REPORT TO
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: SPECIALISTS IN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST
PARTY APPARATUS: Legal Professionals
As Party Functionaries

AUTHOR: Eugene Huskey

CONTRACTOR: Bowdoin College

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Eugene Huskey

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 800-8

DATE: March 31, 1988

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.
NOTE

This is one of two papers supplementing Eugene Huskey's Final Report entitled CAREERS IN THE SOVIET LEGAL BUREAUCRACY, which are being distributed with the Final Report, all dated March 31, 1988.
Revolution breeds contempt for specialists. At the collapse of the old order, the experts' claims of allegiance to narrow professional and technical norms appear incompatible with the grand and selfless vision of the makers of revolution. Yet it is a law of revolutionary development that the gap between red and expert narrows over time. In Soviet history the erosion of these two archetypes occurred in two stages. The first paralleled the coming of age of Soviet society. Initially forced to rely on bourgeois specialists inherited from the old regime, the Bolsheviks were increasingly able in their second and third decades of rule to recruit into the government bureaucracy Soviet-trained cadres with technical expertise. The training of the first generation of red specialists, ably documented in the works of Azrael, Berliner, and others, placed in the service of the state persons who were schooled in the subtleties of both professional disciplines and party rule.

The second stage in the reconciliation of red and expert, at once more problematic and protracted, required specialized training for party bureaucrats. The breakdown of the red archetype represented in part a universal tendency for managers in industrial societies to acquire technical competence. But it was also the result of a conscious decision by the Khrushchev leadership to revive the party's interventionist role in industry and other sectors. In addition to shifting power away from the government, the party revival of the 1950s encouraged the recruitment of a new type of party leader who could merge political instincts with the
specialized knowledge necessary to coordinate effectively professional activities and economic production. 2

Much has already been written about the recruitment of individuals with higher education into leading posts in the party apparatus. 3 A university-level degree now appears essential even for secretaries of district and city party committees, whereas in 1939 only 40 percent of this group had completed secondary school. 4 Perhaps more importantly, a marked increase in the amount of specialized training and work experience accompanied the raising of the overall educational level of party officials. By 1966, 76 percent of party first secretaries in the largest cities of the RSFSR had completed university-level training in engineering and 69 percent had worked for ten years or more in government posts in industry. 5 To be sure, a sizable minority of generalists without training or experience in technical or professional fields remain in party positions, usually in work involving ideology or the supervision of lower party organs. 6 But most leading party officials have either been recruited into the CPSU apparatus with a specialized degree at or near graduation, or coopted at mid-career from a responsible government post in the economy. 7

If the contours of the careers of party secretaries are clear, very little is known about the staff officers who work beneath them in the party machinery, particularly at republican and local levels. To what extent has the emphasis on specialization in party recruitment extended to department heads, instructors, and inspectors, who serve not only as the immediate supervisors of the performance of government experts, but as the recruitment source for the next generation of party leaders? How pervasive is the interweaving of technical/professional and party staff careers? More
specifically, which positions are personnel in the party departments drawn from and to which posts do they advance?

This study addresses these questions in an area where knowledge of party staff careers is especially rudimentary - legal affairs. Using previously untapped biographical materials, the paper explores the extensive network of interlocking party and government careers in law. The goals of the research are to extend Soviet elite studies into the staff ranks of republican and local party organizations, to assess the impact on party-professional relations of the increase of legal specialists among party functionaries, and to raise anew broader interpretive questions about the effects of the specialization of the party apparatus on bureaucratic behavior.

Two discrete sets of biographies as well as a series of interviews with Soviet emigre jurists form the empirical base of this study. One biographical data set includes all individuals appointed since 1978 to leading posts in the Soviet Procuracy at the regional, republican, and all-union levels. Represented here are individuals filling the top 200 posts of an institution with responsibilities for criminal investigation, for state prosecution in criminal cases, and for monitoring the legality (obshchii nadzor zakonnost'yu) of the actions of the courts, soviets, and the government bureaucracy. Besides the basic personal characteristics of procurators, such as date of birth, gender, and legal institute completed, the biographies supply detailed accounts of career movements that frequently take Procuracy officials for extended periods into the party apparatus8, specifically into its Departments of Administrative Organs,
which function at the regional level and above as the institutional overseers of legal affairs.³

Since 1972 the journal of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Kommunist (Vilnius), has published biographies of new appointees to the Administrative Organs Department of the Lithuanian party. This second set of biographies provides the apparatchiks' gender, date of birth, level of education, general career background (i.e. legal specialist, Komsomol worker), previous post, and current position. Although the background sketches of party workers in Lithuania lack the detail and geographical coverage of the Procuracy biographies, they give a fuller picture of the sources of recruitment of party functionaries in legal affairs.¹⁰ Taken together with the interview data and the existing secondary literature, the two data sets offer a revealing, if still partially obstructed, view of cadres policy toward the party supervisors of legal affairs.

The Party Apparatus as Way Station in Soviet Legal Careers

The ease with which specialists in the USSR now move between government and party posts is evident in the careers of leading Soviet procurators. Of the 232 individuals appointed since 1978 to ranking posts in the Procuracy at the regional, republic, or all-union level,¹¹ 29 percent had served earlier in their careers as functionaries in the party apparatus.¹² While in the party bureaucracy, these legal professionals worked almost exclusively as instructors, deputy heads, or heads of Departments of Administrative Organs.
The flow of cadres between party and Procuracy has thus assumed a fundamentally different character in recent decades. Under Stalin it was the party apparatus that often sent its generalists to work in line positions in the legal organs, where they would be trained either on the job or through correspondence courses in law. But contemporary Procuracy leaders are, with rare exceptions, legal specialists with extensive training and experience in the law. Of the 67 procurators in this study with experience in the party bureaucracy, only two could be classified as "party envoys" who entered the Procuracy in mid-career without a legal background. Nowadays it is the Procuracy that sends its cadres to fill staff posts in the party bureaucracy.

Recruitment of legal specialists into the Departments of Administrative Organs appears to have become a matter of priority for the Communist Party over the last quarter century. According to Soviet emigre jurists interviewed for this study, the movement of legal professionals into the Departments of Administrative Organs has risen significantly since the late Stalin period, when legal affairs was supervised by poorly educated but politically reliable party generalists. The biographical data confirm this perception. Among the older generation of procurators in this study, those born in the 1920s, less than 20 percent held party posts during their careers. Furthermore, of the 26 high-ranking Procuracy officials (all born before 1925) whose obituaries were published in the Procuracy journal between 1955 and 1978, only 15 percent had worked in the party bureaucracy. By contrast, over 30 percent of leading Procuracy officials born in the 1930s and 1940s worked in the party apparatus.
This disjuncture in party bureaucratic experience between the older and middle generations of procurators apparently has its roots in a campaign during the 1960s to integrate more fully party and government careers. In the Moscow raion of Leningrad, for example, the percentage of local soviet personnel drawn from party posts more than doubled from 1962 to 1966, from 3.4 percent to 7.8 percent. The effort to broaden the qualifications and expertise of party functionaries did not signal, however, the beginning of a continually rising level of recruitment of procurators into party posts. Since the 1960s, according to our study, the rate of movement of Procuracy officials into party staff positions in law has remained relatively constant, suggesting that the initial breakthrough in the specialization of the party machinery has not been improved upon, at least not in legal affairs. Indeed, whereas 33 percent of the Procuracy officials born in the 1930s had party experience, only 30 percent of the cohort born in the 1940s could claim service in the party bureaucracy.

The pattern of recruitment of procurators into the Departments of Administrative Organs has assumed a stable, or institutionalized, character. When Procuracy officials transfer into the party apparatus, it is usually after approximately 10 to 12 years of work as legal professionals. At recruitment into regional party work, the average age of Procuracy officials is 34 for instructors (n=14) and 37 for department heads or deputy heads (n=11). As one would expect, appointees at the republican and all-union levels are, on average, somewhat older. Republican instructors are recruited from the Procuracy at an average age of 35 (n=6), republican heads or deputy heads at 41 (n=4), and USSR instructors at 41 (n=3). In contrast to the "party insiders" in industrial or agricultural departments,
who are recruited into the party machinery out of university with production-oriented training, legal professionals entering the party bureaucracy are coopted almost exclusively at mid-career from government posts.

Without a designated department for legal supervision, or a perceived need for legal professionals in departments that supervise the economy, ideology, or lower party organs, party secretaries in district and city organizations have not generally recruited legal professionals at the base of the Communist party apparatus. \(^{17}\) According to an authoritative Soviet work on the district and city party committees, these lower-level party organizations promote into the apparatus politically mature persons with party experience, such as secretaries of primary party organizations, or with backgrounds in "social collectives", such as trade union officials. "But at the same time many young engineers, technicians, agronomists, economists, and teachers enter the party apparatus. [Note the omission of jurists from this list.] These individuals know the specifics of a particular area of production but at times do not sufficiently understand the theory and practice of party construction."\(^{18}\)

Because jurists rarely fill party posts at the district and city level, the party has few legally competent in-house candidates for promotion to vacancies on the Departments of Administrative Organs at the regional level and above. Appointments of jurists are usually made laterally from the ranks of government legal personnel who have already achieved a measure of prominence in their profession. At the regional level, for example, the Department of Administrative Organs finds Procuracy recruits primarily in staff positions in the regional Procuracy office or in the post of head
procurator of a major city or district in the region. [See Table 1] Party placement occurs, therefore, at a critical stage in the career of a Procuracy official, when he may be aspiring to a government legal post of regional or republican significance.

For most Procuracy officials recruited into party service, the experience is more than a brief apprenticeship in the party organs. Unlike staff personnel in many other party departments, where turnover is frequent, Procuracy officials drafted into the Department of Administrative organs spend an average of over five and a half years in the party apparatus. During this period the procurators-cum-party functionaries, along with other members of the Department of Administrative Organs, supervise the selection and training of legal cadres, the dissemination of legal propaganda, and the performance of the local soviets, the justice department, the courts, the Bar, the MVD, the Procuracy, and the KGB.

With limited personnel and resources available to oversee the large administrative and legal bureaucracies of the Soviet government, the Departments of Administrative Organs must rely heavily on information gathered from the regular oral and written reports submitted by government institutions. Personnel from the Departments do attend, however, weekly instruktazh meetings in local government institutions, where they monitor the implementation of party directives in the legal sector. The extent to which the powers of the instructors and department heads go beyond the formal analysis of oral and written reports to an active role in shaping party directives on legal affairs depends on a number of factors, including the interest taken by the party secretaries in legal affairs, the personal relations between the heads of local legal institutions and the first
secretary, and crime and justice as a political issue in the area. Whatever the profile assumed by procurators engaged in party work, they are considered to be cadres of regional significance and as such can expect, if rotated back to the legal organs, to occupy a leading line position at the regional level once their party service is completed.

Our study does not track officials who leave the Procuracy permanently for a party career, but it appears that virtually all legal professionals transferred to the party bureaucracy return to government posts in law. Once a legal specialist has attained the post of head of the Administrative Organs Department, whether at the regional, republican, or all-union level, avenues for advancement in the party are effectively closed. In his study of republican elites, Grey Hodnett found that from 1959 to 1968 not a single individual with a legal education occupied the post of republican party secretary. By contrast, agricultural and engineering degrees were held by 19.5 percent and 35 percent, respectively, of republican party secretaries during the same period. Without experience in lower-level party organizations or in the critical sectors of industry, agriculture, or ideology, the legal professional is ill-suited for further promotion within the party, except to chairmanship of the Party Commission (Partiinaya komissiya pri TsK respublik) or the party Control Commission, which performs a quasi-legal function as the disciplinary arm of the party. Even the Administrative Organs Departments at the republican and all-union levels do not reach into the regional Departments of Administrative Organs for their personnel, preferring instead to recruit legal specialists from government institutions at the same, or a lower, administrative level. Only two procurators-cum-party instructors in the study moved vertically in the party
apparatus to a higher-level Department of Administrative Organs. Thus, there is no "inside track" in the party for legal staffers.

Where, then, are the reentry positions in the Procuracy for those with party service? The most likely destination for those returning from the head or deputy head position in the Administrative Organs Department is procurator on the same administrative level as the party post. Procuracy officials returning to the legal system from the post of party instructor normally move into deputy procurator positions on the same administrative level as their party service. [See Table 2] In many legal careers, therefore, the Administrative Organs Department functions as a springboard to scarce line positions in the Procuracy at the regional level and above. This party path to regional procurator is indeed the fastest track to a ranking position in the profession. Those with service in the party bureaucracy achieved the post of regional procurator at an average age of 45, whereas those with straight Procuracy careers reached the post at an average age of 47, and those with mixed Procuracy-judicial careers at an average age of 49.

This picture of Procuracy careers lends additional support to the research of Armstrong, Hough, and others on the relative prominence of party staff officials and the government line personnel whose institutions they oversee. Although instructors and department heads in the party apparatus enjoy considerable authority as the agents of party rule, their individual standing is generally beneath that of the leaders of the prominent government institutions within their jurisdiction. At the all-union level in 1979, for example, the heads of the five legal institutions supervised by the Department of Administrative Organs held full membership
In the Central Committee, whereas only the head of the Department was in the Central Committee, and then as candidate member. In career terms, therefore, the apparatchiki in the party organs charged with the supervision of legal affairs may be junior to the KGB, Procuracy, and MVD heads with whom they regularly interact.

That party staff personnel would aspire to a government line position in their area of competence is perhaps more readily understood if one remembers the relatively low public profile assumed by party bureaucrats. Not only does a line position in government give a specialist transferring from the party apparatus far greater visibility, it also places him at the helm of a large bureaucracy that may have hundreds or even thousands of employees. The head of an Administrative Organs Department, on the other hand, administers an office with only a handful of workers. An emigre jurist from the Baltic reported that in Estonia the republican Department of Administrative Organs had only four members on its professional staff in the 1970s. In the hunting of a career hierarchy that cuts across party and government bureaucracies, one must consider that the trappings of power may be as enticing as power itself.

A career ladder in legal affairs that places party officials below their government counterparts raises important questions about party-professional relations. How forceful will control of specialist groups be if staff personnel in the party regard the head of a government institution as a professional superior as well as an object of supervision? More than 25 years ago John Armstrong wrote about the Ukrainian apparatus: "The instructor is at a disadvantage in dealing with the line officials whose mistakes he must correct. He is supposed to work intimately with these
more powerful figures, yet to maintain his rôle as a liaison officer and as a representative of higher authority.\textsuperscript{30} The same conundrum applies to the contemporary Departments of Administrative Organs, though here the ambiguities are even more acute. First, unlike in many other sectors, the party secretaries do not generally play an active role in legal supervision.\textsuperscript{31} Law does not merit its own party secretary at any administrative level; it is instead a supplemental portfolio, apparently managed by the second secretary,\textsuperscript{32} whose major responsibilities are in industry, agriculture, or ideology. One assumes that the relative lack of attention gives wider latitude to staff personnel in the Departments of Administrative Organs, and particularly to the Department head, who, as Philip Stewart observed, "is a key person in determining what views will get a hearing in the obkom bureau."\textsuperscript{33}

Second, without prospects for advancement in the party bureaucracy, legal specialists detailed at mid-career to the party apparatus may be more solicitous of the interests of legal institutions and their leading personnel than staff workers in other sectors. Since promotion within the legal system reportedly depends as much on professional as party recommendations,\textsuperscript{34} the legal professional in the Department of Administrative Organs must consider the perceptions of his work by government, as well as party, superiors. In fact, one emigre noted that some procurators are able to ensure the transfer of "their people" to openings in the Department of Administrative Organs. He cited the former Moscow city procurator Mal'kov as an example of a procurator who succeeded in placing sympathetic personnel from his own office into the city's Department of Administrative Organs.\textsuperscript{35} The party's oversight of
legal affairs may therefore be less vigorous than in other sectors because of the confluence of divided institutional loyalties of staff personnel and the relatively low priority accorded to law by the party bureau.36

This uneasy relationship between political and administrative careers is not limited to the Soviet Union or to Communist systems. The awkward position of the specialist working between party and profession is mirrored in the French bureaucracy, where members of the civil service in early to mid-career may be appointed by a minister to serve in his personal cabinet (cabinet ministerial) as a technical counselor. The minister will use his technical counselor much as the party secretary uses the staff specialist - to provide reliable information on the specialist's area of expertise and to ensure that specialized departments (directions) in the government bureaucracy adhere faithfully to political commands. However, the counselor's ambivalent attitude toward the higher-ranking civil servants under his supervision may undermine his reliability as a bridge between politics and administration. Particularly in those instances when a counselor plans to return to work in a direction for which he has supervisory responsibility, his reluctance to challenge the perspectives of those with a higher administrative rank reduces his value to the minister.37

The tensions between political and professional loyalties, however, are almost certainly more pronounced in France than in the Soviet Union. While the French functionary regards parties and politicians as temporary claimants of state power38 who can, on some level, be opposed, the Soviet specialist views the Communist Party and its officials as the legitimate, permanent, and unchallengable instruments of national rule. Thus, for the French, the conflict between the expert and the politician, between

13
knowledge and power, may be managed but not eliminated. For the Soviets, there is still the promise of a union of political and professional loyalties. As long as this myth permeates the professional elite in the USSR, and as long as the Communist Party maintains its monopolistic rule over the state and society, specialists in the Soviet Union will be less subject than their Western counterparts to a deformation professionelle.

Party-Legal Careers: The Evidence from the Republics

Thus far the analysis of the relationship between party and legal careers has been grounded in biographical data from the Procuracy. But the Procuracy, of course, is only one possible source of recruitment for personnel appointed to the Departments of Administrative Organs. Although the biographies of leading procurators suggest that more legal professionals are currently rotated into party posts than in the Stalin or Khrushchev eras, they do not tell us about the relative share of "Procuracy" positions in the Departments of Administrative Organs or about the backgrounds of party functionaries in law recruited from other institutions. Unfortunately, comprehensive countrywide data on appointments to party positions in legal affairs are not available. Detailed biographies do exist, however, for individuals appointed to the republican Department of Administrative Organs in Lithuania. More limited data are also available for other republics.

Since 1972 11 appointments have been made to the Lithuanian Department of Administrative Organs. The biographies of these Lithuanian appointees reveal a surprising lack of emphasis on specialized training and work experience, particularly among the leading cadres in the Department. The
heads of the Department have apparently had neither legal education nor previous experience in the direct supervision of legal affairs. Moreover, the deputy head of the Department of Administrative Organs from 1975 to 1985, V. Shkaradek, assumed his post without a completed higher education of any kind. The epitome of the party generalist, Shkaradek entered the Department from the post of inspector in the Party Organs Department of the Lithuanian apparatus. Among the instructors and the recent deputy heads in the Department of Administrative Organs, however, legal professionals figure more prominently. Of the six instructors recruited into the Department since 1972, all but one moved from legal or administrative work, though no more than three appear to be akin to the "pure" legal professional that one encounters in the Procuracy study. (See Table 3)

The traditional preference for party generalists as heads of the Departments of Administrative Organs seems to have died hard in other republican party bureaucracies as well. Among the recent heads of the Departments of Administrative Organs in Belorussia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Latvia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine, only two of 11 were legal professionals. But the ranks of instructors and deputy heads of the Departments of Administrative Organs in the republics are almost certainly filled with a far higher percentage of individuals who have made a career in law before working in the party bureaucracy. Biographical data from the republics reveal that of the five persons with recent experience as deputy heads of Departments of Administrative Organs, three were legal professionals. Although more information is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn about recruitment patterns in the Departments of Administrative Organs, it appears that party cadres in legal affairs may be
divided into managers (the department heads); drawn largely from the ranks of party generalists, and support personnel (the instructors and deputy heads), recruited primarily from the ranks of legal specialists.

The variety in recruitment sources for party staff personnel in law in Lithuania and the other republics certainly indicates that republican party leaders do not appoint persons to lead the Departments of Administrative Organs from a carefully-maintained reserve of cadres specific to the management of legal affairs. The continued use of party generalists in staff positions in legal affairs testifies to the party's unwillingness to abandon the ideal of the party amateur, whose lack of technical expertise is compensated for by the virtue of partiinost. However extensive the specialization of the party apparatus has become in recent decades, the division between amateur and professional among staff officers has not been eliminated.

The Geography of Recruitment in Party-Legal Careers

If an examination of biographies from party sources suggests a higher concentration of legal professionals in the lower ranks of the Departments of Administrative Organs, an analysis of Procuracy biographies reveals a greater concentration of procurators-cum-party functionaries in certain areas of the country. While a sizable minority of leading procurators were seconded to party posts over the past decade, they were spread very unevenly across the country. This is particularly evident at the republican level, where all but one of the procurators with service in the party bureaucracy worked in the Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaidzhan or the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan.

In Georgia, three of the six officials appointed to procurator or deputy procurator positions since 1978 moved from the same post in the republic's Department of Administrative Organs. In 1979, A. Barabadze left his position as deputy head of the Department to become Georgian Procurator. When a vacancy occurred in the first deputy procurator post in 1982, V. Razmadze was also brought in from Barabadze's old position as deputy head of the Department, and at the premature death of Barabadze in 1985 at the age of 48, Razmadze assumed the post of Georgian procurator. In the ensuing shuffle, a new deputy procurator, T. Kogua, was appointed. Like Barabadze and Razmadze, his previous post had been deputy head of the Department of Administrative Organs of the republic. Although it is possible that the recruitment pattern observed here is explained by the existence of a temporary patronage network, it appears more likely that the Georgian Communist Party has institutionalized the use of the post of deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department as a proving ground for future leaders of the republican Procuracy.

At the regional level as well, the practice of rotating Procuracy officials through the Administrative Organs Department varies widely by geographical area of the USSR. Whereas only one of the nine regional procurators appointed in Belorussia from 1978 to 1987 had worked in the party, all three of the regional procurators appointed in Kirgizia in this period had party experience. The current procurator of the Osh oblast, for example, M. Alymbekov, worked from 1975 to 1978 as head of the Administrative Organs Department in the Osh regional party organization. A legal
professional before his move to the party organs, Alymbekov transferred from the party apparatus to the deputy chairmanship of the regional soviet, working there for five years before assuming his present position as Osh regional procurator in 1983.

The markedly uneven geographical distribution of legal cadres with service in the party bureaucracy poses difficult questions about recruitment policy. If the integration of party and Procuracy careers is not in fact a high priority throughout the country, why do some republics rely so heavily on the party apparatus as a recruitment source for leading procurators? The answer seems to have less to do with a desire to professionalize the party than to tighten party control of the Procuracy in certain areas of the country.

The most significant overlap between party and Procuracy careers occurs in areas where the party is known to be especially concerned about legal affairs - the Caucasus and Central Asia. Approximately half of all procurators with party experience in our study worked in these two parts of the country, in which the problems of localism, corruption, and "private property tendencies" are particularly acute. Over the past decade the procuracies of Georgia, Kirgizia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have undergone large-scale purges to remove corrupt and local-minded cadres. Shortly after taking office in 1979, the Georgian republican procurator Barabadze removed from office for unprincipled and negligent behavior seven district procurators, four of their assistants, and two criminal investigators. A year later, after further rounds of dismissals, an article in the republican party newspaper Zarya Vostoka asked: "Who is left in the Procuracy?" In Uzbekistan, a scandal revealed by Literaturnaya
gazeta in the autumn of 1985 led to the expulsion from the Communist Party of the deputy procurator of the republic, to the sanctioning of the former republican procurator, and to the arrest of the senior criminal investigating official in the republican Procuracy. 46 Similarly, in Azerbaidzhan, the disclosure of criminal acts by Procuracy officials in the late 1970s resulted in the dismissal of more than three dozen cadres in the republican Procuracy office as well as the procurators of Baku and two of its districts. 47 Although the Armenian Procuracy has thus far averted a purge, it has been the subject of severe criticism for a number of years from central newspapers as diverse as Sovetskii sport and Sotsialisticheskaya industriya. 48

In the struggle against localism and corruption in the Procuracy, the Communist Party has employed three different, though not mutually exclusive, tools of cadres policy. As we have seen, in some cases the party transfers legal professionals from its Departments of Administrative Organs to serve as operativniki charged with reforming entrenched legal bureaucracies. But the party may also replace compromised legal officials with untainted professional personnel from legal institutions at lower administrative levels. In Kirgizia, for instance, cadres from regional legal institutions replaced the disgraced leaders of the republican Procuracy in 1983. Finally, the party may choose to coopt individuals with extensive legal experience into its own leading ranks in order bring problems of localism and corruption under control. E. Shevarnadze and G. Aliev, former first secretaries of the Georgian and Azerbaidzhan party organizations, respectively, are examples of the party-legal cadre who is mobilized in areas where law acquires special prominence as a political issue. 49
Conclusion

Western scholars writing about the increasing functional integration in the Soviet bureaucracy have traditionally emphasized the effects of party recruitment of professionals not on specialist institutions but on the party itself. With the influx of government experts into prominent staff and line positions in the party, it is argued, the CPSU is threatened by professional norms that may erode its ideology of centralized control. This specialization of the party also presents the specter of an internal debate increasingly dominated by conflicts between professional groups, or issue networks, that cut across party and government lines. Furthermore, the similarities in the training and experience of cadres working on both sides of the party-government divide raise the possibility of the development of elite sectoral corps - again the French bureaucratic experience is suggestive- in industry, law, agriculture, and other areas that supply personnel to both party and government. Writing in 1970, Michael Gehlen thought it "likely that there will be a further gradual transformation of the Party apparat into a coterie of functional elites who maintain close identification with specialist areas of operation. This development would probably even further diminish the distinction of the party from the [government] bureaucracy and make it even more difficult for the Party to justify its dominant role and to maintain its present autonomy."
Whether this is true as regards industrial and agricultural elites has yet to be established. But in the legal sector, at least, the recruitment of specialists into the party apparatus seems to be felt most profoundly in the enhanced ability of the party to control the specialist institutions themselves. Legal professionals are not generally recruited into party staff positions from university or coopted into permanent party posts at mid-career, they are borrowed by the party from the legal system for an intensive period of socialization and service, after which they are returned to government legal posts. Thus, while at any one time there will be a large number of seconded legal specialists in the Departments of Administrative Organs, they do not form part of a permanent corps of party bureaucrats in law whose perspectives on legal principles as alternatives to the plan and administrirovanie might gain a serious hearing.

The system of limited recruitment of legal professionals allows the party, with minimal costs, to increase both the effectiveness of its communications with specialist institutions and the number of reliable party staff veterans in leading government posts. Like nomenklatura and podmena, the rotation of legal cadres through the Departments of Administrative Organs represents another mechanism for party domination of non-party institutions, though one which may be tempered by the legal professional's recognition of the transient character of his party career.

These findings, focusing on party staff positions in legal affairs, invite further research into the integration of party and government careers in the various functional sectors, administrative levels, and geographical areas of the USSR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>TO: Head or Deputy Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Same Administrative Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuracy Staff Personnel</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Procuracy Post</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Department Official</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor, Administrative Organs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Next Lower Administrative Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuracy Staff Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD Official</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor, Administrative Organs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Communist Party Post</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuracy Staff Personnel on Higher Administrative Level</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Omitted from this mobility matrix are the 18 individuals whose biographies mention their work in the party apparatus 'nakhodilis' na partiinoi rabote' but do not specify position or administrative level. It is unlikely that more than a handful of these persons worked outside the Administrative Organs Departments. Also omitted are the four persons in the study known to have occupied other posts in the party apparatus - two as assistant to the first secretary, one as secretary, and one as first secretary - and five persons who worked in the Administrative Organs Departments but on an unspecified administrative level.

Combined here are data on transfers into Department of Administrative Organs in republics, regions, and large cities. Since several persons had multiple postings to or within the Administrative Organs Departments, the number of job changes recorded in Tables 1 and 2 is greater than the number of individuals who are the subjects of these tables.

This category includes nachal'nik otdela, prokuror otdela, pomoshchnik prokurora, and sledovatel'. The first two posts accounted for all but one of the transfers noted here.

Non-Procuracy backgrounds are in evidence in the sample because a few leading procurators at the regional, republic, and all-union spent part of their earlier careers in other legal institutions.

Presumably these are instructors in the Administrative Organs Departments who are elevated, after a period of service, to the leading positions in the Department.
Table 2

NEXT POSITION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS RECRUITED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS DEPARTMENTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY¹
(PROCURACY SAMPLE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>Next Lower Administrative Level</th>
<th>Next Higher Administrative Level</th>
<th>Unspecified Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head or Deputy Head</td>
<td>Same Administrative Level²</td>
<td>Next Lower Administrative Level</td>
<td>Next Higher Administrative Level</td>
<td>Unspecified Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Procurator Head</td>
<td>Court Justice</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Justice Official</td>
<td>Soviet Official Organs</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Head Admin.</td>
<td>Other Party</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Official Organs</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>KGB Official</td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Transport Procurator³</td>
<td>KGB Official</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>Next Lower Administrative Level</th>
<th>Next Higher Administrative Level</th>
<th>Unspecified Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head or Deputy Head</td>
<td>Same Administrative Level²</td>
<td>Next Lower Administrative Level</td>
<td>Next Higher Administrative Level</td>
<td>Unspecified Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Procurator Head</td>
<td>Court Justice</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator Team</td>
<td>Justice Official</td>
<td>Soviet Official Organs</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Head Admin.</td>
<td>Other Party</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>Official Organs</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Deputy Procurator</td>
<td>Procurator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurator</td>
<td>KGB Official</td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Transport Procurator³</td>
<td>KGB Official</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. This table also represents only a portion of all Procuracy officials in the study who worked in the party apparatus. For an explanation, see footnote 1 of Table 1. The discrepancy in the total number of job changes recorded in Tables 1 and 2 is due to the absence of data for certain previous and subsequent postings of recruits to the Administrative Organs Departments.

2. Combined here are data on transfers from the Departments of Administrative Organs in republics, regions, and large cities.

3. Transport procurators form a separate branch of the Procuracy. Their jurisdiction does not correspond to the traditional administrative divisions of the USSR but to unique territorial units or to specific railways, waterways, or airports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Date of App't.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Previous Post</th>
<th>Career Type</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Birth-date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Bujlis, Alfonsas Andriusovič</td>
<td>Head, Party Commission, Lithuanian CC</td>
<td>Party work</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Apanavičius, Stasys Petrovič</td>
<td>First Secretary, Alytus Gorkom, Lithuania</td>
<td>Komsomol/Party work</td>
<td>Lith. Ag. Acad./USSR Komsomol School</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Shkaradek, Valerian Ivanovich</td>
<td>Inspector, Party Organs Dept., Lithuanian CC</td>
<td>Party work</td>
<td>Incomplete higher</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Onisimov, Aleksandr Efimovich</td>
<td>Instructor Administrative Organs Dept., Lithuanian CC</td>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Geržonas, Vitalius Feliksovič</td>
<td>Instructor Administrative Organs Dept., Lithuanian CC</td>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ./Leningrad Higher Party School</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Date of App't.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Previous Post</td>
<td>Career Type¹</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Birthdate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Merčaitis, Benjaminas Vinco</td>
<td>Chairman, People's Court</td>
<td>Army/Komsomol/ Administrative work</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Onisimov, Aleksandr Efimovich</td>
<td>Student, USSR MVD Academy</td>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Geržonas, Vitalius Feliksovič</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Section of Soviet work, Presidium Lithuanian Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Janavičius, Vigantas Stasio</td>
<td>Head, Section of Sport and Military Preparedness, Komsomol CC Lithuania</td>
<td>Teacher/ Komsomol work</td>
<td>Vilnius Pedag. Inst./Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Kiselius, Edmundas Alfonsovič</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Administration of Affairs, Lithuanian Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Komsomol work</td>
<td>Vilnius Pedag. Inst./Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Baranov, Anatolii Anatolevich</td>
<td>Judge, Lithuanian Supreme Court</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Vilnius Univ.</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The career designations are those used in the original Soviet biographies.

Source: Kommunist (Vilnius), 12/73; 1/75; 4/75; 11/82; 3/83; 10/83; 11/83; 3/85; 5/85; 2/87.
*Primary funding for this research was provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. The Faculty Research Fund at Bowdoin College extended additional support. My thanks to Myron Curtis, Thomas Flory, and the staff of the Bowdoin Computer Center for their assistance. I also wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer for this journal.


6. See the biographies of appointees to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and the Department of Organizational-Party Work in Lithuania, published since 1972 in Kommunist (Vilnius).


8. This information on procurators, which has been published for the past decade in the monthly Procuracy journal, Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost', is supplemented by obituaries compiled on a smaller group of high-level Procuracy officials who died from 1955 to 1978.
In all but the largest regions, legal affairs as well as financial and trade matters come under the purview of a single party department, known as the Department of Administrative and Trade-Financial Organs. For the sake of brevity, we shall use the department label found in large regions, republics, and at the all-union level - Department of Administrative Organs. It should be noted that at the all-union level, the Department of Administrative Organs assumes an additional portfolio, military affairs, which is not handled at lower levels.

Incomplete data are also available on the biographies of leading personnel in the Administrative Organs Departments of other republics. These data, drawn from the biographical directories of deputies in the supreme soviets of seven republics, provide information on the backgrounds of recent heads of the Administrative Organs Department in these republics.

Included in this group are all regional procurators, republican procurators and deputy procurators, and, at the all-union level, the Procurator-General, deputy procurators-general, and section heads (nachal'nik otdelov), who were appointed from June 1978 through May 1987.

In a recent study of leading government bureaucrats at the all-union level, Karl Ryavec describes a similar pattern of movement between party and government posts. Of the 121 persons in that sample, 35 percent had worked for a time in the party apparatus, usually at early or "late early" stages of their careers. K. Ryavec, "The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite from 1964 to 1979: A Research Note", Soviet Union, no. 3 (1985), p. 337.
Work in progress by Peter Solomon on the Stalinist legal system, "Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 21-26, examines, inter alia, the backgrounds of early Soviet legal officials.

The two individuals were N. Kornienko and A. Nurmaganbetov. Kornienko worked as a party official from 1958 until 1970, when, at age 42, he was appointed chairman of a city court in the Aktiyubinsk region. After subsequent posts in the Procuracy and the local justice department in the same region, he assumed the post of procurator of the Karachaevo-Cherkessk autonomous oblast in 1984 at the age of 56. For his part, Nurmaganbetov spent the first 21 years of his career in the party apparatus. In 1977, at age 45, he was appointed regional procurator in Alma-Ata. In 1985, he assumed the regional procurator's post in the Taldy-Kurgansk oblast. One suspects that for both Kornienko and Nurmaganbetov, transfer to the legal organs followed difficulties in their careers in the party bureaucracy.

The remaining 65 procurators-cum-party functionaries pursued traditional legal careers before their transfer to work in the party apparatus. 55 of them began work in the Procuracy or other legal organs before the age of 30; ten began between the ages of 30 and 35. Of the procurators in this study with service in the party bureaucracy, only three received their legal education by correspondence. Among the remaining 165 procurators in the study, 12 had correspondence degrees.

Personal interviews with F. Neznanskii (Frankfurt), A. Shtromas (Huddersfield, UK), Ya. Aizenshtat (Jerusalem), S. Pipko (New York), and one jurist who wished to remain anonymous.
16. B. Lebin and M. Perfil'ev, Kadry apparata upravleniya v SSSR: 
sotsiologicheskie problemy podbora i rasstanovki (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 211-212.

17. Perhaps typical of the extent of lower-level party recruitment of jurists is the rural raikom of Orgeev in Moldavia, where in the mid-1970s only one of the 18 staff positions was occupied by an individual with legal training. D. Kukln, Voprosy raboty KPSS s kadrami na sovremennom etape, p. 158.


19. Although one-quarter of Procuracy officials are women, Sovetskaya prokuratura (Moscow, 1982), p. 209, our study of 232 leading procurators contains only a single female appointee, N. Sokolova, who became Deputy Procurator of Kirgizia in the autumn of 1985.

20. J. Hough, How the Soviet Union is Governed, p. 496.

21. T. Shamba, KPSS i organy okhrany pravoporyadka (Moscow, 1979), pp. 102-103. There is a division of labour in the Administrative Organs Departments between those supervising what might be labelled the organs of social control - the KGB and the MVD - and the organs of justice - the Procuracy, the courts, and the Justice Ministry. Personal interviews. A rare mention of an organizational subdivision of a Department of Administrative Organs was made in the 1985 Deputaty from Kazakhstan, where the republican soviet deputy T. Aitmukhambetov was recorded as having worked in the Department's "sector on the courts, Procuracy, and justice". Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Kazakhskoi SSR, 11-yl sozyv (Alma-Ata, 1985). It is not known how frequently procurators recruited into the Administrative Organs Departments are entrusted with direct supervision of
the MVD and the KGB.

22. Personal interviews.

23. Indeed, a party publication in 1956, "From the Practice of Work of One Obkom CPSU Industrial Otdel," Partiinaya zhizn', no. 21 (1956), p. 58, noted that the appointment or removal of department heads at the oblast level must be approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. Cited in P. Stewart, Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad (Indianapolis, 1968), p. 184. Whether this applies to all departments or only the most important ones, such as those overseeing industry, agriculture, ideology, and lower party organs, is unclear.


26. The two individuals are Yu. Lisin, who left his instructor's post in the Administrative Organs Department of the Omsk city party organization to take up a similar position in the Omsk regional party apparatus, and A. Subbotin, who moved from Instructor in the Administrative Organs Department of the Kokchetarsk regional party organization in Uzbekistan to become Instructor, and later head, in the same department of the Uzbek republican party organization. After 13 years of work in the party
apparatus, Subbotin was appointed Procurator of the Semipalatinsk region in Uzbekistan in 1981.

27. Hough, How the Soviet Union is Governed, pp. 412-413.

28. Personal interviews.

29. Innumerable pitfalls await the researcher who attempts to construct a hierarchy of positions in the party and/or state bureaucracy. Useful methodological introductions to the problems associated with this exercise may be found in M. McAuley, "The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee", Soviet Studies, no. 4 (1974), pp. 473-501, and M. Urban, "Elite Stratification and Mobility in a Soviet Republic", in D. Lane, Elites and Political Power in the USSR (forthcoming).


31. Personal interviews.


33. P. Stewart, p. 184.

34. Personal interviews.

35. Personal interviews.

36. There is evidence, however, that Gorbachev - a jurist by training - has been especially attentive to the legal system and that his interest will elevate law as a political issue within the party bureaucracy. Besides the reopening of the debate on law reform, recent months have witnessed the
appointment of a legally-trained official, A. Lukianov, as a Central Committee secretary, references to legal affairs in the published synopses of Politburo meetings, and a call for massive recruitment of jurists into staff positions in the system of soviets. See, for example, "O dal'neishem ukrepleni sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti i pravoporyadke, uselenii okhrany prav i zakonnykh interesov grazhdan," Pravda, November 30, 1986, and V. Kudryavtsev, "Pravovaya sistema: puti perestroiki," Pravda, December 5, 1986.


The counselor is further "compromised" if he is supervising a higher-ranking civil servant from his own corps.

38. The dominance of the Right in the first 23 years of the V Republic in France undermined this perspective but did not eliminate it.

39. This number represents the second lowest level of departmental recruitment in the republican party apparatus. In terms of frequency of appointments since 1972, the departments in the Lithuanian party bureaucracy divide into three groups, with the Department of Party Organs at the top (68 appointments), the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and Department of Agriculture in the middle (39 and 40 appointments, respectively), and a cluster of departments at the bottom (9 to 17 appointments). This last group includes, in declining order of personnel turnover, heavy industry, science and higher education, overseas relations, light and food industry, construction and urban economy, general
department, administrative organs, and trade and social services.

40. The biographies are drawn from files maintained by Mark Beissinger on
the following biographical directories of republican supreme soviets:

Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Moldavskoi SSR, 9-yi sozyv (Kishinev, 1976);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Moldavskoi SSR, 10-yi sozyv (Kishinev, 1981);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Moldavskoi SSR, 11-yi sozyv (Kishinev, 1985);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Kirgizskoi SSR, 9-yi sozyv (Frunze, 1976);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Kirgizskoi SSR, 10-yi sozyv (Frunze, 1982);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Kazakhskoi SSR, 9-yi sozyv (Alma-Ata, 1975);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Kazakhskoi SSR, 11-yi sozyv (Alma-Ata, 1985);
Deputati Verkhovnoi radi Ukrains'koi RSR, 9-e sklikannya (Kiev, 1975);
Deputati Verkhovnoi radi Ukrains'koi RSR, 11-e sklikannya (Kiev, 1985);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Belorusskoi SSR, 10-yi sozyv (Minsk, 1981);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Belorusskoi SSR, 11-yi sozyv (Minsk, 1985);
Verkhovnyi sovet Estonskoi SSR, 9-yi sozyv. Kratkii biograficheskii
spravochnik (Tallin, 1976); Verkhovnyi sovet Estonskoi SSR, 10-yi sozyv.
Kratkii biograficheskii spravochnik (Tallin, 1981); Verkhovnyi sovet
Estonskoi SSR, 11-yi sozyv. Kratkii biograficheskii spravochnik (Tallin, 1985);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Latviskoi SSR, 8-oil sozyv (Riga, 1972);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Latviskoi SSR, 9-yi sozyv (Riga, 1976);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Latviskoi SSR, 10-yi sozyv (Riga, 1980);
Deputaty Verkhovnogo soveta Latviskoi SSR, 11-yi sozyv (Riga, 1985).

41. A fourth official, V. Sharashenidze, also moved into a line position in
the Procuracy in the early 1980s from the Georgian party apparatus, though
from an unspecified post. Unlike the other three promotees, he had not
been a legal professional but a trade union functionary before recruitment to party service.

The head of the Administrative Organs Department in Georgia may be more likely to move into the leading post in the republican MVD. Drawing on a non-random sample of twenty heads of republican Departments of Administrative Organs in the period from 1955 to 1986, Amy Knight reports that of the ten who left the party bureaucracy for legal institutions, seven moved to the MVD (all but one becoming head of the institution), and one each became chairman of the Supreme Court, Justice Minister, and Procurator, all at the republican level. Knight, p. 42.

42. The same sort of institutionalized pattern of mobility is evident at the all-union level, where all three of the procurators in the study with experience as instructors in the all-union Department of Administrative Organs moved directly from the Central Committee apparatus to become heads of sections (отделы) in the all-union Procuracy.

43. At the end of 1985, a questionnaire on private property tendencies was published in the organ of the Georgian Communist Party, Zarya Vostoka, which urged readers to fill it out and return it to the newspaper. Zarya Vostoka, December 13, 1985. Thus far the results have not been made public, though N. Popkhadze, the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Georgian Communist Party, noted in a recent Pravda article that the analysis of the data has been completed. "Glasnost' - forma demokratii", Pravda, December 16, 1986.
44. Although the Procuracy is structured as a highly-centralized institution freed from horizontal subordination to local soviets, it is often caught up in networks of local power and patronage. For a recent discussion of this continuing problem, see O. Chaikovskala, "Obizhaites' na menia, ne obizhaites'...", Literaturnaya gazeta, October 22, 1986, and S. Zamoshkin, "Prokuror i 'mestnaya vlast'", Literaturnaya gazeta, January 14, 1987.


47. Bakinskii rabochii, January 24, 1979. In the Kirgiz city of Tokmak, the local procurator was sentenced to death in 1983 for his involvement in a scandal at a meat combine. Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, March 19, 1983.

48. Arkhiv samizdata, no. 4710, August 20, 1982. Corruption and incompetence is not limited, of course, to Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the end of 1983, leading cadres in the Belorussian MVD, Procuracy, and Supreme Court were fired, and in some cases prosecuted, for "violations of socialist legality". E. Levin, "Heads Roll in the Belorussian MVD and Procurator's Office", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, February 29, 1984, RL 97/84.

49. E. Shevarnadze, currently a member of the Politburo and Foreign Minister of the USSR, was the Georgian party first secretary from 1972 to 1985. Prior to his appointment as first secretary, he had worked for seven years as the republic's MVD chief. G. Aliev, who began his career in the NKVD, rose through the ranks of the KGB in Azerbaidzhan until 1969, when
he assumed the post of first secretary of the republic. He was, until recently, a Politburo member and first deputy Prime Minister of the USSR with responsibilities for, inter alia, justice and corruption.

50. See, for example, S. Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class* (New York, 1963), pp. 118-120.


52. M. Gehlen, p. 156.