

FINAL REPORT TO
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: ISLAM AND IDEOLOGY:
IVAN'S POLITICAL AGENDA*

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COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 800-10

DATE: August 1989

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.

*IVAN is the acronym for the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

NOTE: This study's primary goal was to trace shifts in the published Soviet literature on the Near and Middle East. It has not attempted to trace institutional and personnel shifts in detail, which would be a story in itself.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Soviet Islamicists redirected the focus of their research in the late 1970s to ascertain the stability of the new Iranian regime and to weigh whether the Islamic revival could be used to Soviet advantage. With the development of widespread Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion, Soviet interest in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism became defensive as well, as policy-makers became concerned to disarm key elements of the resistance and prevent a "spill-over" of the Afghan war to the Soviet Union itself.

My project has been to explore the impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on Soviet scholarship on Islam as a social and political force in the Middle East. I focus on research done at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (IVAN) in Moscow, in five republic filials (Baku, Erevan, Tbilisi, Dushanbe and Tashkent) and in the Leningrad filial. IVAN SSSR has been the single most important institution in the Soviet Union for research on "foreign" Islam. Its reputation was enhanced by E. M. Primakov who served as IVAN director until November 1985, and whose influence is still felt at the institution.

In 1980 Primakov published an article on "Islam and the Processes of Social Development in the Countries of the Foreign East" which offered a new conceptual framework for the study of Muslim societies, and a blueprint for a potential foreign policy

strategy designed to take advantage of the political instability caused by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Primakov's article increased the scope of Soviet scholarship on the relationship between Islam and politics, but the new scholarship has rarely endorsed conclusions that are easily translatable into foreign policy strategies.

Primakov's article focused on events in Iran, and encouraged a debate on events in that country. Although Soviet scholars argued that the revolution in Iran would lead to the growth of "progressive" social forces, now few take this position. Nonetheless most see the Islamic government as stable, and as likely to survive Khomeini's death.*

Recent Soviet scholarship on Iran has been marked by a wider diversity of approaches and conclusions than previously, however; ultimately, Soviet scholars on Iran have proved unable to guide Soviet foreign policy-makers because of the indecision of Soviet policy-makers themselves. The official attitude toward the Khomeini regime has varied over time, as the Soviet leadership has vacillated in its judgment as to whether the Iranian revolution works to the advantage of the USSR.

In striking contrast to the divergence of opinion which is characteristic of the literature on Iran is the degree of similarity of editorial viewpoint of the recent literature on Afghanistan. The writings of Soviet Afghanists seem to have been ignored

*This manuscript was completed prior to Khomeini's death in June, 1989.

by Kremlin policy-makers in late 1979, because Soviet scholarship on Afghanistan contained little evidence to suggest that a communist takeover would enjoy widespread popular support. Once again, in retreat, scholarship seems to have had little influence on Soviet foreign policy-makers. Glasnost in academic circles in 1987 and 1988 did not extend to Soviet scholars criticizing the conduct of a war in either their classified or published writings, although they often referred to the political instability of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul in private sessions. The study of Afghanistani society seems likely to remain highly sensitive while the civil war continues there.

The study of Egypt has always been a central problem for Soviet Islamicists. As with scholarship concerned with the Islamic world more generally, Soviet writings about Egypt from the 1980s include a more systematic evaluation of the role of religion. For example, recent accounts of Sadat's last years have stressed that his loss of popularity was in large part caused by his mishandling of the Muslim Brethren and his unsuccessful attempt to coopt religious themes. Many recent articles explicitly discuss the rise in popular support for the Muslim Brethren and for other fundamentalist groups in Egypt and argue that their influence must be continued if a secular state is to prevail.

While Soviet scholarship about various nations of the Arab world has become more objective during the 1980s, published Soviet writings still are often more influenced by the goals of Soviet foreign policy than the internal realities of political develop-

ment of the country under consideration. Pressure has been greatest on those writing about Iraq and Syria. There have been few objective analyses of the internal political processes of these two Ba'th regimes. Scholarship on Iraq is generally more objective than that on Syria. While Gorbachev's political reforms present the possibility of these scholarly stereotypes breaking down over time, there has yet been no major refocusing of Soviet scholarship on the Arab world.

The report also explores the relationship between Soviet Orientalism and the U.S.S.R.'s own national problem. While Western scholars are interested in making explicit linkages, Soviet Orientalists publicly maintain that linkages cannot be made between Soviet writings on the Muslim world and Soviet attitudes toward and treatment of their own Muslim population. But inevitably these linkages do exist. Primakov implicitly recognized that non-Russian scholars have special talents which should be exploited. He paid special attention to upgrading the quality of scholarship in the republic branches of IVAN, particularly in those republics that border on the Middle East. Primakov's revitalization of the All-Union Association of Orientalists was also designed to better utilize the talents of scholars in the periphery.

In the IVAN filials in Muslim republics it has proved almost impossible to wholly separate the study of Islam abroad from that of local Islam. The same is not true in Moscow and Leningrad where there are virtually no formal connections between Soviet

scholars studying Islam abroad and those who do their research on Islam in the Soviet Union, although informal connections do exist. Most Orientalists I met believed that an Islamic revival was occurring in the Soviet Union but that Islamic fundamentalism did not pose a major threat to Soviet power. However they maintained that the Soviet Islamic revival was a fundamentally different process than what was going on in most places beyond the Soviet borders.

It is difficult to know what if any impact the scholarship of IVAN scholars has on Soviet policy-makers concerned with the Middle East. It was certainly Primakov's intention that an improved understanding of current conditions in the Middle East would lead to the maximization of Soviet strategic interests in the area. But the findings of IVAN's scholars would offer little to comfort those in Moscow who might wish to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the Middle East, as most Soviet Orientalists have been very pessimistic about the prospects of the short-term success of "progressive" forces in that region. However, although most Soviet scholars believe that fundamentalist groups will continue to strengthen their hold in a number of Arab nations and that they will serve as an increasingly effective oppositionary force in the Middle East as a whole, they counsel that this need not be detrimental to Soviet interests in the area, as these fundamentalists are almost always more anti-Western and anti-imperialist than they are anti-Soviet. The conclusions of these scholars would appear to favor the continuation of an

incremental approach to trying to slowly win friends in the region, and to find them among traditional rulers, radicals and Islamic fundamentalists alike.

While Primakov improved the quality of policy-relevant research by IVAN scholars, he came nowhere close to maximizing their contributions. There have only been marginal increases in the budget allocations to IVAN in the past decade, which means that few of the material problems of scholars, such as space problems or the shortage of foreign source materials, have been able to be addressed. Moreover there continue to be restrictions on free intellectual exchange, especially on printed scholarship. Soviet studies of the political and social impact of Islam are likely to become more comprehensive and even somewhat more objective in the next few years as glasnost' begins to have greater impact on academic life. However there is little to suggest that the predominating ideology-based models will be abandoned, the existing academic hierarchy dissolved, or the prohibition against Soviet Orientalists studying conditions within the Soviet Union annulled. Without all of these changes Soviet Orientalists will continue to provide only limited information for those concerned with making strategic assessments of political stability in the Middle East and virtually no useful information about the potential impact of world-wide currents in Islam on the Muslims of the Soviet Union.

INTRODUCTION

This report studies some of the responses to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Soviet academic community. Given both the rise of Islam as a social and political force in recent years, and its apparent anti-Western bias, it is not surprising that the increase in religiously inspired political activism in the Middle East and in the Muslim world more generally also led to increased interest in the relationship between Islam and politics in the Soviet Union. Like their American counterparts, Soviet scholars also failed to predict both the overthrow of the Shah and the subsequent course of the Iranian revolution.¹ But although events in Iran posed some challenges to prevailing Marxist-Leninist theories of development and to classic catechisms of the definitionally conservative role of religion in society, the rise of anti-American sentiment presented Soviet policy makers with the long withheld prospect of increasing their influence in this formerly pro-American nation, and of expanding the Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf more generally.

But the Islamic revolution in Iran increased political instability in the area as well. It was unclear whether or not the Islamic revival in Iran, and elsewhere, could be used to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. Thus, Soviet scholars were compelled to redirect the focus of their research in the late 1970s to ascertain the stability of the new Iranian regime and to weigh its

"progressive" nature. Moreover, with the development of widespread Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion and the continued occupation of that country, Soviet interest in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism became defensive as well. Some in Moscow believed that if they better understood the role of Islam they might be able ideologically to disarm key elements of the Afghan resistance, and prevent the spill-over of the Afghan war to other parts of the Muslim world or to the Soviet Union itself. They also prompted scholars to explore whether or not the "Islamic boom" (as they termed it) could possibly serve to increase waning Soviet influence in the Middle East. My project has been to explore the impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on Soviet scholarship of Islam as a social and political force in the Muslim world. I focus on research done at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (IVAN), both in Moscow, in the five republic filials of IVAN (in Baku, Erevan, Tbilisi, Dushanbe and Tashkent) as well as in the Leningrad filial. From the mid-1970s through to the present day this has been the single most important institution in the Soviet Union for research on Islam as found beyond the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. Its reputation was enhanced by Evgenyi M. Primakov who served as IVAN director until November 1985, and whose influence is still felt at the institution.²

Primakov, as well as the Islamicists in the institute that he directed, make an interesting subject for analysis. Primakov is himself a highly intelligent, articulate, and most of all am-

bitious academician-bureaucrat. A former journalist with experience living in the Middle East, Primakov was only in his mid-forties when he took over at IVAN. He was determined to give the institute a new image and so he dismissed many older status-bound scholars and promoted others who were younger and intellectually more adventuresome. This, Primakov hoped, would be sufficient to conduct policy-relevant research, which in turn would improve the relative standing of IVAN, to make it the equal in stature to the powerful foreign policy institutes of IMEMO (the Institute of World Economics and International Relations) and SShA (the Institute of USA and Canada).

Primakov sought to use events in the Middle East to propel his own career. He posited that an explanation of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism that was consistent with Marxist-Leninist theories of religion and economic development might allow the political destabilization that had accompanied the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to be used to strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East. While Primakov managed to impress his superiors enough to become director of IMEMO and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is not clear that the Soviet scholars working under his tutelage made the conceptual breakthroughs necessary to make events in the Muslim world either predictable or controllable, the preconditions of a successful Soviet activist strategy in the Middle East.

The purpose of this report is to describe the development of new analytic frameworks for the study of Islam and analyze their

conceptual utility, to study the functioning of IVAN and its filials, to look at the relationship between Soviet research on Islam in the Muslim world and the U.S.S.R.'s own "national problem", to study the relationship between Soviet scholars of Islam and the process of foreign policy formation, and finally to speculate on the types of impact that changes of Soviet understanding of the social and political roles of Islam might have on Soviet foreign policy makers in the future.

My research focuses on Soviet analyses of the role of Islam in the Middle East. It draws on published materials available in the West, some of which were gathered prior to the beginning of the grant period but, with the exception of some materials on the Iranian revolution published between 1978 and 1983³, lay unread on my shelves until the National Council grant gave me the time off to read them. It also draws on rarer materials gathered in four trips (January 1985, January 1986, January 1987, and December-January 1988-1989) to the U.S.S.R. The first two trips, in which I was received by IVAN SSSR (in Moscow and in Leningrad) and by the republic institutes of Azerbaidzhan and Tadzhikistan, were part of the IREX Academy of Science Exchange. The third trip was at the invitation of the Azerbaidzhani Academy of Sciences, an invitation extended to allow me to begin a collaborative research project on Islam and Nationalism in the Middle East with an Azerbaidzhani Islamicist. The fourth trip was as a result of an IREX grant to go to IVAN SSSR. This report draws in large part on interviews conducted during these four visits, and on impressions

gathered about how the Islamicists describe the process of developing new conceptual frameworks, and their perceptions of the influence of the Soviet scholarly community on policy making more generally.

SOVIET SCHOLARS AND THE STUDY OF ISLAM IN THE EARLY 1980S

In 1980 Primakov published an article on "Islam and the Processes of Social Development in the Countries of the Foreign East", in the journal Voprosy filosofii (Questions of Philosophy), which was designed to serve as a new conceptual framework for the study of Muslim societies, and a potential blueprint for a Soviet foreign policy strategy designed to take advantage of the political instability caused by Islamic fundamentalism to advance the position of the Soviet Union in the Muslim world more generally. Until the appearance of Primakov's article, Soviet scholars had to be careful in their discussions of religion. Religion could be credited with playing an important social and political role in a Muslim society, but Islam could not be described as the foundation of stable social movements. The teachings of the faith could be described in a dry, clinical fashion, but those who subscribed to them could not be considered useful members of society. This produced some real restrictions on the type of scholarship that serious students of the Muslim world could engage in. It encouraged those interested in contemporary events to limit their

focus to a particular individual or to a discrete set of events, while those interested in Islamic theology studied the distant past, leaving the study of current events to those individuals who were more interested in mirroring official policy pronouncements than in doing serious scholarship.

Primakov saw his "theoretical innovations" as expanding the limits of serious scholarship on the Muslim world; he redefined the social role of Islam as both negative and positive in a manner that was consistent with the premises of Marxist-Leninist teachings on religion and economic development but was more flexible than the prevailing scholarly orthodoxy about the conservative role of religion. He argued that in the Islamic societies the unique path of capitalist development had led to a dialectical relationship between religion and ideology. He explained the continuing importance of Islam as a legacy of colonialism, because Islam often played a role in the national liberation struggle. He also saw it as a product of economic development because capitalism was introduced in these societies late and only among small groups of the population. Thus Primakov was able to both claim consistency with orthodox Marxist-Leninist teachings and argue that Islam was a part of the cultural heritage of those who live in Muslim societies. Because of its cultural heritage Islam was an integral part of the national identity of most people living in the Muslim East, and Islamic teachings inevitably must have an impact on the economic and political life of these nations. Consequently, Primakov concluded, members of the Muslim proletar-

iat who live outside of the Soviet Union may preserve strong religious identities, while those living within the U.S.S.R. should have rejected those ties as part of their communist upbringing.

While Primakov argued that the Muslims of the Soviet Union were definitionally excluded from world-wide trends in Islam, he nonetheless counseled that Soviet scholars must not make categorical statements about the role of Islam in the world revolutionary process or in the process of political and economic development more generally. The relationship between religion and ideology varied from setting to setting, Primakov maintained, and depended upon the class background of the leaders of religious movements. Islamic movements were positive when they hastened the cause of the defeat of imperialism (as in the early stages of the Iranian revolution), but when Islam or Islamic slogans are directed against progressive forces (as in Afghanistan), the influence of religion must be combatted.⁴

Primakov's thesis provided policy-makers with an intellectual rationalization to use in explaining why under certain conditions they were now willing to embrace religiously inspired political movements. Thus his thesis soon became the rationale for Soviet foreign policy pronouncements about the Muslim world. In his address to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981 L. I. Brezhnev paraphrased Primakov's words when he referred to the "double-edged character of Islam". Brezhnev explained that the Soviet Union was happy to endorse Islamic revolutions when religion was used as a

vehicle for expressing anti-imperialist ideas, while Moscow would oppose, with force if necessary, the use of religion to thwart the world revolutionary process.⁵ Following the Twenty-sixth Party Congress numerous articles appeared in the press to advance the idea that under the proper conditions Islam could serve as a progressive force.⁶

However, the intellectual explanatory power of Primakov's thesis was limited. Primakov offered no major new theoretical insights into the relationship of religion and politics in the Muslim world. But he did provide a theoretical loophole that could be used to explain how religious movements, which varied from place to place, were not always negative. However, the relationship between Islam and politics was still to be judged through the prism of what was good for the advancement of Soviet interests, and thus it was necessary to discount the potential for Islam to play a political role within the Soviet Union itself.

Nonetheless, this thesis became the framework for analysis by many Soviet Orientalists and its elaboration was adopted as the major research agenda item in the five year plan of the department on "ideology in the countries of the East" of IVAN.⁷ This research agenda was designed to redirect the energies of IVAN's scholars from their narrow research objectives to the production of scholarship that was of direct relevance to policy-makers, scholarship that would use the systematic study of Islam to assess political stability in the region.

Primakov was optimistic that the scholars of his institute could do the desired policy-relevant research because he knew that the ideas he had expressed in his 1980 piece were not original ones. Primakov's "framework" (and the piece itself allegedly was staff-written) simply popularized the already widely held opinions of Soviet Islamicists. Prior to the publication of the 1980 Primakov piece, most leading Soviet Islamicists had long argued privately that Islam was a force to be reckoned with in all the countries of the Middle East; even the so-called secular "progressive" (i.e. pro-Soviet) socialist countries, like Algeria and Yemen, were still strongly influenced by their Islamic history and philosophic heritage.⁸ They were more cautious about offering these conclusions in print, although the development of the line of reasoning found in the Primakov article could be found in some Soviet scholarship on religion in the Middle East that was published in the late 1970s and early 1980.

The "round-table" on "Religion in the Countries of Asia and Africa", published in the January, 1980 issue of Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa), shows the diversity of opinion of Soviet scholars of Islam.⁹ In this article eleven distinguished Orientalists and Africanists described their perceptions of the relationship between religion and ideology in a number of nations.¹⁰ The views expressed in the article showed not only that Soviet scholars generally appreciated the complexity of the relationship between Islam and ideology, but that there were disagreements among them about the role of religion in the

process of political and social development. The main thesis for debate was set out by L. R. Polonskaia, head of the department of ideology in the countries of the East, one of the sectors in the division of general problems at IVAN, who argued that there are distinct relationships between Islam and ideology in traditionalist, modernist and revivalist Islamic movements. This thesis, which she had developed in several earlier works,¹¹ provided a theoretical justification for studying religious and intellectual history as separate from economic history, and for viewing the historical development of Muslim societies as distinct from the process of historical development in European societies.

Polonskaia's scholarship and her active supervision of the training of young scholars drawn from throughout the Soviet Union led to the development of a group of talented Islamicists in IVAN whose research serves as the foundation for current Soviet scholarship on Islam. Not all Polonskaia's proteges and colleagues accept her framework in its entirety. Many are troubled by the degree to which her writings implicitly reject the causal linkage of religion to economic development that is fundamental to Marxist theories of social development.

Some of these disagreements were aired in the 1980 round-table. B. S. Erasov of the sector on national movements, also of the division of general problems at IVAN, took issue with Polonskaia's thesis that there is a unique relationship between religion and ideology in Islamic societies. He also objected to traditional Soviet scholarship which analyzed events in the Muslim

world using the conceptual frameworks that were developed to explain historical processes in European societies. But to Erasov, the central explanatory factor was not the religious foundation of a society, but whether it was an old or a new state. He maintained that there are similar relationships between religion and ideology in Islamic and non-Islamic societies in Asia and Africa. His thesis, developed in his earlier works,¹² was that in newly independent nations religion can play a role in the process of forming or strengthening new ideologies and can influence the economic, state and cultural spheres. But unlike Polonskaia, Erasov argued that the impetus for ideological development does not come from religion but from other economic and structural factors.

Other colleagues offered less serious criticism of the Polonskaia position. A. I. Ionova drew on earlier research on Indonesia and south-east Asia more generally¹³ to argue that Polonskaia overgeneralized the relationship between religion and nationalism in Islamic societies. Ionova maintained that the integration of nationalism and religion in a given society was the product of a number of social and economic factors and thus varied greatly from case to case. She also stressed the importance of economic history.

A. V. Malashchenko, since 1988 Polonskaia's replacement as department head but at that time a very junior specialist on North Africa,¹⁴ agreed with Ionova that Polonskaia underestimated economic factors. He argued that religion is able to shape

ideology in general and nationalism in particular only in countries where there is a negligible working-class. But nonetheless he endorsed Polonskaia's framework as useful for those studying North Africa, because in all the countries in the region, with the possible exception of Algeria, the proletariat was a negligible social force.

In her final remarks to the round-table Polonskaia tried to respond to many of these criticisms and provide some working hypotheses for use by her fellow scholars in their research. She concluded that religion will serve as the basis of mass religio-political movements in Muslim societies when the majority of the society is still in a "pre-bourgeois" or "petty-bourgeois" phase, when religion has served as a rallying point or symbol of independence, or when religion is used to mediate between the contradictory goals of modernists and traditionalists in the creation of a mass-based ideology. These conclusions reaffirmed ideological orthodoxy, as Polonskaia argued that religion can only play a socially useful role prior to the widespread introduction of capitalism and industrial development. But Polonskaia also opened the door for scholarly innovations; she asserted that despite the presence of free-market economies in the Muslim world, capitalism was not firmly "rooted", and so religion could still be a dominant ideological and social force.

The conclusions of the 1980 round-table on religion, the earlier research of these eleven scholars, as well as the works of some of their fellow scholars,¹⁵ when combined with the ideologi-

cal flexibility now encouraged by Primakov's analysis of the social and political role of Islam, have provided the basis for an expansion of Soviet research on Islam and the role of religion in Muslim societies throughout the 1980s. For most Soviet scholars who specialize on Muslim countries (those working on Afghanistan being a conspicuous exception) this has meant greater intellectual freedom and the possibility of publishing ideas that previously could only be discussed and not printed.

In the past decade the number of books and articles relating to the role of religion in the Middle East has increased dramatically in number and improved significantly in objectivity. Many of the new works are based on varied source materials, and offer sophisticated analyses. However, the improvement of scholarship was a gradual one. Most of the books published in the early part of 1981 do not differ markedly in content from those published in the period immediately prior to the publication of Primakov's article. This was to be expected as there is almost always a lag of between one to two years between the completion of a Soviet scholarly monograph or collection and its publication in final form.

The most important work of the period is the third volume of Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost' (The Foreign East and the Present). It was written in large part by scholars in Polonskaia's department and offers an elaboration of the positions expressed in the 1980 round-table article. This volume was published in a large printing, and is still the authoritative work

on the topic of the relationship between religion and ideology even though it offers little theoretical innovation. The announced second edition of this three volume collection on political and intellectual developments in the "Foreign East", reported to have been dramatically revised and updated, was originally announced to appear in 1985, but has yet to emerge from the press of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, as its conclusions are said to be very controversial.¹⁶

Primakov continued trying to prod Soviet Orientalists to explore the larger questions of policies and society in the Muslim world. He restated his thesis on the potentially progressive quality of Islam in two separate versions in 1982.¹⁷ Shortly thereafter several books were published which gave evidence of a more objective examination of religion in the Muslim world in general and in the Middle East in particular than was common previously. These included some synthetic general studies designed to aid in the development of an overall Soviet foreign policy strategy for the Muslim world.

From late 1982 through 1984, a number of major studies on the relationship between Islam and politics were published. Volumes prepared by authors' collectives remained conservative or at least cautious in approach. The volume Natsionalizm v sovremennoi Afriki (Nationalism in Contemporary Africa) was probably the most ambitious of these volumes. It focused on the process of nation building in both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. But while it set the broadening of the framework of analysis as the goal of

the work, the volume was only partially successful in setting out new research agendas. Although the group of authors responsible for the volume did a very good job of surveying the literature, they offered few new insights of their own, and the treatment of the subject of nationalism in general and the relationship between Islam and nationalism simply summarized the already published statements of a large number of authors and did not try to draw any general conclusions from them.¹⁸ The authors shied away from predicting the likely course of political events in the near future, but rather emphasized the difficulty in predicting events. However, Soviet scholars found this volume useful because of its encyclopedic nature, as it was one of a small number of research tools designed to demonstrate to scholars the broadening range of opinions that were now considered acceptable on topics of Islam and politics, as well as to demonstrate to them which opinions were now in vogue.¹⁹

Several senior scholars sought to use the opportunity presented by Primakov's call for innovation to expand upon their earlier efforts to develop analytic frameworks for the study of the evolution of Islamic ideology. Noteworthy was the article on Muslim revivalism by M. T. Stepaniants, head of the department of Eastern Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. This article, a report on work in progress, offered a reexamination of her earlier analysis of the evolution of Islamic philosophy from medieval times through the early 1970s.²⁰ Although her periodization of Islamic history was

similar to Polonskaia's in the 1980 round-table, Stepaniants' distinguished traditional Islamic movements from movements of renewal and fundamentalist revival movements based on the ideological reflections of their differing economic goals. An economic criterion must be used, she maintained, to decide which contemporary Islamic revivalist movements were "regressive" and which were progressive. The former category included movements that are inclusionary in membership and whose goal was to benefit the interests of a narrow social class; the latter group, which included the Libyan Islamic republic, contained movements whose goals were to serve the interests of a broader public.²¹ Stepaniants, of course, listed as progressive all those movements already receiving Soviet aid, but she did offer a rudimentary criterion that went beyond that of Primakov for choosing Islamic "friends" to assist over Islamic "enemies".

The most systematic effort at explaining the current revival of Islam published in these years was the book Vostok: idei i ideologii (The East: Ideas and Ideologies), written by L. R. Polonskaia and A. Kh. Vafa. In it the authors expand upon Polonskaia's earlier writings to defend the primacy of Islam in determining the pattern of historical development in the Muslim world. While they reject the contention that Islamic teachings can provide a third path of development between capitalism and socialism as contrary to "objective social and economic laws", they maintain that Islam can work in conjunction with progressive economic forces. Moreover, they argue that Islam is the most

potent ideological force in the Muslim world. They argue that it will remain the dominant ideological force and the only basis of stable social organization for the 1980s and into the near future, as Islam is an effective basis of synthesizing traditional values with the goals of modernization. But they assert that there is no single relationship between religious ideology and economic development; varying, and sometimes contradictory, interpretations of Islam have become the foundation of most developmental schemas in the Muslim world. Polonskaia and Vafa are pessimistic that "genuinely" progressive movements, those based on Soviet-style socialist premises, will emerge as stable political forces in the Muslim world. They feel that the socialists must align with religious activists in order to achieve any success. They write that there are few real socialists in Muslim countries; most socialist movements in the Muslim world are "Islamic socialist" movements, movements which idealize religion and the pre-colonial past more generally, and so cannot be considered to be genuine socialist movements both on social and on economic criteria.²² Polonskaia's and Vafa's conclusions support the contention that the Soviet Union was likely to develop few genuinely sympathetic allies in the Muslim world in the near future, although alliances of convenience could be developed if Moscow was willing to deal with religious activists.

Primakov's goal in "freeing" Soviet scholars to explore the complexities of Islam was to lead to a universally applicable criterion by which Islamic revivalist movements could be judged

deserving or not of Soviet assistance. Those writing in the early 1980s failed to provide this. They used their increased ideological flexibility in discussing social affairs in the Muslim world to lay the foundations for more objective future studies on the role of religion and to document the complexity of the relationship between Islam and politics. But by doing so, they made it even more difficult than previously for Soviet policy-makers to conceive of formulaic responses to events in the Muslim world or grand strategies to "unleash" the anti-Americanism implicit in the Islamic revival.

But Primakov was determined to make his institute's research on the Muslim world more policy relevant. Thus he decided that still more traditional restrictions on the investigation of religion would have to be lifted. To this end he advanced a new research agenda in a 1985 article published in Voprosy filosofii. In this article he attempted to update his earlier thesis to account for the events of the mid-1980s better, because he complained that scholars were not improving their methodology rapidly enough to keep pace with events in the Middle East. The 1985 article elaborated his thesis that the ideology of a particular Islamic movement was influenced by the social background of those who were proposing religion as an answer to social and economic ills.

Thus, he argued, religion has played both conservative and reactionary roles in Muslim societies, depending upon the history of development of capitalism and the ideology of the bourgeoisie

and the middle economic strata of a particular society. Islam may become the ideology of the large industrialists and upper strata of the bourgeoisie, in which case it becomes a weapon for their trying to maintain power. It may be used by the petty bourgeoisie (the bazaar class) to justify a call for a policy of economic liberalism, or it may become a weapon in the hands of a radical segment of the bourgeoisie who use it to try to defend programs of economic redistribution and social justice. Primakov then offered a class-based argument to explain how the Islamic revolution in Iran went from a positive to a negative force; it did so when Islam became the weapon of the conservative bourgeoisie rather than the radical bourgeoisie. Primakov expressed no surprise that this occurred; ultimately, in his opinion, the alliance between religious and progressive forces must be a temporary one. But despite the variation in the ideological content of Islamic movements in different countries and even within countries, Primakov admitted that Islam was showing all the signs of becoming a "world" movement, as both Sunni and Shiite Muslims were making gains in influencing their co-religionists to strive for an Islamic society and an Islamic economic order. However, Primakov reminded his readers, only an internationalist consciousness can be enduring, and while Islam may serve as the foundation of a social or political movement it is not a stable category for individual self-identity. But although Primakov argued that Islam is unstable across a historical epoch, he recognized Islamic consciousness as a critical element in the self-identity of Muslims

today. Primakov criticized the one-dimensional quality of Soviet research on religion, and in these criticisms, he highlighted the primary weakness of Soviet scholarship of the Middle East in general and post-revolutionary Iran in particular.²³ In conclusion Primakov exhorted Soviet scholars to make a more thorough study of the appeal of religion, rather than simply chronicle the evolution of Islamic movements.

Primakov's writings have certainly helped to diversify the research agenda of IVAN's scholars. But the application of Primakov's thesis alone could not reinvigorate Soviet studies of the Islamic world. Soviet scholars of Islam looked for new theoretical approaches to apply in their work. A few looked directly to Western scholarship, but most only applied foreign scholarship that was "sanctioned" by interpretation by Soviet scholars.

One of the most influential "bridging" figures in this regard has been N. A. Simoniia, head of IVAN's division of general problems until late 1988 when he moved to IMEMO to head a similar department²⁴. Simoniia has set for himself the goal of creating a new theory of development in the third world, a theory which would allow Soviet scholars to explain the discontinuities in development observed by Western analysts in a way that is consistent with the social theories of Marxism-Leninism. Simoniia has tried to reintroduce an examination of the impact of social and political structure into the study of economic development, because he defines economic development as a process which must integrate

traditional social structures and economic forms with contemporary needs.²⁵

Simoniia's theories have been useful tools for those Orientalists who are studying the social and political implications of Islamic ideology. Scholars of Islam have also been able to incorporate the findings of Soviet scholars of nationalism, including especially the writings of B. S. Erasov and V. G. Khorus.²⁶ Khorus, who previously worked under Erasov at IVAN, moved over to join Primakov at IMEMO in 1987, to head a new sector on nationalism. Khorus's work has been an important source of introducing Soviet Orientalists to the literature on social psychology as it relates to political behavior.²⁷ Erasov's major theoretical innovation has been to analyze religion as a cultural system, a system in which the differences between "great" and "small" (doctrinal and mass faith) religions were termed more important than the differences among the religious traditions themselves. His research has certainly stimulated the thinking of Soviet scholars of Islam, but many reject his contention that Islam does not pose unique dilemmas for students of religion. Another scholar whose research has been important for some Orientalists, especially those working with Islamic societies of South and South-east Asia, is A. A. Prauzaukas, of the department of ideology of IVAN SSSR. His research has focused on the problems of nation-building in multi-ethnic societies, and his concern has been to integrate Western thinking on the topic with Soviet conceptual models.²⁸

Another important intellectual spur to Soviet scholars on contemporary Islam, is their access to the greatly expanded research on the early and medieval periods of Islamic history. Much of this research is being done at IVAN in Leningrad, where two former students of L. R. Polonskaia, M. B. Piotrovskii and S. M. Prozorov, have gathered a number of distinguished junior colleagues²⁹ to work on the social and political bases of Islamic society in the pre-modern period. The goal of this scholarly collective is that such research will lead to a more complete understanding of contemporary conditions in the Muslim world.

One early work of this group was the 1981 volume Islam v istorii narodov Vostoka (Islam in the History of Peoples of the East), which attempted to integrate the study of classical Islam with a concern for current conditions.³⁰ This volume drew on the talents of the medievalists and scholars of classical Islam to combine their research on Muhammad, and on classical and Medieval Islamic writings, with research on the contemporary social and political role of Islam. The essays in the volume demonstrated how problems of state building had always preoccupied Muslim thinkers. Previously Soviet scholars were reluctant to argue a similarity between contemporary political and social problems and the concerns of the classical age of Islam because capitalist and post-colonial economic developments were to have reshaped the course of intellectual development.³¹ In the mid-1980s several additional articles and monographs by this collective have been published.³² Finally in late 1988 they published a volume

Sotsial'no-politicheskie predstavleniia v Islame (Social and Political Ideas in Islam) which uses the writings of scholars of classical Islam and contemporary politics in the Muslim world, to demonstrate how successfully direct linkages with the past can help explain current political behavior.³³

But the work of the Piotrovskii's collective remains controversial. They assume that the study of Islamic philosophy can help political analysts predict political behavior of Muslims, thereby down-grading the role of economic factors in explaining social behavior. Although some reworking of prior assumptions has been permitted, scholarship on the Islamic philosophy has only been publishable if it is not in sharp contradiction to previously established scholarly interpretations. Thus, as recently as February 1989, it was reported to me that the Piotrovskii collective's long-completed one volume encyclopedia of Islam was still shelved at the publisher with no date fixed for publication because of its reputedly controversial interpretation of selected events in Islamic history.

Less controversial research has been easier to publish. As was noted above, a great deal of research on medieval Islam is also being done by M. T. Stepaniants, as well as by E. A. Frolova and G. R. Shaimukhambetova, scholars who work with her at the Institute of Philosophy. All three women are particularly concerned with the study of medieval philosophy, most importantly Sufism and the pre-modern reformist tradition, as a means of better understanding contemporary Islamic philosophy.³⁴ But

although these scholars of philosophy have close contacts with the IVAN scholars (there is a tie-line to IVAN in Stepaniants's office and she and her colleagues participate in the activities of the all-union Association of Orientalists), the Institute of Philosophy is wholly separate from IVAN and has traditionally had very different institutional goals. Consequently, in 1985, when interest in Islam was quite high, Stepaniants and her colleagues were assigned to begin a fifteen year rewrite of the Encyclopedia of Ancient Philosophy, leaving them to work on Islamic themes only "outside" of the plan. Whether this will change under the new leadership of the Institute of Philosophy remains to be seen.

Other prominent Islamicists also work on problems of topical interest only in their spare time. A. V. Sagadeev, a specialist on medieval Islam in general and sufism in particular, works at INION gathering information on current Western literature on Islam, and has written a biography of Ibn Sina and nearly a dozen articles on Islamic philosophy all in his spare time.³⁵

This new research by scholars in related fields has further increased the potential scope of Soviet scholarship on the relationship between Islam and politics in the contemporary world. But the loosening up of ideological strictures on scholarship has not always led to research which endorses conclusions potentially to Primakov's liking, that is, conclusions that are easily translatable in clear cut foreign policy strategies.

Take for example the research of L. R. Polonskaia. In recent years Polonskaia's writings have continued to stress that there

are two different ideological trends in Islam, one traditionalist and the other reformist. In her opinion the reformists have reconciled themselves to modernization while the traditionalists have not. Polonskaia terms those that seek the accommodation of religious values with the course of secularization to be "modernists"; those who believe that the development of a secular society must be selectively pursued or even rejected when its goals conflict with religious values she considers "traditionalists". Polonskaia argues that the current Islamic fundamentalists are "revivalists", but she considers them to be an off-shoot of the "traditionalists".

Polonskaia tries to use a class analysis to explain the constituency of each religious category. She argues that traditionalists are from the semi-feudal strata, the modernists are from the bourgeoisie, and the revivalists are from the petty bourgeoisie (thus they consequently can support either a radical or a conservative ideology).³⁶ One can reject her argument about the class basis of Islamic social movements and still find it easy to accept her conclusions that Islamic fundamentalists are more likely to move toward a rejection of modernization than they are toward embracing its values. Although Polonskaia views the threat to the process of secularization posed by the Islamic fundamentalists as a temporary product of the uneven economic and social development that these Muslim societies have experienced, she is nonetheless uncomfortable attempting to predict when the current stage of developments will be reversed, and so avoids offering

bleak conclusions in her work. However, in conversation she offers very pessimistic conclusions about the future of "progressive" forces in the Muslim world.

Equally pessimistic were the highly divergent conclusions reached in a round-table on Islam and the search for a "third path" of development which appeared in the January 1987 issue of Aziia i Afrika segodnia (Asia and Africa Today). Seven Orientalists participated in the discussion (L. R. Polonskaia, Z. I. Levin, R. Ia. Aliev, A. M. Vasil'ev, A. I. Ionova, M. T. Stepaniants and A. K. Lukoianov). Although its title focused on the "third path" of development, in fact the debate itself was far more wide-ranging, touching on the causes for and viability of the Islamic model of state, society and economy.

While all who contributed their ideas of course criticized Islamic socialism as an imperfect non-Marxist imitation of socialism, the authors varied as to their evaluation of the causes and hence the likely duration of Islamic models of development. Lukoianov, Vasiliev and to a slightly lesser extent Ionova, all emphasized that the argument in favor of an Islamic path to development was based on a fallacious understanding of economic laws. They argued that the crisis of economic development in the Muslim world was sufficiently severe to cause the disaffected strata to seek new answers to their problems. But, because of the incomplete pattern of capitalist development in these countries, many Muslims sought these answers in religion and not in socialism. The assumption that these authors made was that when these

religiously inspired efforts at economic development inevitably failed to have their desired effect (and this failure need not be a rapid one), then more progressive solutions would be sought.

Stepaniants, Polonskaia and Aliev disagreed.³⁷ Stepaniants and Polonskaia explained that the development of support for the idea of an Islamic economy and of an Islamic concept of state was a stage of national development. Polonskaia defined it as an effort to create a capitalist model of development which would not include political dependency upon a capitalist power. Hence, in her opinion, the Muslim nations have tried to use Islamic institutions and the advocacy of Muslim values and cultural ideals as a way to promote their own uniqueness and to loosen the hold not just of Western culture but of Western economic interests as well. Aliev went even further. He argued that this "Islamicization" of society is an inevitable stage that Muslim societies confront after independence as they face the problems of economic development, and that they must pass through to become mature societies. Moreover, he claimed, this stage need not be short-lived, particularly if the Islamic countries do as Algeria has done and link Islam to a set of progressive economic and social ideals. In Aliev's opinion, Islam will appear to most Muslims as a "natural" form of government as long as it is being used to justify a relatively equitable and steady pace of development.³⁸

Thus we see that the mainstream of Soviet Orientalists believes and is willing to argue in print that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has permanently transformed the course of political

development in the Muslim world. However, they have been unwilling to challenge the principal assumptions of Marxist theories of development. They write of religion as a form of false consciousness, or a temporary blind which conceals from the religiously inspired activist his own deeper secular goals. They continue to argue that ultimately the masses and popularly minded politicians will begin to identify with "internationalist" or "progressive" ideologies, ideologies which are not time-bound or linked to membership in a distinct social group, as opposed to the eternal and universalistic ideology of Islam, where the reward structure is not geared to objective social categories but to the subjective performance of individual confessants striving to achieve the purity of their souls. But these arguments are usually unconvincing, as they often are in contradiction to the data presented in the text of articles as to the current vitality of religion.

Soviet policy-makers are sent in conflicting directions by their scholars of the Islamic revival. The conclusions of these scholars assert that the Islamic revival is a temporary obstacle in the Muslim world's slow but inevitable movement toward creating "progressive" societies. Yet there is nothing in their analyses to endorse this conclusion. Moreover, there is a great deal of disagreement about the causes of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its probable duration, and the foreign-policy recommendations of the scholars would vary with their differing perceptions of events in the Middle East. Thus, Primakov has not succeeded in getting his scholars to produce a blueprint for use

by Soviet foreign-policy strategists. However, as we see below, the introduction of a new analytic framework for examining developments in the Muslim world has helped improve the objectivity and raise the quality of scholarship on many of the countries and sub-regions involved.

SOVIET ORIENTALISTS AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION³⁹

One of the central problems which confronted Soviet Islamicists in the early 1980s was to explain the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the causes of both its continued survival and its influence abroad. Soviet scholars of Iran tried to do this by applying the new analytic writings on Islam to the specific conditions that were being encountered in Iran.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran led Soviet scholars to reevaluate completely their assumptions about the relationship between religion and politics in that country. There were several factors which prompted this reevaluation. Probably most important was the pressure on scholars from foreign policy-makers for assistance in understanding the changed internal political situation in Iran in order to assess the impact of the Iranian revolution on Soviet strategic interests in the area. Primakov's call for the development of new conceptual frameworks for the study of Islam was meant to apply directly to those who study Iran. His "theory" certainly allowed scholars of Iran greater

intellectual freedom to explore political developments within that country. This opportunity to apply new frameworks of analysis was particularly welcome as many scholars were genuinely perplexed over the turn of events in Iran and wanted to reexamine their previous assumptions.⁴⁰

Using the "hindsight" provided by the loosening of ideological strictures, Soviet Iranian scholars concluded that the Shah's downfall was linked to his underestimation of the potentially political role of the Shiite clergy and his failure to manipulate religio-cultural symbols successfully to enlist mass support. Despite his best efforts, Mohammad-Reza Shah had failed to wrest control of religious symbolism from the medressehs and clerical establishment and had been unable to wed it to the Pahlavi dynasty and Iranian throne. But the use of these frameworks led to contradictory explanations as to the causes of the revolution as well as to its future direction, and Soviet scholarship on post-revolutionary Iran gave Soviet foreign policy-makers no clear direction as to how to proceed.

The Islamic revolution in Iran was perceived by most Soviet scholars as a theoretically interesting yet extremely disturbing event. Most Soviet Iranian scholars have lived in or at least travelled to Iran, and most have a deep appreciation of Iranian culture. Thus, many were seriously disturbed to see seemingly stable secular cultural institutions crumble, and friends and acquaintances arrested, killed, or driven into exile. But the theoretical challenges posed by the Iranian revolution were often

more difficult to work through than the sense of personal grief. Here was a bourgeois society that had undergone a popularly supported anti-Western revolution to end up introducing a fundamentalist religious regime which seemed nonetheless to be economically progressive. Soviet scholars could and did study Khomeini and his policies, but his revolution also demanded that they query whether the Islamic faith could ever manifest progressive features, and if so under what social and political conditions.

The timing of the Iranian revolution had been a surprise to both Soviet academics and policy-makers. The eventual overthrow of the Iranian monarchy by a popularly supported revolution was a logical consequence according to Soviet theories of development. But Soviet analysts wrote that while the demise of a pro-American monarchy was to be expected in some indefinite future, it was not yet foreshadowed by events in Iran.⁴¹ Moreover the course of the revolution was disturbing. Secular progressive forces played virtually no role in the overthrow of the Shah. The revolution was made by a fundamentalist religious leadership, that united "progressive" and "conservative" religious forces. This leadership was vehemently opposed to the leading role played by American business and military interests in the Iranian economy and committed to an egalitarian strategy of economic development. Whereas Khomeini and his Islamic Revolutionary Council were clearly determined to institute a regime that advocated and enforced policies that were predicated on a rather narrow inter-

pretation of Shiite religious doctrines, they were also strongly committed to running the economy and equally importantly the foreign policy of Iran according to policies similar to those that had earned secular rulers in other developing societies the title "progressive" and had gained these secular rulers the right to receive massive amounts of Soviet economic and military aid.

Soviet Iranian experts were able to bring a strong factual base to the study of the Iranian revolution--a nearly century-old legacy of the study of Iran by distinguished Russian and then Soviet scholars.⁴² However, despite the Soviet scholars strong factual background from which to study Iran, prior to the Iranian Revolution Soviet scholarship on Iran was virtually uniform in its assessment of religion as a conservative force which served as an important legitimator of the bourgeois nationalistic regime of the Shah.

This was the position of E. A. Doroshenko, a member of the Iranian sector of IVAN, author of the widely used 1975 study Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane (Shiite Clergy in Contemporary Iran). She saw the divisions among the Iranian clerics as of little importance. She wrote that while the clerics of Qum, led at the time of her writing by Ayatollah Mortaza Motahhari, were philosophically distinct from those clerics that were grouped around the Shah, both groups were insensitive to the "moral superiority of the socialist East", which they saw as no better than the "morally corrupt West".⁴³ While Doroshenko wrote of generational differences between the students and faculty of

the medressehs in Qum, she failed to credit these differences as being of political significance, and so did not appreciate the revolutionary potential of the Qum group and the support it enjoyed among the younger generation of Iranians.⁴⁴

It was not until the very eve of the Iranian Revolution that Soviet scholars were able to identify Khomeini as a dominant religious figure for Iranians. Until that time most Soviet scholars shared the view of V. B. Kliashtorina, a specialist on contemporary Iranian culture at IVAN SSSR, that Iran had no single religious leader, but had a number of competing religious leaders and religious philosophies.⁴⁵ Kliashtorina disregarded the writings of Khomeini, and focused her research on S. Hossein Nasr, a Sufi writer who was closely associated with the Shah and the Pahlavi family.

In general, until the very eve of the 1979 revolution, Soviet scholars continued to focus their work on the Shah and his entourage. They wrote that the regime was under stress and studied the responses of the "victims" of the Shah's unjust economic policies, farmers with small holdings, small-scale merchants, unemployed educated youth and the politically disenfranchised national minorities, groups which they accurately perceived as unable to topple the Shah.

After the Iranian revolution, when prevailing academic norms changed, so too did the focus of Soviet scholarship on Iran, and dozens of articles and books quickly appeared that analyzed the influences of religion in previously unacceptable terms, but which

offered oftentimes contradictory explanations of the socio-political role of Islam in Iran. To this day there remain some fundamental disagreements among Soviet scholars as to how to evaluate the role of religion in causing the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Some, such as the influential scholar-adviser R. A. Ul'ianovskii, argue that religion served as the organizational basis of the revolution, but that the Iranian population supported Ayatollah Khomeini because of their opposition to those in power and their support for populist goals of mass control rather than because of a desire to bring about an Islamic fundamentalist regime.⁴⁶ The implicit assumption of the Ul'ianovskii position was that popular support for the Khomeini government would begin to dissolve as the masses became aware of the anti-populist assumptions of his regime. It was difficult for Ul'ianovskii, a long-time proponent of the idea that the Third World is a battleground between progressive and reactionary forces, to imagine that a religious elite could play a progressive role, and this was the counsel that he shared with those in the International Department of the Central Committee who are reported to have often sought his advice.

Most Soviet scholars do not share Ul'ianovskii's conclusions, although they often lack his contacts to make Soviet policy-makers aware of their views. Critics of his position include a number of professional students of Islam in Iran, such as E. A. Doroshenko, S. M. Aliev, and S. L. Agaev (both Azerbaidzhanis, Aliev of the Iranian sector at IVAN and Agaev of the Institute of the Inter-

national Workers Movement in Moscow).⁴⁷ These scholars have strongly endorsed the proposition that the revolution in Iran was clerically inspired, a product of Shiite dogma and of the unusually prominent position in the Iranian social structure that clergy occupied as a result of Iran's uneven economic development.⁴⁸ They maintained that the revolution was Islamic both in form and in content; Khomeini and his followers were heirs to the tradition of Shiite reformism which now took the form of a commitment to an egalitarian strategy of development, a so-called "third path" of development that neither parted entirely from capitalism nor fully embraced socialism, but advocated "Islam is all".⁴⁹ This made Khomeini anti-imperialist, but not pro-communist. The authors criticized Khomeini's economic strategy as incoherent and not really novel, a form of capitalism with some egalitarian features, but they nonetheless believed his policies to be "progressive" and by implication worthy of support by the Soviet Union.

While Soviet scholars and policy-makers were trying to decide whether or not Khomeini was "progressive" and a potential friend of the USSR, in late 1982 and 1983 Khomeini was showing his lack of sympathy toward socialist aims by persecuting members of the Tudeh party, and even "progressive" elements of the Islamic leadership. Thus, although Khomeini's "progressive" economic policy was still in place, many Soviet academics who had previously praised the progressive qualities of Khomeini began to depict him as having an irrational side alongside his rational one, and

to claim that despite his commitment to social and economic redistribution Khomeini was representative of the conservative qualities of Islam.⁵⁰

It was also clear that Khomeini and his Islamic revolution would survive with or without Soviet support, and Soviet scholars became more and more concerned with understanding the lessons of his Islamic revolution not only for Iranian politics but for regional politics more generally. By mid-1984 Khomeini had defeated virtually all his rivals for control among the Islamic leadership and was proceeding to set himself up as an independent force in world affairs as the guardian of Islamic revivalism. As the Iran-Iraq war dragged on, and Khomeini's interest in destabilizing regional politics increased, Soviet policy-makers became more wary of dealing with him and so official Soviet criticism of his actions mounted.

S. M. Aliev and E. A. Doroshenko remained quite balanced in their writings of this period. They offered criticisms of Khomeini's anti-Soviet policies, but held out the hope that control of the Iranian revolution could be returned to the progressives. They argued that Khomeini was only one of many Iranian religious leaders, and his assumption of a monopoly of jurisprudential decision-making was by self-declaration, subject to dispute by rival ayatollahs whose will might be reasserted and whose politics might be more in keeping with Soviet interests in the area. Thus the implication of the writings of most Soviet analysts on Iran was that the preservation of the Islamic Revolution was to the

advantage of the U.S.S.R., this even with the ongoing war in Afghanistan.⁵¹

Someone like S. L. Agaev, who considers himself a journalist as well as a scholar and so tries to write for a broader audience, was sensitive to the nuancing which required that Muslim rulers who were antagonistic to the Soviet Union or Soviet interests be depicted as conservative or reactionary. There is a real cause and effect quality to Agaev's interpretation of the Iranian revolution; Khomeini had attacked the Soviet ideology and so whatever seemingly progressive actions he took were merely masks for his repressive character. Agaev's 1984 article on the nature of the Islamic revolution continues to assert the thesis that the Iranian revolution was religiously inspired, with some important new caveats. The Iranian revolution is said to have had three distinct "faces", which conform to its three phases. The religious leadership is described as having had a liberal bourgeois phase as it took power, followed by a progressive revolutionary phase which derived from the popular nature of its support, and then a bourgeois counter-revolutionary phase which began with the overthrow of Bani-Sadr and Gubzadeh and was a result of the reactionary nature of Khomeini's own brand of religious theology.⁵²

The Islamic leadership, in Agaev's opinion, had played a positive role in promoting the February revolution because they were responding to a popular desire for society to develop progressively. However, he argued, the egalitarian goals that the

revolutionaries had originally sponsored were undermined by Islam's conservative nature; they were compromised by the pattern of institutionalization of authority employed by the clerics, a pattern that replicated in part the structure of authority under the Shah. Agaev's article offers useful insights into the analytic limitations that are implicit even in the "new" Soviet frameworks for studying Islam. Islam was at best an unstable force; the thread of Islamic doctrine which was supportive of policies of social and economic redistribution always risked being undermined by the conservative nature of the religious hierarchy. Thus religion could be a catalyst for social change, but Islamic reformers were unlikely to execute progressive policies successfully. Agaev concluded that although the Iranian revolution had been a religiously inspired response to the conditions of class struggle, it would not lead to a diminution of that struggle, and so the forces of social progress should conspire to speed its inevitable end.⁵³

Since the mid-1980s scholars interested in keeping their research within the main currents of Soviet Islamic research have had to become more cautious in their discussion of the Khomeini phenomenon. Soviet policy makers have decided that at best the Islamic revolution can be a useful "third force" in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, but that Khomeini's regime will never be a direct advocate of Soviet interests. This realization has created a number of practical problems for those scholars who have had to explain why religion has been able to remain both a stable and

powerful force in Khomeini's Iran, even after what they consider his failure to provide a successful program for comprehensive economic redistribution.

Aghev's recent scholarship is again a good example of the sorts of concerns that have dominated recent Soviet literature on Iran. In his writings he has emphasized the two dominant themes of this scholarship in recent years, the role of religion in Iran, and the ahistoric and unstable quality of Khomeini's Islamic model of development. Aghev's most recent book, Iran: rozhdenie respublik (Iran: The Birth of a Republic), offers the single most comprehensive examination of the role of the clerics and their use of Islamic symbolism and ideology in the making of the Iranian revolution to date. This volume is a book-length expansion of notes he kept while living in Iran as a journalist in the period just before and after Khomeini's revolution. The book provides a clear account of the nearly universal and virtually always successful use of religious symbolism to attain political goals in Iran, its detailed descriptions reflecting Aghev's own background (an Azerbaidzhani of Muslim extraction) and his training as an Islamicist.⁵⁴ However, Aghev contends that the reactionary aspects of Khomeini's rule will ultimately wholly overshadow the progressive ones, and he likens the ayatollah to a modern-day Robespierre.⁵⁵

The rewritten second edition of E. A. Doroshenko's study provides another detailed account of the role of the clergy in contemporary Iran. Doroshenko adds a great deal of new primary

source material to her earlier volume. Her work is more scholarly than Agaev's, but it is also more mechanistic, as it lacks the depth provided by long-time residence in the country. Nonetheless the book goes a long way to remedying some of the defects of the first edition. In the second edition Doroshenko carefully delineates the different philosophical positions of the leading clerics before, during and after the revolution. She describes the gradual radicalization of religion and the process by which Islam became firmly entrenched in the various institutions of state in Iran. But she sidesteps the issue of the long-term stability of the Islamic revolution by concluding the book without offering a prognosis as to the future course of political developments in Iran.⁵⁶

A very interesting but much briefer account of the role of religion in Iran and its function in the formation of contemporary Iranian culture appeared in Narody Azii i Afriki, in 1985. The thesis of this article, written by B. V. KliashTORina, was that while the secularization process was irreversible world-wide, nonetheless "cultural nationalism" (which inevitably included religion as a defining characteristic) will play increasing cultural, social and political roles in Islamic societies like Iran. KliashTORina argued that the fusion between religion and culture was an almost inevitable one in many third world countries, because nationalists often believed that the economic and political instability of their societies was caused by the inability to work out the tensions between their historical past

and the goals of the modern period. Moreover, these nationalists believed that stability could only be attained if they could find a basis of creating a sense of historical continuity. She saw the increased influence of Islam in Iran as a part of this process and as a logical response to a concurrent rise in anti-Western sentiments.⁵⁷

But unlike many Soviet scholars KliashTORINA does not predict that this increased anti-Westernism will lead to the advancement of socialist or pro-Soviet sentiments. Moreover, it seems safe to infer from her silence on the topic, that she believes that Soviet influence is unlikely to grow of its own accord in societies like Iran. This conclusion is further supported by the ideas about the culturally determined roots of politics in Third World societies which she developed in recent conversations with me. KliashTORINA's rather unconventional conclusions about contemporary Iranian politics have caused her work to be considered peripheral by many leading Soviet scholars of Iran.

While it is now possible for Soviet scholars to argue unconventional positions on questions of culture and political development in print, those writing about economic development have had to sustain more conventional Marxist-Leninist interpretations about the relationship of economics to politics. To the degree that one can see evidence of an "official" Soviet position it is not in the treatment of religion, which is far more objective and all-encompassing than previously, but in the critical discussions of Iran's effort to find a "third" path or "Islamic"

model of development. Thus those Soviet authors that have written on Iranian economic development have been far more critical of the policies of the Khomeini regime than their colleagues who write about social issues.

While a consistent proponent of the Islamic basis of the Iranian revolution, S. M. Aliev has taken great pains to "demonstrate" the regressive economic policy of the Khomeini regime. In his recent book-length study of the impact of oil on the social and political development of Iran, he concluded with a chapter designed to demonstrate that the same monopolistic controls which manipulated the oil economy under the Shah have reappeared, tied to the new rulers.⁵⁸

Some scholars have focused directly on Khomeini's philosophy of economic reform, to show how it diverges from a progressive philosophy of economic development. One such effort is an article written by a young protege of L. R. Polonskaia, A. K. Lukoianov (of IVAN SSSR), who used a close textological argument to conclude that Khomeini's economic program was an outgrowth of traditional Shiite theology and bore nothing in common with socialist thought.⁵⁹

A longer and more significant piece is a two-part article which appeared in Aziia i Afrika segodnia in 1986, written by A. Z. Arabadzhian, an economist of Armenian extraction, who works in the Iranian section of IVAN. Arabadzhian, a senior Iranianist whose works include two volumes on the Iranian economy,⁶⁰ had earlier argued both in print and in a personal interview that the

Iranian revolution occurred because the petty-bourgeoisie had lost faith in the Shah. He claimed that while the petty bourgeoisie supported and were supported by the Islamic government, the Khomeini regime would be stable and popular interests would be served (although not to the extent that they would be under a more progressive or socialist government). Arabadzhian's conclusions in the 1986 articles, written after his first trip to Iran since 1981, were far harsher than those he expressed to me nearly two years previously. He concluded the passage of five years had shown that the revolution in Iran had done nothing to curtail the rule of capitalism in Iran, and moreover the popular masses had gained little from the revolution. The reason, he argued, was that the clerics in charge had adapted their religious arguments to continue to defend the interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus, he concluded, the Muslim clergy have perverted the force of a popular anti-imperialist revolution and transformed it into something which served their own corporatist and class interests, demonstrating again that the capitalist basis of society cannot be transformed without shifting the basis of power to the working class.⁶¹

But while condemning the false start of the Iranian revolution, Arabadzhian did not predict that the hold of capitalism will lessen in Iran in the foreseeable future, and thus the implication of Arabadzhian's research is that the anti-Americanism of Khomeini's policies is unlikely to be accompanied by increased support for either the Soviet Union or its goals.

Arabadzhan's conclusions are mirrored in the works of many other Soviet scholars. Although five years ago many scholars expressed the belief that the revolution in Iran would lead to the growth of "progressive" social forces, now few take this position. But serious Soviet scholars of Iran also see the Islamic government in Teheran as stable, and as likely to survive Khomeini's death. Given the course of foreign policy followed by Khomeini and his persecution of "progressive" forces at home, it would be impolitic of Soviet scholars to offer positive judgements of the Iranian revolution.

But while the Soviet scholars share a common hostility towards Khomeini and the policies that he has introduced in Iran, they disagree sharply over the reasons for the stability of the regime that he has introduced and as to what it means for the future course of Iranian political development and politics within the Muslim world more generally. Much of the academic debate has been a relatively private one, confined to the corridors of academic institutions and the proceedings of closed conferences. However, in late 1987 the prestigious scholarly journal Narody Azii i Afriki opened the dispute to a wider academic reading public with the publication of V. I. Maksimenko's "Analiz iranskoi revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg. v sovetskoi vostokovednoi literature" ("The Analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 in Soviet Orientalist Literature").⁶² This article, and the subsequent rejoinder by S. L. Agaev,⁶³ made clear that even nearly a decade

after the event, Soviet scholars had reached few shared conclusions as to its cause, its course, or its future.

Taken as a whole, Soviet scholarship on Iran in recent years has been marked by a wider diversity of approaches and conclusions than was true of the period preceding the Iranian revolution. Most of the authors whose scholarship was published in Moscow displayed a level of conceptual sophistication about religion and a knowledge of both Persian language and Western language materials. Few, however, have travelled to Iran since the revolution, although many have recently requested permission to do so as part of the reestablished Iranian-Soviet academic exchange. It is safe to assume that once permitted access to the field, Soviet scholars will be able to offer more informed insights about the institutionalization and stability of the Islamic revolution, but the basic disagreements that divide the Soviet scholarly community are unlikely to disappear.

For Soviet policy-makers trying to use Soviet scholarship on Iran as a basis to inform subsequent policies, these differences of opinion pose real dilemmas. If, as someone like Ul'ianovskii writes, religion has manipulated the revolutionary consciences of the Iranian masses, then the stability of the Iranian revolution should prove to be relatively short-lived, and Khomeini's successors should have difficulty remaining in power indefinitely. Similarly, Khomeini's support for Islamic fundamentalists in other countries should be able to be countered by strong support of

progressive forces in these societies. If, however, Agaev is correct, and popular support for Khomeini was achieved because of his religiously inspired agenda, then his successors should continue to be able to sustain an Islamic regime in Iran, and to propagate this message successfully abroad as well.

The difference between the Ul'ianovskii and Agaev positions reflects a basic tension which all Soviet scholars on Iran must confront. Ultimately, Soviet scholars on Iran have proved unable to guide Soviet foreign policy-makers because of the indecision of the policy-makers themselves. The official attitude toward the Khomeini regime has varied over time, as the Soviet leadership has vacillated in its judgment as to whether the Iranian revolution works to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. Ul'ianovskii's thesis enjoys virtually no credibility among serious Soviet scholars on Iran, but it has remained a topic for serious scholarly debate, precisely because Soviet scholars have not yet abandoned their commitment to advocate the ultimate inevitability of revolutionary regimes taking power in the Third World.

Given the influence that Ul'ianovskii and his proteges enjoy, and the fact that their intellectual position has long been institutionalized in the very life of the institute by the existence of whole departments which study "revolutionary processes" in the Third world, proponents of Agaev's position within IVAN must be sensitive to the potential for destabilizing Soviet academic life that their conclusions imply. Certainly Agaev himself has been cautious about advancing his conclusions to their

logical ends, so much so that in a recent article on the influence of the Iran's Islamic Revolution on Islamic activism and terrorism more generally his analysis offered no conclusions and depended almost entirely upon Western sources, whose judgments of political events he could ultimately disavow.⁶⁴ But while such caution may help advance a Soviet career, it does not encourage an informed debate over foreign policy options.

Gorbachev's foreign policy statements of the past eighteen months suggest that he is moving away from a continued commitment to the idea that revolutionary forces will be ascendant in the Third World. For only if the Soviets fully disavow their commitment to champion the cause of such "progressive revolutions" will their scholars be able to explore fully and freely the depth of public support for the Islamic regime in Iran as well as its influence abroad.

SOVIET ORIENTALISTS AND THE AFGHAN WAR

In striking contrast to the divergence of opinion which is characteristic of the literature on Iran is the degree of similarity of editorial viewpoint of the recent literature on Afghanistan. Moreover, throughout the course of the Afghanistan war, Soviet Afghanists showed a marked reluctance to meet and converse with foreigners.

In fact, it was only during my third trip to IVAN SSSR, that I was able to meet the institute's leading Afghanist, V. G. Korgun. Korgun had declined to meet me in 1985 and had been in Kabul during my visit to Moscow in 1986. In January 1987, however, we met and talked extensively and freely. Korgun's depth of knowledge of the history and current politics of Afghanistan was impressive. He has lived in Kabul for long periods of time, both before the Soviet invasion and afterward, and by both his own accounts and the accounts of his colleagues he is able to pass as a native speaker of Pashtun. A serious scholar, Korgun has tried to confine the bulk of his recent writings to problems of Afghani nationalism in the period preceding the April 1978 revolution.

His first book, published in 1979, dealt with the 1920s and 1930s, the founding period of the modern Afghani nation.⁶⁵ His second, published in 1983, is a history of intellectual life in Afghanistan from the 1930s through 1978. This second volume, without explicitly asserting this as an aim, clearly showed the roots of the current religious opposition in Afghanistan and demonstrated the connections between the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and the influence of foreign fundamentalist groups. Korgun also conformed to current editorial expectations by explaining that there are two Islamic leaderships in Afghanistan, the leadership which opposes Soviet rule, and the democratic leadership which supports it.⁶⁶ But in this book as well as in a 1986 article on Islam and nationalism in Afghanistan, he describes popular support for both Islamic leadership groups.⁶⁷

Both in his writings and in his conversation Korgun deliberately makes it difficult to assess where his own personal sympathies lie. Although he offers no criticism of Soviet policies in Afghanistan, he does not seem to feel the need to be a defender of them either. As was true of most of the Soviet scholars of Iran that I met, he too seems to feel a deep sympathy for the plight of the people that he has devoted his career to studying, but in 1987 it would certainly have been unwise of him to speculate on the ideal Afghan political future with a foreign acquaintance.

During the years of the Afghanistan war most Soviet scholars of Afghanistan, lacking both Korgun's unusually high level of expertise and the consequently privileged access he enjoyed to Primakov (for whom, it is rumored, Korgun prepared policy-relevant analyses), were far more cautious in their scholarship, restricting themselves to studies of the pre-1978 period⁶⁸ or to panegyrics about the virtues that have accompanied Soviet occupation in Afghanistan⁶⁹.

While very little serious scholarship about Afghanistan was published during the decade-long Soviet military engagement in that country, Soviet scholars in Moscow⁷⁰ were given unprecedented opportunities to travel to that country, either on komandirovkas or as temporarily reassigned experts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other Soviet technical missions in the country.⁷¹

It is hard to know what influence the private advice of scholars or the "official use only" scholarship which more

objectively examined internal conditions in Afghanistan might have had on Soviet decision-making about the war. But given that Soviet scholarship on Afghanistan contained little evidence to suggest that a communist takeover would enjoy widespread popular support, it is likely that this literature was of little interest to the Kremlin policy-makers who decided to invade Afghanistan in late 1979.

Once again, when the Army was sent into retreat, scholarship seems to have had little influence on Soviet foreign policy-makers. While scholars certainly had interesting insights to offer in private sessions with policy-makers, glasnost' in academic circles in 1987 and 1988 did not extend to allowing Soviet scholars to criticize the conduct of a war in either their classified or their published writings. The political instability of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was well-known. The Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan seems to have been based on a new assessment of long-term political and military costs of continuing to use force to try and prop up this politically unstable regime rather than on new appraisals of the internal political situation in Afghanistan.

It is also unlikely that Soviet academics will be called upon to play any sort of significant role in the assessment of Soviet policy options in Afghanistan in the immediate future. The study of Afghanistani society will remain highly sensitive while that country is still in the midst of a civil war designed to overthrow a pro-Soviet regime. As the goal of the Afghanistani opposition

is to introduce an Islamic government, any sort of objective analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in Afghanistan is precluded for the present, since Soviet scholars must continue to attack the Islamic resistance as a force of political destabilization.⁷² However, when political conditions stabilize and scholars working on Afghanistan are permitted greater objectivity in their conclusions, there is a trained core group of scholars with extensive field experience in Afghanistan who will be able to take the lead in providing an objective analysis of internal political conditions in Afghanistan.

SOVIET RECONSIDERATIONS OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS

The study of Egypt has always been a central problem for Soviet Islamicists, from the establishment of Soviet oriental studies through to the present.⁷³ Given the Soviet Union's over thirty-year long effort to increase their influence in Egypt, it is not surprising that the volume of material written about Egypt has been great. This scholarship has been wide-ranging and includes the sorts of histories of the development of nationalism that are necessary for the analysis of the relationship between ideology and religion in contemporary Egypt.⁷⁴

In addition, the quality of Soviet scholarship on Egypt in general, and on the relationship between religion and ideology in Egypt in particular, is higher than it is for many other Middle

Eastern countries. Egyptian source materials, back to the early decades of the century, are relatively more abundant in Soviet libraries than those for other Arab countries. Furthermore, the fact that large numbers of Soviets were sent to Egypt in official capacities from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s, meant that many scholars were able to live there as journalists, translators or analysts, instead of merely travel there on one and two month komandirovkas. Many who were sent to Egypt came from the non-Russian republics and so, although most first-rate Soviet scholarship on Egypt is written and published in Moscow or Leningrad, there are a number of comprehensive works on Egypt that have been written by scholars in the republics and published by the republic Academy of Science presses.⁷⁵

The focus of Soviet scholarship on Egypt has traditionally been influenced by the goals of Soviet foreign policy-makers. While Nasser was alive scholarship on Egypt was stimulated by the concern of Soviet policy-makers first to establish and then to maintain influence in the country.⁷⁶ Subsequent scholarship focused on why Egypt turned from its "progressive path" and whether or not Soviet influence could be reasserted.⁷⁷ The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world provided the impetus for a new reevaluation of events in Egypt, one which focused on the religious opposition to Sadat and Mubarak, and whether or not these forces could directly or indirectly be used to advance the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union further and undermine U.S. interests in the region.

As with scholarship concerned with the Islamic world more generally, Soviet writings about Egypt from the 1980s include a more systematic evaluation of the role of religion. For example, recent accounts of Sadat's last years have stressed that his loss of popularity was in large part caused by his mishandling of the Muslim Brethren and his unsuccessful attempt to coopt religious themes.⁷⁸ Many recent articles explicitly discuss the rise in popular support for the Muslim Brethren and for other fundamentalist groups in Egypt.⁷⁹

The prevailing scholarly opinion on Egypt in the early 1980s was heavily influenced by the works of Z. I. Levin, a senior Egyptian specialist and Arabist and colleague of L. R. Polonskaia in the section on ideology, who published two influential articles on the Islamic roots of Arab nationalism in these years. Levin, more successfully than many Soviet scholars,⁸⁰ has used research on Egypt to form a basis for making more general conclusions about the process of ideology formation in the Arab world more generally. His first piece written after Primakov's 1980 article appeared in 1982, in Natsional'nyi vopros v stranakh Vostoka (The National Question in the Countries of the East); the second was published in the 1983 volume Zarubezhnyi Vostok: Religioznye traditsii i sovremennost' (The Foreign East: Religious Tradition and the Present). In both these articles he expanded upon his earlier thesis, that religion was central to the Arab conception of nation for Arab socialists as well as Arab nationalists. However, Levin now stated without reservation that Islam was so

closely intertwined with the Arab concept of nationhood that it was difficult for him to conceive of a viable wholly secular articulation of the Arab nation that might potentially succeed in any of the Arab countries in the foreseeable future.⁸¹ Many of these ideas were further developed in Levin's monograph on the development of Arab social thought in the post World War II period, Razvitie arabskoi obshchestvennoi mysli (The Development of Arab Social Thought), which appeared in 1984.

This volume, which focused on Egypt, described Arab social thought as having had four distinct phases during the post-war years. Levin distinguished the ideological currents of anti-colonialism which developed before 1952, from the ideologies of independence which developed between 1952 and 1967, from the radical ideas of Arab unity which developed from 1967 through 1978, from the Islamic-based nationalism which developed after 1979. While religion had an impact on Arab thought throughout the period, he claimed that its importance increased over time. Levin argued that during the last period the impact of religion on ideology became the strongest, at the very time when many Arab nations including Egypt and Lebanon were developing working classes of some sizeable proportion. Thus, he concluded that the fusion of religion with ideology in the Arab world will be a long-lasting one, and that those who seek to introduce genuine Marxist solutions to the problems of economic and political development in the Arab world will fail to gain popular support.⁸²

Levin's ideas have not changed over time.⁸³ His new manuscript, on nationalism in the contemporary Arab world, has just appeared.⁸⁴ The thesis of this volume, which is an attempt to explain the impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on mainstream Arab political thought, appeared in more abridged form in a 1985 article. In this article Levin argued that the relationship between Islam and Arab political ideology was strengthened with the development of Islamic socialism in the 1950s and 1960s, but that Islam and politics have grown even more closely intertwined in the 1970s and 1980s. Today no Arab politician can pretend to represent the popular masses and not admit to protecting the interests of Islam as well.⁸⁵ To Levin, the critical question is who defines what the "interests of Islam" are said to be; if this is done by secularly based politicians, political stability and quasi-"progressive" politics can result. The current state of Arab politics is far from ideal, he maintained, but it need not be inconsistent with the advancement of "progressive" ideas in the Muslim world.

Levin's writings have influenced those writing on political developments in the Muslim world more generally. L. R. Polonskaia is swayed in part by the power of Levin's analysis, yet she finds some of his conclusions to be somewhat idealistic. In a number of personal interviews she stated that Islam will continue to be the single most important ideological force in the Middle East in the immediate future. She thus strongly implied that the days of the Islamic progressives, of whom the Ba'th socialists in Syria and

Iraq may be seen as representative, are likely to be numbered. This conclusion is far more pessimistic than Levin's, particularly from the viewpoint of Soviet interests in the area, and it also goes considerably beyond what Polonskaia had been willing to argue in print through 1988. Yet at the same time it is a consistent elaboration of her published position on the course of ideological development in the Muslim world.

While Levin's analyses would offer little optimism to Soviet foreign policy-makers as to the likelihood of a pro-Soviet socialist regime developing in Egypt, his writings do not address the question of whether the increased influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt might work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Several others have taken up this question more directly. The volume Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Islam in the Countries of the Near and Middle East) contains a number of first rate articles of potential use to Soviet policy-makers, employing the close examination of primary source materials to analyze the relationship of Islam to contemporary politics.⁸⁶ One of the most interesting articles in the volume is an analysis of the activities of the Muslim Brethren, written by T. P. Miloslavskaja, who works in the sector on Arab countries (in the department of regional studies) in IVAN SSSR. This article uses primary source materials to analyze the evolution of the content of the Muslim Brethren's theological justification of the concept of statehood, from the inception of the movement to the present. In it she argues that the fortunes of the Muslim Brethren over

time were not the product of their ideology, which remained fairly constant; they were a product of the Brethren leadership's attitudes toward the Egyptian rulers of the day, and the consequent treatment these attitudes earned them.⁸⁷ The ideology of the movement, she maintains, is such that the movement can play either a progressive or a conservative role in Egyptian society. According to Miloslavskaja, both in the period of English domination of Egypt and in the present period of persecution of the movement by Sadat (who was still alive at the time that the article was written), the movement was able to play a progressive role in Egyptian society, because it opposed leaders whose policies were contrary to the best interests of the Egyptian population.

The potential implication of Miloslavskaja's premises for Soviet policy-makers is clear. The Muslim Brethren through their opposition to the current or future Egyptian political establishment could play a positive role in destabilizing an anti-Soviet regime in that country, and so support (overt or covert) of their cause might be in the interest of the U.S.S.R. But some scholars who share Miloslavskaja's belief in the potentially destabilizing quality of the Muslim Brethren, warn that the commitment to terror is intrinsic to the movement, and thus the Brethren could turn on any outside force that seeks to control it.⁸⁸

Other scholars disagree with Miloslavskaja's general assessment of the Muslim Brethren, as well as the policy recommendations that can be drawn from her analyses. One of the main points at

issue is Miloslavskaja's contention that the ideology of the Muslim Brethren is not definitionally reactionary. The article "Pod flagom islama" ("Under the Flag of Islam") by A. A. Akhmedov, of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, directly contradicts this thesis and argues that the Muslim Brethren have always played a very conservative role in Egyptian society and in Muslim politics more generally. Moreover, Akhmedov argues, the leaders of the Muslim Brethren seek directly to undermine Soviet interests in the Muslim world, basing his conclusions on the writings of several prominent Muslim Brethren thinkers, including Muhammad Qutb. Akhmedov accuses these people of falsifying the official Soviet position on religion, a position which he maintains was far more flexible than most Islamic writers credited it as being.⁸⁹ Akhmedov's writings, which appeared in Argumenty, a serial publication designed for party activists, anti-religious propagandists and ideologists alike, imply that the more traditional position of the Party, that religiously inspired political movements were unstable and generally anti-Soviet, was an accurate judgment of the Muslim Brethren, and that support of the movement should be withheld from them.

While Akhmedov and Miloslavskaja differ in their evaluation of the potential impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt on the potential reception of the Soviet Union in that country, both would underscore the necessity of placing the role of Islam at the center of any consideration of politics in Egypt. While there are still a number of prominent scholars⁹⁰ who prefer

to downplay the role of religion in contemporary Egyptian politics in favor of more traditional Soviet socio-economic approaches, this position became less and less popular among distinguished Soviet Orientalists throughout the 1980s.

Analysts like Levin, Miloslavskaja and Akhmedov have assimilated the lessons learned from the overthrow of the Shah and from the popular support for the consolidation of the Islamic revolution in Iran. However, the freeing up of scholarly debate about the role of religion in Egyptian political life has not led to the development of easy or even reassuring answers with regard to the future of Soviet-Egyptian relations. In large part this is because the Soviet scholars have found it difficult to chart the future course of Egyptian politics with any assurance. They admit that continuing deterioration of the economic situation in Egypt has helped stimulate the religious revival but has done little to encourage the development of pro-Soviet or even independent left-wing forces. Moreover they recognize that the Mubarak government has managed to remain in power while increasing the role of Western investment and the private sector more generally and pursuing a policy of "cold peace" with Israel.

These are strategies which according to a traditional Marxist-Leninist analysis, should increase political destabilization and stimulate the development of "progressive" forces in society, but have not had the predicted effect. Thus, many Soviet analysts have been forced to conclude that the current political climate in Egypt is affected more by internal political processes

than by world revolutionary forces, with the implicit or even explicit conclusion that there is little that the Soviets can overtly or even covertly do to affect developments.

SCHOLARSHIP ON THE ARAB WORLD

Soviet scholarship on the Arab world has often been influenced by the role that the nation in question plays in the international system. While scholarship on the region has generally become more objective during the 1980s, published Soviet writings still are often more influenced by the goals of Soviet foreign policy than the internal realities of political development of the country under consideration. Regimes that are pro-Soviet or clients of the Soviet Union are often portrayed as more stable than they are in fact, while the potential for internal political instability of America's allies is discussed at length. Changes of regime in the Middle East, which bring the prospect of a foreign policy realignment, have always provided an opportunity for new scholarly interpretations to be developed, but assessments have traditionally been linked to the likely success of future Soviet inroads in that country. While Gorbachev's political reforms present the possibility of these scholarly stereotypes breaking down over time, there has as yet been no major refocusing of Soviet scholarship on the Arab world.

For the past twenty years Soviet policy-makers and scholars alike have tried to differentiate the actions of progressive Arab regimes like those in Ba'th ruled Syria and Iraq, or socialist Algeria and South Yemen from the conduct of moderate Arab states and traditional Arab monarchies. They have tried to depict the "progressive" regimes of the Middle East as both popular and stable. Pressure has been greatest with regard to the strategically located countries of Iraq and Syria. Thus, it has been difficult for scholars to provide objective analyses of the internal political processes of these two Ba'th regimes. Scholarship on Iraq is generally more objective than that on Syria, as the latter nation's strong support for Soviet foreign policy initiatives virtually precludes public reference to the potential instability of Asad's rule, or the oftentimes harsh measures that he has taken to stay in power.

The rise of Islam as a political force in the "progressive" regimes of the Arab world is a disturbing phenomenon for Soviet scholars for a number of reasons. First it has helped demonstrate the seemingly inherent instability of secular or quasi-secular "progressive" ideologies in the Arab world, the point which Levin has underscored in his work. But the responses of the various Arab "progressive" regimes have also been troubling. The leaders of these various states have been forced both to increase the "Islamic" component in their official ideology and to crack down on Islamic fundamentalists, actions which seem to strain further the credibility and viability of these regimes. But Soviet

scholars have been unwilling or unable to make these points in print. They will argue the inherent instability of Ba'th rule in Syria and Iraq in personal conversations or in "service-use only", documents, but in published sources they downplay the role of religion in the official ideology of their Arab allies. While scholars will now write about the political impact of religion in Algeria and in Yemen,⁹¹ they are generally more circumspect when considering its potentially destabilizing influence in Syria or even in Iraq.

A good example of the hesitations of Soviet scholars with regard to discussing religion in Syria and Iraq is the newly published Khalify bez khalifata (Caliphs without the Caliphate) by A. A. Ignatenko, a study on the rise of Islamic fundamentalist organizations that was published in late 1988. This book is the first in-depth Soviet survey of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Arab countries. While Ignatenko's three page conclusion claims that Islamic fundamentalism is supported by a small percentage of the Arab population and thus is a potentially containable force, his argument in the remaining two hundred pages of the book seems in contradiction with this brief conclusion. The text describes over one hundred Islamic fundamentalist groups active throughout the Arab world, details their genesis, provides background on their membership and current political activities. Ignatenko generally paints a picture of secular rulers besieged by a growing fundamentalist opposition. But despite the fact that Ignatenko identifies over a dozen Islamic groups as active in Syria and Iraq

in the appendix of the book, the section on the role of Islamic fundamentalism in these two countries is only a dozen pages long, and is subtitled "Fifth Column".⁹² As the subtitle intimates, the author describes the activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups in both countries in very negative terms. The description of their activities in Syria is particularly terse, just a few pages long, and Islamic fundamentalists are described as having no legitimate complaints with Asad's rule. The role of religious opposition in Iraq is explored at somewhat greater length, and Saddam Hussein is portrayed (not particularly to his credit) as someone who has been willing to try to usurp parts of the program of fundamentalist groups in order to strengthen his own rule.

It has been especially difficult for Soviet scholars to write about Iraq for the past decade. Whereas, given Soviet ties to Asad, the situation in Syria must be presented in oversimplified black-and-white terms which stress the stability of the regime, there is no simple formulation to be applied in the Iraqi case. Prior to Gulf War, Iraq was a wayward former client with a progressive ruling party, but after the war began the situation became more complex. "Progressive" Iraq was fighting the Islamic republic of Iran. But for numerous reasons the Soviets had very mixed feelings about which side to support, and the emphasis of their "neutrality" shifted over time. Thus, for its nearly ten-year duration the Iran-Iraq war created special problems for Soviet scholars.

In fact, given the ambiguity of the official Soviet position on the Iran-Iraq war, most scholars were reluctant to volunteer⁹³ to write scholarly analyses of the war at all, with few seemingly assigned to do so. There have been numerous journalistic accounts of the war, in the newspapers and in most issues of Aziia i Afrika segodnia, but there are few serious scholarly accounts about the causes of the war, or the role that religion has played for each of the two combatant nations.

As was discussed above in the section on Iran, Soviet scholars have had difficulty understanding internal developments in Iran. This is reflected in their coverage of the Iranian position in the war. They have consistently downplayed the force of personality of Khomeini that is exerted in the name of Islam, how religion was used to obtain popular support for the war against Iraq, and how the virtue of martyrdom was successfully preached to get nearly unarmed adolescent males to march off to battle.

Most Soviet coverage of the war described a conflict caused by two nation-states trying to expand at each other's expense, with religion and nationalism being invoked to mislead the populace to sacrifice for the regime's imperialist goals.⁹⁴ Typical is the coverage of the journalist/academic L. Notin, whose articles in Aziia i Afrika segodnia criticized Western specialists for erroneously depicting the Iran-Iraq conflict as a form of religious war. In fact, he wrote, the war was the result of a territorial dispute dating from colonial times, a dispute which

had been aggravated by Western meddling in the area. Nonetheless, Notin admitted that Iran successfully used religious symbolism to mobilize the Iranian population to make sacrifices for the war effort.

But attributing religious motivation to Iraq has been more problematic for Soviet specialists, as it is not in keeping with its allegedly progressive character to engage in a costly and lengthy war for primarily religious reasons. In fact, Notin explained part of Iraq's difficulties in the war as a product of their progressive ideology. Progressive regimes are not by nature expansionist, and so Notin maintained that Saddam Hussein was unsuccessful in his efforts to use religion to encourage popular resistance to Iran. But Saddam Hussein's claims, as well as the call for the defense of an Iraqi homeland, were ultimately insufficient to wage an aggressive war against Iran, and the Iraqis had to concentrate on the defense of their own territory.⁹⁵

Soviet scholars have offered more objective analyses of the political impact of Islam in Iraq's conduct of the war in conference papers, but few of these comments have made it to published works. For example, at a 1985 conference on Islam and foreign policy I. S. Podkolzin delivered a paper on the influence of Islam on Iraq's conduct of the war with Iran. In this paper Podkolzin argued that like Khomeini, Saddam Hussein has also attempted to use religion to attain popular support in his country's war effort, but unlike Khomeini, he has attempted to use the Islamic (as opposed to either Sunni or Shiite) foundations of

Iraqi nationalism as motivation for popular resistance to the Iranians, and not a theologically based interpretation of Islam. Podkolzin himself admitted that this might not be a sufficiently doctrinal interpretation of the faith to neutralize Shiite opposition to Hussein, as the Shiite fundamentalists rejected the secularist reinterpretation of Islam that was implicit in Ba'th nationalism.

Podkolzin's article appeared in a volume of "theses" from the conference.⁹⁶ This volume had a press-run of 250 copies, and was distributed to scholars and specialized libraries but was never sold in any Soviet bookstore or made available abroad. However, this article was one of the few excluded from the published volume prepared from the conference, which appeared in book form under the title "Islamskii faktor" v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh v Azii (The "Islamic Factor" in International Relations in Asia)⁹⁷-- This despite the fact that Podkolzin's discussion of the relationship of religion in Iraq is not terribly controversial. He depicts Ba'th socialism as an example of religion playing a positive role as national unifier, because Islam helps provide the basis of stability necessary for the regime to pursue its progressive policies.⁹⁸

The Soviet coverage of the Iran-Iraq war appears clearly to be politically inspired. Just before the war drew to a close the Soviets tried even harder to distance themselves from both its conduct and its causes. The same volume which excluded the Podkolzin article included an article on Iranian foreign policy.

The author of the piece, V. A. Uskakov, wrote about the ways in which Iran was using religion to mobilize support in other Muslim countries, but he made no mention of the Iran-Iraq war.⁹⁹ Thus, as Soviet policy-makers have recognized Iran's claim to a central role in the power-politics of the Persian gulf region, Soviet scholars have once again had to review the assumptions of their regional focus in order to avoid potential points of conflict with policy-makers.

In similar fashion, the desire to try to treat "friends" positively has affected scholarship on North Africa.¹⁰⁰ Soviet scholars who write about Algeria and Libya have tried to argue forcefully that religion can coexist with progressive politics, and that Islam need not conflict with a commitment to economic redistribution, social justice and a desire to promote the anti-imperialist goals of the Soviet Union. They argue that Islam helps make these progressive regimes stable. Religion forms an important element in creating a cohesive national ideology, an ideology which links the goals of a national-liberation struggle which had used religious slogans with the progressive redistributive policies of the respective regime. These authors argue that the fusion of Islam with socialist ideas is not true socialism, but that it is nonetheless in keeping with a Marxist interpretation of society, as the progressive secular and even Muslim thinkers are advancing the interests of the working class and lower social orders, and consequently are advancing the cause of world socialism.

Thus, writers like R. Ia. Aliev, argue that in both Algeria and Yemen the stability of "socialist" rule is based on the successful merging of religious themes with socialist ideology.¹⁰¹ Aliev, an Azerbaidzhani, who heads the section of ideological problems of IVAN AzSSR in Baku, is currently preparing to defend his Doctor of Science degree for Polonskaia. He is also a good example of the type of scholar from the periphery who has managed to gain some influence among scholars in Moscow. He travels there regularly, has participated in a number of closed academic conferences, and has gotten his articles into volumes edited by prominent scholars at IVAN SSSR. Privately, many of Aliev's Moscow colleagues criticize his work as too conservative, arguing that he exaggerates the success of "progressive" regimes like those in Algeria or in Yemen (Aliev's other important case study) in manipulating religious themes. However, Aliev has been able to use his unusually thorough training in Islam, combined with his extensive residence in the Middle East,¹⁰² to cement a reputation as a leading expert on religion and politics in Algeria and Yemen.

Not all Soviet specialists see Islam as the key element for understanding politics in Algeria. Some have preferred to employ more traditional economic explanations for explaining political developments.¹⁰³ Others, most prominently R. G. Landa, now head of IVAN's department of general affairs, take what we in the West would term a "political development approach", and argue that the stability of a non-communist regime is more dependent on the pattern of institutionalization of political authority that

occurred during the state-building stage of each nation than it is on the ideology of the regime itself.¹⁰⁴ Landa has consistently used this approach in his analysis of Algeria.

There has also been scholarly disagreement over how to analyze the role of religion in Libya. Libyan politics is not analyzed in quite the same way as Algeria's. Although Libya's foreign policy line is supportive of Soviet goals, Qaddafi's domestic politics are predicated on a model of "Islamic socialism" which is very far from the premises of Marxist socialism. Thus many of those who write about Libya are careful to point out that it would be a mistake to assume that Qaddafi is pursuing a progressive socialist domestic policy line. Scholars like A. V. Malashenko have taken pains to explain that prior to Qaddafi's assumption of power, the process of national consolidation in tribally dominated Libya had proceeded far more slowly than in neighboring Algeria, and so policies of social redistribution in Libya have of necessity been rooted to religious values rather than to the principles of socialism themselves.¹⁰⁵ In private Soviet scholars will often confide that they consider Libya far less "progressive" than they argue in print. Libya's strong defense of the Soviet Union (and conversely the Soviet Union's strong defense of Libya), they claim, is more a product of seriously strained U.S.-Libyan relations than it is of Libyan internal politics or "progressive" developmental strategy.

Soviet scholars have far more limited access to Morocco and Tunisia, and so write far less about them than about the other two

North African states. Single country in-depth studies such as Z. A. Menteshashvili's Sotsial'noe razvitie nezavisimogo Marokko (The Social Development of Independent Morocco) are rare, and even the Menteshashvili study avoids a systematic examination of the relationship of religion to political stability in Morocco.¹⁰⁶ But most North Africanists believe that Islam has the potential to bolster the stability of the existing regimes and to serve as an ideology for political oppositionary forces in both Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁰⁷ There are also ideological restraints that affect scholarship on North Africa. Most scholars of Algeria and Libya are also competent to write about Morocco and Tunisia, but they often judiciously avoid making comparative statements about the region as a whole, because the "conservative" regimes in the area have been relatively stable, and have managed to defuse the political impact of religion at least as successfully as their "progressive" counterparts.

Scholars writing about the Gulf states are constrained in ways similar to those writing about North Africa. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are an area of increasing interest to the Soviet policy-makers, and this interest is beginning to have some impact on scholarship as well. In the past decade there have been numerous political histories¹⁰⁸ of Saudi Arabia. Those by A. M. Vasil'ev¹⁰⁹ and A. I. Iakovlev¹¹⁰ are quite well researched and comprehensive, but most studies of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have either focused on oil wealth and economic development¹¹¹ or on the role of American interests in the region.¹¹² In

general most of the established scholars writing about Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are conservative in their orientation to the study of religion, and depict Islam as a retrograde force in these societies.

Some younger Soviet scholars are becoming interested in writing about contemporary political processes and the prospects for long-term internal stability in the region.¹¹³ This interest is reflected in a growing literature on how the Persian Gulf states have used religion to justify their influence in the Muslim World League.¹¹⁴ But scholars are hampered by their almost total lack of access to the region and by the difficulty of finding sufficient primary source materials in Moscow. In contrast Soviet scholars have easy access to Yemen, but the conclusions that they are forced to draw do not reinforce the assumptions of Soviet theories of development. While Soviet scholars have admitted that the various Gulf states are demonstrating a capacity to contain the threat of Islamic fundamentalism,¹¹⁵ R. Aliev writing on the Yemeni coup of 1986 expressed dismay over the instability likely to result from the failure of the People's Democratic Party of Yemen to integrate Islam successfully into their socialist agenda.¹¹⁶

Although the quality of scholarship on North Africa and on the Gulf States is slowly becoming more objective and more plentiful, it is still almost definitionally impossible for impartial scholarship to be published on issues that touch upon the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is virtually no serious scholar-

ship written about the Israeli-Arabs,¹¹⁷ or about the life of the Palestinians on the West Bank.¹¹⁸ Similarly, Soviet writings about conditions in Lebanon since the 1975 Civil War have been heavily colored by the Soviet preoccupation with castigating Israel. This is true both of discussions of the 1975-1976 Civil War and of accounts of the fighting in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion of June 1982.

Some scholarly or quasi-scholarly literature about the 1975-1976 Civil War has been published, but the authors in question generally conclude cautiously that although there were internal circumstances which helped account for the outbreak of civil disturbances in Lebanon, it was Israeli policies toward the Palestinians that caused this situation to develop into civil war.¹¹⁹

Since Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon numerous journalistic or quasi-journalistic accounts of the situation in Lebanon have appeared in Azija i Afrika segodnja. These accounts have all focused on Israeli and American aggression there, and have been virtually devoid of any scholarly content.¹²⁰ This is also true of journalistic monographs, such as L. I. Medvedko and A. V. Germanovich's recent Imenem Allakha (In the Name of Allah). While these authors depict a dramatic rise in Islamic inspired political activism in Lebanon, they try to account for it solely as a product of Israel's presence in southern Lebanon.¹²¹ Articles about Lebanon which have been published in the generally more

scholarly journal Nauka i religii in recent years have been similar in both tone and content.¹²²

With the easing of censorship there have been a few journalistic accounts that have tried to be more objective, such as S. L. Stoklitskii's recent Livan (Lebanon).¹²³ The Stoklitskii volume had a tirazh (printing) of only 8100 copies, and though written by a journalist, it was published by Nauka (Science) press under the auspices of IVAN. Stoklitskii offers an in-depth discussion of the changes in Lebanese society since the 1982 war. While the author stresses the hardships caused by Israeli aggression, he nonetheless includes information about the growing role of religiously inspired activism in the country. But the unusual combination of an academic press book written by a non-academic author meant that Stoklitskii's work is likely to have little impact. Denied access to a more general readership by the publishing outlet he chose,¹²⁴ Stoklitskii's folksy style of writing and the lack of documentation in his analysis preclude this volume gaining serious attention from Soviet scholars.

The Soviets have never made the study of Lebanon a particular priority of their Orientalists. Nonetheless there is a tradition of scholarship on Lebanon which can be drawn upon should the situation in Lebanon become less tied to international politics.¹²⁵ Soviet scholars are carefully monitoring Western scholarship on Lebanon as well as the writings of the Lebanese themselves. A number of scholars who attended a talk I delivered in January 1986 at IVAN in Moscow, on American scholarly views of

Lebanese internal politics, displayed expertise sufficient to suggest that they too might be considering writing about Islam and politics in Lebanon at some later and more auspicious time. In my January 1989 visit, some of these younger scholars admitted that they were preparing works which would include sections on Lebanon, but that the time was still not "right" to publish them.

Thus, while there certainly are Soviet scholars continuing to do research on the problem of religion and politics in Lebanon, little of their research comes into print. For example, O. A. Komarova delivered a paper on the political influence of Shiism on the Lebanese crisis at the 1985 conference organized by IVAN SSSR on the role of Islam in foreign policy in the Middle East. A summary of this paper appeared in the limited edition volume of conference "theses",¹²⁶ yet as was true of the paper on the role of religion in Iraqi foreign policy, it did not appear in the subsequent published volume of conference papers. Komarova's paper suggests that she has a great deal of material on religion and politics in Lebanon that is ready for publication.

Similarly, A. A. Ignatenko has a wealth of unpublished material on fundamentalist Islamic groups which he alludes to in his study on Islamic fundamentalism. His thesis is that the various confessional communities in Lebanon are both stable and fundamentally in conflict with one another. Moreover, he disputes the contention that this conflict has been incited by external forces. Instead, he writes that the confessional communities have used both zionism and imperialism to further their own religiously

based goals. However, Ignatenko devotes a total of eight pages to the religious conflict in Lebanon, leaving the reader with a very fragmentary view of the author's position.¹²⁷

From my various discussions it became clear to me that most scholars believed that Islam had become a more powerful ideological force for both the Sunni and Shiite communities in Lebanon, and that the Islamic revival, and not just the activities of the forces of "imperialism", was leading to the further destabilization of the Lebanese political order. Moreover, there was no consensus among those scholars as to the likely future course of events within Lebanon.

In general it appears that scholarship on the Arab world is still seriously restricted by the potential foreign policy significance of the Middle East crisis. The amount of material written on a given Arab nation is influenced by the sensitivity of the subject, by the potential access of Soviet scholars to field research, and also by Moscow's evaluation of the strategic importance of the nation and whether there is a potential for increased ties between that nation and the U.S.S.R. Friendly nations must be depicted in more positive terms than their internal conditions might warrant, and the roots of internal political stability of less friendly nations may be downplayed or even ignored. Soviet scholars are certain to be more open with their assessments in materials that are prepared for closed conferences or for inclusion in "service use only" volumes. Nonetheless with regard to those who write about the Arab world,

foreign policy informs scholarship more than scholarship informs policy. The freer expression of scholarly opinion about the political role of Islam that is found in more abstract theoretical discussions has not yet done much to change the type of research that is done about most of the Arab countries. Moreover the type of research is unlikely to change until there is some resolution of the Middle East conflict. Only then will it be possible for scholars to depart from the invocation of ideological stereotypes in their work, and only then will they be likely to gain the necessary freedom to travel and do research more broadly in the region.

**THE 'NATIONAL PROBLEM'
AND SOVIET ORIENTAL STUDIES**

While Western scholars are interested in making explicit linkages between Soviet writings on the Muslim world and Soviet attitudes toward and treatment of their own Muslim population, publicly Soviet Orientalists have vigorously maintained that such linkages cannot be made. But inevitably these linkages do exist. Primakov clearly states in his articles that Islam can only play a progressive role in non-Communist societies, and that his conceptual framework is only to be applied in studying conditions outside of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless in his treatment of Soviet scholars of Islam, both at IVAN SSSR and more importantly those outside of his direct jurisdiction, he implicitly recognized

that non-Russian scholars have special talents which should be exploited.

Thus, Primakov paid special attention to upgrading the quality of scholarship in the republic branches of IVAN, particularly in those republics that border on the Middle East. The Georgian and Armenian¹²⁸ institutes (specializing on the Arab world and Turkey respectively) have brand new buildings; the reputation of the Uzbek¹²⁹ institute has improved (their specialty is India and South Asia more generally); the Tadzhik¹³⁰ institute (whose scholars study Arab and Persian peoples) has doubled in size; and IVAN AzSSR in Baku¹³¹ is now second in importance to Moscow in the study of the contemporary Muslim world.¹³²

One of Primakov's goals had been to coordinate better the activities of Soviet Orientalists, nationwide. The revitalization of the All-Union Association of Orientalists with its regularly scheduled meetings and conferences, was also designed to utilize better the talents of scholars in the periphery.¹³³ The association, reorganized in 1980,¹³⁴ seeks to formalize contacts between scholars at the various regional institutes and put them in direct contact with scholars from the center.

Even though Primakov's predecessor at IVAN, B. G. Gafurov, was himself a Tadzhik, there had previously been little effort made, below the formal dealings of the all-union bureaucracy of the Academy of Science, to coordinate the research programs of the regional institutes with those of the "mother" center in Moscow. Promising young doctoral students (aspiranty) were always sent to

Moscow to be trained, and those who did brilliant work either as graduate students or as junior scholars were traditionally given the opportunity to work in Moscow, but there was little direct intervention by senior scholars in Moscow into the day to day work of republic centers.¹³⁵

A number of all-union conferences have been held. These conferences have generally been held in a republic capital to allow scholars from the periphery to have greater participation and to gain recognition through their organizational as well as intellectual efforts.¹³⁶ The first of these, termed the Second All-union Conference of Orientalists (in deference to the 1957 meeting), was held in Baku in May, 1983, with over three hundred scholars in attendance. Preparations for this meeting had been made at an all-union coordinating session on "The Actual Problems of Philosophy and Social Thought of the Peoples of the East", which had been held in Dushanbe, Tadzhikistan, in the autumn of 1981.¹³⁷ The Baku meeting was divided into four sections, which dealt with socio-economic problems, political and ideological problems, philosophy and culture, and history and sources respectively.¹³⁸ The meeting focused on questions of religion and ideology and the changed nature of the Islamic world, as signified by the presence and influence of Khomeini's Iran. The proximity of these events to the U.S.S.R. was obvious to the Orientalists who had gathered near the Iranian border, and was highlighted in the opening speeches of both Azerbaidzhani Party First Secretary K. M. Bagirov, and E. M. Primakov.

This conference was expected to be a closed working meeting. Some of the conference papers for this meeting were prepared for limited circulation in closed publications, but the papers from the conference were not published until 1988.¹³⁹ The price of the volume, 5 Rubles 40 Kopeks, and the fact that only 1450 copies were printed speak to the limited expected audience for this publication.

There have been two subsequent important all-union meetings since the Baku gathering. The first, held in November 1985, in a suburb of Moscow at an AN SSSR conference center, focused on historiographical problems of studying pre- and post-colonial development of the Afro-Asian nations. The keynote address, delivered by G. F. Kim, then IVAN's acting director, focused on the limitations of Soviet scholarship on the problems of national consolidation in the developing world. He depicted this scholarship as being excessively concerned with class-based analyses to the exclusion of other aspects of social and political development. Those assembled were enjoined to do more research on the role of culture and religion in the adaptation of traditional societies, and to approach economic questions with the goal of understanding the interrelationship of local and global processes, and how the pre-existing patterns of economic development in the Afro-Asian nations affect their present and future developmental options.¹⁴⁰

A third all-union meeting was held in Tbilisi in November, 1986. Published materials from that conference are not yet

available, although many of the conference participants did discuss the proceedings with me. This conference focused exclusively on Islam, on the conceptual problems associated with the study of Islam, on the relationship between Islam and nationalism, and on the influence of Islamic values on the formation of the foreign policies of Muslim countries. The latter two themes were of particular importance. Six months before the Tbilisi meeting a smaller conference on Islam and foreign policy in the Muslim world had been held in Moscow.¹⁴¹ The question of the relationship between Islam and nationalism is one that Soviet scholars are just beginning to explore, as part of a reevaluation of the entire concept of nationalism and how nationalism functions in Asia and Africa. This theme remains a subject of discussion and closed publication, and as there are few sanctioned interpretations as yet, it is still a topic that is rarely broached in open sources.

In May 1988 the Third All-Union Conference of Orientalists was held, this time in Dushanbe. Materials describing that conference are just now beginning to be published.¹⁴² The theme of the conference was "Perestroika and the Social Sciences", and so the meeting focused on the ways in which oriental studies should improve. IVAN SSSR's Deputy Director G. F. Kim's keynote address explicitly criticized the deficiencies of Soviet study of the colonial and post-colonial world. The approach he suggested was to improve the study of classical texts and the languages necessary to read and transcribe them properly, as the understanding of a society begins at its intellectual roots. Although Kim

made reference to the need for better middle-level theory as a necessary precondition for understanding contemporary political behavior, A. V. Malashenko's remarks express the dissatisfaction with the conference of scholars who seek to tie Soviet social science more closely to Western theories of cultural development and social change. He called for the development of a theory of cultural penetration to explain the relationship between religion and politics that had developed in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world in the past two decades.¹⁴³ The whole atmosphere in which this conference was carried out, with far less publicity than the 1983 Baku meeting,¹⁴⁴ as well as what we know of its proceedings, suggests that Soviet Orientalists may be being pushed to return to a more longitudinal study of Oriental societies.

While the organization of the All-union Association of Orientalists and the subsequent convocation of a number of large meetings increased the participation of scholars from the national regions, little was done to tap their special expertise. Nonetheless these all-union conferences provide an important opportunity for scholars from the periphery to be drawn into the discussion of controversial issues. These are meetings designed to stretch audiences intellectually and to encourage those assembled, most of whom do not have access to closed publications, to be less conservative in their own research and writing.

They have served an important role in improving the training of graduate students, including those at republic branches of the institute. Particularly promising graduate students have been

invited to attend all of the major meetings. Conferences where graduate students and very junior scholars make up the bulk of the paper-givers have also been held.¹⁴⁵ Such meetings allow the senior scholars to identify future "stars" better and give the very junior scholars who are invited as paper-givers the opportunity to be exposed to ideas and concepts which are currently being debated. Thus, they make it more likely that the work of talented young national minority scholars will come to the attention of those in Moscow.

Most importantly the conferences have helped integrate scholarship in the periphery with work going on in the center. Consequently, in part as a result of these meetings, in recent years a number of first rate works have been written by scholars at these regional institutes. IVAN Armenia has developed the most specialized center for the study of Turkish political history anywhere in the U.S.S.R. Research on Turkey has been downplayed at IVAN SSSR in the past decade, presumably as Moscow believes that there is little likelihood of substantially improved Soviet-Turkish relations (or substantially weakened U.S.-Turkish ties) in the immediate future.¹⁴⁶ However, for what can best be termed "historic national" reasons, the IVAN branch in Erevan has made Turkey, and especially the history of early twentieth-century Turkey, a particular focus. IVAN Armenia scholars have published a number of recent works which have been well-received by IVAN scholars in Moscow.¹⁴⁷

I do not know much about the workings of IVAN Uzbekistan as I was denied permission to go to Tashkent,¹⁴⁸ but I have heard that the level of research there is the lowest of the republic institutes, although there is reported to be a group of strong younger scholars emerging there as well.¹⁴⁹ However, the linkage between nationality and academic research in IVAN Uzbekistan has been a very indirect one. India has been an important subject of study in this institute. The Uzbek's identity as a South Asian rather than a Muslim people has been stressed, and Uzbek scholars have been sent regularly on komandirovkas to India as opposed to the Middle East.

Probably the strongest republic institute is found in Baku, where some of the leading scholars are occasionally called upon to prepare "closed" studies on Islam and politics in the Middle East and Iran for use by policy-makers in Moscow. Their expertise on the theme of Islam and politics is a major strength of the Institute, and the subject of some of its more important publications.¹⁵⁰ Institute scholars are regularly given the opportunity to travel on komandirovkas to the Middle East, where their Muslim background is traded upon. They are among the most frequent Soviet academic visitors to Syria and Iraq, where their Shiite background makes them welcome guests in certain quarters.

The results of these trips are conveyed upward through the appropriate channels. But for the present at least, the published reports of these scholars are of little interest to an all-union scholarly audience. Most of the Russian language publications of

the republic institutes are only for sale in the republic that published them, accessible to scholars in Moscow only through the libraries. Moreover, few scholars in Moscow seem interested in reading such publications, although they certainly take seriously publications by republic scholars who publish their works in central publications. Institute scholars (and especially IVAN Azerbaidzhan director Z. M. Buniatov), have made important contributions to the Nauka series of "classic" works of the Orient.¹⁵¹

The institute in Baku was the only one that I got to know well enough to become familiar with some of its inner workings. There I got first-hand exposure to the ways in which local autonomy can impede all-union goals, particularly in the area of personnel. In January 1986, Z. M. Buniatov, a historian of classical and medieval Islam of international repute, was dismissed as director of the IVAN AzSSR. Buniatov, who quite obviously does not suffer fools, was dismissed allegedly at the personal request of the newly appointed president of the AN AzSSR (a scientist with whom Buniatov had apparently regularly sparred when the former was a fellow academic), despite the efforts of E. M. Primakov to keep him in office. After allowing the institutes to be administered by an acting director for almost two years, the president of Azerbaidzhan's Academy of Sciences, now under attack by Moscow for permitting cronyism, was forced to reappoint Buniatov.

Another area where personnel problems have impeded scholarship in the Baku institute touches more directly on the national problem. The Iranian section of the institute (in part through pressure from the local communist party) is dominated by Iranian emigres from the failed (1946-1947) Tudeh Party takeover. This section is charged with studying the history and politics of Iran, including southern Azerbaidzhan. But most of the scholarship which comes out of this department is colored by the political biases of the emigres that dominate it. While many of these individuals are undoubtedly credible or even talented historians or scholars of language and literature, those that I met and could converse with¹⁵², understood the world in general and events in Iran in particular in strict Marxist-Leninist terms. Thus, they were unwilling to credit that religion could be a basis of political stability, and dismissed the Islamic revolution in Iran as a political chimera. As one acquaintance put it, they were people who had spent thirty years waiting for a revolution in Iran and were unable to accept that the revolution, once launched, was made by Islamic clerics and not by the Iranian left. But many of these people are precisely those who are charged with monitoring and commenting on events in neighboring Iran.

It is hard to imagine that the senior Iranian specialists of IVAN Azerbaidzhan are making much of a useful contribution to Soviet assessments of developments in Iran. There are certainly other contributions that are being made. Scholars of Azerbaidzhani literature and history (including some of the old Tudeh

members) have prepared dozens of classics of their pre-revolutionary period in Arabic script editions for dissemination across the border.¹⁵³ Moreover, Buniatov has encouraged the development of scholarship on contemporary Iranian politics in other parts of the institute, especially in the department of ideological problems, so that more objective and potentially useful scholarship of conditions in Islamic Iran is being written. Thus, should southern Azerbaidzhan become accessible to Soviet scholars, IVAN Azerbaidzhan has already prepared a core of young scholars able to travel to the area and provide informed assessments of the local situation.

The scholars of IVAN Azerbaidzhan have generally been cautious to follow Primakov's stricture that the study of foreign Islam must be separated from that of domestic Islam. One way that some of the younger scholars have gotten around this rule is to look at the links between southern Azerbaidzhan and Soviet Azerbaidzhan. But these usually are extra projects done on the scholars' own time. In fact, scholars at the institute are expected to help the population understand why the Islamic revolution outside of the U.S.S.R is not akin to conditions within the U.S.S.R, and to prepare regularly materials on this theme, written in Azerbaidzhani, for a general readership as well as for use by scholars within the republic.¹⁵⁴

However, for the Azerbaidzhani Orientalists the separation between the study of Islam abroad and Islam at home is not absolute. Most of these individuals are learned students of

Islam. Many are very knowledgeable about the degree of religiosity of the local population, although often reluctant to discuss this topic with a foreigner. Most IVAN Azerbaidzhan specialists on Islam in the Middle East seem to have regular contacts with the officials at ZaDUM (the ecclesiastical administration of the Transcaucasus) and help to provide hospitality for visiting delegations from the Middle East, including those of religious leaders. This of course helps them gain information about their subjects of study.

The Orientalists I got to know were all secularized individuals. Few seemed to me to be actively mosque-going Muslims, although all viewed their religious heritage as an active part of their identity. One proudly told me of making a pilgrimage to Najaf while a student in Iraq, but maintained he did this only for "historic" reasons. No one I met could have served as an effective anti-religious propagandist. Many were party members, although they did not perceive themselves to be serving an atheistic regime.¹⁵⁵ Some seemed to have chosen their career in order to learn Arabic and more about Islam in ways that were officially sanctioned.

I found many similarities between the study of Islam in Azerbaidzhan and in Tadzhikistan. Again, for reasons obviously linked to nationally specific skills, IVAN Tadzhikistan has specialized on the Persian-speaking world. Several younger scholars in Dushanbe have done very good work on Iran,¹⁵⁶ and several others have manuscripts on Afghanistan under preparation

(one assumes that these manuscripts will wait for a more favorable political climate before they see the light of day). But although many seemed to me to be very accomplished individuals, the majority of scholars in Dushanbe are also not regarded as serious by their colleagues in Moscow.

Nonetheless it is likely that they make their own special contribution to the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The scholars of IVAN Tadjhikistan are sent on komandirovkas throughout the Persian speaking world and the Muslim world more generally, and one may safely assume that their classified reports form a source of intelligence information about these regions. Even the most junior scholars and advanced students are called upon to play a role, as many are temporarily attached to embassies or other Soviet missions abroad to work as translators or aides, but here the linkage between nationality and foreign policy related concerns is even more indirect.

It seems reasonable to assume that IVAN Tadjhikistan will play a greater role in Moscow's research agenda in the future. The all-union visibility of the Tadjhik institute has begun to increase since the November 1986 appointment of A. B. Tursunov as the new director. Shortly after taking over, Tursunov, whose specialty is medieval Islamic philosophy, delivered several well-publicized speeches on the need for a reorganized social science establishment to address current problems through a more thorough analysis of history and the philosophy of the past.¹⁵⁷ This theme

was also the focus of his address before the Dushanbe conference of Orientalists.¹⁵⁸

Moreover, in sharp contrast with most other Soviet academics, Tursunov has been willing to advocate an explicit linkage between the study of Islam beyond the Soviet borders and a study of the Islamic heritage of the Tadzhiks. Tursunov seems to have been charged with this responsibility as part of his mandate upon appointment. It is hard to know whether it was Moscow or Tadzhikistan's communist leadership who delegated this responsibility to him. Tursunov's appointment coincided with revelations by K. M. Makhkamov (Tadzhikistan's party first secretary) of the collusion of the party and anti-religious establishment in the continued widespread practice of Islam.¹⁵⁹ Since Tursunov's appointment the visibility of IVAN Tadzhikistan has increased within both academic and popular circles in Dushanbe. Tursunov is called upon to speak at most important Tadzhikistan party gatherings, and in late February 1989, he was one of the people called upon to quiet the young demonstrators who took to the streets in Dushanbe demanding Tadzhik to be made the state language of Tadzhikistan.¹⁶⁰

The mission of IVAN Tadzhikistan has been modified but not completely redefined under Tursunov. As with the other IVAN branches the scholars in Dushanbe are not permitted to study current religious practices, but they are allowed to examine the history of Islam in Tadzhikistan and in Central Asia more generally and the influence that it has had on Islamic practice and teachings in the Muslim world more generally. Whereas the anti-

religious campaign in Tadzhikistan has revealed that some teachers of Arabic in Tadzhik State University are secretly teaching religion,¹⁶¹ such individuals (many with strong party connections) are a far cry from the type of secularized intellectuals who work in the Academy of Sciences and participate in inter-republic and international activities.

As was true of their Azerbaidzhani counterparts, the Tadzhik Orientalists were proud of their national traditions, which includes Islam. However, IVAN Tadzhikistan has always included the sons and daughters of the secularized Tadzhik intelligentsia among its staff. Although these individuals have a healthy respect for Tadzhik traditions, they are not inclined to romanticize a pre-revolutionary past in which Islam held sway. Their attraction to Oriental studies is in part an expression of national consciousness, but their interest is in some great age of Persian culture and not the perpetuation of Islamic religious practices as they are preserved in the countryside of Tadzhikistan.

Although in the Muslim republics it has proved almost impossible to separate wholly the study of Islam abroad from that of local Islam, the same is not true in Moscow and Leningrad. There are virtually no formal connections between Soviet scholars studying Islam abroad and those Soviet scholars who do their research on Islam in the Soviet Union. However a number of Orientalists that I met in Moscow had in-depth knowledge about the situation in the Muslim regions of the USSR. Most of these

individuals were of one opinion, that Islamic fundamentalism did not pose a major threat to Soviet power because of the level of economic and political stability of the Muslim regions of the country. Virtually all the scholars that I met believed that an Islamic revival could occur and was occurring in the Soviet Union. They accepted as accurate reports that the numbers of young people seeking to learn about and embrace their Muslim heritage was greater than previously, but they nonetheless maintained that this revival of interest in Islam was a fundamentally different process than what was going on in most places beyond the Soviet borders.

Many of the Russian Orientalists that I met were very knowledgeable about and sympathetic toward Islam. A number of these people seem to have decided to become specialists on Islam because they grew up in families that had been either exiled or evacuated to Central Asia. But they avoided the formal academic study of Central Asia because they considered most scholars on Islam in the U.S.S.R to be either political hacks who curry favor by aping an official line, or religious apologists who deliberately down-play the pervasiveness of religion in order to protect it. The most exceptional among them is one acquaintance¹⁶² who travels often and widely in Central Asia (through making use of unused trips allotted to the House of Atheism in Moscow) and who has developed contacts among students of Central Asian Islam who exist outside of the educational hierarchy throughout the country.

Scholars like my acquaintance would like to see IVAN get some responsibility for the study of Islam in the U.S.S.R, precisely

because they feel that they are trained to study religion in a more objective fashion than those who have written on Islam in the U.S.S.R. Primakov was said to have been adamant about the need to separate the two subjects; friends reported that he publicly abused those scholars who argued that Islam was still a potent political and social force in the U.S.S.R and so should be studied by Orientalists.¹⁶³

Since Primakov's departure there is some evidence that these strictures might be breaking down, in response to changes in party policies more than changes in academic politics. As party leaders in the Muslim regions admit the existence of a religious revival in their republics, academics are able to write more openly about the relationship as well. For example, a recent issue of Nauka i religia published an article by S. Agaev, on the Iranian revolution, which consisted of his refutations of letters from Muslim believers that expressed guarded sympathy with some of the ideas of the Islamic revolution in Iran. More important, from the point of view of serious scholarship, was the fact that for the first time IVAN scholars were able to include articles about Islam in the U.S.S.R in a recent handbook. Although these articles were designed to highlight the Islamic history of the Soviet peoples and not the pervasiveness of current practices, they were presented with relatively little diminishing editorial comment.¹⁶⁴

But while it appears that IVAN scholars will now be able to include the Soviet Union as part of the Islamic world in their general surveys, it is unlikely that there will be a major

reorientation in focus of IVAN's research in the near future. While there is a growing official frankness about the pervasiveness of both religious and nationalist sentiments in the U.S.S.R., these remain topics of great sensitivity, which require a proper ideological orientation on the part of those charged with examining them. Thus, although it is true that the Party is undergoing an major ideological overhaul, party officials are still unwilling to abandon wholly the ideological premises of communist rule, or to abandon the assumption that the relationship between Islam and politics in the Soviet Union must be fundamentally different from that which is observed beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, while these assumptions remain, it will be impossible for Moscow to take full advantage of the special talents of Soviet Orientalists, be they of Russian or Muslim extraction, to study conditions within the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to know what if any impact the writings of IVAN scholars have on Soviet policy-makers concerned with the Middle East, the intended audience for many of the conclusions of recent writings on Islam and politics in the Muslim world. It was certainly Primakov's intention that an improved understanding of current conditions in the Middle East would lead to the maximization of Soviet strategic interests in the area. But it is hard to

know precisely what advice Primakov offered to Soviet policy-makers, given the contradictory nature of the conclusions that many IVAN scholars have reached in their assessments of the future course of development in each of the Islamic regimes in the Middle East.

The findings of IVAN's scholars would offer little to comfort those in Moscow who might wish to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the Middle East, as most Soviet Orientalists have been very pessimistic about the prospects of the short-term success of "progressive" forces in that region. But, although most Soviet scholars believe that fundamentalist groups will continue to strengthen their hold in a number of Arab nations and that they will serve as an increasingly effective oppositionary force in the Middle East as a whole, they counsel that this need not be detrimental to Soviet interests in the area, as the fundamentalists are almost always more anti-Western and anti-imperialist than they are anti-Soviet.

IVAN's scholars have been unable to offer any pat formulaic advice on how the Soviets can capitalize on the current political instability of many Middle Eastern nations. However, the conclusions of these scholars would appear to favor the continuation of an incremental approach to win friends in the region slowly, and to find them among traditional rulers, radicals, and Islamic fundamentalists alike.

But it is virtually impossible for an outsider to ascertain what the policy impact of Soviet scholarship on Islam has been.

Primakov himself has been an important conduit. He succeeded in his goal to increase his personal influence in the process of foreign policy formulation by getting his scholars to generate hypotheses of potential interest to policy-makers. He has gotten his scholars to explain the relationship between Islam and ideology, to offer hypotheses as to how the process of secularization could be maintained when there was pressure to theocratize, and to theorize as to what kinds of covert or overt interventions would "help" theocratic regimes be reconstructed as secular ones. The most controversial of these findings were summarized in closed reports, others in published sources, and of course through Primakov himself who has worked to popularize their ideas. As his own fortunes rose through the mid-1980s so too did his access to policy-makers, and most likely too did these policy-makers' knowledge of the conclusions of IVAN's scholars.

E. M. Primakov's efforts to increase the visibility of IVAN as an institute doing politically relevant foreign policy related research were successful from the standpoint of his own career. By the mid-1980s he had become a public figure who frequently editorialized about international conditions in the central press and on television. Following his appointment to head IMEMO in 1986, Primakov's political fortunes rose even more rapidly. He was named to the Central Committee as a candidate member in 1987. In 1989 he was elected a deputy in the new Supreme Soviet as one of the handpicked representatives of the Central Committee, and

then he was named as a full member of the new reduced Central Committee.

Primakov's pragmatic concerns are not shared by the vast majority of scholars at IVAN, where all but the most ambitious scholars are interested in doing academic research and not with making policy recommendations. Many of these individuals have deliberately chosen academic careers over job offers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are primarily concerned with improving the conditions of academic life at IVAN, and here Primakov's contribution is less clear.

It is certainly true that Primakov was responsible for improving the intellectual atmosphere in which IVAN scholars worked. But improving the quality of Soviet scholarship requires more than merely reducing the restrictiveness of the ideological climate. Like scholars everywhere, analysts in the USSR must confront problems of gathering and processing data, and there have been few improvements in this area. There have only been marginal increases in the budget allocations to IVAN in the past decade, which means that few of the material problems of scholars have been able to be addressed.

Space is a critical problem for IVAN scholars. While the senior administrators of the institute have personal offices, each of the academic departments is assigned a single room, which may hold ten to twelve desks to be shared by fifty to sixty scholars. Moreover, the upper floors of the institute which house the academic departments are in very poor repair. However, while no

money was allocated for refurbishing the office space of scholars, funding was made available for the construction of a grandiose new marble main entrance, and the refurbishing of the receiving area and director's office.

As a result of these space problems people come to the institute on their two or three required weekly meeting days,¹⁶⁵ but otherwise do their work in the relative solitude of libraries or their (generally overcrowded) apartments. Each scholar is assigned to an academic department which serves as his or her scholarly "collective". The academic plan of each scholar is drawn up with the collective, and the scholars of the collective serve as obligatory first readers of any manuscripts being prepared for publication. This enforced regular exchange of opinion can be valuable especially for a junior scholar, because it exposes him to a variety of opinions on a particular issue. But there is also a degree of intellectual restrictiveness that the collective system seems to encourage, as most scholars do not go beyond their collectives to try and exchange ideas with other IVAN members. While members within the same division may meet at common colloquia, those in the regional departments are seldom brought together with those of the division of general problems.¹⁶⁶

One of the most serious problems confronting IVAN scholars is the serious shortage of foreign books and journals. Each year IVAN's librarians get their requests for hard currency acquisitions pared down and institute scholars must travel around to a

number of Moscow libraries to read enough foreign (both Western and Middle Eastern) books to keep current in their research. In fact, the IVAN library was so impoverished that the foreign book section of the library was shut for most of 1986 because the ceiling fell down and there were no funds available to rebuild it until the next budget year. While restrictions about using foreign publications have become virtually non-existent for scholars in recent years, the academic bureaucracy has had no excess hard currency to use for book purchases. Moreover, to date IVAN SSSR has not managed to work out any long-term exchange agreement with a Western library to help with their acquisition problems.

Although the major all-union libraries are better funded and have better exchange programs, they are still slow to acquire and process foreign books -- the time lag is generally about two years -- and when catalogued such books might be indefinitely loaned to some distinguished professor.

Soviet scholars have little or no access to foreign currency, so they cannot purchase books printed abroad. Even making photo copies is expensive and time consuming, as official permission must be obtained for each article copied in an all-union library. However, access to xerox facilities has improved within the institute and its filials in the past few years, and a xerox cooperative which has opened across from IVAN SSSR should improve things still further. Still, long hours of potentially productive time are lost as scholars sit and hand-copy research materials.

General secretarial support is also virtually non-existent. Scholars type all but the final submission copies of their own manuscripts, or pay for them to be typed from their own salaries. Manuscripts are typed on old-fashioned mechanical typewriters, with multiple carbons. Although a few privileged individuals have managed to buy personal computers through saving their stipends during long komandirovkas abroad, the institute itself has none to place at the disposal of scholars.

Sending and receiving mail is also a complicated activity. Scholars and even departments cannot receive mail directly. All mail is received in one small office and is brought (eventually) to the office of the addressee's department. All correspondence with foreign scholars is supposed to be carried out through the mail department as well. Packages (and presumably letters) are inspected, and all manuscripts must be approved by several superiors before they can be sent abroad. Official policies governing the sending out of mail have not changed in recent years, although some scholars are now willing to write and receive letters at their residential addresses. A more serious concern of IVAN scholars is the difficulties they encounter in trying to do field-work. Opportunities to gather materials in the field are still problematic. Scholars at the institute may be temporarily attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for up to two years, as translators and/or analysts in a Soviet embassy abroad,¹⁶⁷ but this is of limited appeal to more senior scholars. Given official reluctance to spend foreign currency, this system provides the

only opportunity for most Soviet scholars to do extended field research abroad.

The Soviet Union has long-term cultural exchanges with most foreign countries. Places on exchanges with capitalist countries are rarely given to Orientalists, save the very most favored and distinguished, but senior and junior scholars may apply for permission to go abroad for at least one month annually to do field research in soft currency countries. This, it was explained to me, is why there were so many Indian specialists and Iranian specialists (a hard currency country which had a large cultural exchange). Scholars in the republic institutes appear to have more difficulty arranging for these komandirovkas abroad, as they must be vetted by two academic bureaucracies and two levels of security organizations, those in their republic capital as well as those in Moscow. Orientalists may also find places on Soviet archeological expeditions, and this is how much of the data on religion in politics in Southern Yemen has been gathered. But all Soviet Orientalists complain about the limitations on field experience, and the bulk of their research is done by using whatever materials are available in Soviet libraries.

IVAN scholars also complain about the difficulties of time management. Although scholars at IVAN have more flexibility in managing their time than do many in Soviet academic life, all the scholars employed by the institute have to juggle their academic tasks with those of "community obligation". Their obligations have varied from agitprop lectures at factories for more senior

scholars, to picking potatoes at nearby collective farms during harvest time for new advanced graduate students finishing up their degrees. For example, academic life at the institute came to a nearly complete standstill during summer 1985, when anyone under the age of forty was expected to "volunteer" to work at the International Youth Festival held in Moscow.

Many of the scholars at the institute are party members, as party membership is a virtual prerequisite for appointment to administrative posts and also facilitates foreign travel. But party membership also demands a time commitment. Similarly, those who are not party members but hope to go abroad must volunteer for extra "socially useful" labor, such as serving one or two nights a month as druzhinniki in their neighborhoods. These are all unpaid forms of labor. Moreover, while recent reforms seem to promise that scholars will no longer have to work as common laborers during harvest season, party membership remains an important precondition of career advancement and the expectations that scholars will continue to do "voluntary" social labor remain in effect.

Financial remuneration is another area of concern. As is true of academics more generally, Soviet Orientalists perceive themselves as underpaid. Most feel that the promised revision of salary scales for Academy of Science employees has improved the situation only marginally. Some junior scholars take on paid part-time work which cuts into their scholarship, and others protest more informally by only working in proportion to their

remuneration. The way that Soviet scholars are paid further reduces incentives for work. They receive their salary twice a month, on a set date but no predictable time, so they are often forced to wait around hours for the cash delivery to arrive so that they can get on line quickly, as the amount of money sent is oftentimes not sufficient to meet the entire payroll.¹⁶⁸

Many scholars in the republic IVAN branches are even more disgruntled than their Moscow colleagues. Some of these complaints are similar. They share a feeling of being underpaid. Space is a problem in some branches and not in others. IVAN Armenia and IVAN Georgia have moved to new buildings in the past decade, with some scholars even getting private offices. The scholars of IVAN Azerbaidzhan share departmental offices, but most have their own desks and the building is in good repair. The worst space problems were in IVAN Tadzhikistan, which is housed in the home of the late Tadzhik writer S. Aini. Not only is office space there in short supply, but the building even lacks indoor plumbing and running water.¹⁶⁹

But even when working in relatively good physical conditions many republic IVAN scholars feel second-class. They complain of the virtual non-existence of foreign books in their institute libraries. They also express concern over their special difficulties in arranging travel abroad.¹⁷⁰ But most seriously of all, they are disturbed by the fact that scholars in Moscow often tend to disregard or undervalue their scholarly contributions, which they claim are of particular value because of their own "closer

affinity" to the societies that they are studying. Moreover, most felt that the changes introduced during the Primakov years, such as the reinvigoration of the All-union Association of Orientalists, were only partial amelioratives at best.

Thus it seems clear that while the Primakov years increased the policy-relevance of scholarship at IVAN and the visibility of some of IVAN's scholars, little was done to assist scholars better in doing their research by providing them with better access to research materials, by improving support services, by alleviating the chronic space shortage, or by better remunerating their efforts.

There are also real questions as to how much the intellectual atmosphere at IVAN was freed up under Primakov's leadership. The well-defined hierarchical structure within the institute is a strong potential impediment to the development of new conceptual frameworks to explain the political and social impact of Islam. While everyone pointed out that IVAN was less hierarchical than most Soviet academic institutions, and that scholars at IVAN seem to have more leeway in choosing themes for analysis, nonetheless their research still must be sanctioned as part of the institute "plan".¹⁷¹ Any number of individuals must pass on this plan--the department head, the division head, the institute vice-directors and director as well as the bureaucracy of the Academy of Sciences. Thus even those department heads like L. R. Polonskaia or A. Malashenko (her successor), who are receptive to expanding the

conceptual bases of Soviet scholarship, may find themselves thwarted by the more conservative attitudes of their superiors.

Thus, the selection of senior administrative personnel plays a critical role in setting the tone of intellectual life in a Soviet academic institution. While Primakov was institute director he helped promote a new generation into leadership positions within IVAN, men like N. A. Simoniia, head of the division of general problems, who shared his desire to increase conceptual diversity of Soviet scholarship while retaining a commitment to using scholarship to advance the ideological goals of the regime. In the two years since Primakov's departure he has managed to lure some of these scholar-administrators to IMEMO. It is hard to detect a pattern in their replacements. Simoniia was replaced by R. G. Landa, whose work on political development in North Africa makes innovative use of Western theories of institution building. But the more senior leadership of the Institute seems more dominated by bureaucrats than it did five years ago. Generational change is proceeding slowly, personnel decisions are still made by appointment and not by departmental and divisional elections, and thus there is little prospect that glasnost' will make any immediate impact on the institute's sense of mission.

Nonetheless it is clear that the atmosphere of academic debate within the institute has loosened up dramatically in the early 1980s, and then was further encouraged by the conditions of glasnost'. The publication of the Primakov thesis on the double-edged character of Islam enabled Soviet scholars to argue within

the institute about the potential relationships between Islam and politics, and to express disagreement with one another over what role religion played in a particular set of circumstances. The differences of opinion that are expressed are dramatic. When I first began travelling to IVAN some senior scholars were willing to argue openly before a foreigner within the institute, but most junior scholars were more reticent. But over time I became known to them as a "safe" guest, with whom they were able to associate relatively freely, and so even before glasnost' many of the barriers restricting free discussion began to break down. Finally, in my most recent trip, there were virtually no forbidden topics.¹⁷²

But even now, many scholars still argue positions in person that are far more radical than what they express in print. While the role of glavlit¹⁷³ is said to have been dramatically curtailed, internal censorship within institutions remains very much in place, and it is this type of censorship that has been the most pervasive in academic circles in recent decades. While it has become easier for scholars to do research on controversial themes, it is often still difficult for them to publish on them. Soviet scholarship is still tapered to fit the goals of the organ of distribution. Thus, the conclusions of a particular author may differ from article to article. The conclusions reached in materials published for a more general audience, such as in political pamphlets from the Znanie society, and books from the various political publishing houses tend to be more simplistic

than those published by academic presses and designed for use by academics. The more popular publications seek to identify good guys and bad guys and to express support for stated Soviet foreign policy positions.

But there are differences in the types of conclusions that can be reached in different types of academic publications as well. The most "conservative" conclusions (those which would generate the least controversy) are generally found in works put together by a collective of authors. Even though in the last few years the Soviets have begun to reveal the identity of the authors of each of the chapters and sub-sections of such books, nonetheless, an effort still has to be made to arrive at a thesis that is acceptable to the entire collective. The process of writing and editing a collected work may take several years. Such collective works tend to be seen as authoritative statements designed to endure for several years and to be used by aspiring younger scholars and those in the periphery who have no personal connections to the ongoing scholarly debates in Moscow. Thus, the basic conservatism of many leading scholars is reinforced in such publications, particularly since the professional cost of guessing wrong in a widely circulated volume may be high.

Consequently, as was explained earlier, the conclusions reached about the relationship of religion to ideology in 1981 volume of Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost' were less far reaching than those that were simultaneously being published by leading Soviet Orientalists under their own names in lower

circulation publications. The same can be said to be true of the recently published volume, Islam v sovremennoi politike stran Vostoka. This volume attempted to synthesize the major conclusions of Soviet research on Islam from the late 1970s through the mid 1980s, but in seeking to reach commonly acceptable conclusions it failed to give any sense of the controversies which have characterized Soviet scholarship on the social and political role of Islam in recent years. The book focused more on the social and economic bases of the Islamic revival in the Muslim world than it did on the ideological foundations of the revival. Moreover, the book tried to lay blame for the revival on Western and especially U.S. policies in the area as well as on the further inequalities of development that followed the oil boom of the early 1970s. Thus, although the reader is left with a lot of factual information about the course that the Islamic revival has followed in the major Muslim nations, the collective of authors did not relate much of the sense of uncertainty about the future course of political development in the Muslim world that is conveyed to the reader of more specialized works of the very authors who participated in the volume.¹⁷⁴

The authority of the "responsible" editor is substantial. No project may be considered for publication without the participation of a senior editor who takes responsibility for the text. Moreover, for most works it is the revision that goes on after submission to the responsible editor that is generally the most critical, although all manuscripts will already have been sub-

jected to criticism by the author's scholarly collective. Most editors will not pass on a manuscript to a press if they feel that the work will be subject to severe censorship, as such censorship would be damaging for both the author and the editor alike. Thus, they edit a work both for content and for "approach".

Most distinguished senior scholars have a realistic idea of what can or cannot be published at a given time. When they misjudge a book, it may spend several years "sitting at the publisher", as it appears that censors at the academic publishing houses may edit out or edit in selected phrases but they simply refuse to publish "unacceptable" books rather than to edit them severely. Sometimes it is hard to predict what is acceptable to publish. Soviet scholars talk of "open" and "closed" questions. Most described the relationship between Islam and politics in the Muslim world as an "open" question, a question upon which reputations could be made if one guessed right as to the interpretive line that ultimately will be endorsed.

However, it is always hard to know how far one can stretch the acceptable limits of analysis on such questions.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, it is also debatable how open a question the issue of Islam and politics really is for Soviet scholars, as the conditions under which Islam can be judged progressive or reactionary are still tightly defined by Primakov's conclusions, which to date can only be attacked in print in the most indirect fashion. While some Soviet Orientalists used the occasion of the recent Third All-union Conference of Orientalists to call for casting off the

"modernization mentality" of Soviet scholarship in order to understand societies in their own terms through an appreciation of the indigenous sources of their behavior, there is little in the planned activities of IVAN to suggest that this change of focus is in the immediate offing.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, some scholars privately complained that it was currently virtually impossible to plan small conferences on strictly scholarly themes as all the conference money is to go for meetings on glasnost' and economic reform.

Given the continuing restrictions on free intellectual exchange, especially those imposed on printed scholarship, combined with the more material difficulties that scholars must confront, it is likely that the intellectual potential of researchers of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow and in the republic branches will continue not to be realized. Soviet studies of the political and social impact of Islam are likely to become more comprehensive and even somewhat more objective in the next few years as glasnost' begins to have greater impact on academic life. However there is little to suggest that the predominating ideology-based models will be abandoned, that the existing academic hierarchy will be dissolved, or that the prohibition against Soviet Orientalists studying conditions within the Soviet Union will be annulled. Without all of these changes Soviet Orientalists will continue to provide only limited information for those concerned with making strategic assessments of political stability in the Middle East and virtually no useful

information about the potential impact of world-wide currents in Islam on the Muslims of the Soviet Union.

NOTES

1. See Martha Brill Olcott, "The Iranian Revolution: A Crisis in Social Science Theory," in Dennis Thompson and Dov Ronen, editors, Ethnicity, Politics and Development (Boulder: Lynn Reiner Publishers), 1986.
2. Primakov was named director of IMEMO (Institute of International Economics and World Affairs) in November 1985 but served as de facto director of IVAN until February 1987 when M.S. Kapitsa, a former diplomat and Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, assumed the post.
3. These materials are summarized in the first half of the section "Soviet Orientalists and the Iranian Revolution."
4. E. M. Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiia stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka," Voprosy filosofii, no. 8, 1980, pp. 61-71.
5. Materialy XXVI S"ezda KPSS (Moscow, 1981), p. 13.
6. A good example of this is the article "Pod zelenym flagom Islama" which appeared in a number of republic newspapers, including Kazakhstanskaia pravda, on December 7, 1981. Another example is K. Kh. Tazhikova, "Islam and the Contemporary Islamic Struggle," Qazagstan ayelderi, no. 3, 1982, pp. 25-26, translated in JPRS USSR Political and Social Affairs, 82087, 26 October 1982, pp. 1-3.
7. V. I. Ivanov and A. A. Tamarishvili, "Nauchnye issledovaniia Instituta Vostokovedeniia AN SSSR v svete reshenii XXVI s"ezda KPSS," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1982, p. 116.
8. Personal communications with author.
9. "Religiia v stranakh Azii i Afriki," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 1, 1980.
10. They were L. R. Pojonskaia (IVAN), B. S. Frasov (IVAN), R. M. Sharipova (IVAN), I. I. Vysotskaia (Institute of Africa), V. N. Moskalenko (IVAN), A. I. Ionova (then of IVAN, as of January 1987 of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Central Committee of the CPSU), A. Kh. Vafa (IVAN), V. F. Deviatkina (IVAN), R. G. Landa (IVAN), N. O. Kosykhin

(Africa), Iu. N. Kobishchanov (Africa) and A. V. Malashchenko (IVAN).

11. I. R. Polonskaia, "Novaia tendentsiia modernizatsii Islama," in Religiia i obshchestvennaia mysl' stran Vostoka (Moscow, 1974), and her "Religiia v natsionalisticheskikh kontseptsiakh obshchestvennogo razvitiia," in Sovremennyi natsionalizm i obshchestvennoe razvitie zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1978).
12. B. S. Erasov, "Kontseptsii kul'turnoi samobytnosti v stranakh tret'ego mira, Voprosy filosofii, no. 11, 1971; and his "Problemy issledovaniia ideologii narodov Vostoka v novoe vremia," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 1, 1975.
13. A. I. Ionova, "Iz istorii formirovaniia ideologii musul'manskogo sotsializma v Indonezii," in Sovremennaia istoriografiia zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1970); and her "Sovremennaia ideinaia evoliutsiia islama (na primere stran Iugo-Vostochnoi Azii)," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1979.
14. A. B. Malashchenko, "Nekotorye tendentsii v religioznoi ideologii sovremennogo Alzhira," in Ekonomika, politika i ideologiiia stran Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1978).
15. Several of the most important works include Aktual'nye problemy stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1976); Bor'ba idei v sovremennom mire, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1978); E. A. Doroshenko, Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane (Moscow, 1975); R. G. Landa, Pod'em anticolonial'nogo dvizheniia v Alzhire v 1918-1931 (Moscow, 1977) and his Pod'em anticolonial'nogo dvizheniia v Alzhire 1939-1954 (Moscow, 1980); Z. I. Levin, Razvitie osnovnykh techenii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli Sirii i Egipta (novoe vremia) (Moscow, 1972) and his Razvitie arabskoi obshchestvennoi mysli 1917-1945 (Moscow, 1979); Natsional'nye problemy sovremennogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1977); Religiia i obshchestvennaia mysl' narodov Vostoka (Moscow, 1971); Religiia i obshchestvennaia mysl' narodov Vostoka (Moscow, 1974); Sovremennyi natsionalizm i obshchestvennoe razvitie zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1978); Strany Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka: Istoriia, ekonomika (Moscow, 1972); and Strany Srednego Vostoka: Istoriia, ekonomika, kul'tura (Moscow, 1980).
16. Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost', vol. 3 (Moscow, 1981). Most of the people involved in preparing the sections on religion and ideology were also involved in the 1980 round-table article.
17. E. M. Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiia stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka," in Religii Mira (Moscow, 1982); and his Vostok posle krakha kolonial'noi sistemy (Moscow, 1982) (translated and republished as The East After the

- Collapse of the Colonial System (Moscow, 1983)).
18. Natsionalizm v sovremennoi Afrike (Moscow, 1983).
 19. A similar function was served by the bibliographic essays which appeared at the end of the 1982-1984 volumes of Religii Mira, an annual of IVAN.
 20. M. T. Stepaniants, Islam v filosofskoi i obshchestvennoi mysli zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1974).
 21. M. T. Stepaniants, "Musul'manskoe vozrozhdenchestvo," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1983, pp. 20-29.
 22. L. R. Polonskaia and A. Kh. Vafa, Vostok: Idei i ideologii (Moscow, 1982). More popular versions of her argument appeared Nauka i religiia, no. 6, 1983, pp. 57-61 (as translated in JPRS USSR Political and Social Affairs, no. 84614, pp. 59-74) and "Islam i politika na sovremennom Vostoka," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 4, 1983.
 23. E. M. Primakov, "Volna 'islamskogo fundamentalizma': problemy i uroki," Voprosy filosofii, no. 6, 1985, pp. 63-73.
 24. His influence is described at length in Jerry Hough's The Soviet Union and the Third World (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., 1985).
 25. N. A. Simoniia, Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient (Moscow, 1985) (English translation of Sud'by kapitalizm na Vostoke), and Evoliutsiia vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo (Moscow, 1984).
 26. V. G. Khoros, "Osnovnye ideinye tendentsii v partiiakh natsional'noi i revoliutsionnoi demokratii," in Partii i revoliutsionnyi protsess v stranakh Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1983); V. G. Khoros, "Protivorechivyi kharakter massovogo soznaniia" and B.S. Erasov, "Massovoe soznanie v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh: sodержanie i dinamika peremen," in Ideologicheskie protsessy i massovoe soznanie v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1984); B. S. Erasov, Sotsial'no-kul'turnye traditsii i obshchestvennoe soznanie v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1982).
 27. Khoros's work is influenced more by Soviet scholars like Iu. V. Bromlei and I. S. Kon than by his fellow Orientalists.
 28. A. A. Prazauskas, "Aktual'nye problemy etnonatsional'nogo razvitiia stran Vostoka," Natsional'nyi vopros v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh Vostoka (Moscow, 1986).

29. For an account of the history of the Leningrad branch of IVAN, see "Leningradskoe otdelenie instituta vostokovedeniia AN SSSR," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1981.
30. Islam v istorii narodov Vostoka (Moscow, 1981). This book includes articles by M. B. Piotrovskii on Muhammad ("Mu-khammed, proroki, lzheproroki, kakhiny") and S. M. Prozorov on early Muslim dogma ("K istorii musul'manskoi dogmatiki: Murdzhity") as well as articles on the social and political role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (N. G. Prussakova, "Kontseptsiiia 'musul'manskoi natsii' i 'islamskogo gosudarstva': V ideologii dvizheniia i obrazovanie Pakistana (po rabotam indiiskih i pakistanskikh publisistov i istorikov)"; L. B. Volkova, "Rol' islama v vneshnei politike Saudovskoi Aravii v 60-70-e gody"; and R. N. Stepanov, "Nekotorye nabliudeniia otnositel'no sovremennykh protsessov v islame (na primere Egipta)").
31. One notable exception to this was M. T. Stepaniants, Islam v filosofskoi i obshchestvennoi mysli zarubezhnogo Vostoka (XIX-XX vv) (Moscow, 1974).
32. M. B. Piotrovskii, "Svetskoe i dukhovnoe v teorii i praktike srednevekovogo islama," and S. M. Prozorov, "Shiitskaia (imamitskaia) doktrina verkhovnoi vlasti," in Islam: Religiiia, obshchestvo, gosudarstvo (Moscow, 1984); M. B. Piotrovskii, Iuzhnaia Araviia v rannee srednevekov'e (Moscow, 1985); Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn' na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma (Moscow, 1985).
33. Sotsial'no-politicheskie predstavleniia v Islame: Istoriia i sovremennost' (Moscow, 1988). This volume includes contributions by M. V. Piotrovskii, A. A. Ignatenko, A. I. Ionova and Z. I. Levin.
34. E. A. Frolova, "Otnoshenie k nauke i nauchnomu znaniiu v arabskoi filosofii i sovremennaia ideologicheskaiia bor'ba," G. B. Shaimukhambetova, "Problema genezisa srednevekovoi arabskoi filosofii i sovremennaia ideologicheskaiia bor'ba," and M. T. Stepaniants, "Filosofskoe nasledie sufizma v sovremennom mire", in Filosofskoe nasledie narodov Vostoka i sovremennost' (Moscow, 1983); E. A. Frolova, Problemy very i znaniia v Arabskoi filosofii (Moscow, 1983); T. Stepaniants, Musul'manskii kontseptsii v filosofii i politike XIX-XX vv (Moscow, 1984); G. B. Shaimukhambetova, "O sostoianii, problemakh i perspektivakh izucheniia filosofskoi mysli zarubezhnogo Vostoka," Voprosy filosofii, no. 11, 1985; Filosofiiia i religiiia na zarubezhnom Vostoke XX vek (Moscow, 1985).

35. A. V. Sagadeev, Ibn-Sina (Avicenna), second edition (Moscow, 1985). He was also the "responsible" editor for the recent volume Filosofiiia zarubezhnogo Vostoka o strial'noi sushchnosti cheloveka (Moscow, 1986), which included his article "Filosofskaia rabinzonada".
36. L. R. Polonskaia, "Sovremennye musul'manskie ideinye tehnieniia," in Islam: Problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow, 1985).
37. Levin occupies a position between both groups.
38. "Islam v poiskakh 'tret'evo puti' razvitiia," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 1, 1987, pp. 17-27.
39. The material in this section which relates to the period 1978-1983 is a revision and expansion of some material which appeared in Martha Brill Olcott, "The Iranian Revolution: A Crisis in Social Science Theory," in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen editors, Ethnicity, Politics, and Development (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1986).
40. As reported in personal communications with S. Aliev, E. Doroshenko and V. Kliastorina.
41. For some examples of scholarship from this period see A. I. Demin, Sel'skoe khoziastvo sovremennogo Irana (Moscow, 1967); Iran (Moscow, 1976); Istoriia Irana (Moscow, 1977); M. S. Ivanov, Iran v 60-70 gody XX veka (Moscow, 1977).
42. For some classic studies on Iran see A. E. Krymskii, Istoriia Persii, ee literatury i dervishskoi teosofii (Moscow, 1912); E. E. Bertels', Izbrannye sochineniia (Moscow, 1965); and I. P. Petrushevskii, Islam v Irane v vii-xv vv (Leningrad, 1966).
43. E. A. Doroshenko, "Nekotorye aspekty shiitsko-sunnitskikh otnoshenii," in Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1982), pp. 118-19.
44. Ibid., p. 127.
45. B. V. Kliastorina, "Kul'tura i 'kul'turnoe nasledie' v kontseptsiiakh iranskikh burzhuaznykh ideologov (70e gody XXv)," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 2, 1978, pp. 95-107.
46. R. A. Ul'ianovskii, "Iranskaia revoliutsiia i ee osobennosti," Kommunist, no. 10, 1982, pp. 106-116, as quoted by V. I. Maksimenko, "Analiz Iranskoi Revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg. v sovetskoi vostokovednoi literature," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1987, p. 162. This is also the position taken in R. A. Ul'ianovskii, Pobedy i trudnosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'noi bor'by (Moscow, 1985).

47. They also include prominent generalists studying Iran, such as A. B. Reznikov, author of Iran: Padenie shakhsnogo rezhima (Moscow, 1983).
48. E. A. Doroshenko, "Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v Irane," Nauka i religia, no. 9, 1983, p. 28.
49. S. M. Aliev, "Problems of Political Development of Iran," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 11, 1980, pp. 15-19, translated in JPRS, USSR Political and Social Affairs, 1092, 8 January 1981, p. 5. See also S. L. Agaev, "O poniatii i sushchnosti 'Islamskoi revoliutsii'," Azii i Afrika segodnia, no. 5, 1984, pp. 27-31.
50. S. L. Agaev, "Revoliutsionnye dvizheniia i reformy v Irane," in Revoliutsionnyi protsess na Vostoke (Moscow, 1982), pp. 270-308.
51. E. A. Doroshenko, "Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v Irane," Nauka i religia, no. 9, 1983.
52. S. L. Agaev, "O poniatii i sushchnosti 'Islamskoi revoliutsii'," Azii i Afrika segodnia, no. 5, 1984, pp. 27-31.
53. S. L. Agaev, "O poniatii i sushchnosti 'islamskoi revoliutsii'," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 5, 1984, pp. 29-30.
54. I failed to meet him despite repeated efforts.
55. S. L. Agaev, Iran: rozhdenie respubliky (Moscow, 1984).
56. E. A. Doroshenko, Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane, 2nd edition (Moscow, 1985).
57. V. B. KliashTORina, "'Vostok-Zapad' v kontekste sovremennoi iranskoi kul'tura," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1985, pp. 45-55.
58. S. M. Aliev, Neft' i obshchestvenno-politicheskoe razvitie Irana v XX v (Moscow, 1985).
59. A. K. Lukoianov, "Vzgliady shiitskikh ideologov Irana na problemy sobstvennosti v kontekste islamskoi ekonomiki," in Islam: Problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow, 1985).
60. A. Z. Arabadzhan, Iran: Izmeneniia v otraslevoi strukture ekonomiki v 60-70 godakh (Moscow, 1983), and his Otraslevaia struktura ekonomiki razvivaiushchikhsia stran: Istoriograficheski ocherk (Moscow, 1984).

61. A. G. Arabadzhan, "Iranskaia revolutsiia, prichiny i uroki," Azii i Afrika segodnia, no. 3, 1986, pp. 32-36, 59, and no. 4, pp. 19-22, 38.
62. V. I. Maksimenko, "Analiz iranskoj revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg. v sovetskoi vostokovednoi literature," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1987, pp. 162-172.
63. S. L. Agaev, "K istoriografii iranskoj revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg.," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 2, 1988, pp. 199-205.
64. S. Agaev, "Zhivye bomby," Nauka i religiia, no. 5, 1987, pp. 44-47.
65. V. G. Korgun, Afganistana v 20-30e gody XX v (Moscow, 1979).
66. V. G. Korgun, Intelligentsiia v politicheskoi zhizni Afganistana (Moscow, 1983).
67. V. G. Korgun, "Islam i natsionalizm v Afganistane," in Islam i problema natsionalizma v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1986).
68. For some examples see N. M. Gurevich, Afganistan, Nekotorye osobennosti sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia: 1919-1977 (Moscow, 1983); the collection of essays, Afganistan: Ekonomika, Politika, Istoriia (Moscow, 1984); and Sh. Imanov, Obshchestvennaia mysl' Afganistane v pervoi treti godakh XX v (Moscow, 1986).
69. A. D. Davydov, Agrarnoe zakonodatel'stvo Demokraticheskoi Respubliki Afganistana (Moscow, 1984), and N. A. Khal'fin, Zaria svobody nad Kabulom (Moscow, 1985).
70. For information about the use of Tadzhik-speaking scholars from Central Asia in Afghanistan, see the section on "The National Problem and Oriental Studies".
71. While senior specialists of Afghanistan like Korgun were expected to travel to Kabul on a regular basis, Soviet Iranian specialists who had the necessary language skills and background seem to have been given the opportunity to travel to Kabul also, but on a more voluntary basis. For Soviet scholars of Iran, travel to Afghanistan would have been outside their original scholarly plans, but there were a number of professional perks to reward them for the inconveniences that travel to Kabul brought them.
72. For a good example of current "scholarly" writings on Afghanistan, see V. I. Spol'nikov, "Protivniki protsessa uregulirovaniia," Azii i Afrika segodnia, no. 12, 1988, pp. 18-22. The author of this article (titled in English,

"Opponents of the Process of Regularization"), which focuses on the destabilizing influence of the "reactionary" religiously inspired opposition in Afghanistan, is identified as a scholar at IVAN SSSR and a Major General in the Red Army reserves.

73. For some early scholarship on Egypt see P. V. Kitaigorodskii, Egipet v bor'be za nezavisimost' (Moscow, 1925), F. A. Rotshtein, Anglichane v Egipte (Moscow, 1925), L. V. Vatolina, Sovremennyi Egipet (Moscow, 1949), and L. Sh. Gordonov, Egipet (Moscow, 1953).
74. Z. I. Levin, Razvitie osnovnykh techenii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli Sirii i Egipta (noyoe vremia) (Moscow, 1972), and his Razvitie arabskoi obshchestvennoi mysli 1917-1945 (Moscow, 1979); T. P. Tikhonova, Svetskaiia kontseptsia arabskogo natsionalizma Saty al'-Husri (Moscow, 1984).
75. A good example of just such a work is A. M. Mamedov's new study of religion and politics in Egypt, Islam i problemy sotsial'no-kul'turnogo razvitiia Arabskikh stran (Baku, 1986).
76. For some examples see N. A. Dlin, Ob"edinennaia Arabskaia Respublika (Egipet) (Moscow, 1963), M. F. Gataullin, Ekonomika OAR na novom puti (Moscow, 1966), and I. S. Matiukhin, Ob"edinennaia Arabskaia Respublika: Ekonomika i vneshnaia trgovlia (Moscow, 1966).
77. For some examples see, L. A. Fridman, Egipet 1882-1952: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaiia struktura derevni (Moscow, 1973), I. P. Beliaev and E. M. Primakov, Egipet vremia prezidenta Nasera (Moscow, 1974), and V. A. Lutskevich, Egipet v bor'be za ekonomicheskuiu nezavisimost' (1952-1971) (Moscow, 1976).
78. Iu. Sedov, "Egipet," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 5, 1985, pp. 36-39.
79. A. Vasil'ev, "Islamskii fundamentalizm v Egipte," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 1, 1986.
80. An encyclopedic, but not very analytically sophisticated, attempt at making sweeping claims about the course of ideological developments in the Arab world is D. B. Malyshova's Religiia i obshchestvenno-politicheskoe razvitie arabskikh i afrikanskikh stran: 79-80-e gody (Moscow, 1986).
81. Z. I. Levin, "Arabskii regional'nyi natsionalizm i panarabizm," in Natsional'nyi vopros v stranakh vostoka (Moscow, 1982), and his "Islam v arabskikh stranakh: Neotraditsionalizm i vozrozhdenchestvo (vtoraia polovina XX v)," in Zarubezhnyi Vostok: religioznye traditsii i sovremennost' (Moscow, 1983). V. N. Kornev's effort to typologize tradi-

tional religious movements in Islam ("O roli religioznoi traditsii v stranakh zarubezhnogo Vostoka [Primenenie metoda sistemnogo analiza k opredeleniiu kharakteristik religioznoi traditsii])" and I. I. Ivanova's article about Turkey ("Islam v politicheskoi zhizni Turtsii [1950-1980]").

82. Z. I. Levin, Razvitie arabskoi obshchestvennoi mysli (Moscow, 1984).
83. I was able to talk with Levin during each of my three recent trips to the U.S.S.R.
84. Z. I. Levin, Islam i natsionalizm v stranakh zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1988).
85. Z. I. Levin, "O predelakh radikal'nosti 'islamskogo sotsializma'," in Islam: Problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow, 1985).
86. These included N. G. Kireev, "Problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Turtsii v turetskikh kontseptsiiakh 'islamskoi ekonomiki'," O. A. Zhigalina, "Rol' islama v razvitiu ideologii kurdskogo natsional'nogo dvizheniia v Irane," and E. A. Doroshenko, "Nekotorye aspekty shiitsko-sunnitskikh otnoshenii," all in Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1982).
87. T. P. Miloslavskaiia, "Deiatel'nost' 'Brat'ev-Musul'man' v stranakh Vostoka," in Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1982). In the same year she published "Nachal'nyi etap deiatel'nosti assotsiatsii 'Brat'ev-Musul'man'," in Religii Mira, 1982 (Moscow, 1982).
88. A. Kudriavtsev, "Brat'ia-Musul'mane," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 11, 1988, pp. 43-44.
89. A. Akhmedov, "Pod flagom islama," Argumenty 1981 (Moscow, 1981).
90. A. M. Vasil'ev, "Egipetskii natsionalizm i panarabizm," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 1, 1987.
91. R. Ia. Aliev, "Islam v ideologii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia," Islam i sovremennost' (Leningrad, 1985).
92. A. A. Ignatenko, Khalify bez khalifata (Moscow, 1988), pp. 27-39.
93. Soviet scholars may always volunteer to write about themes that are not included in their personal "plans" of work, and if these articles or books are published they are paid at a "freelance" rate for these publications.

94. In a situation where Soviet policy makers do not have as complex an agenda, as in their support for the Kurdish autonomist movement, Soviet scholars are willing to credit both sides with using religion as a weapon. For an example see O. A. Zhigalina "Natsional'no-religioznaia politika rukovodstva Islamskoi Respubliki Iran v Iranskom Kurdistane," in Islam i problemy natsionalizma v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1986).
95. L. Notin, "The Iran-Iraq Conflict," JPRS, USSR International Affairs, no. 86-006, pp. 106-113.
96. N. S. Podkolzin, "'Shiitskii vopros' v Irake v usloviakh Irano-irakskoi voyny," in Vliianie "islamskogo faktora" na mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Azii i Severnoi Afrike i politike Zapada na sovremennom etape (Moscow, 1985).
97. "Islamskii faktor" v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh v Azii (Moscow, 1987).
98. E. P. Pir-Budagova and T. B. Gasanov, "Islam v ideologii partii arabskogo sotsialisticheskogo vozrozhdeniia," Islam i problema natsionalizma v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1986).
99. V. A. Ushakov, "'Islamskii faktor' vo vneshnei politike Irana," in "Islamskii faktor" v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh v Azii (Moscow, 1987).
100. For a good introduction to Soviet scholarship on North Africa see Strany Severnoi Afriki (Moscow, 1984).
101. R. Ia. Aliev, "Islam kak komponent natsionalizma," Aktual'nye voprosy istoriografii Vostoka novogo i noveishego vremeni; Problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v stranakh Azii i Severnoi Afriki v sovetskoi i zarubezhnoi istoriografii 50-80-x XX veka (Moscow, 1985); and his "Islam v ideologii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia (na primere nekotorykh arabskikh stran)," Islam i sovremennost' (Leningrad, 1985).
102. Before taking up an academic appointment, Aliev worked in Yemen as an instructor in the Higher Party School in Aden and as a journalist in Algeria, living abroad for a total of four years. Through a combination of both Party and Azerbaidzhani academic contacts he has been able to continue to travel abroad in the Middle East on a regular basis.
103. V. I. Komar, Ideino-politicheskoe razvitie FNO Alzhira (1954-1984) (Moscow, 1985); Strany Severnoi Afriki (Moscow, 1984). See also E. G. Pozdorovkina, Trudovye resursy Alzhirskoi demokraticeskoi respubliki; Problemy formirovaniia i

ispol'zovaniia (Moscow, 1984).

104. R. G. Landa, Upravlencheskie kadry stran Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1985).
105. A. V. Malashenko, "Vozdeistvie religioznogo faktora i natsionalizma na formirovanie ideologicheskoi doktriny sovremennoi Livii," in Islam: Problemy, ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow, 1985).
106. Z. A. Menteshashvili, Sotsial'noe razvitie nezavisimogo Morokko: Traditsii i sovremennost' (Moscow, 1988).
107. N. I. Voronchanina, "Musul'manskoe dvizhenie v sovremennom Tunise: Ideologiya i politika," Islam: Problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow, 1985), V. A. Mel'iantsev, "Problemy industrial'nogo razvitiia Marokko i Tunisa (1956-1983)," L. P. Zudina, "Politika SDP i polozhenie v tunisskoi derevne," E. V. Pavlutskaia, "Sel'skokhoziaistvennye rabochie Marokko," Arabskie strany: Istorii, ekonomika, politika (Moscow, 1986), and V. I. Gusarov, Trudovye resursy i sotsial'nye problemy Tunisa (Moscow, 1985).
108. Saudovskaia Araviia: Spravochnik (Moscow, 1980).
109. A. M. Vasil'ev, Istorii Saudovskoi Aravii (Moscow, 1982).
110. A. I. Iakovlev, Saudovskaia Araviia i zapad (Moscow, 1982).
111. A. E. Primakov, Persidskii Zaliv: Neft i monopolii (Moscow, 1983); Arabskie strany: neft i differentsiia (Moscow, 1984).
112. L. V. Val'kova, Saudovskaia Araviia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh (Moscow, 1979).
113. E. S. Melkumian, "Vliianie 'islamskogo faktora' na deiatel'nost' soveta sotrudnichestva arabskikh gosudarstv persidskogo zaliva," in Vliianie "islamskogo faktora" na mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Azii i Severnoi Afrike i politika zapada na sovremennom etape (Moscow, 1985).
114. R. M. Sharipova, "Ekonomicheskie kontseptsii ideologov Ligi islamskogo mira," in Islam: Problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki (Moscow 1985), and her Panislamizm segodnia (ideologiya i praktika Ligi islamskogo mira) (Moscow, 1986).
115. E. S. Melkumov, "'Islamskii faktor' v deiatel'nosti soveta sotrudnichestva arabskikh gosudarstv persidskogo zaliva," in "Islamskii faktor" v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh v Azii (Moscow, 1987), pp. 88-102.

116. R. Ia. Aliev, Islam v kontseptsiiakh "Natsional'nogo Sotsializma" (Alzhir, Egipt, NKRI (Baku, 1987), 107-127.
117. In the volume "Islamskii faktor" v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh v Azii (Moscow, 1987), there was one article which discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict (A. V. Kudriavtsev's "Kontseptsia 'islamskogo resheniia' blizhnevostochnoi problemy") which described how the invocation of themes of Islamic unity could not be sufficient to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the absence of some punitive action toward Western imperialist aggression.
118. A good example of the sort of literature that one gets instead is The Palestinian Problem: Aggression, Resistance, Ways of Settlement (Moscow, 1984).
119. A. Kh. Kamilov, "Livanskii krizis 1975-1978 (vnutrennie i vneshnie prichiny)," Vostokovedenie (Tashkent, 1978); Vneshniaia politika stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka (Moscow, 1984); P. Demichenko, "The Gordian Knot of Lebanon," Argumenty i fakty, no. 31, 30 (July, 1985), pp. 4-5, JPRS USSR International Affairs, 85-019, December 6, 1985; N. M. Gorbunova, "Livan nakapune grazhdanskoi voiny (1975-1976)," in Arabskie strany: Istoriiia, ekonomika, politika (Moscow, 1986).
120. For some examples see I. Blishchenko, "Livan 'mirnoe' soglashenie i ego plody," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 1, 1984; S. Maksimov, "Dereve v kletke," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 3, 1985; S. Maksimov, "Ramadan v Beirute," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 5, 1986.
121. L. I. Medvedko and A. V. Germanovich, Imenem Allakha... (Moscow, 1988), pp. 213-230.
122. M. Gol'denberg, "Terrorizm vo slavy iazhve," Nauka i religiiia, no. 3, 1982; K. Matveev, "Maronity vchera i segodnia," Nauka i religiiia, no. 7, 1985.
123. S. I. Stoklitskii, Livan: Trevogi i nadezhdy (Moscow, 1988).
124. It seems safe to assume that Nauka was the only press that would take the volume, as given the more lucrative contracts offered by general publishing houses such as Politizdat or Mysl' it is hard to imagine that Nauka would have been the author's first choice.
125. M. A. Rodionov, "Maronity v livanskom obschestve," Rasy i narody, no. 5, 1985, Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost', vol. 2 (Moscow, 1978), p. 265; Natsional'nyi vopros v stranakh Vostoka (Moscow, 1982), p. 229.

170. I got to see how that worked when an Azerbaidzhani scholar that I invited to America to work on a proposed collaborative book was never able to get the Academy of Sciences in Moscow even to respond to the request made by the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaidzhan for a visa.
171. As indicated earlier, they are free to write, on their own time, articles and books that "fall outside the plan," for which they get paid extra.
172. One could almost argue that the atmosphere of debate had become so heady as even to impede scholarship, as most scholars were so wrapped up in the revelation of information about the Soviet past that they applied only a minimum of their attention to their own academic work.
173. Glavlit is the central censorship bureau.
174. Islam v sovremennoi politike stran Vostoka (konets 70-x - nachalo 80-x godov XX v) (Moscow, 1986).
175. When L. R. Polonskaia agreed to be responsible editor for a manuscript on Islam and nationalism in the Arab world which I attempted to prepare with R. Ia. Aliev of IVAN, AzSSR, she also pointed out that she could not guarantee that such a work would ultimately be published in the U.S.S.R., although she was confident that we could publish separate single-author pieces from it.
176. G. F. Kim, "Vostokovedenie v usloviakh perestroiki," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 5, 1988, p. 9.

147. For some examples see A. G. Stamboltsian, Vnutrenniaia politika pravitel'stva natsional'noi burzhuazii irana v 1951-1953 gg. (Erevan, 1984), and M. T. Bodzholian, Reformy 10-30-x gg. XIX veka v osmanskoj imperii (Erevan, 1984).
148. I sought to go to Uzbekistan in January 1986 at the height of a purge of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. The Uzbeks granted me permission to go to IVAN Uzbekistan on my 1988 trip, but I couldn't work this komandirovka into my schedule.
149. Their writings are found in the recent collection of essays Zarubezhnyi Vostok: Osobennosti, ideologii, i politiki (Tashkent, 1985).
150. Recent publications include Blizhnii i Srednij Vostok (Baku, 1986), A. M. Mamedov, Islam i problemy sotsial'no-kul'turnogo razvitiia Arabskikh stran (Baku, 1986), and R. A. Mursalov, Ideologicheskie aspekty politiki neprisoedineniia (na primere Arabskikh stran) (Baku, 1986).
151. Although Buniatov himself has recently come under attack for downplaying the Armenian contribution to ancient Albania (Azerbaidzhan in the seventh and eighth centuries). See Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1988, p. 140.
152. Many Azerbaidzhani scholars of Iran had virtually no Russian language skills, which effectively cut them off from the greater Soviet scholarly community.
153. Many of these works are not available in Cyrillic script editions for Soviet Azerbaidzhani readers.
154. A recent example is R. Ia. Aliev and A. N. Mamedov, Islam va Arab olkelerinde milli-azadlyg herekaty (Baku, 1986), and the bilingual Vopros natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostokey (Baku, 1985).
155. One Orientalist and I had a serious fight when I told him that it was against Soviet law to circumcise a child, except for health reasons. He refused to accept this because he said that all Azerbaidzhani boys were routinely circumcised.
156. D. M. Anarkulova, Sotsial'no-politicheskaiia bor'ba v Irane v seredine XIX v (Moscow, 1983).
157. His most visible publication in recent months was an editorial on Islam, published in Pravda on January 23, 1987, and then reprinted in several of the Muslim republic newspapers in the weeks that followed.

158. A. T. Tursunov, "Nekotorye teoreticheskie problemy vzaimodeistviia kul'tur i tsivilizatsii," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 5, 1988, pp. 20-27.
159. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, August 4, 1987, pp. 1-3.
160. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, February 16, 1989, p. 1.
161. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, August 4, 1987, p. 2.
162. This individual is best left anonymous.
163. Personal communications with the author. My friends argued over whether Primakov was advocating this position to keep the institute from doing research that would attract unwanted critical attention or because he really accepted the ideological platitudes which argued that Islam could not exist as a political force in a communist society.
164. Islam: Slovar' ateista (Moscow, 1988). This volume includes entries on all of the principal Islamic figures of the Muslim peoples of the USSR and their religiously inspired political movements, including some of those who resisted Russian or Soviet rule.
165. Doctors of Science are only required to spend two days a week at the institute; all other scholars must spend three days a week at the institute.
166. For example, the members of the department of ideology were unaware of the existence of the A. A. Ignatenko manuscript Khalifat bez khalify prior to publication, and found out about it only because I bought a copy at a Moscow bookstore.
167. Young scholars in Moscow seem to do at least one stint abroad, assigned to the country of their specialization, and many use this as an opportunity to gather materials for their candidate's dissertation. Sometimes those who specialized in Oriental studies at the university may work abroad for a few years to save a nest egg and to collect materials that will make them more attractive candidates to be given aspirant status at a branch of the Academy of Sciences.
168. In fact, on the eve of the 1988 New Year's holiday the payroll never arrived at all and IVAN employees had to go into the holiday weekend with only what cash they had in hand.
169. There was a modern out-house installed in the garden a short distance away.

126. O. A. Komarova, "Rost politicheskogo vliianiia shiitskoi obshchiny i ego znachenie v razvitii livanskogo krizisa," in Vliianie "islamskogo faktora" na mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Azii i Severnoi Afrike i politika Zapada na sovremennom etape (sbornik tezisov) (Moscow, 1985).
127. A. A. Ignatenko, Khalify bez Khalifata (Moscow, 1988), pp. 40-48.
128. For an account of the history of IVAN Armenia see "Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk Armianskoi SSR," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1979.
129. For a history of IVAN Uzbekistan see "Tsentri vostokovednoi nauki v Uzbekistane," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 3, 1979, p. 147.
130. For a history of IVAN Tadzhikistan see "Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 5, 137-138.
131. For a history of IVAN Azerbaidzhan see "Institut narodov Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka Akademii Nauk Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1982, pp. 53-60. The institute again goes under its former name of IVAN AzSSR.
132. Detailed accounts of the historical development of orientalist research in Azerbaidzhan, Armenia and Georgia are found in the recently published Vostokovednye tsentry v SSSR (Moscow, 1988); there are plans for a second volume to be written on the development of research in the Central Asian republics.
133. Its reformulation is described in "Vsesoiuznaia assotsiatsiia vostokovedov (uchreditel'noe zasedanie nauchnoi obshchestvennosti)," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 2, 1981, p. 169. For an account of some of its subsequent activities see "Nauchnaia zhizn'," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 2, 1985, pp. 147-149.
134. Some first steps to organize such a body were made in 1957, when a founding conference of an All-union Association of Orientalists was held, but there was no follow-up to this meeting.
135. One exception to this was that senior scholars from Moscow might be called upon to be "opponents" (official examiners) in the defense of candidate of science dissertations in republic centers.
136. The organizational efforts of these republic scholars have been viewed as lesser as well as greater successes. Stories of the 1986 Tbilisi conference have become fabled in Moscow, as too few bedrooms were reserved and too much wine (in mineral water bottles) was poured at a supposedly dry conference.

137. Many of the papers that were delivered at this session were published in Aktual'nye problemy filosofskoi i obshchestvennoi mysli Zarubezhnogo Vostoka (Dushanbe, 1983).
138. Early accounts of the conference appeared in Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 10, 1983, and Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1983, pp. 21-27.
139. Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie: Problemy i perspektivy (Moscow, 1988).
140. Aktual'nye voprosy istoriografii Vostoka novogo i noveishego vremeni: Problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v stranakh Azii i Severnoi Afriki v sovetskoi i zarubezhnoi istoriografii 50-80-x XX veka; Tezisy: Zvenigorod, 16-20 December 1985 (Moscow, 1985).
141. Vliianie "islamskogo faktora" na mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Azii i Severnoi Afrike i politika Zapada na sovremennom etape (Moscow, 1985).
142. There was a section on the conference in Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 5, 1988, pp. 3-27, which included a general account by G. F. Kim and A. T. Tursonov's welcoming address. There was a report on the proceedings of the section on culture and civilization in Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, pp. 136-144.
143. L. B. Aliev and S. S. Nikiforova, "Vsaimodeistvie i vsaimovliianie kul'tur i tsivilizatsii," Narody Azii i Afriki, no. 6, 1988, p. 141.
144. As with the 1983 meeting, the conference was welcomed by the first secretary of the host-republic communist party, but this address was not well publicized outside of the republic; the main address of the conference was delivered by the institute deputy director rather than the director and consequently received virtually no outside comment.
145. Tezisy konferentsii aspirantov i molodykh nauchnykh sotrudnikov. Tom I. Voprosy istorii, ideologii, filosofii, kul'tury narodov Vostoka. Istochnikovedenie, istoriografiia (Moscow, 1981); Problemy politiki, ideologii, kul'tury stran sovremennogo Vostoka (Moscow, 1983).
146. For some examples of recent writings on Turkey by IVAN SSSR scholars see Turtsiia: Istoriia, ekonomika, politika (Moscow, 1984); see especially I. L. Fadeeva, "Islam v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni sovremennoi Turtsii." She is also the author of Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii v politike osmanskoj imperii (osmanizm - panislamizm) XIX - nachalo XX v (Moscow, 1985).