FINAL REPORT TO
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: MOSCOW'S JAPAN-WATCHERS IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE
GORBACHEV ERA: THE STRUGGLE FOR REALISM AND RESPECT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 801-06

DATE: December 1988

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.
NOTE

This report was submitted in partial fulfillment of Council Contract No. 801-06, and supplements the report by the same author entitled "Soviet and Japanese Mutual Perceptions," distributed in August 1988.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Moscow claims to be guided, since the middle of 1986, by realism and respect for Japan, but Soviet publications fall short of these goals. Reformers continue to struggle for a substantial change in tone.

We can distinguish five schools of thought. The Revolutionary Orthodox group champions an orthodox and jargon-ridden view of Japan. Although recently on the defensive, this group is still the most visible in interpreting political affairs and the history of foreign relations. The Power Politics group long refused to take militarily weak Japan seriously as a major power. Lately it has been adjusting to Japan's growing economic power, but is unable to break with longstanding orthodox criticisms.

Three schools are on the reform side. The Technical Economics group has tried since the 1970s to show the reality of Japan's economic successes and recently has stressed learning from Japan's restructuring. It is becoming bolder, but still faces restrictions in predicting a rosy future for Japan. The Cultural Heritage approach has long struggled against assertions that Japan is just another case of the evils of capitalism, attracting much sympathy for its coverage of diverse areas of life in Japan from literary traditions to the martial arts. Finally, the new
International Relations school shows awareness of the positive side of Japan's non-military approach to world affairs. Along with the other reform groups, it has been coming into the open.

Public opinion polls and interviews with specialists reveal much fascination with Japan in the Soviet Union. The interest extends from material symbols of the good life to a cultural heritage that contrasts with Soviet spiritual emptiness and even to successful integration into the world economy. In the face of long-term neglect of Japan by Soviet scholarship, the Soviet people are eager for more information.

Comparisons of the responses of the various schools to events over the past two years show that the internal Soviet conflict is intensifying. After a partial turn in 1986, there are signs that a second turning point is approaching. The reformers such as E.M. Primakov are striving for a breakthrough in Soviet thinking as a prelude to a breakthrough in negotiations. The internal Soviet debate, which can be followed through publications and interviews, sets the background for Soviet initiatives to transform the relationship with Japan.
Moscow's Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Affairs

Gilbert Rozman

The message from Moscow since mid-1986 is that a new realism has set in, turning the Kremlin's thinking and policy toward Japan onto a track of respect and flexibility.1 To the extent that relations between Moscow and Tokyo are still slow to improve, Soviet spokesmen point an accusatory finger at Japan's unwillingness to make a similar adjustment.2 They claim that the Soviet leadership is now realistic about Japan's emerging great power status and that the Soviet people and specialists respect Japan, but that Japan's attitudes toward the Soviet Union are lacking both realism and respect. In a previous report, I have examined Japanese views of the Soviet Union. Here I review Soviet publications in quest of varied points of view about Japan and their likely consequences for foreign and domestic policy. I conclude

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The Research for this report was supported by a contract from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and by a travel grant from IREX. Additional assistance came from the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, and from Keio University. I am also grateful to more than forty Soviet specialists on Japan who gave generously of their time to answer my questions about their field of study.
that despite some substantial scholarly advances, the Soviets have not yet truly achieved either realism or respect.

While negative and distorted Soviet perceptions of Japan do not offer a complete explanation for problems in bilateral relations, there is ample evidence to show that Moscow is disingenuous in not commenting forthrightly about its own long history of misperceptions of Japan and the continued clash of opinions that leaves its approach to that country in disarray. If respect is epitomized by full and fair coverage of the other side's position and generosity in giving credit where it is due, then it is precisely the absence of respect which characterizes Soviet publications on Japan. As a prelude to negotiations with Tokyo, Soviet reformers have been struggling for realistic and respectful images of Japan. To understand the prospects for improved relations it is important to analyze their struggle.

Soviet views on Japan, as on China, have long seemed to be polarized. In the 1980s orthodox and reform have become more diverse categories, but both endure. Even in the spring of 1988 the overall orthodox position on Japan remains a strong force; the reformers, whatever their differences, still perceive that there has been no decisive breakthrough in their favor. Under these circumstances, my task will be not only to clarify the range of views on Japan, but also to uncover the continued relevance of the division between 'orthodox' and 'reform'.

Soviet policy toward Japan is at a turning point. The old approach was a failure, exacting a far greater price from Moscow
than from Tokyo. The Kremlin sought to isolate Japan militarily, but it ended up isolating itself economically, especially from the booming East Asian region. It sought to turn international public opinion against Japan, but managed instead to rally Japanese opinion against itself and even to help arouse in its own citizens considerable fascination and admiration for Japan. Contrary to official Soviet claims and expectations, the fastest rising star in the second half of this century, especially over the past decade, is not the Soviet Union, but Japan. How the Soviets perceive Japan's new world standing and the domestic system that supports it has many ramifications not only for bilateral relations but also for the emerging world order and for the degree to which foreign capitalism serves as a model for domestic perestroika.

Five Schools of Thought

We can differentiate five distinctive points of view in Soviet Japan-watching over the past two decades. The most prominent school in the generalized literature, especially concerning foreign and domestic politics, but also on aspects of sociology and long-term economic development, is what I call the Revolutionary Orthodox group. Led by I.I. Kovalenko, a deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee (CC) since the 1960s, and I.A. Latyshev, for most of the twenty years until 1987 the head of the Japan Department at the Institute of Oriental Studies (IVAN) and for the past year Pravda correspondent
in Tokyo, this group champions an orthodox and jargon-ridden view of Japan as a country riddled with the contradictions and crises of capitalism and whipped by American imperialism and its own militarist and imperialist ambitions. On the defensive under Mr. Gorbachev, advocates of the Revolutionary Orthodox approach have nevertheless remained outspoken on behalf of their views. They still are the most visible interpreters of political developments including the history of the Japanese Communist Party and the divisions among the political groupings and mass movements of Japan.4

The second school of thinking about Japan is that of the Power Politics group. Long-time foreign minister (MID) and now president, Andrei Gromyko is best noted for this approach. Those who refused to take militarily weak Japan seriously as a major power, including China specialists who gave primary importance to that country's role in East Asia, can also be identified with this school. The once powerful orthodox group in Chinese studies, including M.S. Kapitsa, S.L. Tikhvinsky, and M.I. Sladkovsky and M.L. Titarenko (the latter two serving as successive directors of the Institute of the Far East, IDV), each of whom has written about Japan and has occupied an administrative post which also gave him some jurisdiction over Japan-watching, is part of this school. After being transferred in early 1987 from the post of Deputy Foreign Minister to the directorship of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Mr. Kapitsa has articulated the changing viewpoint of this school toward an increasingly powerful Japan.5 Over
a long period, the publications of L.N. Kutakov of MGIMO (MID and
the Moscow State Institute of International Relations) are also
indicative of the views of the Power Politics approach. This is
the most prominent approach in coverage of international affairs.

In the 1970s a third school succeeded in producing a large
specialized literature on Japan. Its approach can be labelled
Technical Economics. Ia.A. Pevzner, until recently department
head at the Institute of World Economies and International
Relations (IMEMO) along with his bold colleague, B.V. Ramzes,
played a positive role in the development of this approach; the
overall achievement resulted from the decentralized efforts of
economists scattered at many institutes in and out of the Academy
of Sciences. (Recently V.K. Zaitsev at IMEMO and A.I. Kravtsevich
at IVAN, both for a time at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, have
taken a leadership role serving as section heads concerned with
Japan's economy.) Their diverse commitment to economic reform can
be seen in a literature that sometimes went no further than to
give a taste of the reality of Japan's economic successes squeezed
between obligatory assessments of the exploitative and short-term
nature of the methods employed, and increasingly on other oc-
casions appeared to be an urgent plea for learning from Japan's
perestroika. In recent years their detailed studies of the
merits of the Japanese economy have become commonplace, but they
are still circumspect in drawing lessons for the Soviet Union or
even predicting a rosy future for Japan.
A fourth school, the Cultural Heritage approach, could be best seen in the fields of literature, history, and ethnography, although its persistent challenge was directed also at orthodox interpretations of economics and sociology and even internal politics and foreign policy. This was a ground swell response by serious scholars such as T.P. Grigor'eva and V.N. Goregliad, who heads the Japan Department at the Leningrad branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies (L.O. IVAN), obviously impressed by Japan's distinctiveness. They were supported by advocates of the importance of cultural heritage in Europe and other parts of Asia, for example by L.P. Deliusin, head of the Department of China at IVAN. Focusing on Japan's distinctiveness and its rich culture, this school cast doubt on many of the orthodox assertions which disparage Japan as just another case of the evils of capitalism and imperialism.

Finally, we should draw attention to the International Relations school, led, but not necessarily fully represented in the 1980s by two non-specialists on Japan, E.I. Primakov and G.A. Arbatov, whose institutes include Japan-watching in their mandate. Mr. Primakov moved from deputy director at IMEMO to director of IVAN and then, under Mr. Gorbachev, after nine years in that post, to director of IMEMO and in 1988, with the added title, academic secretary for world economies and international relations, in charge of most of the institutes with Japan specialists. Mr. Latyshev's replacement as head of the Department of Japan at IVAN, K.O. Sarkisov, who previously as section chief on international
problems had worked closely with Primakov, and G.F. Kunadze, whom, after working for a time at the Tokyo embassy on leave from IVAN, Mr. Primakov brought with him to IMEMO to head the section on politics in the Pacific Department, take this approach. So does the current Soviet ambassador to Japan, N.N. Solovyev. Above all, the International Relations school is characterized by an awareness of Japan's importance as an independent actor in world affairs and by a willingness to develop a largely non-ideological scholarship on contemporary developments in that country. Its emerging interpretations can be inferred from recent publications, e.g., from an article reporting the call by A. Bovin and V.P. Lukin for a transition from a balance of forces to a balance of interests, and especially from my interviews of specialists. Although the possibility of splits within this school is rising as difficult bilateral problems are faced, it is premature to point to differences between Mr. Primakov, a Near East specialist by training, and Mr. Arbatov, an Americanist, or between generalists and Japan specialists.

The first two of the five schools can be grouped together as orthodox in their approach, although the Power Politics group has been persuaded by events to bend somewhat. The other three have a reform orientation, even though some in the Technical Economics group managed, better than most, to coexist with the first two groups. The balance has shifted over some thirty years from: 1) the overwhelming predominance of the first orthodox group; to 2) a more-or-less equal status for both orthodox groups from the
Table 1 – Five Schools of Soviet Thinking on Japan
(Some Prominent Representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Technical Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.I. Kovalenko (CC)</td>
<td>Ia.A. Pevzner (IMEMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.A. Latyshev (IVAN, Pravda)</td>
<td>B.V. Ramzes (IMEMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Politics</td>
<td>V.K. Zaitsev (IMEMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n Andrei Gromyko (MID)</td>
<td>A.I. Kravtsevich (IVAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n M.S. Kapitsa (MID, IVAN)</td>
<td>T.P. Grigor'eva (IVAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n S.L. Tikhvinsky (MID, AN)</td>
<td>V.N. Goregliad (L.O. IVAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n L.N. Kutakov (MGIMO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n--A non-specialist.

mid-1960s; to 3) the rise of the Technical Economics group by the early 1970s as a third, but still not equal, partner; and to 4) the rise around 1980 of the other reform schools from their limited inroads evident as early as the late 1960s to become strong forces. Throughout the 1980s but especially 5) since 1985 the International Relations school has been battling to supersede the orthodox schools, and all of the reform groups are coming more into the open.
'Japanomania'

The 'Japan craze' has been growing in the Soviet Union. Actually it has been sinking its roots deeper and deeper in Soviet consciousness for about twenty years, but remained out of sight of most observers because of official censorship and other efforts to keep a lid on the spontaneous attraction of the Soviet people to a foreign model. In the second half of the 1980s, as a result of a partial loosening of pressure from above and a further gathering of forces from below, the lid has been giving way. Fascination with Japan has been growing rapidly, as seen in purchases of publications, attendance at exhibitions and lectures, and reports of Soviet and Japanese citizens.9

'Japanomania' is not a unified phenomenon, but a combination of three distinctive interests. Already for two decades the economic interest in Japan has been apparent; in the second half of the 1980s it has gained a powerful boost from the determination of the Gorbachev administration to apply the lessons of the scientific and technological surge in advanced capitalist countries. On a personal level, Soviets are aware that Japan leads the world in the mass production of modern amenities from video recorders to calculators which have come to symbolize the contemporary way of life. Engineers, technicians, and scientists, of whom there are large numbers in the Soviet population, are among the constituency for Japan's materialistic appeal. Many less educated citizens share this interest. The Technical Economists
reach a wide audience, although they have not yet been free to make a strong, direct appeal to that audience.

A cultural interest in Japan also became popular in the 1960s and has continued to expand. For many intellectuals, the cultural deprivation of Soviet history is even more severely decried than the material shortages. When the heightened expectations of the humanistic 'thaw' during the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s were disappointed, the craving for spiritual satisfaction sought other outlets. Japanese traditions gained a following not only because of their richness and even resonance with Russian tastes (e.g., an affinity for being close to nature), but also because they seemed to be able to endure in a modernized setting. Increasingly, the younger generation grew impatient with the one-sided Soviet quest for meeting economic plans, at all costs, and many, including those in the humanities and children of scientists, turned to Eastern spirituality including Zen Buddhism and Japanese aesthetics as part of an alternative worldview. Japanese literature, martial arts, and philosophy became highly popular. The Cultural Heritage school could not easily satisfy this mounting interest.

In the 1980s these two interests were increasingly joined by a third. Soviets began to admire Japan out of a political interest. Social scientists and foreign policy experts were among those who became aware of Japan's growing influence around the world. The Gorbachev reorientation of Soviet goals toward integration into the world economy and disarmament made it
patently clear that the Japanese are masters of what the Soviets are trying to learn. Japan, not the Soviet Union, had fulfilled the spirit of Khrushchev's materialistic promises for surpassing the United States by the 1980s. The International Relations school could interest many Soviets who follow world political affairs by taking a new approach to the continued rise of Japan as a great power.

Popular enthusiasm from below encountered official controls on information from above. All three reform schools were limited by restrictions on positive assessments of Japan. Orthodox voices and others who heeded their demands warned against bourgeois propaganda that presents Japan as a 'model'.\textsuperscript{10} References to positive features had to be couched in a negative context. Despite the censorship, it is still possible to detect differences in views on countless issues.

In order to gain an appreciation for the background of Soviet perceptions in 1988, we first offer an overview of Soviet publications and then concentrate on four subjects with implications for bilateral relations. For each subject we take care to contrast at least one orthodox and one reform position. Although space here is insufficient to cite in detail the literature in support of each viewpoint, a survey of some of the main lines of argument will alert us to the readiness of most Soviets for a new relationship with Japan based upon positive perceptions.
Soviet Publications on Japan

Over the past forty years the Soviet Union has developed what some Soviets refer to orally as the second international center of Japanese studies after the United States. From the late 1960s several persons annually were awarded an advanced degree for research on Japan, and by the first half of the 1980s the number had climbed to approximately seven per year. As many as 15 Russian books a year were now focusing on Japan, roughly half issued by Nauka, the publishing arm of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, while most others originated from university presses or the major Moscow publishers of books on current political affairs. At first glance, it would appear that a substantial center of Japanese studies has indeed emerged.

Close study of Soviet writings as well as scrutiny of a bibliography of Soviet publications in 1985 requires us to qualify this positive evaluation. One-third of the fifteen books in 1985 are in the format of brochures for one of three purposes: 1) a 64-page linguistic brochure for university teaching, 2) two reference collections or overviews of literature not available for purchase but distributed directly to academic institutes and other organizations by INION (the Institute for Scientific Information in the Social Sciences); and 3) two 63-64 page political pamphlets, one on the Second World War called *Destruction of Militarist Japan in the Far East* and the other entitled *Mafia Japanese-style*. The listing of articles more clearly reveals a narrow base of publications. Of the 219 articles published in 1985, 58 were
chapters in four books on Japan. The remaining 161 articles are grouped in Table 2 according to eight types of publication and the length of the article.

If we examine Table 2 closely we find 44 listings for the news magazine, Novoe Vremia, none of which exceeds four pages in length. In fact, these are 1-2 page articles, essentially the same as newspaper articles which are otherwise not included in the bibliography. Our total drops to 117 articles. Still included on the list are book reviews and other short items. If we restrict our search for substantial writings to articles of at least five pages, then the total drops to 65. Furthermore, 36 of these are concerned with foreign policy and military themes. Most are under the headings 'Remilitarization' and 'History'; two-thirds of the latter concern military and foreign policy themes, including many articles commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Only 30 journal articles (or articles in edited books other than the four specifically on Japan) of even 5-pages in length are listed for all other topics, under such headings as the economy, internal politics, workers, culture, art, and literature, and other areas of history. With the exception of a few articles on Japanese management that appeared in economics journals not covered by the bibliography, this listing appears to be virtually complete. It reveals the serious neglect of Japan by Soviet scholarship, which has continued into 1988.

Topic by topic, we can reach the same negative conclusion. On the Japanese economy, 12 of 21 articles appeared in just two
### Table 2 - Soviet Articles on Japan in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Total no. of Articles</th>
<th>Articles of at least 5 pp.</th>
<th>Items on Foreign Policy and the Military of at least 5 pp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far Eastern Affairs*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Africa Journals</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples of Asia &amp; Africa</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Narody Azii i Afriki)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Africa Today</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aziiia i Afrika segodnia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science Institute Journals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEIMO**</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSHA***</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKiSM****</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History Journals</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of History</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern and Contemporary History</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military History Journal</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>World news magazines</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Life</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Times (Novoe Vremia)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conference papers of IVAN</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Society &amp; State in China</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pism. pamiat*****</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in books (excluding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-centered books)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>books on capitalism</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>books on Asia</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>161</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Translated from Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka.*
**World Economies and International Relations**
***USA: Economy, Policy, Ideology***
****The Working Class and the Contemporary World****
*****Written Records and Problems of the History of the Culture of the Peoples of the East*****
books, while of the remainder six were in the journal MEiMO, published by IMEMO. The other articles were only 1-2 pages long. In the year Mr. Gorbachev began his perestroika there were only three noteworthy sources (two books and one journal) on the Japanese economy issued in the Soviet Union! Of 16 articles on internal politics, ten appeared in three books, four totalling 8 pages were in Novoe Vremia, and one was a book review. On culture, art, and literature, 15 of 26 articles appeared in the book, Man and World in Japanese Culture, and four others were short items in Asia and Africa Today. It is no wonder that the Soviet people have been frantic for information about Japan.

Despite the dearth of substantial journal articles, three other types of sources help us to follow Soviet views of Japan. First, there are, among the 15 or so annual books, monographs on specialized and general topics, often growing out of a candidate's dissertation defended some years earlier. Some cover Japanese relations with regions and countries of the world, e.g., A.V. Chuiko's candidate's dissertation (roughly equivalent to the American Ph.D.) on economic relations between Japan and Australia in the 1970s and early 1980s. Others examine separate industries, as in A.S. Nesterov's candidate's dissertation on monopolies in the metal industry. There are also monographs on general topics such as A.N. Kuritsyn, Management in Japan (1981), Iu.I. Berezina, Japan: Social Consequences of Scientific-Technical Progress (1986), and R.Sh.-A. Aliev, The Foreign Policy of Japan in the 1970s to the Beginning of the 1980s: Theory and Practice (1986).
Second, also among the annual total of books, there are collections of articles which represent a joint or wide-ranging assessment. The yearbook (Japan 1985, Japan 1986, etc.) provides the most visible survey, presenting ten or more substantial articles on diverse subjects concerning not only developments over the past year, but also, for many topics, an overview covering a longer period. Its final sections are handy for following conferences and publications in Soviet Japanese studies and developments in Japan itself. Finally for the most up-to-date coverage, we need to examine the daily newspapers, primarily Pravda and Izvestiia. Although sources suffer from repetitiveness and a failure to acknowledge differences of opinion, there is adequate material in order to appreciate variations in Soviet views of Japan. Over the past decade we can identify at least 50 substantial books and more than 200 detailed journal articles, among which are high quality analyses from which foreign specialists would benefit. The ability and commitment to scholarship of Soviet specialists, particularly in the younger generation, is revealed through these works. Reformers have faced difficulties in expressing their views, yet on many issues they have become increasingly assertive.

Centers of Japanese Studies

The 1985 bibliography can help us to identify the centers of Japanese studies. Far Eastern Affairs, in which 16 of 65 substantial articles appeared, is issued by (IDV) the Institute of the Far East. This journal is known for its orthodox orientation on
both Japan and China. Many scholars informed me that their views would not be published in the journal. The fact that 13 of the 16 substantial articles concern foreign policy and the military is indicative of the emphasis in the journal. Peoples of Asia and Africa and Asia and Africa Today are issued by (IVAN) the Institute of Oriental Studies. Although the head of the Japan Department at IVAN through 1986 was I.A. Latyshev, a leading orthodox spokesman and the author in 1985 of a monograph criticizing the capitalist nature of the Japanese family, IVAN is also the home of many authors who take an approach sharply opposed to the orthodox school. Indeed, the clash there has come into the open with an article by Mr. Latyshev attacking T.P. Grigor'eva, the editor responsible for the book Man and World in Japanese Culture and a researcher in the Literature Department of IVAN. Articles in both of the institute's journals reveal a keen interest in Japan's distinctive cultural heritage.

Four other institutes of the Academy of Sciences play an important role in Japanese studies. IMEMO is represented by its journal MEiMO, which has an economic emphasis, including international economic relations. (ISCAN) The Institute of the USA and Canada is represented by the journal SShA, which covers Japan's international relations and, in the past year, also comparisons of the economic systems of Japan and the United States. (IMRD) The Institute of the International Workers' Movement publishes RKiSM and is largely interested in Japan's workers although some writings concern other social classes. Finally INION draws
together foreign studies of Japan, taking advantage of its selectivity and its own summaries to convey new ideas to Soviet audiences. Its two internally distributed publications of 1985, V.I. Nest'ev, *Japanese Conservatives in the 1980s: A Scientific-Analytic Overview*, and V.D. Makovii (ed.), *Economic Aspects of Scientific-Technical Progress in Japan*, introduced considerable material. Articles in *Problems of History*, conference papers, and articles collected in books are mostly written by specialists at IVAN, IDV, and these other four institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Except for those at IDV and IMRD, the Japan specialists at these institutes are largely reform-oriented.

**Japan in the World Setting**

The orthodox groups long enjoyed a virtual monopoly in covering Japanese foreign policy. They found this to be a favorite topic. Writings could simultaneously support Soviet foreign policies, attack American policies, incite opposition to Japan in the Third World, and encourage radical opposition within Japan. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, as Soviet-Japanese relations followed a downhill slope even more abrupt than Soviet-American relations, the Soviet rhetoric became much more vitriolic. Following Leonid Brezhnev's remarks at the Twenty-Sixth Congress that in Japan's foreign policy 'negative forces had been strengthened', criticisms of Japanese militarism intensified. Even in 1987-88 many writings of this type could still be found.
Three villains appear in these orthodox publications. First, there is Washington, which since the second half of the 1940s has sought to build a powerful base for anti-communism in the Far East. Soviets paint an image of Japan as a dependency of the United States, whether because, as once thought, it was kept in a semi-colonial status by American imperialism, or because, as more recently argued, its reliance on exports to the American market makes Japan vulnerable to blackmail. Prior to a sudden reevaluation several years ago, Beijing appeared as the second villain. It had sought to rally Tokyo into a course of confrontation with Moscow. Even though China is now seen as sharing Soviet concern about the rise of Japanese militarism, the image continues of Japan as a power bent on achieving regional dominance and on strengthening a regional military grouping including South Korea and Taiwan as well as the United States. Third, criticisms abound of Japan's ruling circles, who are driven by both the force of imperialism to exploit the economies of less developed countries which are rightly resentful and by their own traditions of militarism to seek to reexamine the results of the Second World War.

The orthodox schools and publications which are obliged in certain sections to echo their views find few redeeming qualities in Japan's foreign policy. Militarism and revanchism are deeply rooted in the country's cruel samurai heritage and in the religiously sanctioned reactionary spirit which led to the Second World War. They are embedded also in the capitalist system's
need to exploit other peoples and in the ruling circles' need to fan nationalistic sentiments in order to deceive the masses into supporting them.\textsuperscript{24} The only hope would seem to be to rally 'democratic forces' inside and outside of Japan against a growing international military, or even political, role for Japan or to mobilize so much pressure that the ruling circles are forced to act against their intentions.\textsuperscript{25} Until recently the two orthodox groups agreed on a strategy of intimidation (together with some bait for business groups eager for raw materials and access to fishing grounds). It was reasoned that Japan, sooner or later, would be vulnerable to the changing balance of forces in favor of socialism, to its own military weakness, and to deepening contradictions with the United States. The Japanese people, who had experienced the unjustified nuclear bombs dropped by Washington as a lesson to the Soviet Union, would sooner or later stand against close military ties to the United States. Soviets are fond of referring to Japan's national interests, confidently contrasting them to current policies.

A split in the orthodox camp has become apparent over the past two years. It resembles the split which occurred from 1982 in the orthodox forces watching China. Indeed, in both instances M.S. Kapitsa's articles have drawn attention to the changing position of the Power Politics group.\textsuperscript{26} Whereas in early 1982 Brezhnev's newly conciliatory language toward China provided the impetus for rethinking Soviet views, in the spring of 1986 it was Mr. Gorbachev's reorganization of Soviet foreign policy, followed
in July by Mr. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech which acknowledged that 'Japan has turned into a power of first-rank importance'. Afterwards, many Soviet statements announced the arrival of an era of 'new thinking' and called for a 'climate of trust, mutual respect, and friendship among peoples'. 'Old schemes and stereotypes' in the Soviet approach to Japan were to give way to the 'new thinking'.

The Power Politics group recognizes that the earlier strategy has failed; Japan already is a great economic power and is destined to become a great power in other respects in the decades ahead. Moscow must approach it in a new way. While not abandoning the Revolutionary Orthodox concern that Japan's emergent world role will be fuelled by a reassertion of dangerous ambitions, the Power Politics group seems to attach more significance to the growing possibility of dealing with Japan because of the intensification of Japanese-American frictions. Its strategy is to play on American-Japanese differences and to appeal to Japanese nationalism. Mr. Kapitsa and others suggest that Washington is to blame for interfering each time there is a warming trend between Tokyo and Moscow and that Japan has been victimized in its relationship with the United States. They pointedly assert that in Tokyo's total deference to Washington there is no honor, and through its concessions on trade issues Japan fails to reduce frictions with its self-interested ally. Given Japan's pride and its economic clout, it only needs a dose of realism, Soviets argue, in order to set its foreign policy on a new course. They
imply that if it becomes conciliatory, Japan will find a newly responsive Soviet Union with which it can deal.

Critics of the Power Politics approach see it as a flawed and insufficient revision of earlier thinking. The same spokesmen as in the past are still giving the Japanese advice without offering any clear explanation of the meaningful incentives that will lead to 'new thinking' in Japan. The critics fear that the Power Politics group underestimates the strength of the Japanese-American bond and the momentum of Japan's growing world role. They foresee two negative scenarios. In the first case, Tokyo will remain passive on international issues, reluctant to step out from the American shadow. If this persists, the Tokyo-Washington linkage will tighten, including military cooperation, while Moscow will be ignored by Tokyo and remain with little leverage or benefit. Even less appealing is the other prospect, of a Japan unable to shake its hostility toward the Soviet Union and, at the same time, a strong enough force to exert pressure on Washington to slow its own rapprochement. Especially on regional issues related to East Asia, Japan could emerge as the leading obstacle to Soviet plans for a new economic and political order.

The International Relations school may see the Revolutionary Orthodox approach as a holdover from an earlier era, especially the late 1940s or late 1950s, when the domestic restraining forces on the Japanese government were temporarily gaining ground, and the Power Politics approach as realistic only for the 1960s or 1970s when Japan's concern for the Soviet military buildup gave
Moscow considerable leverage. For a confident Japan entering the 1990s this approach is inadequate, they realize. Whereas the 1970s approach accepts a model of a neutral country with little interest in its military and the 1960s approach is fond of drawing parallels between Japan and the countries of Western Europe, the 1980s approach increasingly realizes that Japan is becoming a world power second only to the United States and the Soviet Union and must be treated accordingly. The International Relations school is more willing to recognize the advantages that have accrued to Japan from its alliance with the United States and the likelihood that Japan will remain within that framework in ways that may be difficult to predict but are unlikely to follow West European precedents.

Unlike the Power Polities group which likes to remind Tokyo of the unsettled security situation in Northeast Asia and of the reality of Soviet power, the International Relations school anticipates a more positive impulse for Japanese cooperation on world problems. Their hope may be first to set the Soviet-American relationship on a course of disarmament and cooperation, then to cultivate a new image of Soviet :International intentions among the Japanese people and to elicit China's help in pressuring Japan for a regional agreement which limits further military builds, and finally to win Tokyo's cooperation through ap- propriate assurances. They are aware that ahead lies a compli- cated and drawn-out process, which will test the skills of Soviet diplomacy. The reform groups agree on the urgency of defining
Japan's place within the world while its economic power has not yet been translated into political clout. If there is already in place a Soviet-American understanding on a military balance, then both American pressure and Japanese public opinion will help restrain a potentially ambitious rival. If a Sino-Soviet agreement strengthens Moscow's case for economic participation within the Pacific community, then Moscow can join Beijing in exerting a restraining influence on any Japanese effort to divert regional associations from their purely economic goals. The reform groups' projections inevitably remain unclear because of the diverse possibilities for future development and the complexities of quadrilateral relations, but they are the most realistic in recognizing the great power with which Moscow must deal.

Arbatov and Primakov are known as realists about capitalism, but they are not Japan specialists and may not fully convey the 'new thinking' about Japan's prospects. The battle against orthodox views has consumed much energy, leaving less for the elaboration of reform thinking. An opportunity exists for one or more Japan experts on international affairs to emerge as a prominent advocate of realism toward Japan's great power status. In the foreign ministry N.N. Solovyev, the current ambassador to Japan, is a likely candidate. Working under Primakov at IMEMO, G.F. Kunadze is another prospect, as is K.O. Sarkisov, who as head of the Department of Japan at IVAN has taken over the post that long gave Mr. Latyshev his platform for leadership. A new generation of Japan specialists is not yet publishing much on sensitive
subjects, but is likely to soon leave its mark on the study of international relations. Moscow's internal debate has reached a much higher pitch.

In late 1987 and early 1988, Soviet rethinking of Japan's international role was advancing notably. In the September 1987 issue of Kommunist, Mr. Primakov raised doubts about whether militarism is essential to capitalism. In his November 2, 1987 speech on the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mr. Gorbachev concluded that capitalism can develop without militarism. In support of this, he cited the positive experience of Japan. Although a warning was added that contradictory trends were now growing in Japan, these remarks could scarcely be reconciled with a literature already more than forty years old that has considered remilitarization one of the primary tendencies of Japanese development. Also dramatic in its reinterpretation of Japanese militarization was V. Rosin's article in MEiMO, January 1988. Mr. Rosin asserts that it is erroneous to speak of a fatal attraction of the Japanese economy to military growth. Indeed as a new model of economic growth is gaining in Japan, related to an aging population, a huge government debt, tensions in international trade, and the rising value of the yen, Japan's success in overcoming these problems can be found in expanded services and the financial reform of administration with reduced state spending rather than in military production. Interviews with Soviet specialists highlighted the importance of the Rosin article, and they showed that others were eager to reexamine another orthodox
thesis—that Japanese efforts to encourage familiarity in Asia and elsewhere with Japan's distinctive methods of development, society, and language constitute a form of cultural imperialism.36

On these international issues we find IMEMO, INION, and IVAN under Mr. Sarkisov out in front of IDV, Pravda with Mr. Latyshev as its correspondent, and Mr. Kovalenko in the Central Committee. The ideas of the reform forces have few outlets for quick dissemination while the orthodox themes continue to resound from the pages of Pravda and Far Eastern Affairs, where publication is most frequent and the time lag the shortest. Reform views at the end of 1987 were still couched in qualifying language, with obligatory references to the 'imperialist', 'neocolonialist' character of Japan's aims, and to the 'illusion' of the Japanese model as an ideological instrument of Japan's expansionism.37 There has been a turn in the direction of 'realism' and 'respect' among perhaps a majority of specialists and a minority of publications on international relations, but I can still not detect a decisive advance that would justify those labels.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under new direction as is the Soviet embassy in Tokyo. While the prospects for flexibility are much improved, the situation remains inconclusive. Almost at the same time that V.P. Lukin, the reform specialist on East Asian foreign relations, was brought to MID from the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISCAN) to be second in the sector dealing with Japan under the less reform-oriented L.A. Chizhov, Iu.D. Kuznetsov, the orthodox expert on Japan's internal politics left
Kovalenko's department in the Central Committee to take the second spot under the reform-oriented Ambassador Solovyev in Tokyo. The struggle between orthodox and reform, so visible in Soviet politics in the first half of 1988, can be found also in the approach to Japan's world standing.

**Japanese-Soviet Relations**

If Sino-Soviet relations were set back by three obstacles disturbing to Beijing, Sino-Japanese relations have stumbled over one (or, as some say, four) obstacle infuriating to Tokyo. The return of four islands known as the New Territories is the incessant demand which Moscow faces. The Revolutionary Orthodox response has been to reject the demand altogether as an artificial impediment of Japan's ruling circles to arouse nationalistic fervor and rally the Japanese population against the Soviet Union. The Power Politics school has been more flexible, but as it became clear that the price Japan was prepared to pay for the return of just two islands fell far below Soviet demands and as Soviet military might grew and the strategic value of the islands increased, this group lost interest in negotiations. According to the view of this school, a healthy balance now exists in the region and Japan should be realistic about the need to maintain this balance. Japan should not have any illusions about one-sided or immediate benefits that could result from negotiations. The impression is that Japan's only hope for progress on the Northern Territories issue is in the context of a long-term military
relaxation in the region and a correspondingly reduced role for
the United States military in Japan, and after a new atmosphere
has been created through advances in other aspects of Soviet-
Japanese relations. The concept of 'realism' to this group means
largely Japan's recognition of the overwhelming superiority of
Soviet military power and of its entrenched hold over the islands.

Just as there were Soviets who appreciated the depth of
Chinese concern about the three obstacles related to military
activities and territorial questions near China's borders, there
are Soviets who understand the virtual unanimity of thinking in
Japan on an issue that has become emotionally charged. Threats
and a show of force have only solidified Japanese thinking;
without signs of Soviet flexibility it is unlikely that Japan's
leaders will move decisively to improve bilateral relations. The
International Relations school is rethinking Soviet options. It
has hinted at some compromise related to two islands, perhaps
with the objective of stimulating an internal Japanese debate
which could reveal signs of flexibility and help clarify Soviet
options. Further steps have been held in abeyance, as is Mr.
Gorbachev's much anticipated trip to Tokyo; Moscow concentrates on
other goals while trying to resolve internal disputes and,
perhaps, to create an international climate that would isolate
Japan as the one major power unable to work out a new relationship
with the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of this year Soviet commentaries on the
territorial problem hinted at differences of opinion. In a press
release on January 7, K.E. Cherevko of the Institute of the Far East asked why the Soviet Union and Japan have not concluded a peace treaty and answered that Tokyo refuses to recognize the reality born of the results of the Second World War. It makes illegal demands for islands to which it gave up any rights in the 1951 San Francisco treaty. Only intense American pressure later in the decade, as part of an anti-Soviet strategy, artificially fanned the demands for the return of the islands. Although Moscow once agreed to return two of the islands (the two 'small Kurile islands') if Japan would not enter a military alliance aimed at preparing to attack the Soviet Union, Japan is said to have created a situation after it agreed in 1960 to the security treaty with the United States where the islands could be used to expand the territory on which foreign troops could be stationed. After Mr. Takeshita became prime minister Japan's attitude has not changed, Soviets recognize. A recent anti-Soviet campaign aimed at intensified territorial demands and in 1987 alleged to have involved spying on the Soviet Union shows that Japan is not prepared to take steps toward the conclusion of a peace treaty and a stronger foundation for Japanese-Soviet relations.\textsuperscript{40} This negative assessment of the prospects for negotiations contrasts to a brief written remark by G.A. Arbatov in response to a question about the territorial problem from Agahi Shimbun. He said that Moscow 'is attaching importance to relations with Japan and is ready to discuss any questions'. He added, however, that Japan should be 'realistic' about the issue.\textsuperscript{41} In this sense, 'realism'
may mean readiness to accept only two islands or willingness to make major concessions on both strategic and economic issues.

All sides agree on the desirability of expanded trade, scientific and technical cooperation, and other ties which could be beneficial to the troubled Soviet economy. They disagree on the price that Moscow should pay. While some realize that as long as Moscow cannot flex its military muscles or create a crisis atmosphere in the region the negotiations will center on economic matters concerning which Moscow is the supplicant, others take comfort in Moscow's superpower status and expect that Tokyo will find it in its interest to normalize relations. The only likely source of regional instability at this time is North Korea, and the Soviet Union has accelerated the delivery of modern armaments to it in recent years. When Japanese media and police joined in the accusations against North Korea for the terrorist bombing of a South Korean aircraft in late 1987, Mr. Latyshev accused Japan of groundless provocations and even of being somehow involved along with South Korea, perhaps through false passports prepared in Japan or through secret ultra-leftist organizations of Japanese terrorists. This hard-line approach was a holdover from the old thinking of stoking the flames of confrontation at every opportunity.

The reform groups agree that the Soviet Union needs Japan and the Pacific community of which it is a part. Only through economic ties with this region can ambitious plans to turn the Soviet Far East into a major growth center be realized.
region has the resources for large-scale investment and the markets for raw materials and other products which the Soviet Union could provide. Moscow has come to view its isolation from the dynamism of East Asia as a dreadful mistake. As important as normalization of relations with China is, politically close economic ties with Japan have come to symbolize the 'open door' through which the Soviet Union can gain entry into a single world and regional economy. 45

Soviets who hold out the bait of regional security for Japan assume that the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of the anti-United States Security Treaty movements remains strong and that the Japanese have been genuinely worried by the tense international relations of the first half of the 1980s. 46 They may hope that Mr. Gorbachev's statesmanship and personal diplomacy can identify the Soviet Union with the peaceful aspirations of the Japanese people. Realists in the International Relations school understand that Soviets have misjudged Japanese public opinion before and could do so again in the absence of careful studies. There is no indication yet that they are far along in figuring out how to turn public opinion in their country's direction.

As part of the scenario for improved relations, Japanese public opinion is expected to become increasingly caught up in the Gorbachev fever. The absence of such enthusiasm through most of 1987 was noted by Soviet sources. While some sources claim to find in this reaction further proof of the perfidy of Japan's ruling circles, others may find new confirmation of the low image
of their society fostered by their own crude propaganda and mistaken policies over a long period and recognize that strenuous efforts at changing that image are not helped by blaming so-called 'ruling circles'. After the INF agreement in Washington, there was an improvement in the Soviet image. Sales of Mr. Gorbachev's new book quickly rose to over one hundred thousand. Nevertheless, Japan notably lagged behind the United States and Western Europe in public enthusiasm and optimism for Soviet reforms.

Japan's Economy and Modernization

The Revolutionary Orthodox school has consistently found a dark cloud behind the silver lining of the Japanese economy. At any point in time, its spokesmen were warning that the fortuitous results of the past were now giving way to the brutal reality of the 'crisis of capitalism'. Past successes were not, as argued by bourgeois apologists, testimony to any superior qualities of the Japanese system, but a result of temporary factors such as low prices for energy and raw materials on world markets, skimming the cream of scientific and technological progress from the entire capitalist world, intensive exploitation of workers through low wages and long hours, and severe distortions within the economy and sacrifice of social welfare needs. Moreover, many of Japan's reforms that made progress possible were forced by the leftist opposition. According to this school, Japan is not a model for other economies. It does not spearhead human progress. The fact that this message needs frequent repetition in ever more
desperate tones suggests that growing numbers challenge its authenticity.

The Technical Economics school has increasingly shown a different side of the Japanese economy. Under the restrictive conditions of the Brezhnev era, authors could only hope to convey the impressive achievements of Japan's economy in limited or indirect ways. While critical or pessimistic remarks were obligatory at the start or conclusion of an article, in the midst of specific arguments many remarkable achievements could be mentioned in passing. Accurate statistics were presented, for example, in the yearbook on Japan under S. Verbitskii's editorial management. Authors chose topics such as personal consumption in Japan that revealed the distinctiveness and dynamism of Japan's living conditions.

Even these revelations were not accomplished without a struggle. From the 1950s it was Ia.A. Pevzner and the group he headed at IMEMO which led the way. They achieved some success at the end of the 1960s when Soviet leaders recognised the need to examine the economy of a rising economic power and a potential investor in the development of raw materials in the Soviet Far East. Yet, IMEMO in both its writings and discussions ventured too far ahead and it was criticized. For a time, even reference in quotation marks to the Japanese 'economic miracle' raised the ire of some on the orthodox side. The 1973-74 jolt to that economy from the 'oil shock' gave fuel to the critics, delaying
until the end of the decade serious consideration of the reasons for Japan's success.

It was only after Mr. Gorbachev took office that some articles stopped concluding with obligatory references to increasing contradictions within the Japanese economy and growing antagonisms among the economies of imperialistic countries. Yet, the changes did not mean a total disappearance of the old thinking. Some of the most glaring excesses were corrected without any clear-cut position taking their place. There were no macro-level studies, no comparative studies, just micro-level studies. Nevertheless, the growing impression was of positive factors easily outweighing negative ones. Also the explanations for the economic success in past years became more complimentary. Finally, Soviets also were beginning to mention the need to learn from the Japanese experience.

Four circumstances combined to reorient Soviet thinking about the Japanese economy: the rise of the Japanese economy, the deterioration of the Soviet economy, Mr. Gorbachev's perestroika program, and a generational change of specialists. A fifth and, perhaps, most important factor remained a question mark. Would glasnost spread to publications on Japan? There were some positive signs in 1986 and 1987 and by early 1988 plans for more fundamental research were openly discussed, but it was too early to conclude that a decisive turn toward openness had been achieved. As one scholar remarked to me, if the Gorbachev reform course continues to gain momentum to 1990 or 1991, then we can
expect a leap forward also in coverage of the Japanese economy. Despite the limited gains to date, the Technical Economics school has still achieved the greatest visibility in changing Soviet thinking about Japan.

We can also identify an offshoot of this school, which we call the Comparative Economics school. It consists of a group of economists, not originally trained in Japanese studies, who are increasingly writing about Japan. Perhaps the most visible representative of this school is O.S. Vykhanskii of Moscow State University, who was described during an early 1988 visit to Japan as a reform economist who compares economic management in Japan and the Soviet Union. Economists at ISCAN and recent articles in the institute's journal SShA also reflect this trend. This school challenges the traditions of Soviet Japanology, arguing instead for a new, more professionally informed and comparative approach to Japan's economy. Its articles are more likely to appear in journals not directly in Japanese studies and tend to be more openly appreciative of Japan's achievements. The strengths they identify in Japan's economy, such as intense domestic competition, are readily interpreted as goals for perestroika.

There can be no doubt that the Soviet people respect Japan's economic achievement, especially the electrical appliances which in small numbers manage to come into their hands. Managers and economic planners flock to lectures or seminars on the Japanese firm. Some leading Soviet economists including Mr. Aganbegyan and Mr. Abalkin have recently visited Japan. Yet, the literature on
the Japanese economy does not fully reflect the ground swell of admiration on both a mass and an expert level. Excessive attention to relatively minor problems such as unemployment and vocabulary with negative overtones such as the term 'exploitation' are meant to cast doubt. Economic experts on Japan, excluding primarily those in the older generation, are ready to analyze in detail the extraordinary strength of an economy that continues to show resilience on foreign markets even after its currency's value in relation to the dollar was doubled in just a few years. Nevertheless, such appreciation (and, by extension, interest in borrowing from Japan) still seems scarcely evident in Pravda, Far Eastern Affairs, and other bastions of orthodox thought.

Japanese Society

The Revolutionary Orthodox school has battled with considerable success against efforts to ascribe to Japanese society positive attributes of far-reaching significance. Against the notion of a homogeneous society in which social class consciousness is low, this school has insisted that class struggle plays a decisive role and continues to mount. In the face of claims about the many positive sides of the Japanese national character, including willingness to work hard, Mr. Latyshev and others describe coercive methods, a dearth of alternative opportunities, and intensive propaganda. The spiritual emptiness of capitalism engulfs Japan, as it does the countries of the West.
In a Pravda article on February 1, 1988, Mr. Latyshev reemphasizes the negative customs of Japanese family life and marital relations. He describes a country weighed down by the force of traditions. Rather than being enriched, emotional life is impoverished. Conflicts and cool relations with poor communications prevail. A year earlier Latyshev had criticized the theory of Japan's uniqueness and its special type of collectivism as a deliberate creation of government leaders and bureaucratic elements who have succeeded in involving and funding foreign scholars who take an idealistic approach. This way of thinking, he argues, promotes smug claims and a haughty mood and is fed by rising nationalistic sentiments also associated with militarism.

Mr. Latyshev specifically warns against the gullible reactions of those who confine themselves to the belles-lettres and who become excessively enthusiastic about the Japanese national character's impact on the country's accomplishments. There is no doubt that he is expressing alarm against a spreading belief inside the Soviet Union. In fact, the struggle by those who appreciate the personal qualities of the Japanese can be traced back to the literary movements in the post-Stalin thaw. In 1960, Ilya Erenburg, a major literary figure of the time, called for seeing Japan as it really is—not through colored glasses of a single tint. Writing as if it were western authors who had described the Japanese through stereotypes devoid of any individualism, he rejected books in which Japan appears as a ‘country of samurai thirsting to cut and destroy, a country of
harakiri and torture, of perfidy and cruelty, of unquestioning obedience and devilish cunning'.

As the tendency was declining to make national character responsible for the evil deeds of Japan past and present, a new school began to emerge that was prepared to turn the old argument around and give much of the credit for Japan's achievements to different qualities of national character. One father of this school was Academician N.I. Konrad, whose presence offered continuity with the pre-war origins of Japanese scholarship in Russia. Sent to labor camps for a few years under Stalin and later limited in the range of areas he could cover, Konrad (despite a Eurocentric approach to the periodization of Japan) helped to instill respect for Japan's rich heritage. It was not until shortly after his death that most of his writings were published, including three volumes of his collected works from 1974-78 and a large album entitled The Cultural History of Modern Japan in 1980. No less important was the memory of N.A. Nevskii, who was posthumously rehabilitated in 1957 twenty years after his arrest and became a symbol for deep scholarship seeking to understand Japan from within. From about 1980 the study of Japanese culture rose to a new plateau with books such as The Japanese Artistic Tradition, The Culture of Postwar Japan, The Japanese, and Formation of the Japanese National Culture. Nevertheless, the general implications of such writings were only indirectly noted. The fact that something important was being conveyed could be discerned from quotations such as the following
from A.A. Dolin in 1983, 'An unfailing interest in the Japanese literature, art and design has become a token of our time, a characteristic feature of the cultural process in the XXth century'. It was a field with a message that could not yet be fully explained.

In writings on the Japanese way of life, religion, cultural factors in the arts and social psychology, Soviets are trying to satisfy a thirst for a different path of development that does not sacrifice spirituality to modernization. To many who feel a spiritual vacuum and loss of traditions in their own country, Japan represents a deeply traditional society which has become highly modernized without sacrificing its roots. Virtually cut off from direct ties to Japan, ordinary Soviets know it primarily as a source of the best modern technology for mass consumption but also as a protector of perhaps exotic, but also largely functional and stable, social practices. This is a powerful combination for the Soviet mentality of recent years.

Not long before the Gorbachev era began, Mr. Latyshev confronted the advocates of the Cultural Heritage approach at a gathering in Moscow. He strongly expressed the concern of the orthodox group over the admiration being shown for Japan. In reply, T.P. Grigor'eva, and others, assailed the neglect of the historical-cultural-psychological side of Japan under Mr. Latyshev's leadership over a long period. As Mr. Latyshev's grip on the field continued to weaken prior to his departure for Pravda, a conference met in Leningrad early in 1986 on cultural heritage in
the social development of countries of the East. The article summarizing the conference calls attention to an old view that traditions were merely remnants to be overcome and uprooted. The clear-cut focus on this theme signalled its increasing acceptability at a time when the study of Russia's cultural heritage was gaining overwhelming public favor under the championship of Academician Ligachev.

Looking back on the postwar era, we find social scientists trailing in their awareness of the strengths of Japanese society. Until the 1960s they tended to repeat stereotypes of the enemy samurai, which had been encouraged during Japan's intervention in the Far East starting at the time of Russia's Civil War and were intensified in the tense atmosphere of the 1930s and again in 1945. It was not until the mid-1960s that Japan's postwar reforms were reinterpreted as positive developments, although with the qualification that they had been forced from below by mass struggle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s it was the world literature community in Moscow and Leningrad that encouraged literary specialists to reexamine Japanese literature. Around 1970 journalists took the lead in drawing popular attention to the Japanese way of life. Physicists and other scientists are said to have taken a strong interest in the Japanese way of thinking. Just as Soviet intellectuals trace the roots of their own cherished traditions to nineteenth-century Russia, they expected to find the source of modern Japanese dynamism in literary and other traditions of an earlier era.
Some Soviet specialists whom I interviewed in March 1988 said that for the Soviet people Japan is a utopian country; people know little about its problems. Others mentioned that of all foreign literatures and cultures Japan is the most popular. Whether 10,000 or 100,000 copies of a translation from Japanese are made, the book sells out in a matter of days. Scholarly writings on ancient religion sell out almost instantaneously, even in editions of tens of thousands. When Asia and Africa Today carried a series on the martial arts in East Asia, copies became rarities. Scholars who have been eager to cater to the vast market have had to surmount opposition. Mr. Goregliad led a group at L.O. IVAN, urging in-depth-study of Japanese literature and culture. INION led in surveys of Western and Japanese writings on national psychology. Increasingly in the 1980s a popular literature on Japanese national character was reaching a wide audience. Victory was only partial, however, since numerous topics have scarcely been studied and the application of lessons from what is perceived as a 'well-organized' society to the severe organizational problems of Soviet society remains undiscussed.

The Struggle for Influence

Japan specialists compete for influence within three hierarchies centered in Moscow: 1) the Central Committee, especially through its International Department; 2) the Council of Ministers, primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs although economic planning agencies and ministries are now involved; and 3)
the Academy of Sciences, especially under the social sciences divisions in history and economics and the newly created division in world economies and international relations. These bureaucratic chains of command are not absolute; the director of an institute or the head of a department within an institute could try to gain influence within any of the three chains, even by winning the ear of someone not quite at the top of a chain who was known for his independent views. For about two decades the orthodox position dominated in all three hierarchies. Suslov and Ponomarev in the Party hierarchy, Gromyko in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Fedoseyev in the Academy were firm in their support for orthodox positions. Below them were the area specialists who shared their leanings: Kovalenko in the International Department, Kapitsa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tikhvinskii, Sladkovskii, Titarenko, and Latyshev in the Academy. Reform views remained on the fringes against such formidable opposition.

Battles over legitimacy as experts to interpret contemporary Japan have been heated in recent years. The Revolutionary Orthodox group claims a monopoly voice by virtue of its long experience, personal familiarity with the country, language competency, ideological approach, and wide field of vision. It has dismissed as non-specialists economists not trained in Japanese studies and as 'culturologists' literary and historical specialists who argue from the point of view of cultural traditions rather than the superior perspective of social class
relations. Step-by-step the monopoly of the orthodox groups has been broken. Personnel at ISCAN who have an interest in East Asia have paradoxically had to fight from the outside against Latyshev and the old guard to show that Japan is not a small country or a capitalist state along the lines of the United States. Economists, both Japan specialists and others outside of area study circles, have had to fight to take the achievements of Japan's economy seriously. Those who study the arts and history of Japan have struggled to convey wider implications about Japanese national character. All have been aware of the trends in Japanese studies in the West and have realized that Soviet Japanology was out of touch with international scholarship and unconvincing in its arguments. The orthodox groups have been rendered largely irrelevant to mass audiences and to the informed intellectual community. They headed the three bureaucratic hierarchies even after their legitimacy was in serious decline.

What accounts for the continued visibility of the orthodox forces into 1988? Three explanations can be offered to suggest that their visibility is only a transitional phenomenon. First, some Soviets say that there is a shortage of experienced personnel in Japanese studies. Mr. Kovalenko stays on because it is not yet easy to identify a replacement for him. Few promising successors have been trained or given opportunities to assume broad responsibilities. Instead, disciples of the old guard have been groomed to carry on, or at least not to challenge the status quo directly. Second, others mention that in the process of easing out the old
guard from the most powerful posts, their visibility is not necessarily diminished. Mr. Kapitsa was dropped from the Foreign Ministry, but now has prominence as the director of the major institute for Japanese studies. Mr. Latyshev was finally replaced as the department head for Japan at that institute, but he returned to the highly visible position of Pravda correspondent in Tokyo. Although the Foreign Ministry and the leading academic department are at last rid of serious impediments to the new realism, these orthodox figures are still active on the Soviet scene. Third, there are those who expect the orthodox voices to be quieted (although not necessarily silenced) soon by personnel changes at a higher level. At present, the reform forces under Mr. Gorbachev face formidable opposition within the top leadership; if the major residue from the Brezhnev era can be cleared away, then Mr. Kovalenko will quickly fall, Mr. Latyshev will return to Moscow to engage in individual research and writing, the International Relations school will become dominant in the social science leadership of the Academy of Sciences, and glasnost will flower within the community of Japanese specialists. Already Mr. Primakov has risen in the Academy and Mr. Fedoseyev is said to be on the verge of retirement. Predictions on the completion of this transition vary from 1988 to the beginning of the 1990s.

Two Turning Points?

Certain years are remembered for the breakthroughs they brought to previously antagonistic relations among the great
powers. The year 1987 appears to have had that significance for Soviet-American relations, just as 1982 represented a turning point for Sino-Soviet relations and 1972 for Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. In the aftermath of the Gorbachev-Reagan Washington summit, the chilliest atmosphere which remains among the great powers is the Soviet-Japanese relationship. Will a breakthrough between these two countries soon follow, as occurred in the case of Sino-Japanese relations after the Nixon visit to Beijing, or are the obstacles to a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement more serious and not likely to be resolved easily? To find an answer to this question we need not only to recount the familiar obstacles of the Northern Territories dispute, but also to examine the changing perceptions in each country toward the other.

Soviet perceptions of Japan are in flux. The Gorbachev programs of glasnost and perestroika have made an impact, but are not now sufficient either to oust the orthodox groups from central positions or to give free rein to the reform groups to assert their views. Perceptions have not yet received an impetus from a major improvement in relations, as has occurred with Soviet ties to China and the United States. Nevertheless, the summer of 1986 may be considered a partial turning point. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, an article in a Soviet weekly newspaper calling for extending openness to coverage of Japan, and steps around that time or shortly after to put in place a new academic leadership at the level of departments and sections are evidence of change.
The first turning point in the middle of 1986 has not been enough to permit the reform schools and scholarship in general to achieve genuine glasnost. There is no doubt that Soviet publications in press or under preparation will reveal a level of openness and a depth of understanding on contemporary issues superior to anything previously seen in that country. Yet, it is also clear that the orthodox group continues to wield power and the inertia of censorship and old ways of thinking is far from overcome. To become genuine 'realists', Soviets must become well-informed and open to the presentation of different interpretations not just obliquely but through fully stated arguments. If that turning point cannot be reached prior to a breakthrough in bilateral relations with Japan, the breakthrough itself may be in jeopardy.

Specialists on Japan need more channels of publication. When China's reforms were launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s dozens of new journals were established for studies of foreign countries, especially the Soviet Union. Although most were neibu (internal circulation) and the range of debate was restricted, lively discussions ensued. Soviet scholars and citizens are already managing to examine Japan with great interest. If only there were journals and newspapers in which they could quickly and fully express their views, it would soon be even more obvious how fascinated Soviets are with the Japanese experience.

On May 25, 1988, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported on an unprecedented public opinion survey taken together with the Institute of
Sociological Research of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The survey compares the Soviet and Japanese views of each other and supports the conclusion that Soviets are much more favorably disposed toward Japan. While only 25 per cent of Japanese regard themselves as friendly to the Soviet people, 77 per cent of Soviets are friendly to Japan, and in cities of over 1 million people and among technicians the figure is 87 per cent. Younger, urban, and educated Soviets are aware that bilateral relations are not good and emphasize the importance of improving them. The first six images that come to mind about the Japanese people are all positive: Soviets find them industrious; methodical and orderly; rich in originality and strong in technology; cultured and educated; kind; and tenacious. The impressions of the Soviet people have leapt ahead of published images, in which orthodox views are still prominent.

Moscow faces two major decisions concerning Japan. It must decide how to negotiate a new relationship, presumably requiring concessions on Japan's territorial demands. It also must decide how to make use of Japan's considerable achievements in order to invigorate the Soviet economy and the society more generally. There can be little doubt that some of the reform voices are prepared to tell their leaders of the importance of acting quickly and decisively in addressing both issues, that there is much at stake and much can be gained. In March 1988, however, the scholars were not optimistic that Soviet leaders understood the significance of Japan or that the reform group under Mr. Gorbachev
is sufficiently strong to make controversial decisions involving both territorial concessions and borrowing from capitalism. Critical also of Japanese inflexibility and misperceptions, Soviets are nonetheless aware that a new era is dawning in which the pressures are mounting for both countries to be guided by realism and respect.
NOTES


31. Ibid., p. 9.


36. The general mood at IVAN, IMEMO, and INION is that past writings were too ideological and critical. I often heard this in interviews in March 1988.


42. 'SoNichi kankei no seika to tempo', Jiyu, March 1988, pp. 100-102.


45. Interviews with Soviet specialists support this conclusion.


54. 'Keizai kaikaku wa dankaiteki ni: Nihongata keiei o minarau hitsuyo mo', Asahi shimbun, February 16, 1988, p. 6.


57. M.V. Khlynova, "Srednii klass" v sovremennoi Iaponii:

58. I. Latyshev, 'Vremena i nravy; sotsial'nye zametki o iaponskoj sem'e', Pravda, February 1, 1988, p. 7.


60. Ibid., p. 29.

61. V.V. Ovchinnikov, Sakura i dub; vpechatlenija i razmyshlenija o Iapontsakh i Anglichanakh (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1983), pp. 13-14.


