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I. INTRODUCTION

It seems to me that the origins of the Cold War in Asia is an area where remarkable progress has been made in recent years. One of the factors that has contributed to the high level of scholarship in this area is the availability of sources, particularly in the United States. It seems logical, therefore, that one of the least studied areas is Soviet foreign policy in this period, largely because Soviet diplomatic documents are not available. As far as I can gather from basic monographs, it still has to be reconstructed mainly through the image reflected in the mirror of non-Soviet sources. In my admittedly unauthoritative opinion, the best work on Soviet policy toward Asia in this period still remains Max Beloff's monograph, which was published in 1953. Beloff's findings have been partially revised and corrected as new evidence has become available, but basically no serious attempts have been made to replace Beloff in a single stroke. It is interesting to point out also that recent monographs in the Soviet Union are increasingly sophisticated in describing this period, but that this progress owes largely to new evidence made available in the West. It would be a futile attempt to look for them as a guide to Soviet archival materials. As a result, we are still in the dark as to the most fundamental questions that determined Soviet foreign policy toward Asia during this period.

I offer my observations and questions below, but I do so, not because I have answers, but because I am curious to know how specialists who have so assiduously worked in diplomatic papers
II. SHINDO EIICHI'S THESIS ON SOVIET POLICY

One of the leading historians who actively writes about Soviet policy in Asia during this period is Professor Shindo Eiichi of Tsukuba University. The arguments he advanced in three articles which appeared in 1985 seem to provide us with a good starting point for discussion, since he raises important questions and makes bold assumptions that challenge traditional interpretations.4

Professor Shindo's major concern is to criticize those who spoke of a "Soviet threat" in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Seeing the roots of this theory in the interpretation of Soviet policy in the Cold War period, Shindo attempts to dispute this interpretation. First, he rejects the theory that Soviet foreign policy immediately after the war was intrinsically expansionistic. The fallacy of the "expansionist theory" in his opinion stems from one-sided interpretation of international politics by which analysts focus only on analysis of the conduct and behavior of the Soviet Union, relegating the analysis of the policies of other powers, particularly of the United States, to a secondary role. This results in the paradigm of "expansionism of the Soviet Union" and "status quo policy of the United States."5 On the contrary, Shindo sees the major cause for the Cold War in the activist U.S. foreign policy. Soviet policy was, in his opinion, more defensive and reactive. Shindo thus can be said to share the same
interpretation as the revisionist historians in the United States on the question of the origins of the Cold War. This is not to deny that expansion took place. But the Soviet expansion immediately after the war was not in the nature of unlimited expansion, but limited by complex international and domestic pressures.6

With regard to international pressures, Shindo gives the following three facts. (1) The Yalta system presupposed granting certain "trophies" to the Soviet Union in order to induce its participation in the war against Japan. This system, therefore, contained from the beginning the danger that once the alliance of the great powers collapsed, the gains on the one side would always be taken as the losses of the other side. (2) The motives that determined Soviet external behavior were its "national security complex" that had resulted partly from repeated aggressions from foreign enemies in general and partly from the loss of 20 million citizens during World War II in particular. (3) The victory of Communism in North Korea and China cannot be interpreted as the results of Soviet expansionism. Nor could the Communist regimes established in these countries be taken as Soviet puppets, since in these countries nationalistic "national interests" preceded Communist "international interests."7

The domestic context of Soviet foreign policy is the second major point in Shindo's argument. Here, he is concerned with three separate issues.

(1) In the Soviet Union national security was integrally
connected with the security of the regime itself. To the Soviet Union, therefore, threat from the West was not merely threat of aggression against its own territory, but also was perceived as directed toward the disintegration of the Soviet regime itself. "Precisely because of this the Soviet Union decided to adopt a policy of autarchy, as threat was increasing, in order to maintain the regime. At the same time it contributed to the drive to integrate the neighboring countries into its own sphere of influence, and intervene militarily in them. This also indicates that the object of its expansion was limited to the areas which could create direct, and vital threats to the Soviet Union, and which could share the same identity with the Soviet regime, namely to the areas under its spheres of influence contiguous to it." 8

(2) In general a tendency of great power diplomacy (taikoku gaiko) is strengthened after its victory in war by a domestic impulse to seek "trophies." Thus Shindo believes that Soviet expansion into neighboring countries was partly explained by the domestic pressures to gain territories to justify the wartime sacrifices. 9

(3) Shindo believes that there existed important conflicts of opinion within the Soviet leadership with regard to the direction of foreign policy. These conflicting tendencies often appeared as a conflict between Stalin and Molotov. While Stalin leaned toward a conciliatory attitude toward the United States, Molotov represented a hard-line faction. 10

The third major aspect raised by Shindo is the relationship
between Europe and Asia. Based on what Stalin told U.S. Ambassador Harriman at the meetings at Gagri on October 24 and 25, 1945, Shindo concludes that contrary to expansionistic intent against Japan, Stalin actively sought a solution not to send troops from the Soviet Union to occupy Japan so that MacArthur could enjoy supreme power in Japan. What motivated Stalin to take what appears to be totally opposite to expansionist policy vis-a-vis Japan was that he was interested in securing similar power in Rumania and Bulgaria. For this purpose he was willing to concede to the United States the exclusive right to occupy Japan in return for the concession. In this sense, Soviet priority rested in Europe, not in Asia. To be sure, later on Molotov raised an objection to MacArthur's dictatorial power, but the difference between Stalin's position at Gagri and Molotov's subsequent diplomatic moves can be interpreted as a reflection of the existence within Soviet leadership of a major conflict between a conciliatory approach and a confrontational approach to the United States on the occupation of Japan.  

III. SOVIET EXPANSION IN ASIA

(1) Was Soviet Policy Expansionistic?

I agree with Shindo's thesis that Soviet expansion in Asia in the years immediately after the war resulted not from its intrinsic expansionism but from the specific arrangements of the post-war settlements agreed upon by the allies -- the Yalta system. If we compare the Soviet territorial claims in the Yalta
Agreement with the actual expansion in the post-War period, one can conclude that the Soviet Union did not expand more than was envisaged in the Yalta Agreement. Major changes took place in China and North Korea, but they cannot be taken, as Shindo argues, for Soviet expansion in the same sense as the Soviet Union expanded in Eastern Europe.

A series of problems related to the Kurile islands -- whether the Southern Kuriles should be interpreted as a territory illegally possessed by Japan since 1904 through its treacherous act, what was meant by "hand over", and whether the four islands at the southern most Kurile chains should belong to the Kuriles as defined in the Yalta Agreements -- are still hotly debated questions, and I have nothing to add to what has been said on these questions. But the fact remains that the United States judged that in the event of allied victory with the participation of the Soviet Union in the Asian theater of the war, "the Soviet Union would have occupied them regardless of American intentions." Thus, the Soviet possession of the entire Kuriles cannot be taken as expansion beyond the Yalta Agreement. It should be recalled also that the Japanese government was willing to bargain away what the Soviet Union was promised in the Yalta Agreement except for the southern Kuriles. In fact, with the subsequent withdrawal from Manchuria and Dairen, and in abandoning the lease of Port Arthur, it can be said that actually the Soviet Union took less than it was entitled to in the Yalta Agreement.

Thus, direct Soviet expansion in Asia was the result of the
Yalta Settlement. On this point two facts must be stressed. First, needless to say, the Yalta Settlement was necessary to induce Soviet participation in the war in Asia, which the allies, particularly the United States, considered necessary to defeat Japan. In broader terms, as Professor Iriye demonstrated, it was an alternative to establishment of a new equilibrium in Asia to replace the Japanese hegemony which Japan attempted to impose through a series of aggressions. Secondly, therefore, it is well to remember that it was Japanese militarism and aggressions that ultimately invited the Soviet expansion in Asia.

It is possible to criticize the Yalta system, since it contained not only what Iriye calls an "idealistic component" but also "a structure of power," which is called by Iokibe "the vertical principle" and "the horizontal principle." In other words, it was on the one hand an effort to search for peace in Asia, and on the other hand, an attempt to impose peace dictated by the condominium of the two superpowers. I find particularly insightful Shindo's criticism of "great power diplomacy," (taikoku gaiko), which contained the seeds of mutual recriminations against the once agreed-upon gains as losses once this condominium collapsed.

In order to be logically consistent, only two positions are possible for criticism of the Soviet expansion. The first position is to criticize the Yalta system itself, in other words, to criticize both the Soviet expansion and the U.S. occupation of Japan. This is the position taken by extreme nationalists. But
one wonders what kind of Asian international system they think could have been established after Japan's defeat. Or do they harbor a secret dream and wish they could have maintained a Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere? The second position is to criticize the short-sightedness of the United States in allowing the Soviet Union to expand, in other words, to reject Soviet expansion only and to accept the U.S. occupation of Japan. If one recalls that there was a war going on at the time, and that it was Japan that the United States was trying to destroy, one must come to the conclusion that such criticisms were not realistic in the context of wartime international relations.

(2) China and Korea

Probably the single most important cause for the collapse of the condominium was the emergence of nationalism in Asia, which both superpowers grossly underestimated. In China it appeared in the form of Communist nationalism. This was a major threat to the American vision of post-war Asian equilibrium, since it envisioned a unified, democratic China leaning toward the United States to counter predominance of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia as a prerequisite for such equilibrium. It seems certain that the Soviet Union also accepted the existence of such a China as a reality, since otherwise, it would not have made such imperialistic territorial demands against China, which was after all its ally, and it would not have carried out such naked economic exploitation as it did in Manchuria. Such policies seem
to have been designed to weaken a Nationalist China supported by the United States. I am not certain if Soviet reluctance to support the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war resulted from its pessimistic appraisal of the possibility of such victory or from the awareness that Mao's China might pose a potential threat to the Soviet Union, although I tend to think that the latter possibility might be too much influenced by what Nagai Yonosuke calls wisdom in hindsight. I do believe, however, that Soviet fear of being embroiled in a direct confrontation with the United States played an important part in this reluctance.

Nevertheless, all this does not mean that the Soviet Union did not exploit the Communist movement in China to its advantage. Shindo's argument that the Soviet Union represented a hindrance to the Chinese Communist movement and that the Communist victory in China had nothing to do with Soviet expansion seems, therefore, an overstatement. On the contrary, it considerably aided the Chinese Communist in their takeover in Manchuria in terms of handing over weapons confiscated from the Japanese, effectively blocking the path of the Kuomintang forces' advance, raising protests over the U.S. intervention in the Chinese civil war. Although Soviet historians claim that this assistance was extended in the spirit of international solidarity, it seems to me that the explanation that the Soviet Union was interested in keeping China in turmoil makes more sense.18

A curious episode with regard to the CCP boss in Manchuria, Kao Kan, indicates also that the Soviet Union at least entertained
a different solution to the status of Manchuria other than the
Communist victory in entire China. In 1949, a few months before
the Communist victory in China, Kao Kan went to Moscow and
concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. But under
Mao's regime Kao Kan was disgraced, and committed suicide in
1954.19

Shindo's interpretation is also persuasively disputed by
Okabe Tatsumi's excellent analysis of the CCP's approach to the
international situation. Okabe argues that despite all the
dissatisfactions felt by the CCP, the relationship between the CCP
and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1949 did not bring about
their estrangement. Tracing the four stages the CCP went through
in approaching international relations, the CCP's sense of
affinity with the Soviet Union in social systems and ideology
occupied an important place.19a Moreover, it would be a gross
simplification to characterize U.S. policy as completely
influenced by Cold War ideology to the extent that it identified
the Chinese Communist movement entirely as an instrument of Soviet
expansion. Even if U.S. policy-makers wanted to pursue a policy
of rapprochement with the Chinese Communists in 1949, such options
would not have been possible, partly because of the CCP's
position, as Okabe and Buhite argue, and partly because the
perceptions of international politics, which were formed by the
events in Europe, had to influence decisions in Asia as well, as I
will argue later.20

Another area where both superpowers committed gross
miscalculations was Korea. Recent monographs indicate that the Korean War was started by the zealous North Korean Communists, and that its outbreak was due more to an internal power struggle among the North Korean Communists than to Soviet inducement.21 But precisely what motivations led the Soviet Union to approve the North Korean invasion to the south seems to be still in the realm of guess work. Shindo sees Soviet approval as a passive reaction to the U.S. policy of concluding separate peace with Japan, excluding the Soviet Union and China, and he concludes: "we should note that it was not the outbreak of the Korean War that closed the path to the general peace treaty (zenmenkowa) but rather the closing of the general peace treaty itself that provoked the outbreak of the Korean War and made the situation of Cold War in Asia irreversible."22

Iriye also sees the U.S. move to remilitarize Japan having an impact on the Soviet decision. In his opinion, the decision to approve the invasion might be motivated by the calculation that "Soviet power in Korea would compensate for loss of Manchuria and would in part offset the impact of a remilitarized Japan."23 Iriye thus attaches a more activist role in the Soviet approval of the invasion than a mere reaction to the activist U.S. policy, as Shindo argues. Moreover, contrary to Shindo, Iriye argues that "the Korean War had the effect of speeding up the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty and the rearmament of the country."24

Still a third interpretation is offered by Adam Ulam. According to Ulam, the Kremlin did not expect the United States to
intervene, particularly after she did not come to save Chiang K'ai-shek on mainland China, and after it openly declared that Korea was outside the United States defense perimeters. Thus, the Korean adventure was probably in the eyes of the Kremlin less risky than the Berlin Blockade. Ulam further argues that what motivated the Soviet Union to take this risk was the intended advantage that could be derived from the absorption of South Korea, and that this advantage would be the possibility of a Communist revolution in Japan.

The fall of yet another Pacific area into Communist hands would intensify pressures on the American occupation forces and would many Japanese conclude that Communism was indeed the wave of the future, at least in Asia. The Americans could react in one of two ways: they might decide to cut their losses and give up their plans of rebuilding Japan as a military power . . . Or the United States might react in the opposite way and cling to Japan at all costs. This would presumably lead to America's increasing her forces in Japan and her commitments in neighboring areas. In that case the Americans would have to reexamine and reduce their commitments in Europe. The enhanced American presence in Japan and the Pacific would undoubtedly increase the Chinese Communists' dependence on the U.S.S.R. 25

To Ulam, the increasing American commitment to Japan and the neighboring countries was interpreted as a positive gain in the sense that it would divert its commitment and resources from Europe and further that it would increase Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union. This seems to be a bit too far-fetched. But the former possibility of driving the U.S. influence out of Japan by completing the Communist victory in the Korean peninsula and by encouraging a Communist revolution in Japan might be a plausible explanation. In any case, Ulam also attaches an activist
motivation to the Soviet approval of the invasion.

I must confess that I have no answer to solve these conflicting interpretations. It seems that in the Soviet calculations the factor of Japanese remilitarization must have occupied an important place. But to conclude from this that Japanese remilitarization was the major cause to trigger the outbreak of the Korean War, as Shindo does, seems to be an exaggeration. Furthermore, to exonerate the Soviet approval of the invasion by calling it a mere reaction to the activist policy of the United States and Japan appears to underestimate the seriousness of that approval. Nonetheless, the crucial point is how the Soviet Union perceived the danger of Japanese remilitarization, and how this perception was integrated in its overall Far Eastern policy. If such a study exists, I am not aware of it.

One thing is certain, however. If the Soviet Union entertained the intentions described by Ulam, they grossly miscalculated U.S. resolution. As Buhite argues, the Korean War contributed to the U.S. reassertion as a power around the world. It contributed to the increase of the U.S. defense budget from $23 billion to over $60 billion. It led to West German rearmament and strengthening of the NATO alliance.\(^{26}\) In this sense, the Korean War brought about results completely opposite to what, in Ulam's opinion, the Soviet Union intended to accomplish. Although Shindo seems to blame the U.S. decision alone, the Soviet Union was equally responsible for this outcome.
IV. DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

(1) National Security Complex

The second major point Shindo makes is the relationship between domestic pressures and Soviet foreign policy. Here he makes three separate points: (1) it is the Soviets' national security complex that determined the direction of Soviet foreign policy at that time; (2) Stalin needed territorial expansion to satisfy the domestic pressure resulting from the tremendous sacrifices during World War II; and (3) there were differences in approach and substance in Soviet foreign policy which were often manifested in differences between Stalin and Molotov.

Explaining the post-war settlement in Asia, Iriye makes the following statement:

From the beginning there was a strong idealistic component as the U.S. and its allies sought to counter Japan's pan-Asian doctrine with their own vision of Asian freedom . . . . In such a contest, it is possible to view the Pacific War and the origin of the Cold War in Asia as a drama in which participants struggled to establish a new international order where idealistic visions would be provided with a structure of power—in other words, where requirements of power politics would be congruent with certain principles.27

This is certainly true for the United States, but I wonder what kind of idealistic principles the Soviet Union attempted to establish. Here I tend to agree with Shindo that Soviet foreign policy was dictated above all by its national security concerns. Since I have examined the historical roots of what Shindo calls "national security complex" elsewhere, I would not go into this problem further.28 It suffices to say that its "national security
complex" resulted not merely from its history of being invaded by foreign enemies, as Shindo argues. What is important is that a history of invasions as well as aggressions, combined with Marxist ideology have contributed to the basic nature of Soviet foreign policy in which a military factor has played a predominant role.

The dead-seriousness with which the Soviet Union approached its national security after World War II was not merely because it sacrificed so much during the war, although memories of the war have in many ways become a starting point of Soviet post-war history. Rather it was because, as Shindo correctly points out, national security was integrally associated with security of the regime itself. But the Soviet concern with security of the regime was not caused by the U.S. Cold War policy beginning with the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, as Shindo argues. It was not exogenous, but rather indigenous. Stalin had to rebuild the new dictatorship in the vast country completely devastated by the war. He ordered the citizens to catch up with the United States in industrial production—people clothed in rags without shoes, living in hovels, who had nevertheless restored camaraderie among themselves and renewed contact with the West, and who expected that their life should be different after the war from what they had experienced during the oppressive years of collectivization, industrialization, and terror before the war. In other words, when the war was over, Stalin declared another war against the populace in order to rebuild the society according to his image. For this purpose he had to cut the Soviet Union off
from the outside world. He made it a crime for Soviet citizens to marry a foreigner, and even to have contact with foreigners. Even the number of sacrifices -- 20 million deaths -- during the war was kept secret. While the Soviet Union was isolated from outside of the iron curtain, there was an orgy of xenophobic adulation of Russia and Stalin. And the nature of the state became closely associated with the perverse paranoia of the dictator himself.31

As Ulam argues, even if the West had taken a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union, it would not substantially have changed Soviet policy, since isolation came from internal sources.32 Rather it would have been interpreted as a sign of the West's weaknesses and would have been taken advantage of.

(2) Soviet Military Doctrine and Soviet Policy

Soviet military doctrine assumes that military doctrine cannot exist independent of political considerations. In fact, Soviet military doctrine is defined as consisting of two elements: the politico-social factor and the military factor.33 We see in Soviet foreign policy in Asia during and immediately after World War II a classical example of the application of Soviet military doctrine. We see here also the major reason why fantastic Soviet expansions took place precisely at the time when its military strength was significantly inferior to that of the United States. Contrary to Iriye's contention that the Soviet Union also sought an ideal apart from power politics, it seems to me that it
approached the Asian problems with only one objective in mind: to secure the Soviet borders from potential enemies. This single-mindedness had the advantage over the United States, which vacillated between power politics and idealism. The effective combination of the military and political factors to achieve this goal also gave the Soviet Union an edge over the United States, which characteristically approached the military operations during World War II purely from the military point of view. In fact, in his classical article, Michael Howard noted that the purely military-technical approach to strategy dominant in the West had a distinct disadvantage over the Soviet approach, which also takes the political factors into consideration.34

According to Stephen Meyer, Soviet military doctrine also calls for destruction of an enemy's military forces and occupation of enemy territories as necessary prerequisites for victory.35 Stalin knew well that political gains without foundations of military force would be unreliable. Whether or not the Soviet Union actually moved up the day of attack on Japanese forces is a debatable point, although it seems certain that Stalin wanted to do so.36 But to achieve its goal, the Soviet Union had to participate in the war in Asia. It was for this reason that by declaring that the Soviet Union would abrogate the Neutrality Pact with Japan, Molotov made sure to add that the pact would remain valid for the remaining time of its duration.36a When Japan made an attempt to conclude peace through Soviet mediation, it was imperative to keep the Japanese hope alive in order to prevent the
war's termination before the Soviet participation in the war. 37 Once the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, the purpose of the Soviet operation was the speediest occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. 38 The Soviet offensive against Japan continued for this reason even after Japan's surrender. 39 Despite Wada's contention that the Soviet Union did not intend to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido, the Soviet proposal that the surrender of the Japanese on Hokkaido should be submitted to the Red Army should be interpreted in this context. 40 Had the Soviet troops landed on the Japanese island, the Soviet suggestions that the allied high command should be shared by MacArthur and Vasilevskii, and further that Hokkaido should be divided into two zones of occupation with the northern half falling into the Soviet occupation zone might have been a real possibility. These demands were rebuffed by the Americans, and the Soviet Union did not pursue them further. But had it landed even a small number of troops in Hokkaido, I would think the situation would have been completely different. When Stalin referred to the Soviet offer to land troops in Hokkaido to Harriman at Gagri, the American translator noted: "When Stalin made this remark it was quite obvious from the tone of his voice and from the expression on his face that he was still very irked at our refusal to permit Soviet troops to land on Hokkaido." 41 When the fox turns away from the grapes, saying to himself that they were sour grapes after all, it does not necessarily mean that he did not want to eat them.
(3) Territorial Expansions to Satisfy Domestic Demands?

I have difficulty accepting Shindo's second point that Stalin needed territorial expansions in order to satisfy the domestic constituencies that demanded compensation for their sacrifice during the war. Here I think Shindo ignores the basic asymmetry in the political system that existed between Stalin's dictatorship and Western democracies. That is not to say that Stalin was omnipotent, totally unencumbered by any domestic constraints. Even Stalin had to be concerned with domestic pressures, but such pressures were not expressed territorial aggrandizement, at least not in Asia. When Stalin gained what he bargained for at the Yalta Conference in return for the Soviet participation in the war in Asia, he had the audacity to explain to Roosevelt: "it would be much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet." When Stalin demanded that the northern half of Hokkaido should fall into the occupation zone of the Soviet Union, he explained to Truman: "if the Russian army does not have any occupation zone in any part of the Japanese mainlands, Russian public opinion will be extremely upset." I always thought that these kinds of statements have to be taken with a grain of salt. An episode recently reported in *The Japan Times* is more revealing about the nature of the relationship between Stalin and his people. When Ambassador Harriman went up to Stalin at the Teheran Conference, and congratulated him for the bravery of the Soviet troops, Stalin looked at Harriman and said: "In the Red Army, it takes a braver
man to turn back than to advance." 44

The pressure instead came from the glaring gap between the expectations of the people who fought the war and Stalin's determination to restore the regime of terror, forced collectivization, and rapid industrialization. Expansion in real estate was not demanded by these people clamoring for freer life. It was necessary for the dictator and the party not to give a foreign enemy an excuse to stir up trouble that might trigger domestic repercussions.

(4) Policy Differences within the Soviet Leadership

Even harder to accept is Shindo's third contention that there existed a policy difference between Stalin and Molotov. According to Shindo, this difference manifested itself, first in "the different approaches taken by Stalin and Molotov toward Secretary of State Byrnes' so called atomic diplomacy." Since Shindo does not elaborate on this in the articles now available to me, I am not certain exactly how Stalin and Molotov differed in their approach to the U.S. possession of atomic bombs, nor do I have a clear idea of what is meant by "Byrnes' atomic diplomacy." If it means what the revisionist historians interpret as Byrnes' attempt to use atomic bombs to take a hard line against the Soviet Union, I have to plead ignorance on any differences in approach between Stalin and Molotov. The second example Shindo gives is a difference between Stalin and Molotov with regard to the occupation mechanism in Japan. The evidence Shindo gives,
however, cannot be decisive, as I will explain later.

It seems implausible to me to think that someone, even Molotov, could challenge Stalin at that time. Milovan Djilas witnessed a scene, in which Stalin categorically stated that the Benelux Customs Union did not include the Netherlands. No one, including Molotov, dared to contradict the dictator on this most elementary mistake. Molotov's wife was arrested and deported to a forced labor camp; so were Mikoyan's two sons and a brother of Stalin's faithful servant, Kaganovich. Stalin had Voroshilov's and Molotov's telephones bugged. According to Khrushchev's famous secret speech at the 20th Party Congress, everyone in the Presidium, as the Politburo was then called, was nervous literally for their life as to which direction the dictator's eyes would fall. In such an atmosphere, it would be difficult to imagine how Molotov or anybody else could pursue a policy different from Stalin's. An objection might be raised on the grounds that these examples I cited took place toward the end of Stalin's reign. But Stalin's daughter introduces the following anecdote that took place in 1947. "Knowing that Zhdanov suffered from recurrent heart attacks, my father, angered by Zhdanov's silence, turned on him viciously: 'Look at him, sitting there like Christ, as if nothing were of any concern to him! There—looking at me now as if he were Christ!' Zhdanov grew pale, beads of perspiration stood out on his forehead. I was afraid he might have an attack and gave him a glass of water." This is not to deny that there did not exist any differences
In his fascinating monograph, William McCagg challenges the traditional interpretation that Soviet foreign policy was totally controlled by Stalin himself, unencumbered by any domestic pressures. In fascinating details, McCagg convincingly demonstrates that Stalin had to take into account the various forces and groups that attempted to reassert themselves in the decisionmaking process after the war. These forces included the military, the economic managers whose interests were represented by Malenkov, and Beria's secret police, the party "revivalists," who attempted to reassert the dominant role of the party appratchinnki, whose interest above all Zhdanov, and to a lesser extent Molotov represented, and the "insurrectionists" in the international communist movements. McCagg successfully argues that, contrary to Shindo's thesis, Soviet foreign policy should be explained more in the context of domestic power struggle rather than in the context of Western threat to the Soviet Union. He dissects how the debate on the revival of Leninist theory of imperialism, the cultural policy of Zhdanovshchina, Stalin's theory of linguistics, Eugene Varga's economic theory, and the Lysenko affair were all related to domestic power struggles, and had important implications for the direction of foreign policy. McCagg's book well demonstrates that the absence of sources, which has been considered a major hindrance to the study of this period, can no longer serve as a good excuse to ignore the dynamic domestic context of Soviet foreign policy. 48

Nevertheless, in the end, McCagg's interpretation that Stalin
was "embattled" by all these groups that challenged Stalin's authority cannot be sustained. The picture that clearly emerged from McCagg's excellent study is that Stalin exploited these domestic struggles to reestablish his personal power. They were not struggles to challenge Stalin, but rather a competition over which groups and which policies best represented the Stalinist line. Stalin kept silent, transcending these struggles, and at time even encouraging the struggles among his lieutenants. The traditional totalitarian model that denied any existence of domestic struggles within the Soviet decision-making process must be rejected. Nevertheless, there was a basic asymmetry between the Soviet mechanism of foreign policy formulation and that of the Western countries, particularly in the meaning of domestic pressures.

V. INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN ASIA AND EUROPE

(1) The Gargi Meetings

The third general point Shindo makes is the connection between Asia and Europe. This part of his argument is constructed on three grounds. First, Stalin was more concerned with the maintenance of Soviet supremacy in Rumania and Bulgaria than with exerting any influence in Japan. Thus, despite the United States' request to do so, Stalin "consistently refused this request, and on the contrary insisted that the United States alone should occupy Japan, and thus made clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of participating in Japan's occupation." This is taken
by Shindo as evidence to disprove "Soviet expansionism" in Asia.

Secondly, however, in Shindo's opinion, Stalin hoped that MacArthur and the American occupational forces would carry out Japan's democratization so that Japan would never become a military power to threaten the Soviet Union. The third part of his argument is that after November 1945 the Soviet Union abandoned the previous conciliatory policy, and began insisting on a voice in the occupation policies. This was because the conservative forces in Japan gained momentum to prevent democratization and also because the U.S. policy began to take an anti-Soviet character. The Soviet hard-line policy represented by Molotov was, therefore, reactive to the policies of Japan and the United States to sabotage democratization.

There is a contradiction in this argument. If Stalin was interested in preventing Japan from turning into a military power, why did he so easily give up any right to have influence in the occupation? In other words, doesn't the very fact of his interest in Japan's democratization disprove Shindo's argument that he actively sought not to be involved in Japan's occupation?

My second criticism is concerned with his interpretation of the Stalin-Harriman meetings at Gagri on October 24 and 25, which is central to his thesis. In early September Molotov accepted the U.S. proposal to establish a Far Eastern Advisory Commission designed to shape occupation policy in Japan. However, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London in September 1945, when Byrnes informed him that the United States would not recognize the
governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, Molotov began raising **objections** to the establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Because of this objection, the United States was unable to work out a satisfactory formula for Soviet-American cooperation on Japan. Thus, Byrnes instructed Harriman to contact Stalin directly. Harriman succeeded in meeting Stalin at Gagri on October 24 and 25.

At the meeting on October 24, Harriman stated since the first phase of the occupation, "it was contemplated to invite the Russian, Chinese and British to send a certain number of troops to join the second phase of the control of Japan." Stalin answered that there was an analogy between Rumania and Japan. In Rumania there were no troops other than Soviet, and the final word should rest with the Chairman of the Control Commission. Then he stated:

> It went without saying that the United States representative, General MacArthur, should be the permanent Chairman of the Control Commission and should have the final voice. However, if there were other troops on the Japanese islands, as there were in Germany, the effect would be to restrict the rights of General MacArthur. This was not desirable. In order to preserve the freedom of action of MacArthur it, perhaps, might not be advisable to send other troops to Japan. This was more logical.

Reading this portion, it might be possible to draw the conclusions as Shindo does. Stalin indeed refused the invitation to send Soviet troops to participate in the Japanese occupation, and suggested that the United States under MacArthur should have the exclusive rights to occupational policy in Japan. It is also possible to think that Stalin made this suggestion to have the similar exclusive right in Bulgaria and Rumania.
But when one further reads the contents of the meeting on October 25, one notices a contradictory line of argument presented by Stalin. Stalin refused to send a representative to Washington to participate on the Far Eastern Advisory Council, thus, in fact, trying to torpedo the establishment of this organization. He gives the reason for this action:

The Soviet government had been given no responsibilities in Japan and it would be difficult for it to figure as an "annex" without having shared responsibility for policies in Japan or without having had any influence on such policies.54

Harriman pointed out that the Soviet Union had already accepted the invitation to attend the conference. Stalin answered that "the situation in Japan had since changed and that it was not time to organize a control commission." He further stated that the proper place to decide the control mechanism in Japan would not be the Far Eastern Advisory Council, but the governments themselves. Then he stated:

Furthermore the Soviet Government felt that it could not bear responsibility for MacArthur's actions in Japan since it had never been informed or consulted on Japanese matters. It had decided to recall its representative, General Derevyanko because he was not receiving any information on policies or developments in Japan. The Soviet Government had its self-respect as a sovereign state. No decisions made by MacArthur were being transmitted to it. In point of fact the Soviet Union had become an American satellite in the Pacific. This was a role it could not accept. It was not being treated as an ally. The Soviet Union would not be a satellite of the United States in the Far East or elsewhere. These were the reasons Mr. Molotov had raised the question of control machinery in London.55

Stalin further reiterated: "The Soviet Union was not informed of measures adopted there. Is this the way to treat an ally? If
this regime were to continue the Soviet Union would leave Japan for it could not be responsible for actions it only learned of through the press. Did MacArthur represent the Soviet Union? No. It would be more honest if the Soviet Union were to quit Japan than to remain there as a 'piece of furniture.'\textsuperscript{56} Stalin was particularly disturbed by anti-Soviet propaganda carried out in the Japanese press and radio. "Did any censorship exist there?" he asked. Returning to the refusal to send a representative to Washington, Stalin implied that the Soviet Union would take a policy of isolation rather than see a further deterioration of Soviet-American relations.\textsuperscript{57} Then comes a crucial point, which became the basis for Shindo's interpretation on Stalin's giving up Soviet control over Japan in return for Soviet control in Bulgaria and Rumania:

The Generalissimos replied that the situation in the Balkans was entirely different. The Americans were accorded the same treatment the Soviet were extended in Italy. Then the situation changed. In addition there were no American or British troops in the Balkans. The Soviet had troops on Japanese territory. After Potsdam the treatment accorded to the American and British representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania was changed for the better. However no change was made in Italy with respect to the Soviet representatives. In addition, the Russians had maintained 20 to 40 divisions on the Manchurian frontier for the last ten years and recently up to 70 divisions had been in operation against the Japan. The Soviet Union had made its contribution in the Japanese war. No one could say they had done nothing. Furthermore it had been ready to help the United States by landing troops on the Japanese islands. This offer had been rejected. The Soviet Union had never done anything against the Allies in Bulgaria and Rumania which had not been done to the Soviet representatives in Italy.\textsuperscript{58}

These passages quoted above make one wonder: if Stalin was really not interested in any influence over the occupational
policy in Japan, why was he so concerned about the Soviets being excluded from MacArthur's policy? Shindo's contention is that Stalin was merely interested in democratization in Japan, even if it was carried out by MacArthur. But the objections that Stalin was raising was not to the substance of MacArthur's policy, but rather the procedures. He was upset with the fact that the Soviet Union was excluded from the decision-making process, that it was not even consulted, and that it was in fact treated as a "piece of furniture." Furthermore, Stalin demanded the establishment of a control council, in which the Soviet Union would have a veto power, rather than exclusively working through an advisory body, which would be an appendage to MacArthur's dictatorial power. The message that comes out of these passages seems loud and clear: Stalin was demanding a voice in the occupation policy in Japan commensurate with the contributions the Soviet Union had made in defeating Japan.

Still as Shindo argues, it is true that Stalin suggested that Japan should be occupied solely by the United States, and that he rejected the invitation to send Russian troops as a part of the integrated occupation forces. How could we reconcile these contradictions?

As Buhite argues, as soon as the United States refused his demand to land troops in Hokkaido, Stalin realized that he could not directly influence the occupation. Since there would be too many disadvantages in committing Soviet troops to MacArthur's command, he preferred to press for increased influence in the
mechanism of occupation policy. As for Stalin's rejection of sending troops to Japan, Harriman had this to say:

I very much doubt whether Stalin would agree to place any Soviet forces under MacArthur's command, which might involve their being ordered to carry out policies which he has not approved. In addition he no doubt recognizes that differences in customs, standards of discipline and general attitude would cause considerable difficulties. On the other hand if the British and Chinese agree to furnish forces under MacArthur's command I am fearful that Stalin would insist upon having his troops in occupation as well and in an independent zone of their own, which I understand is completely opposed to our concept.

Harriman might have added that in a country where an officer who received a gift from his former British admiral with whom he had fought a war could be arrested and deported to a forced labor camp, and former Soviet prisoners of war in Germany were arrested upon crossing the border and sent to suffer many more years' imprisonment in Siberia, the concept of an integrated occupational force was an anathema.

One should not conclude, however, that the refusal to send troops to Japan meant that the Soviet Union gave up on Japan. As these passages clearly demonstrate, Stalin demanded a decisive voice in determining the occupation policy. As Buhite states: "Apparently Stalin, while writing off direct participation in the occupation, sought to use his refusal to send a delegate to the advisory commission as leverage to secure agreement both on southeastern Europe and a satisfactory control council through which to exercise future options."

Harriman himself concluded that far from being so generous as to surrender all the power to MacArthur, the Soviet Union was
vitaly interested in controlling Japan's occupation. In a cable
dispatched to Washington on October 30, Harriman gave three
reasons for the Soviet dissatisfaction with the forms of the
control commission. The first reason was that "Japan . . . might
some day be utilized by Western Powers as springboard for attack
on USSR. Japan as much as Eastern Europe is in Soviet zone of
vital strategic interest. Long range strategic implications of
American occupation and control of Japan are therefore one reason
for Soviet dissatisfaction with situation in Japan." 62

Secondly, in Harriman's opinion, the U.S. occupation policy
was stealing Communist thunder. The only way to expand Soviet
influence would be through Japanese Communists and Leftists, but
the U.S. policy has not given them a chance to criticize it.
According to Harriman, however, the third cause was the most
important:

Possible third cause of Soviet dissatisfaction . . .
would be feeling that USSR as one of the two greatest
powers and as Pacific power had not been accorded due
"face" in disposition of Japan. Being new rich with a
lingering inferiority complex and feeling of gauche
uncertainty in international society, USSR is
inordinately sensitive re appearance as well as
substance of prestige. 63

It is important to emphasize that the United States went to
great lengths to reach a compromise in view of Soviet opposition.
It agreed to broaden the control machinery by creating an allied
military council. But this did not satisfy Molotov, who insisted
that the Far Eastern Advisory Council should be a control council,
in which the Soviet Union should have a veto power. 64 Harriman
considered this to be a departure from Stalin's position at Gagri,
stating that Molotov "followed his customary tactics of increasing Soviet demands." In Harriman's opinion, "the greatest concern of the Soviets is retention by them of a voice in eventual Government of Japan and steps by which it evolves . . . . Molotov seeks to obtain complete veto of all policies and interpretation of these policies and to tie our hands in such a way that the functioning of control of Japan would be impossible without Soviet approval."65

To Harriman's protest that Molotov's position was a departure from Stalin's position at Gagri, Molotov delivered the following statement:

I. V. Stalin recognized and continues to recognize that the United States has more responsibility in Japanese affairs than the other Allies, but he never agreed that the United States alone should have this responsibility for he considers that those Allied Powers whose forces took an active part in the defeat of Japanese Armed Forces also bear this responsibility.

I. V. Stalin recognizes and continues to recognize that in deciding the majority of questions the decisive voice rests with the Supreme Commander, as the permanent chairman of the control organ, but I. V. Stalin has never agreed that such a right rests with the Supreme Commander in all questions without exception for he considers that, in all cases of disagreement, the Supreme Commander enjoys the final voice except in those few cases when it is a question of matters of principle, such as questions of change in the regime of control of Japan, changes in the composition in the Japanese Government, et cetera . . . .

In all of this, the Soviet Government is solidly with I. V. Stalin.66

The final solution was reached through a kind of informal quid pro quo at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in December. Upon receiving "flimsy assurance" that the Soviet would broaden the representation in the governments in Bulgaria and
Rumania, the United States agreed to recognize these governments. For the occupation of Japan two organs would be set up. The Far Eastern Commission would make a decision with a majority vote with the Great Powers holding a veto power. The United States would have the power to issue interim directives, but on fundamental matters such as change in Japan's government or her constitution, agreement in the commission would precede American directives. Another organ, the Allied Council for Japan, would be created in Tokyo, which would consult with MacArthur. In Buhite's opinion, "this 'compromise' gave Stalin about all he hoped to achieve after failing in his bid to occupy Hokkaido." 67

Is it possible to argue, as Shindo does, that Molotov's policy was a significant departure from Stalin's position at Gagri, and that this difference reflected the existence of different policies within the Soviet leadership? It seems important to recognize the difference in diplomatic tactics and substance of policy. What Harriman recognized was a degree of demands contained in the Soviet proposal -- in other words, a tactical matter in obtaining the ultimate goal of Soviet policy, which Harriman himself found consistent. At Gagri, Stalin certainly accepted the U.S. right to occupy Japan, but as Molotov's statement correctly points out, Stalin also insisted on the Soviet right to influence the occupation policy. It is difficult to argue, therefore, that Molotov's position significantly departed from Stalin's policy in substance. Moreover, Molotov's statement that the Soviet government was
solidly behind Stalin should not indicate that it was the Soviet
government that controlled Stalin, and that it was evidence that
there existed some differences within the leadership. For the
reasons I have already discussed, it was impossible for Molotov or
other members of the Politburo to raise objections to Stalin.

(2) Interconnection between Asia and Europe

Although I cannot accept Shindo's thesis that Stalin was not
interested in exerting Soviet influence on occupation policy in
Japan, I am in agreement with his general conclusions that to the
Soviet Union the first and foremost priority rested with Europe
and the importance of Asia was but secondary. Japan was
important, too, and to the degree of its importance, the Soviet
Union pursued its goal. But Bulgaria and Rumania were more
important than Japan on its list of priorities, and a long, hard
bargaining process on Japanese occupation mechanism was at the
same time a process to extract concessions from the West on
Bulgaria and Rumania as well. Here we come to a complicated
problem of interconnections between Asia and Europe.

If the Soviet Union was more modest in its ambition in Asia,
it may be because it was preoccupied with expansion and
consolidation of Eastern Europe. But if Asia was relegated to a
secondary position in Soviet foreign policy, the same can be said
about U.S. foreign policy. As the Soviet Union showed
uncompromising intransigence in maintaining its East European
satellites but only a modest ambition in Asia, the United States
ultimately came to the conclusion that "it was not worth trying to
save parts of Asia from Communism if the price was to see Soviet power extend to the English Channel and the Atlantic Coast.\textsuperscript{68}

Paradoxically, it was precisely because the Soviets perceived that the United States would not regard as its top priority a portion of Asia which it had assigned outside its defense perimeters—and its perception was not necessarily wrong—that it approved the North Korean invasion of the south. Equally paradoxically, the U.S. intervention in Korea was thought necessary precisely to prevent a similar invasion in Europe. We can see, thus, Europe and Asia interconnected in a complex way.

This fact was already pointed out by Max Beloff in his classical work in 1953:

While the study of Soviet policy in the Far East should make its contribution to a general understanding of the nature of the Soviet approach to international relations, this policy itself has of course been profoundly affected at every stage by events taking place in areas of the globe outside the purview of this study. The Yalta Conference itself...was mainly concerned not with Far Eastern questions but with the final stages of the war in Europe. The critical year of the Chinese civil war, 1948, was also the year of the Berlin blockade and of the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet camp. Both the Soviet Union and the other Great Powers had to consider the allocation of their resources to the Far Eastern theatre of conflict in relation to the demands upon them made elsewhere.\textsuperscript{69}

The interconnection between Asia and Europe can be considered at two levels: at the policy level and at the level of perceptions. We have seen above that the Soviet pressure to increase its influence in Japan's occupation was also motivated by its desire to diffuse the pressures from the West on its conduct in Rumania and Bulgaria. In addition, Ulam gives two more examples of such interconnections. First, he surmised that
Moscow's interest in national liberation movements in Southeast Asia might have been connected with its desire to distract the military power and resources of two countries of NATO in Asia—Britain in Malaya and France in Indochina. Second, Ulam sees the interconnection between Soviet diplomatic moves with regard to West German rearmament and the Korean War. The Soviet proposal at the Prague Conference in October, 1950, contained something that the West could have considered for serious negotiations. Ulam speculates that on the eve of the intervention of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the Korean War, which would inevitably lead to West German rearmament, Moscow found it necessary to make a deal with the West before it was too late. Also the Soviet cease fire proposal in Korea at the United Nations in June 1951 may have been motivated by the Soviet desire to prevent West German rearmament. Buhite also claims that the Berlin crisis in 1948 led to Soviet pressure on the world Communist and anti-imperialist movements to support Soviet views, and this may explain Mao's denunciation of Tito.

More difficult is a question of how Europe and Asia were interconnected in policymakers' perceptions. As far as Eastern Europe was concerned, as Ulam states, Soviet policy "cannot be described as other than expansionist." Even though Soviet ambitions were modest in Asia, compared with Europe, it was inevitable that the victory of Communism in China and the outbreak of the Korean War, which actually had different roots from Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, were seen in the same context.
John Gaddis shows, U.S. policymakers were not blindly influenced by the Cold War rhetoric, and did not mistake the Chinese Communists as mere puppets of Moscow. There was an influential group within the government who entertained the possibility of the Chinese Communists acting as another Tito. Dean Acheson himself tried to educate the Congress and the public to the intricacies of Far Eastern policy. But in the end, in the context of international politics as well as domestic pressures, no responsible policy-makers could have taken a policy to seek rapprochement with the Chinese Communists. In December 1950 British Prime Minister Attlee came to Washington and suggested that, despite the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, significant differences remained between China and the Soviet Union, and that the United States was making a mistake by pushing China in the direction where the Soviet Union was left as its only friend. "Acheson replied that the prime minister would not find much disagreement among the president's advisers with his analysis. Indeed he himself had probably been more 'bloodied' than anyone else in trying to articulate this argument. 'The question was not whether this was a correct analysis but whether it was possible to act on it.'" 74 In general those who argue from hindsight that the United States and the West missed opportunities of accommodating with either China or the Soviet Union seem to underestimate the constraints that the perceptions of the policy-makers as well as the public imposed on the range of policy choices.
Futhermore, we are completely in the dark as to such interconnections in the perceptions of the Soviet leadership. What lessons the Kremlin learned from U.S. determination in Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Berlin, and from its inactions in Czechoslovakia and Chiang K'ai-shek's fall to the Communists, and how each event was related to Moscow's assessment of situations elsewhere are important questions. But as far as I know, the problem of interconnections between Asia and Europe either at the policy level or at the level of perceptions is not sufficiently examined, and this seems to be the area where more scholarly attention should be paid.

VI. CONCLUSION

Professor Shindo has challenged the traditional view of Soviet policy in the Far East. He is most successful in dispelling the myth of Soviet expansionism. He points out the inherent weaknesses of the Yalta system, which could not absorb emerging nationalism in its own system. Arguing that Soviet policy in Asia was mainly defensive, he also indicates that origins of the Cold War in Asia cannot be grasped by using the same yardstick that is used to measure international politics in Europe.

But Shindo advances the same argument advocated by American revisionists. It is mainly the activist anti-Soviet, anti-Communist American foreign policy that provided the major driving force for the Cold War in Asia, whereas Soviet policy was mainly
defensive and reactive. I found this part of his interpretation unconvincing. Nonetheless, he raises important questions that should be examined further by specialists.

The Yalta system, which was to create a new international equilibrium in Asia, ultimately failed. The only aspect that remained was, as Iriye notes, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would challenge each other's supremacy in its spheres of predominance, if it contained a risk of war between the two superpowers.75 In fact, their self-awareness of their superpower status and the role they took upon themselves in maintaining peace in the postwar world was the foundation of this system, and also the basic cause for its failure. In October 1944 Roosevelt asserted: "in the current world war there is literally not a single problem, military or political, in which the United States are not interested."76 Needless to say, the United States took upon itself this global responsibility beyond the war's end. Likewise, Molotov made the following statement in February 1946: "The U.S.S.R. is one of the mightiest countries of the world. One cannot decide now any serious problem of international relations without the U.S.S.R. or without listening to the voice of our Fatherland."77

The attempt to create peace imposed by the condominium of the superpowers crumbled due to two forces, which Shindo correctly identifies. The first was the emergence of nationalism. Both superpowers have attempted to exploit nationalism to its advantage at the expense of the other. In other words, both have tended to
interpret nationalism in terms of a zero-sum game for the superpower confrontation. And in the end, this miscalculation cost both of them highly.

The second was the logic and ideology of the Cold War. As Iriye points out, the Yalta system was specific in its global arrangements, but the Cold War was universalistic as a conceptual framework. "It defined a reality which was often at variance with actual policy decision, but nevertheless it tended to determine the way in which these decisions were articulated and communicated to the public." The concept of the Cold War, which was basically created from the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, therefore had the inevitability of being applied to Asia, where the context of confrontations were different. It is a paradoxical tragedy that the two bloodiest wars had to be fought in Asia.

While in Europe the basic framework of the Yalta system has not become the basis of the international system, in Asia there has not been a final settlement of the Yalta system itself. Japan and the Soviet Union have not solved the territorial dispute, which is rooted in the different approach to the Yalta system. While the Soviet Union claims to be an Asian power, and demands political and military influence commensurate with its status in Asia -- a demand that Moscow can legitimately claim to have originated from the Yalta system -- the United States and its Pacific allies have not defined what the legitimate Soviet role in Asia should be other than negatively. In this sense it can be
said that in Asia an equilibrium has not been found yet. It is the most troubling factor that creates a major source of instability in the region.
Notes


3. For instance, see Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniiia na Dal'nom Vostoke v poslevoennye gody, 1945-1957, ed. by E. M. Zhukov et al. (2 vols., Moscow, 1978).


10. Ibid., pp. 267-268.
15. Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, p. 69.
16. Iokibe, Beikokuno Nihonsenryoseisaku, I, II.
17. Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, p. 81.
18. Ibid., p. 114.


24. Ibid., p. 182.


27. Iriye, Cold War in Asia, p. 68.


29. Ibid., pp. 226-227. Also for the Soviet concern with security of the regime during the war and the years immediately after the war, see Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Chapters VI, VII.


42. Quoted in Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 371.
45. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), p. 181; this episode is quoted also in Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 434.
48. See McCagg, Stalin Embattled.
52. Foreign Relations of the United States, VI, p. 784.
53. Ibid., p. 785.
54. Ibid., p. 787.
55. Ibid., p. 789.
56. Ibid., p. 789-790.
57. Ibid., p. 792.
58. Ibid., p. 792-793.
60. Foreign Relations of the United States, VI, p. 805.


63. Ibid., p. 809.

64. Ibid., p. 828.

65. Ibid., p. 831.

66. Ibid., p. 846.


69. Ibid., pp. 5-6.


71. Ibid., 509-510.


76. Ibid., p. 129.

