movement.⁹⁷ In this sense, developed socialism as an indication of renewed Soviet strength had become a rather meaningless symbol.

By the end of the 1970s developed socialism had clearly lost its utility as a term synonymous with Soviet control of international communism. It still had some value as a "political formula"⁹⁸ to describe the aspirations and policies of the Brezhnev regime within the U.S.S.R.. It also provided a convenient label for the current stage of Soviet development that proved useful in forestalling the advent of communism so brashly predicted by Khrushchev for 1980.⁹⁹ The continued use of the term by Brezhnev's immediate successors -- modified slightly to "perfecting developed socialism" -- may also reflect its usefulness to connote the continuing de-Stalinization of Soviet society. But Soviet hopes for developed socialism as the ideological manifestation of renewed Soviet control over international communism, evident in the evolution of the concept in the late 1960s, have clearly not been realized. The invasion

of Czechoslovakia, the lingering effects of Khrushchev's secret speech, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 combined to ensure that the Soviets will almost certainly not soon regain the dominance among world communists they enjoyed prior to 1956.

The virtual abandonment of "developed socialism" by Gorbachev suggests that a new ideological formula is being developed to serve as the theoretical basis for "restructuring" and "glasnost'." While this formula will certainly maintain continuity with the de-Stalinizing policies of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, it will not contain any references to the U.S.S.R. as the center of the world communist movement. As part of Gorbachev's overall reform program, the Soviet Union is now portrayed as more or less an equal partner in the communist movement and is no longer presented as the only model for socialist development. While such "new thinking" is always subject to reinterpretation, especially in the event of backlash to Gorbachev's policies, it appears that the Soviets are content to treat developed socialism as an historical concept appropriate to the Brezhnev era, when the stated Soviet policy regarding international communism was quite different.¹⁰⁰

1. For an excellent discussion of the political and ideological implications of developed socialism, see Alfred B. Evans, Jr., "Developed Socialism in Soviet Ideology," Soviet Studies 24 (July 1977), pp. 409-28. See also his "Social Transformation in Developed Socialism: Recent Trends in Soviet Ideology," Co-existence 17 (April 1980), pp. 58-81. Donald Kelly has also discussed the domestic implications of developed socialism. See Donald R. Kelley, "Developed Socialism: A Political Formula for the Brezhnev Era," in Jim Seroka and Maurice D. Simon, eds., Developed Socialism in the Soviet Bloc: Political Theory and Political Reality (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 3-20. See also Kelley's recent book, The Politics of Developed Socialism: The Soviet Union as a Post-Industrial State (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986)
2. Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Ehntsiklopediya, 3rd ed., s.v. "Sotsializm" by L. I. Abalkin, pp. 222-26. See especially the subsection entitled "Ehtapy razvitiya S.," pp. 224-5.
3. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Revised ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 159-70. See also Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), pp. 15-29.
4. Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 38. Also see his article, "Moscow and the 'Eurocommunists'," Problems of Communism 27 (July-August 1978), p. 39.
5. M. A. Suslov, Na Putyakh Stroitel'stva Kommunizma, 2 vols. (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1977), 1:243. Hereafter referred to as Na Putyakh. For a statement regarding Ponomarev, see Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 310.
6. The secret speech also had negative repercussions on the nascent Western European Communist Parties. See J. W. Friend, "The Roots of Autonomy in West European Communism," Problems of Communism 29 (September-October 1980), p. 33.
7. Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 271 ff., and *ibid.*, pp. 295-302.
8. For discussions of the Great Leap Forward, see Franz Schurman, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), p. 74, and Richard C. Thornton, China: A Political History, 1917-80 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 250.
9. Lowenthal, World Communism, pp. 135-7.

10. In response to this rejection, the Soviets cancelled their military assistance agreement of 1957, proposed that a nuclear free zone be established for most of Asia and the Pacific Basin, and suggested that the PRC accept a two-China policy, abandoning its claim on Taiwan. See Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 409.
11. As Lowenthal has described, the Communist movement had in fact entered a period of "polycentric autonomy," See Lowenthal, World Communism, pp. 193 and 198.
12. Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 409.
13. Thornton, China, pp. 255-56. The Soviets also lost control of Communist parties in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. See Friend, "Roots of Autonomy," pp. 35-6.
14. For the best Soviet description of the "all-people's state" from this period, see the 1961 Party Program in Programma i Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1964), pp. 169-85. Also see Evans, "Developed Socialism," p. 422.
15. Thornton, p. 256.
16. Quoted in Richard Lowenthal, "The Degeneration of an Ideological Dispute," in Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, China, The Soviet Union and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press [paperback], 1982), p. 65. In a letter of 14 June 1963 signed by the CCP Central Committee, the Chinese repudiated Soviet primacy in the World Communist movement, denouncing Soviet hegemonistic economic policies and offering a "programmatic ideological manifesto" designed to justify the takeover of Communist leadership by the CCP. See William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 6-7 and 147-8.
17. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 169.
18. Adam Ulam points out that Hanoi had sided with Beijing in denouncing the Test Ban Treaty. See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers [paperback], 1974), p. 699.
19. Thornton speculates that the failure to attain such a land route was one of the reasons behind Khrushchev's removal from power. See Thornton, China, pp. 272-3.
20. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 230.
21. Ulam makes this point in Expansion and Coexistence, p. 721.

22. The PRC apparently signalled that some form of reconciliation was possible late in 1964 when it modified its previous claim that China would be the first country to establish Communism. China was now said to be still "building socialism." See the report of Chou En Lai to the First Session of the Third All-China Assembly of the People's Republic, reprinted in Pravda, 12 January 1965.
23. Pravda, 12 and 16 February 1965.
24. Thornton, China, p. 275.
25. Pravda, 13 and 16 April 1965.
26. Pravda, 30 April and 13 June 1965.
27. Thornton, China, pp. 275-7.
28. Pravda, 12 May, 20 August, and 5 September 1965, respectively.
29. Pravda, 14 February 1966.
30. See, for example, Pravda, 30 October 1966.
31. For the speeches of Todor Zhivkov and Janos Kadar at the Ninth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Ninth Hungarian Communist Party Congress, respectively, see Pravda, 15 November and 29 November 1966. Burlatskii neglected to point out that the concept of developed socialism had been actually introduced much earlier, in June 1960 at a plenum of the Czechoslovak CP Central Committee. The term was soon adopted by other East European parties and was used extensively throughout the 1960s. For a fuller description of the East European development and use of the concept, see the excellent article, "Theories of Socialist Development in Soviet-East European Relations," by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry in Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, ed. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 224-227.
32. Sarah Terry suggests that the Soviets in fact encouraged the East European reforms in the 1960s, in part because of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program. See Terry, "Theories of Socialist Development," pp. 231-2.
33. Fedor Burlatskii, "O Stroitel'stve Razvitogo Sotsialisticheskogo Obshchestva," Pravda, 21 December 1966, p. 4.
34. Pravda, 25 November 1967.
35. Pravda, 20 February 1967, pp. 2-3. D. I. Chesnokov, "Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo, Ego Vospitatel'naya Rol'," Pravda, 27 February 1967, pp. 2-3.

36. V. Zh. Kelle, "Sovershenstvovanie Obshchestvennykh Otnoshenii Pri Sotsializme," Pravda, 5 April 1967, pp. 2-3.

37. Pravda, 16 March 1968, pp. 2-3.

38. See Burlatskii's report on the meeting, in Pravda, 17 May 1967. A Moscow conference the same year also stressed the themes of "unity" and "internationalism," See Pravda, 13 April 1967.

39. A Pravda statement in November 1967, for example, asserted that "it is well-known that the correlation of forces in the world arena depends both on the military-economic might of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and on the unity of all revolutionary movements and their activities in the anti-imperialist struggle." Pravda, 28 November 1967.

40. This journal is also published in a North American English language edition, World Marxist Review (Toronto).

41. This is the spelling of his name provided by the Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Ehntsiklopediya, 3rd ed., volume 28, p. 69. In print, however, including in his capacity as Chief Editor of Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, he often used the alternate spelling "Frantsev." I am indebted to Professor Jerry Hough for pointing this out to me.

42. See the discussion in Evans, "Developed Socialism," pp. 410-12.

43. This debate took place in the context of the broader struggle among political leaders who were polarized between advocating extensive reforms and returning to the rigid centralization of the Stalin period. See Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), especially the section "From Objectivity to Restalinization", pp. 479-493.

44. In early 1967, Walter Ulbricht proclaimed to the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party that a developed socialist society had already been established in East Germany. Developed socialism was widely used in East German writings from 1967 on, and one of the announced goals of the 1968 East German constitution was the construction of a completely developed socialist state. See Pravda, 15 April 1967, and 2 and 14 February 1968. For a broader discussion of Soviet-East German ideological disputes, see Hartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970s," Problems of Communism 27 (March-April 1978), pp. 7-9, and Walter Voekel, "Das Problem der Ideologischen Integration," Deutschland Archiv, October 1973 (Special Volume), pp. 61-75. For an overview of Soviet-East European ideological relations, see Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations, pp. 206-228.

45. XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1966). See especially the speeches by Sh. Rashidov, P. Masherov, A. Pel'she, and M. Solomentsev.
46. M. T. Iovchuk, "Ob Istoricheskikh Ehtapakh Stanovleniya i Razvitiya Sotsialisticheskogo Soznaniya v SSSR," Voprosy Filosofii 2 (February 1965), pp. 3-14.
47. R. Kosolapov, "Vklad XXIV, XXV, i XXVI S"ezdov KPSS v Razrabotku Teoreticheskikh i Politicheskikh Problem Razvitogo Sotsializma i Perekhoda k Kommunizmu," Kommunist 5 (March, 1982), pp. 54-67.
48. See the round-table discussion, "Istoricheskoe Mesto Sotsializma, Ehtapy i Kriterii Ego Razvitiya," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 12 (December) 1970, pp. 37-59. Glezerman, however, did eventually support developed socialism. See G. E. Glezerman and O. Rejngol'd, eds., Razvitoe Sotsialisticheskoe Obshchestvo: Sushchnost', Kriterii Zrelosti, Kritika Revizionistskikh Kontseptsii (Moscow: Mysl', 1979)
49. P. Fedoseev, "Marksizm i Stroitel'stvo Kommunisticheskogo Obshchestva," Kommunist 6 (June) 1968, p. 74.
50. Iovchuk, "Ob Istoricheskikh Ehtapakh," p. 9.
51. F. Konstantinov, "Oktyabr'skaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya i Marksistko-Leninskaya Filosofiya," Voprosy Filosofii 10 (October) 1967, pp. 18-19.
52. It is possible that Konstantinov's doubts and second thoughts about Stalin cost him his job; he was replaced as Director of the Institute of Philosophy by P. V. Kopnin in 1967.
53. See the articles by Mitko Grigorov, Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 4 (April) 1966, pp. 12-20; Stanko Todorov, *ibid.*, 4 (April) 1967, pp. 20-29; Elena Berg, *ibid.*, 6 (June) 1967, pp. 88-92; German Materi, *ibid.*, 8 (August) 1967, pp. 48-54; Eric Honecker, *ibid.*, 9 (September) 1967, pp. 67-73; Gunther Mittag, *ibid.*, 1 (January) 1968, pp. 14-20. See also the editorial in *ibid.*, 12 (December) 1968, pp. 2-9, in which the Soviet Union is said to be in the new stage of "building the material-technical base of communism" while "a group of European socialist countries" are "creating a developed socialist society."
54. Yu. Frantsov, "Shagi Istōrii," Pravda, 3 November 1967, p. 6.
55. L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, 8 vols. (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1970-81), 2:92-93.

56. According to his biographical sketch in the Soviet encyclopedia, Kosolapov worked "in the Central Committee apparatus" between 1966-74.

57. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, vol. 2, p. 100. For a similar statement, see the article on the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx's birth by Kh. Momdzhyan in Pravda, 16 March 1968, pp. 2-3.

58. The institute's responsibilities had been increased and its authorized personnel strength raised after Fedoseev became chief in 1967. A Central Committee resolution in 1967 concerning the improvement of social sciences in general stated that IML was "the center for the study of the ideological heritage of Marx, Engels, and Lenin." A second resolution of June 1968 further elaborated IML's duties to include publication of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and works on the current trends in party activity. See Kommunist 13 (September) 1967, pp. 3-13, and 12 (August) 1968, pp. 20-3.

59. P. N. Fedoseev, "Idei Lenina i Metodologiya Sovremennoi Nauki," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 4 (April) 1967, p. 12. This article was possibly a direct response to Burlatskii's article on developed socialism, published in Pravda four months earlier. See fn 33.

60. Pravda, 7 April 1968.

61. P. N. Fedoseev, "Leninizm -- Marksizm XX Veka," Pravda, 22 April 1968, pp. 2-3.

62. Suslov, Na Putyakh, vol. 2, pp. 155-7.

63. M. T. Iovchuk, "Marksistko-Leninskaya Filosofiya i Sovremennaya Marksologiya," Voprosy Filosofii 8 (August) 1968, pp. 3-11.

64. I. Pomelov, "Obshchie Printsipy i Natsional'nye Osobennosti v Razviti Sotsializma," Pravda, 14 August 1968, pp. 2-3. Pomelov had earlier supported developed socialism in his "Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Sotsialisticheskome Obshchestve," Pravda, 20 February 1967, pp. 2-3.

65. S. Kovalev, "Trebovaniya Zhizni i Obshchestvennye Nauki," Pravda, 6 May 1966, pp. 2-3.

66. S. Kovalev, "O 'Mirnoi' i Nemirnoi Kontrevolyutsii," Pravda, 11 September 1968, pp. 3-4.

67. S. Kovalev, "Suverenitet i Internatsional'nye Obyazannosti Sotsialisticheskikh Stran," Pravda, 26 September 1968, p. 4.

68. Yu. Frantsov, "O Nekotorykh Osobennostyakh Sovremennoi Ideologicheskoi Bor'by," Pravda, 22 September 1968, pp. 3-4.

69. The end of the debate on a new stage of socialism was signalled by Fedoseev's capitulation in early 1969 on the major question of whether Marxism-Leninism could be used "creatively" to reflect current realities. Apparently fully convinced, he wrote:

It would be foolish to regard Marxism as a locked trunk filled with treasure and to acknowledge that one was only supposed to sit on the trunk and protect it, drawing from its ideological riches only when necessary.

More important, he implicitly acknowledged that a new stage of socialist evolution was needed when he agreed that "Communism could only be built on the basis of developed socialism," reiterating Brezhnev's 1967 statement. P. Fedoseev, "V. I. Lenin -- Velikii Teoretik Kommunizma," Kommunist 1 (January) 1969, pp. 15-16, 22.

70. For an analysis that supports this conclusion, at least in the area of Soviet-East European relations, see Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations, pp. 59-62 and 233-235.

71. For a discussion of CMEA integration after the 1969 Executive Sessions, see Pravda, 24 January and 27 April 1969, and Paul Marer and John Michael Montias, "CMEA Integration: Theory and Practice," in U. S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, East European Economic Assessment (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 162. For Soviet interpretations of the results of these sessions, see O. Bogomolov, "Leninizm i Nekotorye Problemy Sotrudnichestva Stran Sotsializma," Kommunist 8 (May) 1968, pp. 14-25; Grigor Podpisakov, "Novye Gorizonty," Pravda, 4 August 1969; and M. Lesechko, "Sotrudnichestvo Stran SEV na Sovremennom Ehtape," Kommunist 4 (March) 1971, pp. 82-93.

For discussions of the 1971 Comprehensive Program, see Marer and Montias, "CMEA Integration," and John Hannigan and Carl McMillan, "Joint Investment in Resource Development," U. S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, East European Economic Assessment, pp. 148-95. See also Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations, pp. 76-90. For Soviet descriptions of the Comprehensive Program, see Pravda, 29 January and 3 August 1971, and A. Alekseev, "Sotsialisticheskaya Integratsiya," Pravda, 13 August 1971, pp. 3-4. The text of the Comprehensive Program was published in Pravda, 7 August 1971, pp. 1-7.

72. For a discussion of these events, see Thornton, China, pp. 341-60, and Juergen Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 129-30.

73. This may have been a reference to the secret Sino-U.S. agreement of 1969, in which the Chinese agreed to cut back arms supplies to North Vietnam in return for U.S. strategic support against the USSR. See Thornton, China, p. 355.

74. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, vol. II, pp. 366 and 415.
75. Ibid., p. 392.
76. Ibid., p. 396.
77. Thornton, China, pp. 343-4. The explanation for inaction by East European leaders was that they were probably not willing to antagonize an important trading partner; Chinese trade with Eastern Europe was undergoing a period of growth, and had in fact doubled between 1965-70. See Robin Remington, "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 88-91, and Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution, p. 225.
78. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, vol. II, pp. 388-91.
79. Ibid., pp. 373 and 377.
80. Terry, "Theories of Socialist Development in Soviet-East European Relations," p. 247.
81. Leonid Brezhnev, "Kommunisticheskoe Dvizhenie Vstupilo v Polocu Novogo Pod"ema," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 8 (August) 1969, pp. 1-9. This article was reprinted in Leninskim Kursom, vol. II, pp. 427-47.
82. See "Za Postroenie Razvitogo Sotsialisticheskogo Obshchestva," based on a Bulgarian newspaper article by Stanko Todorov, Pravda, 14 April 1969, p. 4; Boris Volchev, "Razvitie Sistemy Upravleniya Obshchestvom v Sotsialisticheskoi Bolgarii," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, 4 (April) 1969, pp. 19-26; W. Ulbricht, "Dvadtsat' Plodotvornykh Let Stroitel'stva Sotsializma," Ibid., 10 (October) 1969, pp. 1-9; and Werner Lamberts, "Leninskie Printsipy Nauchnogo Rukovodstva Sotsialisticheskimi Stroitel'stvom i ikh Primenenie v GDR," Ibid., 2 (February) 1970, pp. 16-69.
83. Ulbricht placed the beginning of developed socialism in East Germany in 1963. See Ulbricht, "Dvadtsat' Plodotvornykh Let," p. 5. The strength of his conviction on the subject led him to commit a serious faux pas at the June 1969 conference when he urged the Soviet Union to complete the building of Communism while fraternal bloc countries were building developed socialism. See his speech to the conference in Pravda, 11 June 1969.
84. Pravda, 13 May 1969, pp. 2-3.
85. Kh. Momdzhyan, "O Revizionistkoi Kontsepstii 'Modelei' Sotsializma," Kommunist 2 (January) 1970, pp. 60-72.
86. M. Iovchuk, "Leninizm: Sovremennaya Bor'ba Idei v Filosofii," Kommunist 2 (January) 1970, pp. 47-59.

87. M. Suslov, "Leninizm i Sovremennaya Ehpoka," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 5 (May) 1969, pp. 1-15. This campaign also included important articles by Kosolapov, who referred to the "historic mission" of the working class to construct a developed socialist society, and Professor A. Kositsyn, who described socialist democracy and the "all-people's state" in terms of developed socialism. See R. Kosolapov, "Sotsializm i Molodezh'," Pravda, 17 March 1969, pp. 3-4, and A. Kositsyn, "Lenin i Rasvitie Sotsialisticheskogo Gosudarstvo," Pravda, 13 August 1969, pp. 3-4.

88. G. E. Glezerman and O. Rejngol'd, Razvitoe Sotsialisticheskoe Obschestvo, pp. 453-592. For a contemporary article on totalitarianism, see E. Chekarin, "Teoreticheskie Spekulyatsii Ideologov Antikommunizma," Kommunist 10 (July 1969), pp. 101-12. For one example of a discussion of convergence, see L. Skvortsov, "Sovremennaya Bor'ba Idei i Kontseptsiiya 'Ideologicheskogo Razoruzheniya,'" Pravda, 7 February 1969, pp. 3-4.

89. See, for example, the remarks by K. Zarodov a the conclusion of the summary of the conference "Sotsialisticheskaya Gosudarstvennost' i Demokratiya," held in Prague on 19-20 May 1971. Problemy Mira i Sotsializma 8 (August) 1971, pp. 3-23.

90. XXIV S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 30 Marta-9 April'ya 1971 g.: Stenograficheskii Otchet, 2 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971).

91. "Manifest Razvitogo Sotsializma," in Kommunist 7 (May) 1976, pp. 1-35; also published in XXV S"ezd KPSS: Edinstvo Teorii i Praktiki (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1977), pp. 9-35.

92. Lowenthal, "Moscow and the 'Eurocommunists'," p. 38.

93. See the excellent discussions on the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) in Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "The PCE in Spanish Politics," and "Cataluna, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism," Problems of Communism 27 (July-August 1978), pp. 15-37, and *ibid.*, 30 (March-April 1981), pp. 25-47. On the Italian Communist Party, see Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism 27 (March-April) 1978, pp. 41-4, Lowenthal, "Moscow and the 'Eurocommunists'," p. 45, and Friend, "Roots of Autonomy," pp. 29-34. Hutchings points out that Eurocommunist parties also began to move toward normalization of relations with the PRC, further emphasizing the threat to Soviet prestige. See Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations, pp. 208 and 213.

94. Valenta, "Eurocommunism," p. 49.

95. Robin Alison Remington, "Politics of Accomodation: Redefining Soviet-East European Relations," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New York: Praeger [paperback], 1982), p. 112.

96. See the discussion in Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations, pp. 218-227, and Terry, "Theories of Socialist Development in Soviet-East European Relations," pp. 247-253.

97. Joan Barth Urban, "The West European Communist Challenge to Soviet Foreign Policy," in *ibid.*, p. 187.

98. Kelley, "Developed Socialism," p. 3. Recent work by Alfred Evans suggests the utility of developed socialism as a politically useful formula was diminished significantly as a result of the economic slowdown in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This had a serious impact on the regime's ability to satisfy consumer expectations that had been nurtured by Brezhnev and others beginning at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971. See Alfred E. Evans, Jr., "The Decline of Developed Socialism? Some Trends in Recent Soviet Ideology" Soviet Studies 34 (January 1986), pp. 1-23.

96. Evans, "Developed Socialism," pp. 411-2.

100. In the new Party Program, for example, developed socialism is said to be the result of the plan for Soviet development outlined in the Third Party Program, adopted at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in 1961. This neatly links the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and lays the groundwork for a new stage of socialist development under Gorbachev. See Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), p. 4.