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TITLE: JAPAN'S SOVIET-WATCHERS IN THE
FIRST YEARS OF THE GORBACHEV ERA:
THE SEARCH FOR A WORLDVIEW FOR
THE JAPANESE SUPERPOWER

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NOTE

This paper supplements the National Council's recent Final Report entitled "Soviet and Japanese Mutual Perceptions," by Professor Gilbert Rozman. It contains a survey of Japanese opinions of the Soviet Union, the various schools of thought shaping those opinions, some of the authors in those schools, and the likely future.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"Japan's Soviet-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Search for a Worldview for the Japanese Superpower"

An image is spreading of Japan as the last line of resistance against Gorbachev's reform appeals and personal diplomacy. While Japanese have been slow to join the Gorbachev "bandwagon," a national debate opened in 1987-88. At stake are not only Soviet-Japanese relations, but also Japan's self-image as a world power.

The image of the Soviet enemy has played an important part in Japanese political life contributing to consensus and low visibility diplomacy. The prospect of a flexible Soviet leadership, a changing relationship between Washington and Moscow, and Japan's rise as an economic superpower all now encourage Tokyo to assume a new leadership role. Japanese are divided in their response to the new conditions. Cautious approval of the summits is the reaction of about half of those polled, while a fifth enthusiastically approve and another fifth are negative. Those who are negative on the right wing and the right-of-center retain much influence, in part because of the "Northern Territories" dispute.

Five schools of thought predominate. The Totalitarian-Expansionist school is notable among former and current Ministry of Foreign Affairs Soviet experts. It is losing popularity, but remains influential. The Economic Power Politics approach finds insufficient evidence of a fundamental shift in the Soviet Union. It looks down on Moscow and opposes bailing it out of its crisis, at least until Moscow relinquishes the islands. Western-Style Reform Optimism is evident in the major newspapers. Its proponents worry about Japan becoming
isolated and seek to influence the outcome in Moscow. The Cultural Heritage approach appreciates the intellectual community in the USSR and its traditions and resists the monolithic negative images long popular in Japan. Finally, the Inherent Appeal of Socialism school draws on the postwar fascination with socialism on the part of Japanese intellectuals. It sees the possibility of Soviet revival, turning back to the ideals of the 1920s or Marxist ideology.

The first two of these schools are most consistent with the Sovietophobia long popular in Japan. Public opinion polls show many more Japanese negative about the Soviet Union than Soviets critical of Japan. Yet, over the past year opinions have been gradually improving. There is much self-criticism of the quality of knowledge of the Soviet Union and many calls for improved scholarship. If Moscow makes concessions on the four islands, the Japanese debate will intensify. If not, negative views will leave a strong impact on the worldview of a new superpower.
Japan's Soviet-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Search for a Worldview for the Japanese Superpower

Gilbert Rozman

More than the citizens of any other major power, the Japanese people ignore, dismiss, and even (among a vocal minority) disdain the Soviet Union. While Mikhail Gorbachev's vigorous reform appeals and personal diplomacy are exerting a powerful impact around the world and the dramatic rapprochement between Moscow and Washington (and, more gradually and with less fanfare, between Moscow and Beijing) is quickly altering the climate of international relations, Japan remains relatively aloof from this process. Tokyo, it seems, will not shift directions toward the Soviet Union—at least not more than appearances as a close ally of the United States require—until the Kremlin acts on its demand for the return of four disputed islands known as the "Northern Territories." At stake is also Japan's self-image as a world power.

The Soviet affairs desk of Japan's Foreign Ministry (the Gaimusho) deems it essential that the national will remain firm, and, obligingly, the Japanese people, with remarkably little dissension, have retained a decidedly negative image of the Soviet Union and its people. When the Reagan administration raised the issue of the "Northern Territories" at the Moscow summit and the Takeshita administration sought allied support on this issue at the Toronto seven-nation summit, it became clear that Tokyo's "blessing" for the new cordiality with Moscow was in return for allied understanding of its resolute stand. An image has quickly developed of Japan as the last line of vigorous opposition to the Soviet Union. This image has ramifications not only for Soviet-Japanese relations, but also for international relations more generally.
and for the emergence of a more independent Japanese approach to the world order in the years ahead.

While Japanese have, on the whole, been slow to join the Gorbachev "bandwagon," a national debate opened in 1987-1988 over the prospects for Soviet reforms and the appropriate Japanese response to Soviet diplomatic initiatives and "new thinking" on international relations. Suddenly Japanese views about the Soviet Union and about Soviet-American relations are becoming less monolithic. The emerging clash of opinions about Soviet socialism offers the first serious challenge to a consensus on the Japanese worldview which was firmly forged in the aftermath of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and reenforced first in 1972 with the restoration of relations with China and then in the late 1970s through the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. The Gorbachev challenge to Japan has not led to major policy revisions or to dramatic changes in thinking, but it has shifted the terms of debate and heightened awareness of Japan's independent interests. By examining the recent debate in Japanese publications, we may be able to identify new directions of thought and to anticipate their impact on public opinion and state policy.

The Soviet Issue in Japanese Politics

Japan's negative outlook on the Soviet Union has long played an important role in Japanese political life. It served the interest of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) in discrediting its principal opposition--the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)--and wrecking the JSP's coalition prospects with the Japan Communist Party (JCP). It rallied the nation around the goal of recovering territory lost in 1945, thus (along with memories of the American atomic bombings) refocusing recollections of WWII away from guilt about Japan's misdeeds and toward the mixed image of Japan as both aggressor and victim. This has spared the Japanese right from much of the "guilt by association"
which initially burdened it in the postwar era. Fervent acceptance of the image of the Soviet enemy also reassured Washington and other allies, diverting pressure to reduce Japan's market penetration and trade surplus and gaining support (and, among some LDP circles, much welcomed pressure) for Japan's gradual military build-up.

Riding the crest of the international repudiation since the late 1970s of Moscow's vast military expenditures, brazen foreign intervention, rigid and inefficient economic model, and human rights violations, Tokyo has scarcely had to consider what might constitute its independent outlook on world affairs. A polarized international climate in which military concerns prevailed largely relieved it of the need to specify its national interests apart from those of the United States and to translate its growing economic power into a corresponding status in international politics. Now the relaxation of Soviet-American tensions appears to be bringing to an end the era of easy and low visibility diplomacy based on "Cold War" psychology. Already at the Toronto summit in June, in the wake of the publicity given to Soviet-American summit diplomacy, the Takeshita leadership was asserting itself to highlight Japan's claim to a share of the superpower spotlight.

Although much has been written in the second half of the 1980s about the arrival of a new era in which Tokyo must assume a leading international role, until recently rethinking focused largely on the Third World and rarely on the Soviet Union. The search for a broader reconceptualization stumbled against the rocky shores of the islands which Japanese doubt Moscow is prepared to return in the foreseeable future. As a result, Japanese discounted the prospect of any substantial improvement in relations with Moscow or of reduced need for American military protection. With this reasoning, they could avoid pondering not only future Japanese-Soviet relations, but also great power relations in general. This complacency is now beginning to be challenged,
among some Japanese, by three impressions: 1) the image of a changing Soviet Union with which Tokyo should deal; 2) the image of a changing relationship between Washington and Moscow, which establishes a new context for Tokyo's relations with both superpowers; and 3) the image of Japan as an economic superpower, which increasingly deserves world recognition and respect as an equal with the other two superpowers.

Early rumblings of the need for a debate about Tokyo's approach to negotiations with Moscow could already be discerned in journal articles of late 1986 and early 1987. These were followed by clashing opinions among Japan's Soviet specialists at round table discussions on the meaning of perestroika. A genuine change of mood could, to some extent, be detected at the time of the Washington summit and INF agreement in December 1987 and during the Moscow summit in May 1988. The Japanese debate about the Soviet Union will continue to gather momentum, to the degree that Soviet reform and Soviet-American relations show progress. After a slow start, the Gorbachev challenge has begun to leave an imprint on Japanese views of the future.

The Yomiuri shimbun surveys of responses to the Washington and Moscow summits show a mostly positive evolution, but also a roughly equal split between those who are strongly in favor and those who are largely or wholly against. After each summit 46 percent of Japanese respondents stated that they somewhat valued the meeting (tasho wa hyoka), and 21 to 26 percent (the larger figure followed the December meeting) highly valued it (oi ni hyoka). Only 3 percent said they were completely negative, (mattaku hyoka shinai) while 16-17 percent answered that they did not make much of it (amari hyoka shinai). A steady 56 to 57 percent expressed optimism that talks toward the complete abolition of nuclear weapons would advance, as opposed to 34 to 35 percent who did not think so. These results indicate cautious approval for the summits and some optimism that arms talks will advance among about half of the Japanese
people. More enthusiastic approval is shown by a fifth to a quarter of the people (presumably among those who are optimistic about arms control) as opposed to negative reactions from another fifth of the people, of whom a tiny minority of about 3 percent remains completely negative. An additional one-tenth prefer not to answer.

Despite recurrent accusations by the Soviet orthodox group that the forces of extreme nationalism or militarism are ascendant in Tokyo, the center in Japanese politics continues to predominate. Unlike the Soviet Union where orthodox and reform have coexisted in a polarized environment with a weak center, Japan has enjoyed a high level of national consensus. Nevertheless, because the consensus was harshly critical of Moscow, the right-wing was able to seize the opportunity to play a prominent role. For the past decade a vocal right and a supportive center have joined forces, with little resistance from an acquiescent left.

The center, influenced by developments in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-American relations, has now begun to split into two groups. There are also signs of a reappearance of the left, which for nearly a decade had been almost dormant in discussions of the Soviet Union, apart from echoing the national consensus on the territorial issue. At the same time, those on the right who are alarmed by signs of a breakdown in the national consensus are urgently warning against "gullible" reactions and insisting that the "Northern Territories" remain the litmus test of a genuine change of course in Moscow. All sides are influenced too by domestic concerns about how an "internationalized" Japan should change.

To analyze the divisions in Japanese thought, I use the labels: 1) the right-wing; 2) the right-of-center; 3) the left-of-center; and 4) the left-wing. The one-fifth of Yomiuri respondents who are enthusiastic about the summits are likely to come from the left-wing and the left-of-center, the
one-half who are more or less favorable include most who are left-of-center and most right-of-center, the one-fifth who are largely negative include many right-of-center and part of the right-wing, and the three percent completely negative from the core of the right-wing. It should be understood that differences at the center of the political spectrum often vary from issue to issue, and these labels ought not to be extrapolated to unrelated issues. The challenge to the status quo comes both from Japan's right-wing, which is reluctant to follow Washington's lead toward the Soviet Union, and from the left-of-center and the left-wing, which seek to convert a new outlook on Moscow into a revised agenda for domestic and international politics. Even the right-of-center, which has the greatest influence, sees an opportunity for a more assertive posture by Japan.

Five Schools of Thought

Long dominant in Japanese thinking about the Soviet Union is the Totalitarian-Expansionist school. It includes right-wing alarmists, who have warned of a Soviet invasion against Japan or have referred to Gorbachev's proposals as "lies" intended to deceive the capitalist countries. This school also includes many who drew harsh conclusions from the Brezhnev era and lately, as circumstances have changed, have slowly reexamined them without yet changing their basic way of thinking. Just as Ronald Reagan has discarded the concept of the "evil empire" as no longer applicable, many Japanese are shifting away from a Totalitarian-Expansionist image; yet an influential and apparently sizeable group of this persuasion remains. Both the intensity of the old beliefs and the ingrained Japanese suspicion of volatile changes in thought work in favor of this image.

The core of this school can be found among former and current Soviet specialists in the Gaimusho. Hogen Shinsaku and Sono Akira, the two patriarchs
of Soviet affairs in the Gaimusho, remain active in retirement as international affairs commentators who cling to this way of thinking. According to this viewpoint, it is inherent in the communist system and embedded in Russian history and national character that the Soviet Union will remain a totalitarian state with scant democracy and an expansionist power with little respect for the interests of other countries. The pessimistic response to perestroika and the INF agreement found in some public interest magazines and in books directed at a mass audience reflects this thinking. Typical was the Sankei newspaper's doubtful reaction in April 1988 that Moscow would abide by its announced plans to withdraw from Afghanistan.¹⁰

The second school of thought about the Soviet Union is what I call the Economic Power Politics approach. While granting the importance of reform inside the Soviet Union and Soviet retreat from military involvement abroad, this school considers these steps to be only partial and perhaps temporary responses to Soviet weakness. They are insufficient evidence of a fundamental shift in the Soviet system. This group looks down on the Soviet Union as a second-rate power in all but military matters, which, in turn, are now reduced in importance because of the effectiveness of the Western response based on high technology.¹¹ The Economic Power Politics school concludes that the West should not bail Moscow out of its crisis, at least not until Moscow makes a much more drastic change in course.

Above all, the attention of this school centers on the "Northern Territories" issue. If the Soviet Union is gravely weakened, it follows that Tokyo should approach Moscow from a position of strength. Since the Kremlin shows no sign of relinquishing the islands, advocates of the Economic Power Politics approach take this as evidence that realism about the grave weaknesses of the Soviet Union and its past transgressions has not yet taken hold. The Economic Power Politics approach can be found in the Japanese government,
including the Gaimusho, and among academic specialists and international affairs commentators. As identified in Table 1, Kimura Hiroshi, perhaps Japan's best-known specialist on Soviet foreign policy, presents the most convincing arguments for this approach.12

Western-Style Reform Optimism is the third approach which can now be found in Japanese publications. It is the view that, however difficult are the short-term problems, perestroika will continue in the long run, and that Soviet-American negotiations stand a good chance of leading to less tension-filled international relations.13 Through these changes, the Soviet Union will emerge more competitive economically and still influential as a superpower. It follows that Tokyo must not allow its suspicions or its confidence to stand in the way of searching for a flexible approach to improved relations. This view is buttressed by such assumptions as: Tokyo can favorably influence the outcome in Moscow, Tokyo must avoid becoming isolated, and there is a danger from the Japanese right related to this issue.

Two possibilities of inertia in Japanese thinking present potentially contradictory implications. Inertia based on past negative stereotypes favors either the Totalitarian-Expansionist school or the Economic Power Politics school, while inertia based on the assumption that Tokyo consistently follows Washington's lead in superpower relations favors Western-Style Reform Optimism. The mass media, including the leading newspapers Yomiuri and Asahi, are providing detailed coverage of Soviet reform discussions and summit developments. Despite frequent qualifications about the difficulties ahead, the overall effect seems to be to encourage greater optimism. Some voices on the right are critical of what they see as "sympathetic" coverage.14 Although this favorable response has been less evident than in the United States or Western Europe, trailing by perhaps one or two years, it has been gaining ground.
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<th>Inherent Appeal of Socialism</th>
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Within Japan's intellectual community, there is also much interest in what might be called a Cultural Heritage approach to the Soviet Union. In part, this is a return to the extraordinary interest shown over the first postwar decades in Russian and Soviet literature and some other aspects of culture. Historians of Russia have continued to study the tradition of peasant movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while interest in the Russian and Soviet intelligentsia has been rekindled through profiles of reformers battling for glasnost' and perestroika. The Cultural Heritage advocates were never satisfied with the monochromatic picture of a totalitarian society and a population of base national character. Now they are drawing attention to the Soviet intellectuals who, nourished by a rich tradition, advocate a more humane world. Disciplinary diversity in this Japanese approach can be readily discerned: Hakamada Shigeki takes a sociological perspective to both mass psychology and intellectuals steeped in European traditions; Shimotomai Nobuo writes as a political scientist about interest groups and power struggles; and Wada Haruki follows an historian's approach, especially by focusing on bold Soviet historians and their recent causes. Each of these academics seeks an in-depth understanding of the cultural heritage of the Soviet people.

The various advocates of the Cultural Heritage approach recognize the social diversity of the Soviet population, which comprises the mass of the people, the bureaucrats, the intelligentsia, and many nationalities. Some are pessimistic about perestroika, in its current version, because of their assessments of the ingrained ways of the Slavic masses or the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, they discern roots in the Soviet system for a different kind of socialism. This even raises the possibility of future Soviet inspiration for Japan and for a degree of independence in Japan's responses from American attitudes, particularly if Washington does not relax pressure for Tokyo to
accelerate its military build-up. The foreign policy implications are secondary and often remain unclear since this school concentrates on change internal to the Soviet Union, but at least some advocates of this approach are eager to distance Japan from what they see as nationalistic responses in Washington and Tokyo that fail to appreciate the positive dynamics of Soviet life. 18

Finally from the left-wing of Japanese politics a resurgent interest in the Inherent Appeal of Socialism can be detected. This takes the form of looking back to the 1920s for the roots of a type of socialism that might now be revived. It is also a response to the continuation of evaluations of capitalism, in comparison to some ideals of socialism, which are strongly critical. The Inherent Appeal of Socialism approach is found in the political parties and their research units on the left and within a part of the academic community. For example, the JCP has recently become active in encouraging studies of the Soviet Union. 19 Taniuchi Yuzuru, formerly of Tokyo University, is one of the most prominent academics engaged in searching for socialist ideals in the pre-Stalin era and showing their links to Gorbachev's reforms. 20

"Sovietophobia"

For the first 15-20 years after the end of WWII Japanese opinion concerning Soviet socialism was polarized. The Totalitarian-Expansionist school formed a strong nucleus from the start, but it faced a formidable rival in the Inherent Appeal of Socialism school. Hostility to the Soviet Union could be traced to four broad factors: 1) continuities with prior "anti-communist" thinking, especially found among government officials who remained in office or returned to political activism after the "reverse course" in 1948 revealed that American Occupation authorities were becoming more
worried about communism than about a revival of wartime militarism; 2) anger over the Soviet entry into the war with Japan at the last moment in violation of a neutrality pact, at the prolongation of fighting into September despite Japan's declaration of surrender on August 14, at the seizure of territory regarded as unambiguously part of Japan, and at the detention of roughly 600,000 Japanese in Soviet labor camps and their slow repatriation to 1956; 21 3) antagonisms aroused by the Cold War, heightened by the proximity of the Korean War and reenforced with revelations about the evils of Stalinism; and 4) identification of the Soviet Union with political and even revolutionary movements striving to destabilize Japan, especially the JCP which turned to violent methods during the first half of the 1950s. Nevertheless, large numbers of intellectuals and many urban workers as well long rejected most criticisms of the Soviet Union. 22 They idealized socialism with little regard for the realities of the Stalin era and they sought to avoid a security treaty with the United States as unnecessary or provocative. "Anti-communism" was highly suspect inside academic and artistic circles, at least into the 1960s.

From the time of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1956 to the era of detente through the mid-1970s, both poles of thinking were losing adherents. On the left, idealism was shattered by the deStalinization speech of 1956 and subsequent Soviet revelations, by the Sino-Soviet split and Chinese accusations which carried extra weight in Japan because of guilt feelings left from the war era, and by the Czech invasion of 1968 and the end to the Khrushchev "thaw." 23 Both the enormously successful economics of prosperity and the modernately successful politics of parliamentary opposition and local coalition governments aided in the gradual formation of a more pragmatic left in Japan, less identified with Soviet socialism. Over the same period the right was finding some of its arguments undercut by Moscow's doctrines of peaceful coexistence and detente and by Soviet reforms that gave a more humane
face to socialism. The rapid expansion of trade between Japan and the Soviet Union created an atmosphere of normality that made anti-communism seem outdated to many.

Already in the period when polarization was being replaced by centrism, there were signs that the decline of leftist thinking was more pronounced than the decline on the right. The Soviet Union was losing its admirers, while its detractors remained active and found new sources of concerns. Brezhnev's repressive policies alienated many intellectuals, as Moscow's arrogance and harsh rhetoric toward Japan's political and economic system antagonized official circles. Above all, the reduced profile of the United States military in Asia following the Vietnam War, the sympathy with China as tensions persisted on the Sino-Soviet border, and the vast Soviet military build-up made the Japanese people conscious of their vulnerability and dependence on Washington. After Washington returned Okinawa to Japan, Moscow's unwillingness to discuss the return of the "Northern Territories" gave rightist forces a powerful instrument for shaping public opinion.

One event after another from the late-1970s to the mid-1980s fueled the fires of "Sovietophobia." By positioning squadrons of airplanes on the "Northern Territories," sending armed forces into Afghanistan, shooting down a Korean airplane, and many other provocative actions, Moscow severely damaged its image in Japan. Whereas "Sovietophobia" in China was, to a large degree, suspect as a creation of the artificial atmosphere of Mao's extremism, represented by the Cultural Revolution, and "Sovietophobia" in the United States was tinged, in the opinion of a sizable minority, by its association with extremist positions of America's most conservative president in recent times, in Japan this phenomenon swept nearly all groups before it. Even the JCP emphatically agreed that the "Northern Territories" should be returned and argued that Moscow must withdraw from Afghanistan. For nearly a decade the
center and the right-wing coalesced in a thorough rejection of the Soviet Union with little optimism for either its domestic reform or foreign cooperation.

Public opinion polls revealed a virtual unanimity of criticism of the Soviet Union. After the summit between Tanaka and Brezhnev in 1973, when the mood of detente largely prevailed, the Soviet Union soon fell in the polls to become the least popular country for Japanese. Images of the Soviet people remained unshakeably negative into the Gorbachev era.25

Two polls taken in early 1988 revealed that at last the Soviet image has begun to improve. The poll taken February 20-22 by the Kyodo News Agency jointly with Tass found a sharp contrast between the 17.6 percent of Japanese with a good feeling toward the Soviet Union and the 88.0 percent of Soviets with a good feeling toward Japan. The results concerning bad feelings toward the other country were even more lopsided: 2.4 percent of Soviet compared to 47.4 percent of Japanese. Yet, the analysis showed that in comparison to a December 1983 poll the percentage of Japanese who liked the Soviet Union had tripled. Moreover, whereas only 2.1 percent of Japanese had earlier regarded the Soviet Union as peace-loving, the figure had risen to 20.6 percent.26 Just one month later the Yomiuri shimbun together with the Institute of Sociological Research of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union conducted a more substantial public opinion poll comparing views in both countries. Again the result was a huge discrepancy between largely favorable Soviet views of Japan and negative Japanese views of the Soviet Union and its people. This time the Japanese who expressed friendly feelings to the Soviet people reached 25 percent (only 1.5 percent felt strong friendship), while those not very friendly numbered 60 percent and another 7 percent expressed outright antipathy. The level of friendliness was highest (30 percent) for persons in their twenties, suggesting that negative views were more embedded among older citizens. The three images most widely attributed to the Soviet people
reflected the negative disposition of the Japanese people. They found the Soviets: 1) closed; 2) dark and cold; and 3) self-centered. Fourth on the list was the ability of Soviets to endure and fifth came their secretive nature. Only the sixth item (expressed by just 3.3 percent of respondents), which described Soviets as big-hearted and simple, indicated a more positive response. 27 Japanese views were improving, but they continued in the first months of 1988 to be predominantly negative.

Japanese respondents were considerably more pessimistic than were Soviets about the prospects for a total ban on nuclear testing (66 percent said it could not be done, compared to 8 percent of Soviets) and for the abolition of nuclear weapons (75 percent compared to 13 percent). These indications of pessimism contrast with more hopeful views of perestroika and glasnost'. In March already 47 percent of Japanese found them useful for Japanese-Soviet relations. Especially males (52 percent) and persons in their twenties and thirties (54 and 55 percent respectively) saw these new Soviet policies as useful. Younger persons also placed more importance on developing cultural exchanges (41 percent of those in their twenties listed this as one of the top two priorities, while only 18 percent of persons older than 70 did), but the two primary concerns among Japanese respondents as a whole remained, the "Northern Territories" (60 percent listed it) and fishing rights (49 percent). According to the Japanese, trade and economic cooperation (28 percent) and scientific-technical exchange (8 percent) are relatively low priorities in Japanese-Soviet relations, while Soviets placed them first (82 percent) and second (52 percent) on their lists. 28

Explaining the results of the March poll, Hakamada Shigeki discounts the longstanding Soviet assertion that anti-Soviet propaganda from the Japanese government and mass media are responsible. Instead, he contends that the Japanese were responding to the dearth of glasnost' and democracy, which
Gorbachev himself has acknowledged, and to the Soviet reliance on military strength and a hard line. Hakamada also finds ignorance at fault. He observes that the people of both countries really do not know each other, and that the survey shows they are eager to learn about the daily lives of their counterparts, which will add to mutual understanding. The Yomiuri analysis finds signs of an upturn in Japanese thinking in progress; when one of the same questions had been asked in October 1986 5 percent fewer had answered positively about the state of Japanese-Soviet relations. Yet, no one was yet claiming that more than a small dent had been made in the negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union which had long prevailed.

Japanese Publications and Centers on the Soviet Union

While Soviet articles on Japanese concentrated in a small number of journals and edited volumes, Japanese articles are scattered in numerous university bulletins and small-circulation journals. This fragmentation corresponds to the distribution of specialists among more than one hundred universities and colleges, none of which has a large center by the standards of Soviet Japanese studies or American Slavic studies. Other articles appear in public interest journals and reach out to a mass audience, as do the majority of the thirty or more books on the Soviet Union which now appear annually. The field is bifurcated into narrow scholarship which does not address many broad questions or reach a wide audience and popularized presentations which make little use of scholarly findings.

Table 2 offers a listing over an eight-month period of Japanese book-length publications primarily concerned with perestroika, Gorbachev, or confronting misunderstandings about the Soviet Union. This is not a complete enumeration of Japanese books and special journals. Books on Russian history,
Chernobyl, foreign relations, and other themes would nearly double the size of the list. The titles here show the focus of the Japanese debate centering on three questions: what is perestroika and will it succeed? who is Gorbachev and will he prevail? and what do Japanese need to know in order to understand Soviet development correctly?
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<td>Asahi shimbun staff</td>
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There is no shortage of self-critical commentaries over the past two years about the state of Soviet studies in Japan. Scholars are embarrassed by the mediocrity of most books to be found in bookstores during the period of unbridled criticism to 1986. Contemporary specialists are now taking the lead in calling for the development of genuine centers of Slavic studies, of at least one good research library, and of expanded fields of specialization including political science and sociology.32

In October 1987 the journal Soviet Studies (which itself began in the Gorbachev era as a product of the growing perception that Japanese must know the Soviet Union better) devoted most of an issue to the state of Soviet studies in seven countries. The message was unmistakeable: the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and even recent entrants to this field such as Australia and China are noticeably advancing in ways that Japan is not. Kimura Hiroshi's article, "Soviet Studies in Japan," offers the most thorough overview yet presented on the shortcomings of the field in Japan.33

Kimura first notes that in quantitative terms Japan with about 800 specialists on the Soviet Union may be third to the United States and China, but it is a distant third, especially to the 8,000 American specialists. Second, Kimura shows through a breakdown of the Japanese total that quality of coverage of the contemporary Soviet Union falls far short of reflecting the total number of experts. Although perhaps 30 percent of Japan's total are economists by specialization, persons in this category are noted for their "emulative" approach, expressing in their studies a belief in the correctness of the Soviet model and doubts about capitalism in the West. These are not economic specialists, as we know them in the United States, concerned with the actual conditions of the Soviet economy. Another 30 percent of Japan's total are literary specialists, whose work concentrates on nineteenth-century Russian literature which over the past century has occupied a prominent (some suggest
the prominent place among all foreign literature) place in the hearts of the Japanese people. Interest in Soviet literature declined sharply over the past two decades and even the classics of Russian literature have lately been losing their appeal to Japanese youth.

The third group, which comprises roughly 15 percent of the total, are the historians. Some of their work is first-rate, Kimura concludes, based on primary sources and purely scholarly methods, for instance in studies of the history of social thought and economic history. Among the names Kimura mentions are Kojima Shuichi and Shimotomai Nobuo (the latter lately has been writing about contemporary politics, but his prior research centered on the establishment of the Soviet system in the 1920s and 1930s). Nonetheless, Kimura adds, many historical specialists retain a narrow research focus. In response to the poor library holdings in Japan and the difficulty of working abroad, they devote themselves to overlapping research themes throughout their careers, without gradually—as occurs elsewhere—developing the perspective of a generalist.

When he turns to the approximately 15 percent of Japan's Soviet and Russian specialists in the fields of law and political science, Kimura is again critical. He mentions the presence of "taboos" or areas that remained "out of bounds" and a tradition of not expressing one's own opinion. The overall impression, repeated in conversations with many Japanese scholars, is of a virtual vacuum in the specialized study of the development of the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s to the late 1970s, filled largely by translations from the West and Japanese textbooks accounts. This problem relates to the low level of planning and coordination in Soviet studies. Japanese scholars have so far had little success in appeals for funding to organize large centers, collaborative projects, and international cooperation to overcome their fragmentation and isolation. Only the Slavic Research Center in Sapporo and the Japan Institute
of International Affairs in Tokyo with support from the Gaimusho have made a
start toward solving these problems.

The Soviet Union in the World Setting and
Soviet-Japanese Relations

The image of the "evil empire" has gained wide currency in Japan. It is
shared by: 1) "nationalists," whose motives focus on Japan's return to the
status of an international power with growing military might and recovery of
territory beyond the four islands, in the Kuriles or even on Sakhalin island;
and 2) "internationalists," who while ardent supporters of the "Free World" in
the struggle against communism prefer a modest military role for Japan. At its
extreme, this image depicts Moscow as bent on taking over the world. Its
weapons are expansionism through military means, economic espionage through
stealing the fruits of capitalism's inventiveness, and deceit through false
propaganda. The appropriate response is to counter with allied military
strength, isolation of the enemy, and exposure of the national media and
specialists who dupe the Japanese public.

A part of the right wing which advocates the Totalitarian-Expansionist
approach has responded to Gorbachev era by insisting that nothing significant
has changed or, alternatively, that Moscow has become a more duplicitous and
dangerous enemy. For instance, Nasu Kiyoshi, whose books on the collapse of
the Soviet empire appear at a rate of about one per year, contends that as the
decline of the Soviet Union accelerates, the threat of expansionism rises.36
Books describing a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido have continued to appear over
the past year.37 Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, who assessed the Gorbachev era in books
published in November 1987 and May 1988, has stated emphatically that Gorbachev
is lying and that the Soviet goals of spreading socialism through military
means and false propaganda remain unchanged.38
If the orthodox Soviet response to Deng Xiaoping's first years of reform until the second half of 1982 is captured by the slogan that China continued to have "Maoism with Mao," then it would be appropriate to introduce a corresponding slogan for Japan's right-wing response to Gorbachev's first years as "Brezhnevism without Brezhnev" or even "Stalinism without Stalin." The right-wing refuses to recognize the sincerity of a reform group within the Soviet Union, preferring to criticize Arbatov, Bovin and other reformers. 39 Not surprisingly, it saves much of its fury for those in Japan who have drawn different conclusions. Nakagawa argues that such views are only, in part, a result of ignorance. He warns that hidden political motives are also present, noting ominously that following Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in 1986 new orders were sent out by the K.G.B. 40

Despite the high visibility of such unyielding interpretations and of a small number of Japanese who engage in harassment of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo with loudspeakers and demonstrations, the main leanings of the right wing are not so extreme. While retaining an image of the expansionist essence of the "evil empire" and of the inability of Gorbachev to alter the deep-seated totalitarian nature of the system, many recognize that Gorbachev's speeches are not just "lies" and that Tokyo must continue to explore possibilities for better relations through diplomatic channels. Sase Masanori of the Self-Defense University, has been one of the most prominent commentators on the Reagan-Gorbachev summits. In his opinion, Moscow retains the goal of achieving world revolution and seeks through perestroika, above all, to improve the machine-building industry in order to make the Soviet Union more competitive in high-technology weapons. In March 1988 he warned of the danger of thinking that detente has replaced the Cold War, of expecting that Tokyo's cooperation would lead Moscow in a reform direction, or of being misled by the
misunderstandings of the Soviet Union conveyed by many international affairs specialists who only echo Gorbachev's message. 41

Sono Akira and Arai Hirokazu have also been warning that public opinion is vulnerable to Soviet propaganda. Their views reflect the distrust over a long period by Gaimusho Soviet experts of the mass media in Japan and of the academic community. Sono writes that one-sided coverage in "left-wing" papers arouses a psychology of fear and leads readers to seek the goodwill of communist countries in order to avert nuclear war. He refers to this as "defeatism," and says it threatens the very prosperity of Japan before a country whose intentions are neither peaceful nor defensive. 42 Arai warns that it may take generations to change the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the West must not succumb to a repetition of the early 1970s when people believed that peace had arrived. 43 Implied or explicit in such commentaries is the assumption that Japanese are less naive than other nations of the West, but they too are in danger of forgetting that, even if Moscow has altered some of its means, the Soviet Union remains intent on achieving goals dangerous to free peoples. 44

Even when voices on the right are willing to grant that Gorbachev has made "a significant change in Soviet foreign policy in general," they are not optimistic about the foreseeable future. Ito Kenichi, who has aroused Soviet ire by tracing expansionism to geographical determinism and the national character of people who lived as hunters in a forest environment without secure borders, 45 advocates "conditional cooperation" but with little optimism that Tokyo can influence Soviet behavior. He leaves room for some hope when he speculates that if Gorbachev were "bold and wise enough" to dare to return the four islands, this "might possibly being about a dramatic turn of national sentiment in Japan toward the Soviet Union" similar to the turn in 1972 with the opening of the PRC. 46 Sase also advocates "conditional" support for a new
detente if the West simultaneously improves its conventional weapons. Others on the right openly reject the INF agreement. Sono called it a means to rejuvenate the crisis-ridden Soviet economy with Western capital. Hogen commented on plans to steal Western technology. Suspicions of Soviet intentions, American naivete and the susceptibility of Japanese to propaganda are all common on the right.

The Economic Power Politics view has been gaining in the 1980s, first as complementary to Totalitarian-Expansionism and recently as an alternative to it. Kimura Hiroshi and some Soviet experts at the Gaimusho express this view, arguing that Japan and the West are now well-positioned to extract favorable terms by remaining steadfast against "premature" major concessions. Unlike the right-wing assumption that Moscow remains driven to expansionism by national tradition and ideological determination, this school finds Moscow capable of acting opportunistically or cautiously depending on circumstances. In contrast to the view that "old thinking" persists, Kimura finds a rough parity between "new thinking," which he accepts as real, and "old thinking." 48

The crux of the Economic Power Politics argument is that Moscow has been forced to change because of crisis conditions that threaten to turn the Soviet Union into a second rate country and that a careful response to Moscow's needs, based on expert knowledge, can help to tip the balance. Kimura has been reluctant since 1985 to credit Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership with genuine reform intentions; he has gradually conceded the far-reaching nature of the reforms, but in early 1988 remained largely noncommittal. He conceded the presence of "buds" of a big change, while insisting on reserving judgment whether the messianic drive to save the world by exporting revolution is completely abandoned. 49

Two questions arouse the most interest in the Economic Power Politics group, with some signs that a third question may be lingering in the
background. First, this group wants to know why Moscow has turned to perestroika, glasnost', the INF pact, the Afghan withdrawal, and other reform initiatives. The answers given stress failure and fear in competition with rising capitalist economies, including the NIEs in East Asia, and with reinvigorated militaries, as symbolized by SDI. They also warn of a new Soviet strategy of trying to block SDI through reaching public opinion abroad. The second question asks what should Japan's response be. The answer is to be realistic about the strategic and fishing advantages that make Moscow unwilling to return the Northern Territories, but at the same time to remain firm so that Moscow will know that without taking this step it will gain little from Japan. Japan must continue to make politics and economics inseparable by refusing long-term credits; it must use national will as an asset by maintaining the strong determination of its people to prevail; it must take careful advantage of timing in the changing international situation; and it must devise a strategy to develop Soviet relations as a whole, aware that Moscow's ability to return the islands depends on its ability to save face and to explain the decision to hesitant comrades. While presenting this scenario, Kimura cautions that the Soviet Union can find other and perhaps better partners for its economic needs in Western Europe, China, and South Korea, and that opposition to Gorbachev may delay new policies toward Japan. Coupled with his noncommittal view on "new thinking," Kimusa's caution about Soviet incentives to return the "Northern Territories" leads to a pessimistic outlook. Nonetheless, Kimusa's position opens the way for some Japanese flexibility if Moscow is prepared to discuss the return of all four islands.

The third question which some on the right, including former Prime Minister Nakasone, appear to be asking is what benefits may come for Tokyo's world standing from a new Japanese-Soviet relationship. Nakasone was reportedly impressed with Gorbachev when they met at Chernenko's funeral in
March 1985 and retains an interest in enlarging Japan's role both in the study of world issues (through his new Peace Institute) and in contributing to the resolution of international problems. Apart from vague indications of this line of thinking, there seems to be little discussion on the right of what Japan might gain from a new Soviet relationship, perhaps out of fear that Tokyo's bargaining hand would be weakened by even mentioning Japan's interest.

On international and bilateral issues Japanese views opposed to official policy largely coalesce. Just as Soviet reformers share a common target in the orthodox approach to Japan that has long been dominant, Japanese reformers in the center and on the left agree that the views of the Japanese right have prevailed to the exclusion of a deep understanding of Soviet reality and a wide-ranging debate of Japanese policy alternatives. From academics, journalists, and even former and present officials in the Gaimusho, I heard repeated criticisms of the emotional, narrowly nationalist, inflexible, and one-sided thinking that has been centered in the community of Soviet experts at the Gaimusho. Former ambassadors to Moscow such as Katori Yasue and Nakagawa Yu and officials in the Gaimusho who have been obliged to defer to the Soviet experts, have been frustrated by the rigidity of official thinking about the Soviet Union. This reaction is especially strong among younger academics. In their opinion, even when persons on the right avoid being imprisoned by their theory of Soviet Totalitarian Expansionism, they tend to be obsessed with the need to remain firm in order to hasten the return of the "Northern Territories" to the exclusion of a realistic understanding of a society in flux.

Rather than to insist on a return of all four islands as the "entry" point or precondition for improved relations, the critics are prepared to explore various options. Calling their ideas the "exit" approach (as has been done) is unfair because, whether they would relinquish two islands or none, they generally favor some momentum on the territorial question as part of
negotiations, not as its end point. They are optimistic that as relations improve, Tokyo's leverage will not disappear and Moscow will find it worthwhile to make further concessions. The critics reject a one-sided reliance on pressuring Moscow without offering incentives. They increasingly fear that Japan will be isolated and the Japanese right will maintain its leverage in the government by trying to keep the Northern Territories at the center of attention. Rather than conclude that Japanese are more realistic about the Soviet Union than gullible Americans and West Europeans, these observers find Japanese more poorly informed and unresponsive to changing developments. Some also think that it is time for Japanese to draw their own conclusions about the Soviet Union after echoing hardline American thinking for many years. Above all, the critics on the left and the center want to get by the Northern Territories issue to advance a debate in Japan about how Tokyo and Moscow can coexist in the future.

Writings by Shimotomai Nobuo and Wada Haruki stand out for their interest in Soviet reformers. Shimotomai traces the history of reform thinking about foreign policy from the Stalin era, pointing to the leading spokesmen and their academic institutions. The impression is that Soviet "new thinking" stems from internal, intellectual arguments as well as from foreign setbacks. This new thinking is deeply rooted and can be encouraged by conciliatory international behavior. Advocates of a Cultural Heritage approach identify the intellectual community as an interest group for globalism eager for cooperation with Japan and other capitalist countries. Even when they doubt that the Soviet masses will respond soon to domestic reforms, some think that the greater ability to manage diplomacy from above makes it a more promising arena for earlier breakthroughs.
The Response to Perestroika and Glasnost'

According to Japan's right-wing, detailed coverage of Soviet reforms and reform thinking runs the risk of creating an illusion. A similar false impression had to be discredited before, which should give warning now against succumbing again to the idea that modest reforms, of the sort proposed, can dislodge a totalitarian system. The right-of-center approach is also pessimistic, or at least cautious in drawing a favorable conclusion from the developments to date. Its advocates recognize that in the current tense struggle there are forces in favor of substantial reforms but doubt that they can prevail. Kimura and others reason that the present system is deeply rooted in Leninism, as well as in its grotesque continuation as Stalinism, which leaves no alternative path of socialism to which reform can turn. They further argue that the internal factors that brought Khrushchev's defeat are still present. In addition, the objectives of perestroika and glasnost' do not indicate a fundamental reassessment of the values on which the Soviet system is built; instead they are conceived as a means to maintain the Soviet Union's superpower status. Pessimism about socialism inheres in the conclusion there is no prospect of a realistic strategy to address the serious contradictions which beset Soviet society.

The conclusions of the right-of-center rest on two assumptions: first, that the real needs of Soviet society demand complete liberalization and westernization, and second that the Soviet leadership will not push much beyond its current reform strategy. These conclusions would be more persuasive if they were linked with some explanation for the continuation of reforms. Over the past three years advocates of this view have not anticipated new reform steps. They have taken their pessimistic conclusions so much for granted that little effort has gone into the prediction of reform. The standard for
determining success in reforms is set so high that change is unlikely to be appreciated until after the fact. Also concern with the "Northern Territories" problems and foreign relations appears to weigh so heavily in this group's thinking that assessments of domestic change may become dependent on this primary concern.

Publications on domestic change in the Soviet Union demonstrate that the left-of-center is mounting a serious challenge to the concept of totalitarianism. Genuine scholarship is overwhelmingly on the side of sympathy for perestroika and glasnost', generally accompanied by expectations that they will continue and prove to be significant for producing a new type of society. Even among a small number of Soviet specialists in the Gaimusho we can find this optimistic viewpoint. For instance, writing under the pseudonym Saga Toru, Kawato Akio argues that people have been blinded by the Stalin or totalitarian image from noticing the real dimensions of change inside the Soviet Union. Kawato charges in his early 1988 book, *Is Soviet Society Changing?* that political science studies have been biased toward the right, leading to misperceptions such as that the Soviet Union is collapsing. He echoes the widely expressed concern inside Japan that misinformation and bias have made it difficult for Japanese to gain an objective understanding of an enduring Soviet Union capable of being revitalized.

Kawato's treatment of Soviet society is distinguished by an emphasis on the commonalities of social change (or modernization) that favor liberalization in socialist as well as capitalist countries. Drawing on his observations while in Moscow earlier in this decade, he claims that urbanization, the spread of television, and other social forces are increasing the role of public opinion and creating a mass society. While recognizing that the Soviet government continues to try to restrict the consequences of these social forces, he emphasizes the pressure building from below for democratization and
the role of law. The effects are widespread, for instance youth in the Soviet Union are rapidly becoming westernized.\textsuperscript{57} Kawato's sociological perspective emphasizing the power of modernization contrasts to Kimura's political science perspective focusing on the political traditions and self-interest of the communist party elite.

Hakamada Shigeki also takes a sociological approach, but he concentrates on cultural heritage rather than the forces of modernization. He distinguishes two types of Soviet citizens with whom bureaucrats must contend: the masses, who traditionally in Russia lack experience with entrepreneurship and also remain hesitant of or resistant to reforms because of the strong influence of a socialist society which has not accustomed them to material incentives; and the European-style intelligentsia, which is impressive in its philosophical guest and lively inquiry into questions about socialism. Hakamada expresses pessimism about perestroika to the extent it depends on the initiative of the Russian masses, although he identifies other nationalities such as those in the Baltic region who are responding quicker to new opportunities.\textsuperscript{58} The fact that he appreciates the quest for reform within the intellectual community and Gorbachev's eagerness to realize its goals makes Hakamada's pessimism more qualified than the pessimism of those on the right. Even if he foresees a difficult process ahead, he sees the key to its outcome not just in the interests of the bureaucrats, but also in the diverse character of the people.

Kimura's ideas are more directly challenged by the political science perspective of Shimotomai Nobuo. While both strongly criticize the state of Japanese scholarship on the Soviet Union, Shimotomai is more direct in pinpointing interests in both Japan and the West which politicized scholarship. Shimotomai objects not only to the dearth of political science research in Japan, but also to the excessive reliance on the totalitarian model in both the West and Japan. He shares with Stephen Cohen and certain English scholars a
desire to apply new approaches in order to appreciate the dynamism of the Soviet Union. While Kimura concentrates on the barriers to reform, Shimotomai details the accelerating reform process—its advocates, its ideas, and its turning points. Without failing to mention difficulties, he pays most attention to what is advancing and what makes perestroika a "second revolution." The two authors interpret Soviet history from different viewpoints. While Kimura finds barriers to reform in the grim facts of past communist policies, Shimotomai looks to the NEP period for the healthy roots of glasnost' and an information society. He finds sources of diversity even in the Brezhnev era, and concludes that political reforms can produce a new Soviet Union. 59

While Shimotomai discerns useful precedent in Soviet history of the 1920s, others are more explicit in expressing admiration for both the principles of socialism and the traditions of Lenin, Trotsky, or Bukharin. In late 1987 Taniuchi Yuzuru called for realism about socialism, including awareness that ideals matter in history and that the classics of Marxism were distorted by Stalin and his successors. For Taniuchi the October Revolution remains significant as an unfinished revolution. Its ideals live on as the greatest intellectual stimulus to perestroika. True socialism calls for an end of censorship, truth about history, and spontaneity from below. Although no breakthrough has yet occurred in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev is returning to the ideals of socialism. This can be seen, Taniuchi adds, by taking an historical approach and rejecting the totalitarian concept borrowed from American communist studies, which stands in the way of our accurate understanding. 60

Other writings from the left of Japan's political spectrum also accept the rich traditions of socialism along with criticisms of the serious shortcomings of capitalism. They strongly support Gorbachev's reforms, not ignoring its
difficulties and yet lauding its correspondence to "socialism as it should be." For portions of the Japanese left hope is beginning to build that the dismal fortunes they have increasingly faced as Soviet socialism fell into disrepute can begin to be reversed by the more favorable image associated with Gorbachev's brand of socialism.

The Struggle for Influence

Increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s academics on the left became irrelevant to both policy making and public opinion in Japan. The Gaimusho bypassed Soviet specialists inside Japan by sending its newly hired Soviet experts-to-be to selected centers (usually Harvard) in the United States and Great Britain. The impression spread that articles in obscure academic journals or in left-oriented public interest journals would reach only a small audience. Lacking a broad-based organization and resources, academics did not play a prominent role in discussions of the Soviet Union. The exceptions were those who reached out to a popular market, joining in the Totalitarian-Expansionist approach.

In the second half of the 1980s we are witnessing a return of the academic specialists as participants in a national debate. They are expressing their views in the mass media and in journals with wide circulation. They are publishing new points of view in books that attract a broad readership. Above all, they are introducing detailed and specialized knowledge from recent visits to the Soviet Union and from their research. Public opinion has become sufficiently diverse to provide an audience for new interpretations. There is also some diversity in the Gaimusho and elsewhere in the Japanese government, reenforcing the views of academics. The electric reform atmosphere in the Soviet Union and the enthusiastic debate in the West accompanied by improving
relations, have made it inevitable that Japan too would reexamine the nature of
the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

The impetus to study the Soviet Union still remains underdeveloped in the
second half of 1988 for at least three reasons. First, unlike the Soviet
fascination with Japanese capitalism, there is virtually no interest in
borrowing from Soviet socialism. Japanese are self-confident of their
country's success and, whatever they think of Soviet reform prospects, find
little of merit in the actual Soviet conditions of recent periods. Second, the
personnel and organization of Soviet studies in Japan are less prepared to
study contemporary and recent developments than is the field of Japanese
studies in the Soviet Union. This results from a long period of neglect,
although recent steps to introduce new journals and launch collaborative
projects and expand international cooperation are bringing improvements to the
field. Third, Japan is only now beginning to look beyond the "Northern
Territories" issue and the "Cold War" perspective on a polarized world with two
superpowers.

From the second half of 1987, Japanese began to become aware that their
reexamination of the Soviet Union is closely linked to their own country's rise
to superpower standing and its growing independence of the United States.
Because Tokyo has its own dispute with Moscow, it needs its own assessments of
Soviet reforms and changes in Soviet-American relations. The traditional
Japanese outlook on social relations in which status distinctions are carefully
observed now is extended to Japan's growing awareness that it is not, on the
whole, inferior to the Soviet Union as a superpower.

The Gorbachev challenge has led the right-wing and the right-of-center in
Japan to conclude that the time has come to concentrate on the "Northern
Territories" and to make clear to Washington and other allies that Tokyo will
pursue its own interests until Moscow relents. Japan's reticence about
endorsing the new stage of cooperation between Washington and Moscow should
remind us of Beijing's reticence, in part because of its dispute over islands
including Quemoy and Matsu, which were shelled as an indication of an
independent stance, as well as Taiwan, to join an earlier stage of their
"peaceful coexistence" in the second half of the 1950s. For Japan this is an
opportunity not only to stand behind a principle against past Soviet injustice,
but also to establish Japan's rightful political standing as a superpower.
They seek nothing less than a new worldview, still dependent on the United
States but less so, and now assigning Japan greater significance as a
counterweight and negotiating partner of the Soviet Union. For some on the
right, this situation warrants a nationalistic foreign policy with a more
independent military force and some distancing from Western optimism about the
Soviet Union. Their chances would be enhanced if Soviet-American and
Soviet-Japanese relations diverge, Gorbachev is ousted or forced to slow his
reforms, and the "Northern Territories" stay at the center of attention. Yet,
if the currents of the past few years continue, it will not be easy for the
right-wing to retain the cooperation of the right-of-center.

The left-of-center is also likely to become more active in the struggle
for influence in response to Gorbachev's challenge. Its goals are likely to be
threelfold: First, many on the left are eager for high quality, substantial
scholarship. Second, they along with the left-wing, are concerned about the
influence of the right-wing inside Japan and will be struggling within the LDP
and the Diet and directly in the media and publications to reach public
opinion. Third, it is likely that the left-of-center will also respond to
Japan's emerging superpower status with a program for reasserting Tokyo's
international role. Their worldview will highlight ways Japan can cooperate
with the Soviet Union. While some on the left are prepared to ignore the
territorial issue or to settle for two islands, previously offered by the
Kremlin, it is unlikely that they could do so in a country where national consensus is prized. The left's best chance would come from a conciliatory approach by the Kremlin on the territorial issue as well as continued momentum in U.S.-Soviet relations and Gorbachev's reform drive.

Of course, other issues, including U.S.-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations, will help shape Japan's emerging worldview. The Soviet Union is not the only factor. Yet, it is ironic that despite the tendency in Japan to ignore or dismiss the Soviet Union--the low numbers studying Russian or traveling to the Soviet Union for business or pleasure--the Soviet Union figures importantly at this possibly decisive stage when Japan is groping for a worldview which takes into account its new international significance. While both Moscow and Tokyo have long devoted a lot of attention to Washington, neither has yet devised a realistic and respectful approach to the other.
NOTES


5. These observations are based on watching Japanese television and reading Japanese newspapers. The surveys cited in notes 24 and 26 offer supporting evidence to March 1988. See also Akino Yutaka, "INF kyotei Gorubachofu no shini," Seiron, January 1988, pp. 120-27; and "Gomodori yurusarenai BeiSo shin jidai," Yomiuri shimbun, June 2, 1988, p. 3.


12. Ibid.


31. Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies in Japan (Sapporo: The Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1979-).


38. Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, Gorubachofu no uso.

40. Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, Gorubachofu no uso, p. 76.


42. Sono Akira, "Sayokuteki shimbun no 'mienai dangan,'" p. 142.

43. Arai Hirokazu, "BeiSo shono kaidan to kongo no tozai kankei," Sekai keizai hyoron, February 1988, p. 34.


49. Kimura Hiroshi, Soren o yomu 50 no ponto, pp.
50. Ibid., p. 193.

51. I interviewed and heard the views of more than fifty Soviet and international affairs specialists during a ten-month stay in Japan in 1987 and 1988.


54. Shimotomai Nobuo, Gorubachofu no jidai, pp. 96-105.

55. Kimura Hiroshi, Soren o yomu 50 no pointo, pp. 23 and 234.


57. Ibid., p. 284.
