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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although Western scholars have written at length about many aspects of Soviet security policy, they have paid little attention to the political dynamics of the process by which that policy is formulated. This report presents a brief survey of the dynamics of security policy under Brezhnev and a detailed analysis of developments under Gorbachev. It addresses four questions. First, how have the Soviets evaluated their security position vis-a-vis the United States, and how have these evaluations changed? Second, how have decisionmakers viewed the connection between the accumulation of military power and other foreign-policy instruments, particularly diplomatic initiatives and arms-control negotiations? Third, how have choices about military policy interacted with choices about the domestic political and economic agenda? Finally, the study assesses the level of elite agreement on these matters and considers whether the main trend in recent years has been toward more or less consensus over security policy.

The Soviet approach to national security between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s was based on the belief that a sustained expansion of Soviet military power was essential to protect the USSR and extend its international influence. As a complement to this policy, Brezhnev and his colleagues sought East-West diplomatic understandings to bolster the USSR's international position and avoid the risk of an unbridled arms race with the
United States. In addition, they made a vigorous attempt to expand Soviet influence in the Third World. Finally, the party oligarchs, although eager to project Soviet influence outward, strove to minimize their own society's exposure to foreign cultural influences and political pressures. As conceived under Brezhnev, East-West detente was designed to alleviate the pressures for internal change.

The breakdown of detente around 1980 provoked an extended leadership controversy about Brezhnev's approach to national security. Party and military conservatives asserted that superpower detente had been permanently eclipsed by a growing American aggressiveness reminiscent of Nazi Germany during the 1930s. Brezhnev, and later Andropov and Chernenko, countered that detente was a long-term trend which could be revived through patience and hard-nosed diplomacy. They also suggested that a more militant Soviet international posture would be dangerous because of the social and economic problems accumulating at home. The resulting struggle over the defense budget and diplomatic tactics toward the West produced no clear change of policy, but it did indicate that Brezhnev's security strategy was gradually losing credibility within the elite.

Since coming to power, Gorbachev has underwritten an increasingly open and harsh critique of Brezhnev's security policies. However, in contrast to the criticism in the early 1980s, the new critique is based on liberal rather than conservative premises. Like Gorbachev's attempts to promote a
reexamination of the past handling of domestic issues, the critique has rested on an alliance between reformist officials and intellectuals dissatisfied with inherited policy. This reevaluation of security policy has sparked a turbulent adjustment, still far from complete, in the roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces, and the KGB.

In terms of substance, the most fundamental aspect of the liberal critique is the claim that the West is less hostile to the USSR than previously thought. Gorbachev has encouraged a strategic reassessment that minimizes the theme of inherent Western aggressiveness, highlights the possibilities of East-West cooperation, and identifies the main military threat to the USSR as accidental nuclear war rather than premeditated Western attack. This proposition, about which some influential officials have serious reservations, has radical implications, particularly for the structuring and deployment of the Armed Forces.

A second element of the liberal critique is the contention that the Brezhnev leadership placed too much stress on military instruments and failed to gain the security benefits available through flexible diplomacy and compromise. In the name of security, Gorbachev has made a series of increasingly accommodating arms-control offers and directed an extraordinarily energetic diplomatic campaign toward the West. He has also initiated a basic reappraisal of Third-World commitments that has produced, among other things, the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. The accent on diplomatic flexibility and
concessions has encountered skepticism among party and military conservatives—for example, in the handling of the Soviet nuclear test moratorium and the delinking of the INF negotiations from the issue of SDI.

The third element of the liberal critique is that Brezhnev permitted a corrosive process of domestic decay which sapped the USSR's economic vitality and political stability, thereby undermining its capacity to compete successfully in the international arena over the long term. In response Gorbachev has attempted to revitalize the economy through radical decentralization, a push to cap military spending, and the diversion of scarce resources into civilian investment. Even more significant, however, is the radical political reform launched at the end of 1986.

Gorbachev has increasingly sought to connect political reform with security policy. This stratagem involves mobilizing new social and intellectual groups to reduce the role of the Armed Forces and the KGB. It also involves an effort to work a permanent change in Western military policy by using domestic liberalization to moderate Western perceptions of the Soviet threat. Previous party leaders have instinctively linked the protection of Soviet international security with internal repression. Gorbachev is seeking to link security with internal liberalization.

At present the amount of open conflict over security policy seems lower than the high-water mark reached during the first
half of the 1980s. Gorbachev's approach has encountered serious resistance within the elite, but to date the skeptics have been unable to do more than raise temporary obstacles. They have occasionally slowed but not disrupted his campaign to change security strategy.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev's drive to recast Soviet security policy is a high-risk undertaking. If he were seeking only a "breathing space" in which to revive the economy for the sake of future successes in a renewed rivalry with the West, the domestic resistance to his policy would probably remain easily manageable. A significant number of national-security officials, including some military officers, probably appreciate the connection between economic revitalization and the USSR's future capacity to compete internationally. But Gorbachev is seeking more than a breathing space. He is pursuing a comprehensive process of liberalization that calls into question the necessity of a highly competitive policy toward the West and challenges the standing of the coercive institutions which have traditionally implemented this policy. If Gorbachev pushes further along this road, as seems likely, he will need great political skill to prevent the emergence of a dangerous coalition uniting skeptical party leaders with conservative soldiers and policemen who believe his strategy threatens the interests of the Soviet state.
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INTRODUCTION

The motive forces underlying Soviet national-security policy have long been a source of deep controversy among Western observers. In part this is true because interpretations of Soviet motives generally imply prescriptions for Western policy toward the USSR. But it is also due to our inadequate knowledge of the process by which Soviet national-security policy is made. In the past, thanks partly to a shortage of data, the making of Soviet external policy was more difficult to analyze than the making of internal policy. In addition, the division of scholarly labor among Western Sovietologists has impeded research on the topic. Specialists on Soviet foreign relations have paid relatively little attention to the policymaking process, while specialists on Soviet domestic politics have usually focused on the making of internal policy. As a consequence, most Western discourse on this subject has been dominated by expressions of conviction rather than by the results of careful study.

The same holds true of Western treatments of the political linkage between Soviet foreign and domestic requirements, even though the linkage has fundamental implications for Soviet international behavior. Over the years outside observers have advanced many interpretations of the tradeoffs between the USSR's foreign and domestic needs. Some have maintained that the Soviet leadership has rejected any thought of voluntarily slowing the growth of military spending for domestic reasons. Others have contended that intense economic pressures may persuade the party
chiefs to trim defense outlays. Still other commentators have contended that changes in the Soviet polity and Soviet views of the outside world may diminish the regime's commitment to military growth, independent of economic pressures. No one, however, has carefully examined the record of Soviet discussions and debates to ascertain how Soviet decisionmakers themselves have perceived and tried to reconcile such tradeoffs. Needless to say, these questions have become especially topical since Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR.

Organized chronologically, this report begins with a brief survey of the main features of Soviet security policy between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. Against this backdrop, the report then offers a detailed analysis of the changes in security policy since Gorbachev became general secretary. The investigation centers on four questions. First, how have the Soviets evaluated their security position vis-a-vis the United States, and how have these evaluations changed? Second, how have Soviet decisionmakers viewed the connection between the accumulation of military power and other foreign-policy instruments, particularly diplomatic initiatives and arms-control negotiations? Third, how have Soviet decisions about military policy interacted with choices about the domestic political and economic agenda? Finally, the study assesses the level of elite agreement on these matters and considers whether the main trend in recent years has been toward more or less elite consensus over security policy.
In the following discussion "national security" is taken to mean military, economic, and political protection against external threats. By this definition, Soviet national-security policy encompasses military programs, diplomatic initiatives, economic choices affecting the state's geopolitical position, and policy toward foreign economic and cultural contacts that might threaten the regime. This definition, although somewhat broader than customary notions of national security, helps make sense of Gorbachev's policy innovations and political tactics.

THE BREZHNEV LEGACY AND THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE

The Soviet approach to national security between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s had several salient features. The first was a belief that the sustained expansion of Soviet military power was essential to protect the USSR and extend its international influence. In the mid-70s Brezhnev and his colleagues did slow the growth of the military budget, but they never faced up to the fact that the expansion of the Soviet arsenal might contribute to a political and military backlash in the West. Instead they continued to operate on the assumption

1. Although Soviet policy did vary slightly under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, the similarities are so marked that we may justifiably describe them all as the Brezhnev legacy.

2. In the heyday of US-Soviet detente during the early 1970s, a few Soviet foreign-affairs specialists hinted at this possibility, but their oblique warnings never found any
that military power was a crucial component of the world "correlation of forces," and most of them assumed that a further shift of the military balance toward the USSR would elicit greater caution and additional political concessions from the West.

As a complement to this policy, Brezhnev sought East-West diplomatic understandings that would bolster the USSR's international standing and avoid the risk of an unbridled arms race with the United States. Eschewing Khrushchev's erratic alternation between bluff and conciliation, Brezhnev and his colleagues adopted a low-key diplomatic style, particularly in Europe. This new approach was based on a genuine belief in the desirability of diplomatic engagement with the West, but after the formative period at the start of the 1970s, it was carried out doggedly and unimaginatively. In practice the approach rested on the optimistic assumption that the USSR could obtain its goals primarily by outwaiting the Western powers, and only secondarily by making substantive concessions.

In keeping with this outlook the Soviets capitalized on detente to expand their influence in the Third World. Under Brezhnev the official line was that East-West detente, rather than necessitating a downgrading of "national liberation" struggles, would actually aid them by making the United States reflection in the public statements of the political leadership. See, for instance, the comment by Georgii Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, in Pravda, 22 July 1973, 4-5.
less assertive internationally. In the dawn of superpower detente Brezhnev and his associates showed more restraint in the Third World than is commonly recognized, particularly with respect to Vietnam.3 But by 1975 they had clearly become unwilling to satisfy American entreaties that they trim their expanding Third-World involvements. Instead they saw their gains in the Third World as a legitimate fruit of the sort of competitive policy they believed the U.S. still aimed to pursue, for example in the Middle East.

Although eager to project Soviet influence into the outside world, Brezhnev and his cohorts strove to minimize their own society's exposure to foreign cultural influences and political pressures. The oligarchs assiduously sought Western credits and technology, but they simultaneously limited the expansion of East-West cultural ties, asserting that the struggle between socialist and bourgeois ideologies was intensifying.4 This policy was not implemented with absolute consistency. Some emigration of Jews and other ethnic minorities was allowed in tacit response to Western pressures, and during the second half the 1970s the persecution of dissidents declined significantly,


apparently in deference to Western concerns. But the heated official response to such events as President Carter's public meeting with Vladimir Bukovsky demonstrated that these were grudging deviations from a policy intended to insulate Soviet society from outside influence. As conceived under Brezhnev, the security of the regime required the preservation of a high degree of sociopolitical isolation. Detente was meant to alleviate the pressures for internal change, not to increase them.

The collapse of superpower detente around 1980 provoked an extended leadership controversy about the Brezhnevian approach to national security. Up to 1985 the sharpest complaints came from national-security conservatives rather than from liberals. The central issue was whether 1970s-style detente could be restored or had given way to a new era of East-West confrontation. Party conservatives and their military supporters criticized the prevailing assumption—espoused by Brezhnev and then by Andropov and Chernenko—that detente was a long-term trend which could be revived through patience and hard-nosed diplomacy. In reality, argued the conservatives, Soviet diplomatic maneuvers could not


6. There were, however, a few hints that liberal criticisms were being made privately. For instance, one commentary focused on rejecting the views of conservatives who believed that detente had no future and that confrontation and an accelerated arms race were unavoidable. At the same time, it referred briefly to doubters who also felt that detente—presumably of the 1970s variety—had no future, but who therefore advocated unilateral Soviet steps in disarmament to "set an example" for the West. (Iu. Molchanov, "Razriadki: istoki i vozmozhnosti," Kommunist, No. 13, 1984, 109-110.)
achieve this goal. Detente had been eclipsed by a growing American aggressiveness reminiscent of Nazi Germany during the 1930s, and an acceleration of the Soviet military effort was urgently necessary.7

These divergent outlooks produced a extended internal struggle over the size of the military budget and Soviet diplomatic tactics vis-a-vis the West.8 In 1984, after the USSR broke off arms talks in response to the beginning of new U.S. INF deployments in Europe, the champions of an accelerated military buildup opposed resuming the arms talks without first obtaining a NATO commitment to reverse the deployments. NATO was naturally unwilling to offer such a commitment, and General Secretary Chernenko needed the better part of a year to force through a decision to return to the negotiating table. Chernenko's victory on this issue coincided with the demotion of Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, which constituted a decisive rebuff to the advocates of a surge in military spending.9

Soviet specialists and decisionmakers also began to review


their policy toward the Third World, although the process was less controversial and the options less clear-cut. During the early 1980s the statements of General Secretary Andropov and other leaders hinted at a more cautious attitude toward military and economic involvement in the Third World, partly because of growing pressures on Soviet domestic resources.¹⁰ In addition, a few foreign-affairs analysts began to concede that Soviet Third-World involvements had undermined U.S.-Soviet detente. Senior political leaders, however, did not echo the acknowledgement of this linkage and made no major policy changes. While avoiding new military involvements in regional conflicts, they showed no signs of reconsidering past Third-World decisions, including the invasion of Afghanistan. Instead they expanded support for their existing Third World clients.¹¹

In the realm of economic and cultural security, as in the formulation of military policy, the collapse of detente triggered a conservative reaction within the elite. After the U.S. imposed embargoes on grain exports and technology transfers in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, some members of the leadership criticized Brezhnev for allowing the USSR to become vulnerable to Western economic pressure, and Andropov hinted that Brezhnev's tacit substitution of Western trade for domestic economic reform


¹¹. Ibid., 47-75. For a different interpretation of the leadership's position on this linkage, see ibid., pp. 25-26.
was no longer acceptable. Meanwhile, the regime sought to heighten the isolation of domestic society from outside political-cultural influences by slashing emigration and cracking down on domestic dissent. The crackdown was symbolized by the breakup of *The Chronicle of Current Events* and other centers of dissent, along with the banishment of Andrei Sakharov to the city of Gorky.

**GORBACHEV AND THE SECURITY AGENDA**

**Military Power versus Diplomacy**

Judging by the handful of foreign-policy statements made by Gorbachev before 1985, the new general secretary lacked any predisposition to shift external policy toward greater reliance on military instruments. His public comments reflected a belief in the continued value of diplomatic tools for handling the geopolitical rivalry with the United States, and he appeared quite sanguine about the current stability of the strategic military balance. Gorbachev's position on these issues was notably more optimistic than that of some other Politburo members such as Romanov. Sketchy evidence suggests that in the fall of 1984 Gorbachev sided with Chernenko against Romanov over the

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12. *Pravda*, 23 April 1982, 2; Parrott, "Soviet Foreign Policy, Internal Politics, and Trade with the West," 50. Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskii was especially outspoken on the question of vulnerability.

advisability of resuming arms-control negotiations with the United States. 14 Some observers have speculated that Gorbachev and Chernenko reached an early political deal calling for Gorbachev to support Chernenko in exchange for Chernenko's backing in positioning himself to become the next general secretary. If that is so, agreement between the two leaders on the contentious issue of resuming superpower negotiations was probably part of the deal.

As general secretary, Gorbachev emphasized the dangerous nature of current international trends but asserted repeatedly that vigorous political efforts could reverse those trends. Gorbachev frequently highlighted the desire of hostile American groups to obtain military superiority over the USSR, and he promised to protect the "historic achievement" of Soviet strategic parity, which he depicted as a trustworthy means of deterring Western attack. 15 At the same time, noting the burden of the arms race for "all" countries, he suggested that the current defense budget was sufficient for this purpose and underscored the primacy of increased economic growth for the USSR's future durability. 16

Although he pledged to continue his predecessors' course in foreign policy, Gorbachev's early pronouncements contained hints


16. See, for instance, Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 147 (16 April 1985), and Kommunist, No. 17, 1985, 48.
that he wanted to go beyond the Brezhnevian approach to national security. By calling for "civilized relations" with the West he intimated that East and West had important values in common, and his endorsement of "peaceful constructive coexistence" implied that he rejected a minimalist approach to coexistence as unconstructive.\(^\text{17}\) It was necessary, he said, not simply to return to the detente of the 1970s but to achieve "much more"--namely, a comprehensive system of international security based on the recognition that socialist and capitalist states both could benefit from cooperation and both could be harmed by rivalry.\(^\text{18}\) Despite his criticisms of the Reagan Administration's alleged militarism, Gorbachev singled out positive elements in the Administration's pronouncements, and he predicted that in the future the Western antiwar movement would become increasingly effective at inhibiting the "forces of aggression."\(^\text{19}\) In discussing the burning issue of SDI, he remarked that the USSR would respond to a U.S. deployment of space-based defenses by expanding its offensive forces, but he declined to say the USSR

\(^{17}\) Pravda, 24 April 1985, 2; Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 204.

\(^{18}\) Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 134, 205 (7 April and 8 May 1985); Kommunist, No. 13, 1985, 18.

\(^{19}\) For instance, in a move anticipating his discussions with President Reagan at Geneva a few months later, he singled out the "positive aspects" of the President's "very important" statement that nuclear war was unwinnable and the President's remark that the United States was not seeking military superiority. (Kommunist, No. 13, 1985, 25. This interview was originally given to Time and was first published in the West.) See also Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 204-205.
would build similar defenses of its own.  

To buttress his policy views, Gorbachev set forth an unusual interpretation of the history of Soviet foreign relations. Asserting that the East-West confrontation was an historical "anomaly," he vigorously denied the parallel between the 1930s and the present which Soviet conservatives have traditionally conjured up as a justification for a hard-line external policy. Rather than draw confrontational lessons from the failure of Soviet collective-security diplomacy during the mid-1930s and prewar delays in Soviet arms programs, Gorbachev alluded to a new assessment of the causes of World War II and hinted obliquely that some of the responsibility for the war belonged to the USSR for allowing Hitler to come to power in Germany.  

Underscoring

20. In the spring of 1985 Gorbachev said that continuation of the SDI program would compel the USSR to adopt countermeasures "including, of course, the strengthening and perfection of offensive nuclear weapons," but he said nothing about the possible creation of a large-scale Soviet ABM system. (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 178.)

21. Gorbachev remarked that now, decades after World War II, "we are, as it were, thinking over the causes of the war anew...and are drawing serious conclusions about how to escape war in the life of the present and future generations." Although he put forward the customary condemnation of Western statesmen for the Munich agreement, he added an important new twist. The war, he said, began long before the first battles commenced. "Its ominous shadow hung over humanity when some politicians were unable--and others did not want--to prevent the establishment of Hitlerism in power. [Emphasis added.] Today we know more and better than than they knew at the time, how and by whom the fascist ruling clique was helped to arm itself...[and] prepare for military adventures." (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 180 (5 May 1985); Kommunist, No. 8, 1985, 13-14). Gorbachev's broad wording suggests that the passage was intended to include Stalin's disastrous orders for the German Communists to attack the German Social Democrats (as "social fascists") rather than the Nazis--orders which greatly facilitated the
the experience of socialist-capitalist cooperation against fascism during the war, he voiced the hope that East and West could work against the new "common enemy" represented by the threat of nuclear conflict.22

In broad terms, Gorbachev's approach to security policy enjoyed the support of several Politburo members. Perhaps the most important was Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In nominating Gorbachev at the March 1985 Central Committee plenum, Gromyko went out of his way to justify Gorbachev's foreign-policy credentials in terms that suggested he was trying to allay misgivings among party conservatives concerned about Soviet military security.23 Gromyko, who had been a major architect of Brezhnev's detente policy and had defended it against the conservatives during the early 1980s, plainly thought that the policy had not outlived its usefulness.24 Several other Politburo members, including Prime Minister Ryzhkov, Deputy Prime Minister Aliev, party secretary Zaikov, and Georgian party chief

Nazis' assumption of power in 1933. This critical interpretation of Stalin's early policy toward Germany was later spelled out by several Soviet exponents of foreign-policy reform (see below), and at the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev warned against underestimating the danger of a further move to the right in contemporary capitalist politics. (XXVII s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), I, 3.)


Shevardnadze, also backed Gorbachev's diplomatic line.  

Other leaders, including two strong backers of Gorbachev's campaign for domestic discipline and order, were more cautious about security policy. KGB Chairman Chebrikov at first strongly emphasized the hostility of the West, although his depiction of the threat suggests that he was probably seeking a broad KGB mandate to combat Western political and intelligence "provocations" rather than an expansion of the Armed Forces. Several months later, after the Politburo balance shifted in favor of Gorbachev and Chebrikov obtained the mandate he desired, the KGB chief strongly affirmed the large benefits of flexible diplomacy. Quite possibly this shift of stance reflected a deal struck by Gorbachev in order to maintain the KGB as a political counterweight to the Armed Forces and obtain stronger backing for his diplomatic initiatives.  

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26. Kommunist, No. 9, 1985, 49-50. See also Chebrikov's earlier positive description of the adequacy of the Soviet military effort: Pravda, 7 February 1985, 2.  
27. Chebrikov's change of stance was reflected in his enthusiastic comments about the growing potential of the peace movement and the effectiveness of flexible diplomacy; see Pravda, 7 November 1985, 2.  
28. The new edition of the party program, which was unveiled in draft in the fall of 1985, assigned the security organs a security mission equal in importance to that of the Armed Forces. This was a marked shift from the 1961 edition of the program, which did not mention the police in connection with national defense. (Amy W. Knight, The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 99). At the 27th party congress, which approved the new version of the program, Gorbachev made some very favorable comments about the KGB.
comments of party secretary Egor Ligachev, another powerful backer of the drive for domestic discipline, remained rather noncommittal and seemed to give the military budget somewhat higher priority than Gorbachev assigned to it.\textsuperscript{29}

Whatever the exact preferences of these two figures, other leaders manifestly harbored serious doubts about Gorbachev's approach to military security. Warning that adventurist tendencies were becoming stronger in Western policies, Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskii claimed that the United States was seeking "decisive military superiority" over the USSR--a formula which only hard-line advocates of a stepped-up military effort ordinarily used.\textsuperscript{30} Shcherbitskii's pessimistic interpretation of the influence of the Western antiwar movement

\textsuperscript{29} According to Ligachev, the "complex international situation" required "a maximum mobilization of the party ranks and genuine Bolshevik concern about accelerating economic growth and strengthening the defense capacity of the country." (\textit{Kommunist}, No. 12, 1985, 21.) Ligachev's comments about the November 1985 Geneva summit were also lukewarm (see below).

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Pravda Ukrainy}, 8 May 1985, 2; and \textit{Pravda}, 8 March 1985, 4 (emphasis added). This formula had been used by Marshal Ogarkov in his public campaign for larger defense budgets. The customary formula was that the U.S. was seeking "military superiority" or "military-strategic superiority." Shcherbitskii adopted Gorbachev's terminology of "civilized relations" and "reasonable compromises" between East and West. But he said that every Soviet patriot should do everything to strengthen the country's economic and defense might, adding that "we would manifest an unforgivable carelessness if we behaved otherwise." Remarking that the USSR's economic and defense might was a decisive condition for the success of its foreign policy, Shcherbitskii said that every Communist and citizen was obligated to "strengthen this might and see to it (zabotit'sia) that our Armed Forces have everything necessary for a reliable defense of the Fatherland." The wording contained an oblique hint that the Armed Forces did not presently have all that they needed. (\textit{Pravda Ukrainy}, 8 May 1985, 2, and 22 May 1985, 3.)
also suggested that he favored a more vigorous Soviet military effort. Having recently visited the United States and West Germany, he remarked that McCarthyite and neo-Nazi tendencies in the two countries "remind world society of similar processes that occurred in the states of the fascist coalition on the eve of the [Second World] War." This remark contradicted Gorbachev's contrast between the 1930s and the present and implicitly ran against the lessons Gorbachev had drawn from World War II. Shcherbistskii's statement was almost certainly intended to bolster the similar parallels with the 1930s drawn by Marshal Ogarkov, who renewed his demand for higher defense spending at this time. Shcherbistskii also seemed readier than Gorbachev to threaten that the USSR would meet the further development of the American SDI program with extensive missile defenses of its

31. Pravda Ukrainy, 8 May 1985, 2. Shcherbistskii gave a report on his visit to the U.S. at the Politburo meeting on March 21, and on April 5 he gave a report on his trip to the Federal Republic. At the April 12 Politburo meeting Gorbachev and Gromyko reported on their conversations with a high-level U.S. Congressional delegation in Moscow. During the Politburo discussion of this subject, the Soviet aim of improving relations with the U.S. was reportedly "underscored with all definiteness." It was also remarked that the achievement of this goal required "political will on both sides." (Izvestiia 12 April 1985, 1.) The wording suggested some disagreement about policy toward the U.S.

32. N. A. Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), 20, 24, 93. Shortly after his demotion in September 1984, Ogarkov was forced to recant many of his alarmist views. In the spring, however, he published this new book. Although the book was an amalgam of disparate elements, it set forth most of the alarmist points that Ogarkov had briefly retracted the previous fall. It was sent to the compositor in late February and signed for printing in early April.
own. 33

Grigorii Romanov harbored a similar skepticism about Gorbachev's security policy. In the fall of 1984, when the Chernenko Politburo was debating whether to make American INF rollbacks a precondition for the reopening of superpower arms talks, Romanov apparently opposed dropping the condition, whereas Gorbachev evidently favored it. 34 To judge by sketchy evidence, in the first half of 1985 Romanov continued to doubt the wisdom of making a vigorous bid for improved Soviet-American relations. Although he paid lip-service to the notion, he remarked that the international situation was "extremely complicated and dangerous." The U.S. had been seeking military superiority since the second half of the 1970s--"that is,...practically already for a whole decade"--and only the Soviet Union and its allies had prevented nuclear war from breaking out. 35 Romanov's periodization suggested that the superpower detente of the 1970s had exerted only a fleeting influence on Western military programs, and it seemed to reflect an underlying doubt that future arms negotiations would be any more effective. As Romanov saw it, detente, not confrontation, appeared to be the historical

33. In March 1985 Shcherbitskii told U.S. officials that Moscow would respond to the further development of SDI with "both offensive and defensive" measures, a formula which hinted at the possible deployment of extensive Soviet ABM defenses. (The Washington Post, 8 March 1985, A1.)


anomaly.

Defense Minister Sokolov shared some of these conservative attitudes. Shortly after Gorbachev became party leader Sokolov published an article on the forthcoming V-E Day anniversary. Although he echoed Gorbachev's statement that all East-West disputes could be resolved by peaceful means, Sokolov painted a grim picture of deepening U.S. militarism. Implying that the Soviet armed forces did not currently have all they needed, he remarked that the "severe lessons" of World War II demanded great vigilance. "The growing military threat from the U.S. and its NATO allies requires [us] to strengthen the defense capacity of our Motherland and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces," Sokolov said emphatically.36 There was also a noteworthy difference between Gorbachev's and Sokolov's descriptions of how the USSR would respond to the further development of SDI. Whereas Gorbachev avoided raising the possibility of deploying a Soviet space-based BMD, Sokolov said that one side's deployment of an extensive ABM system "will inevitably provoke answering actions by the other side in the form of the quantitative and qualitative growth of strategic offensive weapons and the creation of a large-scale ABM defense," plus defense-suppression

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36. Kommunist, No. 6, 1985, 67; emphasis in the original. The party, Sokolov remarked, "is working out and realizing...a complex of measures for supplying the army and navy with everything necessary." (Ibid., 69). The implication is that the military would not have all it needed until these measures were fully implemented.
weapons designed to neutralize the other side's ABM system.37

Sokolov's dissatisfaction with the defense budget was probably aggravated by the political slight he suffered at Gorbachev's hands. Shortly after Gorbachev became general secretary two of Gorbachev's political allies--Ryzhkov and Ligachev--were vaulted to full Politburo membership without passing through the candidate stage, and another associate, Chebrikov, was raised from candidate to full membership. Sokolov, however, was promoted only to candidate membership. The result was to give the other principal state organizations concerned with external relations--the Foreign Ministry and the KGB--a stronger voice in top-level deliberations than the military establishment enjoyed. Sokolov's displeasure is indicated by the fact that he delivered several major speeches in the following months without ever mentioning Gorbachev's name. His first public reference to the new general secretary came almost six months after Gorbachev assumed power.

**Economic Acceleration and the Defense Budget**

In addition to being upset by the low Politburo status accorded to the military, Sokolov apparently also disagreed with Gorbachev's stand on the issue of guns versus growth. Gorbachev

37. Pravda, 6 November 1985, 4. This constituted a noticeable hardening of Sokolov's position. Six months earlier he had said that one side would respond to a large-scale BMD deployment by the other "either by expanding its strategic offensive weapons, or by augmenting them with ABM systems, or more likely, by both means." (Krasnaiia zvezda, 5 May 1985, 3.)
voiced profound concern about the USSR's future international security, but he highlighted the economic rather than the strictly military aspect of the threat. While Gorbachev promised not to let the United States obtain strategic superiority over the USSR, he claimed that the future of the Soviet system and world socialism hinged on accelerated economic development, and he remarked that added increments of military power should not be equated with an increase in the state's security.\textsuperscript{38} Overriding priority, he asserted, must be given to modernizing the machinebuilding, computer, and other high-technology industries.\textsuperscript{39}

In striking this posture, Gorbachev still intimated that his economic program would enhance the country's safety. By asserting repeatedly that the USSR should be able to meet its own high technology requirements, he clearly distinguished his economic program from Brezhnev's and appealed to conservatives alarmed by the USSR's increased economic reliance on the West. Moreover, despite his firm rejection of analogies between the prewar and contemporary geopolitical situations, on one occasion Gorbachev did draw a parallel between his call for economic acceleration and the breakneck industrialization drive launched

\textsuperscript{38} Pravda, 24 April 1985, p. 1; Parrott, \textit{The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense}, chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{39} Gorbachev, \textit{Izbrannye rechi i stat'i}, II, 147 (16 April 1985), and \textit{Kommunist}, No. 17, 1985, 48.
during the 1930s. But this statement was clearly a political gambit to undermine a Politburo rival, Romanov, rather than a genuine commitment to unleash a new surge of military spending on the heels of industrial modernization. The statement was made in Leningrad, a major defense industrial center in which Romanov had built a strong political machine before moving to Moscow as the national party secretary for defense production. Gorbachev, who was trying to unseat Romanov, probably made the statement to woo Romanov's conservative potential supporters. Apparently the gambit succeeded, and Romanov was ousted from the Politburo two months later.

Although Gorbachev's drive for economic modernization offered potential military benefits in the long term, it strengthened the temptation to divert resources from the current military budget to industrial investment. Partly for that reason, the campaign for uskorenie provoked a budgetary struggle in which Gorbachev's opponents stressed the continuity between current economic policies and those of the Brezhnev period, whereas he and his supporters advocated a "Leninist" version of

40. Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, II, 214. Gorbachev, however, carefully refrained from mentioning Stalin or any need to expand the armed forces.

political continuity based on policy innovation.42 In mid-July, shortly after Romanov was ousted, Gorbachev met in Minsk with the military high command. According to informal accounts of his unpublished speech, Gorbachev told military planners that stringent limits would be imposed on the growth of military expenditures.43 The fact that this speech has never been published indicates that its contents were indeed sensitive, and oblique evidence suggests that it caused discomfort within the military high command.44

42. During Gorbachev's first six months in power he and such backers as Shevardnadze emphasized the current leadership's sharp break with previous party policy. (Pravda, 24 April 1985, 1, and Zaria vostoka, 21 May 1985 [CHECK], 1.). More conservative figures, such as Kunaev, Grishin, and Shcherbitskii, stressed he continuity between current policy and that established under Brezhnev. (Pravda, 14 March 1985, 2, 12 June 1985, 2, and 22 December 1985, 3; Pravda Ukrainy, 8 May 1985, 2, and 22 May 1985, 3).

43. Dale Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," Orbis 30, No. 2 (Summer 1986), p. 311. A capsule summary provided by Shcherbitskii, who would if anything have toned down the Gorbachev's accent on growth, is consistent with these reports. According to Shcherbitskii, the Minsk speech emphasized that "of all matters the most paramount (samoe pervoocherednoe) today is to do the maximum possible for successful completion of the current five-year plan. It is important that everyone understand that the fulfillment of the 1985 plan and the thoughtful development of plans (sic) of the future five-year period is a test of our cadres' understanding of the tasks standing [before us]...." (Pravda Ukrainy, 17 July 1985, 2.)

44. For instance, an account of the December 1985 meeting of the General Staff's party aktiv implied that Marshal Akhromeev and other officers were uneasy with the line taken by Gorbachev in the Minsk speech. On the one hand, the meeting emphasized the authoritative character of the principles laid down in Gorbachev's speech. On the other hand, at the gathering Akhromeev emphasized that despite the recent Geneva summit, the U.S. was still striving to preempt the USSR in deploying new types of weapons, and unidentified speakers underscored the need
Although some military intellectuals and thoughtful officers were ready to accept short-term military sacrifices as the price of maintaining military effectiveness over the long term, some key senior commanders resisted this idea. Marshal Sokolov, in particular, seemed suspicious of any attempt to promote industrial modernization at the expense of the military establishment. As noted above, Sokolov was emphatic about the need to expand Soviet military power further. In May 1985, when the party aktiv of the Ministry of Defense met to discuss the results of the April plenum at which Gorbachev had laid out his agenda for accelerated economic growth, Sokolov reported on the plenum without mentioning Gorbachev's keynote address. Instead, following a tactic employed by Shcherbitskii and other Politburo conservatives intent on curbing Gorbachev's economic innovations, he stressed the continuity between the April plenum and policies adopted in the pre-Gorbachev era. The April plenum, Sokolov said, "confirmed with all persuasiveness the continuity of the strategic [political] course developed by the 26th Party Congress"--that is, under Brezhnev--"and by the following plenums of the CPSU Central Committee."45 In other words, the Defense

for the USSR to preempt the U.S. in taking countermeasures. (Krasnaia zvezda, 31 December 1985.)

45. Krasnaia zvezda, 25 May 1985, p. 2. Cf. MPA chief Epishev's more favorable treatment of the April plenum's decisions at the same meeting. Sokolov's negative attitude was also reflected in his attachment to the Brezhnevian slogan of "developed socialism," which was a major point of contention between Gorbachev and members of the party's old guard. Only days before Gorbachev told the 27th Party Congress that the concept had become a figleaf for socioeconomic stagnation,
Minister sided with the civilian politicians who were trying to restrict Gorbachev's growing power and slow the momentum of his drive for economic revitalization. During the following year, Sokolov again pressed for fuller attention to military needs than Gorbachev was prepared to give.

Diplomacy, Summits, and Security

Not long after becoming general secretary Gorbachev took the first steps to realize his goal of achieving a relationship with the West that was "much more" than the old version of detente. In July 1985, coincident with Romanov's removal from the Politburo, Gromyko was made chairman of the Supreme Soviet and replaced as foreign minister by Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze, an exceptionally close political ally of Gorbachev, was an enthusiastic advocate of diplomatic flexibility. His appointment gave Gorbachev more control over the implementation of foreign policy, although he and Gorbachev at first avoided

Sokolov referred to it approvingly. (Pravda, 23 February 1986, 2.)


47. See below.

48. Shortly after Gorbachev became general secretary, Shevardnadze hailed him as head of the Politburo; to my knowledge he was the only member to confer this status on the new leader. After becoming foreign minister Shevardnadze observed that the detente of the 1970s was not an "accidental episode" but a valuable experience showing that the "natural condition" of international relations is "constructive dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation." (Zaria vostoka, 21 May 1985, 4; Pravda, 31 July 1985, 4-5.)
major personnel changes at the Foreign Ministry, most likely in order not to offend Gromyko.49

During his first three months as leader Gorbachev had hinted that the USSR might again break off the superpower arms talks if the U.S. were not more forthcoming. But immediately after Romanov's removal and Shevardnadze's appointment Gorbachev tacked sharply and announced that he would meet President Reagan in Geneva during the fall. He also declared a unilateral moratorium on Soviet nuclear tests and appealed for the United States to reciprocate. At about the same time, Soviet arms negotiators began to table proposals which made concessions to the U.S. desire for deep reductions in the Soviet strategic arsenal, and at the Geneva summit Gorbachev hinted that the INF question, previously linked by the USSR to SDI, might be resolved separately. In addition, he agreed to hold two further summits with President Reagan in 1986 and 1987.50 Together these steps marked a palpable shift in diplomatic tactics.

Senior leaders, however, differed over whether this shift was wise, particularly in view of the fact that the Geneva summit produced few concrete results. Gorbachev himself adopted an upbeat tone. Remarking that the Soviet side had not had "the smallest illusions" about American intentions on the eve of the meeting, he asserted that the final joint communique was


significant because it entailed a recognition that nuclear war was unwinnable and must be avoided, along with a pledge not to seek military superiority. The communique was not a formal agreement, Gorbachev acknowledged, but it nevertheless expressed "a fundamental stance of the leaders of both countries obligating [them] to a great deal." American international conduct had begun to change, said Gorbachev, and "even the smallest chance" to curb the arms race through negotiations should not be lost. Very serious differences continued to separate the two sides, but the differences might be resolved through compromises and should not be overdramatized. "Inactivity or slowness in actions," Gorbachev maintained, would be "criminal." Obviously he regarded the summit as part of an urgent political struggle against U.S. military programs, especially SDI, and he appeared to be trying to persuade persons who doubted that the summit had been as successful as he claimed.

Led by Shevardnadze, several leaders evidently accepted Gorbachev's arguments. Hailing the meeting as "an event of enormous international significance," Shevardnadze highlighted the Warsaw Pact members' "exceptionally high evaluation" of Gorbachev's skill in presenting the socialist camp's views on international issues. Perhaps the strongest endorsements came from Ryzhkov and Aliev. The summit, Ryzhkov said, strengthened faith in the large potential of active diplomacy. Its

52. Pravda, 7 December 1985, 4.
achievements should not be underestimated, and the final communique contained "obligations of fundamental importance." Gromyko's much more restrained description of the Geneva communique as a matter of "importance" may have signified new frictions with Gorbachev. At the end of 1985 Gorbachev intimated that he was dissatisfied with the objectivity of the reports from Soviet diplomats abroad and hinted obliquely that these reports might adversely affect the formulation of Soviet policy. Most of the officials in question had been appointed when Gromyko was foreign minister, and Gorbachev may have been complaining about their reporting on the foreign impact of the Geneva meeting. A month later, on the eve of his definitive statement delinking INF from SDI--an issue that had been treated ambiguously since the summit--Gorbachev observed that a Soviet policy based on ultimatums would allow other governments to hide behind the USSR's uncompromising stance and deceive their peoples

53. Izvestiia, 4 December 1985, 4; Sovetskaia Belorussia, 15 December 1985, 2.
54. Izvestiia, 4 December 1985.
56. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 121 (27 December 1985).
about their real intentions. At roughly the same time, Gromyko remarked that the restoration of detente had always been the aim of Soviet policy, "including before [the] Geneva [summit], at the Soviet-American summit, and after Geneva." His accent on continuity seemed intended to downgrade the significance of the Geneva meeting and implicitly to justify the handling of foreign policy in the period when he had been foreign minister. Whether Gromyko opposed delinking INF remains unclear. But these comments suggest that he and Gorbachev were privately sparring over whether a more flexible foreign-policy strategy, including an advance commitment to hold two more summits, would help improve superpower relations.

If Gromyko offered only lukewarm support for the results of Geneva, Shcherbitskii voiced clear skepticism. Although Shcherbitskii hailed the joint communique's statements on nuclear war, he silently passed over the mutual pledge not to seek military superiority, and in a riposte to Gorbachev, he warned against "needless illusions" about the benefits of the summit. Even before the meeting, Shcherbitskii asserted, it had been

57. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 167 (4 February 1986).


59. Ligachev's endorsement of the summit also seemed half-hearted. As one of Gorbachev's most forceful allies in the struggle against Brezhnevite holdovers in the party, Ligachev presumably had an incentive to express and possibly overstate any favorable attitudes about the Geneva meeting. Seen in this light, his laconic description of the meeting as a "major political event" suggests he was not particularly enthusiastic about the results. (Bakinskii rabochii, 22 December 1985, 1.)
clear that the Reagan administration intended to continue to pursue military superiority, and recent White House statements demonstrated that superiority remained the administration's goal. At present, possibilities for reaching a common understanding with the United States on fundamental questions, particularly SDI and the SALT II agreement, "do not exist." The U.S. commitment to SDI doomed the world to many years of a forced arms race and undermined the very basis for the limitation or reduction of weaponry. The contrast with Gorbachev's words was striking. Gorbachev had forthrightly acknowledged that the superpowers were at odds over SDI, but he and Reagan had agreed that there was a real prospect of reducing strategic nuclear arms and INF contingents. By suggesting that agreements on strategic nuclear forces and on INF, which presumably qualified as another 'fundamental question,' were impossible, Shcherbitskii appeared to oppose any move to decouple SDI from agreements on offensive nuclear weapons. The skeptical responses from Chief of the General Staff Akhromeev and some military commentators indicated that a significant group of professional officers agreed with

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60. Izvestiia, 28 November 1985, 3; Pravda Ukrainy, 22 December 1985, 2. In the same week that Shcherbitskii warned against illusions, Gorbachev remarked that recent signals had given a "certain hope" for finding mutually acceptable East-West arrangements and that on "certain points" the superpowers had recently come closer in their negotiations on nuclear and space arms. (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'ii, III, 119 (27 December 1985).)

This tugging and hauling foreshadowed Gorbachev's adoption of a more daring security policy. In January 1986 he unveiled a sweeping proposal for the step-by-step abolition of nuclear weapons during the next fifteen years, and at the 27th Party Congress he declared that the growing interdependence of the world required a radical improvement of East-West relations. Perhaps anticipating conservative objections, Gorbachev maintained that this approach did not require the regime to renounce either its principles or its ideals. A new level of East-West cooperation was attainable, he asserted, and a rapid transition to constructive action was necessary.

At the party congress Gorbachev voiced deep apprehension about trends in the East-West military competition. His comments, however, departed drastically from customary Soviet statements of alarm, because they highlighted political accommodation rather than the unilateral accumulation of military power as the solution to the problem. With SDI uppermost in his mind, Gorbachev asserted that even the strongest state could no longer protect itself by military-technical means alone; security

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was increasingly becoming a task that could be solved only by political means. Emphasizing the unpredictability of conflict situations and the increasing encroachment of automated weapons-systems on politicians' ability to control events during a crisis, Gorbachev raised the specter of a military logic that might ultimately escape political control and lead to accidental nuclear war.64

In keeping with this picture, Gorbachev adopted a skeptical attitude toward the utility of military power. A year earlier he had praised the Soviet achievement of parity and described it as an effective means for deterring Western attack. Now, however, he asserted that in future stages of the arms race, even if superpower parity were maintained, the Soviet doctrine of deterrence might not prevent a general war.65 These statements were part of an emerging liberal critique of the security strategy that had taken shape under Brezhnev.

The essence of the liberal critique was that the Brezhnev leadership had placed too much stress on military instruments—not too little, as conservative critics maintained—and had failed to gain the security benefits available through flexible diplomacy and compromise. At the party congress Gorbachev gave

64. Ibid., 7-8.

65. Gorbachev manifestly had in mind both the Soviet and Western variants of deterrence. Security, he said, could not be built forever on the doctrines of deterrence (sderzhivanie) and intimidation (ustrashenie). (Ibid., 7-8). Soviet commentators have customarily used the word sderzhivanie to describe Soviet nuclear doctrine. They have reserved the word ustrashenie as a term to stigmatize Western nuclear doctrine.
his first unmistakable signal of dissatisfaction with recent Soviet foreign policy, and shortly afterward he spelled out his complaints in a speech at a special meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was not published until the following year. Gorbachev now invoked the "Leninist" version of political continuity (preemstvennost'), which he had previously used to legitimize the reversal of Brezhnev's domestic policies, to justify changes in the security policy inherited from Brezhnev and Gromyko. In foreign affairs, said the general secretary, the principle of continuity had nothing in common with the simple repetition of past practice, but required new approaches to avoid confrontation and reach mutually acceptable compromises. Future Soviet policy, he said, would aim to avoid provoking other countries' "fears, even if imaginary, for their security."66

This statement, obviously at odds with Gromyko's recent accent on real continuity in foreign policy, constituted a striking reversal of the traditional Soviet refusal to acknowledge that Soviet military programs might provoke the legitimate apprehension of other countries. It also heralded a far-reaching shakeup of the personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.67

66. Izvestiia, 26 February 1986, 8. In this connection, Gorbachev remarked that the April 1985 plenum had undertaken a new analysis of the threat of nuclear war. The plenum materials published at the time, however, gave no indication of such a reassessment. Either it was kept confidential or Gorbachev was trying to legitimize his preferences by reading them back into the decisions of an earlier party gathering.

67. Between January and August seven of the eight deputy foreign ministers who had served under Gromyko were replaced. (Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," 32-33). In addition to
Consistent with this new perspective, Gorbachev not only claimed that the current Soviet military effort was adequate but vigorously argued that any delay in engaging the West in active negotiations would be a mistake. In military affairs, he declared, his country's goal was "reasonable sufficiency." By itself the USSR could not solve such global problems as military security, and much hinged on the ability of Western leaders to make sober judgments about the current state of affairs. But in any case, Gorbachev told the party congress, the USSR would not hold back or slam the door on negotiations, as Western reactionary circles desired; instead it would press for dialogue and mutual agreements. 68

During the following months of fencing between Washington and Moscow over the timing of a new summit, Gorbachev repeated this theme and sought to counter the view of unnamed Soviet figures who wished to stretch out the arms-control talks and wait for the next American administration. He made his most specific public rebuttal of this outlook ten days before privately writing President Reagan to propose that they meet at Reykjavik in October. 69 Reassuring "many of our people" that the USSR would

Gorbachev, three recently appointed party secretaries attended: Anatoly Dobrynin, overseer and head of the International Department; Aleksander Iakovlev, overseer of the Propaganda Department; and Vadim Medvedev.

68. Izvestiia, 26 February 1986, 2-3, 8; XXVII s"ezd KPSS, II, 301.

69. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 284-285, 489 (6 March and 14 July 1986); Pravda, 9 September 1986, 2. The U.S. attack on Libya in April caused the USSR to postpone talks
not allow itself to be surprised by an American break-out in ballistic missile defense, he also argued that the recent upturn in Soviet-American relations was due to improved Soviet economic performance—and not, by implication, to Soviet military programs.\textsuperscript{70} Evidently some leaders favored larger defense budgets and believed a new summit would only help the Reagan administration generate domestic support for U.S. military spending without producing any beneficial arms-control agreements.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{Widening the Diplomatic Agenda}

Gorbachev strove to minimize this possibility by unveiling a new four-part security agenda that included not only arms control and economic cooperation with the West but cooperation in political and "humanitarian" matters as well.\textsuperscript{72} In negotiations, intended to fix a date for the next summit. Another source of delay was the August arrest of Nicholas Daniloff, which may conceivably have been authorized by officials interested in blocking a second summit. The selection of Reykjavik as the site for the meeting allowed Gorbachev to bill it as a "preliminary summit" and avoid coming to the United States when no arms-control agreements were ready to be signed.

\textsuperscript{70} Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 356, 376, and Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, No. 1, 1987, 4-6, as translated in FBIS, 2 September 1987, 23. This is a report on the "basic theses" of Gorbachev's speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 May 1986.

\textsuperscript{71} As noted below, Dobrynin went out of his way to offer assurances that the Soviet side would not be tricked in the superpower maneuvering over a new summit. The leaders most likely to hold such skeptical views were Shcherbitskii and Sokolov. Their statements are examined below.

\textsuperscript{72} XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 97-99.
Gorbachev said in his private remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet representatives must avoid a "senseless stubbornness" that led to impasses and created the image of "Mr. Nyet" for the USSR. When the West raised human-rights issues, Soviet diplomats should avoid being passive or defensive and engage the West in an open dialogue that stressed Soviet human-rights accomplishments.  

Gorbachev also implicitly downgraded the importance of the Third World and hinted at a less venturesome policy toward Third-World revolutions and commitments. At the party congress he restricted himself to a rather perfunctory pledge of "solidarity" with national-liberation movements, and he observed that capitalism had succeeded in keeping many liberated countries in a position of economic dependency. While he repeated his predecessors' assurance that the USSR would not "export revolution," he omitted the usual accompanying promise that the USSR would struggle against the "export of counterrevolution" by the West, and he cited Lenin's condemnation of left-wing communists who tried to "push" foreign revolutions. In his speech at the Foreign Ministry Gorbachev remarked that "the time has also come to consider as a comprehensive whole our economic pledges with respect to the Third World." This seemed to imply  

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73. Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, No. 1, 1987, 4-6, as translated in FBIS, 2 September 1987, 24-25.

74. Izvestia, 26 February 1986, 2-3, 7-8; Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, 716.

75. FBIS, 2 September 1987, 24.
that the aggregate burden of Soviet Third-World commitments ought to be reduced.

Shevardnadze, Gromyko's replacement as foreign minister, strongly backed Gorbachev's security approach and highlighted the urgent need for "a decisive renunciation of outdated philosophies and...doctrines." Obviously Shevardnadze believed that some of those doctrines existed within the foreign-policy apparatus, because he said pointedly that Soviet foreign-policy institutions could not be immune from criticism and that Soviet "reserves" of diplomatic dynamism and foreign-policy analysis had not yet been tapped. Probably in response to objections from Gromyko and his supporters, Shevardnadze evidently also tried to counter the charge that any defects in the foreign-affairs bureaucracy were his own fault.76

As Shevardnadze saw it, more active Soviet diplomacy was particularly necessary to cope with ominous military trends. In an open-ended passage apparently addressed to Soviet officials as well as to Western policymakers, the foreign minister condemned the idea that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter a foreign attack. Hailing the beneficial effects of foreign-policy glasnost', he attached special significance to Gorbachev's recent declaration calling for phased arms reductions and the

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76. "I have been working as Minister [of Foreign Affairs] for a short time," he said. "It would seem early to come out with self-criticism. But if I have the occasion to speak at the 28th Congress then, naturally, I will speak both about achievements and inadequacies; I will speak directly, self-critically." (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 416.)
elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The declaration, said Shevardnadze, was "an event of truly global significance" that "has already attained the character of a material force" and had put the United States on the diplomatic defensive. Support for this line also came from several other Politburo members, such as Nikolai Sliun'kov and Boris El'tsin, who emphasized the positive international impact of Gorbachev's personal diplomacy and argued that not to press ahead with the diplomatic campaign would "border on crime."

The most thorough exposition of the rationale for a revised security policy was presented by Anatoly Dobrynin. Dobrynin had been recalled from his ambassadorial post in Washington and installed as the party secretary overseeing foreign relations shortly before Gorbachev spoke at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and authorized a shakeup of the diplomatic corps. Soon after the meeting, Dobrynin published a pathbreaking article on security policy. Soviet passivity in the face of negative international trends was unacceptable, said the secretary in a jab at the

77. "It would seem that everything is perfectly clear and simple: nuclear weaponry is a terrible, immoral and unnatural thing. However, one has only to call for its complete elimination, and at once 'lawyers' appear who give it out as nearly a universal good. Today they are trying anew to prove that such weaponry is allegedly necessary as a factor of mutual (sic) deterrence, that allegedly there is no doing without it." In addition to the elimination of nuclear weapons, Shevardnadze advocated the simultaneous implementation of "stabilizing reductions of conventional weapons." (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 412-413.)

78. See, for example, the statements by Sliunk'kov (Izvestiia, 26 September 1986, 4), and El'tsin (Pravda, 4 May 1986, 4).
advocates of stand-pat or hard-line diplomacy. Instead the USSR must respond with unprecedentedly active diplomacy involving a qualitatively higher level of flexibility and "reasonable compromises" between the sides.\textsuperscript{79}

Dobrynin's prescription was clearly aimed at maximizing support in the West for a more conciliatory policy toward the USSR.\textsuperscript{80} Flexible diplomacy, he claimed, would put the U.S. on the defensive and create virtually irresistible political pressures that would lead to advantageous arms agreements.\textsuperscript{81} The USSR, Dobrynin reassured Soviet skeptics, would not let itself be outwitted in the maneuvering over another summit meeting, nor would it allow the United States to achieve military superiority while engaging in negotiations.\textsuperscript{82}

Despite this reassurance, Dobrynin clearly thought the accumulation of Soviet military power was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In explaining the avoidance of general war in recent decades, Dobrynin sharply downgraded the role of Soviet military might and highlighted the role of Soviet diplomacy, along with the growing influence of reasonable

\textsuperscript{79}. Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 21 May 86, 1-2; Kommunist, No. 9, 1986, 24-25.

\textsuperscript{80}. The Western antiwar movements, he asserted, had, perhaps for the first time in history, become a powerful force of independent importance, and some opportunities to strengthen the political influence of Western workers were not yet being utilized or even recognized. (Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 21 May 86, 1-2; Kommunist, No. 9, 1986, 24-25, and No. 16, 1986, 23-24.)

\textsuperscript{81}. Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 20 May 1986, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{82}. Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 20 May 1986, 1-2.
Looking to the future, he did not focus on the danger of a premeditated Western attack, as Soviet conservatives did. Instead he suggested that the current military balance was vulnerable to the outbreak of accidental war and that the further advance of military technology would make it more so. In the long term, nuclear deterrence could not ensure the avoidance of general war. Scholars and politicians, said Dobrynin in a slap at military men, had long understood that improved weapons serve merely to make war more terrible, not to avoid it, and nuclear weapons should not be justified on the grounds that they reduced the chances of conventional conflict. Wary of new military programs, Dobrynin also indicated that any future Soviet military response to SDI would probably not be in space.

To spur the rethinking of security policy, Dobrynin pushed hard for the creation of new civilian centers of military expertise. He praised the recent emergence of a "contemporary Soviet school of foreign-policy and military-political research"

83. During the nuclear era, Dobrynin said, the U.S. had repeatedly tried to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of military-political blackmail. "And if a nuclear war nevertheless did not break out during the four postwar decades, that is not at all thanks to the 'deterrent' (sderzhivaiushchei) force of nuclear weaponry. In part the reason of politicians played a role, and in still larger measure, the efforts of the USSR and other peaceloving states and the rise of the mass antiwar movement." (Kommunist, No. 9, 1986, 20.)


85. Kommunist, No. 9, 1986, 22.
but noted that many new problems still required scholarly study. Dobrynin proceeded to list a series of military-technical topics to which Soviet military theorists and planners had devoted years of careful professional study.86 At no point, however, did he refer to any of the military academies and institutes engaged in analyzing these topics. Instead he singled out the Scientific Council on Peace and Disarmament and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences as the locus of promising research on these subjects.87 The same interest in increasing the role of civilian experts in the formulation of military policy was shown by Aleksandr Iakovlev—himself a former director of one of the Academy's foreign-affairs institutes—after he became a full member of the Politburo.88

Dobrynin's glaring omission of any reference to military specialists signaled an attempt to reduce the professional authority of the officer corps in favor of civilian defense specialists. Shortly after being appointed to the secretariat Dobrynin organized a military affairs section within the Central Committee's International Department. A small arms-control

86. These included the interaction between offensive and defensive armaments, as well as between nuclear and conventional weapons, the definition of "reasonable sufficiency" in nuclear arsenals, the mathematical modeling of strategic stability, and the verification of arms-control agreements. (Ibid., pp. 26-28.)


section was also set up under Iakovlev's Propaganda Department. About the same time a closed research department dealing with classified military and security issues was established inside the Academy's Institute for the World Economy and International Relations. Some of the staff members of these new units were retired officers or military men seconded from regular military assignments. As a rule, however, their views tended to fall outside the mainstream of conventional military thought, and they functioned as allies of the civilian experts working to recast security policy.

Dobrynin's recipe for bolstering Soviet security called for more agile and conciliatory diplomacy. Apart from endorsing the unilateral test moratorium, he appeared to advocate a less venturesome Third-World policy as a means of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. But perhaps most striking was his explicit and positive recognition of the linkage between superpower arms control and human rights. The human rights issue, he granted Soviet conservatives, must be removed from the realm of Western political manipulation (спекуляции). To do this, however, it was necessary not simply to rebut Western propaganda but to


90. By calling for a deeper theoretical understanding of the world revolutionary process and the socialist-capitalist competition in the nuclear age, Dobrynin implied that the promotion of world revolution should be subordinated to the struggle to curb the superpower arms race. (Kommunist, No. 9, 1986, 25, 30.)
handle the problem constructively, and cooperation in the "humanitarian" field was possible without compromising Soviet principles.⁹¹ Civilized international relations, Dobrynin said, involved not just interstate ties, but a broadening of contacts between people and organizations. From his standpoint, one of the main benefits of the movement toward domestic revitalization was that it strengthened the hand of Soviet diplomacy.⁹²

Dobrynin, in other words, was challenging the basic approach to security policy laid down by Brezhnev. Just as important, he was implicitly challenging the three main state bureaucracies which had implemented that approach. Apart from censuring the lack of diplomatic imaginativeness at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Gromyko's time, he was asserting that Soviet military power, embodied in the Ministry of Defense, had contributed less to Soviet security than previously supposed. He was also suggesting that the handling of human-rights issues, which the KGB had overseen, had obstructed the achievement of the regime's security goals. When the Politburo discussed the results of the May conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the published account of the discussion stated that the tasks posed at the conference must guide the activities of the Ministry and all the other institutions involved in implementing Soviet foreign


policy. The performance of these institutions, it added, required "a steady improvement." Although the Ministry of Defense and the KGB were not named, the statement constituted a tacit criticism of their past conduct.

Several members of the leadership accepted the need for diplomatic engagement with the West but distrusted Gorbachev's tendency to make dramatic concessions in order to sway Western opinion. Gromyko, for example, continued to advocate arms-control and supported summit diplomacy. But Gromyko, who was obviously the target of Gorbachev's barbed remarks about "Mr. Nyet," seemed reluctant to soften the Soviet position in regional conflicts in order to improve relations with the United States. The former foreign minister was plainly unreceptive to Gorbachev's idea that the West needed political reassurance about Soviet strategic intentions. Instead he continued to treat

93. Izvestiia, 6 June 1986, 1.

94. Gromyko's response to the Reykjavik meeting is discussed below.

95. Dobrynin, for instance, appeared to take a softer position than Gromyko had taken on the Middle East. Dobrynin advocated holding an international conference on the Middle East and including representatives of the PLO, but did not mention the idea of a Palestinian state. (Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 20 May 1986, 1-2.) During his time as foreign minister, Gromyko advocated a Palestinian state when he mentioned PLO representation at such a conference (although in conversations with the French he touched on the idea of an international conference without mentioning either the likely parties or the idea of Palestinian state). (Pravda, 12 March 85, 4, and 25 May 85, 2). In 1986, after leaving the foreign ministry, Gromyko evidently made no public statements on this question, but Prime Minister Ryzhkov again endorsed the idea of a Palestinian state. (Pravda, 6 June 1986, 4).
Western expressions of fear about Soviet strategic aims as propaganda calculated to put the USSR on the political defensive.\textsuperscript{96} Moreover, Gromyko resisted the notion of a more open diplomatic style that would reveal internal policy disagreements and overtly offer human-rights concessions to the West.\textsuperscript{97}

KGB chairman Chebrikov, though he backed Gorbachev's comprehensive disarmament plan, shared this distrust of conciliatory diplomatic and human-rights initiatives. Like Gromyko, he treated Western expressions of apprehension about Soviet military programs as a myth that Western propagandists knew to be untrue.\textsuperscript{98} Moreover, the KGB chief feared the sort of

\textsuperscript{96} At the 27th Party Congress, Gromyko hailed Gorbachev's January declaration on arms control. At the same time he warned, as he had in March 1985, that the West was seeking to exploit any internal division within the Soviet leadership. By branding Westerners worried about the Soviet military threat as a myth that Western propagandists knew to be untrue, Gromyko seemed to dismiss Gorbachev's suggestion that such views might be genuine concerns requiring Soviet concessions. (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 191-192).

\textsuperscript{97} At the party congress Gromyko responded hotly to Western human-rights charges, accusing Western human-rights groups of competing to see who could take the hardest line on this issue. In actuality, said Gromyko scornfully, they had no moral justification for pretending to be concerned about human rights. Western exponents of the theory of the Soviet military threat were trying to force a choice on the regime--either renounce socialism or face war. But, said Gromyko in a remark that may have reflected his past experience with the Jackson-Vani k amendment, the regime would not bargain or engage in commerce over socialism (\textit{My sotsializmom ne torguem}. (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 191-192, 196-197.)

\textsuperscript{98} For example, Chebrikov approvingly quoted Lenin's attack on Westerners who raise the specter of "red militarism," "make a face as if they believe this stupid stuff," and contrive false arguments to deceive the masses. (\textit{Pravda}, 7 November 1985, 2.)
society-to-society contacts Gorbachev had endorsed at the Geneva summit. Shortly before the Geneva meeting he asserted that the human-rights issue was not undermining the USSR's political appeal abroad, and at the party congress he laid exceptional weight on the vulnerability of the Soviet intelligentsia to foreign ideological subversion and espionage.  

Claiming that Western intelligence services were striving to obtain a wide range of Soviet state secrets, Chebrikov noted pointedly that a series of imperialist agents had recently been unmasked within government ministries.  

Despite his pro forma endorsement of widened East-West social interchange, his statements amounted to an obvious effort to preserve the KGB's prerogatives in controlling contacts with the outside world.

If such "swing votes" as Gromyko and Chebrikov doubted Gorbachev's diplomatic tactics but still hoped for substantial benefits from superpower arms talks, conservatives such as Shcherbitskii harbored serious reservations about the talks themselves. Although Gorbachev had already personally gone on

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99. Despite the imperialist harping on human rights, Chebrikov claimed, "more and more people" in the West were beginning to understand the humanistic essence of socialist democracy, and efforts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs would be rebuffed "in the most decisive fashion." (Pravda [CH], 1 October 1985, 2; XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 347-349).

100. Chebrikov's stance on the question of the intellectuals' vulnerability contrasted sharply with that of Demichev, the Minister of Culture and a candidate member of the Politburo. Demichev emphasized the "high maturity" of the intelligentsia and its ability to defend Soviet ideals against Western attempts at interference. "Not one people," Demichev claimed, was interested in turning cultural cooperation into an arena of the cold war. (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 346-348, 389.)
record as favoring a separate INF agreement, his highly-publicized January declaration outlining a plan for phased arms reductions was ambiguous on the question of INF-SDI linkage.\textsuperscript{101} Three days after the declaration Shcherbitskii described it as offering a phased program for the liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 "on the condition of the prohibition of the creation, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons."\textsuperscript{102} Although accurate in a certain sense, this description of the declaration differed from the terms used by other leaders, who did not mention SDI in their references to it.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, when Shcherbitskii mentioned the January declaration at the party congress, he offered no assurance that it was having a favorable effect on the international situation, as Shevardnadze and other leaders had said. Instead he remarked that Soviet citizens could not fail to feel "bitterness and disappointment" at the unforthcoming U.S. response, which was in essence blocking an opportunity for agreement.\textsuperscript{104}

In addition, Shcherbitskii implicitly placed the


103. By any reading, the declaration required limits on SDI before strategic weapons could be reduced. It was, however, ambiguous about INF reductions, which were part of the "phased" reductions also mentioned by Shcherbitskii.

104. \textit{XXVII s"ezd KPSS}, I, 136. Whereas Shevardnadze treated the U.S. stipulations made in response to the declaration as satisfying evidence that the U.S. had been thrown onto the political defensive, Shcherbitskii cited the stipulations as evidence that no worthwhile agreement could be reached.
requirements of the military budget above investments in economic growth. Whereas Gorbachev was touting the geopolitical significance of uskorenje and maintaining that the recent improvement in Soviet economic growth was responsible for the upturn in U.S.-Soviet relations, Shcherbitskii remarked that the realization of Soviet internal tasks depended in many respects on the international situation, which remained sharp and complex. In other words, Soviet security demanded that the defense budget receive higher priority than the growth of the economy.

Marshal Sokolov must have welcomed Shcherbitskii's accent on military needs. It is true that on several occasions in late 1985 and early 1986 Sokolov endorsed the adequacy of the resources going to defense. In mid-1986, however, pressures over the finalization of the new five-year plan built up, and some members of the leadership began to highlight the party's demand that the defense industries produce more consumer goods.


106. In November, for instance, Sokolov said that the party and government were supplying the military with "everything necessary." In an article on the eve of the party congress he remarked that the Armed Forces accepted the task of protecting Soviet security on the basis of "the most rational utilization of all that the country gives them." He also said at three separate points that the military had "everything" or "everything necessary" for its mission. The article's repetitiousness on the resource-allocation question raises the possibility that it was a command performance written at the behest of Gorbachev and like minds in the civilian leadership. (Pravda, 8 November 1985, 1-2, and 23 February 1986, 2.)
and services.  

Probably in response to such pressures, Sokolov asserted that the West was seeking "decisive" military superiority. Embracing the position of assertive military participants in a veiled debate over the new party program, he claimed that the revised program called for "the balanced, dynamic development of all the elements of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces." This claim, which was inaccurate, exaggerated the party's commitment to military growth.

Moreover, Sokolov stoutly resisted the efforts of Gorbachev and particularly Dobrynin to downgrade the assessment of the role

107. This point was made gently by Ryzhkov and vigorously by Zaikov (Pravda, 19 June 1986, 2-3, 29 June 1986, 2, and 9 August 1986, 2).

108. Pravda, 9 May 1986, 2. When the draft of the revised program was published in the fall of 1985, past military champions of bigger defense budgets urged that the draft's treatment of military power be strengthened. The draft listed a series of factors said to contribute to the might of the Armed Forces, such as ideological firmness and discipline of military cadres. In the final version of the program, equipment and technology were moved from last to second place in this formula, but the proposal to increase the weight attached to the material components of military might by expanding the portion of the formula dealing with equipment and manpower was not accepted. (Kommunist, No. 16, 1985, 35; XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 595-596.) I am indebted to Ellen Jones for calling my attention to the change in the formula.

109. Pravda, 9 May 1986, 2. Earlier, at the 27th Party Congress, Sokolov was more accurate. The revised program, he said, pledged that national defense capacity would be comprehensively improved and that everything would be done to prevent imperialism from attaining military superiority. This statement was less assertive than Sokolov's later stress on the "dynamic development" of the Armed Forces' combat potential—a phrase which in fact was not mentioned in the revised program (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 453, 595-96.)
of Soviet military power in deterring a Western attack. The Armed Forces, he said, "are a real factor deterring the aggressive strivings of imperialist reaction." The avoidance of general war in the recent past had been due above all to Soviet military and economic might and to the unavoidability of Soviet retaliation against an attacker. Nor did Sokolov share the belief that the USSR's international image needed political refurbishing as an aid to its arms-control diplomacy. Instead he flatly asserted that the country's international political appeal had grown as a consequence of World War II and was continuing to increase.

The Moratorium and Reykjavik

The nuclear test moratorium was a touchstone for elite opinion about the wisdom of making conciliatory gestures in an effort to elicit Western concessions. During the spring of 1986 delays in renewing the moratorium suggested that the leadership was divided over this step. During the summer another delay deprived Soviet diplomacy of propaganda gains that could have been reaped by renewing the moratorium on the anniversary of Hiroshima, and party liberals indicated that the latest renewal had provoked internal controversy, particularly within the

110. Pravda, 23 February 1986, 2; XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 454. Sokolov also called the strategic nuclear forces the "foundation" of the Armed Forces' might.

111. Pravda, 8 November 1985, 1, and 9 May 1986, 2.
military establishment. But military resistance alone could probably not have delayed the decision. More likely the party leaders' disagreements about the effect of unilateral gestures on Soviet security led them to differ over the wisdom of extending the moratorium.

The Reykjavik summit provided a particularly good measure of leadership attitudes toward security policy. At the meeting, the Soviet side made major concessions to the U.S. demands on INF and strategic forces, but in the end the meeting foundered on the U.S. refusal to limit SDI, and the Soviet side reversed its previous offer to conclude a separate agreement on INF. The meeting's failure to produce agreement, which resulted in recriminations between the Soviet and American sides, raised questions about the prospects for reaching arms accords in the future.

In his press conference at the end of the summit, Gorbachev was upbeat, emphasizing that the two sides had come close to a comprehensive agreement and that this marked great progress. Striking an unusual note, he remarked that the potential for arms-control agreements could be actualized in the future if in the White House "and in our [Soviet] leadership we once more think everything over and manifest responsibility." A few


days later Gorbachev commented that at Reykjavik "there was not enough new political thinking." Although the wording was ambiguous and the context did not definitely indicate whether he was referring to an American or a Soviet shortage of new thinking, his earlier remark about the Soviet leadership suggests that he felt that there had been shortcomings on the Soviet side.\textsuperscript{114}

In the same statement Gorbachev pushed his own approach to international security one step further. Lenin, said the general secretary, had expressed a "thought of colossal profundity—about the priority of the interests of social development and pan-human values over the interests of this or that class. Today, in the nuclear-missile era, the significance of this thought is sensed with special sharpness."\textsuperscript{115} In other words, the Soviet pursuit of an international line based on "class conflict" and the alleged interests of the working class alone should be moderated for the sake of more important human values. The main value Gorbachev seemed to have in mind was human survival in the face of the potential for nuclear war.

A number of Soviet leaders commented favorably on the Reykjavik meeting. Aliev, although increasingly cool to Gorbachev's domestic initiatives, vigorously endorsed the meeting.

\textsuperscript{114} Kommunist, No. 16, 1986, 13. Gorbachev's words were, "I vse zhe v Reik'javike etogo novogo myshleniia ne khvatilo. This might also be rendered, "And still this new thinking did not suffice at Reykjavik," which carries quite a different connotation.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 12.
and said it showed that agreements on fundamental questions are "certainly possible." Predictably, Dobrynin enthused about the summit's political impact on nuclear weapons programs and SDI. Gromyko said that at Reykjavik Gorbachev had expounded the Soviet position "frankly and persuasively," that the Soviet proposals "are making history," and that the progress in Iceland offered an opportunity to reach agreement on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Ryzhkov was particularly positive. Reykjavik, he said, had moved nuclear negotiations into a "qualitatively new stage" and showed the real possibility of reaching mutual understanding on fundamental questions.

Shcherbitskii took a far more pessimistic view. He agreed that Reykjavik had created a "qualitatively new situation." On the other hand, he refrained from stating that Reykjavik had showed that arms-control agreements were still possible. Instead he highlighted the U.S. decision to "bury" the 1972 ABM Treaty and the SALT II Treaty, calling it "a blow to the

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118. Izvestiia, 14 November 1986, 1.
119. Pravda, 21 November 1986, 4, and 6 December 1986, 2. Ryzhkov's first comment on Reykjavik was much more cautious, although he simultaneously singled out the Stockholm conference as evidence that it was possible to reach agreements embodying military detente (Pravda, 21 October 1986, 4.)
120. According to Shcherbitskii, Gorbachev's statements in India showed "the necessity for the activation of efforts to achieve progress on the path of limiting arms and the real ways and prospects of deciding a series of burning contemporary problems." (Pravda Ukrainy, 9 December 1986, 2).
structure of fundamental agreements in the area of strategic-arms limitations which was created in the course of 15 years," and he approvingly mentioned the Soviet government's declaration on this matter.\textsuperscript{121} In sum, Shcherbitskii seemed no more positively disposed toward the results of the Reykjavik meeting than he had been toward the Geneva summit a year earlier.

Marshal Sokolov was more laconic and even less positive. In an order of the day he remarked that the Reykjavik meeting had shown that the U.S. administration still hoped to achieve military superiority over the USSR, thereby necessitating a constant improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat capacity. According to Sokolov the U.S. commitment to SDI had scuttled the possibilities of an agreement in Iceland.\textsuperscript{122} In neither instance did Sokolov echo the theme that the meeting marked a new stage in the struggle for peace or that it was a stepping-stone toward future arms-control agreements. Given the other signs of tension between Gorbachev and Sokolov, it is fair to conclude that the marshal felt that the Reykjavik summit had been a setback for Soviet external policy.

Within the spectrum of leadership opinion toward Gorbachev's security policy during 1986, Ligachev apparently moved from qualified support to qualified criticism. At the beginning of the year Ligachev hinted at impatience over Gorbachev's accent on

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{122} Krasnaia zvezda, 7 November 1986, 1; FBIS, 21 January 1987, AA2.
unilateral Soviet restraint. Nevertheless, he emphasized the significance of the mutual no-superiority pledge at the Geneva summit and said firmly that Gorbachev's January declaration would exert a beneficial, long-term influence on international affairs. Ligachev also spoke of the "tremendous means that are now being squandered" on the arms race. Endorsing the benefits of flexible diplomacy, he remarked that the USSR had gained new allies and now held the initiative in the international arena.

Ligachev, however, disagreed with Gorbachev over Reykjavik. Three days after Gorbachev emphasized the progress made at the meeting and called on Soviet leaders to show the "responsibility" necessary to reach full arms-control agreements, Ligachev described the meeting as "a failure" (neudacha). Shortly afterward Gorbachev, in an apparent reply, observed that a great deal of progress had been made at Reykjavik and that "this is not

123. In the January declaration, Gorbachev said that the USSR "cannot endlessly manifest unilateral restraint with respect to nuclear tests." (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 136). A week later Ligachev said the USSR could not "endlessly manifest unilateral restraint, including [restraint] in the question of the curtailment of all nuclear explosions..." (Izvestiia, 22 January 1986, 2). Ligachev's phrasing implied that there were issues besides the test moratorium that might not warrant much further Soviet restraint.


126. Pravda, 14 October 1986, 2; Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, No. 11, 1986, 14. Ligachev used this word when denouncing U.S. attempts to put the blame for Reykjavik on the USSR, but he did not challenge the accuracy of the term.
a failure (proval) or a hopeless matter." 127 Exactly how these divergent evaluations were linked to the internal controversy over the Soviet offers at Reykjavik remains uncertain. 128 Perhaps Ligachev, swayed by the arguments of Shcherbitskii or other conservatives, balked when a real choice had to be made on Gorbachev's proposal to sign an INF agreement in the absence of new curbs on SDI. At any rate, Ligachev now came out in favor of the acceleration of Soviet military R & D. Reykjavik had shown that the U.S. favored the creation of new weapons of mass destruction, he said. "Therefore it is now more important than ever before to strengthen the role of scientists in defending peace and strengthening the country's defense capacity." 129 A few weeks later Ligachev took a more positive stance toward Reykjavik, but his statement still contained a trace of skepticism, suggesting that the lessons he drew from the event


128. For evidence that the offers provoked controversy, see Parrott, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense, 68-69.

129. Pravda, 17 October 1986, 3. Ligachev's comment was reported quite differently in the Vestnik of the Academy, where a substantial contingent of members has long favored curbing the growth of military R & D. The Academy account quoted Ligachev as advocating vigorous efforts by Soviet scholars to enlist their foreign colleagues in the peace struggle—a theme that was omitted from the Pravda summary. Moreover, the Vestnik quoted Ligachev as expressing confidence that Soviet scientists would do everything necessary to strengthen Soviet defense; the idea of increasing the contribution of scientists to the military effort was omitted. In other words, the Vestnik gloss pointed toward a continued emphasis on energetic diplomacy and high-level intellectual contacts; the Pravda summary pointed toward a greater accent on Soviet military programs.
were more pessimistic than Gorbachev's. Just as he seemed increasingly wary of the implications of the general secretary's emerging domestic policies, he seemed more skeptical of Gorbachev's security policy as well.

SECURITY, CREDIBILITY AND DOMESTIC LIBERALIZATION

Near the end of 1986 Gorbachev started to push for additional radical changes in security policy. By encouraging basic alterations in the traditional Soviet assessment of the Western strategic threat, he sought to revise the military doctrines that flowed from that assessment. On a bureaucratic level, he pursued this goal by giving a green light to unorthodox civilian defense theorists and stepping up the pressure for an internal military reform that encompassed doctrine as well as organization.

Gorbachev also redoubled his efforts to allay Western fears of Soviet military intentions. In addition to making new concessions on arms control, he sought to recast the traditional

130. On the positive side of the ledger, Ligachev said that the USSR's active foreign policy was facilitating a favorable shift in the psychology of foreign politicians and citizens. The Soviet Union, he promised, would not succumb to Western provocations intended to kill the chances of negotiated solutions to international problems, and Reykjavik showed that agreements leading to nuclear disarmament were possible. However, Ligachev also remarked that "it's not so simple" to say whether the USSR had achieved much internationally since the 27th Party Congress. (Pravda, 7 November 1986, 3, and 14 November 1986, 5.)
relationship between Soviet domestic politics and external policy. Party leaders from Stalin to Brezhnev had instinctively linked the pursuit of external security with internal regimentation. In contrast, Gorbachev attempted to moderate Western military behavior through a dramatic new program of internal political liberalization unveiled at a Central Committee plenum in January 1987. In foreign as well as domestic affairs, he drew increasingly on the intellectual class for political allies and point men in the struggle to further his policies.131 This, in turn, necessitated a reduction of the party and police controls obstructing intellectual freedom and contacts with the West.

Reassessing the Western Challenge

After Reykjavik Gorbachev began to articulate the idea, latent in his previous speeches, that the Western powers might be evolving toward a less aggressive form of behavior. On the 70th anniversary of the Revolution, Gorbachev noted that members of the Western ruling elite now recognized the "catastrophic danger

131. In June 1986 Gorbachev highlighted the intelligentsia's "enormous" contribution to Soviet society's development. Shortly after Reykjavik, he remarked that the intelligentsia was a passionate advocate of perestroika and that the regime was counting on "enormous help" from it to solve not only domestic but global problems. (Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat'i, III, 416; Kommunist, No. 16, 1986, 14.) The first remark coincided with Dobrynin's call for the development of a civilian school of defense analysis. The second presaged a push to use the intellectual advocates of "new political thinking" to change Western opinion about the USSR. The Moscow Peace Forum in February 1987 was an especially graphic example of this diplomatic strategy.
to peace," and he asked rhetorically whether heightened world interdependence might not curb the most destructive types of imperialist behavior. Although he refrained from answering directly, he obviously meant to suggest that such a trend existed, and he sanctioned the publication of articles by civilian foreign-affairs specialists that spelled out this view with extraordinary bluntness.

The clearest example was an article published in Kommunist shortly after Gorbachev's anniversary speech. Vigorously rejecting analogies between 1941 and the current international situation, the three authors flatly denied that the West would intentionally attack the USSR. According to them, "today in East-West relations there is not one conflict" which might produce "the temptation to resort to war...[I]t is difficult to imagine for what goals Western armies might invade the territory of the socialist states...[T]oday there are no politically influential forces in Western Europe or in the USA which would set themselves such a task," let alone launch a surprise nuclear attack. Indeed, "bourgeois democracy serves as a definite barrier on the path of unleashing...war" between the capitalist and socialist systems. However, warned the authors, the likelihood of accidental nuclear war between East and West was growing. "An outwardly paradoxical situation is therefore developing: the threat of intentional nuclear aggression is

132. Pravda, 3 November 1987, 5; see also ibid., 26 February 1987, 2.
declining, but the threat of war can also increase." 133

The implications of this diagnosis were truly radical. If East-West military conflict was likely to arise not from premeditated Western aggression but from misperceptions and technical malfunctions of weapons systems, the main goal of Soviet security policy must shift from intimidating the West to reassuring it. In these circumstances the accumulation of military power could easily become counterproductive, whereas measures to allay the fears of potential adversaries acquired a vital role in protecting the USSR against nuclear destruction.

Gorbachev's pronouncements on security policy reflected this outlook. Proclaiming that the notion of war as an extension of politics "has become worthless [uzhe ne goditsia]," he delivered a fundamental critique of the theory of deterrence that was almost certainly directed at the theory's Soviet as well as its Western proponents. Gorbachev noted that there were "many people" who still sincerely believed in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. However, he argued, the possibility of catastrophic technical or human error rose with the number of weapons, their complexity, and the duration of their deployment. Together these factors constituted "an enormous number of contingencies" on which the fate of mankind depended, and the doctrine of

133. V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, and A. Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti--starye i novye," Kommunist, No. 1, 1988, 44-47.
deterrence heightened the likelihood of military conflicts.\textsuperscript{134}

Taking up a theme sounded by Dobrynin, Gorbachev denied that world war had been avoided because of nuclear weapons; rather, he asserted, it had been avoided in spite of them.\textsuperscript{135} The USSR, he pledged, would limit itself to the requirements of "reasonable, sufficient defense."\textsuperscript{136} It would not seek more security for itself than for the United States, because this would make the U.S. insecure and violate political stability.\textsuperscript{137} By defining stability in political rather than simply military terms, Gorbachev gave superpower political relations a more salient role in determining Soviet national-security requirements.

Gorbachev also gave a new twist to his contention that the Soviet security depended on greater economic dynamism. While playing down the Western military threat, he claimed the West was trying to slow the USSR's forward movement by keeping it on the path of military confrontation. However, he asserted, the USSR would not "irrationally and automatically" adopt military programs which imperialism was trying to foist on it through the

\textsuperscript{134}. \textit{Pravda}, 17 February 1987, 2. As previously, the word Gorbachev used to describe the idea of deterrence was \textit{sderzhivanie}, not \textit{ustrashenie}.

\textsuperscript{135}. \textit{Pravda}, 17 September 1987, 1. Gorbachev also referred to Soviet-American study that suggested that strategic stability could be maintained with five percent of existing nuclear weapons.

\textsuperscript{136}. \textit{Pravda}, 26 February 1987, 2. He mentioned the desirability of reasonable sufficiency in both nuclear and conventional armaments.

\textsuperscript{137}. \textit{Pravda}, 30 September 1987, 2.
arms competition. The obvious implication was that a larger Soviet military effort, far from foiling imperialist designs, might play into the West's hands by undermining Soviet economic performance.

Gorbachev's doctrinal innovations and leadership style had important ramifications for civil-military relations. In announcing his sweeping proposals for political liberalization at January plenum, Gorbachev expressed veiled dissatisfaction with the military establishment, which he said "also lives by restructuring." Given his stress on the personnel turnover as a key aspect of perestroika, Gorbachev's displeasure with the military probably included slow personnel change as well as foot-dragging on other aspects of internal military reform. He also indicated that the military should make more effective use of existing resources rather than press the party for bigger budgets. The tone of censure in these comments contrasted noticeably with Gorbachev's unqualified praise of the KGB--praise

139. In the same speech Gorbachev pressed for the continuation of staff and structural changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a prerequisite for the pursuit of a more active foreign policy. (Pravda, 28 January 1987, 5.)
140. Gorbachev told the plenum that Soviet military cadres had "an enormous responsibility before the people" to protect the country's security. The people and the party, he said, were doing "everything" to strengthen the Armed Forces and had a right to assume that no aggression could catch the USSR unawares. The party was counting on the officer corps in deciding the tasks of strengthening the state's defense capacity, said Gorbachev, and the Central Committee was sure that all military cadres would act "with the greatest responsibility." (Pravda, 28 January 1987, 5; see also Pravda, 11 April 1987, 2.)
which he probably voiced in an effort to avoid antagonizing both institutions simultaneously.\textsuperscript{141}

Gorbachev's expression of dissatisfaction with the military presaged a new campaign to renovate the high command and, in the process, to install officers having doctrinal dispositions closer to his own.\textsuperscript{142} The campaign received a serendipitous boost from

\textsuperscript{141.} Shortly before the plenum, KGB chairman Chebrikov found it necessary to acknowledge in the pages of \textit{Pravda} that a Ukrainian KGB official had conspired to persecute a muck-raking journalist. (Knight, \textit{The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union}, 101). This unprecedented public admission of KGB malfeasance probably could not have been extracted without Gorbachev's backing. Logically speaking, Gorbachev's push for liberalization at the January plenum should have entailed further censure for the KGB. But the party leadership's sharp internal divisions over political reform probably caused him to back off from such a risky step. Instead he extolled the high qualifications of KGB personnel, expressed confidence in their ability to counter foreign subversion, and made no mention of any need for \textit{perestroika} in the organization. (\textit{Pravda}, 28 January 1987, 5). At the same time, this rhetorical accommodation may have allowed Gorbachev to strengthen his bureaucratic hold over the police. The January plenum appointed Anatoly Lukianov to be the party secretary overseeing the Administrative Organs Department. Lukianov was a longtime associate of Gorbachev and had views on citizen rights and the role of the state which were much less conservative than Chebrikov's.

\textsuperscript{142.} During the preceding two years the officer corps had responded sluggishly to Gorbachev's earlier calls for "criticism and self-criticism" and institutional \textit{perestroika}. Although MPA officials had quickly taken up the idea of improving the Armed Forces' style of management and handling of personnel, Defense Minister Sokolov and his principal deputies had treated the idea almost with indifference. After the January plenum Sokolov and Marshal Kulikov, CINC of the Warsaw Pact forces, ignored Gorbachev's call for the renewal of cadres, although Marshal Akhromeev, Chief of the General Staff, echoed it. (Dale Herspring, "On \textit{Perestroika}: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," \textit{Problems of Communism}, July-August 1987, 101; \textit{Pravda} [CHECK], 23 February 1987, 2; \textit{Trud}, 22 February 1987, 3; \textit{Sovetskaia Rossiia}, 21 February 1987, 1.) For evidence of the connection between changes in personnel and in doctrine, see the account of the meeting at which the party \textit{aktiv} of the Ministry of Defense discussed the military implications of the January plenum.
the Cessna affair, which provided a golden opportunity to replace
the recalcitrant Sokolov with another officer, Dmitri Iazov, more
sympathetic to internal military reform. The drive was also
fueled by an unprecedented wave of articles in which civilian
foreign-affairs specialists invaded the domain of the military
theoreticians and took stands that were uncongenial to mainstream
military thought. In the pre-Gorbachev years civilian
specialists had tried to influence military policy only
indirectly, by offering a more temperate image of the West and
its military intentions. Now civilian analysts began to offer
opinions on the nature of strategic stability, the scope of arms
cuts, and the kinds of weapons that should be eliminated.

Breaking the Reykjavik Stalemate

In keeping with his new accent on the political dimension of
security, Gorbachev quickly sought a way out of the stalemate
created at Reykjavik. In the spring of 1987 he once again
decoupled the INF issue from talks over strategic offensive and
defensive arms, promising to strive for a quick INF accord.

(Krasnaia zvezda, 18 March 1987, 2).

143. Herspring, "On Perestroika: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the
Military."

144. Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approach to
Conventional Arms Control," The Harriman Institute Forum 1, No. 1
(January 1988); Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet
Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988, 131-
158; Zhurkin et al. in Kommunist, No. 1, 1988; and A. Arbatov in
Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniiia, No. 4 [CHECK],
000-000.

145. Pravda, 1 March 1987, 1.
(The timing of this move artfully obscured the nearly simultaneous termination of the USSR's moratorium on nuclear tests.) Departing decisively from past policy on the verification of arms agreements, Gorbachev endorsed "previously unheard-of standards" of glasnost' and otkrytost' to ensure the monitoring of international arms-control obligations.¹⁴⁶ In pursuit of the "humanization of international relations," Gorbachev also announced a new approach to the human-rights issues raised under CSCE Basket Three. Denying the assertion of "those who assume...that our position is the result of pressure from the West," he backed the convocation in Moscow of a CSCE conference on "humanitarian cooperation" and remarked that national legislation and rules on humanitarian issues must be brought into correspondence with international obligations and norms.¹⁴⁷

In addition, Gorbachev hinted at a relaxation of efforts to promote pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World. The sovereign right of peoples to decide on revolutionary or evolutionary paths of development, including the right to preserve "the status quo," should be observed unconditionally, he said.¹⁴⁸ Although set in the context of a general affirmation of obligations under the U.N. charter, this statement was probably intended to signal a

¹⁴⁷. Pravda, 17 February 1987, 1; Pravda, 25 February 1987, 1; Pravda, 11 April 1987, 2; Pravda, 17 September 1987, 2.
new restraint in specific cases such as Afghanistan.

These new initiatives generated internal debate. To begin with, there were discrepancies between Gorbachev's treatment of security issues at the January plenum and the plenum's final resolution. Gorbachev focused on domestic "crisis phenomena" and glossed over the competition with the West, but the resolution played down the theme of domestic crisis and highlighted the efforts of "militant imperialist circles" to attain strategic superiority. Although the resolution concluded that the party must "maintain the country's defense capacity on the necessary level"--language Gorbachev probably favored--it also remarked incongruously that the international situation required "a comprehensive strengthening of the defense possibilities of our country." Moreover, it praised the Armed Forces fulsomely, omitting the undertone of criticism in Gorbachev's speech.149

The resolution's clumsy treatment of defense issues probably

149. The resolution read: "The complex contemporary international situation, the striving of militant imperialist circles of the USA to destroy military-strategic parity and obtain nuclear superiority demand the most rapid growth of economic potential, the comprehensive strengthening of the defense possibilities of our country, the maintenance of the country's defense capacity on the necessary level, high training and battle preparedness of the Armed Forces, [and] high vigilance." Party resolutions generally contain a single formula covering the level of defense spending. They rarely conflate two formulas, particularly two divergent formulas such as these. While the resolution advocated a further strengthening of military discipline, its overall treatment of the armed services was quite positive: "The Central Committee evaluates highly the activity of military cadres and the military men of the Soviet Army and the Navy, who are reliably defending the peaceful labor of the people and the security of the Motherland and fulfilling their international duty with honor." (Pravda, 29 January 1987, 2; emphasis added).
reflected an effort to accommodate two divergent views of the defense budget and the military establishment.

In the ensuing months several of Gorbachev's colleagues backed his high-profile diplomacy, including his announcement delinking INF from other arms issues. Ryzhkov, for instance, asserted that Reykjavik had put disarmament on "an entirely new qualitative level" and had shown that the idea of nuclear disarmament "is not a utopia." Stating that the new Soviet INF offer opened the way for a major improvement in European security, Ryzhkov foresaw favorable possibilities for progress on other issues of superpower arms control. 150 Zaikov likewise supported flexible diplomacy. Strongly endorsing the USSR's "new philosophy of international relations," which he said was embodied in Gorbachev's statement at the Moscow Peace Forum, Zaikov referred favorably to the INF offer and struck an optimistic note about the future benefits of Soviet arms-control diplomacy. 151 Gromyko also endorsed the INF proposal. 152 Support for basic changes in military doctrine came from Aleskandr Iakovlev, a new Politburo member. Firmly ruling out the possibility of responding to SDI with a similar Soviet program, Iakovlev called for a move away from deterrence and

150. Pravda, 30 March 1987, 3, and 28 April 1987, 4. At the same time, Ryzhkov specified that any liquidation of strategic weapons must be directly linked to the observance of the ABM treaty.


showed a strong interest in applying the slogan of "reasonable sufficiency" to conventional as well as nuclear arms. 153

Other figures reacted more coolly to Gorbachev's emphasis on political gestures and concessionary arms-control initiatives. Ligachev waited almost two months after the decoupling of INF to mention and commend the new policy. 154 If the meaning of this behavior was ambiguous, Shcherbitskii's position was more clear-cut. Unlike some liberal leaders, the Ukrainian leader refrained from mentioning the positive effects of the January plenum in swaying Western public opinion. Instead he interpreted the plenum in a way that may have been meant to underscore the plenary resolution's comments on military preparedness. Most important, his brief reference to the new policy on INF fell far short of an endorsement and may have signified a continuing belief that no INF agreement should be signed in the absence of new limits on SDI. 155 Marshal Sokolov also remained skeptical.

153. FBIS, 16 March 1987, G12; Kommunist, May 1987, 18. Iakovlev expressed an inclination to counter SDI, should that prove necessary, with defense suppression weapons. (FBIS, 20 March 1987, G4.)

154. FBIS, 27 April 1987, F3. When Ligachev did mention the decision, his comments were quite favorable, although still less positive than those of Gorbachev's most ardent supporters.

155. Shcherbitskii remarked that the January plenum "again affirmed the unshakable character of the unity of the CPSU's internal and foreign policy." He left open the question of whether internal requirements or external dangers should receive greater weight in national policymaking, but in view of his past remarks it would be fair to assume that he continued to assign special significance to external threats. Shcherbitskii did not refer explicitly to the decoupling of INF--in contrast to several of the figures discussed above--and he said nothing about future
After keeping silent for two and a half months about the INF decision, Sokolov finally endorsed it, but he simultaneously emphasized the aggressive nature of imperialism and hinted that a policy based on diplomatic maneuver might be unable to cope with the Western threat. He also resisted efforts to downgrade the importance of military power as a deterrent of Western attack—as did Iazov, his successor. In short, the debate about how to

benefits from the step. (Pravda Ukrainy, 25 March 1987, 1.)

156. Like Shcherbitskii, Sokolov described the Soviet proposal as being for the liquidation of intermediate-range rockets in Europe; he did not refer directly to the decision to delink the issue from other arms matters. In contrast to Gorbachev's past glosses on Soviet history, Sokolov indicated that the experience of wartime cooperation with the Western allies was an aberration which was quickly superceded by postwar hostility. The contemporary situation, he said, persuasively showed the significance of this historical experience and the need for "high vigilance" against the "adventurist course of the reactionary imperialist circles which are pushing the world toward war..." (Pravda, 9 May 1987, 2.)

157. XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 454; Pravda, 23 February 1986, 2, and 9 May 1986, 1. Sokolov finally yielded and tersely criticized the doctrine of deterrence. (Pravda, 9 May 1987, 2.) However, the fact that he delayed until he came under heavy pressure from the campaign for military perestroika suggests that he doubted the wisdom of this doctrinal shift. Significantly, Iazov, who replaced Sokolov shortly afterward, backtracked on this doctrinal point. Iazov endorsed Gorbachev's assertion that war had ceased to be an instrument of policy, but he drew the line at deterrence. According to Iazov, "reasonable sufficiency" included the maintenance of parity and the ability to launch a devastating counterattack against an aggressor under any conditions. Although Iazov granted the desirability of reducing stocks of nuclear weapons, he insisted that at present strategic parity was the decisive factor preventing war, and he plainly doubted the contention of Dobrynin and some civilian specialists that the current military situation had already become unstable. According to Iazov, the new thinking taught that the higher the level of Soviet military preparedness, the less likely a potential aggressor would be to launch a nuclear attack. (Krasnaia zvezda, 7 July 1987, 2, 28 July 1987, 2, and 13 August
combine political gestures, negotiating concessions, and military preparations was apparently still simmering below the surface.158

This impression was confirmed by polemics that broke out shortly after Gorbachev announced the decision to delink INF. Aleksandr Bovin, a journalist who had long favored a more conciliatory policy toward the West, suggested that the original Soviet decision to deploy SS20 missiles in the European theater had been a mistake. Invoking Lenin's criticism of a diplomacy based on "ultimatums," Bovin justified the recent delinking of INF from SDI in terms which suggested that some people believed the relinkage at Reykjavik should become part of a long-term

1987, 2.)

158. Other circumstantial evidence supports this conclusion. In a January address to a Soviet audience Gromyko remarked rather defensively that "there was never any underestimation from our side" of the forces opposing the USSR in matters of war and peace. Given the influence of those forces, said Gromyko, the USSR should redouble its efforts in the Geneva arms-control negotiations, taking as a point of departure the Geneva and Reykjavik summits. (Izvestiia, 18 January 1987, 1.) Shortly after endorsing the INF delinkage, Gromyko also said that "it was not our fault" that the U.S. had failed to respond to the Soviet test moratorium during the previous year (Pravda, 14 March 1987, 1.) Although it is unclear whether Gromyko continued to hold a centrist attitude or took a more liberal line during this period, the tone of his remarks suggests that current diplomatic strategy was a source of private disagreement. One plausible explanation is that Gromyko was responding to Gorbachev, who again underscored the need for further reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and may have been blaming the post-Reykjavik impasse on the faulty implementation of his policy by the ministry Gromyko had built. Another plausible surmise is that Gromyko was responding to conservative critics who were using the failure of the moratorium as an argument against delinking INF.
strategy, rather than merely a short-term tactical maneuver.\textsuperscript{159}

Bovin was promptly challenged by Major-General Iurii Lebedev, a General Staff officer who had served as military advisor at the unsuccessful Soviet-American INF negotiations in the early 1980s. According to Lebedev, the original decision to deploy the SS20s was correct. It had not provoked the U.S. INF deployments—as Bovin implied—but had been a response to military moves which the West had already planned.\textsuperscript{160} Lebedev remained silent about the decoupling of INF, but he was clearly unsympathetic to Bovin's hint that Soviet military programs should be curbed in order to elicit reciprocal Western restraint. In any event, other members of the elite must have felt that the decoupling was a mistake. Immediately after Reykjavik there was evidence that some officials felt too much had been given away at the summit, and reportedly some officers felt that the INF treaty which finally resulted from the post-Reykjavik decoupling put the USSR at a military disadvantage.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159}. \textit{Moscow News}, No. 10, 1987, 3. One Western analysis interpreted the article as an argument that the Soviet relinking of INF with SDI at Reykjavik had needlessly obstructed progress in arms control. (Radio Liberty Daily Report, 20 March 1987.) This is a misreading. Bovin's point was that without the relinking at Reykjavik, SDI would have received a green light, which would have harmed Soviet security. Now, however, after the relinking had generated the maximum political pressure against SDI, it was time for the USSR to shift to a more conciliatory line to avoid being depicted in the West as recalcitrant.


\textsuperscript{161}. Parrott, \textit{The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense}, 68-69. In early 1988 General Vladimir Arkhipov remarked that some officers disapproved of the treaty because it
The persistence of such attitudes explains why Gorbachev found it necessary to answer internal criticism of his security policy. During a visit to the Soviet space center at Baikonur, Gorbachev delivered a passionate defense of the need to keep the diplomatic initiative and wage an all-out political struggle against SDI. By striving to show the world the grave danger of SDI, he said, "we are sure that...we are acting in the interests of the Soviet people." 162 Probably in response to private accusations that the USSR was in danger of falling behind in the military space race against the United States, Gorbachev underscored his commitment to the Soviet space program and remarked that "our course toward a peaceful cosmos...is not a sign of weakness." Although he reportedly commented on the military applications of the space program, his published remarks forcefully demanded more useful scientific and economic results from the program. 163 In a statement reminiscent of his comments about the Armed Forces at the January plenum, Gorbachev also indicated that the party had put enough resources into the space required the destruction of more Soviet than American missiles. Arkhipov added that most officers supported the treaty.

162. Pravda, 14 May 1987, 2. Gorbachev's entourage included two Politburo members: Sokolov and Chebrikov.

163. "It is necessary for all to understand that Baikonur has been created for a long time, forever. We do not intend to weaken our efforts and lose [our] vanguard positions in the exploitation of space....But before us stand tasks about which it is necessary for all of us to think together: how to make the output from the cosmos more substantial both for science and for the whole economy. Today this is the practical task that stands squarely before us." (Pravda, 14 May 1987, 2).
program and that it was now up to the sector's own officials and workers to reach the necessary goals. 164

Apparently the internal discussion of Soviet security policy continued into the fall. On the eve of the Washington summit, Gorbachev harked back to Reykjavik and claimed it had been a turning point in history. Past "panic" and skeptical declarations about "failure" after the meeting, he said, had not been borne out. Instead, events had justified the evaluation he had presented literally forty minutes after the dramatic end of the Reykjavik conference. Gorbachev also maintained that progress on negotiations to limit nuclear testing had justified the wisdom of the unilateral Soviet test moratorium. 165 He seemed to be making these points to counter persisting skepticism about his approach to security questions.

Security, Liberalization, and Subversion

Perhaps more significant, however, were the sharp differences within the leadership over the relationship between security policy and domestic political liberalization. During 1987 several leaders argued that perestroika was helping to persuade the West of the USSR's benign intentions and gaining valuable political leverage for Soviet diplomacy. By undermining

164. There were "inadequacies and omissions" in the space program, he remarked, which must be eliminated. "We have adopted a series of measures through the CPSU Central Committee and the government to support your efforts. Now the matter is in your hands." (Pravda, 14 May 1987, 2.)

165. Krasnaia zvezda, 2 October 1987, 2.
anti-Soviet propaganda, perestroika was making it more difficult for Western antagonists to justify a hostile policy toward the USSR. Ryzhkov, for instance, hailed the benefit of perestroika in countering foreign propaganda about the USSR's "expansionism" and "closed society."\textsuperscript{166} This view was espoused by Dobrynin as well.\textsuperscript{167} In the same vein, other leaders suggested that the "humanization" of international relations, entailing greatly expanded societal contacts with the West, would improve Soviet security. Iakovlev and Zaikov, for example, supported the idea of holding a CSCE conference on human rights in Moscow.\textsuperscript{168} Such a conference could indeed have a dramatic international impact, but as many of its proponents doubtless knew, scheduling it would generate pressures for further domestic relaxation to ensure that the impact would be positive rather than negative.

This conception of the relationship between perestroika and foreign relations struck more conservative leaders as dangerous. Such figures as Ligachev and Shcherbitskii asserted that the West sought to promote a form of democratization that would destroy socialism in the USSR.\textsuperscript{169} Although they may have believed that socioeconomic revitalization would enhance the USSR's international prestige and therefore strengthen its diplomacy,

\textsuperscript{166.} Pravda, 23 April 1987, 2.
\textsuperscript{167.} FBIS, 5 May 1987, AA7.
\textsuperscript{168.} Pravda, 4 March 1987, 1, and Izvestiia, 12 March 1987, 4.
\textsuperscript{169.} FBIS, 10 March 1987, R8; Pravda Ukrainy, 7 March 1987, 2.
they were far more skeptical about the diplomatic benefits of political liberalization. From their perspective, political liberalization intended to placate the West could easily become a wedge for Western attempts to create "political pluralism" and undermine party rule. Both men avoided connecting liberalization with the success of Soviet diplomacy, and both remained silent about the idea of an international human rights meeting in Moscow. Their sentiments clearly lay much closer to the traditional Soviet equation of international security with domestic regimentation.

Chebrikov articulated this view most forcefully in a speech commemorating the birth of Dzerzhinskii, the first head of the secret police. Liberalized treatment of dissidents, said Chebrikov, would not eliminate Western "ideological speculation" on human rights issues. Rather, it would give greater influence to antisocialist elements liable to be used for subversive ends by Western intelligence agencies. Chebrikov's statement directly contradicted the forthright stand Dobrynin had taken on the need to neutralize foreign "speculation" through a more accommodating line on human rights. It was also at odds with Gorbachev's position on the question, and it came just days before Gorbachev called for steps to bring human-rights legislation into line with international legal norms.

Concern about the stability of the political system appeared

171. See above.
to be one reason for Chebrikov's veiled warning that he, much like Dzerzhinskii during the 1918 debate over the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, might not support diplomatic concessions toward the West. According to Chebrikov, Dzerzhinskii stoutly defended the unity of the party in the struggle against Trotskyites and other oppositionists, and he always implemented the party's orders unswervingly. Although Dzerzhinskii had considered the signing of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty "a mistake," said Chebrikov, he had refused the tactics of the "left communists," which threatened to split the party over this issue. The striking thing about this passage was Chebrikov's failure directly to condemn Dzerzhinskii's attitude toward Brest-Litovsk. Previous generations of policymakers had invoked the precedent of Brest-Litovsk whenever they wished to legitimize Soviet foreign-policy concessions, and pro-Gorbachev intellectuals such as Mikhail Shatrov were currently using it to justify a more accommodating line toward the West. Two months later, in his November anniversary speech, Gorbachev briefly referred to the Brest-Litovsk treaty as a step that had been essential for the survival of Soviet Russia.

Chebrikov was also concerned about the implications of Gorbachev's relatively open diplomatic style for Soviet security.

172. Pravda, 11 September 1987, 3. This interpretation of Chebrikov's intent is strengthened by the fact that other portions of the speech contained obvious arguments by historical analogy intended to caution Gorbachev against the dangers of runaway political liberalization.

in a narrower sense. Western intelligence agencies, warned the KGB chief, were stepping up efforts to gain information about Soviet technical research and economic plans, as well as about the USSR's "planned foreign-policy actions." This remark was a clear rebuttal to the liberal spokesmen who were pressing for more glasnost' in the treatment of foreign as well as domestic policy. Chebrikov, who had taken a conservative line on the general issue of glasnost' in the media, probably disliked the idea of foreign news coverage that would erode the ideological contrast between East and West and strengthen the tide of heterodox thought inside the USSR. He was probably no less concerned about Gorbachev's radically new approach to arms-control verification, which threatened to breach the wall of secrecy the KGB had long been charged to preserve around Soviet military activities.


175. Fedor Burlatskii, for example, had called for Soviet journalists to present more factual analyses of the West, and Bovin had chastised the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense for their secretiveness.

176. As noted earlier, at the 27th Party Congress Chebrikov referred to Western efforts to obtain Soviet military and scientific secrets and to penetrate important defense sites; he also stated that a series of imperialist agents had been unmasked in several ministries. (XXVII s"ezd KPSS, I, 347). In the Dzerzhinskii speech he referred to Western attempts to obtain Soviet secrets without referring to military secrets per se. But he may have omitted them out of political prudence rather than because he agreed with Gorbachev on intrusive verification measures.
CONCLUSION

Since becoming general secretary Gorbachev has sponsored increasingly radical changes in Soviet security policy. He has pushed for a moderation of the traditional assessment of the military threat from the West, along with diminished reliance on military power and a heightened accent on flexible diplomacy in ensuring the USSR's security. In addition to focusing greater attention on remedying the Soviet system's internal ills, he has increasingly attempted to link internal political liberalization with an improvement of Soviet external security.

This is a formidable policy agenda, and Gorbachev and his allies have made impressive strides toward meeting it. Gorbachev's security initiatives have encountered significant resistance within the elite, but to date the skeptics have been unable to disrupt the momentum of his campaign for change. Four U.S.-Soviet summits, the INF Treaty, substantial progress toward agreement on strategic arms reductions, and the sea-change in American attitudes toward the USSR all attest to Gorbachev's accomplishments.

Nevertheless, the drive to recast Soviet security policy remains a high-risk undertaking. If Gorbachev were seeking only a "breathing space" in which to revive the economy for the sake of future successes in a renewed rivalry with the West, the domestic resistance to his policy would probably be easily manageable. A significant number of national-security officials,
including some military officers, probably appreciate the connection between economic revitalization and the USSR's future capacity to compete internationally. But Gorbachev is seeking more than a breathing space. He is pursuing a comprehensive process of liberalization which calls into question the necessity of the USSR's traditional competitive policy toward the West and challenges the standing of the coercive institutions which have traditionally implemented this policy. If Gorbachev pushes further along this road, as seems likely, he will face the possibility of a dangerous coalition uniting skeptical party leaders with conservative soldiers and policemen convinced that his strategy threatens the interests of the Soviet state. Thus far he has skillfully avoided such a development. But in the future, if his support within the top civilian leadership flags, the chances for the emergence of such a coalition will increase.