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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: THE STRUCTURE OF ELITE CIRCULATION IN THE BELORUSSIAN REPUBLIC

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NOTE

This is the second report by Professor Urban on his research into the effectiveness of Moscow's hold on Soviet society through control of personnel. The first report, distributed by the Council in September 1986, was titled "Political Power in the USSR: Network Analysis" and contained the following brief description of his work.

> Since the elimination of terror in the USSR, the top Soviet leadership has had few mechanisms available to it to insure that the policies which it formulates will be implemented in practice. Cadres policy, a term encompassing political recruitment, mobility, and elite circulation, is rightly regarded in the Western literature as the single effective tool by which the top leadership can enforce its will. Hence, cadres policy intersects with every policy sector in the Soviet state. Through the centralized nomenklatura system, Moscow is able to exchange with subordinate officials in the republics and regions certain incentives (jobs, promotions, etc.) for compliance with its directives. Or is it?
>
> Much of the Western literature in recent years suggests that the nomenklatura system operates largely so as to ratify at the top personnel decisions which effectively have been made at lower levels in the hierarchy. To the degree that this is the case, cadres policy ceases to be an effective tool for promoting central control. And without such control, drift takes over. In a pattern reminiscent of feudalism, individual officials tend to appropriate their offices, form alliances one with another against the central power, and govern their respective "fiefs" according to norms indigenous to the locality (officially known in the USSR as "localism").

This project represents an investigation of the accretion of political power to sub-national units in the Soviet Union, using the Belorussian SSR as the case study. The results provide information on two aspects of the interrelation between local and central power in the area of cadres policy. The first aspect is the system of pressures from the center and responses from the local level which I have termed "binding and bonding" to describe the development of strong, personal bonds between political actors at the local level as a defense against the various binding, contradictory and often un-fulfillable directives from the center. The second is the system of cadres mobility between positions at various levels. To discern and describe the patterns governing that system, I have developed a new model, the "vacancy chain" model, which improves upon the current "turnover" model used in analyzing cadres policy in the Soviet Union. This Final Report consists of the conclusions of research on the "binding-bonding" mechanism, and a description of the methodology and data base to date for the application of the "vacancy chain" model.

This, second report describes the application of "vacancy chain" analysis and the findings resulting from it.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study concerns the mobility patterns evinced by some 3127 political actors who circulated through a hierarchy composed of 2034 offices in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) during the years, 1966-1986. Its primary objective is to test for the influences of three factors —centralization, regionalism and patronage — on the circulation process. The relative presence/absence of these influences in personnel policy appears to have immediate implications for the implementation of substantive policies in the Soviet system. As a pure type, centralization refers to a pattern of intervention by the authorities in Moscow and/or Minsk that constrains access to political jobs. In this instance, appointments/promotions can be exchanged by superiors for compliance with substantive directives. Regionalism represents the inverse of this pattern. It orders mobility according to distinct geographic units without interference from central authorities. Absent, then, are career incentives to follow central directives. Conversely, regionally-based elites are known to develop their own agendas (the phenomenon of "localism") which frustrate the policy designs of the center. Finally, patronage involves the private appropriation of public office by cliques whose members engage in mutual protection and assistance, thereby replacing formal authority relations with personalized ones.

The principal findings of this study are: (1) central control over elite circulation has a marginal impact on mobility patterns in the system, and the marginal impact itself is mainly the result of the interaction between personnel systems at the national and republic levels rather than a coordinated cadres policy issuing from Moscow and/or Minsk that systematically shapes the contours of the circulation process; (2) regionalism has a pronounced effect on elite circulation but falls short of furnishing a complete explanation for what appears in the data; and (3)

patronage relations, micro-level phenomena that interact in complex ways with the macro-level factors of centralization and regionalism, appear to account for both differential rates of access to upper level positions in the BSSR and the incidence, timing and results of those negative sanctions which have been employed against officeholders. In sum, this study suggests that elite circulation in the BSSR has moved mainly according to its own rhythms, that these are structured by region and that patronage relations bind the actors into a mutable configuration of cliques whose competion for control of elite offices represents the principal dynamic in the system. These findings are elaborated here according to four stages of the analysis.

Stage 1 involved the construction of a hierarchy of positions required for the analysis mobility in the subsequent stages. Authority relations within the Soviet form of organization and the existence of multiple hierarchies across which the actors move militated against the use of nominal rank in this enterprise. Consequently, a hierarchy of positions in the BSSR was composed on the basis of the mobility of the actors who moved among them. The offices were ranked according to their respective distances from an identified upper stratum of positions (those which were regularly included on the Bureau of the Kommunist Party of Belorussia (KPB), with "distance" measured by the mobility patterns of their incumbents. When a specified probability existed that the holder of a given office could enter some position ranked in a stratum somewhere above him, then the office which he occupied was ranked at one remove from (one stratum below) the stratum that he had a certain probability of reaching. The computer program designed to accomodate this purpose ranked all 2034 positions in a hierarchy containing 10 strata.

Testing for the influence of centralization on the mobility of the actors was the objective in Stage 2. Such testing was carried out primarily by means of a vacancy chain analysis, a method that focuses on the movement of vacancies and the paths

that they trace (chains) as they circulate through the array of offices. This approach postulates that the movement of vacancies can be grasped as a Markov process in which all that is required to predict the flow of vacancies is knowledge of the distribution of vacancies among the states in the system (here, the 10 strata in the hierarchy) and the probabilities that govern their transitions to other states. Empirical cases are then compared against this theoretic baseline. To the degree that an algebraic equation accurately predicts the distribution of the lengths of vacancy chains initiated in each of the 10 strata, the circulation of vacancies would exhibit the Markov property. Under this circumstance, vacancies would be moving independently of one another is accordance with fixed transition probabilities; central control over appointments would not add anything to an explanation of the circulation of elites within the system.

A comparison of the predicted and observed distributions of vacancy chain lengths by the strata of their origins revealed two things. On one hand, when all-union jobs that had been filled by an actor from the BSSR were included in the analysis, the model was able accurately to predict length distributions for strata 7-10. Among the top 3 strata, some considerable discrepancies appeared. On the other hand, when all-union jobs were removed from the analysis, predicted and observed values came into very close agreement. These results suggested, in turn, two things: (1) a central influence issuing from Moscow, but not from Minsk, had some effect on elite circulation and this effect was confined to the upper end of the hierarchy; (2) the nature of the effect was indirect and took the form of an interaction between personnel systems at the republic and national levels.

Three auxiliary tests were performed on the data in order to probe further for the effects of centralization. The first involved the grooming of replacements through their systematic installation in stepping stone jobs prior to appointment to

top elite offices. The data showed that this practice has been effectively absent in the BSSR. The second utilized the notion of vetting, whereby candidates for high office in the BSSR would serve briefly in positions in Moscow prior to promotion in the Republic. Vetting occurred, but very rarely. The third test focused on packing, the practice of appointing politicians, who had made their careers outside of the BSSR, to elite offices in the Republic. This pattern, too, appeared very infrequently.

Stage 3 replaced the hierarchical ordering of positions with one based on region and repeated the vacancy chain analysis. Here, the states in the system were taken as the regions of the BSSR, and the model constructed on this basis predicted the distribution of the lengths of vacancy chains initiated in each of the regions and at the republic level. Predicted and observed values were in this case matched very closely, indicating that elite circulation in the BSSR has been structured on the basis of region.

Auxiliary tests performed on the data, however, showed less of a regional influence on the movement of actors into the top positions at the regional and republic levels. These results also indicated the presence of three regionally-based patronage groups in the BSSR: the Partisan faction (the members of which served in the Belorussian resistance during the German occupation and rose to high office in the BSSR in the postwar years), clients of the Brezhnev network, and the Minsk City Industrial Group (MCIG).

Stage 4 analyzed patronage relations. Two techniques were employed for identifying the factional affiliations of actors in the sample — repeated movement within the same chain of replacements, and repeated joint-movement within regions on hierarchies identified as falling within the control of a particular patronage

group. The results of these exercises were then employed in testing for the influence of patronage on three categories of events in the system.

The first category involved the rates of mobility for actors entering the hierarchy through five separate recruitment channels. With the exception of the Komsomol channel, those actors associated with the MCIG consistently evinced considerably higher rates of mobility than did others. The examination of the second category of events, the mobility patterns of female politicians, showed similar results. The third category, the use and consequences of negative sanctions, also pointed up the influence of patronage ties. The use of negative sanctions on members of a given patronage group correlated with the overall position of the group in the political order at a given time. When the group was in the ascendant, negative sanctions showed no appreciable effect on the members; when the dominant group was under challenge but not yet dislodged from power, the effect of negative sanctions was mixed.

Finally, mention might be made of a noticeable change in the structure of patronage relations in the BSSR which took place within the period convered by this study. From the mid-sixties till the late-seventies, Belorussian politics was dominated by the Partisan faction. This group was republic-based and organized along conventional lines — namely, around a single patron (in this case, K.T. Mazurov, who had risen to the post of First Deputy Chair of the USSR's Council of Ministers and was a full member of the Politburo). The political demise of Mazurov in 1978 weakened the position of the Partisan faction in the BSSR, and with the death of P.M. Masherov (KPB First Secretary) in 1980, Brezhnev clients in the BSSR rapidly took over the reins of power. Following Brezhnev's death in 1982, however, Belorussian clients of his old machine were themselves quickly replaced by the MCIG

whose leading members had been holding jobs in Moscow for the better part of the previous decade.

Certain characteristics of the MCIG, whose more prominent member have ties to Gorbachev and whose career histories resemble in certain respects those of the current Soviet leader, set it apart from previous patronage cliques. Schematically:

(1) The membership has come not from the Komsomol apparatus but from the skilled sector of the working class in Minsk.

(2) There are a number of leading representatives in the group but no identifiable single patron.

(3) Geographically, the MCIG was organized on a Minsk-Moscow axis and, on becoming the dominant faction in the BSSR, it broadened its narrow base in the BSSR through apparent coalition with certain politicians who had been previously associated with its rivals.

CONTENTS

THE STRUCTURE OF ELITE CIRCULATION IN THE BELORUSSIAN REPUBLIC

FINAL REPORT

Introduction

The research support provided under this contract enabled me to complete a project that was begun in 1984. This report, then, concerns the entire project and addresses itself to the method of analysis employed as well to the empirical results which have been derived from the application of the method. It is devided into four sections. The first involves the construction of a stratified model of positions in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) which forms part of the analysis in the sections that follow. The second tests for the influence of centralization on the mobility patterns of actors in the system, while the third repeats the tests, examining in this case the effects of regionalism. The fourth concerns itself with the influence of patronage relations on mobility. Inasmuch as the project itself has been a lengthy one, this report is also rather lengthy. Consequently, the Executive Summary stands in place of a set of conclusions appended to the end. It remains, here, to say a word on vacancy chain analysis, the principal method employed in this study.

Vacancy chain analysis begins by abstracting from individuals and focusing instead on positions, particularly on those which have fallen vacant. Once a vacancy has appeared in some position, it can circulate within the system of offices and form a chain in the process of doing so. That is, when a vacancy occurs and is then filled by some incumbent in the system, another vacancy has been created in the job which this incumbent has just left. This vacancy, in turn, might be filled by another incumbent, creating thereby another vacancy until the chain formed by the movement of vacancies has passed outside the system (recruitment of a non-incumbent). Alternatively, this process might be regarded as a replacement chain composed of the

actors (replacements) whose movement in the system flows in a direction opposite to the flow of vacancies. Figure 1 illustrates this process by means of a hypothetical example. In this instance, a vacancy has appeared in Position 1 with the retirement of Actor A. Since B then fills the opening in Position 1, the vacancy moves to Position 2 which B has just left. It continues to circulate until a non-incumbent (Actor F) is recruited to fill Position 5, at which point the vacancy has passed outside the system and the chain terminates.

See figure 1, page 92.

We shall have occasion to develop some of the conceptual and mathematic aspects of the vacancy model as we apply it to the analysis of our data. At this point, we are concerned with the methodological advantages which it holds for the study of Soviet elites. Firstly, whereas the conventional approach in the field, the turnover model, ignores the relations among actors who circulate through offices in system, the vacancy model analytically includes the concept of circulation and offers an immediate empirical interpretation for it: vacancies circulate in chains. Accordingly, the circulation of vacancies is cast within a relational framework, their circulation in chains reports events within the system which are themselves empirically linked. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 in which actor F, for instance, enters the system because of an opportunity which resulted from events having little if anything to do with his/her own intentions or decisions. In the first instance, F's entry into the system is occasioned by E's movement out of Position 5 and into Position 4. Similarly, E's movement is brought about by the opportunity to move to Position 4, an event conditioned by the movement of D and the resulting vacancy in his previous job. Carrying forward this logic, it becomes clear that A's retirement

and F's recruitment are in fact related. This relationship, however, would not be noticed were we using the turnover model which focuses on individuals and their attributes.

Secondly, since the vacancy approach proceeds on the basis of relations among actors circulating through the array of offices, its application enables us to examine the systematic influcence of three factors—centralization, regionalism and patronage—on mobility. We can regard the presence of effective centralization in the process of elite circulation in Belorussia as an indication of structural strength in the deployment of political power. In this respect, the political center, whether at the all-union or republic level, would be seen as directly effecting the mobility of elites and thereby controlling inducements (jobs, promotions) which it can exchange for performance. Conversely, regionalism and patronage would influence elite circulation in the opposite direction, contributing to the personalization of relations within Belorussia's formal organizations, fragmenting control over the personnel process and, assumedly, over the implementation of substantive policies as well.

Finally, the method employed in this study allows for both a diachronic and a synchronic approach to the category of time and the related phenomeon of the mobility of the actors within the system. Mobility has conventionally been grasped in a diachronic fashion. It concerns those snapshots taken at various points in time which, when compared one to another, reveal certain changes in elite composition which have resulted from changing patterns of mobility. A diachronic approach to mobility is essential when the question of change is under consideration and, accordingly, it is often employed in this study. However, in the same way that vacancy chain analysis enables us to see the links among what might otherwise be perceived as discrete events within the system, it also opens another vista on the category of time which conduces to a synchronic appreciation of mobility and its

effects. From this vantage, we view events as if they were occurring all at once. Mobility, when placed in synchronic perspective, can then be used in novel ways in order to specify characteristics of the system itself. In what follows, a synchronic concept of mobility is employed to determine the hierarchical structure of the system, and the influence of centralization, regionalism and patronage on the circulation of elites within it.

Constructing a Stratified Model for Analysis

The construction of a stratified model of offices for the BSSR is required for an analysis of elite circulation in the Republic. However, a number of complications associated with the Soviet form of organization immediately confront such an undertaking. Taking, first, the question of intra-organizational hierarchies, it would appear that the relative absense of a bureaucratic pattern of organization in the USSR would raise serious questions about the utility of relying simply upon the nominal designations of the various offices in order to arrive at an adequate conception of how power and authority are actually distributed among them. If, for instance, communications among these offices do not consistently conform to bureaucratic rules whereby orders are passed along an explicit chain of command, but instead involve numerous cases in which middle-level offices are bypassed in the course of direct communications between "top" and "bottom",[1] we cannot safely infer that the formal standing of offices in Soviet organizations is coincident with their operational or practical significance. Consequently, formal rank emerges as a rather imprecise index of the gradations in power and authority which may in fact prevail in Soviet organizations. In what follows, we find that this is also true for the mobility of actors within formal organizational hierarchies.

Second, there is the matter of what may be regarded as multiple hierarchies in the Soviet system—the array of party jobs, state jobs, jobs in mass organizations or

soviets—all of which intersect in various committees and bureaus at various levels. Inasmuch as the careers of actors commonly span a number of these, the student of Soviet elites must be something of a juggler, keeping a number of such balls in motion simultaneously in order to chart promotions, demotions and simple transfers. This issue of multiple hierarchies compounds, and is in turn compounded by, the problems associated with determining rank within organizations considered individually. If the names of positions do not necessarily present a reliable guide to their actual standing within the system of offices, how might we compare positions in one organization with those in another and determine thereby which jobs are above, below or on a par with others?[2]

Finally, the specific mechanism for filling positions in the Soviet system, the nomenklatura, introduces yet another set of difficulties. We know that elite mobility occurs through the medium of the nomenklatura system of appointments. One gets a position, a promotion and so on on the basis of one's name being entered on these appointments' lists.[3] We also know that the nomenklatura system enables one organization, the party, to "interfer" with the staffing of other organizations, such that moves across hierarchies—from, say, a party to a soviet office or vice versa—may in fact be moves within a single nomenklatura.[4] Moreover, appointment powers are staggered in this system such that the top official in a given organization will likely appoint some of his staff but not his immediate subordinates. Consequently, officials are often beholden to others outside their respective organizations for their positions and career opportunities.[5] The fact that appointments in many cases are made by units at one administrative level on the basis of nominations and/or recommendations issuing from their counterparts at lower levels or from other units attached to different administrative hierarchies produces a

situation in which we are at a loss to know who in fact appointed whom and, as a result, where the actual lines of responsibility among officials lie.[6]

Previous attempts at mapping out an explicit hierarchy of positions in the Soviet system have in my view given too little attention to these peculiar features of Soviet organization. Tacitly, the assumption seems to have been that there is a hierarchy "out there" which the analyst can locate.[7] Location, in turn, has been largely nominal; a position's name and the duties, authority, or importance known or thought to be associated with it would place it above, below, or on par with some other position.[8] As a consequence, analysts have tended to focus on the characteristics of this job or that—its formal rank, whether it is represented on central committees, the size of the organization in which it exists, the 'importance' of the unit in the economy, and so on—and the drawing of comparisons between these characteristics and those of other jobs. This method would likely encounter few if any difficulties were we dealing with hierarchies in advanced capitalist systems. But when applied to organizations of the Soviet type it produces results which are difficult if not impossible to validate.

While retaining the same objective—the specification of a hierarchy of positions in order to gauge elite mobility—we depart from the nominal method of ranking conventionally employed. Rather than treating hierarchy and mobility as two separate phenomena, which is the common approach, we shall conjoin them. In so doing it becomes possible (a) to see each as a function of the other and (b) to reverse their order of determination. If we wish to specify a hierarchy in order to study mobility, might we not study mobility in order to specify a hierarchy? This is the tack taken here. The hierarchy of positions in our Belorussian sample will be determined by the probabilities displayed by incumbents in a given set of jobs for reaching positions grouped into strata above them. The hierarchy of positions

generated by this method avoids the problems associated with nominal ranking by allowing empirical patterns of mobility to designate which jobs occupy which ranks.

Data and Method of Ranking

In order to employ the principal method adopted in this study for the analysis of elite circulation in the BSSR, the method of vacancy chair analysis, a more or less complete inventory of positions and incumbents in the Belorussian Republic is required. This consideration rules out the time-saving device of using data sets which have been prepared by organizations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty or the CIA, or of consulting the biographical sketches which appear in Soviet publications. Although these sources might assist in the task of compiling a full inventory of positions and incumbents, they are nonetheless themselves insufficient for our purposes. The reason for this insufficiency is straightforward enough: the data compiled by these agencies are organized around individual actors rather than positions. Consequently, these sources may tell us which jobs a particular actor held over the span of his career, but they do not tell us whom the actor replaced when he assumed a given position nor who replaced him when he left a certain job. Complete career histories for a set of actors does not, that is, translate into what our method of analysis requires as a data base—a complete set of <u>positions</u> and the actors who filled them at one time or another.

In order to generate the requisite data base, it was necessary to follow personnel changes in the Belorussian elite by systematically reading a number of Soviet newspapers and journals.[9] In the course of doing so, a file was opened for each office holder whose name appeared in these publications. (Military offices constitute a distinct personnel system and, as such, were not recorded as part of the data set). Alongside the individual's name in each file were entered the initial position listed for him plus all subsequent jobs which he held as these were reported

in the data sources. After completing these files for the period, January, 1966-June, 1986, a computerized data set was constructed wherein each actor appeared as a "case," and to each "case" was appended a code which designated the position held by the actor in specified years. This yielded a matrix of 3,127 rows (officeholders) and 21 columns (each a one year interval over the period, 1966-1986) into which the 2034 jobs which appeared in the sample were entered.

To accommodate the purpose of tracking the mobility of actors, a range of hierarchically-ordered positions is called for. Consequently the scope of data collection was designed to include incumbents in factory-level jobs at (assummedly) the lower end of the hierarchy and those occupying certain all-union jobs at the upper end. The array of positions spanned the following hierarchies: Communist Party of Belorussia (KPB), governmental positions in the Belorussian Republic (ministeries, state committees and soviets), Komsomol, trade union, cultural and educational posts. The vertical range extended from republic-level positions in these hierarchies through oblast' (and, for party and soviet positions, raion) level jobs, and to the positions of directors (and in some cases deputy directors) and the secretaries of primary party organizations and trade union presidents in large enterprises. Additionally, 24 jobs at the all-union level known to have been taken by former officeholders in Belorussia were included.

The matrix of officeholders/years (1966-1986) with offices as the entries was then transformed into a matrix of offices/years (1966-1986) wherein the entries were the officeholders.[10] This matrix has 2034 rows (each representing a job) and 21 columns (each designating a year). Each actor who held a given position at the end of a particular year occupies the cell in the matrix designated by the intersection of the corresponding row (position) and column (year). Row entries then change with mobility into and out of the positions which designate the row.

Having arranged this position/year matrix for the data set, the next step in generating a hierarchy on the basis of transition probabilities to higher strata was to select the top stratum itself. A number of considerations bear upon this choice. This stratum functions as the ultimate "destination" of all those holding jobs in the Belorussian Republic. Since jobs are to be ranked in accordance with the probabilities which their incumbents have for reaching higher positions, and since this first stratum will therefore define a second stratum which will, in turn, define a third and so on, it is clear that the first stratum should be limited to top jobs but at the same time be large enough to accommodate the purpose of generating a second stratum which is itself sufficiently large to generate a third (etc.), such that the hierarchy thereby derived will contain of number a strata suited to the purpose for which the model was devised.

With these considerations in mind, two sets of positions were selected for the top stratum. The first set is composed by those jobs whose incumbents regularly held positions on the Buro of the Central Committee of the KPB (i.e., Buro membership was awarded to the incumbent at at least four of the five congress of the KPB held during the time frame of the study). There is no reason to believe that these jobs are all equal in their importance. They are likely not. The point is only that regular membership on the Buro, the highest decision making organ in the Republic, defines a particular set of jobs which are set apart from all others by virtue of their incumbents' membership on a body which can be regarded the uppermost layer of the Republic's elite.

A second set of jobs selected for the top stratum is composed of national positions to which Belorussian officeholders moved during the course of their careers. The inclusion of this group follows again from the purpose for generating the positions hierarchy, namely, in order to study elite circulation and mobility in

Belorussia. Here, the assumption is that moving into one of these all-union positions is equivalent to moving into one of the jobs regularly represented on the Buro of the KPB. In either case, a promotion to the top stratum has occurred. Stratum 1 jobs at the all-union level were defined as executive positions, whether in the party or state apparatuses, at the level of deputy minister of, or for the party, deputy head of a department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee or those with formal rankings above these (first deputy, minister, etc.). The two sets of jobs yielded a top stratum numbering 25 positions, 13 of which were regularly represented on the Buro of the KPB, 12 of which were executive jobs at the national level.

Having assigned these two sets of positions to Stratum 1, it became clear that such a ranking would not serve the purpose of generating a sizeable second stratum for the hierarchy. That is, there is a relatively high frequency of circulation among those holding jobs in the top stratum and a rather low degree of mobility into this stratum. Moreover, if regular Buro membership and executive jobs at the national level were the criteria for inclusion into Stratum 1, might not consistency suggest that irregular Buro membership and sub-executive jobs at the all-union level constitute the criteria for membership in Stratum 2? This was the approach adopted. To all those jobs which would appear in Stratum 2 by virtue of their transition probabilities to jobs in Stratum 1 were added at the onset 15 positions, 9 of which were heads of ministerial departments or sectors of the CPSU Secretariat, 6 of which were infrequently represented on the Buro of the KPB or were regularly candidate members of that body.

Once the positions comprising Stratum 1 had been specified and those comprising Stratum 2 had been partially specified, a computer program was designed to created succeeding strata for the remainder of the jobs in the data set and to assign individual jobs to individual strata on the basis of the formula:

$$S_l = P_{i-j} + P_{i-k}$$

where S_l represents the stratum to which a given job is assigned, P designates the level of probability (at this point, not yet fixed) that an incumbent in a given job will move into one of the positions in S_k (i.e., the stratum above S_l), and the subscripts, i-j, i-k, denote movement from i (initial, unstratified position) into jobs in hierarchically ordered strata (j, k) above S_l. If the computed probabilities that the holder of a given position can move to jobs in, say, the first and second strata are summed, and if this sum equals or exceeds the probability level set for inclusion into the third stratum, then the job will be ranked in that third stratum. Succeeding strata are created and composed in the same way.

Which level of probability should serve as the cut off point for the inclusion of jobs into their respective strata? Obviously, the answer to this question turns on the purpose for which this hierarchical ranking is generated. In order to employ the stratified ranking of jobs to study mobility, we should prefer a cut off point neither too high (in which case too few jobs would be grouped into too many strata) nor too low (which would produce the opposite result of too many jobs in too few strata). Consequently, some experimentation was in order. The cut off point was set first at a probability of 0.5, but this proved to be too restrictive as the computer program was able to create only 2 additional strata and rank only 40 jobs (not counting those specifically assigned to the first and second strata) under this criterion. Relaxing the cut off point by setting it at 0.4 yielded more promising results; some 168 jobs were ranked in 6 strata. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.0. The subscripted jobs A, B and C belong to strata 1 through 3, respectively. The group of jobs at the

See figure 2, page 93.

bottom of the Figure (X_1,X_2 etc.) are ranked by the frequency of transition of their incumbents to jobs in the 3 strata depicted here. So, job X_1, whose summed probabilities for transition to strata 1 and 2 exceeds the .4 criterion (.25 + .25) is ranked in Stratum 3; job X_2 has no transition to Stratum 1, only .25 to Stratum 2 and .5 to Stratum 3, ranking it therefore in Stratum 4; accordingly, X_3 is ranked in Stratum 3 and X_4 in Stratum 2.

As the ranking progressed a snag in the procedure became evident, viz., the great majority of positions in the data set could not be assigned to strata on the basis of this (unmodified) method inasmuch as a majority of positions with nominally high rank have no transition probabilities at all. That is, if no incumbents in such jobs as, say, Minister of Agriculture or first secretary of an obkom ever received promotions to jobs in the top two strata, then these "transitionless" jobs would not be ranked. Accordingly, those positions which the incumbents left in order to become Minister of Agriculture or an obkom first secretary would also go unranked since these transitions were also to unranked jobs. This same problem, the absence of transitions to other jobs, was also apparent in the case of many positions thought to be of middle rank (deputy ministers, gorkom secretaries, and so forth) and as such prevented the ranking of those positions which were vacated when incumbents moved to these middle-level jobs. Clearly, if the general procedure for creating and filling strata on the basis of the probability of movement to higher strata is to succeed, some modifications were required in order to deal with the positions lacking transition probabilities.

Two modifications were introduced. First, unranked positions nominally equivalent to ranked positions were assigned to the same stratum in which a decisive majority of the ranked positions had been ordered. In the first such iteration, this involved assigning all unranked ministers to Stratum 3 (where all ministers who had

been ranked by the first computer run were located) and all unranked heads of departments of the Secretariat of the KPB to Stratum 4 (where the majority of ranked department heads were to be found). Subsequent runs of the computer program yielded similar ranking patterns for other nominally equivalent positions and transitionless jobs were assigned to strata accordingly. In those cases in which patterns were unclear, other criteria became important. The first secretaries of raikoms are a case in point. Those with transition probabilities to other jobs were ranked in a number of different strata with the greatest concentrations falling in Stratum 7 and Stratum 8. By consulting the size of the party membership in their respective raions[11], it became clear that those in Stratum 8 were also those with small party memberships (under 2000). Hence, unranked first secretaries of raikoms were assigned to Stratum 7 unless the party membership in their respective raions fell below 2000, in which case they were included in Stratum 8.

The second modification involved a pooling of jobs of nominally equivalent rank in the same organization. Examples of such job pools are: inspectors or instructors in a department of the Secretariat of the KPB, department heads in a ministry, and secretaries of gorkoms (but not the first secretary). Once pooled, all jobs in the pool were included in a single stratum on the basis of the sum of the probabilities for transition into other strata (in accordance with the formula set out, above) divided by the total number of such transitions for all jobs in the pool. To illustrate, take the case of heads of sectors in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the KPB. The five positions of sector head in the data set were treated as one pool. Taking together those who held the top position in a sector, we observe that transitions occurred for the heads of two sectors on two occasions, that for another sector head one transition took place, and that for the remaining two positions of head of a sector there is no record of any transition. Hence, for the pool of five

sector heads, five transitions occurred. On three occasions a sector head's next job was Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department, in one instance his next job was First Deputy Head of the Central Committee's Department of Culture, and in the fifth case, the next job was First Deputy Chair of the Belorussian State Committee for Publications. All five of these jobs to which the sector heads moved were ranked in Stratum 5. Consequently, the computer program ranked the entire pool of sector heads in Stratum 6.

The two modifications just discussed, assigning unranked jobs to the stratum in which their nominally equivalent counterparts had been ranked and (where possible) creating pools of jobs in order to stratify those in the pool which evinced no transitions to other positions, were undertaken simultaneously, but the first modification was introduced in series from the top downward. That is, the first computer run which ranked 168 jobs in 6 strata became the basis for ranking by nominally equivalent position another 87 jobs. With these inserted into the hierarchy, the program was run again and produced a ranking for 727 jobs in 10 strata. This made possible the assignment by nominally equivalent position of another 196 jobs for which there were no records of transitions. Repeating this procedure, the computer program now ranked 1413 jobs in 10 strata, on the basis of which the remaining 621 transitionless jobs were assigned to strata on the basis of the rank of nominally equivalent positions.

The jobs in the data set and their respective rankings in the 10 strata of the hierarchy are available to the reader on request. The shape of the hierarchy generated on the basis of transition probabilities to jobs in the various strata is non-pyramidal, and this aspect reflects both the nature of the data and the method used to order them. It will be noticed, however, that the top four strata do resemble a pyramid (especially if we subtract the all-union jobs from strata 1 and 2), Stratum

5 enlarges the base of this pyramid considerably, the number of jobs per stratum then peaks at Stratum 6, tapers off at strata 7 and 8 and declines in the last two strata. A major reason for the bulge in membership in the two largest strata results from the inclusion — both via the method of assigning transitionless positions to the stratum of nominally equivalent jobs and that of creating job pools which ranks all jobs in the pool according to the pool's transition probability — of sub-ministerial positions in these strata. In Stratum 5 we find 58 deputy minister positions, in Stratum 6, the heads of 135 departments of ministeries. These two sub-groups of positions form something of a special case. As the relative absence of transitions here might suggest, we are likely dealing with positions in which adjectives such as "professional-managerial" have more salience than is true for other types of jobs in the system, and access to them is largely concentrated within the hierarchies of their respective organizations. These positions are very rarely (in the data set) entered from outside their organizational hierarchies and the number of cases in which their incumbents leave for positions in other organizations is equally negligible. Were we to take this aspect into account and subtract as special cases these sub-groups form the data set, the mobility-based hierarchy which we have generated would much more resemble a pyramid. Additionally, if we keep in mind the fact that a major reason for the relative paucity of membership in the bottom two strata is the method of data collection (job holders in strata 9 and 10 appear in print far less often than do those in higher strata), then we can enlarge these strata to pyramidal proportions in our mind's eye by adding in all the other, say, raiispolkom department heads, whom we know to be in the world but whose names did not appear in the data sources.

With these qualifications in mind, the hierarchy of positions generated here seems well-suited to the purpose of analyzing elite circulation in the Belorussian

Republic. It distributes the 2,034 jobs in the sample across 10 strata, thereby providing us with ample range to chart the mobility of the actors in the system. It also keeps intact the idea of a "top elite" by confining Stratum 1 positions to those regularly represented on the Buro of the KPB and to executive positions at the all-union level, while at the same time populating each stratum with a number of jobs which is large enough to record frequent movements into and out of each hierarchical rank. The stratified ranking of positions can now be used to investigate the determinants of elite circulation in the BSSR.

Centralization as a Property of the System

The movement of actors across the array of political offices provides a particularly important index for power and policy in any political system. In the Soviet case, where effectively all social activity transpires through the medium of the party-state, the import of this proposition is especially pronounced. On the one hand, such activity is not so much regulated as it is (in principle) consciously planned, organized and directed by the central authorities whose formal lines of command run from Moscow to republic and provincial capitals whence they radiate outward to, ultimately, the basic units of political, economic and social organization. In the official parlance of the Soviet regime, there is a "monolithic party" which directs a "unified state structure" which in turn superintends a "single economic mechanism."

On the other hand, however, there are strong grounds for questioning the effectiveness of centralization, Soviet-style. As Lindblom has pointed out, the grand attempt at central direction which seems to be a defining feature of Soviet-type regimes is in fact fraught with a number of impediments embedded

in the very structures that appear to privilege the role of the political center.[12] I have summed up the consequence of these structural impediments as "the tendency toward the personal appropriation of public office" and have noted in this respect the ability of those in subordinate positions to reinterpret, deflect or simply ignore the directives of superiors and to elude responsibility in doing so.[13] Within this context, "cadres policy" assumes a critical importance. Moscow can overcome to some extent the effect of personalized relations in formally subordinate organizations by manipulating the movement of personnel, by directly and indirectly offering the inducements of appointments and promotions in the apparatuses of the party-state in return for compliance with its directives. Centrally controlled appointments and promotions, then, constitute vertically structured incentives designed to offset the centrifugal pull of those horizontally structured incentive systems operating within the world of personalized administrative relations--personal enrichment via corruption, mutual security through collusion to deceive superiors, and so forth.

A great number of previous studies of Soviet elites have tended to frame their basic research questions, implicitly at least, around the idea of a centralized personnel system. Their focus on the attributes of officeholders as indications of policy or systems change in the USSR appears to rest on assumptions regarding the categories of individuals who are favored at one time or another by the appointments policy of the center. If certain types of individuals are being recruited and promoted at certain points, the inference can easily be drawn that Moscow is consciously pursuing certain cadres policies in concert with its overall policy orientations. Inasmuch as the <u>nomenklatura</u> system formally concentrates enormous appointment powers in

Moscow (and, secondarily, in the capitals of the republics), the assumption that the right hand (cadres policy) knows what the left hand (substantive policy) is doing does not appear to be an unreasonable one to hold.

This assumption, however, has recently been called into question by a number of studies which indicate that the political center uses its formal powers of appointments largely to ratify the results of the real process of selection taking place in the localities.[14] These studies represent a challenge to, and in certain respects an advance over, the conventional assumptions regarding central control over elite circulation in the USSR. The method which informs them, though, is continuous with the general orientation in the field which gives primacy to individuals rather than to the relations among them. As a result, the evidence which these studies adduce to support their overall conclusions regarding a declining importance of centralized direction in the Soviet personnel process is more suggestive than systematic. Take, for instance, the use of cross-regional transfers, an indicator commonly employed to measure the center's influence on regional elite mobility. A diminishing frequency of such transfers and a concomitant tendency for officials to make their entire careers within a single republic or region are taken as indications of a weakening of the center's influence over the movement of personnel and suggests that something of a laizze faire posture (summed up in Brezhnev's slogan of "trust in local cadres") has been adopted with respect to the circulation of sub-national elites.

But as plausible as this argument seems, it remains inconclusive because it seeks to address a systemic issue--the degree of centralization in the system--on the basis of individual-level data. As a consequence, it finds itself unable to engage a counter-argument constructed in terms of relations

within the system, namely, that declining rates of cross-regional transfers may signal an increase in centralized control over personnel matters inasmuch as the center is now able to vet, groom and install local cadres on whom it can rely, thus obviating its need to shift personnel around among the various regions in order to secure compliance with its policy directives. Rather than a decline in centralization, a diminishing frequency in cross-regional transfers may indicate that centralization has been perfected to the point that the relatively clumsy method of moving subordinate officials around the map has become obsolete.

The point of this discussion is neither to suggest that indicators such as cross-regional transfers are useless nor that, in the present illustration, a decline in the rate at which actors are shifted among the regions of the USSR shows that central control over the movement of personnel has indeed been perfected. Rather, it merely points up the ambiguity which results when an analysis of systemic factors such as centralization rests on the rather oblique individual-level data which are available at this time to scholars in the field. The vacancy model, which is designed to incorporate the relations among individuals, seems a sounder approach to answering questions of a systemic order. Here, we apply it to the question of whether centralization accounts for elite circulation in the BSSR.

An Algebaic Model. To the outline of the vacancy model developed in the introduction, it is important at this point to add a word on its dynamics and to explicate its mechanics. As to the former, vacancy chains are a species of Markov chains, meaning that specifiable probabilities exist which govern the transitions in the system from one state to another. The "states" in the system under consideration are the ten strata of jobs which comprise the

hierarchical model generated in the previous chapter. The vacancy chain approach, then, postulates that the circulation process is a Markovian one wherein events in the system can be predicted solely on the basis of the distribution of vacancies among the strata in the system and the probabilities which effect their transitions among these strata.[15] Accordingly, the Markovian nature of the vacancy approach allows us to postulate a pure model of elite circulation in which central control plays no role, and then to compare empirical cases against this baseline. To the degree that the model fits the data, elite circulation across the array of positions in our stratified system of Belorussian offices can be regarded as Markovian. Vacancies can be taken as moving independently of one another in accordance with fixed transition probabilities which govern this movement. Effective, as opposed to nominal, central control over appointments would not add, if the model is successful, anything to an explanation of the circulation of elites within the system.

When a vacancy occurs in any of the ten strata in our hierarchical model, it can trace a chain through any number of strata before passing outside the system. The mathematic expressions[16] relevant to modeling the movement of vacancies are:

j = length of a vacancy chain

j_m = mean length of chains by stratum of origin (column vector)

s = number of strata

p = probability that a vacancy passes outside the system (column vector)

P_j = probability by stratum of origin that chains will be of length j (column vector)

F = number of vacancies created

A_{ij} = number of moves by vacancies from stratum i to stratum j

Q = matrix of transition probabilities among strata

Direct observation or simple calculation provides values for j, j_m, s, F and A_{ij}. The matrix Q is composed of transition probabilities (i.e., the probability that a given vacancy's next move will be within the same, or to any other, stratum), each derived from $\frac{Aij}{F}$. The values for p are computed according to the equation, $p = \frac{1}{j_m}$ and they give the probability that a vacancy's next move in the system will be to the outside. Table 1 sets out the Q matrix and p vector for the entire sample of positions in the BSSR arranged in ten strata, for the period 1966-1986. This matrix of transition

See Table 1, page 94.

probabilities is read by taking any row entry as the stratum in which a given vacancy has arisen and matching it to any column as the probability that its next move will be to that stratum. For instance, the first row reports that vacancies in the first stratum had a .38 probability of moving next to another job in Stratum 1, a .25 probability of moving next to Stratum 2 and an equal chance (.06) of making their next moves to either Stratum 3 or Stratum 4. The p value in the right-hand column of Table 3.0 indicates a .25 probability that Stratum 1 vacancies will next move outside the system (i.e., the replacement who fills the vacancy will come from outside of the BSSR).

The primary test for a centralizing influence on the circulation of vacancies within the set of positions in the BSSR involves P_j, the column vector that predicts chain length by the stratum in which a given chain has originated. P_j is computed as: $P_j = Q^{j-1}p$, where Q is the transition matrix, j

is chain length and p is the probability that the vacancy passes outside the system. P_j, then, is computed successively, by stratum in which initial vacancies occur, for chains of length 1, 2, 3, . . .8 (the longest chain in the sample). It yields a prediction that a certain percentage of chains originating in, say, Stratum 1 will be of length 1, a certain percentage will be of length 2, and so forth. If the observed distribution of vacancy chains originating in this stratum and others matches the predicted percentages in P_j, then the process is Markovian. In other words, the circulation of elites (taken as the circulation of vacancies) is not affected by a centralizing influence.[17]

In addition to this test for determining whether the system of positions in the BSSR exhibits the Markov property, three auxiliary measures of centralization are employed here. The first, and strongest, indicator of centralization involves a comparison of the career histories of those in the top three strata of the model (i.e., the strata in which effectively all jobs are subject to Moscow's nomenklatura) with the observed vacancy chains initiated by their exits from the system. If there are matches, that is, if we find the jobs in a certain actor's career history appearing again in the chain of vacancies set off by his departure from the system, then it is reasonable to infer that certain positions function as stepping stones to others, that the central authorities are grooming replacements for the top positions by installing certain individuals in stepping stone jobs and that the circulation of elites in the BSSR is determined from above.[18] To the degree that no significant overlaps of this type occur, however, the hypothesis that the central authorities are merely ratifying the results of a personnel process specific to the BSSR would be supported.

The second, and weaker, indicator of a centralizing effect on elite circulation in the BSSR involves the vetting of personnel in Moscow. Are vacancies in the Belorussian positions which numbered among the offices in the two strata filled by replacements whose previous jobs were at the all-union level? A pattern of such would constitute evidence that candidates for high office in the BSSR regularly are placed in upper level jobs after a career detour which takes them to Moscow where they are vetted by the central authorities.

The third, and weakest, indicator of centralization utilizes the p value (the probability that a vacancy will leave the system) for strata 1-3. Increases or decreased in p over various periods in the time frame would suggest a concomitant tendency on the part of the central authorities to pack higher offices in the BSSR with individuals from outside (or those briefly holding jobs outside) of the Republic. As with the second indicator, above, this is a rather weak measure of centralization, "weak" inasmuch as unlike P_j, which is based on the structure of elite circulation in the BSSR, it is confined to the particular movements of particular individuals. We might assume that Moscow, having vetted these individuals, has come to rely on them to carry out specific directives in the Republic. But this practice might be regarded as a rather poor substitute for effective personnel centralization in a systemic sense. Having been parachuted into high office in the BSSR, these same individuals must work with personnel there in place. If the career mobility of the latter is shown to be beyond the effective reach of the center either directly or indirectly, then these outsiders would be surrounded by "natives" whom, even if they did not "marry," would likely find difficult to control.

The Main Test for Centralization. The Q matrix presented in Table 1 reports the transition probabilities for individual vacancies to the 10 strata in the model over the entire 20 year period encompassed by our study. As we would expect from the method used to stratify the sample of positions, the diagonal line in the matrix running through the intersection of row values and the column values found one step to the right of the corresponding row (2, 3; 3, 4; etc.) records in all but two cases the highest transition probabilities for vacancies in the system. So, for instance, vacancies which arrived in Stratum 2 had a probability of .56 of moving next to Stratum 3; those arriving in Stratum 3, a probability of .50 of moving next to Stratum 4, and so forth as one follows the diagonal toward the bottom-right quadrant of the matrix. The exceptions to this pattern occur at the top-left and bottom-right of Table 1. We notice in this respect that vacancies appearing in the first and last strata evince a higher probability to circulate within these same strata than they do to move to any other stratum in the model. In the case of Stratum 10, this simply reflects the fact that there are no lower strata from which to summon replacements. For Stratum 1, however, the relatively high probability (.38) that a vacancy arriving there will make its next move to another job in the same stratum indicates a considerable degree of rotation of personnel among these top-level jobs and suggests that once an actor has filled one of these positions, his next career move will likely be to another top level job.

We might begin the search for a centralizing influence on elite circulation by inquiring into the relative stability of these transition probabilities. Should they change significantly over time, then we would be alerted to the presence of some factor which is altering the flow of vacancies in the system. Table 2 divides the data into 2 periods of 10 years each and

reports on the relative stability of the transition probabilities from one

See Table 2, pages 95 - 96.

period to the next. Comparing the data in Table 2 for these two periods, we find that sizeable differences emerge in a few instances. For a vacancy arriving in Stratum 1, the probability that its next move would be to another job in the same stratum rose from .29 to .44, while its probability of moving next to Stratum 2 correspondingly declined from .43 to .11. The differences here, along with the propensity for Stratum 1 jobs to draw replacements from Stratum 3 (.14) in the first period and from Stratum 4 (.11) in the second indicate changes in the pattern of elite circulation through the top set of positions over the two decades. The differences in p values recorded for Stratum 1 for these two periods also seems to signal changes in personnel flows, with a much higher percentage of top jobs being filled by recruits from outside the system in the second period as opposed to the first (.14 vs .33). The increase in transitions to the outside, however, reports events occurring in Moscow rather than in the BSSR. That is, of the 10 vacancies which passed outside the system (1977-1986) 7 appeared in all-union jobs (previously held by an incumbent from the BSSR) which did not summon a replacement from the BSSR. In the first time period there are no recorded incidents of same. As a result, we should interpret the difference in p values for the two periods conservatively; they have little to do with elite circulation in the BSSR.

There are some differences evident over the two time periods with respect to vacancies arriving in Stratum 2. Whereas these vacancies summoned no replacements from among incumbents in Stratum 1 or Stratum 2 jobs during the

first decade, they did so with equal frequency (.14) during the second. Movement into Stratum 2 jobs from lower strata also declined considerably over the two time periods.

Other differences which appear in Table 2 include the declines in recruitment to the second, fifth and sixth strata from the stratum one level below each, respectively. In large part, these differences result from the corresponding increase in p values. In the case of Stratum 2, the increase in transitions to outside the system over the figure recorded for the first time period (.18 vs .29) is not especially large and, as was true of Stratum 1, tends to reflect events in Moscow (all-union jobs held by Belorussians who were replaced by non-Belorussians) rather than in the BSSR. In the case of the fifth and sixth strata (and for all strata below them) the increase in transitions to outside the system is largely the result of a coding decision not to list individuals in jobs in a given year unless their names and positions appeared in the data sources during that year. Consequently, for the last year or two of the twenty-year time period, a number of jobs in the lower strata, less frequently mentioned in the data sources, have been coded as "vacant", although the incumbents are not in fact known to have left. Allowing for this, and in view of the overall comparability of transition probabilities for vacancies arriving in strata 3-10, we reach the initial conclusion that the effects of a centralizing influence on the flow of vacancies in the system seems confined to the top two strata.

Our main test for centralization is concerned with discrepancies between predicted and observed chain lengths by stratum of origin and involves the term, P_j, which predicts the distribution of chain lengths. Table 3 presents these data. In comparing the predicted distributions of chain

See Table 3, pages 97 - 98.

lengths against the observed values for same, it is clear that the largest differences occur in the top 3 strata. Stratum 1 records two instances in which the differences between predicted and observed values reached or exceeded 10 percentage points, as does Stratum 3, while Stratum 2 involves one such case. Additionally, it will be noticed that modal values in the predicted and observed distributions agree in the case of Stratum 2 but diverge in the first and third strata.

Among the remaining strata, all differences between predicted and observed values are under the 10 percentage point mark. The largest difference in this group occurs in Stratum 4, a difference of 8.1 percent. For these seven strata taken together, predicted and observed values were separated by a single percentage point or less in 29 of the 48 instances involved (60.4 percent of the cases) and by two percentage points or less in 41 of the instances (85.4 percent).

Although we are not attempting to generalize the findings in a sample to a larger population, there seems to be some utility in following White's suggestion[18] that the application of a significance test to data such as these would provide an indication of the meaning which we might attach to the differences recorded between predicted and observed values. A nonparametric statistic, the Kolmogorov Goodness of Fit Test, is appropriate to this purpose.[19] Setting the significance level at .5 (for we wish to test rigorously the predictive accuracy of the model and, hence, we want to make it difficult for ourselves to say that no significant differences obtain) we find

that none of the differences between predicted and observed values is significant. This finding would support the predictive accuracy of the model and indicate that the circulation of elites in the BSSR resembles a Markovian process in which the centralized nomenklatura system in Moscow (or its counterpart in Minsk) has but a marginal influence.

Let us, however, examine this influence further. The data in Table 3 indicate that disruptions in our hypothesized Markov process for the flow of vacancies in the system are effectively confined to the top three strata. Since the jobs in question here overwhelmingly fall within the scope of Moscow's nomenklatura, this is to be expected on substantive grounds as well. However, a question remains regarding the precise manner in which this centralizing influence functions. We can clarify matters by conceptually distinguishing between a direct form of centralization in which Moscow's cadres policies reach into the BSSR to alter the results of a personnel process which is endemic to the Republic, on the one hand, and an indirect form of central influence which derives from the interaction between the personnel system in the BSSR and that which exists at the all-union level, on the other. Insofar as the latter is concerned, it may be the case, as we already noted with respect to changes in the comparable p values for two decades as recorded by the top two strata, that the influences which are disturbing a postulated Markovian flow of vacancies come about as a result of events taking place in Moscow rather than in Belorussia. Since a number of all-union positions appear among the jobs contained in the top two strata, we can determine whether the centralizing influence is directly or only indirectly at work by removing the all-union positions from the data set and repeating the analysis.

The results of this procedure are displayed in Table 4 which (owing to the small number of cases which remain in the data set for the top two strata once the all-union positions have been excluded) lumps together all jobs in the top three strata. These data show that an indirect form of centralization

See Table 4, page 99.

appears to be present in the system, but do not support the idea of a direct form of central control over elite circulation within the BSSR. The centralizing effect, which is evident in the marked disagreements between the columns of predicted and observed values on the left-hand side of Table 4 (differences larger than 10 percentage points show up in two cases) which include the all-union positions in the sample, disappears on the right-hand side where the all-union jobs have been excluded from the analysis and where the predicted and observed distributions of chain lengths come into very close agreement. To be sure, some of the closeness apparent in matching predicted and observed values on the right-hand side of Table 4 is a statistical consequence of performing the analysis after having excluded the all-union positions. Such skews the distribution in the direction of short chains, since we have artificially removed a number of the "links" provided by vacancies in all-union positions which are evident in the greater proportion of long chains in the left-hand columns of Table 4. Nonetheless, the predicted values fit the observed results in the right-hand columns with such a high degree of accuracy (all differences are under one percentage point) that it seems safe to infer that to the degree that a centralizing effect on the circulation of vacancies in the model is apparent, it can be traced to the

interaction of two separate personnel systems, one at the all-union level and another in the BSSR. Of course, in the real order of things this division between personnel systems is somewhat artificial, but in drawing it we have been able to distinguish analytically between two varieties of centralization. One takes the direct form of a cadres policy which systematically manipulates the movement of actors among the offices in the BSSR, the other is indirect and consists of the implications which events taking place at one level of the system have for events at other levels. On the basis of the results from the main test, it appears (a) that a centralizing influence on elite circulation in the BSSR is of marginal import and (b) to the extent that the flow of vacancies in the Belorussian Republic is subject to such an influence, centralization is manifest indirectly as the interaction between personnel systems at the all-union and republic levels.

Auxiliary Tests for Centralization. The first, and strongest, potential indicator of centralization among the three auxiliary tests to be conducted is concerned with what matches might be found between the jobs contained in the career histories of those leaving the system by virtue of death, retirement, transfer to a position not included in the data set of simple removal from office, and the specific positions included in the vacancy chains initiated by their exits. We confine the application of this test to those actors whose departures from the system left a vacancy in some job which is numbered among the top three strata. The focus on these strata follows both from their position atop the hierarchy and from the marginal impact of a centralizing influence on this sub-set of jobs which we observed in the results of the main test. Here, we are looking for another way in which centralization might manifest itself in the system. Job matches between the career histories of

those leaving the system and the vacancy chains triggered by their exits would indicate the presence of a cohort of cadres, advancing through stepping stone jobs, who fill vacancies in the top jobs as they occur. Such would be demonstrable evidence of a centralizing influence on elite circulation, suggesting that Moscow has been effectively reaching into the personnel process in the BSSR and systematically staffing the top positions with replacements whom it had groomed and eventually installed in elite jobs.

Table 5 summarizes the results of this test for the top three strata. A total of 24 vacancy chains containing a total of 79 vacancies occurred in Stratum 1. Of these chains, as the upper-left portion of Table 5 shows, 7

See Table 5, page 100.

were initiated by a vacancy in an executive job in Moscow which had been held by an official whose former career had been in the BSSR. Five of these were of length 1 (indicating that these vacancies summed no replacements from the BSSR), two were of length 4 and one of these contained a single match with the career history of the official whose exit initiated the chain.

A similar dearth of matches is observable in Stratum 1 for those chains begun by the exit of an officeholder in the BSSR (upper-right section of Table 5). In only 3 cases were there matches and each involved a single job in the replacement chain matching one of the positions in the career history of the exiting official (albeit, in one instance, the second person in the replacement chain evinced 2 matches between his career history and the other jobs in the chain through which he was moving at the time). Inasmuch as these 17 vacancy chains varied in length from 1 (the Head of the Belorussian KGB who

in the two reported cases drew a replacement from outside the BSSR) to 8 and accounted for some 66 vacancies in all, the 3 matches recorded would not indicate that the center has been grooming and installing replacements in Stratum 1 jobs in the BSSR.

The application of this same test to Stratum 2 yielded comparable results. No vacancies in Moscow summoned replacements from the BSSR (middle-left portion of Table 5). For those 28 chains begun by a vacancy in a BSSR job (middle-right section) only 3 contained jobs which matched the career histories of those leaving the system (one in each case). Given that 91 vacancies were included in these 28 chains, 3 matches seems quite a negligible figure.

The data on the career histories of those leaving the system from jobs in Stratum 3 are incomplete. As a result, the analysis excludes 34 chains (with a total of 97 vacancies) begun by the exit of an official for whom no career history is available. The remaining 54 chains which were triggered by a vacancy first appearing in a job in this stratum were all initiated in the BSSR, owing to the fact that Stratum 3 includes no all-union positions. These 54 chains contain a total of 159 vacancies, of which only 6 (one in each case) match jobs in the career histories of those exiting officials on whom data are available. Again, the relative absence of matches indicates an absence of centralization measured in this way.

A sub-set of positions in Stratum 3, however, shows a slightly higher score on this indicator. That is, if we divide the jobs in Stratum 3 into one group which contains the executives of the state apparatus (ministers and deputy ministers, chairs and deputy chairs of state committees and so forth, as set out in the Appendix) and another group composed of all other positions

in Stratum 3, we find that those leaving jobs in the state apparatus have career histories which match their respective vacancy chains more often than is true for the other group. In the case of the state executives, 4 matches were recorded against 49 vacancies contained in 21 chains (8.2 percent), whereas the career histories of those exiting from the remaining positions in Stratum 3 evinced only 2 matches against 110 vacancies contained in 33 chains (1.8 percent). While the percentage figures in either case are far too low to support the notion of centralization under this test, it is interesting to observe a muted "bureaucratic" effect in the system, involving some (albeit, small) measure of predictability in the career paths to top jobs in the state apparatus. These results are consonant with those reported by other observers in the field, and apparently reflect the influence of the nomenklatura powers held by ministerial superiors at the all-union level.[20]

Even taking into account this (rather small) "bureaucratic" effect which we have observed for certain jobs in Stratum 3, the overall results of this test indicate a decided absence of centralization in staffing the top three strata of positions in the BSSR through the use of a specifiable set of offices which function as stepping stones to jobs at the top of the hierarchy. The positions in these strata are clearly within the purview of the all-union nomenklatura, yet Moscow seems not to have used its formal authority to shape systematically the process of elite recruitment in the BSSR. One indication of what might be driving this process also emerges from these data, namely, the effect of region, in this case taking the form of a disproportionate representation of organizations located in the capital city, Minsk, in the vacancy chains begun in the top three strata. Minsk is a city of republic, rather than oblast', subordination and consequently shares with the oblast' in

which it is located a formally equivalent administrative status.[21] However, in terms of rank in the KPB, the party organization in Minsk City is apparently inferior to the Minsk Oblast' organization. The First Secretary of the Minsk Obkom has always been over the period of our study a full member of the Buro of the KPB while the First Secretary of Minsk Gorkom has never been included on the Buro as even a candidate member. Additionally, the First Secretary of the Obkom is the official head of the entire delegation from Minsk to congresses of the CPSU.[22] Therefore, we might expect that jobs in the city and oblast' organizations of Minsk would be more or less evenly represented in the vacancy chains initiated in the top three strata, with any edge going to Minsk Oblast'. We find, however, that the reverse is true. Among the vacancy chains begun in Stratum 1, jobs in Minsk City appeared eleven times while jobs in Minsk Oblast' turned up only twice; the comparable figures for chains begun in Stratum 2 are ten for Minsk City and four for Minsk Oblast'; and for Stratum 3, fifteen for Minsk City and ten for Minsk Oblast'. Positions in Minsk City, then, are something of a fast track to high office in the Republic, a feature of this set of jobs which also accounts for the case, mentioned above, of two jobs matches between the career history of the second person in the replacement chain and the vacancy chain through which he was moving at the time (both jobs matches were Minsk City positions). The salience of Minsk City organizations as stepping stones to top elite positions in the BSSR may be better explained from the bottom-up rather than from the top-down. That is, an identifiable pool of positions with a relatively high frequency of transitions to higher office is not in itself evidence of an effective centralizing influence on elite circulation. It simply records the fact that a certain set of positions lines much of the avenue to higher

office. As we shall see, below, a patronage group emerged in Minsk City organizations over the period encompassed in this study which, through ties with actors in Moscow, managed to distribute jobs in Minsk City to group members for whom these positions functioned as stepping stones to the highest offices in the Republic. Insofar as a regionally-based pattern of patronage is concerned, centralized control over elite circulation in the BSSR would be of the nominal variety. A centrally-placed patron would be engaged in a particularistic exchange with clients in the BSSR; however, this could not be taken as evidence that Moscow has been pursuing a coordinated cadres policy in the Republic in conjunction with other of its substantive policy orientations.

The results of the second auxiliary test indicate that Moscow makes very sparing use of a surrogate form of centralization, the vetting of candidates for higher office in the BSSR by means of sojourns in all-union offices which immediately precede their appointments to top positions in Belorussia. For Stratum 1 positions, such vetting seems to have occurred on four occasions. The position of First Secretary of the KPB was twice filled by Belorussian politicians who held jobs in Moscow prior to this appointment. The other two cases involve Belorussians who held all-union jobs prior to being appointed secretaries of the KPB. Stratum 2 contains only two instances in which actors occupied Moscow positions before they were named Chair of Gosplan, BSSR, and Chair of the BSSR State Committee for Construction Affairs, respectively. For vacancies which appeared in Stratum 3 posts, the data record three instances in which replacements were drawn from Belorussian politicians who were occupying all-union offices at the time. In one case, the Ambassador to North Korea was recalled to fill the position of Belorussian Minister of Social Security, in another, the Head of the Main Administration for Repair and

Technical Services of the USSR's State Committee for Agricultural Technology returned to Belorussia to become Head of the BSSR's State Committee for Agricultural Technology and, in a third, the Head of the Main Administration for Automotive Inspections of the USSR's Ministry of Internal Affairs came back to the BSSR to become its Minister of Internal Affairs. Taken together, the infrequency with which Belorussian politicians held all-union posts prior to taking up a position in the BSSR in any of the top three strata appears to indicate that vetting, even as a surrogate form of centralization, does not seem to be a pronounced factor in shaping the circulation of elites in the Belorussian Republic.

The results of the final auxiliary test are displayed in Table 6. These data allow for a comparison between the probability (p statistic) and

See Table 6, page 101.

the relative frequency (observed rated) of vacancies passing out of the system over various periods of time. The figures in the two left-hand columns were calculated from the full set of data while those in the right-hand columns were derived from the same calculations but with all-union jobs excluded from the data set. This division permits us to make some further comparisons. The figures in the left-hand columns include data on those all-union positions which were at one time or another held by politicians from Belorussian who were replaced by individuals from outside the BSSR. The inclusion of such jobs tends to inflate somewhat the predicted and observed values in the table, adding to the turnover in specifically Belorussian positions a small fraction of the turnover in all-union jobs through which Belorussians had circulated.

The figures in the right-hand columns are not affected by this consideration since they have been calculated solely on the basis of positions in the BSSR. As a consequence, however, vacancies in Belorussian jobs which have been filled by a Belorussian politician returning to the BSSR from a post at the all-union level are recorded as vacancies which have passed outside of the system. This, as the figures indicate, raises predicted and observed values even more.

A comparison of the predicted and observed values in the left-hand columns of Table 6 shows that the probabilities for vacancies to pass to the outside consistently run ahead of the actual rates at which they do so. Although the figures in the fourth row of the table (1966-71) are close to agreement (.24 vs .21), those in other rows, such as the fifth (1972-1976), are clearly not (.45 vs .19). The lack of overall agreement between predicted and observed values is apparently due to two things: the fact that the data used to calculate these values include all-union jobs and, relatedly, the method employed for calculating the predicted values. The former enables those vacancy chains begun in the BSSR to trace a path through jobs in Moscow, thus adding to their respective lengths. One result of this is apparent in the left-hand columns of Table 4 in which the predicted modal length of chains begun in the top three strata is a length of one (28.9 percent) while the observed mode is a chain length of two (32.7 percent). A similar difference between predicted and observed modes for chain lengths initiated in the top three strata obtains when the same analysis is performed on the data divided into discrete time periods.[23] The model's inability to predict modal lengths in the distribution of vacancy chains (Table 4) has already been traced to the inclusion of all-union jobs in the sample. This same factor seems to account

for the differences apparent in the left-hand columns of Table 6. Recalling that the p statistic is the reciprocal of the mean chain length ($p = \frac{1}{j_m}$) its tendency to "overpredict" the rate at which vacancies in the top three strata make their next moves to outside the system is a consequence of the bunching of modal values for observed chain length distributions at lengths two and three. Such distributions make for relatively low mean chain lengths and, hence, result in relatively high values for their reciprocal, p. Again, the presence of all-union jobs in the data set explains why the p values outrun the relative frequencies in Table 6. If, for instance, a job in any of the top three strata is filled by a Belorussian politician who leaves an all-union position, and this all-union job is, in turn, taken by an individual from some other locale in the USSR, the resulting chain attains a length of two. Such a transaction does not then show up in the observed frequencies at which vacancies pass out of the system for the observed frequencies involve only chain lengths of one, but it does tend to raise the probability estimate that they will do so because of the very small increment which a chain of length two adds to the score for mean chain length (the reciprocal of p). In the right-hand columns of Table 6, predicted and observed values come into close agreement precisely because all-union positions have been extracted from the data set, hence eliminating the pattern of chain length bunching around low values greater than one.

Focusing on the observed rates at which vacancies in Table 6 moved outside the system, we notice two patterns running in opposing directions over time. With all-union jobs included in the sample, rows 4-7 (i.e., those which cover the four periods of five years each) display a monotonic decrease in the relative frequency of movements to the outside; when the all-union jobs are

excluded from the data, the relative frequency increases monotonically. The first pattern suggests a relative decline in the number of instances in which Moscow installed outsiders (i.e., officials from other parts of the USSR) in elite positions in the BSSR. Accordingly, the second pattern, which combines the installation of outsiders with the vetting of personnel in Moscow, indicates that over time Belorussian politicians who advanced to all-union posts were returning to top level jobs in the BSSR with increasing frequency. We take up this pattern, below. Here, having examined in the preceding test the matter of vetting and its relations to centralization, we turn our attention to the question of the direct packing of positions by Moscow.

Taken together, the individual cases represented in the data show a limited proclivity on Moscow's part to exercise central control over elite circulation in the BSSR by packing positions in Belorussia with outsiders. For jobs in Stratum 1, such packing took place on three occasions, two of which involved outsiders who were installed as Chair of the Belorussian KGB, and in the third an outsider was parachuted into the position of Secretary of the KPB in charge of agriculture. No such parachuting occurred for any of the positions in Stratum 2. Among the twenty-one vacancies in Stratum 3 which were not recorded as having been filled by an individual who moved immediately from another job in the system, eight involved cases in which either no background information on the replacement was available or the jobs themselves were terminated by administrative reorganization. In the remaining thirteen cases, eight recorded instances of vacancies filled by individuals who had career histories in the BSSR and who had either left the collection of positions assembled in the data set for brief periods (owing to health reasons, a return to full time studies, or a posting described in the data

sources as "other work") or entered from a job in the BSSR which was not included in the data set. Hence, the data support only five possible instances of packing for Stratum 3 offices: Minister of the Belorussian Peat Industry, Minister of Rural Construction, Procurator of the BSSR, Chair of Gosteleradio and Deputy Chair of the Belorussian State Committee for Petroleum Products.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the third auxiliary test for centralization. First, the method of packing has been seldom used by Moscow as a means to manipulate elite circulation in the BSSR. Over the twenty year period spanned in this study, some 1,368 vacancies occurred in the Belorussian jobs numbered among those in the top three strata. The data record only 9 instances in which these vacancies were filled by the transfer of an individual who had no previous career history in the BSSR. Even allowing for those few additional cases in which data are missing, the quantitative aspect of this method of centralized control over the personnel system bulks quite small.

Second, on the qualitative side, it is interesting to note something of a pattern in the positions which were packed. One sub-set of these, involving jobs in the area of political and legal control, includes the offices of Chair of the Belorussian KGB (twice packed) and Procurator of the BSSR (once packed). These cases appear to be particularly clear illustrations of cross-regional transfers which are designed to serve the purpose of enhancing Moscow's control over events in Belorussia through the insertion of outsiders into the leading positions in the law-enforcement apparatuses. By the same token, however, one may well wonder about the efficacy of this device, especially inasmuch as one of the individuals in question, V. A. Mogilnitskii

(Procurator of the BSSR from 1973-1983), was dismissed from office in the wake of a major scandal which also toppled a number of Belorussians in the Procuracy and Ministry of the Interior. Perhaps in this instance, the outsider sent in to control the natives ended up marrying them. At any event, these cases would indicate that Moscow has relied on packing certain sensitive positions in the BSSR in the interest of asserting central control, but the infrequency of same and the unreliability of the results would also caution against attaching much significance to this method.

Another sub-set of Belorussian jobs wherein some packing is evident involves the agricultural sector. Agriculture, including both the production of foodstuffs and the raising of crops for industrial use, has been an especially important component of Belorussia's economy.[24] It might be expected, then, that Moscow would take a particular interest in Belorussian agriculture and dispatch to the BSSR reliable cadres to superintend the agricultural sector. The data show three instances of such: V. S. Shevelukha served as Secretary of the KPB in charge of agriculture from 1974 to 1979, at which time he was transferred out of the BSSR and became Deputy Minister of Agriculture for the USSR; L. M. Chura was appointed Belorussian Minister of Rural Construction in 1980 and retains that post at the present time; I. Ya. Britov was named Minister of the Peat Industry, BSSR, in 1970 but drew an early pension in 1972 for reasons of health. Although this sub-set of jobs differs from that discussed above by virtue of the fact that these positions have more to do with implementing policy in order to make something happen, rather than to prevent something from occurring, which is the forte of law enforcement, the small size of the sub-set leads us to the same conclusion which we drew in reference to the first group.

Over the remaining policy sectors in the BSSR--light and heavy industry, education, health, cultural affairs and so on--only two instances of packing were recorded. G. N. Buravkin was named Chair of Gosteleradio, BSSR, in 1978 and continues in that post at present; V. S. Baranovskii became Deputy Chair of the Belorussian State Committee for Petroleum Products in 1980 and also holds that post currently. We draw from these rare inferences in which outsiders were installed in Belorussian jobs the inference that packing as a method of centralized control is distinguished by the infrequency of its use.

The Regional Structure of Elite Circulation

Regionalism connotes a de facto decentralization of authority in the Soviet system. It amounts to a form of slippage in the implementation of substantive policies established by the center, one which substitutes, as it were, the ongoing modifications of carpenters, bricklayers and so forth for the designs developed by the architect. Insofar as cadres policy is concerned, regionalism functions as a counterveiling influence on the centralized appointments mechanism through which the content of Moscow's nomenklatura is determined by personnel processes transpiring far from the capital. Behind the appearance of a central personnel office which directs the placement of cadres from the top-down, a number of studies have detected the presence of regionally-based pockets of positions through which personnel circulate with little interference from the center.[25] An upwardly mobile career for the great majority of Soviet politicians seems to hinge on, firstly, finding one's way into one of those networks which control local appointments and advancing on the basis of the patronage dispensed by holders of important regional posts. Secondly, it involves ascending the regional

hierarchies to the point at which connections with potential patrons at higher levels might be cultivated.

The longevity and resilience of the regional factor in Soviet political life is in large measure a consequence of the manner in which that political life is structured. On the one hand, central actors seeking support against their rivals have actively nurtured regionalism through the beneficent extension of patronage to both cronies and potential allies alike.[26] On the other, attempts by the central authorities to exercise effective control over the affairs of this or that region have engendered defensive reactions on the part of local elites who collude in the interest of mutual security to elude the accounting to which they would otherwise be called.[27] Indeed, a number of observers have located the basis of regionalism's sustained presence in the Soviet system in the repeated cycle of attempts made by the political center to enforce its dominion on regional elites who, in the face of this common threat, close ranks and cover their collective tracks by systematically deceiving the central authorities about the actual state of affairs in their respective bailiwicks, thus deepening further the problem of central control.[28] The Soviet form of organization tends to favor a personalized style of interaction on which regionalism thrives and provides little by way of institutionalized means for reining in regionalism's centrifugal effects.

Continuing the methodological orientation which we have followed to this point, we direct our attention to regionalism as a systemic factor in the process of elite circulation in the BSSR. Accordingly, we repeat the main test performed in the analysis of centralization, modifying its design by replacing the hierarchical strata with the regions of the Belorussian Republic.[29] In order to avoid confusion, we refer to the number of moves by

vacancies from region i to region j as B_{ij} (instead of A_{ij}) and the matrix of transition probabilities among the regions as R (instead of Q). R, then, is derived from $\frac{B_{ij}}{F}$, where F is the number of vacancies which have been created in each region. Vacancy chains which begin at the all-union level are in some instances not germane to the issue of a regional structure of elite circulation in Belorussia and are therefore excluded from certain portions of the analysis. Chains which begin at the republic level, however, are relevant in all cases, and, hence, are consistently included. All other terms and calculations pertaining to the main test as set out above are retained here.

The logic employed in this examination of the effects of region on the circulation of Belorussian elites parallels that found in our discussion of the effects of centralization. P_j, which here predicts the distribution of chain lengths by the regions in which chains originate, is again the key term. To the degree that the observed distribution of vacancy chain lengths matches the values predicted by P_j, the circulation of vacancies among the regions of the BSSR can be regarded as a Markovian process in which the flow of vacancies is explained by the present state of the system (the regional distribution of vacancies) and the probabilities which govern the movement of vacancies among the regions. Region, if the model's predictions prove accurate, would form the basis of elite circulation in Belorussia.

The Main Test for Regionalism

The first set of results of our analysis of elite circulation according to region are set out in Table 7. Here, the statistic, P_j, predicts the length distribution of vacancy chains for each of the regions, and for

republic-level organizations, in which chains originated. The overall agree-

See Table 7, pages 102 - 103.

ment between the predicted and observed distributions of chain lengths (represented by the columns of percentages recorded under "P" and "O" for each of the regions) is quite high, and suggests considerable accuracy for the regional model. In fact, 38 of the 56 predicted/observed couplings (67.9 per cent) are separated by a single percentage point or less, 49 of the 56 (87.5 per cent), by 2 percentage points or less. Applying, again, the Kolmogorov Goodness of Fit Test to the results here, we find that none of the differences between predicted and observed values is significant at the 0.5 level. Hence, there seem to be particularly strong grounds for accepting the validity of the regional model.

Focusing on the individual regions for a moment, we notice that disagreement between predicted and observed values in greatest in Minsk City and Minsk Oblast'. Although the size of these differences is not large enough to be statistically significant, we note in passing the fact that the differences which appear have been somewhat exaggerated by our method of coding inasmuch as we have in this case analytically separated what is geographically a single unit. Were we to subsume Minsk City within Minsk Oblast', predicted and observed values would come into closer agreement and the values recorded for Minsk Oblast' as a whole would more resemble those of the other oblasts. As we see below, however, there is considerable utility in maintaining the City and Oblast' as discrete units with respect to explaining the process of elite circulation in the BSSR over this period.

Minsk City stands out from the other units in the regional model on another count. The chains which originated there do not exceed a length of three, while in the oblasts the longest chains reported vary from lengths of four to seven. Two factors account for this. First, the number of administrative levels is fewer in Minsk City as compared to the oblasts. Whereas each oblast' contains city, raion and enterprise level positions within it, the administrative hierarchy in Minsk City includes only raion and enterprise level organizations. Hence, when vacancies draw replacements from jobs at levels below them, vacancies occurring in Minsk City have one less level from which to draw. Second, and more importantly, vacancies arriving in Minsk City which traced chains through its organization of lengths greater than three were themselves initiated by vacancies at the republic or all-union levels. As a consequence, such chains are not reported in the results for Minsk City. This phenomenon not only explains the peculiar chain length distribution for the City but indicates a replacement pattern in which those occupying Minsk City jobs are drawn into republic and all-union positions with a particularly high frequency. We return in what follows to both of these anomalies and draw out some of their implications.

Table 8 introduces a second set of results associated with the main test. It involves the R matrix of transition probabilities among regions which figured into the equation for calculating the P_j statistic. The Table is composed of 9 rows and 9 columns, 6 of which designate jobs in the 6 oblasts of the BSSR, 1 of which represents jobs in the capital city, Minsk, and the remaining 2 refer to republic and all-union positions, respectively. The matrix is read by taking any row entry as the place in which a given

See Table 8, page 104.

vacancy has occurred and matching it to any column to find the probability that its next move will be to the place designated by that column. So, for instance, the first row reports that a vacancy which appeared in Minsk Oblast' had a .22 probability of moving next to another job within (or, what is the same thing, summing a replacement from within) that same oblast, a .01 probability of moving next to Brest Oblast', and so forth. The values entered along the diagonal in the matrix represent, then, the probabilities that vacancies occurring in a given place will make their next moves to jobs within that same place. For the regions and capital city of the BSSR, these values on the diagonal again place in sharp relief the importance of region in the circulation of vacancies. Only in the cases of Minsk and Gomel' oblasts did a vacancy have a greater than .01 chance of summoning a replacement from another region; and in the case of Minsk Oblast' the replacements came from Minsk City which is, of course, within the same region geographically speaking, while for Gomel' only in one instance did a vacancy have a greater than .01 chance of circulating to another region and this figure is still rather small (.02). Below, we examine the case of Minsk Oblast' further, for it seems to result from the rise and decline of a particular faction in Belorussian politics during the period encompassed by our study.

As might be expected, incumbents in Minsk Oblast' and Minsk City jobs had a greater likelihood of moving next to jobs at the republic level than did their counterparts in the other regions of the USSR. Row 8 which reports these probabilities for the BSSR, indicates that a vacancy in a republic level job had a slightly greater chance (.05) of moving next to Minsk City than it did for moving to Minsk Oblast'. What may be rather unexpected, however, are the comparable figures in row 9. In this case, all-union vacancies summoned

replacements from Minsk City and Brest Oblast' with equal probability (.04) while the probability that vacancies in all-union jobs would be filled by an incumbent in a Minsk Oblast' position was no greater than that for Vitebsk and Mogilev oblasts (.02). Recalling that the City of Minsk is the administrative equivalent of Minsk Oblast' but is apparently outranked by the Oblast' as far as the party hierarchy is concerned, we would not expect that the formal standing of Minsk City in the BSSR is sufficient to explain the fact that officeholders there had, in comparison with their counterparts in Minsk Oblast', twice the likelihood of making their next career moves to positions at the all-union level. Minsk City does have the largest concentration of industry in the BSSR and the size of its party organization is larger than that of any of the oblasts taken separately (which would for Minsk Oblast', of course, require deducting the Minsk City membership from its total).[30] But, again, these differences do not seem large enough to account for the disparity in transition probabilities, especially inasmuch as the second largest oblast' by both industrial concentration and party membership, Gomel', evinced no transitions to all-union jobs while Mogilev', the smallest oblast' in the BSSR, scored equally with the larger Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts as we have seen.

Industrial concentration and party membership do not, then, correlate with transition probability to all-union jobs. The high scores recorded by Minsk City, as we shall see in more detail in what follows, seem to be due to the factor of "region", in this case, the connections among officeholders within Minsk City and their relations with officials in Moscow.

Regarding the relatively high score recorded for Brest Oblast', we note that this seems to be the result of a small number of cases involved and the

particular nature of the cases themselves. Of three transitions which summoned replacements from Brest, one involved the First Secretary of the Brest Obkom of the Komsomol entering the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU as an aspirant (the only such case recorded in the data), and two concerned officeholders in Brest moving to instructors' positions in the Secretariat of the CPSU, positions well below the rank of offices in Moscow held by the great majority of BSSR politicians whose careers took them to jobs in the Soviet capital. As a consequence, the relatively high score for Brest Oblast' does not imply, as it does for Minsk City, a commitantly high frequency of transitions to important posts in Moscow.

The figures set out in Table 9, which divides our time frame into two ten-year periods, refer to the question of the stability of the regional

See Table 9, page 105.

pattern of vacancy circulation. A comparison of the scores entered on the diagonal in the two matrices reveals some rather sharp differences from one period to the next (the scores for Brest', for instance, drop from .39 to .18). Closer inspection, however, would show that these differences are a function of the increase in the transitions of vacancies to outside the system (right-hand column of Table 9) over the two periods, an increase which we have already accounted for in terms of missing data and decisions for coding the cases. We can correct for this problem and, in so doing, focus on that which is of primary interest here--the relative stability of transition probabilities among regions--by adding each score on the diagonal to the corresponding score for transition to the outside and then subtracting each of

these sums from 100. The remainder, then, is the sum of the probabilities for each region that a vacancy appearing in that region will make its next move to some other place outside the region.[31] These data, displayed in Table 10, indicate considerable stability in the regional pattern over the two time periods. In no cases were differences in the respective rates of vacancy transitions to other regions greater than .02. Consequently, the regional pattern of vacancy circulation appears to be quite stable over time across all jobs in the system. (See Table 10, page 106.)

Taken together, the data presented in tables 7-10 suggest that elite circulation in the BSSR over this time period can be grasped as a process in which region seems to be the primary characteristic of the system. The high predictive accuracy of the model with respect to chain length distributions across the regions (Table 7), the high probability evinced by vacancies to circulate within the region in which they appear (diagonal in Table 8) and the relative stability of the regional pattern over time (tables 9 and 10), all indicate the salience of region as a characteristic of elite mobility in the BSSR when such is grasped as a systemic process. At this point, some comparisons might be made regarding the manner in which this process is construed in the regional and stratified models and the respective utilities associated with each.

The Two Models Compared

The results of the main test performed on the regional model can be compared against those of the equivalent test conducted on the stratified model in the previous chapter. In general, the predictive accuracy of the regional model (Table 7) is clearly higher than that of the stratified model when all-union jobs are included in the data set (Table 3). The movement of

vacancies in the system, therefore, seems in some respects to be better captured by an analytic framework constructed on the basis of lateral vacancy flows (movement within the same and among the other regions) than by the stratified model in which vacancies move in vertical paths across ranks in a hierarchy. On the other hand, the modification introduced in the stratified model (the exclusion of all-union jobs from the data set) yielded results (Table 4) which compare quite favorably with those of the regional model. On this basis, there appears to be no warrant for preferring one model over the other. Rather, we might view them as alternative explanations of the circulation process, each of which contributes something to the total picture.

The similarity of chain length distribution in the regional model contrasts sharply with the differences in chain lengths recorded by the various strata in the hierarchical model (Table 3). As a rule, higher strata produce longer chains. That is, whenever a vacancy enters a job in the upper strata and then circulates in the system by drawing successive replacements from jobs of lower rank, the result will be a relatively long, hierarchically ordered chain. This effect is obviously present in a model constructed on the basis of a stratified ranking of jobs (hence, the particular pattern of chain length distributions reported in Table 3). It also appears within the regional model. As noted above in our comparison of chain length distributions for chains begun in Minsk City as opposed to those originating in the oblasts, the number of administrative levels in a region is related to the length of the chains which form there. Consequently, we reach the conclusion that the movement of vacancies within and among the regions is not independent of their movement across jobs in a hierarchy. The stratified

model contributes to our comprehension of the regional pattern of vacancy circulation.

The converse of this proportion is also true. Region influences the flow of vacancies within the stratified model. An inspection of those thirteen chains reported in Table 3 which attained lengths of 6 or greater points up the fact that in ten of them vacancies traced paths through jobs situated in a single region, while in the remaining three vacancies circulated among positions characterized by a particular functional specialization (agriculture in two instances, Komsomol work in the other) and, accordingly, cut across two or more of the regions of the BSSR. In the same way that the distribution of chain lengths generated by the regional model can be regarded in large measure as a function of hierarchy, so the specific content of the longer chains which appeared in the stratified model is primarily determined by the regional circulation of vacancies. Each model, as it were, complements the information provided by the other.

When the modification of removing all-union positions from the data set is introduced into the stratified model, the results of the main test for both the stratified and regional models are quite similar on two counts. First, the termination probabilities in each are relatively high. For the stratified model, the probability that of vacancy will make its next move to outside the system is .63 (Table 4), while for the regional model the probability varies from .55 to .75 (Table 7). Second, the predicted and observed chain length distributions agree closely with the observed results in each case (Tables 4 and 7). Although this agreement is somewhat greater in the stratified model when modified, we recall that it was brought about by the removal of the all-union jobs from the sample. Inasmuch as no such adjustments were made in the

regional model, it has the advantage of being a more realistic representation of the data.

This final observation notwithstanding, our comparison of the two models points up the interaction of hierarchical rank and region in the circulation process. Although rank and region on their face would obviously be considered as major factors determining the mobility patterns of Soviet elites, the utility of the vacancy chain approach employed here consists in its capacity to capture this interaction explicitly by preserving the relations among events which are themselves empirically linked. Particularly in those cases which involve relatively long chains, the vacancy models have enabled us to see how region contributes the bulk of the content to chains begun at the upper levels of the hierarchy, while hierarchy, in its turn, plays a key role in determining the sequence of moves made by a vacancy once it has arrived in a given region. In brief, these two models call attention to the dialectical relationship which obtains between region and rank as factors which structure mobility patterns within the system. When viewing the circulation process from the vantage point of either model, we are at the same time observing the effects of the other. The interaction between rank and region is placed in yet sharper relief by the results of the auxiliary tests for the influence of regionalism on the circulation of elites in the BSSR.

Auxiliary Tests for Regionalism.

Having established the reciprocal relation between the lateral movement of vacancies highlighted in the regional model and their vertical flows across ranks in a hierarchy, we direct our attention at this point to another facet of the interaction between these two methods of modeling mobility by examining regionally based leadership systems in the BSSR and the manner in which they

articulate with their counterparts at the republic and all-union levels. Accordingly, the auxiliary tests are designed to analyze the origins and destinations of those who at one time or another occupied the top positions in the regions.

The data presented in Table 11 concern the origins of the regional elites. Here, "origin" is defined as the place in which one held a job prior to occupying a top position in a given region. Even allowing for the fact

See Table 11, page 107.

that a number of those appearing in the columns under "BSSR" and "USSR" in Table 11 were in effect returning to the regions in which their careers began, these data indicate that regionalism is much less a pronounced factor in accounting for movement into elite positions in the regions than it is with respect to the set of regional positions in general. For the seven regions considered together, 62.8 per cent of the top jobs in each were filled by someone whose immediately prior position was in the same region, yielding a ratio of recruitment from within the respective regions to recruitment from without of 1.7:1. For the overall circulation of vacancies (Table 8) the comparable ratios vary from a low of 2.75:1 (Minsk Oblast') to a high of 14:1 (Brest Oblast').

Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts recorded the lowest scores (45.6 per cent and 51.1 per cent, respectively) on the internal recruitment of their top elites. The score for Minsk Oblast', however, approximates the mean score for all regions if we were to consider those arriving from Minsk City jobs as coming from within Minsk Oblast' (63.2). The other extreme case is clearly Minsk

City with an internal recruitment rate to top positions of 81.1 per cent. If we apply to Minsk City the same qualification which we introduced for Minsk Oblast' and deduct those who moved from jobs in the latter to positions in the former, we note that in only 1 of 53 cases did a member of Minsk City's elite come from a job in another region. This exceptionally high rate of internal recruitment for elite positions in Minsk City suggests the existence of a closed personnel system in the capital. Particularly in the second decade of our study, we find that this closed Minsk City group has come to dominate the top offices in the Belorussian Republic.

Table 12 displays the data on regional access to elite jobs at the republic level. Here, "elite" refers to those jobs whose incumbents were regularly represented (i.e., elected to these positions after at least four of the five congresses of the KPB held within the time frame of this study) on the Buro of the KPB. The numbers enclosed by parentheses in the table record

See Table 12, page 108.

the frequency with which members of the Partisan faction in Belorussian politics, the dominant group by the mid-sixties, left leading positions in the regions to occupy elite jobs at the republic level. The left-hand column of Table 12 points up the fact that Minsk Oblast' has been the regional stronghold of this group and that out of an overall total of 30 officials moving from regional positions to elite jobs in the BSSR, 11 of these could be identified as Partisans.[32]

Perhaps the most interesting contrast apparent in Table 12 concerns the shifting regional basis of recruitment to elite jobs in the Republic. The

middle column which includes the first decade of the study indicates a decisive dominance of Minsk Oblast'. Of 16 politicians moving from regional jobs to elite positions in the BSSR, 10 were from Minsk Oblast'. The second period (right-hand column of Table 12), however, witnesses the complete discontinuation of this line of recruitment and the emergence of Minsk City, which accounted for 7 of the 14 recruits from the regions, as the dominant regional basis for entry into the BSSR elite. Were we to include in these figures those individuals who had begun their careers at the regional level, entered positions at the all-union or republic level, and then found their way into the set of elite jobs in the BSSR, this dominance on the part of Minsk City would stand out all the more.[33] When we compare the pattern of recruitment from the regions to the republic-level elite with that for recruitment into the regional elites, we notice that the faction emerging in Minsk City in the first decade of our study on the basis of high levels of internal recruitment was able during the second decade to replace the partisans as the leading group in Belorussian politics. It seems reasonable to infer in this respect that what appeared under the category of vetting in our analysis of centralization also contains another element. Members of the Minsk City faction while posted in Moscow jobs were apparently able to utilize their offices and the access which they afforded to other influential actors at the center in order to advance their own career interests and those of other members of the group.[34] It appears that by the mid-seventies a certain axis developed between the Minsk City group and its members and supporters in Moscow. Although a full treatment of this matter is reserved for the discussion of patronage what follows, we note here that through sojourns in Moscow jobs three leading members of the Minsk City faction--N. N. Slyunkov,

A. A. Reut and V. A. Lepeshkin—enjoyed a close proximity to patrons at the center which appears to have been a crucial factor in promoting the fortunes of the group in general.

In addition to the apparent all-union ties developed by leading members of this group, one of the striking things about the Minsk City faction is its industrial base. Contrary to the pattern which has prevailed for other groups of politicians in the BSSR who launched their careers in the Komsomol apparatus, the leading figures in the Minsk City group began their political activity in the industrial enterprises of the capital, particularly at the Minsk Tractor Factory.[35] We notice in this respect a pattern familiar to students of elite recruitment in the USSR, namely, the tendency among rising leaders to bring with them to higher office those with whom they had previously worked.[36] In the Minsk City case, the dominant figure exercising such patronage seems to be N. N. Slyunkov, who was First Secretary of the KPB from 1983 to January of 1987 at which time he became a secretary of the CPSU and, shortly afterwards, a full member of the Politburo. By the same token, however, it would be difficult to explain the ascent of the Minsk City faction in terms of the pattern commonly described in the literature whereby a single patron develops through his control over appointments a vertically structured network of clients who, in turn, may exercise patronage over their own sub-groups of followers. Slyunkov and another leading member of the Minsk City group, A. A. Reut (currently First Deputy Chair of Gosplan, USSR), were both in Moscow from the mid-1970s to 1983, the former as a deputy chair of Gosplan, the latter as First Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry. Give the fact that this was the period during which the Minsk City faction began to replace the Partisans as the dominant group in the BSSR and that the offices then held by

both Slyunkov and Reut would not equip them with nomenklatura rights sufficient to ensure the promotions of their would-be clients from Minsk City, it seems logical to conclude that something other than the standard patron-client model was operative in this case. Likely, what we have here is a double-edged process which, from below, took the form of a cohort of individuals from industry entering, first, into prominent Minsk City jobs and, from above, the cultivation of lateral ties between Slyunkov and Reut to other officials in Moscow with appropriate nomenklatura rights which facilitated this upward mobility for the Minsk City group. In sum, the process more resembles the actions of a team in which a certain division of political labor prevails; those in Moscow use lateral ties to other all-union officials in order to advance the fortunes of their colleagues back home, the latter, in turn, recruit new team members and build a bloc of supporters within the regional base.

The other region for which distinctions are apparent in Tables 11 and 12 is Vitebsk, which recorded the lowest rate of internal recruitment to top regional posts (45.6 per cent) and, after Minsk Oblast' and Minsk City, the highest rate of recruitment to republic positions (23.3 per cent). The middle and right-hand columns of Table 12 indicate a presence and an absence, respectively, of Partisans among its upwardly mobile politicians. Although we have insufficient data to reach firm conclusions in this case, the available information would suggest that a regional clique there was instrumental in breaking the dominance of the Partisan faction both in Vitebsk Oblast' and in the BSSR as a whole. The most influential politician to have emerged from a position in the Vitebsk region is A. N. Aksenov. Work in the Belorussian Komsomol during the earlier postwar years (a stronghold of the Partisans at

that time) has led one observer to infer that Aksenov had close connections with the Partisan faction.[37] Aksenov, however, was not himself a member of the Partisan resistance and he moved very early in his career to a job in Moscow (he worked as a Komsomol secretary there from 1957 to 1959). On returning to the BSSR he became a deputy Chair of the Republic's KGB and then Minister of Internal Affairs, appointments which indicate that he had been cultivating the patronage of important all-union officials during the period of his Komsomol work in Moscow. Aksenov served as First Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom from 1966 to 1971, a period in which a certain struggle seems to have gone on in Vitebsk between members of the Partisan faction there entrenched and a group of younger politicians whose careers were advancing under Aksenov's aegis.[38] L. S. Firisanov and V. I. Brovikov who became obkom secretaries in Vitebsk during Aksenov's tenure as First Secretary there are cases in point; each rose rapidly to higher office at the republic and (in Brovikov's case) all-union levels in conjunction with subsequent promotions enjoyed by their apparent benefactor, Aksenov.[39] Indeed, Brovikov's career on leaving Vitebsk followed in the wake of Aksenov's. He replaced Aksenov as Second Secretary of the KPB in 1978 when Aksenov became Chair of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR; after some two years as Deputy Head of the Organization-Party Work Department of the CPSU, Brovikov returned to the BSSR in 1983 as Chair of the Council of Ministers while Aksenov became Ambassador to Poland, a position taken by Brovikov when Aksenov was named Chair of Gosteleradio, USSR. It seems quite plausible that Aksenov enjoyed important Moscow connections and that these were instrumental in his appointment to head the Vitebsk Obkom, the only regional job in his career history. We might interpret this appointment within the context of a larger struggle taking

place in Moscow between certain Belorussian partisans and rival groups in the Kremlin leadership.[40] Aksenov's career in the BSSR from this perspective would involve his scheduling of personnel appointments in Vitebsk to weaken Partisan control in the Oblast', and his subsequent promotions to the positions of Second Secretary of the KPB and Chair of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR as the installation of a political rival who would act as a check on the republic-level leader of the Partisan faction, First Secretary of the KPB, P. M. Masherov. Aksenov's influence would also account for the relatively high rate of recruitment from Vitebsk to elite BSSR jobs in the second decade of our study.

Summing up our findings at this point, we note that the circulations of vacancies in the system appears as a function of the regional configuration of vacancies which initiate chains and the transition probabilities contained in the R matrix (Table 8). From this we conclude that elite circulation in the BSSR tends to move according to its own rhythms, rather than according to the calculations of a centralized personnel office in Moscow or Minsk, and that the structure evident in these rhythms is a regional one.

Formal control over elite circulation which is exercised by Moscow and Minsk does not necessarily translate into an effective method of centralization in personnel policy. Rather, such control takes place on a field where other systemic forces operate, forces which tend to limit, if not negate, the formal powers of nomenklatura. Regionalism is a broad name covering a number of these forces. In the sense of substantive policy implementation, it connotes a pattern of behavior in localities in which individual actors make their own adjustments one to another, develop their own relationships of mutual assistance, set their own agendas in spite of, and

often enough in opposition to, directives from the political center. With respect to cadres policy, regionalism represents both a centrifugal force in the system, and an integrating mechanism. It tends to pull the loci of personnel transactions outward toward a plurality of points by influencing the direction of initial recruitment and early career patterns in such a way as to provide constant opportunities for local elites to form bonds--in this regard, patronage arrangements--among themselves. The concept of regionalism, then, taps at the macro-level an important dimension of elite circulation, suggesting a process which from the perspective of the center may well seem to be fragmented by region but, within a given region, one which appears rather ordered and, on the basis of our findings (tables 9 and 10), one which seems quite stable and predictable.

When we adjust our focus to the micro-level, however, the picture becomes a bit more complex. We begin to notice other factors, masked by the general concept of regionalism in the macro-perspective, which modify our understanding of the role of region in the circulation process. In this respect, we remind ourselves that the concept "region" is no more an exhaustive account of what drives the process of elite circulation than is the formal appointments mechanism of the nomenklatura. Each represents a factor in the equation, and each for the analyst constitutes more a point of departure than an ultimate destination. For studies of the circulation process are, in the end, studies of social action. Indirectly, at least, we are necessarily involved with the matter of what the actors themselves are doing, what they believe themselves to be doing, the ends which they intend to achieve or the things which they seek to prevent. What the macro-level concept of regionalism contributes to this enterprise is a framework which

enables us to sort out the systemic effects which structure individual action, systemic effects which are themselves but the combined results of the totality of actions in the system but which appear to individual actors or groups of same as opportunities or constraints which they face.

Finally, our attention is drawn to the Minsk City group, for whom the influence of region seems especially pronounced. The data indicate that a tightly knit group formed in Minsk over the period of our study and emerged as the dominant faction in Belorussian politics during the latter part of this period. This group is characterized by: (1) an exceptionally high level of regionally constrained access; (2) numerous connections between its leading figures and officials at the all-union level; (3) a recruitment base in local industrial firms rather than in the Komsomol apparatus; and (4) the apparent absence of a single leader or patron. The first three of these characteristics seem to be variations on the regional theme in Soviet politics. However, they lend themselves to another interpretation when considered in the context of the fourth characteristic, the emergence of a patronage group lacking a single patron.

In comparative perspective, what we have observed with respect to the Minsk City group in Belorussian politics evinces some striking similarities to changes in the structure of clientelism in Italy as reported by Luigi Graziano.[41] Traditionally, clientelistic relations in Italy have been forged on the basis of vertical links between individual patrons and their respective followings. With the advent of socioeconomic modernization, clientelism persists but assumes another form, one in which horizontal linkages replace vertical ones and in which <u>groups</u> of individuals identify and act so as to advance group interests. In the Belorussian case, we seem to see a comparable

phenomenon unfolding. The Partisan faction, dominant in the early years of our study, was initially organized around a single patron, K. T. Mazurov. The rise and decline of Mazurov's fortunes in the central leadership appear in retrospect as something of a barometer for those of the Partisan faction in Belorussia. This pattern is a familiar one to observers of patronage politics in the USSR. The Minsk City group which replaced the Partisans as the dominant faction in the BSSR, however, appear to be organized along lines analogous to Graziano's "new clientelism" in which horizontal linkages (our concept of a "political team") supplant vertical ones. From this perspective, the other characteristics of the Minsk City group--highly restricted entry, multiple connections to all-union offices, an industrial base of recruitment--may well signal the advent of a "new clientelism" on the Soviet scene, one congruent with the patterns of urban-industrial life in the same way as the traditional patron-client model is rooted in agrarian society.[42] In this respect, it is useful to recall the urban-industrial transformation of Belorussia over the period that concerns this study. Our initial evidence on the topic of patronage would lead to the inference that changes in patronage relations correspond to changes in the socio-economic context in which these relations are embedded. The Minsk City group, from this point of view, emerged as the dominant faction in Belorussian politics in part because it succeeded in developing a form of organization functionally adapted to an industrial society.

The Influence of Patronage Relations

Detecting Patronage Groups

The conventional model of patronage is specified in terms of vertically ordered dyads which lock both patrons and clients into personalized relations

governed by the norm of reciprocity and oriented toward the rendering of mutual assistance.[43] Larger networks are often constructed by aggregating these dyads together, both vertically and horizontally, such that a major patron who occupies the top position in such a network is connected to clients who in turn act as patrons vis-a-vis clients of their own who are found at lower levels in the patronage structure.[44]

This model of patronage aims to reduce to a common denominator great quantities of social phenomena occurring in numerous places, across different cultures and spanning centuries of time. In this consists an obvious and considerable advantage from the standpoint of conceptual scope. Nonetheless, it would be mistaken to reify a particular conceptualization of patron-client relations and regard it as some objective and eternal pattern which either invariably occurs or defines a priori a patronage relation in a given instance.[45] As we have seen in the pervious discussion, patronage relations in the Soviet Union closely resemble the dyadic construct in some instances (e.g., the Partisan faction) but not in others (e.g., the Minsk City Industrial Group). In employing the concept of patronage, then, we would do well to leave open the matter of the precise form which patronage relations might take and seek closure via an empirical route.

While refraining from designating in advance a single form taken by patronage relations in our sample, we recognize at the onset that in directing our attention to such relations in the USSR we are travelling down a well-worn path. Indeed, what T. H. Rigby has described as the "second polity" -- the informal world of personal relations which reshapes all manner of official decisions at the implementation stage, not least of which those in the area of personnel[46] — has been openly identified in recent years by Soviet scholars

themselves, who diagnose it as a leading cause of the various maladies which afflict the Soviet system.[47] Yet general agreement among specialists with respect to the presence and importance of patronage ties in the USSR has so far not led to an established method for detecting them.

If there are criticisms to be made here, the first might be directed to the question of specificity, or lack thereof, in setting out just what constitutes a patronage tie and what sorts of information are to be used to indicate the presence of such in a given case. It is, unfortunately, not at all uncommon to encounter statements in the field of Soviet elite studies on the order of "actor X, who has ties to actor Y", or "actor X promoted his client, Y", without learning in context anything about the methodological and empirical bases on which such statements rest. In any and all instances, the statements themselves may be valid. The point is that our knowledge of Soviet elites cannot advance in a cumulative and systematic way unless the criteria for specifying inter-personal ties are themselves specified and, hence, susceptible to demonstration of their validity and reliability.

A second difficulty involves those cases in which the criteria for establishing patronage ties are specified but remain less than convincing indicators of clique affiliation. In this respect, indicators which are thought to measure clientelistic ties on the basis of the career histories of actors which show that two or more of them have worked in the same institution or in the same locale contain a large element of ambiguity which is not always acknowledged by those who employ them. Work in, say, the same institution may mean that a tie has been established. It may also mean just the opposite. A rival group may have succeeded in "planting" one of their members in an institution otherwise dominated by a particular patronage clique.[48] To be

sure, a standard of absolute certitude in these matters would do nothing but paralyze research efforts. The closed world of Soviet politics divulges few of its inner secrets and the parties to patronage relations are not known for advertising their existence as such. In attempting an analysis of these relations we are, then, necessarily confronted with some degree of ambiguity in what we observe and consequently are forced to make interpretations which may not be as susceptible to verification as we would otherwise prefer. The point, again, is to reduce this ambiguity as much as possible in order to render our interpretations, if not valid, then at least sufficiently transparent to stand correction from further research.

The results of our analysis to this point enable us to identify in a preliminary way a small fraction of the total number of individuals in the data set as members of various factions or patronage groups in Belorussian politics. First, we have those who fought in the partisan movement during World War II and entered political life in the BSSR thereafter. From the available data sources, some 74 members of this faction, the Partisans, can be identified. Second, as noted above, there appears to be a particular core to the regional grouping arrayed among jobs in Minsk City which is composed of individuals who initiated their political careers in the industrial organizations of Minsk. This core, the Minsk City Industrial Group (MCIG) has 51 known members. It is more than conceivable that others in the larger Minsk City grouping are also members of the MCIG, but the absence of data on their early careers prevents us from identifying more than 51 members of the MCIG proper. Finally, we are able at this point to identify explicitly only a small contingent of a third factional grouping in the BSSR which was discussed in the preceding chapter. This factor, which formed in Vitebsk Oblast;

includes A. N. Aksenov, the apparent patron in the BSSR, and V. I. Brovikov and L. S. Firisanov, his clients. The following analysis will enable us to fill out the membership of this group and also to locate other patronage cliques which have operated in the BSSR over the period encompassed by this study.

Consistent with the methodological orientation which has guided the analysis to this point, we rely, here, on mobility as the principal means for indicating patronage affiliations. In so doing, we can appropriate some very useful ideas from two students of patronage relations in the Soviet Union. The first derives from Gyula Jozsa who has put forward the metaphor of a seilschaft -- a roped party of mountain climbers -- in order to suggest the manner in which patronage groups ascend the political heights in the Soviet hierarchy as a single unit.[49] The second has been developed by John P. Willerton, Jr., who has used, among other discriminating factors, upward mobility -- in this case two or more promotions for a client within a region and/or institution headed by his would-be patron -- to indicate patronage ties.[50] We begin our analysis of patronage by empirically interpreting the idea of seilshaft.

Replacement Chains as Seilschaften. A replacement chain, the cohort of actors who advance through the set a jobs contained in a given vacancy chain, represents a strict and empirically direct interpretation of a political seilschaft. The appearance of certain actors in the same replacement chain, however, need not in itself connote a patronage link among them. On the one hand, the composition of the replacement chain may be due in part or in toto to chance factors; say, the unexpected death of an officeholder which summoned a (perhaps temporary) replacement from among his immediate lieutenants which

in turn created a vacancy which was filled by a new recruit as yet unconnected to some patronage clique. On the other, those in a given replacement chain may on occasion be the clients of different patrons. Their simultaneous movements through the chain might reflect the fact that the jobs within it belong to separate nomenklatury and may even have resulted from a negotiated arrangement among patrons whereby X's client received a promotion to one position as part of a bargain that brought about a similar promotion for Y's client to another. In order to minimize the ambiguity which obtains here, we stipulate that, unless we have reason to think otherwise, individuals occupying positions in replacement chains will be regarded as linked if and only if they have appeared together in the same chain on more than one occasion.

Applying this criterion to the data, we find that on twenty-six occasions two individuals appeared twice within the same replacement chain, and that on two other occasions two individuals were thrice members of the same chain. The relative frequency of such occurrences in the context of the total number of replacement chains in the sample is quite low (0.7 percent for twice-appearing and 0.1 percent for thrice-appearing pairs of actors) and would therefore suggest that these pairings are not likely the result of chance. Rather, we seem to have here a rather select group of cases in which the mobility of one of the actors in a given pair is predicated on the mobility of the other. From this relationship, we infer a tie between them.

Two very useful pieces of information which this exercise has turned up are: (1) the coupling of actors not yet classified by factional affiliation with individuals previously identified as either Partisans or members of the MCIG; and (2) the presence of a given actor in more than one pairing. Each of

these results enables us to expand our present factional rosters by including additional clients. The coupling of an as yet unclassified actor with an individual already identified as a member of a given faction is taken as evidence that the former is a client of the faction to which the latter belongs. Multiple pairings of a particular actor, the second pattern from which associations can be inferred, are treated as transitive (i.e., if X has twice or more appeared in the same chains with both Y and Z, we assume that Y and Z are both tied to X and tied to each other).

Taken together, these pieces of information allow us to designate a number of factionally affiliated blocks of actors. The largest single block, containing 17 actors, is grouped around offices in Minsk City. Given the relatively closed system of recruitment to these jobs, noted above, it is not at all unexpected to find the frequent appearance of these officials in the same chains, often paired with members of the MCIG. One other actor, A. A. Sanchukovskii, whose early career includes jobs as an industrial executive and gorkom secretary in Mogilev, is linked to this group by virtue of a Minsk City office (after an apparent sojourn in Moscow), a personnel move involving a seven-person replacement chain, three of whose links have been identified as members of the MCIG and, a fourth, appears as an MCIG client.

These data indicate that the Partisan faction had developed networks of clientele in four of the oblasts of the BSSR (Minsk, Gomel', Grodno, and Mogilev). As the dominant group in Belorussian politics for most of the period encompassed by this study, this too is not unexpected. Interestingly, the three regions which in this analysis do not appear as areas of Partisan strength (Minsk City, Vitebsk and Brest oblast's) comprise the regional bases

for those factions in visible contention for the leadership of the BSSR during the succession which followed the death of P. M. Masherov in 1980.

In addition to those Brezhnev clients holding republic level offices[51] two of the three regional bases which were not areas of Partisan strength over the period encompassed by this study were headed by Belorussian politicians with ties to the Brezhnev network -- A. N. Aksenov in Vitebsk and E. E. Sokolov in Brest.[52] The MCIG, which operated in the third of the regional bases not controlled by the Partisan faction, had ties to the Andropov-Gorbachev group. With these classifications in place and with the addition of those actors identified with various factions in our analysis of seilschaften, we are able to carry forward our analysis of factional affiliation.

Patronage Ties as Repeated Joint-Mobility. A second method for detecting the factional affiliations of individuals in the sample again incorporates the ideas of mobility and recurrence. In this case, however, we aim to associate individuals who were not necessarily members of the same replacement chain and whose movements from one job to another did not necessarily take place within the same year. Rather, we are concerned with those cases in which a potential client made two or more career moves within an organization or region which the analysis to this point would indicate as having been within the control of one of the patronage groups or sub-groups which we have detected. When such is the case, we draw the inference that a tie exists between the client and the patronage group in question.

The ambiguity which necessarily obtains in inferring such ties among actors is minimized by adopting again the rule of two or more moves, this time in reference to the client advancing within an organization or region controlled by a patronage group. It is further minimized by specifying that

the member of the patronage group, under whose wing the client's mobility took place, was himself mobile on both occasions. Hence, this method is geared to the assumption that when an identified member of a patronage group found a new job, the influence of his faction was also used to promote certain other individuals who are to be regarded a clients of the group in question. Ambiguity is minimized again by adding the proviso that only those individuals are to be regarded as clients who (two or more times) moved in the same year as, or in the year following, the patron's move. Surely, patronage powers could be exercised at a greater remove than a one-year lag between the mobility of patrons and clients, and we are a priori screening out all cases in which such took place. In this respect, however, we are prepared to exchange a broader scope for more precision in the identification of clients. By reducing the time dimension to no more than one year after the move of the patron, we are able to identify what might be called "hard" clients, i.e., those whose career fortunes are more or less directly linked to those of their patrons. Given the ambiguity which confronts such an exercise and our wish to reduce it as much as possible, adherence to these three rules -- (1) movement by the client on more than one occasion within an organization or region controlled by a patronage group, (2) movement by the patron on each occasion, and (3) a time lag of no more than one year between the respective moves of patrons and clients — seems to be a price well worth paying.

The data generated from the application of these three rules to our sample of Belorussian officeholders are presented in Table 13. This exercise

See Table 13, page 109.

allows for the classification of some 398 individuals (12.7 percent of the total sample) as clients of one of the three main patronage groups and, together with those actors whose patronage affiliations have already been identified, brings our count of members of the various networks to 557 (17.8 percent of the total sample). Were we attempting simply to classify as many individuals as possible as members or clients of the various groupings it is clear from the results obtained that the methods which we have adopted serve that purpose rather poorly. Since the constraints built into the analysis perforce exclude from classification the great majority of the individuals in the data set, an attempt at a more comprehensive classification would require less rigorous decision rules which would yield a more inclusive method of grouping. But inasmuch as our intention has been to reduce ambiguity in this stage of the analysis in order to deploy some relatively solid results in subsequent stages which treat various events in the system from the viewpoint of factional politics, the matter of the inclusiveness of the procedures used to determine factional affiliation presents no insurmountable difficulties.

The Influence of Faction on Mobility Patterns. One dimension of the influence of factional affiliation on our sample of Belorussian officeholders concerns mobility. Does membership in a particular patronage group enhance one's chances for promotion to higher office? Here, we address this question by examining the career histories of 361 individuals who can be identified from the data sources as having begun their political activity as either, (1) party secretaries, trade union officials, or executives in industrial firms, (2) officers in the Belorussian Komsomol, or (3) skilled workers who rose to executive positions in various industrial enterprises but who did not previously occupy party or trade union offices within them. Partitioning this

group of 361 officeholders according to their respective points of entry into the system makes it possible to compare the trajectories of careers launched from each of these points. Is it the case, for instance, that those who initially served as party secretaries in industrial firms climb higher than do their counterparts who worked in trade union organizations? More importantly for present purposes, however, this categorization by channel of entry allows us to control for the effect of the channels themselves and to determine, by comparing, say, trade union officials associated with one patronage group against others who entered via the same channel, whether factional affiliation makes a difference in the career histories of those coming into the system through these various portals. The number of officeholders of concern to us here is not large, and categorizing them by both faction and channel of entry would yield subgroups too small in many cases to show any worthwhile results. In order, therefore, to distribute the sample in such a way as to fill all of the categories with a number of cases sufficiently large to draw comparisons regarding the influence of factional affiliation on the mobility patterns displayed by those entering through the various channels, we shall divide the 361 individuals in question into two subsets: members of the Minsk City Industrial Group (MCIG) and all others.

Some 128 individuals can be identified as having begun their political careers in the BSSR in one of the industrial firms in the capital. Of these, 70 (53.1 percent) recorded no subsequent career moves to higher offices, 28 (21.9 percent) advanced to positions in the party apparatus in their next career moves, 7 (5.5 percent) were appointed to an executive position in a soviet in their next career moves, and the remainder, 25 (19.5 percent), made their next career moves to a job in the state apparatus (ministries and state

committees). The comparable figures for the 233 non-MCIG members under consideration here are: 112 (48.1 percent) recorded no subsequent career moves to higher offices, 75 (32.2 percent) next took jobs in the party apparatus, 21 (9.0 percent) found executive positions in soviets, and 25 (10.7 percent) moved next to higher posts in the state apparatus. These figures indicate that members of the MCIG had a marginally smaller likelihood of upward mobility (46.9 percent) than did their counterparts in other areas of the BSSR (51.9 percent). They also indicate that members of the MCIG moved immediately into positions in the party and soviet apparatus with a lower frequency (21.9 percent vs. 32.2 percent, and 5.5 percent vs. 9.0 percent, respectively) and were more frequently promoted out of their entry-level jobs into positions in the state apparatus (19.5 percent vs. 10.7 percent). Taken together, the relative frequencies reported here for the two groups would suggest that tracks to high-level political careers are slightly more competitive in Minsk City and that those from the capital who did manage to make their way upward on the job ladder tend more so than the others to take their next career steps on some rung within the hierarchies of the ministries or state committees.

The second of these distinctions between the two groups seems to be consonant with the profile of the MCIG which has been developed up to this point. As a group composed of individuals from the highly skilled sector of the working class in the capital, we would expect that members of the MCIG would provide a reservoir talent from which appointments to managerial and administrative posts in the economy would be made. Such appointments were facilitated, no doubt, by those members of the MCIG who occupied administrative posts in Moscow where they were able to recommend for promotion

others with whom they had previously worked or with whom they had prior association in Minsk by means of, say, common membership on a party committee, a director's council and so forth. The first distinction noted above, however, would add another characteristic to the group, namely, a relatively high level of internal competition for advancement to higher office. The political structures in Minsk City constitute a somewhat more narrow funnel for passage from factory-level jobs to higher positions in party and governmental bodies. There are more KPB members in Minsk City, we recall, than in any of the oblasts of the BSSR (deducting, of course, Minsk City's total from that of Minsk Oblast') and with some one-quarter of the BSSR's total industrial output, Minsk City represents the largest single source of potential recruits from factory-level positions to higher political office. Yet, within the capital, the number of jobs into which such recruits might move (e.g., raikom secretaries or raiispolkom chairmen) is comparatively much smaller than it is in the oblasts. Hence, in Minsk City there appears to be a larger number of potential candidates competing for jobs in a smaller pool of positions. This competitive aspect of the MCIG may, then, say something about the skills (technical, organizational and political) of those who managed to obtain subsequent promotions. It also, as the data in Table 14 suggest, indicates the influence which membership in the MCIG has on career advancement.

The data displayed in Table 14 were derived by taking the number of the stratum which corresponds to each of the respective positions in the data set

See Table 14, page 110.

which were occupied at one time or another by one or more of our 361 individuals and calculating the mean scores for each group according to the five categories of entry-level positions. The first row in the table reports, then, that the average rank of the jobs first held by members of the MCIG when they entered into the positions contained in the data set was in some cases (secretaries in primary party organizations, chairmen of trade union councils, and skilled workers in industrial firms) considerably higher than the jobs first held by the others, inasmuch as the higher strata are designated by the lower numbers. For industrial executives and Komsomol officials, however, the rankings are by and large equivalent for the two groups.

The second row in the Table reports on those who advanced from the entry-level positions to another position in the system. We note here an indication of the relative competitiveness of the personnel system in Minsk City with respect to party secretaries in industrial firms. Whereas 29 of the 71 actors (40.8 percent) who entered the system as P.P.O. secretaries outside of Minsk City were able to advance to a higher position, only 18 of 69 (26.1 percent) among the MCIG managed to do so. Those who entered the system as trade union officials in Minsk City, on the other hand, had a much higher incidence of promotion than did their counterparts elsewhere, but the numbers in this case are not large enough to support any firm conclusions. Otherwise, the two groups seem to compare rather evenly on the percentage of members who received promotions after having entered the system via one of the remaining three channels.

Moving to the second row of Table 14, we find that, taken as a group and excepting for the moment those who entered through the Komsomol channel, members of the MCIG who advanced to another job in the system were more

successful than were their counterparts in reaching highly ranked positions. For these individuals, a full rank separates those members of the MCIG from their counterparts who entered as factory executives, and the better part of a full rank divides the members of the two groups for those entering as secretaries of P.P.O.s and skilled workers. The largest difference recorded in this respect appears in the cases of those entering from factory-level trade union offices, a rank difference of 3.1, but here, again, the numbers involved are too small to sustain meaningful inference.

The data in the second row of the Table indicate that the field of Komsomol work represents the only channel into elite positions in which MCIG members were at a (slight) comparative disadvantage. Moreover, this disadvantage also appears in the third row, and suggests a number of things. First, recruitment to elite positions from among the ranks of Komsomol officers has been somewhat less pronounced in Minsk City than it has been in the oblasts of the BSSR. Second, among non-members of the MCIG, the Komsomol apparatus served as a faster track to top elite positions than did the channels of party secretary or trade union officer in an industrial enterprise, while industrial executives ranked evenly with Komsomol entrants with respect to highest rank attained, and skilled workers came out considerably better (2.4 vs 4.3). With the exception of this small group (10 individuals) it is possible to put forward the generalization that Komsomol office in the BSSR has been the most advantageous site from which to launch a political career outside of Minsk City. In addition to the average ranks of jobs attained, the numbers of non-members of the MCIG which appear in the third row of the Table indicate that a greater percentage (42.6 percent) of

recruits from the Komsomol reach top elite jobs than is true of those entering through the other channels.

This generalization is reversed when we apply it to members of the MCIG. In this respect, either channels other than Komsomol office have led to higher ranking jobs or, as is the case with trade unions, the respective rates of attrition have been greater for those entering the elite through the channel of Komsomol work. Consequently, one part of the answer to the question of what difference does faction make regarding one's chances for upward mobility can be supplied with reference to entry via the Komsomol. For MCIG members, Komsomol work has been the least important path to the top, for non-members of the MCIG, excepting again the small number of those in the sample classified as "skilled workers", it has been the most important one.

The data in the third row of the Table also point up the fact that MCIG members were able to reach higher ranking offices than were their counterparts in all cases except Komsomol entrants. Attrition rates here vary. For instance, comparatively fewer MCIG executives received promotions after having reached "second job" status (row 2), and comparatively fewer non-members of the MCIG who entered through the channels of party secretary or trade union chairman in an industrial enterprise received promotions after having reached the "second job" plateau. Combining entrants from all channels, however, we find that the percentage of members who were promoted after having reached "second job" status is effectively equivalent for the two groups--52.1 percent for members of the MCIG, 55.7 percent for non-members, and, with Komsomol entrants excluded, the comparable figures become 51.2 percent and 53.0 percent, respectively. Given this overall equivalence in rates of attrition between the two groups, we can add a second part of the answer to our question

regarding the difference made by faction. Members of the MCIG who advanced beyond the "second job" plateau and who had entered elite positions through any of the channels except Komsomol work were able as a group to attain higher ranking positions than was true for non-members of the MCIG. Moreover, this difference between the groups is especially pronounced in the case of those who entered the elite from positions as either party secretaries (3.9 vs 5.9) or executives (3.0 vs 4.3) in industrial enterprises. In sum, the influence of factional affiliation on the careers of MCIG members appears to be strong, especially for those who entered the Belorussian elite after having served their political apprenticeships in the factories of Minsk.

Women in the System. Western studies of women who occupy positions in the politico-administrative hierarchies of the USSR underscore the fact that there is a place for women in the Soviet system. This place, moreover, can be relatively well-defined. On one hand, among the highest offices of the Soviet party-state, women are conspicuous by their absence.[53] As one observer has put it:

> In substantive rather than ceremonial roles, in the key hierarchies of political and coercive power, and at the apex of the system as a whole, politics remains a male affair.[54]

On the other hand, women who occupy political roles in the USSR tend to cluster around those positions which carry on supportive and/or nurturing activities of one sort or another. In both respects, Belorussian women appear as a relatively undifferentiated subset of Soviet women. The type and importance of the offices which they have held seem to fit closely the larger Soviet pattern.

One of the occupational characteristics of women in the sample, their concentration in lower-level positions, limits the utility of the methods developed for identifying factional affiliation. Since a majority of women in our sample (139 of 230) held only a single job in the system, the method of inferring a patronage relation on the basis of two or more career moves within the same organizational hierarchy and/or geographic region could not be applied in most cases. Consequently, and in order to generate a sample of factionally affiliated females large enough to make it possible to discern differences among groups, another approach, in addition to the methods employed thus far, was employed whereby factional affiliation was determined by appointment to a position within a set of offices thought to be controlled by one of the factional groups already identified. The accuracy of this less rigorous technique was improved to some degree by assigning all borderline cases to the category labelled "unknown." Through a combination of the methods previously developed and the somewhat less rigorous technique introduced here, it was possible to classify 174 of the 230 women as clients of one patronage group or another.

The data set out in Table 15 point up a relationship between the

See Table 15, page 111.

factional affiliations of women in the sample and their access to elite positions in the BSSR (defined here as those jobs included in the top four strata of positions). The left-hand column of the table lists the various factional groupings together with the number of women who could be associated with each; the column in the center provides the number of women from each of

these respective groups who gained access to one of the elite jobs; and those on the right-hand side list the names of the women in question and the highest offices which they reached. Perhaps the first thing that might be said about these data is that they suggest something about the place of women in the system, namely, that their place is not at or near the top of the hierarchy of offices. Whether we view these results from the perspective of the proportion of women in the sample who reached these elite jobs (10 of 230) or from the even more revealing standpoint that the 212 jobs in these four strata over twenty-one years yield a total of 4452 possible year-long tenures in this set of elite positions of which only some 60 involved females, it would follow that women's access to elite jobs in the BSSR is very highly constrained.

Secondly, for those women who did manage to reach elite positions, the influence of factional affiliation is apparent in these results. Only 14.3 percent of the women in the sample could be identified as either members or clients of the MCIG, yet this group accounted for half of the women who held elite jobs. Owing to the small number of cases involved, however, we cannot establish a clear difference among the groups in a statistical sense. Moreover, the highest ranking position held by a woman was that of Deputy Chair of the Belorussian Council of Ministers (Stratum 2) which was occupied on two occasions (N. L. Snezhkova, 1968-85, and N. N. Mazai, 1985-) by the clients of other patronage cliques. Even with these two qualifications in mind, however, these findings would support the inference that factional affiliation is associated with the career chances of women in the system. Taking women as a group, the data indicate that each had a one-in-thirty-three chance of reaching an elite job. For members and clients of the Partisan faction, the comparable figure would be one-in-twenty-three, for clients of

the Brezhnev group, one-in-forty-one, and for members and clients of the MCIG, a little better than one-in-seven.

The Use of Negative Sanctions. Patronage affiliation, as we have seen thus far, can exercise a discernible influence on one's chances for gaining access to higher office in the BSSR. Does it also play a role in determining the relative frequencies at which punishments ("negative sanctions") are visited on officeholders? In this section we treat this question by examining three types of negative sanctions not uncommonly faced by officials in the USSR: reprimands, authoritative criticism and publicly announced dismissals. In so doing, we are interested to determine whether and to what extent patronage affiliation serves to protect members of a given clique and, conversely, to what degree and under what conditions it might increase their vulnerability to the use of negative sanctions.

Studies of crime and punishment in Soviet officialdom have called attention to the pronounced personalistic element embedded within the formal rules and procedures purporting to govern the conduct of officeholders.[55] For those operating within a milieu in which legal codes and administrative regulations are often contradictory, in which the demands of political superiors for performance are often a matter of greater urgency than is following the officially prescribed procedures, and in which personal contacts and the trading of favors may well have more to do with getting things accomplished than does the method of "going by the book", following the formally established rules becomes at best an uncertain guarantee against the threat of punishment and, at worst, an indication (under the charge of "formalism") that punishment may be warranted in a given case. Indeed, one student of Soviet affairs has gone so far as to refer to the process of rule-

enforcement as simply another phase in a cycle of extra-legal, if not corrupt, administrative behavior, arguing that negative sanctions are in context less a means of impersonally discouraging illegal behavior than they are a weapon in the hands of one clique or another to be used against the more vulnerable members of rival groups.[56]

(1) Reprimands. We begin our analysis of the use of negative sanctions on officeholders in the BSSR with 99 recorded cases of official reprimands issued by the People's Control Commission (Narkontrol'), the KPB and governmental authorities in the BSSR against individuals in the data set over the twenty-one year period encompassed by this study. To be sure, the total number of reprimands generated by these organs in this period runs into the thousands, but the great bulk of them were directed at lower-level officials--chairmen of collective farms or village soviets, rank-and-file party members, and so forth--who do not appear in the data set. Consequently, the small fraction of the total number of reprimands which is of concern to us refers to those rather special cases in which an individual, who occupied an office of sufficient importance to be included in the data set, received this negative sanction.

The data presented in Table 16 are arranged according to the source of

See Table 16, page 112.

the reprimands, their relative severity (whether of the ordinary or strict variety), the alleged reasons as to why they were issued (whether for poor work or corruption) and what effect, if any, they seem to have had on the careers of those who received them. The figures listed in the bottom row of

the table, which show the net effects of reprimands, suggest that this form of negative sanction is a rather mild one. Among the 99 officials who were reprimanded, only 17 are known to have been sacked within the following year, 62 retained their posts for at least the following two years, 12 received subsequent promotions, while the outcome in 20 of the cases was indeterminate.[57] Focusing on those cases in which terminations were known to have occurred after reprimands were issued, we find that only one individual was removed from office after a reprimand for corrupt activities and this case involved an "ordinary" reprimand from Narkontrol'. In the two instances involving strict reprimands from Narkontrol' for corruption, the subsequent careers of the officials in question are unknown and, consequently, may have involved terminations. For the two cases of corruption in which the KPB issued strict reprimands, however, one individual is known to have been retained in office while the results in the other case are indeterminate. Overall, the data suggest that the use of this negative sanction on Belorussian officials does not follow the pattern one might expect to find were the system governed by impersonal bureaucratic norms. Even if we were to assume that all of the cases which fall under the category of "unknown results" in fact involved terminations, then it appears one's odds of surviving a strict as opposed to a regular reprimand from Narkontrol' were not much different (7-in-12 vs 8-in 11), one's odds vis-a-vis KPB reprimands were actually greater for strict (2-in-3) than for regular (9-in-22) reprimands, and that reprimands issued by governmental authorities were followed as often by promotion as they were by termination.

Does factional affiliation shed any light on these outcomes? Regarding the members of the three factions under consideration, only two received

reprimands and each managed to retain his job thereafter. Some 37 additional members of this collection of reprimanded officials can be identified as clients of one or another of three patronage groups. Inasmuch as the particular time at which a reprimand was issued has a bearing on the factional politics at play as we shall see in the following chapter, it is useful, here, to divide our time-frame into two periods, 1966-1976 and 1977-1986. During the first period in which a jockeying for position was evident between the Partisans and Brezhnev clients, we find that eight of the latter received reprimands and all eight retained their jobs, while fourteen of the former were reprimanded resulting in three terminations. Two clients of the MCIG were issued reprimands during this period; one retained his job and, in the other case, the result is unknown.

In the second period, four Brezhnev clients were issued reprimands. One, who was reprimanded in February of 1980 on the eve of the (brief) accession of this group on the dominant position in the BSSR's leadership, managed to retain his office. Two were reprimanded in March of 1982 when the Brezhnev succession was getting underway in Moscow and, when anti-Brezhnev forces were mustering themselves in the BSSR. The outcomes of these two cases are unknown, but assumedly each may have ended in a termination. The final case occurred at the end of 1983 after the Brezhnev faction had been displaced as the dominant group in the Belorussian leadership by the MCIG. This reprimand resulted in termination. Clients of the Partisan faction received reprimands on nine occasions during this second period. None is known to have resulted in a termination while in five of the cases the officials in question retained their offices. Finally, three reprimands were issued to members of the MCIG during this period yielding no known terminations and two retentions.

Although the number of cases in which clients of the various patronage groups were issued reprimands is not large enough to support firm conclusions regarding the influence of factional affiliation on the use of this negative sanction, the results of the analysis seem to be suggestive on two counts. First, the institution of reprimands in the BSSR does not appear to conform to a bureaucratic pattern in which reprimands have marked, negative effects on the careers of officials who receive them. Leaving aside the matter of what personalistic or factional motives might have prompted the various authorities to issue reprimands in the first place, the data indicate little difference in the outcomes of cases in which strict, as opposed to ordinary, reprimands were employed, and further show that officials had at least a roughly 2-in-3 chance of surviving a reprimand and a 1-in-8 chance of being promoted thereafter. Second, the use and consequences of this negative sanction appear to be consistent with phases of factional rivalry. During the first period, the Partisan faction, as the dominant group in Belorussian politics, was under challenge from the Brezhnev forces. The only cases in which termination followed a reprimand involved Partisan clients. In the second period when the pendulum had swung the other way, clients of each of these groups were issued reprimands but the only known termination involved a Brezhnev client who lost his job shortly after his group had lost its dominant position in the leadership.

(2) Authoritative Criticism. What happens to those officials who either have been singled out for blame by an authoritative spokesman at a party gathering or who have been named in critical articles published in the press? The incidence of such events is relatively rare. Among the 3127 individuals in our sample, only 20 are known too have been the targets of these forms of

authoritative criticism. Again, these rather special cases may indicate something of particular importance with respect to the use of negative sanctions and their relation to factional politics in the BSSR. If it is by no means not an everyday event for members of officialdom to be held up to authoritative criticism, then we would do well to pay close attention to those rare occasions on which they were.

In late 1969, Pravda published an especially critical article on poor agricultural performance in Gomel' Oblast', replete will calls for sacking certain members of the regional elite.[58] Four of the five officials who were singled out for blame lost their jobs in a matter of days. Inasmuch as each of the five held but a single job within the time-frame of this study, our methods for determining factional affiliation do not apply here. Nonetheless, there are two reasons to infer a motivation based on factional considerations in these incidences of authoritative criticism. First, Pravda was the medium for articulating the negative sanction and its editor at the time was M. V. Zimyanin, a leading member of the Partisan faction. Second, all four of the vacancies which resulted from the terminations were filled by individuals who have been identified as clients of the Partisans.

On four occasions, leading members of the MCIG and prominent clients of the Brezhnev group subjected various officials in the BSSR to authoritative criticism. Taking, first, the Brezhnev clients, we find A. N. Askenov as Second Secretary of the KPB singling out for blame four raikom secretaries whom he alleged to be poorly discharging their responsibilities in the agricultural sector.[59] Two of the individuals in question were clients of the Partisan faction and one of them was removed from office shortly thereafter. The factional affiliation of the other two is unknown, but insofar as one of

them was terminated shortly after Aksenov's charges, and this individual had only recently been decorated with the Order of Lenin for outstanding work in the agricultural sector, factional politics may have played a role in motivating these criticism as well. The final case in which an official was criticized by a leading client of the Brezhnev faction involved T. Ya. Kiselev, as First Secretary of the KPB, charging another raikom secretary with poor performance in agricultural work.[60] The individual in question, who lost his job shortly thereafter, has been identified as a client of the Brezhnev machine. If factional identification was accurate in this instance, then we would assume that Kiselev sought the removal of this official for reasons other than those associated with factional rivalry *per se*.

The factional affiliations of those criticized by A. A. Reut[61] and G. G. Bartoshevich,[62] leading members of the MCIG, are not known, as is the case with three other officials who were criticized by party authorities for unsatisfactory performance in office. The four remaining officials who were subjected to this negative sanction have all been identified as clients of the Partisans. The criticisms were levelled during a period (1969-1974) in which the Partisan faction was dominant in Belorussian politics but under challenge from clients of the Brezhnev group, and the outcomes of these criticisms are predictably mixed. Two Partisan clients retained their jobs, another was soon promoted and the fourth was sacked.

(3) Publicly Announced Dismissals. In some thirty instances, the Belorussian press reported the outright termination of individuals whose names appear in our data set for reasons ranging from poor leadership to corruption. Thirteen of these dismissed officials have been identified as clients of either the Partisan or Brezhnev factions. The timing of the dismissals of

these thirteen actors generally conforms to the phases of factional rivalry specific to the period of our study.

Ten of the dismissed officials have been identified as clients of the Brezhnev group. Terminations in all ten cases occurred after 1983, that is, after the MCIG had replaced the Brezhnev clients as the dominant group in Belorussian politics. The other three cases involve the dismissal of officials identified with the Partisan faction and these took place at various times: one occurred in 1976 during a period of rivalry between the Partisan and Brezhnev groups; another took place in 1981 when Brezhnev clients had succeeded in ousting the Partisans from control of the Belorussian leadership; and the final instance was announced in 1986 by which time the MCIG had assumed the dominant position in the BSSR. Whereas the dismissal of ten Brezhnev clients after the fall of the Brezhnev faction seems a straightforward case of redividing the spoils of office, the termination of the three Partisan clients is more difficult to account for in terms of factional rivalries. Under the assumption that these three terminations were motivated by factional considerations, the first two might be explained as blows struck by the Brezhnev machine against their Partisan rivals. The third case, however, occurred during a period in which the MCIG was in collaboration with the remnants of the Partisan group and was busy, as we just noted, sacking clients of the vanquished Brezhnev clique. N. N. Slyunkov, then First Secretary of the KPB who announced this and three other dismissals in his speech to the Thirtieth Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia, listed "corrupt and deceitful leadership" as the reason for the terminations.[63] The most plausible explanation might be, then, that while prepared to reach accommodation with clients of their defeated rivals--and such seems to be true

for clients of the Brezhnev group as well as for those affiliated with the Partisans--the MCIG was also prepared to be selective in doing so.

The evidence presented here tends to support the idea that faction makes a difference for the career prospects of those individuals associated with one or another patronage group. In those instances in which the available information is relatively plentiful, i.e., for those who entered the system through one of the five channels discussed and for those whom we were able to identify as females, the effect of faction on careers stands out rather distinctly. In either case, actors affiliated with the MCIG regularly displayed a greater potential for promotion than did their counterparts. These findings can be regarded as evidence of a personalistic basis for elite circulation in the BSSR. Rather than considerations of merit or talent which we would associate with promotion mechanisms operating under bureaucratic conditions, we note in all cases, excepting those involving individuals who began their political careers as Komsomol officials, that affiliation with a particular patronage group coincides with the career chances of the actors.

The available information related to the use of negative sanctions is somewhat more sketchy, and the conclusions which we are prepared to draw from it should, therefore, be rendered in more provisional terms. Nonetheless, we observed with respect to the issuing and results of reprimands little of the pattern one might expect under a bureaucratic mode of organization. The consequences of a reprimand, if not the motives for issuing it, seem to be determined by forces other than those associated with a modern bureaucracy. Specifically, the timing and results of reprimands appear to be related to phases of factional conflict in the system. If officials are in fact reprimanded on the basis of poor performance or corruption, it would seem that

phases in the rivalry among factional groups account for much of the variance over time regarding who is reprimanded and with what result. The use of the other two negative sanctions which we discussed also appears to have a factional element in it, but the infrequency of the cases in which authoritative criticism or publicly announced dismissals occurred cautions against drawing firm conclusions. Nonetheless, considering the employment of all three types of negative sanctions together, we can say that the pattern which prevails--in one instance strongly, in another, weakly--points consistently to factional affiliation as a major influence on events within the system.

Figure 1

A Vacancy Chain Encompassing Five Positions*



*Letters indicate actors, numbers indicate positions. Solid lines denote movement of actors, broken lines, the movement of vacancies.

Figure 2

Representation of Ranking Procedure for Jobs in Sample



Table 1 Q Matrix of Transition Probabilities of Vacancies Among Strata, 1966-1986

Stratum of Destination

Stratum of Origin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	P
1	.38	.25	.06	.06	____	____	____	____	____	____	.25
2	.06	.06	.56	.06	.06	____	____	____	____	____	.22
3	____	.02	.07	.50	.05	.04	____	____	____	____	.32
4	____	____	.05	.05	.53	.07	.02	____	____	____	.28
5	____	.01	.01	.02	.11	.33	.03	____	____	____	.49
6	____	____	.01	.01	.02	.04	.24	.02	____	____	.67
7	____	____	____	____	.01	.04	.07	.18	.02	____	.67
8	____	____	____	____	.02	.03	.05	.06	.09	____	.74
9	____	____	____	____	____	.01	.02	.02	____	.03	.92
10	____	____	____	____	.01	.04	.01	____	.03	.05	.86

Table 2 Q Matrix of Transition Probabilities of Vacancies Among Strata for Two Periods

1966-1976

Stratum of Destination

Stratum of Origin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	P
1	.29	.43	.14	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	.14
2	____	____	.64	.09	.09	____	____	____	____	____	.18
3	____	____	.05	.53	.05	.03	____	____	____	____	.34
4	____	____	.05	.07	.48	.09	.04	____	____	____	.27
5	____	.01	.01	.03	.12	.37	.03	____	____	____	.43
6	____	____	.01	.01	.01	.04	.30	.02	____	____	.60
7	____	____	____	.01	.01	.04	.06	.21	.01	____	.66
8	____	____	.01	.01	.02	.04	.05	.08	.10	____	.70
9	____	____	____	____	____	.01	.02	.03	____	.01	.91
10	____	____	____	____	.01	.04	.01	____	.04	.07	.81

(Table 2 con't)
1977-1986

Stratum of Destination

Stratum of Origin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	P
1	.44	.11	____	.11	____	____	____	____	____	____	.33
2	.14	.14	.43	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	.29
3	____	.06	.11	.44	.06	.06	____	____	____	____	.28
4	____	____	.03	____	.62	.03	____	____	____	____	.31
5	____	____	.01	.01	.07	.25	.01	.01	____	____	.62
6	____	____	____	____	.03	.03	.12	.01	____	____	.81
7	____	____	____	____	.01	.03	.08	.13	.04	____	.71
8	____	____	____	____	____	____	.03	.02	.09	____	.86
9	____	____	____	____	____	.02	.02	____	____	.05	.92
10	____	____	____	____	____	.04	____	____	.02	.02	.92

Table 3 Predicted (P) and Observed (O) Distribution of Chain Lengths by Stratum of Origin (in percentages) N = 2774*

Chain Lengths	Stratum 1			Stratum 2			Stratum 3		
	P	O	n	P	O	n	P	O	n
1	25.0	16.7	5	22.2	13.9	5	32.1	18.8	18
2	18.7	20.0	6	24.8	38.9	14	21.8	34.4	33
3	16.7	6.7	2	18.2	16.7	7	21.8	26.0	25
4	13.5	23.3	7	16.0	13.9	5	13.3	12.5	12
5	10.5	16.7	5	9.8	8.3	3	6.2	4.2	4
6	7.0	6.7	2	4.9	8.3	3	2.7	3.1	3
7	4.1	6.7	2	2.3	____	____	1.1	1.0	1
8	2.2	3.3	1	1.0	____	____	0.4	____	____
9	1.1	____	____	0.5	____	____	0.2	____	____

Chain Lengths	Stratum 4			Stratum 5			Stratum 6		
	P	O	n	P	O	n	P	O	n
1	28.2	26.5	32	48.7	48.8	177	67.1	70.2	420
2	34.9	43.0	52	30.8	33.3	121	21.5	22.4	134
3	21.0	19.0	23	12.4	12.4	45	7.7	6.4	38
4	9.3	7.4	9	5.0	2.5	9	2.5	0.5	3
5	3.9	3.3	4	1.9	2.8	10	0.8	0.3	2
6	1.6	____	____	0.7	0.3	1	0.2	0.2	1
7	0.6	0.8	1	0.3	____	____	0.1		
8	0.2	____	____	0.1	____	____			

Table 3 cont.

Chain Lengths	Stratum 7 P	Stratum 7 O	Stratum 7 n	Stratum 8 P	Stratum 8 O	Stratum 8 n	Stratum 9 P	Stratum 9 O	Stratum 9 n
1	67.4	67.5	305	74.4	76.4	410	91.8	90.0	261
2	23.3	26.3	119	19.4	19.7	106	6.1	9.0	26
3	6.6	4.7	21	4.2	3.7	20	1.5	1.0	3
4	1.8	1.6	7	1.3	0.2	1	0.4	___	___
5	0.6	___	___	0.4	___	___	0.1	___	___
6	0.2	___	___	0.2	___	___			
7	0.1	___	___	0.1	___	___			

Stratum 10

Chain Lengths	P	O	n
1	86.0	87.7	220
2	11.0	8.8	22
3	2.1	3.2	8
4	0.6	___	___
5	0.2	0.4	1
6	0.1	___	___

*"Number" refers to the number of vacancy chains.

Table 4 Predicted (P) and Observed (O) Distributions of Chain Lengths for the Top Three Strata, With and Without All-Union Jobs

Chain Length	Strata 1-3 All-Union Jobs Included		Strata 1-3 All Union Jobs Excluded	
	P	O	P	O
1	28.9	17.3	62.6	62.5
2	22.0	32.7	22.7	23.6
3	20.3	20.4	8.8	9.1
4	14.0	14.8	3.5	2.6
5	7.7	7.4	1.4	1.2
6	3.8	4.9	0.5	0.7
7	1.8	1.9	0.2	0.4
8	0.8	0.6	0.1	____
9	0.3	____		
10	0.2	____		

Table 5 Job Matches Between Career Histories of Officeholders and Vacancy Chains Initiated By Their Exits, 1966-1986 (Strata 1 and 2).

Chains Initiated in Stratum 1

	Chains Initiated in Moscow	Chains Initiated in BSSR
Total Number of Vacancies	13	66
Number of Chains	7	17
Chain Lengths	1,4	1-8
Number of Matches	1	3

Chains Initiated in Stratum 2

	Chains Initiated in Moscow	Chains Initiated in BSSR
Total Number of Vacancies	4	91
Number of Chains	4	28
Chain Lengths	1	1-6
Number of Matches	0	3

Chains Initiated in Stratum 3

	Chains Initiated in Moscow	Chains Initiated in BSSR
Total Number of Vacancies	___	159
Number of Chains	___	54
Chain Lengths	___	1-7
Number of Matches	___	6

Table 6 Probabilities and Relative Frequencies of Vacancies Passing Out of the System in Strata 1-3 (Combined), by Time Periods, With and Without All-Union Jobs.

	All-Union Jobs Included		All-Union Jobs Excluded	
Time Period	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed
1966-1986	.29	.17	.63	.63
1966-1976	.29	.20	.58	.52
1977-1986	.29	.15	.71	.70
1966-1971	.24	.21	.48	.57
1972-1976	.45	.19	.55	.58
1977-1981	.25	.18	.68	.70
1982-1986	.36	.13	.72	.72

Table 7

Predicted (P) and Observed (O) Length Distributions of Chain Lengths by Place of Origin, 1966-1986 (N = 2739)

	BSSR			Minsk Oblast'		
Chain Lengths	P	O	n	P	O	n
1	55.1	55.5	434	70.0	66.6	219
2	28.0	26.6	208	20.6	25.2	83
3	10.8	10.7	84	6.4	5.5	18
4	3.8	3.6	28	2.0	1.5	5
5	1.3	2.3	18	0.7	0.9	3
6	0.4	0.9	7	0.2	0.3	1
7	0.1	0.4	3	0.1	-	-

	Brest Oblast'			Vitebsk Oblast'		
Chain Lengths	P	O	n	P	O	n
1	69.5	71.5	158	73.4	74.4	227
2	21.0	19.9	44	19.3	17.7	54
3	6.5	6.8	15	5.2	6.2	19
4	2.0	1.8	4	1.5	0.7	2
5	0.7	-	-	0.4	0.7	2
6	0.2	-	-	0.1	0.3	1
7	0	-	-	0	-	-

(Table 7 Con't)

Chain Lengths	Gomel' Oblast P	Gomel' Oblast O	Gomel' Oblast n	Grodno Oblast' P	Grodno Oblast' O	Grodno Oblast' n
1	71.4	70.8	225	74.9	78.5	179
2	20.1	23.9	76	18.5	15.8	36
3	5.9	4.7	15	4.8	4.8	11
4	1.8	0.3	1	1.3	-	-
5	0.5	-	-	0.4	0.9	2
6	0.2	-	-	0.1	-	-
7	0.1	0.3	1	0	-	-

Chain Lengths	Mogilev Oblast' P	Mogilev Oblast' O	Mogilev Oblast' n	Minsk City P	Minsk City O	Minsk City n
1	70.3	68.8	201	72.4	76.2	198
2	20.7	24.3	71	19.2	19.6	51
3	6.2	5.1	15	5.7	4.2	11
4	1.9	1.4	4	1.8	-	-
5	0.6	0.3	1	0.6	-	-
6	0.2	-	-	0.2	-	-
7	0.1	-	-	0	-	-

Table 8

R Matrix of Transition Probabilities of Vacancies Among Regions, 1966-1986

Place of Origin	Place of Destination									
	Minsk	Brest	Vitebsk	Gomel'	Grodno	Mogilev	Minsk City	BSSR	USSR	Outside
Minsk	.22	.01	-----	.01	-----	-----	.03	.03	-----	.70
Brest	.01	.28	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.01	-----	.69
Vitebsk	-----	.01	.23	-----	.01	-----	-----	.01	-----	.73
Gomel'	.02	-----	-----	.25	.01	-----	-----	.02	-----	.71
Grodno	-----	-----	.01	-----	.22	-----	.01	.01	-----	.75
Mogilev	.01	-----	-----	-----	-----	.26	-----	.02	-----	.70
Minsk City	.01	-----	-----	-----	.01	-----	.22	.04	-----	.72
BSSR	.04	.03	.03	.02	.02	.02	.05	.23	.01	.55
USSR	.02	.04	.02	-----	-----	.02	.04	.29	.10	.48

Table 9

R Matrix of Transition Probabilities Among Regions for Two Intervals

1966-1976

Place of Origin	Place of Destination									
	Minsk	Brest	Vitebsk	Gomel'	Grodno	Mogilev	Minsk City	BSSR	USSR	Outside
Minsk	.23	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.05	.03	-----	.68
Brest	.02	.39	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.60
Vitebsk	-----	.01	.30	-----	-----	-----	-----	.01	-----	.67
Gomel'	.01	.01	-----	.32	-----	.01	.01	.02	-----	.63
Grodno	.01	-----	.01	-----	.25	-----	.01	.01	-----	.71
Mogilev	.01	-----	-----	-----	-----	.31	.01	.03	-----	.64
Minsk City	.01	-----	-----	-----	.01	-----	.24	.05	-----	.69

1976-1986

Place of Origin	Place of Destination									
	Minsk	Brest	Vitebsk	Gomel'	Grodno	Mogilev	Minsk City	BSSR	USSR	Outside
Minsk	.21	.01	-----	.01	-----	-----	.01	.04	-----	.72
Brest	-----	.18	-----	.01	-----	-----	.01	.02	.01	.79
Vitebsk	-----	-----	.17	-----	.01	-----	-----	.01	-----	.80
Gomel'	-----	-----	-----	.19	.01	-----	-----	.02	-----	.78
Grodno	-----	-----	.01	.01	.19	-----	.01	.01	-----	.78
Mogilev	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.22	-----	-----	-----	.76
Minsk City	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	.19	.03	-----	.75

Table 10

Probabilities of Transition of Vacancies to Jobs Outside of Region of Origin for Two Intervals

	1966-1976	1977-2986	Differences Between Periods
Minsk	.09	.07	.02
Brest	.01	.03	.02
Vitebsk	.03	.03	.00
Gomel'	.05	.03	.02
Grodno	.04	.03	.01
Mogilev	.05	.03	.02
Minsk City	.07	.06	.01

Table 11

Regional Origins of Belorussian Regional Elites*, 1966-1986

	From Inside Region	Other BSSR Region	From Outside Region BSSR	USSR	Total
Brest Oblast'	26	8	7	3	44
Vitebsk Oblast'	24	11	8	4	47
Gomel' Oblast'	33	6	9	0	48
Grodno Oblast'	24	7	5	0	36
Mogilev Oblast'	33	5	7	0	45
Minsk Oblast'	31	29 (12)	8	0	68
Minsk City	43	4 (3)	6	0	53

*Elite positions include: oblast' party secretaries (for Minsk City, city party secretaries); the president and first deputy president of the oblispolkom (for Minsk City, the gorispolkom); and the first secretary of the largest gorkom in the region (since Minsk City is dealt with as the equivalent of a region, the Borisov gorkom is used for Minsk Oblast' and the largest raikom in Minsk City, Sovetskii Raikom, is used for the capital).

The numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the complement for Minsk Oblast' which came from positions in Minsk City and the complement for Minsk City which came from Minsk Oblast'.

Table 12

Regions of Origin of Top Elite in BSSR, 1966-1986

	1966-1986	1966-1975	1976-1986
Minsk Oblast'	10 (8)	10 (8)	0
Brest Oblast'	2	1	1
Vitebsk Oblast'	7 (2)	3 (2)	4
Gomel' Oblast'	1*	1*	0
Grodno Oblast'	2 (1*)	1 (1*)	1
Mogilev Oblast'	1 (1)	0	1 (1)
Minsk City	7	0	7
Outside of BSSR	4	3	1

Note: Origin is defined as region in which last position was held before entering the top elite. Numbers in parentheses indicate number of identified Partisans; asterisks indicate established career outside of BSSR before entering BSSR elite; number with asterisk in parentheses indicate main career line in Minsk Oblast'.

Table 13 Identification of Clients by Repeated Joint-Mobility for Three Patronage Groups

(N = 398)

Partisan Clients:	Number Identified
Republic Level	87
Minsk Oblast'	27
Gomel' Oblast'	52
Grodno Oblast'	18
Mogilev Oblast'	40
Brezhnev Clients:	
Republic Level	50
Vitebsk Oblast'	58
Brest Oblast'	11
MCIG Clients:	55

Table 14 Average Ranks of First, Second and Highest Positions Held For Two Groups Entering System Through Five Channels. (N=361)

Job Rank	Entry Jobs									
	P.P.Os		Trade Unions		Executives		Workers		Komsomol	
	MCIG	Others	MCIG	Others	MCIG	Others	MCIG	Others	MCIG	Others
First Job	7.7(69)	8.6(71)	7.3(4)	10(17)	7.4(35)	7.7(62)	5.6(12)	6.7(15)	6.6(8)	6.4(68)
Second Job	6.2(18)	6.9(29)	5.7(3)	8.8(4)	4.6(13)	5.6(21)	4.3(9)	5.2(12)	5.8(5)	5.6(49)
Highest Job	3.9(9)	5.9(12)	4.7(3)	5(1)	3.0(3)	4.3(12)	1.7(7)	2.4(10)	4.7(3)	4.3(29)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate respective number of cases from which average ranks of jobs were determined.

Table 15 Factional Affiliation of Women and Access to Elite Positions* (N=230)

Factional Groupings	Number Reaching Elite	Name	Highest Office
Partisans and Clients:			
Republic Level (n=12)	2	V.A. Klochkova	First Dep. Chair, Belkoopsoyuz, 1977-82.
		I. A. Stavrovskaya	Minister of Food Ind., 1980-.
Mogilev Oblast' (n=19)	1	N.L. Snezhkova	Dep. Chair, Council of Ministers, 1968-85.
Gomel' Oblast' (n=23)	____		
Grodno Oblast' (n=23)	____		
Minsk Oblast' (n=23)	____		
MCIG and Clients (n=33)	5	T.T. Dmitrieva	Dep. Minister, Higher and Middle Spec. Ed. 1968-78.
		M.S. Kononova	Minister of Light Ind., 1972-75.
		M.S. Senokosova	Director, Minsk Worsted Factory, 1976-78.
		N.S. Nerad	Chair, BSSR Soc. for Friendship and Cultural Ties, 1982-.
		L.K. Sukhnat	Minister of Education, 1985-.
Brezhnev Clients:			
Brest Oblast' (n=12)	1	N.N. Mazai	Dep. Chair, Council of Ministers, 1985-.
Vitebsk Oblast' (n=29)	____		
Unknown Affiliation (n=56)	1	M.T. Dekhta	First Dep. Minister of Communic., 1976-82.

*"Elite positions" is here defined as those jobs in strata 1-4 of the hierarchy which is set out in Appendix A.

Table 16 Official Reprimands and Their Effects on Careers

Source and Type of Reprimand		Number	Infraction		Result			
			Poor Work	Corruption	Termination	Retention	LP*	Unknown
Narkontrol'	Ordinary	44	34	10	4	32	5	8
	Strict	12	10	2	1	7	2	4
Party Organs	Ordinary	22	22	——	7	9	1	6
	Strict	15	13	2	3	10	2	2
Government	Ordinary	6	5	1	2	4	2	——
	Strict	——	——	——	——	——	——	——
Totals		99	84	15	17	62	12	20

*"LP" refers to those cases in which an official, having retained his job after receiving a reprimand, was later promoted to a higher office.

NOTES

1. Jerry F. Hough discusses numerous instances of this in his The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). For an illustration of same in the Belorussian case, see Izvestiya's coverage (29 June, 1985) of the directives issued to the Primary Party Organization at the heavy truck-building firm, "BelavtoMAZ", by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

2. This observation echoes those made by: Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 147; Philip D. Stewart et al, "Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models", American Political Science Review Vol. 66 (Dec., 1972), p. 1272; John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas -- Recruitment of CPSU first and second Secretaries in the non-Russian republics of the USSR," Soviet Studies, Vol. 29 (Jan., 1977), p. 33.

3. On the nomenklatura system in general, see: Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 154-173; Gerd Meyer, "The Impact of the Political Structure on the Recruitment of the Political Elite in the USSR", in L. J. Cohen and J. P. Shapiro (eds.) Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 202-204; Joel C. Moses, "The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional and Elite Recruitment," Soviet Union, Vol. 8 (Pt. 1, 1981), pp. 62-102; Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984).

4. Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 114-115; Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 40-41.

5. For a examination of this phenomenon in a department of local soviets, see Michael E. Urban, "Technical Assistance and Political Control: A Research Note on the Organization-Instruction Department of Local Soviets," Comparative Politics, Vol. 17 (April, 1985), pp. 337-350.

6. Peter Solomon offers an excellent illustration of this point in the context of appointments to judicial and law enforcement bodies in his "Soviet Politicians and Criminal Prosecutions: The Logic of Party Intervention", Soviet Interview Project, Working Paper No. 33 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, March 1987) pp. 4-5.

7. The title of Mary McAuley's well-known and in many ways masterful article on this subject is perhaps itself an indication of the objectivist bias which has informed our approach to the problem. See her "The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee" Soviet Studies, Vol. 26 (Oct., 1974), pp. 473-501.

8. Ibid.; Stewart et al; Peter Frank, "Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (Pt. 2, 1974), pp. 217-230.

Less explicit rankings of mobility can be found in Miller; Joel C. Moses, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk," Soviet Union, Vol. 3 (Pt. 1, 1976), pp. 63-89; George W. Breslauer, "Provincial Party Leaders' Demand Articulation and the Nature of Center-Perifery Relations in the USSR," Slavic Review, Vol. 45 (Winter, 1986), pp. 650-672. Mark Beissinger, "Economic Performance and Career Prospects in the CPSU Party Apparatus" (paper presented at the Eighteenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, LA., Nov. 20-23, 1986).

9. The main source for these data is the daily, Sovetskaya Belorussiya over the period January, 1966 - June, 1986. I also relied on the monthly, Kommunist Belorussii (Jan., 1966-June, 1986), selected numbers of the daily, Zvyazda, and on listings which appeared (far less frequently, of course) in Sovety narodnykh deputatov (Jan., 1976-June, 1986) and Izvestiya (1983-1986). Some data were taken from Soviet personnel directories compiled by the CIA, from Val Ogareff's Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1971-1980 (Canberra: Dept. of Political Science, Australian National University, 1980), and from the short biographies in relevant editions of Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR.

10. J. W. Cleary, has used a similar matrix in his analysis of the Kazakh elite. See his "Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (July, 1974), pp. 323-344.

11. Kommunisticheskaya partiya Belorussii v. tsifrakh: 1918-1978 (Minsk: Belarus', 1978), pp. 212-214.

12. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 17-32, 244-260.

13. Michael E. Urban, "Conceptualizing Political Power in the USSR: Patterns of Binding and Bonding," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 18 (Winter, 1985), pp. 207-226.

14. John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU first and second secretaries in the non-Russian republics of the USR", Soviet Studies, Vol. 29 (Jan., 1977), pp. 3-36; idem,"Nomenklatura: A Check on Localism?", T. H. Rigby and B. Harasymiw (eds.) Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 15-61; Gyula Jozsa, "Political Seilschaften in the USSR",

ibid., pp. 139-173; Joel C. Moses, "The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional Recruitment", Soviet Union, Vol. 8 (pt. 1, 1981), pp. 62-102; idem, "Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change", Soviet Studies Vol. 37 (April, 1985), pp. 184-211; Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism Vol. 28 (Mar-Apr, 1979), pp. 29-42.

15. For a development of this point, see: John G. Kemeny, et al, Introduction to Finite Mathematics (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); Krishnan Namboodiri, Matrix Algebra: An Introduction (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984); D. J. Bartholomew, Stochastic Models for Social Processes (3rd ed.; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982).

16. These have been adopted from Harrison C. White's Chains of Opportunity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

17. White, pp. 308-310.

18. Ibid., p. 104.

19. W. J. Conover, Practical Nonparametric Statistics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 293-298.

20. Miller, "Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas"; J. W. Cleary, "Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (July, 1974), pp. 323-344.

21. P. U. Brovka et al, Belorusskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika (Minsk: Glavnaya redaktsiya Belorusskoi Sovetskoi entsiklopedii, 1978), p. 587.

22. I am indebted to Alexander Rahr for this observation on the leadership of delegations to congresses of the CPSU.

23. For the period 1966-1976, the predicted mode in the distribution of chain lengths is one (28.6 percent) while the observed mode is three (26.8 percent). For the 1977-1986 period, the predicted mode is, again, one (29.4 percent) and the observed mode is two (39.6 percent).

24. W. J. McGrath, "The Politics of Soviet Federalism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; Ottawa: Carleton University, 1981) pp. 107-187; Brovka et al, pp. 286-298.

25. T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," Slavic Review Vol. 37 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1-24; James H. Oliver "Turnover and Family Circles in Soviet Administration," Slavic Review, Vol. 32 (Sept., 1973), pp. 527-545; Joel C. Moses, Regional Party Leadership and Policy Making in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1974); idem, "Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change," Soviet Studies, Vol. 37 (April, 1985), pp. 184-211; idem, "The Impact of Nomenklatura in Soviet Regional Elite Recruitment", Soviet Union, Vol. 8 (Pt. 1, 1981), pp. 62-102; John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU first and second secretaries in the non-Russian republics of the USSR," Soviet Studies, Vol. 29 (Jan., 1977), pp. 3-36; idem, "The Communist Party: Trends and Problems", in A. Brown and M. Kaiser (eds.), Soviet Policy for the 1980s (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 1-34; idem, "Nomenklatura: Check on Localism?" in T. H. Rigby and B. Harasymiw (eds.), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 64-96.

26. For the early Soviet period, see T. H. Rigby, "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin," Soviet Studies, Vol. 33 (Jan., 1981), pp. 3-28; R. V. Daniels, "Evaluation of Leadership Selection in the Central Committee, 1917-

1927" in W. Pintner and R. Rowney (eds.), Russian Officialdom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 355-368.

For the contemporary period, see Joel C. Moses, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk," Soviet Union, Vol. 3 (Pt. 1, 1976), pp. 63-89; John P. Willerton, Jr., "Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era," Soviet Studies, Vol. 39 (April, 1987), pp. 175-204.

27. See J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Gabor Tamas Rittersporn, "Soviet Politics in the 1930s: Rehabilitating Society", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 19 (Summer, 1986), pp. 105-128; idem, "Stalin in 1938: Political Defeat Behind the Rhetorical Apotheosis", Telos, No. 46 (Winter, 1980-1981), pp. 6-42; idem, "The State Against Itself: Social Tension and Political Conflict in the USSR: 1936-1938", Telos, No. 41 (Fall, 1979), pp. 87-104; T. H. Rigby, "How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered", Problems of Communism, Vol. 29 (Mar.-Apr., 1980), pp. 57-63; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), passim.

28. Urban, "Conceptualizing Political Power in the USSR: Patterns of Binding and Bonding"; Robert Sharlet," Dissent and the Contra-System in the Soviet Union", in E. Hoffmann (ed.) The Soviet Union in the 1980s (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984, pp. 135-146; Graeme Gill, "The Single Party as an Agent of Development: Lessons from the Soviet Experience", World Politics, Vol. 39 (July, 1987), pp. 566-578; idem, "Personality Cult, Political Culture and Party Structure", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 17 (Summer, 1984), pp. 111-121; Jonathan R. Adelman, "The Early Development of the Soviet

Governmental Bureaucracy: Center, Localities and National Areas," International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 16 (No. 1, 1984), pp. 55-95; esp. pp. 69-78.

29. To the six oblasts of the BSSR was added a seventh region, Minsk City. The decision to treat Minsk City in this way follows from the importance of positions there as noted in previous chapters and from the fact that it is the only city in the BSSR which is administratively subordinate to the Republic rather than to the oblast' in which it is located. Classifying Minsk City in this way is also consonant with the standard practices of statistical reporting in Belorussia (e.g. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Belorusskoi SSR v 1982g. (Minsk: Belarus', 1983).

30. As of January 1, 1978, Gomel' Oblast' had the largest party membership (when the figure for Minsk City is deducted from Minsk Oblast') among the oblasts (92,985), while Minsk City as of July 1 of that year, had some 102,838 party members. These figures appear in Kommunisticheskaya partiya Belorussii v tsifrakh, 1918-1978, pp. 212-214.

31. We have used this technique, rather than simply adding together all of the scores for transitions to other regions, the BSSR and the USSR insofar as fewer calculations and, consequently, less influence of rounding error are involved.

32. In addition to biographical listings in Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR and obituaries in newspapers, I have relied on the memoirs of K. T. Mazurov (former Partisan commander and Belorussia's leading political figure in the postwar years), Nezabyvaemoe (Minsk: Belarus', 1984), and on an article by another prominent Partisan and BSSR politician, S. O. Pritytskii, "Kurgany

slavy i bessmertiya", Sovetskaya Belorussiya (July 26, 1967), in order to identify members of this clique.

33. We would add three cases to Minsk City's total if these individuals were included: N. N. Slyunkov who was First Secretary of the Minsk Gorkom (1972-1974) before becoming a Deputy Chair of Gosplan, USSR, and who returned to the BSSR as First Secretary of the KPB in January of 1983; A. A. Reut, Second Secretary of the Minsk Gorkom (1974-1975), who became First Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry, USSR (1975-1983) before returning to the BSSR to become Chair of Gosplan; and V. A. Lepeshkin, First Secretary of the Minsk Gorkom (1974-1976) who became Deputy Head of the CPSU's Department of Administrative Organs (1977-1983) and then returned to Belorussia as a secretary of the KPB.

34. T. H. Rigby describes a pattern in which regional or republic officials who are posted in Moscow endeavor to utilize contacts at the center for the purpose of staffing positions back home with their own supporters. Rigby, however, confines his remarks to the first secretaries of obkoms or republic party organizations. See his, "Khrushchev and the Rules of the Soviet Political Game", R. F. Miller and F. Feher (eds.), Khrushchev and the Communist World (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 39-81; esp., p. 40.

35. Within this study's time frame, the First Secretary of the KPB (N. N. Slyunkov), another KPB secretary (V. A. Lepeshkin), a deputy chair of the BSSR's Council of Ministers (V. I. Kritskii) and First Deputy Minister of Local Industry in the BSSR (A. I. Bulgak) began their early careers as skilled workers in the Minsk Tractor Factory whose administrative, party and trade union offices represented their entries into politics. According to the available data, the primary party organizations in Minsk factories were also launching grounds for careers which include the following offices: Chair of

the Council of Ministers of the BSSR, Second Secretary of the KPB, two ministers of the BSSR, the head of the Council of Ministers apparatus, two heads of departments of the KPB, head of a Republican trade union, and a deputy president of Minsk Gorispolkom. In addition to the Minsk Tractor Factory, four other industrial managers in Minsk found their way to ministerial positions in the BSSR, another to a deputy minister's job, and a sixth to the Chair of Gosplan, BSSR.

36. Moses, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR . . ."; Willerton, "Patronage Networks . . ."; Ronald J. Hill and Alexander Rahr (Revised title unknown at moment) in David Lane (ed.) Elites and Soviet Politics (London: Edward Elgar, forthcoming).

37. Amy W. Knight, "Pyotr Masherov and the Soviet Leadership: A Study in Kremlinology", Survey, Vol. 26 (Winter, 1982), pp. 151-168; esp. p. 157.

38. The low rate of internal recruitment to leading positions in Vitebsk may be one indication of such a struggle. Another might be the fact that a Partisan, S. M. Shabashov, replaced Aksenov as First Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom when the latter became Second Secretary of the KPB.

39. Brovikov's case is discussed in the text. What might be added is the early date at which he was coopted into the party leadership in Vitebsk. Brovikov's previous career was mainly as the editor of various local newspapers in Vitebsk Oblast' between 1955 and 1970. He also served as a raion party secretary in Vitebsk for some 3 years during this period. In 1970 he was named a secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom. L. S. Firisanov served as a secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom for some 10 years before being named a secretary of the KPB in 1978. Some four months before Aksenov was posted to the ambassadorial position in Poland, however, Firisanov suffered a demotion

to the position of Deputy Chair of the BSSR's Council of Ministers and the loss of his seat on the Buro of the KPB.

40. Aspects of this struggle are discussed in the studies by Knight and Willerton cited above.

41. Luigi Graziano, "A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Clientelistic Behavior", European Journal of Social Research, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 149-174.

42. For East Europe, see Zygmunt Bauman, "Comment on Eastern Europe", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 12 (Summer/Autumn, 1979), pp. 184-189; Jacek Tarkowski "Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy", in S. N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 173-188; "Symposium on Soviet Peasants", Telos, No. 68 (Summer, 1986), pp. 109-127.

43. For outlines of the conventional concept of patron-client relations, see Carl H. Lande, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (Mar., 1973), pp. 103-127; idem, "Introduction: The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism", in Steffen W. Schmidt et al (eds.) Friends, Followers and Factions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. xiii-xxxvii; Christopher Clapham, "Clientelism and the State", in his Private Patronage and Public Power (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 1-35.

44. Inter alia, Lande, "Networks and Groups . . ."; idem, "Introduction . . ."; James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (Mar., 1972), pp. 91-113.

45. Clapham, p. 19; Rene Lemarchand, "Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic", in S. N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (eds.),

Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 7-32; esp., pp. 9-16, 21.

46. T. H. Rigby, "Early Provincial Cliques . . .", p. 5

47. Inter alia, Yu. A. Rozenbaum, "Sistema raboty s kadrami v usloviyakh perestroiki", Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (Dec., 1986), pp. 11-20; M. Piskotin, "Strategiya upravleniya", Sovety narodnykh deputatov (Dec., 1986), pp. 10-16.

The subject of political patronage has also begun to appear in the Soviet press. For a straightforward and detailed account of a particular patronage mechanism operating in one locality, see G. Ni-Li, "Provintsial'naya istoriya", Izvestiya (Dec. 11, 1986).

48. This point is made by Clapham, p. 27.

49. Gyula Jozsa, "Political Seilschaften in the USSR", in Rigby and Harasymiw (eds.), pp. 139-172.

Clapham, p. 27, has suggested a similar conceptualization which he calls a "tail".

50. John P. Willerton, Jr., "Patronage Politics in the Soviet Union" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1985), pp. 69-70; idem, "Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era", Soviet Studies, Vol. 39 (Apr., 1987), pp. 175-204; esp., 177.

51. The individuals in question are V. S. Shevelukha who served as a Secretary of the KPB from 1974 to 1979, A. A. Smirnov, a member of Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk clique who was a KPB Secretary from 1968 to 1978, and T. Ya. Kiselev, who was Chair of the Belorussian Council of Ministers (1959-1978) before becoming Deputy Chair of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1978-1980) and the returning to the BSSR in 1980 as First Secretary of the KPB

(1980-82). Kiselev has been identified as a Brezhnev client by Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1984), p. 375; and by Baruch A. Hazan, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 58.

52. E. E. Sokolov's association with the Brezhnev network dates from his work in Kazakhstan as First Secretary of the Urlyutskii Raikom and, later, as Secretary of the Party Committee of the Zhelezinskii Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz Administration of the Kazakh SSR. A. N. Aksenov's ties to the Brezhnev faction and the MCIG's connections to the Andropov-Gorbachev group are discussed in Chapter Seven.

53. Jerry F. Hough, "Women and Women's Issues in Soviet Political Debates", in Dorothy Atkinson et al (eds.) Women in Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 356-357; Genia Browning, "Soviet Politics--Where Are the Women?" in Barbara Holland (ed.) Soviet Sisterhood (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 207-236.

54. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 200.

55. See, in particular, the following works by Nicholas Lampert: "Whistleblowers: Citizens Complaints in the USSR", in M. Clarke (ed.), Corruption (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 268-287; "Law and Order in the USSR: The Case of Economic and Official Crime", Soviet Studies, Vol. 36 (July, 1984), pp. 366-385; " ", Coexistence Vol. (full reference not available at time of writing).

See also, Constantine Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gyorgi Markus, Dictatorship Over Needs (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), passim.

56. Gregory Grossman, "Notes on the Illegal Private Economy and Corruption", in Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress; Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), pp. 834-854; esp., pp. 845-846.

57. "Indeterminate" here refers to those cases in which in the year following the reprimand, neither did the individual in question appear in the data sources nor did some other actor appear in the position which he held when the reprimand was issued.

58. Pravda (Dec. 12, 1969).