TITLE: SOVIET AND JAPANESE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary.................................v

Soviet and Japanese Mutual Perceptions......................1
The Significance of Soviet-Japanese Mutual Perceptions.........3
Views in the First Half of the 1980s..........................8
Changing Views in the Gorbachev Era..........................11
Public Opinion........................................13
Soviet Orthodoxy: Will it yield?...........................19
Soviet Reform: Is it genuine?..............................23
Japan's Right-of-Center: What does it want?..................25
The Summer of 1988: The rivalry intensifies..................30
Perceptions and Bilateral Relations in the 1990s..............37
Scenarios for Negotiations...............................46
Notes..................................................49
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Soviet and Japanese Mutual Perceptions

Gilbert Rozman

Soviets and Japanese are severe critics of each other. Lately their mutual suspicions have acquired new significance as Japanese remained relatively skeptical about the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington while Soviets accused Tokyo of imposing a negative tone on the Toronto summit. The potential exists for a long-term antagonism, with broad implications for complicating relations between the Soviet Union and the other major capitalist countries as well as the other countries in the Asian-Pacific region. Yet, Soviet reformers are striving for a different outcome. In stages over the past two decades they have come to appreciate Japan, even to the point of "Japanomania" or believing that this is the society most worthy of Soviet emulation. In late July 1988, under Gorbachev's leadership, reformers launched a campaign to improve relations with Japan and to convince the Japanese people of Soviet goodwill. A struggle continues in Moscow over the dimensions of this initiative, and the receptivity of the Japanese to it must be understood against the background of a widening debate inside Japan over how to interpret the Gorbachev reforms and the prospects for a new world order.

The success of the new Soviet campaign to persuade Japan is not simply a question of whether Moscow is prepared to return the four islands known as the "Northern Territories." Of course, if Moscow refused to discuss changes in the status of the islands, it is doubtful that any breakthrough in relations would be possible. Based on the July campaign, it now seems likely that Moscow will consider the return
of at least two islands, while also discussing joint ventures and other ways in which the islands can be used and considering their fate in the context of a timetable for securing a wide-ranging settlement of bilateral or regional issues. Gorbachev has chosen former Prime Minister Nakasone as the central figure for bringing Japan to the negotiating table.

Simultaneous with Nakasone's almost three-hour meeting on July 22 with Gorbachev and his lecture on July 23 at the Institute of World Economies and International Relations (IMEMO), Japanologists at IMEMO appeared prominently in the Japanese media. One specialist proposed joint enterprises on the islands, while another called for a symposium on the previously sensitive subject of Japanese prisoners of war after World War II. Over the same week a three-part series in Izvestiia described the reality of the "Japanese phenomenon" as having "nothing in common with our impression of capitalism." These developments in late July represent the culmination to date of a struggle by Soviet reform thinkers to create a realistic and respectful image of Japan.

Little attention has been paid to Soviet and Japanese perceptions of each other. Even among Japanese Sovietologists there is little awareness of the varied approaches to their country inside the Soviet Union. Through detailed study of Soviet publications and extensive interviews with specialists, I have been able to trace the development of five schools of thought — three of which have sharply opposed the standard orthodox critiques of Japanese capitalism. Especially since an initial turning point in mid-1986 in Moscow's official approach toward Japan, the reform groups have been gathering strength.
Interviews in March 1988 in Moscow and Leningrad indicated that a Nakasone visit was already under discussion and that new trends in thinking were appearing that would be partially revealed in the July initiative toward Japan.

Official policy decisions need to be interpreted in the context of public opinion and debates which involve area specialists. The first two polls of Soviet views of Japan (accompanied by improved polls of Japanese views of the Soviet Union) appeared in March and May 1988. They reveal a sharp discrepancy between positive Soviet attitudes and skeptical Japanese ones. The Soviet public is ready for a new relationship with Japan. Yet, the leading orthodox Japanologists have intensified their disruptive efforts; even in July Kovalenko and Latyshev prominently restated views that both irritated Soviet reformers and left Japanese with a feeling of hopelessness. Ligachev's early August attack on the new Soviet approach to "peaceful coexistence" shows that Soviet leaders are still divided.

It is important to understand Japanese public opinion and debates, beginning with the harsh critiques of Soviet socialism that prevailed prior to the Gorbachev era. These were not based on a strong scholarly tradition nor did they offer any clue about the potential for Soviet reform in domestic or foreign policy. Although the impact of this negativism remains strong, there is now widespread self-criticism by Sovietologists. They also attribute one-sidedness to the concerted efforts of officials. Many well-informed scholars and even Foreign Ministry officials are doubtful about the objectivity of Soviet experts formerly or presently in the Ministry.
Over the past two years the Japanese debate over the Soviet Union has intensified, resulting in diversification into at least five schools of thinking. The most influential approach is that associated with the Foreign Ministry and right-of-center scholars such as Kimura Hiroshi. The right-wing also remains quite visible, and, as long as pessimism prevails over prospects for the "Northern Territories," it exercises some influence over policy. Together these groups give a more critical cast to Tokyo's response to Gorbachev than, I think, is prevalent in the United States. The growing debate over the Soviet Union is significant not only because it affects bilateral relations but also because it opens the door to a long-postponed inquiry into what should be the independent worldview of the Japanese superpower.

My research from 1986-88 concentrated on Soviet and Japanese publications and interviews. As in my previous research on Sino-Soviet mutual perceptions and relations, I uncovered a field that is almost completely neglected except for those who rely on English-language sources and official pronouncements. Publications in Japanese and Russian are expanding and becoming more informative. Public relations in conjunction with diplomatic initiatives are likely to play an increasing role, supported by sophisticated analyses of public opinion polls. The academic community has not yet taken seriously the requirements of research on bilateral relations among the major powers. A new field of scholarship is needed that links international relations to domestic social analysis.

Both the U.S. government and the scholarly community should be closely monitoring Japanese and Soviet debates about each other. A new
era in Soviet-Japanese relations has dawned, whether the current Soviet campaign leads directly to negotiations and a breakthrough in relations or it fails and an adversarial atmosphere continues to build. The Soviet-Japanese rivalry is likely to become a central force in shaping the international order in the decades to come. We need to develop a deep appreciation for contending schools, changing public opinion, and policy options in these countries.

In October when Nakasone returns to Moscow and later in the year when Shevardnadze travels to Tokyo, Gorbachev will be trying to establish a foundation for his own promised trip to Japan, perhaps in 1989, and for negotiations to settle the territorial dispute and set relations on a new course. By studying Soviet publications on Japan in the coming months we will learn to appreciate what Moscow wants and how various groups envision new ties with Tokyo. By following Japanese coverage of the Soviet Union we will understand the pressures on the Foreign Ministry to compromise and the likelihood that it will resist them. In both countries the intensity of debate is mounting, but longstanding suspicions and even misperceptions will need to be overcome if relations are to improve substantially.
In the summer of 1988 Soviet-Japanese relations appear to be at an impasse because of Tokyo’s resolve to regain the four islands known as the "Northern Territories" and Moscow’s insistence that the national boundaries to which allies agreed at the end of WWII not be renegotiated. For many observers it is sufficient to note this one deadlock in order to predict the course of Soviet-Japanese relations—to project past illwill based on old ways of thinking well into the future. Yet, preoccupation with the persistence of this dispute, as the preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute in the late 1970s and early 1980s, runs the risk of diverting attention from the rapidly changing context of bilateral relations. Perceptions inside the Soviet Union and Japan are in flux. By studying the increasingly lively debates over the past two years about the significance of the other superpower, we can identify potential consequences for the newly emergent worldview in each country and for a new era in international relations.

This report concentrates on the overall character and implications of recent debates. Two articles to appear in the fall of 1988 offer more detail on the debate in each country, identifying the contending schools of thought and some of the contentious issues. In addition, separate books are planned on the wide-ranging and long-term course of the Soviet debate about Japanese capitalism and the Japanese debate about Soviet socialism. The volume of writing anticipated on the basis of research from 1986 to 1988 reflects my judgment of how much
significant and previously unexamined information is available. Two separate national debates are in progress; where possible I discuss the overlap between them and their mutual impact.

In 1985, when this project was proposed, I expected to emphasize the long-term negative perceptions in each country of the other with some updating to show recent developments. In the second half of 1987 when this project had become my full-time preoccupation, I had become accustomed to the fact that new developments and interpretations each month were requiring most of my attention and that the final product for the project would inevitably concentrate on the Gorbachev era. By the spring of 1988, after returning from Moscow, I realized that this year represents a turning point in Soviet perceptions and that I need to emphasize ongoing efforts to change prevailing perceptions and to create a new relationship. Yet, when I requested a 45-day extension to mid-August, I could hardly have anticipated that the major initiative to date toward setting the Soviet-Japanese relationship on a new track would occur in the final weeks of July, in conjunction with former Prime Minister Nakasone’s trip to the USSR, after my departure from Japan and at the very time I was settling down to summarize the findings from two years of research. Because my two articles cover the state of the field into the spring of 1988 and because there has been little commentary in English on the latest developments, I devote a

"My research included more than fifty hours of interviews, mostly in March 1988 at institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, with Soviets knowledgeable about Japan and at least as much time meeting with Japanese knowledgeable about the Soviet Union during a ten-month stay in Japan to July 1988. Interviews are used to supplement primary reliance on published materials -- books, specialized and popular journal articles, newspaper articles, and public opinion polls."
large part of this report to their analysis. The focus is on how to interpret the developments of late July 1988 in the context of past policies and perceptions.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET-JAPANESE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS

Observers have tended to overlook policy debates and public opinion regarding foreign countries in both the Soviet Union and Japan. They assumed that censorship renders Soviet publications about foreign problems uninformative and that power concentrated at the top makes them irrelevant. They also assumed that a high level of consensus in Japan leads to few differences of opinion on foreign policy issues and, in any case, that the tight grip on power by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and the great authority of bureaucratic experts cause the views of "outsiders" to remain uninfluential. If in the past these assumptions may have done little harm apart from leading us to overlook tendencies with long-range implications, they now could inflict noticeable damage on our ability to anticipate on-going transformations in international relations.

Japan figured importantly in Russian perceptions of the world from the time of the Russo-Japanese War and again, from 1918 to 1945, when fighting between the two countries threatened or even flared for brief periods. From the late 1960s the flames of rivalry were rekindled by the Soviet defensive reaction to the Japanese "economic miracle," by concern that Japan was becoming a model for Soviet citizens as well as for international public opinion, and by distrust of Japan's expanded leadership role in East Asia. Since that initial reawakening to the rivalry with Japan, Moscow's sense of the seriousness of the rivalry
has heightened. From the end of the 1970s Soviets became more conscious of the continued ability of the Japanese economy to outperform its rivals, they grew more concerned about the contrast between their own country's fading image and performance and Japan's rising image as the "society of the twenty-first century," and they were shocked by the prospect of China joining with Japan as part of a resurgent East Asian region.

Developments in the Gorbachev era—have so far exacerbated the perceptions of rivalry with Japan, while also raising hopes for cooperation. Japan's record trade surpluses and association with technologies of the future have increased that country's appeal. At the same time, open acknowledgement of the danger of Soviet decline and the widening horizon of what is possible created by "perestroika" and "glasnost'" have prodded Soviets to seek solutions in the Japanese experience. Reform forces in Moscow appear to have fully awakened to the long-term implications of East Asian dynamism led by Japan. Yet, they must contend with orthodox forces which long underestimated Japan and still resist a full reassessment of past images.

Viewed from the Soviet Union, the Soviet-Japanese rivalry may already rank with the Sino-Soviet rivalry as the second most significant "adversarial" international relationship after the Soviet-American competition. It is now a high-intensity rivalry. Even if the confrontational atmosphere of recent years can indeed be replaced by a more cooperative approach to world problems, the likelihood remains of a keen sense of competition centered on economic growth, national self-confidence, regional influence, and international competitiveness and
standing. Lately the prospect of continued military expansion, applying the most futuristic high technology, also draws Soviet attention to Japan. Moscow has good reason to fear this rivalry and, at the same time, to seek to overcome it.

Japan matters to Moscow, above all, because of the emerging objectives of Soviet development, Gorbachev advocates restructuring the Soviet economy to make maximum use of the achievements of modern science and technology, of incentives to workers, and of efficient management. In these respects Japan has gained a reputation as a world leader. The emerging Soviet program also calls for activating the human factor, creating a new psychology of human relations in which individuals take responsibility for the quality of their work and studies. Japan's low crime rates, strong family bonds, intense company loyalty, and diligent students and workers cannot help but arouse interest. The Soviets have also strongly asserted their desire to become closely integrated into the world economy. For this they need access to the most advanced technology, foreign credits and investments, joint venture partners, and other links to the most developed capitalist countries. Japan is a prime target.

Lately, Soviet determination to develop Russia's Far Eastern region has been strongly emphasized. An article which presented, perhaps, the most detail about Soviet plans for the region mentioned Japan so often and with such high expectations of what could be accomplished together that the reader could gain the impression that only with Tokyo's cooperation could Moscow hope to realize its goals. Soviet reformers now envision a world in which military expenditures
are sharply reduced and economies are reoriented toward civilian production and the international division of labor, citing Japan's success as an example of what can be accomplished. Japan looms large in Soviet thinking about the future. It is both a positive example as a model and a source of trade and investment, and a worrisome obstacle as a rival and a critic ready to thwart new Soviet plans for an "integrated" world.

For different reasons, Japanese views of the Soviet rivalry have also been gaining in importance. Understandably Japanese are not interested in borrowing from the Soviet model and do not expect any improvement in their quality of life from new ties with Moscow. Economic and scientific cooperation are low on the list of Japanese desires. Nevertheless, there is a growing uneasiness about the insufficient "internationalization" of Japan. While the meaning of this popular term is often vague, much of the discussion centers on improved mutual understanding; Japanese must become more responsible citizens of the world. In turn, Japanese seek international respect, influence commensurate with their economic achievements, and confidence that all of the loose ends associated with their ignominious experience in WWII are left behind. The "Northern Territories" symbolize, in Japanese thinking, an awareness of an indignity unfit for the Japanese superpower of today, which prevents the unfinished business of WWII from being settled. The worldview of the Japanese superpower is still forming. How the past is laid to rest has a lot to do with what can be expected of the future.

Over the past decade or longer, the Japanese image of the Soviet
rival has played an important role in political life. It served the interest of the LDP in discrediting its main opposition on the left, in rallying the nation behind a more active foreign policy with an increased military component, and in reassuring Washington and other allies. The "image of the enemy" remains an important force in Japan's debate over the Soviet Union. If it should outlive similar images in the West, there will, no doubt, be consequences for international and domestic politics worthy of our careful consideration. We may face a situation of three superpowers -- the Soviet Union on the left, Japan on the right, and the United States trying to move along with the others toward the center -- plus Europe and China as additional world powers.

Recently another image has emerged which, if it were to prevail, would lead to different consequences. This is the image of Japan as a holdout from a much needed process of international reconciliation. Whether because of misperceptions of the Soviet Union or excess "nationalism" in comparison to Washington's "realism," Tokyo is allegedly failing to respond to the "new thinking" in the Soviet Union. Critics charge that the Japanese right clings to an outmoded image of the Soviet Union with harmful consequences. They fear the isolation of Japan on the right and seek to revive the intellectual legacy of a state constitutionally committed to peace.

At stake is the still undeveloped worldview of a country that has long been spared the necessity of asserting an independent outlook. To the extent that "Cold War" psychology in a polarized world with high military tensions is fading, reassessments in Japan of the Soviet Union
threaten to widen the cleavage between the right-wing and the center and even to restore the credibility of an independent worldview from the left. Nevertheless, in the short-run, the level of consensus is likely to remain high, with the right-of-center dominant and the right wing still influential. There is less urgency in the Japanese debate than in the Soviet one. Developments in the Soviet Union and in Soviet policy toward the other superpowers are likely to further shape Japanese responses.

VIEWS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1980S

In the early 1980s Soviet-Japanese relations plunged to a low point since the reestablishment of relations in 1956. Not only was public opinion in Japan almost solidly critical of the Soviet Union, even the intellectual community and the left-oriented parties had joined the condemnations. By its international behavior and mismanagement of Japanese relations, Moscow had brought this negative reaction on itself. It had sought to intimidate Japan, but instead was arousing support for increased military cooperation with the United States and military spending. It had hoped to expand economic ties and to recoup expenses for the costly BAM railroad across Siberia, but found Japanese interest in trade and investment declining because of both economic factors and an unwillingness to separate economics from politics. Japanese publications on the Soviet Union depicted the dark side of Soviet life, with almost no hint of any potential for reform. No other major country in the period 1982-84 conveyed such an unanimity of gloomy expectations about the future of the Soviet Union. No wonder some Japanese have recently looked back to explain why experts and
foreign affairs analysts had failed to predict the Gorbachev reform era."

From 1983 to 1985 as Soviet-American relations improved somewhat and early signs of reform could be discerned in some of Moscow's domestic policies, the impact in Japan was difficult to notice. There was almost no debate about Andropov's reform tendencies or optimism about the resumed arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow. The "Northern Territories" question and the Soviet military buildup had become emotional issues which did not invite dissent. Along with the shooting down of a Korean airliner and other emotionally charged incidents, they kept the spotlight on Soviet aggressive behavior. Polls revealed only a slight shift in the balance between left and right in Japan; whereas in December 1981, for every three Japanese who favored a decrease in military expenditures, there were four who wanted an accelerated increase (15.0% to 20.1%), in November 1984 those in favor of a decrease had become more numerous (17.7% to 14.2%). The majority accepted the status quo or a gradual build-up. The perception of a Soviet military threat, which had aroused alarm after a Soviet arms buildup on the "Northern Territories" and the dispatch of troops to fight in Afghanistan, was receding somewhat. Increased revelations of the failings of the Soviet system led more Japanese to dismiss the Soviet Union as a second-rate power.

Soviet negative propaganda about Japan in the years before Gorbachev became general secretary faced a greater credibility gap. The official response to the 1979 oil shock, echoing the earlier reaction to the 1973 oil shock that Japan's "crisis of capitalism" was
Charges of Japanese "militarism" may have struck a sympathetic chord among some "patriots" reminded of earlier history, but others were skeptical of the scanty evidence presented. As reformers became bolder, especially from the time of Andropov's rise, a positive reassessment of Japan gained increasing support. One tangible sign was the more open opposition to I. A. Latyshev, who as head of the Department of Japan at the Institute of Oriental Studies (IVAN) exercised the most academic power in the field. From above and below, Latyshev faced sharp opposition. E. M. Primakov, the institute director from 1978, bypassed him in an effort to invigorate studies of contemporary Japan and simultaneously sought to remove Latyshev. Contentious seminars brought together economists (including nonspecialists) who accused the orthodox establishment of suppressing the facts about Japan's achievements, and literary experts, who confronted Latyshev about the barriers interfering with the study of Japan's cultural heritage. Frustrations over unrealistic and erroneous images of Japan, already in evidence for decades, were bursting into open clashes of opinion.

Officials tried to channel the increasingly positive interpretations of Japan into acceptable channels, such as technical assessments of certain dimensions of the scientific and technological revolution. Publications for limited audiences, including the brochures on Japan issued by the Institute for Scientific Study in the Social Sciences (INION), broke new ground. Frustrations ran high because of the mounting gap between highly favorable popular perceptions of Japan and the largely critical half-truths which could not easily be sustained.
be printed, for mass audiences; among Soviet intellectuals there was a
growing sense of urgency about the need for the truth.

Japan's appeal to the Soviet people appears to have grown
substantially during the first half of the 1980s. This was part of a
world trend, but also can be explained by the close fit between the
perceived needs of Soviet society and the objective strengths of Japan.
Publications on diverse subjects, sometimes in editions of tens of
thousands, quickly sold out, even when they only partially responded to
the Soviet thirst for information. Interest in Japanese literature
continued to be high, while on such topics as national character, the
social roots of industrial innovations, and the martial arts it climbed
to a new peak. Soviet Japanologists also drew my attention to the
important role of television. Despite the one-sided preoccupation with
demonstrations against the Japanese government, which in August 1986
was openly acknowledged by the well-known commentator V. M. Tsvetov, favorable impressions managed to filter through to the Soviet public.

CHANGING VIEWS IN THE GORBACHEV ERA

Soviet leaders recognize that past views of Japan are a prime
element of the "old thinking" that created an atmosphere of stagnation
and isolation. Gorbachev's meeting with Nakasone on the occasion of
Chernenko's funeral, remarks in connection with Shevardnadze's visit to
Tokyo in January 1986, and Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech are among the
early indications of a Soviet reassessment. In 1987 increasingly
favorable interpretations of the prospects for capitalism and its
ability to endure without militarism opened the way to new approaches
to Japan. Yet, in the summer of 1988 there was still no expose of past
errors and no substantial statement of how "new thinking" applies to Japan. Prior to Nakasone's visit to Moscow in July 1988 which will be discussed below, any reassessment remained largely concealed. In general, glasnost' had not yet been extended to international affairs, nor had past foreign policy errors been publicly acknowledged.

At the top, the Soviet leadership prior to July 1988 seemed paralyzed on how to handle Japan. Should Gorbachev travel to Tokyo or display a personal initiative toward the Japanese leadership? Should the old guard of officials and national spokesmen be cleansed of the personnel such as I. V. Kovalenko (deputy to Dobrynin in the International Department) long associated with a harsh attitude toward Tokyo? Should a public relations strategy be devised to appeal to the Japanese public? Should a debate be launched concerning what Moscow should do to make amends for past mistakes and to find common ground for future cooperation with Tokyo? There were signs that all of these matters had been considered, but without resolution. Small victories had not yielded unmitigated gains to the forces of reform. When reformers finally succeeded in ousting Latyshev from his administrative post at IVAN, his protectors managed to reassign him at the beginning of 1987 to a third stint as Pravda's correspondent in Tokyo. At this time he continues to describe Japan in the same negative tone despite the fact that a 1987 letter to the editor openly criticized his negativism and at least some Soviets stationed in Tokyo find his articles an embarrassment. Experts are still awaiting a clear signal from above that coverage of Japan can make a sharp break with the past.

The issue is not simply that the balance of power in Moscow
remained opposed to acceding to Japan's demands on the "Northern Territories." Some in the Soviet leadership have used this dispute to delay a personnel shakeup and a reexamination of past mistakes, both of which are urgently needed. Yet, at the level of sector and department head in academic institutes a new generation around age 40 is quickly emerging. K. O. Sarkisov, V. K. Zaitsev, G. F. Kunadze, and A. I. Kravitsevich represent a well-informed, middle-level leadership, who together with regional specialists such as V. I. Ivanov and V. P. Lukin are likely to treat Japan with respect. Gorbachev's ambassador in Tokyo, N. N. Solovyov, is similarly inclined. Among specialists, the reform side is rising rapidly to the fore. If support for the orthodox group were withdrawn at the top, it would be little mourned. In contrast, the "old thinking" has been so fully discredited that any effort to reimpose it would arouse enormous discontent. In the current state of limbo, reform forces are frustrated by their incomplete gains. As we see below, only in July were there signs that the reformers under Gorbachev had made a breakthrough.

PUBLIC OPINION

At the level of public opinion, the Gorbachev era has intensified a craze for Japan that had already spread widely. The first public opinion polls on this subject were published in March and May, offering some confirmation for the "Japanomania" about which many Soviet Japan specialists had told me. Educated and big city residents are in the vanguard in viewing Japan in a highly favorable light. According to some informants, Japan is even a "model or utopian" society for large numbers of Soviets. Most of what is published about Japan is still
intended to dampen such enthusiasm, but reformers who believe that the more positive the impressions of Japan the more pressure will be mounted for "perestroika" and a cooperative foreign policy have gained ground. If Gorbachev were to visit Japan or some other spark were to ignite the already burning interest in that country, the effects would likely be surprising to observers around the world who have not yet taken notice of "Japanomania" in the Soviet Union.

See Table 1, p. 15

Drawing on the poll results in 1988, I have divided Soviet attitudes toward Japan into five categories. The groups clearly sympathetic to Japan are, I assume, also likely to be pro-reform. They comprise about one-third of the Soviet public and a higher proportion of informed public opinion. In the center of the political spectrum and comprising perhaps a quarter of the population are other persons who are at least eager to gain the fruits of Japan's industrial progress and consider bilateral relations to be very important. An additional quarter of the Soviet public are friendly and, to some degree, in favor of economic cooperation, but it is unclear whether their interest extends beyond the bounds of the existing orthodox forces. Finally, there is an extreme group of ten percent polled who are unfriendly to Japan.

Japanese views of the Soviet Union have changed over the past three years, but remain much more negative than Soviet views of Japan. Table 2 summarizes the combined results of recent public opinion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL LEANINGS</th>
<th>ATTITUDE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-reform and highly sympathetic to Japan</td>
<td>Consider the return of the &quot;Northern Territories&quot; a top priority</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very friendly.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-reform and sympathetic to Japan</td>
<td>See as democratic</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See as peace-loving</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of Japan's importance and at least partially pro-reform</td>
<td>Consider science and technology a top priority</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See bilateral relations as very important</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations should definitely be friendly</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not hostile toward Japan and for economic ties with capitalism, as in the 1970s</td>
<td>Place a high priority on knowing more about the daily lives of the people</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel more or less friendly</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider trade and economic cooperation a top priority</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sympathetic to Japan and not pro-reform</td>
<td>Not unfriendly</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not consider perestroika and glasnost' unhelpful for relations</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not see bilateral relations as bad</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See as economically developed</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For improved relations</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not strongly unfriendly</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in knowing more about some area of Japanese life</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The proportions who find the Soviet Union to be peace loving and have a good feeling toward it have more than doubled, while those at the other end of the spectrum who prefer to treat Moscow as an outcast have declined. It is possible now to identify a middle group who are, on the whole, positive about the Moscow summit, do not see a need for increasing Japan's military budget, and consider trade and economic relations useful. While still not friendly toward the Soviet Union, this group has disassociated itself from the right wing's refusal to recognize the importance of positive changes over the past three years.

See Table 2, p. 17

Groups to the right and left of the center comprise about twenty percent of respondents each. On the right, they include a small core strongly opposed to the Moscow summit, a somewhat larger group strongly unfriendly to the Soviet Union and against improving relations, and a still larger group in favor of increasing Japan's military expenses and, on the whole, doubtful about the value of the Moscow summit and the continuation of Soviet-American progress on detente. On the left, there is a core who regard the Soviet Union as democratic and are very optimistic about recent developments, and a wider group that now regards the Soviet Union as peace-loving and is generally optimistic about recent developments. The left considers itself friendly, while the right generally sees no point in dealing with the Soviets.

In the center, broadly construed, are those who look upon the
TABLE 2

Japanese Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL LEANINGS</th>
<th>ATTITUDE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The left wing</td>
<td>Very friendly</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enthusiastic about the Moscow summit, very optimistic about US-SU arms control</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See as democratic</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The left-of-center</td>
<td>See as peace-loving</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enthusiastic about the Moscow summit, at least moderately optimistic about US-SU arms control</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel more or less friendly</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider cultural exchange a top priority</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider trade, economic cooperation a top priority</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations should definitely be friendly</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See as economically developed</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See bilateral relations as very important</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not treat Northern Territories as a top priority</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>The center</td>
<td>See perestroika, glasnost' as useful to relations</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place a high priority on knowing more about daily life of people</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>The right-of-center</td>
<td>Not unfriendly</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive about the Moscow summit, at least moderately optimistic about US-SU arms control</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not see bilateral relations as bad</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider trade, economic relations useful</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive about the Moscow summit</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not see perestroika, glasnost' as not useful to relations</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in knowing more about some area of Soviet life</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not in favor of an increase in Japan's military expenditures</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right wing</td>
<td>For improved relations</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not against improved relations</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not strongly unfriendly</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not strongly against the Moscow summit</td>
<td>97</td>
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Soviet Union critically but somewhat hopefully. Their views are
decidedly more negative than views in other developed countries. Most
Japanese do not consider the Soviet Union to be economically developed.
About half do not consider perestroika and glasnost' to be useful for
Soviet-Japanese relations. Nearly half feel unfriendly toward the
Soviet Union. Almost half are not optimistic about further US-Soviet
arms control progress. Nearly two out of five do not even consider
trade and economic relations to be useful for Japan. While we can
divide the large center group into a right-of-center, which is
pessimistic about arms control and even about the continuation of
Gorbachev's reforms, and a left-of-center, which is more optimistic,
neither group is very hopeful that Japan will benefit substantially.

Few Japanese are idealistic about a new world setting in which
cooperation with the Soviet Union leads to continued constructive
resolution of international problems. There are at least three reasons
for this, in addition to the contradictory and still inconclusive
evidence from ongoing struggles within the Soviet leadership that the
entire world is watching. First, Japanese opinion tends to be less
volatile than American opinion. Many people adopt a wait-and-see
approach, largely retaining old beliefs until convincing evidence to
the contrary is forthcoming. Second, Japanese focus on national
color and on aspects of behavior which convince them that the
causes of Soviet misbehavior are deeply rooted. They have been
bombarded with unattractive stereotypes of the Soviet people -- many of
which appear to be the opposite of their opinions of Japanese national
color. Third, the "Northern Territories" dispute and what it
symbolizes about past Soviet conduct remains at the center of attention. Nothing else has been able to divert Japanese attention or to excite interest in how Japan might benefit from improved relations.

On domestic issues, publications reflecting views to the left-of-center and in the center have become about as visible as views to the right in Japan, helping to shift public opinion gradually. On international issues of special concern to Japan, the right-of-center is most visible, reflecting the sensitivity of the "Northern Territories" problem. Overall, the Japanese response remains cautious, skeptical, and patient. There is little speculation about a future different from the present and little inclination to take the initiative.

SOVIET ORTHODOXY: WILL IT YIELD?

The major determinant of the Soviet approach to Japan has been the orthodox strategy approved by the top leadership and implemented by: (1) the Japan desk of the International Department of the Central Committee under Ivan V. Kovalenko; (2) the Seventh Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate under officers such as Vladimir A. Pronnikov; and (3) the Academy of Sciences' several institutes with a cluster of Japan specialists, especially the Department of Japan in the Institute of Oriental Studies under Igor' A. Latyshev. Whereas some of the institutes also shelter strong reform orientations, the International Department long sought to extend its reach into scholarship and journalism to suppress these views.

The orthodox strategy is based on assumptions which have been increasingly discredited. In the first fifteen or more years following
WWII Soviets considered Japan to be politically unstable and ripe for subversion; to take advantage of this situation they "brainwashed" POWs prior to their return to Japan and encouraged left-wing activists in opposition to the existing order. Soviets now acknowledge that previous assumptions were inaccurate and that they had been slow to realize that LDP rule provides a high degree of political stability. In the 1960s and 1970s Soviets counted on using Japan's growing economic strength but low level of vigilance to gain access to vital goods, credits, and technology. A two-fold strategy evolved, on the one hand, courting businessmen and politicians and persuading Japanese opinion of Moscow's peaceful intentions, and, on the other hand, implanting a network of secret agents to steal high technology and obtain other normally unavailable information. As the Toshiba case of 1987 demonstrates, Moscow achieved some stunning success in obtaining technology, but also alienated Japanese authorities and made normal economic ties more difficult. In the second half of the 1980s Soviets feel the urgency of "integration" into the East Asian regional economy and regret the depth of Japanese skepticism about joint venture investments and other forms of cooperation.

The orthodox forces also assumed that, as part of an intensifying ideological struggle, every effort should be made to discredit Japan--its political order, its economy, its society, and its international relations. Along with subversion and espionage, propaganda formed the third leg on which orthodoxy stood. Increasingly it became clear, however, that disinformation was counterproductive; Japanese opinion became less and less susceptible, while losing respect for the
initiators of such crude distortions, and Soviet opinion distrusted the inevitably contradictory conclusions about Japan. Among the Soviet intelligentsia, rejection of crude Japanology apparently reached a high level.

Exposes by two Japan specialists, who each sought political asylum in 1979 while on assignment abroad, focused attention on the orthodox camp. Galina Orionova, an academic specialist, drew attention to the wide gulf that separates the "subtle and more academic approach" of scholars and the orthodox cliches which predominate in Pravda and mass publications on Japan. She describes a field divided: reform scholars object to the way most Soviet writings treat Japan, but their internal reports fail to exert an impact on authorities. Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB major working undercover as a journalist, revealed a huge intelligence operation in which half or more of the journalists and trade representatives are more concerned about their espionage activities than about their presumed jobs. According to Levchenko's 1988 book, none of the journalists believed what they wrote. Their aim was to deceive Soviet readers, who would lack other sources of information from which to question such deceptions.

The situation in academia has improved under Gorbachev although the orthodox viewpoint prevails on many sensitive topics. Within academic circles the balance shifted toward the forces of reform. Yet the lack of personnel turnover on the Japan desk in the International Department and the continued activity of the KGB as one of the largest employers of Japan specialists demonstrate that the orthodox group remains powerful in 1988.
To reestablish their credibility with the Japanese and even with their own populace, Soviets need to take decisive action against the existing orthodox intelligence orientation toward Japan. As long as Kovalenko remains the leading party authority and Latyshev the journalist who covers Japan most frequently and with the most visibility, the orthodox image is likely to remain in place. Until the reach of the International Department, the KGB, and the censorship mechanisms that allow few outlets for reform ideas on Japan is curtailed, Japanese will continue to suspect their Soviet counterparts and contacts -- maids, guides, secretaries, journalists, business representatives, and even academics. After more than four decades of abusing the trust of the Japanese, Soviets should make a symbolic break with the past if they hope to overcome the suspicions with which they are now met.

The deceptive strategy of claiming to speak in a new respectful tone without changing the cast of speakers or the basic substance of the message is not convincing. This is a continuation of a practice already seen in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. The orthodox group had some success in preempting the topics of interest to reformers: V. I. Ovchinnikov, who as political observer for Pravda is a harsh critic of Japan, wrote a highly popular book on the Japanese way of life; V. A. Pronnikov, the KGB official exposed by Levchenko, coauthored a 1983 book on the Japanese national character; I. A. Latyshev, after standing in the way of others who might have taken a sociological approach, issued a book in 1985 on the Japanese family; and V. M. Tsvetov returned in 1986 to Ovchinnikov's themes with
comparable success." In each case, there is much to fascinate the Soviet audience, but it is accompanied by one-sided and politicized coverage to disparage the existing order. In the Gorbachev era, many Soviets decry such half-truths. Recent claims by M. S. Kapitsa and others that Moscow now respects Japan are unpersuasive in the absence of a far-reaching rethinking of past mistakes." The preemptive approach does not satisfy the growing thirst for accurate information by a more worldly Soviet population nor does it impress the Japanese.

**SOVIET REFORM: IS IT GENUINE?**

The struggle against orthodoxy brings together diverse elements who differ in their commitment to honest scholarship, to borrowing from capitalism in order to improve the Soviet Union, and to a less militarized and antagonistic international environment. Many of the scholars who respect Japan's cultural heritage or admire its economic organization are, in my opinion, full-fledged reformers. The impulse for reform from within the scholarly community is genuine. At the level of sector and department heads, I think, it is also genuine but tinged with compromise. If L. P. Deliusin, the head of the Department of China at the Institute of Oriental Studies, is held up as a standard for reform, then I must conclude that I met no administrator in the Japanese field who is equally uncompromising. There are able and cosmopolitan scholars who are realistic about Japan and who are already exerting pressure on higher levels for "new thinking," but it is too early to decide how far they would carry this process.

At this point the scholarly community is largely on the side of extending glasnost' in Japanese studies. They have many unexamined
areas to explore, particularly in the history of Japan and of Soviet-Japanese relations, and many cliches to expunge. It is likely that new organization will be developed through the Academy of Sciences and under the leadership of E. M. Primakov, who in March was named academic secretary over almost all of the institutes in which the social sciences are applied to Japan and also head of the all-union organization for cooperation with PEEC and integration in the Asia-Pacific region. New organization promises to make Japanese and regional studies a more effective instrument for informing the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people.

Even if the existing orthodox forces were defeated, it is necessary to anticipate a new struggle between the genuine proponents of reform and those who accept a rationale for drawing the line. Some fear revisionist history that could undermine justifications for past Soviet conduct, such as the prolonged fighting in August 1945 and the extended detention of captured Japanese. Some fear "Japanomania" that could undermine the legitimacy of socialism. Others fear foreign policy reversals from compromises with the Japanese approach to the world, which Moscow is poorly prepared to emulate. Perhaps more than any other concern, Soviets worry about the future of Japan as an emerging superpower with little inclination to compromise with Moscow. A new critical approach to Japan of the future may reestablish a semi-orthodoxy in which reformers have a limited say.

Reform forces are on the rise and they still have much to accomplish. The academic community has been partially subdued, but some among it will seize any opportunity to extend honest scholarship
and give substance to "new thinking." They must await decisions from above. It depends on the central leadership whether reform in Japanese studies will be genuine.

JAPAN'S RIGHT-OF-CENTER: WHAT DOES IT WANT?

Until recently the factors unifying the Japanese people in their condemnation of the Soviet Union easily outweighed their differences of approach. While the right-wing was more alarmist about Soviet intentions and accusatory of alleged leftist bias in the Japanese media, the right-of-center shared its general concerns about dealings with the "evil empire." Although the left-of-center and left-wing were uneasy about the rhetoric of the right, they joined in the preoccupation with Soviet expansionism, Soviet domestic decline, and Soviet intransigence on the "Northern Territories." Soviet policy cut across party and factional lines, uniting the Japanese people.

By mid-1988 the position of the right-of-center had become more clearly differentiated from other views. The right-of-center was not as cynical as the right-wing about the genuine motivation for perestroika or about the utility of the INF agreement. It was less concerned about American gullibility and the possibility that the Japanese public would fail to remain steadfast. At the same time, the right-of-center was more pessimistic then the left-of-center about the prospects of perestroika and about the continued progress of arms negotiations. Unlike the center, it was not prepared to respond with encouragement to Soviet reforms and to follow the American lead in international negotiations. Japan's right-of-center was in the process
of establishing a distinctive worldview toward the Soviet Union, with long-term policy implications.

By focusing on four paramount concerns of official thinking in Japan, we can better appreciate the right-of-center outlook that is steering an emergent superpower onto the world stage. The first concern is to face the world with an unshakable national consensus guided by the national bureaucracy. Japanese find strength in unity under central coordination. They already have this in their approach to the Soviet Union, and the presence of the "Northern Territories" issue is cited in appeals for preserving a unified stance. Given the history of postwar Japanese politics and the long-term exclusion of the left from central power, it might not be a matter of grave concern if at some future date an active opposition on Soviet policy arose on the left. Yet, the continued inclusion of the right-wing, which supports the LDP and is well-represented in it and in the bureaucracy, is another matter. Close-knit personal networks and loyalties have left a solid nucleus in the Gaimusho and among those associated with it (ex foreign service officers, LDP politicians with a strong interest in Soviet policy, and academics who are in close contact). The right-of-center and the right wing are integrated into these networks; it would be difficult for the former to launch a policy unacceptable to the latter.

The obsession with national consensus under central direction has created the impression that Tokyo is unresponsive to change emanating from Moscow. There is a reluctance to air alternatives and to discuss long-term prospects. Criticisms are mounting that the Japanese
government is not doing enough to aid in the gathering of information and scholarship, as well as in encouraging debate. Scholars complain of bureaucratic arrogance and distrust, symbolized by weak state support for research centers and libraries. They accuse a small group centered at the Gaimusho of trying to monopolize the claim to expertise and to shape the national debate. The increasing activity over the past few years of the Soviet Studies Center at the Japanese Institute of International Affairs under the Foreign Ministry and the recent announcement of the establishment of Nakasone's Peace Institute without a direct government affiliation are not now seen as steps to widen the independent input of scholars in policy deliberations about the Soviet Union. While unity may strengthen Tokyo's hand in dealing with Moscow, it has exacted a price in weak scholarship and a lack of public debate about options for the future.

The second concern of those in charge in Japan is to establish a balance of interest that leaves no doubt about which country needs the other more. In their calculations there is no room for idealistic hopes for world peace and convergence between socialism and capitalism. They count on the United States checking the Soviet military on a global scale and providing a nuclear umbrella for Japan, while Japan bolsters its own capabilities to defend its own territory and contribute to security in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). As far as Tokyo is concerned, Soviet military might in the region is excessive, while its own forces should continue to be gradually augmented with the advantage of the latest technological achievements. Tokyo is not prepared to freeze in place the status quo; it calculates that time is
working against Moscow. Tokyo takes comfort in the fact that Japanese are relatively unconcerned about the danger of nuclear war and are not clamoring to strike a deal that would halt the Soviet buildup at the price of Japan's future security or influence.

Japan's right-of-center regards Moscow as a second-rate economic power with little standing in the APR. Moscow is the supplicant, seeking economic assistance and regional access. Tokyo wants little in return except the "Northern Territories" and recognition of its own superpower status and just claims as a victim. Japan's right-of-center is adamant that this set of calculations remain in effect. It is disturbed by efforts to point to other Japanese benefits -- strategic or economic -- from an improved relationship or to predict a resurgent Soviet Union which would not be as dependent on Tokyo and its allies. Instead Japanese leaders are striving to strengthen their position as a regional spokesman -- to reduce Moscow's opportunities to bypass it in dealings of regional significance with the United States, the NIEs or China.

Third on the agenda of Japan's most powerful group is their insistence that a comprehensive settlement be reached. The Soviet strategy of setting aside the territorial question while advancing other relations is not acceptable to the right-of-center. They want a full resolution of outstanding problems leading to a new type of relationship. This does not mean that we have evidence that the Gaimusho has thought out the terms of such a settlement. After all, as seen in item two, the Soviets are supposed to be the supplicant. Tokyo's demand for the four islands is on the table. Now it is up to
Moscow to respond and then to begin to shape a package for an overall settlement.

Tokyo appears to be following Beijing's strategy of making tough demands on Moscow and then awaiting concessions. In each instance the promised reward is "normalization," accompanied in the Chinese case by a restoration of party-to-party relations curtailed for more than two decades and in the Japanese case by conclusion of a peace treaty for a war that ended more than forty years ago. The parallels should not blind us to the obvious difference between a weak China of the early 1980s whose leaders needed a positive image of the history of Soviet socialism for their own legitimacy and a strong Japan of the late 1980s gloating in the contrasting fortunes of East Asian capitalism and Soviet socialism. Beijing was prepared to reach many agreements prior to Moscow's concessions on the three obstacles. Tokyo wants less from Moscow and faces stronger domestic pressures against compromise. Yet, Moscow can make some gains through the relative independence of capitalist enterprises and regional interests and expand some ties with Japan even in the absence of "normalization."

Tokyo's fourth concern in the new era of Soviet diplomacy is to maintain unity with Washington and also to act in harmony with its close regional trading partners. Japan and the United States may differ in their evaluations of Soviet intentions and in their principal objectives in seeking a rapprochement, but Tokyo seeks close coordination. It wants Washington not to act on its own, but as the representative of its allies. Washington is asked to recognize Tokyo's territorial demands and its regional interests.
Although the Japanese government supported the Soviet-American summit results and the INF agreement, there was some uneasiness among Japan's right-of-center and more within the right wing. Were the world's first two superpowers cutting a deal that left the third power out? Was this the beginning of a new detente with a repetition of the one-sided Soviet benefits which Japanese now associate with the 1970s? Was Japan's pressure on Moscow for the return of the islands undermined by Moscow's improved world standing? Had the American people become infected by "Gorbachev fever" or had President Reagan acted out of desperation at a time of political weakness, permitting public relations to substitute for sober diplomacy? While sharing some of the misgivings raised by the right-wing, Japanese on the right-of-center were satisfied that no serious error had yet been committed. Their attention shifted to averting a future error.

THE SUMMER OF 1988: THE RIVALRY INTENSIFIES

The Moscow summit between Gorbachev and Reagan, the Toronto summit of western leaders, the Nineteenth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party, and the July meeting between Gorbachev and Nakasone all focused Japanese attention on the Soviet Union. In turn, Moscow reacted to subsequent publicity in the United States about the U.S. raising Japan's territorial question at the Moscow summit and to references to itself at the Toronto summit. As the summer began, commentaries about the tense state of Japanese-Soviet relations were becoming more poignant. The world was awakening to a rivalry that had previously seemed of minor importance. The fact that the voices of Soviet orthodoxy and the Japanese right-of-center were heard loudest added to
the tension in the exchanges through the middle of July.

At a luncheon on June 29 with Togo Kazuhiko, about to become the head of the Soviet desk at the Gaimusho, and in meetings with other Japanese Soviet experts I tried to piece together the new Japanese position. The first point that impressed me was the clear intent of Japan's right-of-center to seize the initiative and to forestall illusions about what is happening in the Soviet Union. Aware of some change in the mood of the Japanese public, the authorities were trying to fix the terms of debate and to convince the public that there is no reason to change Japan's basic policy.

The second point to emerge from the Japanese reassessment in the second quarter of 1988 is that Tokyo will emphasize two standards for evaluating change in Moscow: (1) actions in the APR rather than the actions that draw world attention such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the INF; and (2) policies that demonstrate a genuine shift in the fundamental aims of Soviet policy. The "Northern Territories" and the Soviet military buildup in the Far East are central concerns as seen by these standards.

The third point is Tokyo's sense of appreciation that Washington recognizes its concerns. More than that, Japanese in authority consider the Toronto summit a model for coordination in dealings with Moscow. In other words, Japan wants to exert a brake on Soviet-American relations and to work jointly with Washington to achieve joint objectives. At the end of June when the Japanese press emphasized the divisions and lack of a clear mandate for reform at the 19th Conference, Japan's leaders had no reason to fear that their national
Moscow vehemently responded to the airing of Japan's critical positions in a multilateral setting. Latyshev's July 12 article in Pravda most clearly laid bare the current thinking of the orthodox forces in Moscow on Soviet-Japanese relations. He made seven assertions that reflect Moscow's response to the Toronto summit. (1) Japan advocates a spirit of confrontation, refusing to recognize the new international reality or to alter its "cold" and "tough" approach to Moscow. (2) Japan takes the most extreme position among the seven leading capitalist countries and is striving to warn the others against building relations of trust with Moscow. (3) Prime Minister Takeshita insists that perestroika is not affecting Soviet policies in the APR or Soviet expansionism, indicating that he has no desire to cooperate in creating a healthy international climate in the region. (4) Driven by a desire to reexamine the results of WWII, the Gaimusho is steering Japan on a new political course. (5) Japanese conservative circles erroneously perceive perestroika as a response to external pressure and consider the intensification of such pressure to be the best method to advance their aims. (6) Japan is under the dangerous illusion that greater diplomatic pressure will induce Moscow to reexamine its position on the "Northern Territories." (7) The only outcome from Tokyo's actions will be the preservation of tension in the region and of stagnation in bilateral relations. When Kovalenko visited Japan in mid-July, he reasserted the view that the territorial issue was closed. Raising it made Tokyo guilty of the excesses identified by Latyshev.
As long as the Soviet orthodox group and the Japanese right-of-center are exchanging harsh critiques, there seems to be no prospect of improved relations. Whereas there were times over the past three years when the countries were looking forward to new developments, especially a trip by Gorbachev to Japan, in the early summer of 1988 neither was expressing optimism. That situation changed suddenly in late July.

The message personally conveyed to Gorbachev on July 22 by former Prime Minister Nakasone reflects both Nakasone's personal ambition and the image which the Japanese government seeks to project. It combines praise for the INF agreement and the start of the withdrawal from Afghanistan with encouragement for Moscow to act to resolve the "only barrier" to normalization, the "Northern Territories" problem. Nakasone indicated that relations across a wide sphere would be advanced by a solution concerning the islands and he urged Gorbachev to go to Japan at an early date. As Japanese commentaries observed, from the time he was in office Nakasone has had a strong desire for a breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet relations and his July visit to Moscow indicates that efforts continue to build the momentum for a breakthrough.

The exchange between Nakasone and Gorbachev revealed two different ways of thinking about the historical background of the territorial question. On the one hand, Nakasone had criticized Stalin, implying that in the midst of their own reassessment of Stalin's legacy Soviets could include the war-ending policies toward Japan. The hope in Japan was that Nakasone would directly communicate to the Soviet people and help them to understand Japan's perspective and its goodwill for
improved relations. On the other hand, Gorbachev reminded Nakasone of the Soviet loss of twenty million people in the war, implying that Japanese should look on the territorial decisions at the end of the war in the light of the overall responsibility for its outbreak and the damage inflicted. Furthermore, Gorbachev asserted that great confusion would result in Europe from reopening border questions that have already been settled. Finally Gorbachev mentioned the Soviet goodwill offer of two islands in 1956, which Japan refused to accept, and added that with the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, conditions anticipated in 1986 were no longer in existence. While this was a defense of the Soviet position, Gorbachev omitted the usual claim that the problem was already resolved and he may have opened the door somewhat for the return of two islands as part of a new security arrangement for the region which would give Moscow reason to conclude that the conditions of 1960 no longer prevail.

Gorbachev's avoidance of the language aimed at closing the door to Tokyo's demands and Nakasone's obvious eagerness for a breakthrough were the most hopeful signs in a period of confrontational accusations. Whereas in 1986 Japanese hopes had somewhat risen that Soviet reform forces would take a conciliatory position and follow up hints that Moscow would be flexible on the territorial question, in 1987 and the first half of 1988 these hopes were dashed. Some Soviets who were aware of the continued refusal in top leadership circles to return four islands had also become increasingly concerned as Japanese expectations from 1986 grew excessive.

The orthodox forces in Moscow were reluctant to allow the Soviet
desire for Japanese assistance and inclination to flexibility in bilateral relations to appear in the open. There was even controversy over why Nakasone was visiting Moscow. While in Japan shortly before Nakasone’s trip, Kovalenko stressed that it was Nakasone’s strong wish to go to Moscow, some Japanese noted that Ambassador Solovyev had played an active role.⁴ When I was at Primakov’s Institute of World Economies and International Relations in March, some Japan specialists had discussed the possibility of a Nakasone visit with me. They were aware that Nakasone was interested and wondered whether Moscow should encourage it as a step towards better relations. No doubt Soviet reformers did encourage it. They continue to strive, despite clashes with Kovalenko’s orthodox group, to set relations on an improving course.

Although not a few headlines in Japan focused on the negative, e.g. "Gorbachev spurns Nakasone on matter of northern islands,"² some Japanese were of the impression that the late July visit by Nakasone represented an important development in Soviet-Japanese relations. Gorbachev had now become directly involved in the discussion of the "Northern Territories" question, and he had done so by distancing himself from the former Soviet line that the issue had already been settled. Asahi Shimbun explained that Soviet attitudes were beginning to change -- the gate was no longer closed.³ The fact that Nakasone was able to speak directly to the Soviet people on television without words about the territorial problem being cut was further indication of a change.

The meaning of the Gorbachev-Nakasone meeting was quickly enhanced
by Japanese efforts to place it in a wider context. Asashi Shimbun noted that Soviet criticisms of Japan's remilitarization were softening and that coverage of Japan's economy and foreign relations had become more objective. It mentioned that recently Soviet Prime Minister D. Ryzhkov had held a long conversation with the heads of Japanese firms in which he expressed high expectations for economic cooperation. What stood out most was the new impression that Gorbachev was taking Japan seriously. Contacts between the two countries through various pipelines were becoming livelier. Two years after his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev revealed in his long and straightforward session with Nakasone his serious intent. Asashi found a logic in the timing. In May the Moscow summit with Reagan had highlighted Europe-centered diplomacy. At the end of June the Nineteenth Party Conference had concentrated on perestroika at home. Now in July after successfully devoting earlier Asia-centered efforts toward extracting the Soviet military from Afghanistan and improving relations with China, Gorbachev was turning to Japan. The Soviets were not only softening toward Japan, they were giving it a high priority.

Hopes for future Soviet flexibility were raised by the July meeting. Gorbachev was preparing new initiatives. The Shevardnadze visit, promised to occur before the end of the year, could be anticipated in a new, positive light. The Yomiuri Shimbun commented on the news that Nakasone would be returning to Moscow in the fall together with Giscard and Kissinger as an indication that more than the expected fruits had been harvested from the July visit.

Appearing on Japanese television on August 2, Nakasone was upbeat
about the results of his visit. He found Gorbachev's turning attention back to the earlier Soviet offer to return two islands a hint that Moscow was changing its position on the territorial problem. Nakasone's call in Moscow for restructuring East-West relations clearly associated Japan with Gorbachev's goal for a new world order. Tokyo's past suspicion of "new thinking" had seemed to preclude any Japanese input into the restructuring process, but now the prospect of securing the active cooperation of the world's third superpower suddenly seemed real. Yomiuri also saw in Nakasone's reference in Moscow to linking a solution to the territorial question to progress on economic exchange a shift from the Gaimusho position -- perhaps a sign that Tokyo would seriously discuss assistance to the Soviet economy in return for an agreement on territory.

PERCEPTIONS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

Public relations are acquiring new significance in the era of glasnost'. Japanese now are able to sponsor polls of Soviet opinion, as the Yomiuri poll which appeared in May. Japanese leaders and ex-leaders can hope to deliver their message on Soviet television or in newspapers. Gorbachev, in turn, found a strong public response to his book, which sold more than 100,000 copies in Japan during the first half of 1988. There is no doubt that Soviet Japanologists are considering ways to improve their country's image in Japan.

Each side can take hope from two widespread sentiments in the other country. In the Soviet Union the most widespread opinion appears to be: we want to find out more about Japan, which is a country with
remarkable success in producing electronic goods and other internationally desired products. The Soviet people feel that they know too little about Japan and are thirsting for information. The second response in the Soviet Union is to blame the orthodox authorities for continuing to resist a realistic policy toward Japan. This attitude can be found among Japanologists and many other groups in the intelligentsia. Given these circumstances, Tokyo should be able to shift the onus of poor relations more fully onto the Soviet orthodox forces. Tokyo should not dismiss the Soviet Union as unworthy of its attention if its goal is to reach agreement on the future of the "Northern Territories" and to influence Soviet policy in the long-run.

The Soviets can take advantage of the widespread feeling among Japanese that their country should not become a military power nor a force pressuring Washington for vigilance on military matters. The shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane by the United States navy and a few weeks later the collision of a Japanese excursion boat with a submarine from the Japanese navy helped to make July a month for cautious concern about the costs of military vigilance. If Moscow is sincere about switching from a world environment of military buildup and confrontation to one of economic cooperation and integration, it should find the overall outlook of the Japanese people among the most favorable in the world. Second, Moscow can find comfort in the fact that many Japanese, especially intellectuals, are not satisfied with the direction of Soviet policy and analysis in their country. They are worried about the right wing and would like to defuse the Soviet issue, which has provided the right with much mileage over the past decade.
Orthodox Soviets and right-wing Japanese do not attach any importance to appealing to citizens of the other country. The Soviet reform camp is the one group with sufficient influence and access to the other country to make plans to overcome the current troubled relations. Its hands have been tied, however, because it was not able to publish freely on such subjects as the history of mistakes in Soviet-Japanese relations or how the Soviet Union can learn from Japan. Working under many restrictions, Soviet reformers -- including those at the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of World Economies and International Relations -- constitute the most active force for changing relations between the two countries.

The major method available to specialists in two countries where policy making is highly centralized with little initiative from below is to shape perceptions. A small group of Japanese scholars has become more prolific in the Gorbachev era. Although the majority seem disturbed about inadequate knowledge about the Soviet Union in Japan, they have failed to make a strong case for an alternative approach to Soviet socialism. This outcome stems from their own uncertainty about the prospects for Soviet reforms as well as from the apparent absence of a realistic solution to the territorial question acceptable to both nations. Japan's left-of-center and left wing cannot be galvanized behind a forceful message until Soviet reformers give them grounds for becoming hopeful that it could work.

Moscow's specialists on Japan are being pressed by Soviet authorities to find a way to reach Japanese public opinion. Aware of the futility of previous reliance on Japan's left wing, experts on
Japanese politics are striving to understand the center of the political spectrum, including the right-of-center. They are not interested in forging a narrow partnership with a small group without access to power, but want to make inroads into the political establishment. Their best hope appears to be the national daily newspapers, influential general interest journals, and television.

Public relations through visits to Japan by Soviet dignitaries, interviews in the Soviet Union, and media events are a concern in Moscow. Translations of Gorbachev's book and other books by Soviet reformers and Nakasone's visit to Moscow were calculated steps in the Soviet public relations offensive.

Many Soviet Japanologists realize that there is not much reason for optimism about communications until they have a better product to advertise. They need more convincing proof of the success of reform at home and a strategy to placate Japanese hostility over the "Northern Territories" question.

Furthermore, Soviets working on behalf of improved relations need momentum from Washington-Moscow talks and arms agreements. Major gains have come in the final months of 1987 from the INF agreement and perhaps in the spring of 1988 from the Afghan pullout and the prospect of continued progress in talks with Washington. Through the first half of 1988 the most powerful force behind the gradually increased Soviet appeal to Japan is the success of U.S.-Soviet relations. When the momentum of this progress subsides, as it has in the summer of 1988, inertia quickly overtakes Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. In the absence of momentum from new developments, Japanese easily fall
back into a rut of expecting little change in the state of distrust and hopelessness to which they have been accustomed.

Some Soviet reformers realize that their first priority should not be finding a way to persuade the Japanese public, but changing Soviet reality to improve the substance of the message which they are delivering. They need both a national image of successful reform and international moderation and a Japan-centered image of realism and respect on the part of Moscow. It is not unlikely that reform Japanologists are hoping that Gorbachev can consolidate his power, Dobrynin can rally the leadership to oust Kovalenko, Yakovlev can prevail over the media to oust Latyshev, and Japan studies can be revamped in a reform direction. This would be the beginning of a serious strategy to appeal to the Japanese.

PROSPECTS FOR A BREAKTHROUGH

The struggle in Moscow over foreign policy appears to have intensified during the summer of 1988. After the mid-June news conference which called for extending glasnost' to a review of Soviet diplomatic history, and the Nineteenth Party Conference, Shevardnadze led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in redefining the goals of Soviet foreign policy. This was followed in early August by a sharp retort from Ligachev in a speech delivered in Gorkii, which received wide coverage in Pravda. The clash in views between reform-oriented specialists on Japan and Kovalenko and Latyshev seemed to echo this conflict at the top. Was the primary goal an "integrated" world, in which the joint effort to overcome serious threats to the survival of mankind took precedence, or was it class struggle, in opposition to
imperialism?

IMEMO occupies center stage in the reform thrust toward Japan. The July 22 Yomiuri Shimbum showed Nakasone with E. M. Primakov, the institute's director. It was at IMEMO that Nakasone gave his major speech. In March Kunadze at this institute had questioned me about the desirability of a Nakasone visit. In late May he came to Japan along with Primakov for the PEEC meetings and to set in motion efforts to improve relations, and then in late July he returned for a symposium at which he broached the subject of joint use of the islands in the "Northern Territories."

Simultaneous with Nakasone's visit and Kunadze's symposium comments, occurred an interview in Tokyo Shimbum with Kirichenko of IMEMO on Japanese views of the Soviet Union. In it the first Soviet specialist on this announced his intention to write a book that could play a big role in increasing trust between the two countries and called for a joint symposium on the problem of Japanese prisoners of war held in Siberia after WWII. Kirichenko suggested that even more than the "Northern Territory" dispute and the perceived Soviet military threat Japanese views have been affected by this issue. Instead of ignoring it, as Soviet specialists have done in the past, he urges that Soviet views be communicated to the Japanese public. Briefly Kirichenko begins this process by making four points: 1) in the 1904-1905 war the Japanese held 70,000 Russian prisoners; 2) the Japanese suffered the same fate as the Soviet people -- all the Soviet people were hungry in those first postwar years, of course a Soviet camp was not an Hawaiian hotel, and under Stalin many Soviets also suffered from
forced labor; 3) the Japanese were spared the harshest treatment—German prisoners were treated worse; and 4) the Japanese government contributed to their suffering—in 1905 ships were slow to arrive at the port of Nakhodka, delaying by months their return home. By transmitting these and other Soviet views, Kirichenko of IMEMO implied that Japanese would become less anti-Soviet. In other words, the problem was less substance than a subjective image. This point is reinforced with reference to a parallel to early nineteenth-century Dutch efforts to arouse the Japanese to a threat from Russia which did not exist.

Amidst the flurry of IMEMO activity, the journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' in its issue appearing on July 21, reported on a symposium in Moscow bringing together specialists from leading institutes, including IMEMO, to discuss the Soviet approach to the Asia-Pacific region. According to Japanese coverage of the article, the symposium stressed the need for a different approach from that taken toward Europe, agreed with Takeshita at the Toronto summit that Moscow had not done enough to bring about an improvement in relations with Japan, and emphasized that plans were needed for short-, middle-, and long-term relations with Japan.41

The burst of Soviet activity points to a new strategy for reaching Japanese public opinion, discussing sensitive historical questions, and using Nakasone as the statesman who could lead Japan to a breakthrough in relations. When the news of Nakasone's plan for a return visit to Moscow in the fall was reported in Japan, the historian Wada Haruki suggested that there was a hidden meaning.42 Yet, Kunadze made clear
that the Soviets also expected Japanese concessions. Criticizing the Japanese government, he said both sides would need to take a creative approach.

The Gaimusho seemed to be skeptical that the Soviets were intending more than a public relations campaign. Although the head of the Soviet desk accompanied Nakasone, the public response following the trip was that the Soviet position had not changed. Mainichi Shimbun reported on July 22 about a mission to some of Japan’s allies to seek revisions in world maps that would clearly show the four disputed islands as Japanese territory. Speculation was mounting about possible talks regarding the Soviet Union expected in late August when Takeshita would meet in Beijing with China’s leaders. Would Takeshita also seek Chinese understanding for Japan’s viewpoint or would China increasingly adopt Soviet reasoning about the future of the Asia-Pacific region? Nakasone’s speech in Moscow had staked out not only Japan’s superpower claim to have a way of thinking fit for our era, but also the notion that the East Asian region was resurgent drawing on Confucian and Buddhist thought and differing from individualism and rationalism which had been the spirit of an earlier age led by the West. Would Chinese leaders side with this plea for Eastern thought or would they defend socialist reform in accord with Gorbachev? Tokyo and Moscow are increasingly competing for Beijing’s support in the resolution of regional problems. Following the Seoul Olympics, the Korean issue may galvanize interest in the wider regional setting.

On the basis of the new developments in the summer of 1988, we can expect a livelier Soviet-Japanese and regional interaction.
Quadrilateral diplomacy, with the Toronto and Beijing summits highlighting the role of the two other regional powers, is also likely to become active.

Public relations will play a prominent role. If Kirichenko's defensive arguments are an indication, the Soviets may fail to impress the Japanese with the extent of their "new thinking." More sympathy with the Japanese viewpoint may be expressed by other Soviet specialists, if given the opportunity...

The battle between the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze reform view of the world and the Ligachev orthodox view, which had centered on domestic issues when it surfaced in March, burst into the open again at the beginning of August. The central question now was to decide which is primary: peaceful coexistence to solve serious worldwide problems or class struggle against capitalism to continue the revolutionary tradition. The same struggle could be discerned in the field of Japanese studies and journalism. While Pravda's coverage of Japan remained fixed on the struggle against negative forces, Izvestiia brought its more reform orientation to Japan clearly into the open in a series of three articles from July 21 to July 26. A group of three journalists described the picture they were drawing of Japanese as having "nothing in common with our impression of capitalism." They portray a society in which domestic goods are superior to those exported and in which capitalists are "virtuous patriots" who understand that for their own well-being they must share the blessings. They ask, "What do we know of Japan," and they imply that it is very little. They refer to Japan as a very rich country and to the
"Japanese phenomenon." Noting that one could hardly add to so much that has already been written about the "pockmarks of capitalism," they assert that there is no reason to complain about being shown the best of Japan. Their aim is to understand where the islands of Japan have been sailing. In other words, Soviets have failed to pay attention at their own peril to a society which was sailing into the future because it is better organized. The thrust of the argument is that Japanese work hard because they sell their labor on favorable terms for yen which they are eager to receive because there is much that they can buy with it. From this presentation, capitalism appears to work very well and to be based on reasonable principles.

**SCENARIOS FOR NEGOTIATIONS**

The Soviet campaign of late July followed by the Nakasone return visit in October and the Shevardnadze visit to Tokyo at the end of the year are aimed at starting negotiations on the four islands and other issues. It is not unlikely that Gorbachev will seek to visit Japan at the outset of negotiations. His visit would be a major part of the public relations program directed at persuading the Japanese public. Moscow wants to reach the public, especially through the mass media, with a new message. It would seem likely that Japan's right-of-center and right wing will feel threatened or at least uncertain about the depth of Soviet concessions and will respond with a campaign of their own directed at the Japanese people. In addition, they may follow Nakasone's television broadcast in July with a public relations effort aimed at the Soviet people. Competition for the minds of the people will play a much greater role in Soviet-Japanese negotiations than in
Sino-Soviet negotiations.

Speculation on the negotiations themselves should identify at least four possible outcomes.

(1) A rapid, positive solution. Moscow may offer the return of two islands and the conditional use of the other two without sacrificing navigational and fishing rights that matter most. Tokyo may press for a shortened timetable of joint use, with a complete reversion of the remaining two islands to it at some future date. These differences could be bridged through negotiations.

(2) A substantial Soviet initiative unacceptable to Japan. Moscow may place conditions on the return of two islands and offer only limited joint use of the other two with no prospect for Japanese sovereignty. Tokyo may remain adamant for the return of four islands. Moscow would then seek to rally support, internationally and among the Japanese public.

(3) A vague Soviet initiative and a drawn-out process of negotiations. Moscow may make a vague offer with the possibility of some return of territory and Tokyo may explore it through regular consultations, as in the Sino-Soviet negotiations over the past six years.

(4) A Soviet impasse rendering Moscow unable to make a new offer to Japan. Moscow may remain divided on how to approach the "Northern Territories" question and seek to isolate Japan while improving relations with other countries. Tokyo may become more active in generating support for its position in opposition to Moscow.

If Gorbachev is not defeated by Ligachev and can continue the
momentum that produced the July campaign, the fourth scenario seems unlikely. There is no reason to raise hopes if Moscow cannot deliver. The third scenario is not much more likely because Japanese public opinion could easily lose patience. A skeptical Japan needs a serious offer soon if it is to overcome longstanding pessimism. The first and second scenarios seem most likely. Tokyo's seriousness about making counteroffers, Nakasone's personal stake in arriving at a mutually acceptable outcome, and the sophistication of the Soviet appeal to the Japanese public all will help determine the results. Certainly Gorbachev's personal power and commitment to improving relations with Japan will be among the decisive factors. American and Chinese encouragement or hesitation may also influence the outcome.

If the "Northern Territories" problem is not resolved, it is likely to become a principal barrier to Soviet integration into the world community. The Japanese-Soviet conflict will become a central concern in international affairs. Even if the territorial problem is resolved, Japan and the Soviet Union are likely to be rivals for international influence. Japanese views of the Soviet Union as a second-rate economic power and the Soviet habit of seeing their country as one of the two superpowers provide a starting point for many differences of perception. The intense mutual criticisms of past years are likely to take new forms, but they are only the starting point for a clash of views that will arouse much world attention for the foreseeable future.
NOTES


2. This is my impression from interviews with Soviet Japanologists and is reinforced by articles in the spring and early summer of 1988 in journals such as MEiMO and Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' and finally by the Soviet campaign to change Japanese thinking visible in the second half of July and discussed in this paper.


15. Ibid; "BeiSo shono kaidan 60% ga hyoka," Yomiuri Shimbun, June 26, 1988, p. 2; and "Boeiihi zō, 77% ga hiteiteki," p. 1.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.


35. "Nakasone san hōSo no shukaku," p. 3.
36. "NiSo ryōkokumin no koe o kitte: Sorenjin no Nihonjinkan to Nihonjin no Sorenjinkan," p. 3.


42. "Soren shokicho no 'nitō' genkyū."

43. "Kyōdō kanri o teian."


47. Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Deputy Criticizes Policy," p. 11.
