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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: STATE ORGANIZED TERROR:
THE CASE OF VIOLENT INTERNAL REPRESSION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 2-5, 1988 over 200 scholars gathered to hear and discuss 42 papers given by political scientists, sociologists, and historians on the subject of the use of terroristic violence by the state against its own citizens. The conference brought together scholars from 11 nations to present studies of terroristic rule by regimes of widely varying political ideologies in many different regions of the world including Eastern Europe, Nazi Germany, Latin America, Africa, China, Southeast Asia, and others. Special emphasis was placed on the Great Soviet Terror of the 1930's as a prototypical case deserving of commemoration on the fiftieth anniversary of its height. This conference was the most interdisciplinary and globally comparative attempt to date to explore the subject of state-perpetrated, internally directed terror, a form of terror which has been severely neglected in scholarship and a phenomenon whose origins, processes, and consequences need to be understood by all those who wish to further the respect for human rights.

The human rights perspective from which the conference was organized, would have us identify and combat violations of individual rights without regard to the ideology or institutional form of the states in which they occur. Such a perspective takes the dehumanizing experience of terror, whether as its victim or as a perpetrator, as the common core of all episodes of terror. While the political, social, and economic factors associated with state organized terror vary importantly from case to case, the
conference nevertheless confirmed the sense that parallels run deep and that each of the cases considered could be better understood when examined in conjunction with the others.

We therefore present here a generic and composite description of state organized terror based on analysis of all of the papers presented at the conference. This description takes the form of 8 political, economic, and social conditions which contribute to the emergence of terror, and 12 political and social processes that are central to the period of terror itself. Several of these processes are classified as self-reinforcing aspects of terror and several are classified as self-limiting. Two of these processes concern the aftermath of terror. Not all of the conditions and processes of state organized terror are salient or even present in every case, but presenting all of them together as a composite picture of terror should help provide a framework for thinking about and analyzing each individual case, including cases not discussed at the conference. The names of authors of conference papers dealing most directly with each of the conditions and processes are noted in brackets.

This summary report of conference themes concludes with a list of future trends related to state organized terror, and recommendations concerning future study of terror and international humanitarian intervention against it. What follows should not be regarded as an objective record of the consensus of conference participants but as the organizers' interpretation of the proceedings.
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EMERGENCE
OF STATE ORGANIZED TERROR

(1) Dominance of False Conceptions of Society

Terroristic regimes are typically animated by ideologies sharply at odds with reality and by unrealistic ambitions for social and economic control. Communist regimes such as those in the Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea, see society in terms of class struggle and attempt to radically transform feudal and capitalist structures of land tenure and enterprise. One party, military dominated regimes tend to see the nation as an organism that must be dedicated to survival in the face of external aggressors whose agents are behind all independent political movements within the country. The "National Security Doctrine" of the Argentine military in the 1970's and the concept of "total onslaught" guiding the South African government today are examples. The idea of the embattled, organic state provides a framework and reinforcement for the ideas of social engineering, eugenics, and racial purification. [Pion-Berlin, Rittersporn, Friedman, Riordan, Maley, Fein, Adelman]

(2) Disarray of State Institutions

Most episodes of state organized terror, even in cases such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia where the state has seemed monolithic and all powerful to its victims and external enemies, grow out of a context of great institutional chaos and disorganization which breeds particularly intense political rivalries within the state apparatus. This
chaos may exist because the state's various agencies have no clearly defined mission or means of carrying out their duties, or have overlapping responsibilities. Chaos is often great in states in early stages of formation when concepts of public service to the nation and bureaucratic order have a weak hold on ill-trained personnel. The danger in such political chaos, particularly where the state is facing obvious and severe economic problems or military threat, is the emergence of political rhetoric emphasizing boundless will and energy and simplistic absolutes. Such rhetoric will take root and thrive because there are no established bureaucratic structures of decision making or political norms that support balanced evaluation of policies. [Rittersporn, Wegner, Shernock, Bacon, Maley]

(3) Belief in Total Command and Control as the Norm for the Relationship of Leader to State and State to Society Despite their chaotic nature, the dominant political ideology of terroristic regimes usually pictures the agencies of the state with the power to command social change (or stability) and the state's leader with the power to control the agencies of the state. Progress is conceived to depend on the strength of the leader's power of command and the destruction of anyone who would threaten to disrupt the implementation of command. The image of a strictly top-down, pyramidal exercise of power is often legitimized and reinforced by a personality cult or a belief in the religious authority of the head of state. Thus most cases of
state terror are closely associated with the concentration of power in a single leader such as Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, Jim Jones, Khomeini, Pinochet, etc. [Rittersporn, Bacon, Pion-Berlin, Mahdi, Salehi, Fein, Vanderpool]

(4) Politically Unsophisticated and Passive Population  Although terror is often a response to social unrest and popular resistance to state actions, the state's use of terror for political control is more frequent where the population has traditionally been politically passive. While popular resistance is aimed at reversing the violence and injustice of state actions, it does not necessarily aim at democratic participation in affairs of the state and it may not be coupled with a capacity to see and understand the political dynamics in ruling circles. Such was the case in Iran where people rebelling against the repression of the Shah were ready to submit to Khomeini's authority. Terror can even be justified to a naive population, as it was by Stalin, as a method of purging those elements in the leadership and bureaucracy which supposedly are at fault for the violence of the terror itself as well as for the economic and military failures of the state. The general population remains unable to distinguish the war against society from the war against society's enemy and is ready to acquiesce in violent political upheavals and terror as attempts to return state and society to the right path. Modern mass communication often makes the situation worse since it is
more effectively used to control political perceptions than to inform. [McCagg, D. Shlapentokh, Mahdi, Salehi, Richter]

(5) Unequal Economic Growth  Economic growth has often created large numbers of landless peasants and a new industrial working class which have lost their economic security while commercial and political elites have grown wealthy. The resulting political volatility and mobilization of large sectors of the population has motivated severe repression in response or has caused revolutions that have installed repressive regimes. Economic factors in state terror have been most salient in Latin America and are becoming more important in Africa with increased industrialization. The volatility of the economically suffering Soviet peasants and workers amidst the visible wealth of ruling elites played a key role in bringing about Stalin's Great Terror as well. [D. Shlapentokh, Weissman, Brockett, Howard, McCamant]

(6) State Dependence on Support of a Foreign Power  Repressive and terroristic regimes have often been regimes that have gained power with the military, financial and political support of another, more powerful state. The clearest examples are the Eastern European nations and Afghanistan, but several severely repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere have come to power as a result of U.S. support. Such externally installed regimes tend to lack legitimacy and an orientation and ability to be responsive to citizens' needs and so are more likely to resort to violent repression for control. [Adelman, Maley, Lewellen]
Many violent regimes in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, though not installed by external powers, have built up their security and police forces with heavy foreign assistance, leaving other state institutions relatively underdeveloped. Such foreign aid has been aimed largely at maintaining secure conditions for production and trade by keeping volatile opposition political activity in check and at increasing influence to achieve geopolitical goals. However, the relative overdevelopment of the state's means of coercion has meant that leaders are heavily influenced by military doctrine and are more likely to deal with internal political problems by force, and by extension, terror. [Pion-Berlin, Thaxton, Salehi, McCamant, Howard]

(7) **Civil War and International Conflict**  War with other nations or civil war frequently destroys previous social norms that limit the level of savagery and leads to violence against internal groups that become identified with the enemy. This may be the case particularly where enemy civilians have become a principal target. Examples include Nazi Germany during the Russian campaign, Kampuchea during its attack on Vietnamese peasants, and Turkey in its battles against the Russians. [Kiernan, Suny, Montville]

(8) **Ethnic Rivalries and Hatreds**  The violence of a state against its own citizens is often built upon or reinforces preexisting racial and ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts, however, rarely
lead to massive violence unless cultural and religious differences correspond to some degree with differences in economic or political status. Often, ethnic differences will be exaggerated by a regime such as Hitler's as a way of crystallizing a definition of the enemy which will add the force of ethnic antagonisms to their own political support.

Where subjugated ethnic groups are culturally cohesive and engage in subversion or violence against the dominant group as Indians have in Guatemala, the way is clear for legitimation of mass political murder by the dominant group. This is the case in many Third World states which were set up by colonial powers to rule over different ethnic groups which had not previously developed a common political culture or ways of balancing interests. [Suny, Adams, McKay, McCamant, Vanderpool]

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROCESSES OF STATE ORGANIZED TERROR

(1) Political Polarization and Politicization of Society

The politics of terroristic regimes becomes dominated by a radically simplistic view of society which attributes the multiplicity of society's evils to the work of a single enemy---an ideology, an economic class, or an ethnic group. This single enemy is usually portrayed as both ubiquitous and hidden, thus the need for universal vigilance and scrutiny of everyone's behavior, political or otherwise, for signs of loyalty and subversion. Suspicion falls on all types of nonconformity, marginality, or resented exercise of power. Though the single enemy be simply named, he is
so menacing and deceptive that only the supreme leader or leaders can be relied upon as a guide to his identity. In this way, the enemies of the leader and the enemies of society come to be seen as one and the same. Thus the leader is able to redirect and mobilize all of society's preexisting resentments and prejudices against his chosen targets. Groups that feel socially marginal are most readily trained and incorporated into the state's agencies of terroristic violence where they can be given an outlet for their resentments and an opportunity to identify with society's dominant group. To feed the radicalization of politics and monopolize political allegiance, the state attempts to destroy those forms of association which would provide a context in which alternative interpretations of social reality could gain recognition and social reinforcement. The jealousy of the state may even extend to the family and the social networks of civil society. The most extreme examples of polarizing politicization are found in communist states, but Nazi Germany and other fascist and military dominated regimes are examples as well. [Fein, Bacon, Wu, Van Toai, Solo, Wegner, Richter, Montville, Friedman, Vanderpool]

Self-Reinforcing Aspects of Terror

(2) Self-justifying Nature of Violence Dramatic violence is not only a physical act. It is also perceived as a statement of the
victim's guilt. Even where the victim might be easily identified as innocent, observers of violence tend naturally to repair the cognitive and emotional shock of injustice by searching for possibilities of guilt just as people might interpret natural disasters as punishment for sin. The less politically aware a population is, the more easily will it assume state violence to be justified. [Bacon]

(3) **Terror's Creation of its Own Targets** When the enemy is portrayed as ubiquitous, and many formerly trusted people are targeted for violence according to criteria which are difficult to know and frequently shifting, a situation of universal suspicion is created. Since no one can be trusted, people try to hide many of their own thoughts and actions and form personal alliances to protect themselves from those that might accuse them of being an enemy. Thus, as in the Soviet state apparatus of the 1930's, terror creates its own networks of secretive "saboteurs" and an ostensible need to ruthlessly flush them out through escalated surveillance and violence. [Rittersporn, solo]

(4) **Destruction of Alternative Means of Control** Where terror becomes the primary tool for control of the state apparatus and the population, it becomes progressively more difficult, in the face of increasing chaos, distrust and alienation, to elicit compliance through measured material and status inducements or sincere ideological commitments. People's behavior becomes geared
too exclusively to avoidance of becoming a victim of violence. Where terror goes far enough in deligitimizing a regime and spawning popular resistance as it did in Afghanistan and South Africa or in Guatemala against the Indians, more terror is likely to be seen as necessary to maintain or assert control. [Rittersporn, Weissman, Perlmutter, Maley, Adams]

(5) **Creation of a Terror Culture** Reliance upon terror can become a part of the political culture. Once former standards of morality and legality have been violated (eg. in war or ethnic violence), it becomes easier to continue violating them. Also, leaders may become subject to expectations that they demonstrate the "strength" and "resolve" that their roles demand by exercising great violence. [Adams, Wegner, Montville, Brockett, Kiernan, Suny, Friedman, Vanderpool]

(6) **Tendency of Violence to Spread Beyond its Initial Targets** Because people desperately attempt to prove their loyalty and their vigilance against the enemy during episodes of terror by finding scapegoats for their failures and attacking rivals, terror tends to spread far beyond its intended targets before all of those targets are eliminated. For example, purges in the Soviet Union which aimed at high level, official malfeasance and disloyalty were deflected onto lower levels of the apparatus and the population at large, while many suicide victims of the Cultural Revolution were also scapegoats or came under attack for local and personal reasons having little to do with Mao's
political objectives. [Rittersporn, Wu, Wegner, Shernock, Vanderpool]

Self-Limiting Aspects of Terror

(7) Destruction of the Integrity of State Institutions A regime of terror such as Stalin's in the 1930's requires the use of vast numbers of informers to identify the ubiquitous enemy and these informers are largely motivated by the need to accuse others to demonstrate their own loyalty and escape blame for malperformance of duties. In addition, the criteria for targeting of victims are arbitrary and the standards of evidence low or nonexistent. Self-protective falsification of reports and clandestine personal alliances for protection and promotion throughout the bureaucracy make matters worse. In this context, the quality of information received by the agencies and leaders of the state is very poor and its quantity is likely to be overwhelming. Thus, there is a decline in the ability to monitor events and impose detailed accountability. Information distortion and overload may become so great that it contributes to a perception by the leadership that terror is dysfunctional. Terror also sometimes threatens to seriously disrupt private sector organizations in industry and commerce as it did in Nazi Germany. [Rittersporn, Coser, Shernock]

(8) Popular Resistance and Loss of Legitimacy Often, a regime maintaining its power through terror progressively loses
legitimacy and provokes popular resistance to the point where terror becomes much less effective and a serious, perpetual drain on resources of the state. Afghanistan is one of the clearest examples. [Maley, Wegner, Rittersporn, McCamant]

(9) Loss of Control Over Agents of Terror  
Radical social change and control through terror requires a vast number of agents to which a great deal of power must be delegated despite the ideology of total command by the state's leader. Such extensive delegation of power to lower levels of the state apparatus or to people outside the government can lead to loss of control and unwanted social unrest as in the Soviet and Chinese cases and motivates a return to less arbitrary and massive use of violence. Retreat from terror as a government policy is likely to take the form of a restriction of powers of violence to the official police and military. However, terroristic regimes also give secret police and military units much authority to act on their own and the result is operations that political leaders know little about as has been discovered recently in South Africa. [Rittersporn, Riordan, Wegner, Shernock]

(10) Loss of International Legitimacy and Foreign Aid  
The international credibility of leaders and their ability to attract aid from foreign powers has come to depend partly on their human rights records and many repressive regimes have increasingly shown sensitivity to these considerations. [Howard]
Post-Terror Processes of Democratization

(11) Struggle for Justice and a Reconstructed History  When terror ends, its victims feel a need to recover a sense of themselves as the subject of their nation's history over and above those state institutions and political leaders who perpetrated the terror. Thus, Glasnost in the Soviet Union has led to passionate public discussion of the history of the Stalinist era with a view to exonerating its victims and condemning its leaders. Linked to this reconstruction of history is the fight to have those who were guilty brought to justice through the power of a reformed state. Argentine citizens have been successful in this. Such a demonstration of the state's realignment with the people's will is needed to continue development of popular support for democratic political institutions and norms of political action which protect human rights. [Bowen, V. Shlapentokh, Vanderpool, Richter]

(12) Role of Non-governmental Organizations  Non-governmental, international and local human rights organizations and economic development projects help develop people's capacity for collective initiative and political awareness. The political passivity which terror takes advantage of is thereby lessened and the state feels increased pressure to be responsive to citizens' needs and sense of justice. [McCamant, V. Shlapentokh, Vanderpool]
FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE ORGANIZED TERROR

(1) **Technology**  
Advancing communications and data processing technology will create much greater capabilities for surveillance and intimidation, and killing and torture will be made more efficient. This is true for the developed, democratic nations as well as for others. An international, private sector market in technologies of repression will make these technologies readily available and relatively easy to use without responsibility being traced to governments. [Sloan]

(2) **Role of the Superpowers**  
The superpowers appear to be moving toward less geopolitically motivated support for repressive regimes that have little legitimacy with their citizens. This will allow repressive regimes to more easily be toppled from within, yet this also raises the possibility of political chaos which can sometimes lead to terroristic violence.

(3) **Human Rights Movement**  
The concept of human rights will continue to grow in its role as a principle that will guide foreign policy and structure diplomatic discourse. The great number of non-governmental human rights organizations will continue to grow and contribute to an ongoing replacement of the idea of rights as dependent upon citizenship with the idea of rights as inhering in the individual. [McCamant, Vanderpool, V. Shlapentokh]
RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Humanitarian Intervention  The pressure for humanitarian intervention to stop episodes of violent repression is likely to increase in the future. Such interventions would likely be more successful if carried out before terror becomes institutionalized and self-reinforcing. On the other hand, intervention will have to be undertaken with an understanding that democracy is not installed but evolved, and this evolution may involve substantial violence. Repressing the repressors is not a long term solution and the humanitarian benefits of intervention must be evident to the world if the goal of institutionalizing principles of human rights on the international level is to be served. Such a common understanding of the justification for acts of intervention will have to be developed through further international dialog on human rights, monitoring of human rights violations, and a better knowledge of how and why states resort to the use of terroristic violence. Interventions will only be internationally supported if the nations engaged in them are credible and consistent in their support for human rights.

Future Study of Terror

(2) Communist Reforms  Communist nations are opening up to reforms of repressive state institutions that have been
responsible for terror and shaped by terror. This gives us new opportunities to study the process of evolution toward greater democracy as well as to better understand the causes and history of terror itself.

(3) **Comparative Perspective**  The experience of the conference suggests that further comparative study will help to bring out deeper and more extensive parallels between different cases of state organized terror while illuminating the wide range of factors that may be involved in particular cases. Such comparative study needs to encompass less violent forms of repression in the economically developed, democratic nations. Almost all states have great powers of violence and histories that include episodes of terror. The terroristic use of state power needs to be understood in all its shapes and degrees and in relation to non-terroristic uses of state power.

(4) **Social and Psychological Effects of Terror**  Special attention needs to be given to the study of the effect of terror on its victims, on culture and society. It is the people who suffer from terror that need to build a political culture that will support the development of more democratic and humane institutional structures and a political discourse that articulates the imperative to respect human rights.
(5) Genocide and State Organized Terror  Sometimes, cases of
genocide are not regarded as cases of terror because in genocide
the objective is simply to destroy a well defined and
circumscribed group, and in terror the objective is to intimidate
a group or a whole population by arbitrary violence against only
some of its members. However, the political processes and
structural antecedents of terror and genocide are very similar, as
is the experience of their victims. The principal difference is
that ethnic rivalries and prejudices are present to a greater
degree in genocidal societies and these ethnic divisions become
very closely aligned during the process of radical politicization
with other political and economic divisions. Disloyalty then comes
to be defined in ethnic terms. Most future studies of state
organized terror of a general and comparative nature should
therefore encompass the Holocaust and other genocides.
SUMMARIES OF PAPERS

SESSION 1: General Perspectives on State Terror

Vladimir Shlapentokh opened the conference with his observations on the decline of popular esteem for the state since its high-water mark in the 1930's. Only decades ago, he said, the state was exalted as the vehicle of people's aspirations and the defender of their interests in a hostile world. This view of the state has a long ancestry represented in the writings of Hobbes who pictured the state as the bringer of peace to a violent, chaotic society, and in the writings of Rousseau whose state formed one organic whole with society and could not wish to harm any of its members. Even for Marx, the state would be devoted only to the well-being of the masses once it was wrested from capitalist control. In more recent times, the First World has looked to the state as provider of economic stability and full employment and the Second and Third Worlds have found in the state the promise of economic development and national liberation.

However, the Holocaust, the Great Soviet Terror, the Cultural Revolution and other episodes of arbitrary violence by the state against its citizens have increasingly called into question the state's legitimacy. The state in these instances seemed to have gone mad, to have become a bewildering and hostile beast. It went beyond the familiar ruthlessness in stamping out rebellion and repressing minorities to the devouring of people who could not be considered enemies to its existence or even to society's dominant
elites. It had come to serve only the personal interest of the leaders in retaining their power. Moreover, the state has lost much of its claim to be an effective organizer of economic activity. Even the elites in the socialist countries have clearly come under the sway of the free market model of development.

The disillusionment with the state and its consequent loss of legitimacy have helped give rise to a human rights movement which asserts the rights of the individual to be superior to the right of the state to control and speak for the people within its territory. In recent decades, there has been a remarkable growth of international human rights organizations and increasing acceptance of their attempts to monitor human rights violations and make them a subject of international dialogue and negotiation. The human rights movement is part of the development of a wider range of institutions within civil society (at both the domestic and international levels) which are independent of the state and represent the best hope for reining in its arbitrary powers.

The present conference will hopefully make a modest contribution to the developing international community of conscience. It has been organized in the belief---evident in the impassioned discussion of the Stalinist era in Moscow---that understanding the terror of the past will be important in preventing its recurrence.

Barbara Harff followed Shlapentokh with a presentation of a data base she is constructing on 40 genocides and politicides
which have occurred since 1945. (Politicide is defined as the mass murder of potential or actual political opponents.) She gave an overview of the types of governments which have been responsible for genocide or politicide and of the frequency of their leaders' identification with minority and majority ethnic groups. She also examined how often the orders for mass killing were given explicitly by the top leaders of the state as well as the relative frequency with which the regular military, special units, and private or semi-private groups were the instruments of violence. The most salient pattern Harff found in her data base was that one-party revolutionary governments and governments dominated by the military were about equally frequently responsible for genocide and politicide. Both forms of government accounted for far more of these episodes than did multi-party governments, colonial governments, and quasi-religious governments.

George Lopez then broached the question of international humanitarian intervention: Given that we know something of the patterns into which massive episodes of human rights violations fall, and taking cognizance of recent legal theory which is beginning to place individual rights more frequently ahead of the traditional rights of state sovereignty, might we not now attempt to formulate a new, less restrictive set of moral and legal guidelines for intervention? We cannot be complacent since the historical record shows that states do not normally stop violent repression of their own accord. On the other hand, there are very
difficult analytical issues to grapple with in determining the
details of intervention. The mission of intervention cannot be
simply to stop an isolated episode of rights violation. If it is
to do real good in the long run, it must leave in its wake a
substantially reformed political system and contribute to the
evolution of institutionalized respect for human rights. Those
considering intervention must also recognize international causes
and effects of internal repression which in themselves may provide
defensible grounds for intervention. Often, for example,
repressive apparatuses are built and sustained with external
resources. Internal repression is also often carried out in
conjunction with outward aggression or produces a flow of refugees
with which other nations must cope.

SESSION 2: The Experience of Terror

The session on the experience of terror began with two papers
that built on the personal experiences of the writers to make
generalizations about how state terror's victims are targeted and
attacked and the way they cope with their situations. Doan Van
Toai's paper described the differences in the treatment he
received in prison at the hands of the pre-1975 "rightist"
Vietnamese regime and of the post-1975 communist regime. He
asserted that the object of imprisonment and torture under the
rightist regime was only to make him submit behaviorally, to
confess and to obey, but that in the communist prison, the object
of his oppressors was to break his spirit and to enforce sincerity
and enthusiasm for the revolution, or, at the very least, a deep passivity. The former treatment only had the effect of creating a resolve among the prisoners to resist their captors and the regime they represented. The treatment under the communists, on the other hand, maximized the victims' feelings of shame and isolation from family and friends, leaving commitment to the ideology of the revolution the only avenue for social reward and emotional security. Van Toai linked the lack of concern by the rightist regime for controlling the spirit of their victims to their lack of an ideology or, at the least, an ideology that could have enlisted sincere belief or idealism. For victims, he said, it was a strong sense of values and belief in their cause that allowed them to resist the demands of their oppressors.

Jane Wu's paper on suicide during the Cultural Revolution in China was a painful confrontation with the tremendous psychological wounds left by the suicide of loved ones and the lack of social opportunity or personal strength to express, or allow oneself to feel grief. After relating the story of her brother's isolation from her family and the political predicament that led to his shocking death, Wu drew on her wider experience and interviews with suicide survivors, to describe the characteristics of social groups that appeared most vulnerable to suicide. These groups included (1) single young men (such as Wu's brother) working in areas apart from their family and whose ordinary social activities came under suspicion as politically
subversive, (2) upper class women supervisors of neighborhood organizations that became subject to the humiliations of resentful working class women formerly under their direction, (3) young students who lost their hope for the future after being singled out by their political instructors for independence of mind or dubious family background, (4) Communist Party cadres, men aged 50-60 who, because of their belief in the Party and knowledge of its methods, felt terribly disillusioned and trapped when they became targets, at the same time finding themselves unable to gain emotional support from their family who tended to denounce and resent them because of their own belief in the Party and/or opportunism, and (5) old women without family who were never targeted but who, in their vulnerability, could not bear the possibility of becoming a target.

Wu then told of how suicide survivors were forced or intimidated into denouncing their own family members for committing suicide. However, not only did most Chinese hide their feelings from Party representatives but they hid their feelings from themselves as well, not even talking about them within the family. Whether denunciations of the suicide victim were coerced or were motivated more by opportunism, there remain to this day, huge reservoirs of guilt and grief in the survivors that stay dammed up out of fear.

William McCagg's paper examined one of the most important events in the formation of the "captive mind" in Hungary, the
Stalinist show trial of leading Hungarian Communist Party figure
Laszlo Rajk. He asked why the trial needed to be staged, how it
produced terror in its intended audience, and whether it was an
effective device for strengthening the power of its perpetrators.
He started by noting that the creation of terror seemed
unnecessary. The Communist Party in Hungary had been hugely
successful in winning political support through its appeal to the
interests of many major sectors of Hungarian society, while the
mass of Hungarian peasantry remained in deep poverty and
passivity. However, an across-the-board reversal of Hungarian
government policy in 1948-49 reflecting a reversal of policy in
the Kremlin in favor of more violent revolutionary tactics, so
completely contradicted what Party members had been taught to
expect of their Party, that the show trial was needed to dramatize
the dangers of deviating from the Party line.

The choice of Rajk as the victim was ingenious, for he was an
extremely well connected and popular figure within the Party and
his downfall implicitly threatened a great number of others while
showing that any trusted person might well be guilty of secretly
subverting the Party and/or become a purge target. The
propagandistic effect of the trial was reinforced, according to
McCagg, by the fact that the Party membership had grown accustomed
to intellectual passivity by the Hungarian Communist Party's
unusual emphasis on thoroughly explaining in detail and in a
timely manner every new shift and element of its policy. Having
followed these explanations for years, it was difficult for people
to question the genuineness of Rajk's guilt or to reject the trial's message no matter how unbelievable it might have otherwise seemed.

The terror involved in the trial was not confined only to its audience, said McCagg, because those Hungarians who designed and carried it out were themselves acting out of fear of Stalin who had begun to signal that the time had come for Communist Parties to ruthlessly assert their power and who was beginning another wave of purges in the Soviet Union. The Hungarian leaders' fear led them to feverishly demonstrate how completely in line they were with Stalin's wishes by devouring one of their own.

SESSION 3: Cults and Demons

The "cults and demons" session was designed to focus on the extremes of suspicion, hatred, and adulation that are associated with political polarization and the willingness to tolerate or participate in violence. Helen Fein's paper described the social psychology of the People's Temple at Jonestown and its mass suicide in such a way as to draw out its parallels with Hitler's Germany and other totalitarian regimes. Going beyond explanations for the events in Jonestown that focus on the emotional states of Jim Jones and his followers, Fein drew attention to the cognitive dimensions of the psychology and how perceptions of reality were either systematically constructed by Jim Jones and his agents or became self-fulfilling.
The allegiance of People's Temple members to Jones personally and to Jonestown as a utopia of social justice was secured through several manipulative means: (1) public humiliation for satisfying natural human wants or expressing complaints about conditions, all of which was defined as selfish, anti-communal behavior, (2) the threat of violent punishment, (3) rewarding of compliance and loyalty with status and material rewards, (4) separation of marriage partners to preserve emotional dependence on and allegiance to Jones, and (5) control of all sources of information. These techniques were effective in making people distrust and override their own perceptions of injustice and in conditioning them to participate in public cruelty to others.

Belief in Jonestown as a utopia was closely linked psychologically to the myth of collective persecution whereby all internal discontents and failures were assigned their origin in external enemies bent on destroying Jonestown and its people. This myth was both a product of the personal paranoia of Jones, due in part to his inherent insecurity as sole holder of absolute power, and an instrument consciously used by Jones to motivate communal solidarity and allegiance to himself. The fear of outside enemies, however, led to acts of aggression against U.S. government representatives that would inevitably provoke a response that seemed to justify the original paranoia. When the survival of Jonestown as a community was threatened, Jones willed death for himself and his followers just as Hitler did. This suicidal response to defeat represented a radical attempt to evade
collapse of the fictive cognitive construct upon which totalitarian regimes depend, i.e. the paranoid myth of collective persecution by outside enemies bent on destroying a community whose essence in the leader's eyes is solidarity in allegiance to himself.

Walter Bacon's paper also treated the construction of myth by terroristic regimes, in this case, the myth surrounding the leaders of personality cults in communist states. His emphasis was on the political functions for the leader and his "psychophantocracy" of projecting the image of a charismatic, heroic, and all-knowing father figure. Belief in such a figure would serve several related functions: (1) support of the leader's personal power, (2) a need to mobilize the population for economic restructuring or military purposes, and (3) legitimation of the whole regime where the state's institutions are still ill-defined and for a population and Marxist/Leninist political party that conceives power to take the form of a strict hierarchy heading up to a single leader.

When communist states attempt to propagate and enforce myths of a personality cult, violent terror becomes more functional. First, terror is useful for eliminating and suppressing opinions that run counter to the myth. Second, it creates rampant fear and universal suspicion of neighbors, work associates, and family, leaving the leader as the only safe outlet for (the required) enthusiasm and loyalty. The pseudo-religious nature of the focus
upon the personality cult figure inspires an especially insidious, "inquisitional" type of terror which is self-perpetuating: the violence itself dramatizes the evil of its victims and leads to a drive for more victims.

Joseph Montville began his paper, "The Psychology of the Khmer Rouge Terror," by describing the extreme, personalized violence by the Khmer Rouge against vast numbers of people identified as enemies by their membership in various ethnic or socioeconomically elite groups. He then asked how this violence was possible in a psychological and social psychological sense. Part of the answer lies in the history of oppression and humiliation that Cambodians had suffered for many centuries at the hands of the Vietnamese, Thais, Chinese, and, more recently, the French. As a result, a sense of violation and victimhood at the hands of outsiders was deeply ingrained in the Cambodian psyche and this was combined with an apparently unusually high level of cultural acceptance of personal cruelty and violence. The rage and violence within Cambodian society made it responsive to the leadership of the paranoid Pol Pot and provided social fuel for the drive of the Khmer Rouge to purify the nation and assert its inviolable independence. Two events finally carried violence to the extremes necessary for the genocide of the late 1970's: (1) the tremendous geographic and economic dislocation, violence and death suffered by the rural population during the two Indochinese wars and (2) the recruitment by Pol Pot of the children of poor,
low status, mountain people for military camp training in cruelty
and violence and their organization into a force for annihilation
of "enemy" groups. The training of Cambodian mountain people for
violence has parallels in more modern contexts. When directed by
acknowledged authority figures, German doctors ran the Nazi death
machine. Similarly, American students in psychological
experiments were willing to administer extreme pain to people
towards which they had no animosity.

The final speaker in the "cults and demons" session, Robert
Solo, delivered an essay which sought to evoke the psychological
essence of the idea of the demon, an idea which he placed at the
center of the great, twentieth century slaughters of the innocent.
The salient characteristic of the demon according to Solo is that
he plots and conspires for one's destruction behind a facade of
normalcy, loyalty, and even friendship. But once one becomes
gripped by fear of the demon lurking inside of those among whom
one lives, one becomes a demon oneself in the need to hide one's
suspicions and project a false conformity while waiting until it
comes time to unmask and destroy the enemy. The idea of the demon
seems to be an ancient part of the human psyche and one that has
been periodically reactivated throughout history. But in the
twentieth century, it seems that societies in the upheaval of war,
revolution, or economic collapse, have crossed a threshold beyond
which fear and suspicion of others becomes so deep and widespread
that the syndrome of demonization of others and of oneself in
defense becomes self reinforcing and universal. In such circumstances, the leader of the state is turned to as the only reliable guide to the identity of demons, and citizens follow him in his personal paranoia and demonhood in rooting out the supposed enemies of himself and the nation.

SESSION 4: The Institutionalization of Terror

The session on the institutionalization of terror dealt principally with the origins and character of the primary agent of state terror, the secret political police, and the social ideology that supports terroristic repression of the population. Jonathan Adelman's paper on the development of the secret police in communist states began by describing in detail the lack of scholarship on the subject. Adelman claimed that the only nation for which a substantial literature exists is the Soviet Union, and that even for the Soviet Union, the only period that has received treatment that is close to being adequate is the civil war period. Very little work has been done on China and almost nothing on the other communist nations. The principal reasons Adelman identified for this situation are the lack of reliable information and the fact that (mostly liberal) researchers have avoided detailing the most distasteful aspects of communist regimes for fear of playing into the hands of those who would spread misinformation to exaggerate the communist threat.

Adelman then comparatively analyzed the importance of the role of the secret police in communist regimes by placing those
regimes in three categories according to how they achieved power: (1) by peasant-based revolution, (2) through the aid of an external power (the Red Army), and (3) the special case of the Soviet Union in which the takeover relied on a narrow, urban political base of sectors of the elite and proletarian classes. The three categories differ as to how well Party, governmental, and military institutions are developed. Those regimes that came to power by a protracted political and military struggle without the support of outside powers and whose legitimacy is well established with a large proportion of the population (as in peasant-based revolution) tend to have strong institutions by the time of takeover and therefore have less need of political police to maintain power. When takeover comes quickly and without overwhelming political support (as in the Soviet satellites) the secret police becomes much more critical for regime control. A further factor influencing the extent of subsequent reliance on the secret police is the scope of ambition of the regime for military or economic mobilization.

Amos Perlmutter, in his paper on the role of the political police in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, paralleled Adelman in observing that the political police is the most important tool of power for the regimes he was discussing. In describing the origins, development, and key actions of the political police in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Perlmutter brought out the independence it has from judicial and legal constraint and
characterizes the political police as a Praetorian Guard for the leaders of the Party. As such, it may become driven by ideologically defined missions given to it by the leaders of the authoritarian state, but it does not constitute an autonomous ideological force in its own right. The political police remains ideologically flexible in its role of protecting the power of the regime's leaders through its core activities of gathering intelligence and killing or terrorizing "enemies."

Perlmutter delivers a pessimistic prognosis for the "modern authoritarian state" because he sees it as irrevocably dependent, from the time of its origins, on the ethically and ideologically unfettered use of violence by the political police. The recent rise of Jaruzelski and Andropov to power in Poland and the Soviet Union he sees as the latest manifestation of the continuing symbiosis of the Party and the political police. Furthermore, instead of a declining role for the political police due to stability and growth in other institutions of the state, Perlmutter sees the progressing deterioration of popular ideological commitment to authoritarian regimes as forcing increasing reliance on the political police.

Alfred Meyer made a presentation on an attempted deinstitutionalization of terror by an outside power: the post World War II U.S. Army Denazification Program which was a political purge carried out by counter-intelligence teams, to one of which Meyer was assigned for a brief period. The goal was to
eliminate National Socialists from public life within the U.S. zone of occupation. However, there were problems encountered in defining and identifying those to be apprehended and incarcerated. Inconsistencies and injustices resulted in a kind of terror among potential targets, and the program became known colloquially as the "renazification" of Germany.

Edward Friedman's paper was entitled "The Origins of Mao's Terror in Pre-1949 Leninist Institutions and Robespierian Legitimations." In it, he detailed how Mao eliminated political opponents within the Communist Party through a series of purges and executions of so-called spies and traitors between 1930 and the Revolution. These purges were carried out by security bureaus and secret police which Mao used to control mountain base areas functioning as separate states within the Chinese state before the Revolution. In this terroristic political system, those who attacked others with invented charges and demonstrated willingness to obey orders to violently eliminate political targets were promoted, while the more principled members of the Party were silenced and alienated. Thus was produced a ruling elite which apparently would not be able to claim legitimacy or function as competent agents of economic development. Yet this system was adopted by Mao long before the Revolution and demonstrated substantial longevity.

Part of the reason must lie in the Communist Party's adoption from the very beginning of a Leninist ideology which can only fix
blame for the Revolution's failures on implacable outside enemies and counterrevolutionaries and which sees the Revolution's mission as the violent reversal of the state's inherently violent role as an instrument of class repression. Democracy and pluralism are seen in this context only as a compromise of the Revolution's power to subdue class enemies. As Mao knew, these class enemies must be legion because the Revolution stands for radical transformation of society and thus a change that inevitably goes against the interests of vast numbers of people who remain tied to feudal or capitalist class interests. This view virtually makes the scale of violence a measure of social advance. So it came to be that the worst atrocities of the Cultural Revolution were committed not against a capitalist or politically elite group, but against the masses of poor and religious Tibet, a population seen as an obstacle to progressive communism.

SESSION 5: Planned and Unplanned Terror

Much of the terror which the state perpetrates and incites is not controlled by the state's leaders and may, at times, be harmful to their interests. The papers in the session on planned and unplanned terror address the question of how well the top leaders in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and China were able to strategically control the course of terror in their countries.

Bernd Wegner's paper was entitled "Violent Repression in the Third Reich--Did It Stabilize Hitler's rule?" To answer this question, Wegner began by answering another closely related one
which recent scholarship has sought to answer: To what extent was Hitler in control of the actions of the Nazi state? It has come to light over the last 15 to 20 years that Nazi government posts and agencies had broadly overlapping and ill-defined responsibilities, resulting in struggles for power involving competitive interpretations of the Fuhrer's will. One group of historians, the "intentionalists," see this chaos as controlled by Hitler through a "divide and conquer" strategy. Wegner, however, favors another group led by Hans Mommsen which sees the power struggles as associated with Hitler's haphazardness in creating ad-hoc agencies and positions and as generating an out-of-control "excessive dynamism" that (1) permitted no rational planning of priorities and (2) politically undermined the regime through violation of moral and legal norms, ultimately leading to the military defeat. Violence and terror cannot be assumed to have been rationally deployed by the Nazi regime, said Wegner, because the regime had effective alternative means of gaining power such as bribery, cooptation of other political forces, and ideological appeal.

The "cumulative radicalization" that Mommsen saw over time in the power struggles within the Nazi regime, Wegner explained partly in terms of an ideology, deeply embedded in National Socialism, that held struggle to be the Darwinian essence and the virtual goal of existence. Accordingly, it interpreted politics as political soldiery or war by other means. In the context of intense and chaotic political rivalry within the German state, the
influence of this ideology pushed resolution of policy questions toward the most violent and radical solutions, extending terror and extra-legality beyond their rational use as instruments of power to a point where they posed a threat to Nazi authority.

Gabor Rittersporn noted that there was a process of cumulative radicalization in the Soviet case that was in some ways parallel to the process that Wegner described for Nazi Germany. His paper, "State Organized Terror and the Disorganization of the Soviet State," was devoted to explaining the Soviet purges of the 1930's as the chaotic outcome of top Party leaders' efforts to assert control over the bureaucratic apparatus and the Soviet population. The Soviets' crash program of collectivization and forced industrialization was motivated by a desire to cope with problems of declining food supply and urban unrest. But these campaigns were extremely difficult to carry out, for they had to rely on penal sanctions against local Party officials who were not able to force peasants and workers to comply with their duties to the state. But while local authorities had tremendous demands placed upon them, they were also, purposefully and of necessity, given wide latitude to adapt the instructions of the center to the widely varying local conditions. This prerogative they used in a ruthless and arbitrary way, inflaming the discontent of the masses to the point where top Party leaders were led to search for ways to rein them in.
Rittersporn detailed how, beginning in 1932 through the period of the Great Purges, many directives went out from Moscow trying to enforce bureaucratic and judicial regularity by condemning various forms of arbitrariness such as infliction of punishments grossly out of proportion to crimes. This task was made especially difficult by the lack of bureaucratic training and professionalism in the apparatus. While the apparatus was conceived theoretically as a military style organization dedicated to carrying out the Party line without calling it into question, in reality it contained extensive personal networks formed for mutual protection and promotion and quite capable of subverting orders from the top.

Corruption was, in fact, very widespread and well known to the public. Its public prosecution by the top organ of the Party risked exacerbating the already deep popular resentment of the bureaucrats and police. Moreover, the apparatus often stepped up its violence against the population precisely in order to provoke increased unrest which would strengthen the position of those leaders at the center who were in favor of giving local authorities increased arbitrary powers to enforce Party directives and restore order. Thus the need to preserve the power and minimal legitimacy of the apparatus was in conflict with the need to moderate its ruthlessness and establish judicial regularity.

As a result, the signals from Moscow were contradictory and ambiguous, sometimes emphasizing the imperative to root out alien and oppositionist elements as the true source of the state's
failures (a line of attack that let the apparatus off the hook), and sometimes emphasizing the need to root out Party "bigwigs." Though the latter emphasis hit closer to the real problems, there were also factors that made oppositionist elements such as Trotskyists a plausible main source of the problems. One factor was the fabrication and vast exaggeration of opposition plots by the political police fueled by its suspicions that popular unrest was incited by leftist or monarchist propaganda. Also, the bureaucratic networks of alliances clearly linked to corruption could easily be made to appear as oppositionist conspiracy. More important, according to Rittersporn, was the almost total incapacity of the Party and apparatus to regard themselves as anything but the embodiment of the people's will and vehicle of their welfare. Consequently, the idea that alien subversive elements were the cause of bureaucratic and economic failures was far more acceptable.

The ambiguity of the center about the true nature of the target of purges played into the hands of the lower levels of the apparatus which took every opportunity to redefine the targets as alien elements identified not by any specific wrongdoings but in terms of background and past associations. Such redefinition of targets in vague terms lent itself to maneuvers by officials to use the purges against rivals and to settle old scores.

In response to this subversion of their intent, and out of difficulty in identifying the desired targets, top Party leaders attempted to institute elections of officials and encouraged
criticism of bureaucratic abuse at the grassroots level of the Party in order to identify and eliminate key offenders. However, these measures were generally successfully subverted by the incumbent officials.

After June 1936 when the official focus of the purges shifted abruptly again toward oppositionists, the pressure to demonstrate one's "vigilance" by denouncing as many people as seemed possible or necessary and the absolute flexibility and arbitrariness of the pretexts for denunciation bearing little relation to actual malfeasance, led to an almost patternless slaughter of innocents that included both high officials and those with no position in the bureaucracy at all. The Great Terror finally came to an end as a result of a January 1938 decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee that reflected a desire for the apparatus to stop devouring itself and close ranks to discipline workers and peasants who were beginning to use the chaos to evade the state's requirements.

Stanley Shernock's paper, entitled "The Problem of Unplanned Terror in Repressive Movement Regimes" was a comparative study of the anti-Semitic campaign in Nazi Germany prior to World War II, the vigilance campaign in the Soviet Union against the so-called "Trotskyist-Zinovievist-Bukharinist" conspiracy culminating in the Great Terror, and the rectification campaign in Maoist China against "capitalist roaders" during the Cultural Revolution. Many of the most prominent theorists of terror including E.V. Walter
and the theorists of totalitarianism have regarded terror as the constitutive principle of certain political systems. Shernock, however, agreeing with Alvin Gouldner, said he does not believe that terror should be analyzed as a fundamental requirement of a system or as a phenomenon having a dynamic of its own. Instead, terror is more accurately viewed as perpetrated by certain political factions, while other factions generally push for less extreme and more controlled forms of repression. Statements made by repressive regimes indicating problems in controlling terror should be interpreted less as an indicator of the regime's inability to control terror than as the efforts of relatively "moderate" political factions to redefine the terror instigated by more "radical" factions as illegitimate or counterproductive. 

Hitler, Stalin, and Mao along with their closest allies represented the clearly dominant radical political faction and were able to control the general course of terror while only making limited concessions to the concerns of the moderates when general regime support or their own power seemed threatened.

In the case of Nazi Germany, it was the "individual actions" of the SA that appeared to be unplanned and perhaps out of control. Yet the SA was taking its cue from the propaganda of Goebbels and other high-ranking Party officials. Party "moderates" on the other hand, tried to bring SA actions against Jews within orderly and legal bounds so as not to jeopardize rearmament and the progress of the economy by disruption of important Jewish-owned businesses. Hitler did not attempt to
control the rivalry between moderates and radicals and allowed the moderates to influence policy. He occasionally made statements supporting their positions. However, he never ceased to identify the Jew as the principal source of evil and to call for an eventual "total solution" to the "Jewish problem." At critical junctures, when economic and political consequences were manageable, Hitler consistently came down on the side of the radicals. Because Hitler and other radical elements of the Nazi leadership achieved their apparent objectives, the terror against the Jews must be seen as the result of a purposive strategy of a political faction, not as the result of a dynamic that the top leadership could not control or did not intend.

In the Soviet case, "moderate" factions challenged Stalin's drive to purge the Party and state apparatus during the 1930's on many occasions, mainly from a pragmatic point of view. They saw the need for more consideration of worker and peasant interests and less arbitrary repression in order to gain some measure of voluntary cooperation from the masses as well as stability within the apparatus as a basis for economic growth and preparation for war. Stalin sometimes appeared to agree with moderates' criticism of excesses, irregular procedures, and targeting of innocent people, and he engaged in rhetoric about the need for power from below to root out corrupt and subversive officials. However, his words were not backed by any action to lessen the hardship or reduce the terrorizing of the masses. Instead, he continued throughout the Great Terror to criticize the NKVD for lack of
vigilance and pointed to scapegoating as evidence not of overzealousness but of failure to find the guilty who were attempting to deflect attention from their own misdeeds. His motive in calling upon the masses to unmask wreckers and oppositionists was motivated instead by his desire to replace the existing Party and state apparatus elite with a new one that was indebted to him for their upward mobility. What finally brought Stalin to remove Yezhov and wind down the Purges was not the pragmatic concerns of the moderates about damage to the destruction of the managerial elite, but simply a belief that Yezhov was plotting against him. Although terror against the masses was not a goal of the Great Purges, it did not appear to concern Stalin or other Party leaders. The terror against the apparatus hit Stalin's desired targets and there is no evidence that the NKVD overcomplied with its quotas for arrest or engaged in spontaneous violence.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution began with Mao's sponsorship of a mass organization, the Red Guards, as a means of attacking an entrenched, unresponsive and elitist bureaucracy. The Red Guards were able to virtually eliminate provincial Party leadership. But they engaged not only in the various kinds of intimidation, humiliation, and coercion that Mao supported, but in the most extreme forms of violence and terror as well. In response to the chaos caused by the Red Guards, rival conservative Red Guard factions also acting in the name of Maoist ideology, were organized by regional military commanders to keep the radical Red Guards in check and maintain political and economic order. Mao's
political circle made efforts to reconcile and unify the Red Guard factions through Red Guard congresses and use of military units for training, supervision and ideological guidance. But after the Wuhan incident of 1967, Mao was finally persuaded by moderate elements in the People's Liberation Army that the radical Red Guards must be suppressed. Although the Red Guards had been guilty of excesses and the conflict between Red Guard factions had contributed to much unplanned violence, the rise and decline of terror in the Cultural Revolution was not explained by an internal dynamic of the Chinese political system but by Mao's attempts to mobilize the masses against political targets and the countervailing attempts of other political and military elements to use mass organizations and the military to restore order.
Lewis Coser's address, entitled "The Power and Limits of Terror," explored the problematic aspects of the surveillance function in terroristic regimes such as those in the Soviet Union under Stalin and in China during the Cultural Revolution. On the one hand, the arbitrariness and instability of the criteria by which "enemies" are identified contributes to the efficiency of efforts to keep people in line, for it creates fear in vast numbers of people beyond those in immediate danger of being targeted. But there are also drawbacks to the use of terror as an instrument of power. Surveillance relies on a very large number of informers who monitor behavior in the vast sphere of private life and report deviance to the authorities. The sheer magnitude of the task of evaluating the enormous amount of information flowing in from the informers overloads the capacity to evaluate it and leads to an inability to form a true picture of the extent and nature of regime opposition. Even greater arbitrariness in the use of sanctions and increased terror are the result. The exercise of terror is also destructive to the regime itself. The fear of the informer and the universal suspicion it breeds is spread throughout the regime's apparatus which undermines effective administration and coordination. Perception of this has a tendency to erode belief in the benefits of terror for maintenance of the regime's power and may help bring about a deescalation of terror.
SESSION 7: The Practice and Ecology of Terror

This session focused on the specific techniques and strategies of the terroristic state and the political ideas involved in their use. Rory Riordan, in his paper on South Africa, catalogued and classified the wide array of responses the South African government has made to the violent and non-violent political action of blacks against the new constitution adopted in 1983, a constitution which denied blacks any legislative representation. One response has been to build up the institutional, legal, and physical dimensions of the security apparatus. This has involved the development of a large armaments industry and increased security expenditures as well as creation of the National Security Management System in which civil servants and military officials at all levels of government are brought together in committees for the integration of their activities. This organizational innovation has been guided by the "total onslaught" philosophy by which all available resources must be deployed to survive a comprehensive attack by the Soviet Union on South Africa's sovereignty as part of its plan for world domination. The enactment of sweeping security laws has granted the apparatus a tremendous freedom of action, allowing almost any action or expression of opinion to be defined as treasonous or subversive and permitting individual security force members, on the basis of their personal judgement, to arrest and indefinitely detain anyone without explanation or possibility of legal recourse.
The newly strengthened security apparatus has been used to terrorize the black population both within this elastic legal framework and outside of it. Legal terror includes (1) arbitrary detention (about one out of every 1000 people have been detained in the last two years), (2) elimination of all contact with the outside world for detainees, (3) police killings for purposes of self defense, prevention of escape, or dispersal of a crowd (security forces are responsible for about half of the deaths due to civil unrest), (4) executions for political offenses, and (5) forced relocation to break up communities posing security problems. Illegal forms of terror have included (1) torture and killing of detainees, (2) political assassination, (3) the support of vigilante groups that attack anti-apartheid activists, and (4) the use of minimally trained, auxiliary police forces unattached to the regular South African Police for especially brutal forms of repression.

The powers of the security forces have been so far expanded by the law and so often allowed to go beyond what is left of ostensible legal limits, that they appear to be in danger of going out of control. The courts have been frustrated in their attempts to restrain police from torturing detainees and to keep the "dirty tricks" department of the South African Defense Force from harassing a legal, passive resistance group. Politicians have also discovered several foreign military operations that were carried out without their knowledge.
Manelisi Ndibongo's paper focused on the ways in which black people are used for policing in South Africa. Little scholarly attention has been paid to the recruitment, training and deployment of police in South Africa and in particular to the almost half of its police force which is black. Ndibongo formulated what he believed to be the typical pattern of black recruitment. Rural chiefs who derive their power from alliance with white authorities are approached for selection of recruits. These chiefs, besides getting material and political rewards for their cooperation, are to some degree sympathetic to the need for policing of urban black townships. They are accustomed to viewing those who have lost contact with tribal life and adapted to the towns as "corrupted", as being unruly and undisciplined, and responsible for a disproportionate share of local crime. Training of the rurally recruited blacks is thought to include reinforcement of rural suspicions of urban people by portraying them as ruthless, uncultured hooligans who do not respect adults, chiefs, or laws. The townships thus come to be perceived by them as alien, enemy territories that require special force to control.

There has been a recent redeployment of police from the black townships to the bantustans/homelands, causing a shortage of personnel in the townships. In the wake of this, there has been strong evidence of South African Police encouragement and support of politically conservative, black vigilante groups in the townships in attacks on anti-apartheid activists as well as the
The organization of township hoodlums into terrorist groups. There is very little information on police activities in the bantustans, but there has been increasing irregularity and brutality associated with homeland police forces including the use of assassins in police uniforms. It has become the preference of some political activists to be arrested by the regular South African Police rather than the police in the Bantustans.

John McKay's paper was an attempt to use the work of Anthony Giddens in conceptualizing the nature of the modern nation-state and modern totalitarianism within an historical context in order to deepen the analysis of repression in Northern Ireland. The modern nation-state is distinctive for its powers of surveillance which reach deeply into the affairs of everyday life and make the development of state and society far more interdependent than in earlier periods. The emergence of both democracy and totalitarianism must be understood historically as part of a single dynamic that created the modern powers of centralized administration and control. The centralization of power was responsible for creating a popular awareness of the collective dimension of life. This awareness spawned citizen resistance to the intrusions of the state resulting, where it was strong enough, in the formation of democratic institutions in which political, civil, and economic rights are recognized and incorporated into state policies and public discourse.
civilization.

Facing such a comprehensive threat, the state (following the discredited pre World War II geopolitical theory adopted by the Nazis) was conceived as the brain center of an organism which must coordinate all the cells of its body politic to engage in "total war" so as to survive through control and expansion of its territory. Under the National Security Doctrine, the prescribed method of waging this total war was the use of counterinsurgency techniques developed by France and the U.S. in their wars in Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria. These techniques, brought to Argentina by French military missions in the 1950's, facilitated the projection of an international battle for survival onto a hidden internal enemy.

SESSION 8: The Legitimation of Terror

This session focused on the political legitimations which always surround the use of state organized terror despite the fact that arbitrary violence inevitably turns many people against their government. Dmitry Shlapentokh presented a paper which shed light on the origins of the Great Soviet Purges of the 1930's by examining the political context and motivations for an earlier set of political trials and purges at the end of the 1920's. His thesis was that these earlier political trials were motivated largely by Stalin's struggles with his political rivals within the elite but were also designed to appeal to growing popular resentment of corrupt bureaucracy.

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This popular resentment was growing throughout the 1920's. At the beginning of the decade, bureaucrats had privileged access to better food, lodging, clothing, and alcohol, but their lifestyles were not too different from the rest of society and the regime was making an effort to provide especially well for workers in dangerous and heavy physical jobs and those in the armed services in order to preserve their loyalty. After institution of the New Economic Policy (NEP), however, the gap between the lifestyles of bureaucrats and workers widened drastically and so did the level of official corruption. Although most historians judge the lot of workers to have improved under NEP, unemployment rose as did the pressure in the workplace for higher productivity. By the summer of 1928, workers' salaries had fallen substantially and food prices and rent had risen sharply. Strikes increased after 1925 and rose to unprecedented levels by 1930. The visibility of the bureaucrats' wealth and frequent drunkenness and debauchery fueled workers' resentment of "parasitic" bureaucrats. Discontent among the peasants was also rising and even the Army became unreliable. By the end of the 1920's, their complaints centered around a call for equality. Politically, workers became attracted to the Left Opposition grouped around Trotsky and to non-Marxist parties. The Left Opposition supported the workers' strikes and the workers in turn protected them from the political police (GPU).
In the late 1920's, Stalin was struggling at the top with opposition on the right and flirted with an alliance or truce with the left, partly because Trotsky, though exiled, was still influential and there appeared to be a possibility of a mass movement from the left with unpredictable consequences. Stalin therefore launched a campaign against bureaucracy and projected the image of an egalitarian defender of worker interests, calling for "control by the masses" and "inner-Party democracy." On March 10, 1929 it was announced that a counterrevolutionary plot had been uncovered. 55 people were tried for sabotage and treason and several were executed. Letters written by Trotskyites in exile demonstrate that workers and the Left Opposition wanted the harshest punishments for the high level managers accused in the Shakhty affair and fully supported purges of the bureaucracy being directed by Stalin against supporters of the Right. Other political trials later in 1929 and in 1931 were supported in the same spirit of resentment against bureaucrats and desire for equality.

However, bureaucracy continued to acquire privileges throughout the 1930's. Though worker unrest continued, the anti-bureaucratic drive by Stalin was successful in politically neutralizing a major segment of the workers who came to see Stalin as an egalitarian leader. Such workers were the target of Stalin's efforts to portray loyal Party officials as tough but hard working, close to the masses, and puritanical in their personal lives.
Akbar Mahdi, in his paper "Islam, Human Rights, and Violence," explored theoretical concepts of citizenship in Islam as a framework for justifying or motivating the state's use of violence. He pointed out that there is no idea in Islam equivalent to the Western idea of social contract in which citizens are conceived to have implicitly granted power to the state in return for enjoying the state's enforcement of the social order. Neither does Islam contain the related Western idea that the state's authority for using violence and coercion is ultimately derived from a social contract expressed in law and theories of individual rights. Instead, all of the state's authority is conceived to derive from God. Religious figures in ruling circles (an imam, a khalifa, or the ulama) are looked to as the authoritative interpreters of God's will as it is found in the Quran, hadith (the prophet's words), or sunna (tradition). The Islamic view is that the governed cannot know what is in their best interest and are disobedient by nature. Islam means "submission" and this is the primary obligation and orientation which individuals must accept with respect to the laws of society and state.

There has been controversy within Islam about whether it is permissible to oppose an unjust ruler who does not appear to be following Islamic principles. In any case, both state rulers and those who oppose them have relied on religious justifications for their actions.
The Quran has implicitly articulated citizenship rights in its call for equal treatment for people of different ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups, and speaks against conversion to Islam by force, advising patient persuasion instead. Such ideals have been frequently violated in the Islamic world, though in early Islamic history great tolerance was shown for Christians and Jews. The state's use of violence in the interests of Islam is explicitly justified by the key concept of Jihad meaning "striving" and which can take four forms, one of which is violence. Declaration of Jihad is the responsibility of the head of the state and is warranted by the need to defend the state as a representative of Islam against its enemies. Jihad against polytheists or pagans wherever they are found is especially imperative. The tradition of violent conquest of nonbelievers has its roots in Mohammed's approval of assassinations of his opponents and his successful military campaign against Mecca. Jews and Christians are considered more worthy of a gentle, noncoercive conversion to Islam, but all who repent and convert are supposed to be left in peace. Jews and Christians who do not convert, however, must submit to the laws of the Islamic state and pay special taxes on account of their beliefs. Non-Islamic beliefs have frequently been suppressed by Islamic regimes.

Mohammad Salehi's paper complemented Akbar Hahdi's discussion of the legitimation of repression in Islamic nations by focusing
on the case of repression in recent decades in pre and post-revolutionary Iran. He described the development of SAVAK, the political police created after the military coup of 1953, and summarized the array of repressive techniques it introduced for the first time into Iran. SAVAK operated independently of the civil courts and was free to detain, beat, and torture anyone it considered suspicious. It secured expert training from Western countries for its employees and developed a sophisticated capacity to design counterinsurgency and repressive policies. It infiltrated opposition groups and employed advanced computer data processing and espionage equipment for keeping track of the backgrounds and activities of large segments of the population. It filtered and approved the content of the mass media and instructional materials in the schools, intimidated people into participating in elections and political street demonstrations, and had the power of final approval for a vast number of hiring decisions.

The political opposition to SAVAK, up until the 1970's, concentrated on publicizing the suffering of individual victims of SAVAK's grossest acts of brutality. However, this strategy allowed the bulk of SAVAK's activity to remain relatively hidden since the modern forms of repression used by SAVAK were less visible than traditional types of repression. Besides this, SAVAK used the media and its intellectual resources to discredit the opposition. In the 1970's, opposition groups developed greater sophistication in exposing the structure of the regime and its
repressive apparatus, and violent clashes with SAVAK increased. Still missing, however, was a wider sociological analysis of society that would make visible the repressive potential of emerging religious opposition groups. After the revolution, when these groups took the reins of power, they used the same instruments of repression as the previous regime. But much of the population did not even see the directives of the clerical rulers as political but as the laying out of religious tasks and duties.

SESSION 9: Genocidal Terror

Ben Kiernan's paper focused on how two groups of victims were targeted for genocide in Pol Pot's Kampuchea, the approximately 1.4 million peasants of the Eastern Zone and the Muslims of Kampuchea known as the Chams numbering about 200,000. At least 100,000 of the Eastern Zone peasants, perhaps several times that, were killed, most of them in 1978. The Eastern Zone peasants represent the largest group of victims of the Pol Pot regime and the attack on them was more ferocious than on those evacuated from the cities when the regime first took power. The reason for the targeting of Eastern Zone peasants was their close social contact with the Vietnamese and the traditional alliance between Communist leaders of the Eastern Zone with the Vietnamese Communists. During a series of vicious attacks upon the Vietnamese involving the massive slaughter of peasants in 1977, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) leadership decided that none of the Eastern Zone natives could be trusted, calling them "Khmer bodies with
Vietnamese minds." Party cadres were purged and executed everywhere in the country in 1977, but in the Eastern Zone the purges were especially extensive and indiscriminate. In 1978, many villages were evacuated to the west, every person being given blue scarves along the way so that they would be clearly distinguishable from the native population where they were settled. For weeks or months, the significance of this marking was not known by the Eastern peasants or those they settled among, although the wearing of properly colored scarves (any color but blue for the natives) was strictly enforced. Later, however, the Eastern peasants were systematically rounded up and taken away to be executed. The administrative character of this mass murder was similar to the Holocaust and was justified in a similar way as well. Thus individuals from the Eastern Zone were characterized as part of an impure and inherently alien and disloyal segment of the population.

The Muslim Cham minority was another special target of the Pol Pot regime, but in this case it was not so much the inherent disloyalty of the individuals in the group that was at issue but the Muslim faith and Cham language and culture. The inhabitants of Cham villages were dispersed and resettled in small groups among the non-Muslim Khmers, prohibited from manifesting their cultural differences in any substantial way, many being forced to eat pork, and threatened with execution for speaking their own language. Most of their religious leaders were killed and those that had political positions were purged. Chams do not appear to
have suffered more than the general population in terms of number of killings, death by starvation, or the burden of forced labor, but they were a "favorite target" of the Khmer Rouge in many situations and they suffered more because of the ruthless repression of their cultural identity and community.

Chanthou Boua's paper, based on 29 interviews with Buddhist monks, described how Buddhism was virtually eliminated within a year after the Khmer Rouge took power in April 1975. Buddhism had been the state religion of Kampuchea since the twelfth century and had been growing more influential in public life in the twentieth century.

Its following peaked after independence (1954) at almost 90% of the population. Buddhist monasteries served as the center of village social and ritual life as well as providing shelter, food, and other aid to the most needy out of the gifts the monks received regularly from those who were better off. Because of the social importance of Buddhism, the Khmer Rouge took a more gradual and indirect approach to its destruction than they did to the Muslim culture of the Chams. During the war from 1970 to 1975, the Khmer Rouge policy toward Buddhism was unclear and inconsistent. In this period and shortly after takeover, the Khmer Rouge often gave rhetorical support to Buddhism and tried to win popular support by sponsoring Buddhist festivals and drawing monks into political activity by appealing to the ideals of national independence and social equality, even recruiting them as cadre.
Within months, however, orders came from the center to the villages that the monks must "disrobe" and abandon Buddhism. These orders were not always carried out immediately and completely. The majority of monks were able to evade disrobing until late 1975 and a very few until early 1977. The more senior monks and those not tainted by city origins were the last forced to disrobe. Those who refused, were taken away to be killed. The ideological opposition to Buddhism was not consistently strong among the cadres, but monks were officially criticized for not engaging in the physical labor necessary to build the nation. By early 1976, Buddhist festivals, including birth celebrations, funerals, and weddings had been completely suppressed. Traditional weddings were replaced by mass weddings in which women were wedded without their consent or the consent of parents to the man who had requested them through local authorities.

Ronald Suny presented a paper entitled "Ideology or Social Ecology? Rethinking the Armenian Genocide" in which he tried to show that explanations of the genocide in terms of the religious and nationalist ideologies of the Armenian and Turkish leaderships are incomplete without also considering how social hostilities developed between the Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian communities. For several centuries these groups had lived in stable "symbiosis", a relationship which allowed the Christian Armenians a degree of communal autonomy but which made of them an underclass
subordinated to the Muslim Turks and Kurds. Though they were able to rise high in commerce and government service, Armenians had to live with severe discrimination and an ideology of Muslim superiority. For example, their testimony was frequently not accepted in courts, they were prevented from bearing arms as was customary among Muslims, and they were forced to wear distinctive clothing.

The Armenians submitted to Muslim domination without much protest until the middle of the 19th century when some Armenian liberals began to argue for more Armenian autonomy, equal protection under the law, and reform of repressive institutions like tax farming. These political stirrings grew out of a cultural ferment associated with increasing Armenian contact with the Christian and capitalist West through their wide diaspora, alienating them from their Muslim neighbors. Armenians increasingly distinguished themselves from the Muslims by their adoption of Western business practices and Western intellectual and artistic fashions, by having their children educated abroad, and by their better developed educational and publishing institutions.

Armenians saw progress in liberal Turkish reforms up until the late 1870's when a new, more liberal constitution was withdrawn. From this point on, the Armenians' situation deteriorated, their greatest suffering being at the hands of the Kurds who harassed them in marauding, armed bands and in some places held them in a kind of feudal servitude, even buying and
selling Armenians as property. The context of increasing Kurdish aggressiveness, against which the Turkish authorities refused to provide any substantial protection, was a demographic shift that made Armenians a smaller minority, along with increasing population pressure and competition for agricultural resources.

In the 1890's, the Turkish government sanctioned Kurdish military units, and massacres of Armenians were reported from all parts of Eastern Anatolia. 300,000 were killed between 1894 and 1896. The state's support of Kurdish violence was in spite of the fact that recurrent Kurdish insurrections represented a much greater threat to its power than the Armenians. However, the government saw an opportunity to secure the loyalty of Kurds and channel Kurdish military force not only against Armenians but against powerful Turks at the local level who would not bend their will to the central government. In the face of the Kurdish aggression, Armenians still remained mostly passive although small rebel groups formed which did not genuinely threaten the government.

The Armenian situation worsened again in 1913 when a group of extreme Turkish nationalists took over the government in a coup d'etat after a string of humiliating military defeats. This took place against a backdrop of increasing resentment against Armenians for their great prominence in industry and commerce and association with elites of urban life and dangerous foreign political ideas. Turkish suspicions of the Armenians appeared fully confirmed when Armenian volunteers fought on the side of the Russians against the Turks in 1915. This led to deportation of
Armenians from those areas where they might join with the enemy, an act which degenerated into a policy of systematic extermination of all Armenians.

Geoff Eley made a presentation on the possibilities and problems of putting Nazi anti-semitism into historical and social context. The use of the word "Holocaust" as a term which distinguishes the Nazi genocide against the Jews from all other acts of genocide signifies the sacralizing of the event and the impossibility of comparing it with any other. The meaning of "Holocaust" is "burnt sacrifice offered to God," and much Holocaust scholarship has been undertaken as a holy task to preserve the memory and specificity of Jewish victimhood and the uniquely absolute quality of Nazi evil. More recent scholarship of the last two decades has, however, transformed the image of the Jews as sacrificial (and passive) victims and explored the social history of European Jewry and the way in which they resisted becoming victims.

One of the most important contexts for the Jewish genocide was Germany's ambitions for the subjugation of other peoples and territorial expansion which were already evident in 1918, as well as the general problem of aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. Active anti-semitism during the war was at its worst in Poland, Hungary, Romania and France where claims of an historic right to greater national territory were strongest. The anti-semitism associated with such nationalisms of mainly peasant
peoples was fueled by the identification of the urbanized Jew with a dominant and exploitative ruling culture.

Another important context for the Jewish genocide is suggested by the "structuralist" school of German historiography which sees the Final Solution not just as the implementation of Hitler's longstanding personal ideology but as the outgrowth of an unpredictable series of responses to events by a complex, multi-centered apparatus, a process which is summed up in the term "cumulative radicalization." The capacity for genocide against the Jews cannot be attributed solely, however, to the power of the Nazi leadership to exert its will or even to the apparatus as a whole but must be found in society as well and the openness of large sections of the population to the bureaucratic victimization of unwanted minorities. Part of the ideological conditions for genocide were created during the Weimar Republic with the development of eugenicist, social engineering philosophy in social policy and the health care professions. The complicity of "non-Nazis" at all levels of society including business people, professionals, and those in the civil apparatus must be a part of the explanation for Nazi racialist genocide which extended to several non-Jewish groups who have received more attention in recent scholarship---other East European nationalities, Socialists and Communists, homosexuals, "mental defectives", the incurably ill, etc.
SESSION 10: Socioeconomic Factors in State Terror

This session was concerned mainly with the relation between development of the state's repressive apparatus and economic development. Ralph Thaxton presented a paper which described how the Chinese state in the period from 1913 to 1935 developed a treasury police in order to suppress peasants who were resisting the government's efforts to stop them from making salt. The making of salt by peasants undermined the government's attempt to raise salt tax revenues by restricting salt production through exclusive licensing of large scale producers and merchants. The salt tax was one of three important sources of revenue for the government and was critical for raising an army and meeting international financial obligations, some of which were guaranteed by the salt tax. In fact, as part of the conditions for a very large loan, representatives of Western nations and banks imposed reforms in salt tax administration creating direct pressure to raise salt tax revenues.

Making salt was the only means of subsistence for many peasants and over half the peasants in many rural counties were engaged in salt making. Thus the attempt to force peasants out of salt making provoked widespread protest which exploded in the North China Salt area (the area focused on by Thaxton) in 1932, the year of maximum government pressure.

Susan Weissman's paper, entitled "The Role of the Purges in the Formation of the USSR," took the position that the terror of
the 1930's must be explained in the context of the development of the Soviet economic system and its associated class relations. Specifically, the terror was a consequence of the closing off of alternative ways of coordinating and increasing production. One of these alternatives was a return to reliance on market incentives and the New Economic Policy of the 1920's. But this option was discredited by the failure of NEP to generate industrialization and adequate grain supplies and was made less feasible by collectivization's elimination of the social forces necessary for a market oriented agriculture. On the other hand, a path of development that would have been truer to the socialist ideals of the Revolution—genuinely democratic planning and a more gradual process of industrialization that would have avoided sacrifice of worker and peasant welfare—was also closed off as deteriorating living conditions and workplace chaos and unrest led to more and more ruthless means of disciplining peasants and workers. Terror was effective in forcing managers and workers to build an industrial infrastructure and in eliminating Stalin's political opposition, especially the Old Bolsheviks of the Revolution. But the purges also created a new class of passively obedient, opportunist bureaucrats and a managerial apparatus which routinely falsified information to protect itself, stifled innovation, and created great waste through its inability to effectively coordinate production and enforce quality standards.
Charles Brockett, in his paper "Sources of State Terrorism in Rural Central America," made a comparative case study of Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica in order to test hypotheses about why their governments differ in the degree to which they have used repressive violence. Usually, state terror has been seen as a response to popular political mobilization. Yet while the level of such mobilization has been roughly equivalent in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Honduras has experienced much less terror while Guatemala and El Salvador have experienced much more and Nicaragua an intermediate amount. Brockett therefore examined several other factors that influence the resort to violence by the state with specific reference to political mobilization among peasants who have been displaced from the land by expansion of export crop production. These factors include (1) the ruling group's perception of threat from mobilization as influenced by (a) the supply of (land) resources to meet demands of the opposition, (b) the inequality and rigidity of the class structure and (c) the degree to which the state is geared to its support, (2) the capabilities of the state security apparatus and (3) the propensity for repression embedded in the political culture.

Pressure from peasants to redistribute land was likely viewed in relation to the amount of land available to give them. Guatemala and El Salvador had relatively few acres of agricultural land per agricultural worker and relatively more inequality in the size of holdings. In Honduras, the displacement of peasants had
been slowed down by lack of capital and infrastructure and
difficult terrain and there was a relatively large amount of
public land and foreign fruit company holdings available to meet
peasant demands.

The lack, up until 1960, of a domestically-controlled export
crop in Honduras also resulted in a less developed bourgeoisie and
state to further bourgeois interests. This was paralleled by
Honduras's relatively late development of a small military and
police as compared with El Salvador and Guatemala. Thus Honduras
had less capacity for bringing terror to bear on its population.

Finally, the use of violence appears to be less acceptable in
Honduras than in El Salvador or Guatemala since these latter
countries have a long history of violent repression which elites
see as effective in quelling unrest. On the other hand, in El
Salvador and especially Guatemala, there is more severe cultural
stratification that allows Indians who bear the brunt of terror to
be perceived as subhuman.

The intermediate level of arbitrary violence against
civilians in Nicaragua can be explained by the same set of
factors. Nicaragua had a relative abundance of land and low
degree of inequality in its distribution but a security apparatus
and institutions of state which were further developed and better
aligned with elite economic interests than in Honduras.
SESSION 11: Glasnost and the Legacy of the Great Terror

Glasnost has opened Soviet society to a confrontation with its past, especially the Stalinist period and the Great Terror. The search for truth about the Great Terror and the rewriting of its history have been critical elements in the political restructuring of the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Shlapentokh made a presentation in which he traced the evolution of popular knowledge of the terror of the 1930's. During the terror itself, different groups had differing amounts of knowledge. Stalin and his circle knew everything about the terror's true dimensions as did the NKVD, probably down to the lowest levels. Party apparatchiks didn't recognize the mass terror in its first year. But in 1937-38, some of them came to see it for what it was while others perceived only the arrest of a small part of the population. The intelligentsia was able, under the influence of propaganda, to ignore the terror except when it touched its own families. Propaganda was even more successful in keeping the truth of mass terror away from the masses and most were convinced of Zinoviev's and Trotsky's guilt. Krushchev's revelations at the 20th Party Congress helped recover some of the history of the 1930's. The mass terror was recognized, though without citing any figures, and the concept of the Gulag was introduced without using that term. Second layer Party officials were exonerated although Stalin's opponents were not. The 1930's finally began to be understood by the public as a great tragedy in the early 1960's.
Under Brezhnev, however, a blackout was imposed on public discussion of the Great Terror and the public's consciousness of it was virtually destroyed. Manipulation of public memory and perception appeared to be easy. Where people's experience contradicted the official version of events it was dismissed plausibly as unrepresentative.

Then, in the 1980's, in accordance with his new policy of Glasnost, Gorbachev prompted intellectuals to revise official Soviet history. Much polarization and debate followed, for the discrediting of Gorbachev's predecessors risked delegitimating the current regime and state apparatus. It has proved difficult to dislodge the long accepted mythology, particularly that which concerns events in earlier periods. There also appears to be more eagerness to denounce the recent periods of history because they are far removed from Lenin and the October Revolution, the foundations of Soviet legitimacy. Rehabilitation of Stalin's opponents has started with the most recently condemned and worked backwards. At the center of the struggle over how history will be rewritten is discussion of the number of victims of terror. Gorbachev first opened this subject to public discussion by referring in 1987 to "thousands" of victims, but since then, the figures in the Soviet press have been gradually increasing to estimates as high as 30 million.

Stephen Wheatcroft presented a paper which recounted recent academic controversies over estimates, for the Soviet Union of the
1930's, of the level of arrests, the size of the forced labor, concentration camp population, and the number of deaths in excess of "normal expectations." Several respected scholars have used estimates of concentration camp labor of over 10 million although demographic analysis seems to rule out the possibility that the real figure was more than 4 to 5 million (as of 1939). Estimates of excess mortality for the 1926-39 period are difficult to make and are quite sensitive to assumptions about normal mortality and fertility rates, but exaggerated figures used by some should be discarded in favor of a reasonable estimate of 5 to 6 million. Our judgments about the significance of the Great Terror depend upon estimates of its scale, yet leading scholars have shown either reluctance to analyze statistical evidence in detail or refusal to acknowledge the need to revise their figures in the light of new evidence and analysis.

Helena Richter presented a paper entitled "In the Shadow of Stalin's Terror: The Course of Development of the Opposition During the Post-Stalinist Era in the USSR." She asked why Soviet society was so passive and unsupportive of dissidents under Krushchev and Brezhnev when political terror was officially censored and virtually discontinued, and when the need for social change seemed manifest. Richter answered by pointing to the social-psychological after-effects of Stalinist terror: passivity of the masses and their reliance on authorities for upholding their rights and ensuring social benefits. Opposition was
forestalled by the lack of ability to perceive and conceptualize conflicts between the Party and society.

The first form of opposition was led by Krushchev who aimed reforms at Stalin's "cult of personality" and Stalin's personal dogmatism and abuse of power but not at the structure of the political system. These reforms were the beginning of a larger movement called "liberal opposition" and was supported by a small group within the apparatus and a larger group of intelligentsia. Its main success between 1956 and 1964 was in articulating humanistic values by restoring the names of murdered artists, writers, and scientists as well as suppressed areas of culture. Later, in the mid 1960's, political critique extended to analysis of Stalin's policies and brought the legitimacy of the political system into question. Conflicts began to arise related to labor relations, industry, agriculture, nationalistic groups, deported minorities, and religious groups as well as within the Party. The apparatus responded by bringing down Krushchev and crushing the various oppositions leaving only small groups willing to continue resistance. Krushchev had failed to receive active support from those close to the ruling circles because they could not see behind the facade of Party unity to the split at the top between Krushchev and his opponents. In addition, society in general was more concerned with comprehending the Stalinist past as revealed by Krushchev at the Party congresses than with current political events.
The Prague Spring put a final end to "liberal opposition" and all criticism of Stalin. All discussion of economic reform and freedom in the arts and sciences was stopped. The emergence of the modern human rights movement in 1967-68 received no mass support leaving Brezhnev free to crush it and isolate its members. Those who made up the former opposition, however, were encouraged by Brezhnev's affirmations of the end of terror and lawlessness and believed that Krushchev's anti-Stalin reforms would continue.

Soviet dissidents have emphasized the role of fear in causing the weakness of oppositional activity in the 1960's. But passivity must also be explained by the Bolsheviks' attack on the ideological, moral and psychological resources of individuals and their familial, religious and other social ties. The suppression of social conflicts was accompanied by rationalizations meant to increase victims' sense of isolation and disgrace. In the absence of alternative social perspectives, people could not grasp the meaning of the mass slaughter of the 1930's and depended on official explanations that excited their suspicions of victims while suppressing their private doubts. Irrational faith in Stalin was followed by a faith in Krushchev and then Brezhnev and people believed they were being freed from repression despite Krushchev's repression of all spontaneously emerging organizations. Finally, in the early 1970's, the nature of the conflict between the Stalinist apparatus and society began to be grasped. The propaganda of the state lost its grip on the people who developed disregard for official ethics and beliefs.
Gorbachev's policies are aimed at active participation of massive social groups as the only thing which will turn the tide against the Stalinist system of social control.

SESSION 12: The Future of Terror

The session on the future of terror focused on factors which will be critical in determining whether terror is reproduced or healed over through political reform. Gordon Bowen's paper was entitled "Legacies of Latin American State Terrorism: Barriers to Democratization in Argentina and Guatemala." His thesis was that the kind of popular support and citizen-state relationships necessary for democracy cannot be built following an episode of state organized terror without public trials and convictions of its perpetrators and justice for its victims. It was only massive, multi-party, street demonstrations in Argentina which prevented the necessary support from developing within the military for a coup to replace the democratically elected government led by Alfonsin. These street demonstrations could only have taken place in the context of the regime's clear articulation of human rights, its purges of the security forces and especially its willingness to publicly prosecute in an orderly and rigorous way those responsible for murder and torture during Argentina's "dirty war" of 1976-81. The Alfonsin government has also been successful in putting an end to massacres, assassinations and disappearances.

In Guatemala, the coming to power of the new civilian regime in 1986 has been followed by a sharp reduction in reports of major
Guatemalan Army massacres, but disappearances and politically motivated murders have continued and violence has increased against university students, labor unionists and schoolteachers. The civilian controlled police have not been arresting the perpetrators though many of them are known. The inability of the government to end the terror of the military appears connected to its failure to put former leaders and security personnel on trial for their crimes or to hold out hope of doing so. This failure has embittered human rights advocates and victims' families, and undermined the credibility of President Cerezo and of Guatemalan law. Although the desire of part of the military to maintain a facade of democracy was probably a key reason why a serious military rebellion against Cerezo failed in May 1988, the prospects of continued development of democracy appear dimmer because of the failure to cement popular unified support for the new government through prosecution of those guilty of human rights violations. Bowen believes that the importance of bringing the guilty to justice for establishing democracy is demonstrated not only by the contrast between the Argentinean and Guatemalan cases, but by the passionate desire of the victims' families for justice. We need to give such experiential evidence more weight, for social scientists have concentrated too exclusively on determining the social, political, and economic structural conditions that correlate with democracy.

Richard Newbold Adams, in his paper entitled "The Reproduction of State Terrorism in Central America," explained how
state or "regime" terror, has become self reproducing in those areas of Central America where it is reinforced by "societal terror." Societal terror grows primarily out of profound differences between ethnic groups, in this case the ruling Ladinos and the Indians, but is also linked to the historical means used by the Ladinos to subdue the Indians. State terror has emerged mainly in areas where the Indians were subjected to forced labor after the conquest, areas which correspond to the location of the high civilization of the Aztecs and Mayas. In these areas, slaughter has been the typical response to Indian resistance and rebellion rather than negotiation and a degree of accommodation and autonomy.

The indigenous peoples in Guatemala and El Salvador were regarded from the beginning by their conquerors not as external enemies but as treasonous subjects, yet to this day they regard the conquest as temporary and look forward in their community rituals to the day when it is reversed. Indians make up half the population of Guatemala and Indians and Ladinos there have long terrorized each other with great violence. The most recent slaughter of Indians in Guatemala between 1979 and 1984 was not just the tactic of a political elite. It was also a terrified Ladino response to a real possibility of Indian revolt and civil war.

Rhoda Howard's paper, "Repression and Terror in Africa: The Case of Kenya", was an attempt to explain part of the recent increase in state perpetrated political violence in Kenya between
1982 and 1987 and predict further such violence on the basis of three factors: (1) severe economic inequality and the associated potential for class-based political opposition, (2) the incipience of ideologically motivated political opposition among the educated elite and (3) the degree to which foreign powers (the U.S. in this instance) have interests in government continuity due to geopolitical concerns. The possible importance of these three factors is suggested by the case of terror in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala. Although Kenya has experienced lower levels of arbitrary violence than these nations, it is an interesting case of African state violence because its state is relatively well developed compared to other sub-Saharan English speaking nations (nations of Commonwealth Africa). By contrast, the reign of terror under Idi Amin in Uganda is less relevant to the study of state organized terror because the agent of terror was not an institution with administrative continuity or claim to political legitimacy but merely a network of personal, political henchmen.

The increase in Kenyan political repression beginning in 1982 came in the wake of an unsuccessful coup attempt by members of Kenya's Air Force with the backing of university students. From 1982 to 1988 at least 600 people were imprisoned or preventively detained, most of them professionals, academics, and businessmen. Confessions were extracted by torture from most of these prisoners and convictions were for publishing, reading, or being aware of written material from the opposition Mwakenya movement. Three deaths of political prisoners were documented during this period. In 1988, the President was given the power to dismiss judges of
the highest court and police were given more powers of detention of suspects without charge.

The first factor conducive to repression—deep class divisions—is not as important in Africa as in Latin America. Rates of peasant landlessness in Commonwealth Africa are very low compared to Central America and most urban dwellers still have ties to their villages so there is relatively little polarization between a capitalist and landowning class and an urban or rural proletariat. Kenya, however, has a relatively high number of landless peasants amounting to 22% of its population. In addition, land distribution and income distribution are particularly unequal. The ruling class in Kenya is also more established and dedicated to exploiting the state for the resources and privileges it can provide. All of this is becoming more apparent and a source of popular resentment.

Kenya is also unusual among Commonwealth African nations for having at least an embryonic liberal/socialist oriented political movement. A small group of underground dissidents (probably mostly professionals and intelligentsia) calling themselves Mwakenya advocate "revolutionary change" in favor of "majority poor, dispossessed Kenyans", "forcibly if necessary." Its literature calls for democracy and freedom, equality of all Kenyans, and of men and women, rights to freedom of expression and association, and laws against arbitrary arrest. Mwakenya appears to have no real prospect of mobilizing the masses, yet President Daniel arap Moi has prohibited public discussion of its views or even of its existence and has become obsessed with its possible
Marxist tendencies. The increasing number of well educated people unable to find satisfactory employment is creating a potential, however, for an ideologically animated opposition such as Mwakenya to develop into a serious threat.

The third main factor behind increasing repression in Kenya is U.S. government ties to the current regime based on geopolitical considerations. These include treaties allowing the U.S. Navy to use Kenyan ports, supplies of fighter aircraft and other equipment to the government, and training of Kenyan military officers. The augmented capability of Kenyan security forces, the provocation to socialist and populist oriented opposition of such U.S. supported capability, and the U.S.'s probable support for keeping political opposition under control are all conducive to greater repression. On the other hand, Kenya seems sensitive to U.S. criticisms of its human rights record and this could lead to a better result than increasing class consciousness, ideological polarization, and geopolitically motivated support for the regime might suggest.

Stephen Sloan, in his paper entitled "State Organized Terrorism: New Trends, Capabilities and Tactics: The Privatization of Public Violence" presented an outline of potentials for new forms of state organized terror stemming from technological advance and the recent growth of private firms offering security services to corporate and public clients. There are several rapidly spreading technologies with repressive potential including telecommunications networks, computerized data banks, and
sophisticated psychological analysis of media audiences. At the same time, the new private security industry has experienced explosive growth in the last two decades on the basis of public perception of lack of government ability to provide protection from both crime and international terrorism. More personnel and financial resources are now devoted to private security in the U.S. than to public law enforcement. Firms providing counterterrorism services devote much of their time to risk assessment and crisis management negotiation, but they also provide training and services in surveillance, interrogation, sabotage, and methods of killing and handling prisoners which can be used as much for repression as for counterterrorist action.

Governments can take advantage of new technologies and private security services to reduce the amount of violence they use and thus their vulnerability to criticism by increasing the intimidation effects of violence on the audience targeted. This can be done by using mass media to more widely demonstrate consequences of transgression and through computer and social science-aided psychological monitoring of groups and individuals so as to more efficiently proportion and target acts of intimidation. The use of private firms by the state threatens to grow because it allows government officials to operate with plausible deniability. Accountability is especially low because there is very little regulation of the private security and counterterrorism industry and firms can operate out of any country within an international market. In the more democratic countries, the state's use of private firms to advance its capabilities of
violent forms of repression may not be as great, yet there is a more insidious threat of both private and public data processing and surveillance networks becoming so extensive and sophisticated that it will become very easy to intimidate individuals by threat of turning against them the networks upon which they depend for credit, licenses, etc.

SESSION 13: Terror in an International Context

This session explored the ways in which a regime's use of terror for domestic political control is conditioned by its relationships to foreign powers. Ted Lewellen presented a paper entitled "State Terror and the Disruption of Internal Adaptations by CIA Covert Actions." He noted that while only a very small proportion of CIA covert actions have become public knowledge, the pattern among those that have suggests that such actions have almost always been unsuccessful when directed against Communist regimes, but have quite often been successful when directed against democracies and non-communist, constitutional governments. Lewellen had previously compiled a list of 13 cases of successful interventions against democratic and constitutional governments between 1953 and 1973, almost all of which were followed by periods of violent repression. He used this set of cases (including Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, British Guyana, Zaire, Ecuador, Brazil, Greece, Indonesia, Dominican Republic, and Chile) to demonstrate that terror follows covert intervention because intervention thwarts populist political movements which provided the only avenue of constructive
adaptation to stresses in existing anachronistic social, economic, and political structures. Absent such adaptation, maintenance of these structures has often been accomplished by resort to terror.

Four types of stresses and indigenous attempts to adapt to them appear to have been especially important in inducing destructive CIA covert action: (1) multinational penetration into the economy, usually connected with the extraction of natural resources, has created stress through its tendency to increase economic inequality, decrease provision of basic needs, and retard development. Adaptations which provoke U.S. reactions include nationalization, increased taxes, laws forcing reinvestment of profits and limits on investment. (2) Rationalization of agriculture for export purposes that forces peasants off their land and into wage labor and takes away feudal economic security has created pressure for redistributive land reform. (3) Decolonization has created a political vacuum and given birth to ethnic conflicts which may lead to a political accommodation which may not be considered favorable to U.S. geopolitical and economic interests. (4) Autonomous militaries have wielded veto power over civilian governments who have tried to implement reforms. The U.S., however, may continue to support the military if its political influence over the government is rooted in a close working relationship with and funding of the military.

Violent repression after U.S. intervention in democratic nations has usually been far worse than under the regime that was in power before the democratization process took place. This is because democratization provides new opportunities for formation
of political groups and demands as well as expectations for responses to political protest. All of these must be violently destroyed if the old order is to be reasserted.

William Maley's paper, "Weak State and Strong Society: Terror in Afghanistan 1978-1988," developed the idea that in cases where the legitimacy and capability of state institutions is very weak, the resort to terror for political control becomes counterproductive and only provokes solidarity and determination in resistances which are sustained by cohesive social values and networks. Historically, the various, feuding, ethnic and tribal groups within the territory of Afghanistan have effectively united to repel outside invaders. This cohesiveness was due largely to a common allegiance to Islam that drew together Sunni and Shia Muslims. The makings of a modern state including a standing army and a tax collection system, first began to emerge at the end of the 19th century. Yet the state's authority still depended on allowing autonomy to the tribal aristocracy and religious establishment which were the only elements capable of mobilizing and coalescing to defend the country.

The state was fairly stable until 1973 when a traditional political leader, Mohammad Daoud, carried out a successful coup with the support of one of the many factions of the tiny Communist Party. However, after Daoud began purging the members of his first cabinet and clashed openly with Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union used its influence in the country, based on extensive trade
with Afghanistan and military aid, to force a reunification of the Communist Party within the armed forces. This led to another successful coup by the communists.

The new leaders of the state had no more independent authority over traditional society than their predecessors, yet their ambitions for societal transformation and control were far higher. After the coup, there began a purge of the urban elite and then purges of rural elites. Many thousands of people, particularly intellectuals and supporters of previous regimes, were incarcerated, tortured and executed. Rural purges were targeted principally at clergy and other local notables. The policy which provoked the greatest resistance from the rural population was land reform which set an ownership limit of 6 hectares per family. This measure was supposed to free peasants from feudal bonds but was actually offensive to the peasants who did not perceive existing inequalities as grossly unjust and who benefitted from the redistributive social obligations of the wealthy in their communities. The small, mal-equipped, and illegitimate state bureaucracy could not carry out the land reform and the regime resorted to mass terror to impose its will.

The opposition was not suppressed by the purging of local elites. This was because the elites did not command from a position of personal authority but were filling roles which could readily be filled by others within a stable lineage structure, and because community decisions were determined more by customs and the communal deliberations of local, pluralistic assemblies. From
1978 the regime increasingly carried out mass murders, herding groups of hundreds and thousands to their deaths, shooting them, forcing them over cliffs, throwing them into rivers, burying them alive, etc. In addition they used Soviet pilots to carry out massive bombing raids against civilians.

The disorder of the situation led the Soviets to intervene, believing that their military strength could control the population. However, the opposition only hardened, united in its hatred of Soviet atheism and its associated debauchery, its desire to defend Islam and its idea of salvation through martyrdom. The conflict escalated into full-scale war including extensive torture, random atrocities, and bombing of civilians. Over five million Afghan refugees fled the country, huge numbers of internal refugees were created, and roughly 9% of the population was killed. But none of this brutality strengthened the power of the state over society, a fact recognized by the Soviets when they finally decided to withdraw their forces.

John McCamant's paper asked why the twentieth century has brought unprecedented political repression as well as political freedom. To answer this question, McCamant proposed a conceptual scheme for analyzing the interrelationship between forms of social domination and the relation between domination at the local, national, and international levels. He used this scheme to explain the historical development of state power in the Third World and presented case studies of repression in Chile and El Salvador to demonstrate the scheme's usefulness.
McCamant sees three basic forms of social domination: (1) command backed by coercion, (2) exchange backed by control of the means of purchase, and (3) consensus backed by means of persuasion. Repression is associated with coercion and democracy with persuasion and consensus, but all states exercise social domination. These forms of domination are usually used in combination. For example, the state uses coercion to enforce laws which are established in part through persuasion and consensus. Likewise, an exchange of service and obligation between rulers and citizens is reinforced by both consensus and coercion. The distribution of the means of coercion, exchange, and persuasion between sectors of society is often highly unequal and an elite may dominate on the basis of its superior resources in any of these categories or use one type of domination to secure another. For example, financial resources can be used to purchase means of coercion, or resources of persuasion may be used to control financial resources.

Domination at the level of the state operates in relation to the possibly different forms of domination prevailing at the lower, local level and at the higher, international level. The character and relative strength of domination at the local and national levels of Third World nations has been subject to two main trends of change in the twentieth century. First, the commodification of life and reorientation of production and commerce to national and international markets has eroded local forms of domination based on exchange and consensus. Exchange between local parties which can be used to express reciprocal ties
and obligations becomes less frequent. The market driven rationalization of production and use of labor saving techniques, combined with increasing population, makes labor redundant and peasants are pushed off the land, deprived of a place in the local economy. Investment and production decisions come to be made outside the local setting by a narrower national and international elite who alone possess the skills and resources to manage large scale operations. Along with development of wider markets there is also a shift in the distribution of means of persuasion away from the local level as national and international media penetrate deeper into local public discourse.

Linked to these economic changes is the second twentieth century trend of increasing state power. In general, Third World states have developed their capabilities for social regulation and provision of public services principally as a response to pressure to create favorable conditions for expanding international trade and production for export. Trade and economic growth have, in turn, generated financial resources for the state through taxes and tariffs and bribes to officials.

However, the development of the state and the rise of economic power at the national and international level have caused much social dislocation and conflict. The state has dealt with this conflict mainly through coercive means and repression rather than through responsiveness to citizens' needs (exchange mode of domination) or through dialogue (persuasion and consensus mode of domination). This choice of means has been encouraged by the other principal source of increased state power in the twentieth
century: extensive international aid to the security and police apparatuses of the Third World states. Third World states have found themselves relatively well equipped for repression and relatively short of the resources, institutions and time to meet social needs and demonstrate their legitimacy. Repression has been reinforced at the local level when local elites, suffering a weakening of local level domination in the exchange and consensus modes, have sought to draw on state resources to buttress their power and found resources for coercion the most readily available. Repression has been made an even more likely choice for political control in the Third World by the fact that colonialism has created ethnically divided states in which there is a tradition of mutual coercion between groups and the power of the state has been used to extend the hegemony of dominant groups.

Repression in Chile and El Salvador illustrates these patterns. In 1973, the Chilean state went from allowing some of the freest political debate in Latin America to being, at that time, the most brutal and absolute dictatorship in Latin America since the Spanish conquest. A landed capitalist class was dominant, yet it had lost out in political debate in the 1960's to political parties arguing for communitarianism and various forms of socialism. Wealthy Chileans and the CIA counter-attacked in 1967 with a massive propaganda campaign to persuade voters that free enterprise was the answer to economic difficulties. After a socialist, Salvador Allende, was elected President in 1970, the U.S. government collaborated with members of the Chilean business class to destabilize Chile through the cut off of loans,
disruption of international trade, stopping of investment, and causing of strikes. As a result, the military was eventually convinced that it must throw Allende out to allow a group of American trained economists and financiers under General Pinochet to impose a broad range of free market policies and suppress worker movements. The U.S. provided the military with the equipment and counter-insurgency training which Pinochet used to secure his power over the country. Thus, international support for state power provided the local and national Chilean elites with the means to repress social upheaval resulting from its exploitation of opportunities presented by integration of Chilean production into the world economy.

Between the mid 1970's and the mid 1980's, the government of El Salvador, dominated by an unusually narrow, landowning elite, murdered close to one percent of its population, targeting especially the Christian base communities and leaders of workers' and teachers' unions and professional organizations. In accord with the general explanation of repression outlined above, this killing took place in the context of socially disruptive reorientation of production to national and international markets and large, internationally supported increases in the coercive powers of the state. Tenant farming was being replaced by large scale, capitalist agriculture relying on wage labor, a change which increased poverty and insecurity among peasants, sending rural landlessness from 12 percent of the rural population in 1960 to 60 percent in 1980. During the 1960's and early 1970's Gross Domestic Product and regional trade grew rapidly on the basis of
expanded export agriculture and manufactures as the state, with
the assistance of the U.S., developed its ability to provide
infrastructure for the new economic activity in the form of
education, agricultural research, transportation, and electric
power. At the same time, however, the coercive powers of the
state were built up through extensive military aid. By the late
1970's, it was clear that repression served only to generate more
popular, armed resistance to the government. As a result, the
U.S. stepped up military and economic aid and virtually took over
the direction of Salvadoran security forces.

McCamant concluded his paper by calling for the cessation of
support for military governments, including clandestine operations
which are designed to split the political left from the center,
leading to center-right coalitions. Loans are harmful as well
since the ruling regimes only use the funds for their own
advantage. The U.S. could also help lessen the readiness to use
repression through the example of its own behavior by
deemphasizing military power in its international relationships
and ceasing to insist that insurgencies be militarily defeated.
U.S. promotion of free enterprise doctrine has been destructive
insofar as it rationalizes the suppression of working class
movements or becomes a dogma justifying its own authoritarian
imposition.

The long run solution to preventing state repression is the
development of a more autonomous civil society which may require
partial relocalization of the economy. The only type of foreign
assistance which clearly supports the strengthening of civil
society is that which goes from nongovernmental organizations to other nongovernmental organizations.

SESSION 14: Final Reflections on the Conference

Chris Vanderpool began the final session by drawing on sociological theory to construct an overview of what happens to a culture when subjected to state terror and how a culture must regenerate itself to overcome terror. When terror begins, it is directed by a ruling elite against non-governing elites who threaten its power. The masses of society also become terrorized, however, either because they fear becoming targets of the terror within the elite, or because terror is spread directly to them in order to intimidate them even further into passivity than they typically are and prevent them from becoming a political force behind a rival elite. Terrorization of the general populace is usually accomplished through the fueling of existing social antagonisms between ethnic groups and socioeconomic strata. This fragments society and enables the elite to channel social resentments and violence against its political opponents. Arbitrary violence becomes the norm in society and the evidence and symbols of state violence become pervasive in culture and public life. Any kind of social behavior that calls attention to oneself risks making oneself a target of violence and people withdraw behind masks of total conformity.

The passivity and fragmentation of the masses contrasts with the overwhelming resources of the state. These include physical, financial, and technological resources, but also the control over
the symbols and institutions that legitimate the use of power and give the state its authority. The leaders of the terroristic state project their view of the state as the sole valid initiator of social change. They deny the possibility of social progress growing out of the actions of individuals and groups within civil society except insofar as they are carrying out the commands of the state. The moral consciousness of people is split, especially those employed in the service of the state as agents of terror. There is the morality of private life and there is the transcendent morality of the state conceived as the embodiment of reason, the vehicle of the people's history, and the ultimate arbiter of what is good for the society as a whole. The leader of the state claims absolute allegiance as the personal expression of the omniscience and omnipotence of the state while the general populace is reduced to passivity.

The ending of a reign of terror requires not just a violent overthrow of the state's leadership but a regeneration of culture that will lift people out of passivity and reject the total authority and transcendent morality of the state. People must take back a measure of individual moral responsibility for actions carried out in the name of the state. They need to form groups which are capable of social action and of fostering public discourse which is independent of the state. Finally, legal protections must allow people to take their rights and physical safety for granted so that they will not be intimidated into
passivity. This reassurance depends partly on the ability of a reformed legal system to bring the perpetrators of state terror to justice.

Stanley Shernock focused his final remarks on the concept of "cumulative radicalization" which was originally developed by Hans Mommsen to describe the political process which led to conception and implementation of the Final Solution in Nazi Germany. This concept was discussed at the conference by Wegner and Eley in their presentations on Germany but was also alluded to by Rittersporn and Kiernan as somewhat applicable to the Soviet and Cambodian cases as well. Shernock saw the concept as useful in replacing the simplistic notion of the Holocaust as the realization of a long-standing master plan by a state apparatus under the unified, total control of Hitler. Cumulative radicalization represents the Final Solution as the endpoint of a series of responses to unpredictable situations and portrays the actions of the mal-organized state as the product of the interaction of a variety of institutional and individual actors within it. Shernock, however, was concerned that if cumulative radicalization comes to be used as a framework within which to sum up the political and institutional processes of genocidal or massively terroristic regimes, it would draw our attention away from some of their essential features. Cumulative radicalization focuses on the reactive, unreflective aspect of decision making and the lack of ability of any one person or political faction to
control state policy. Yet terror is usually the result of self-conscious, ideologically informed decision making by an elite which clearly has much scope for strategic control of the terror. Though there are often factions and segments within the apparatus engaging in uncoordinated acts of terror, one can observe substantially successful attempts by the most powerful leaders to control and institutionalize terror, as well as evidence of strategic shifting of terror targets and the intentional use of war as a cover for massive internal violence.

On the other hand, cumulative radicalization, referring as it does to the dynamics of decision making within the agencies of the state, also does not call sufficient attention to the propensities for violence within the larger society which form the social base upon which the political leaders build their policy of terror. These leaders channel and exacerbate existing ethnic rivalries and resentments, nationalism and xenophobia, or even the anger of the masses at the state apparatus. Shernock thus argued for a general perspective on terror which assigns more specific responsibility to certain powerful leaders and the social conflicts and crises which they take advantage of in strategic ways, rather than a cumulative radicalization perspective which may suggest too strongly an uncontrollable syndrome which catches hold of an entire, complex, multi-centered state. This position is based partly on the presumption that regardless of what structural political analysis reveals, an irreducible existential responsibility must still be assigned to specific groups and individuals.
Rory Riordan distilled from his notes during the conference a list of key dimensions of the state organized terror phenomenon, tentative generalizations concerning its characteristics, and an enumeration of avenues toward the ending of terror. The characteristics he noted as most salient and general were (1) the intentional arbitrariness of state terror, (2) the central role of the political police, (3) extensive reliance on informers, (4) the presence of a charismatic and paranoid leader, followers with inadequate personalities, and violent sociopaths as agents of terror, (5) the linkage of terror to the rewriting of history and the creation of an illusion of comprehensive social understanding on the part of the heads of state, (6) dominance of an ideology which holds that the ruling regime must maintain its power at all cost in order to force the people to be free, while regarding formal, representative democracy as a fraud, and (7) the presence of war or other involvement with foreign powers as a precipitating factor.

Six avenues to the ending of terror were listed by Riordan, namely (1) the death of the regime's leader where he is the focus of a personality cult, (2) the overburdening of the systems of surveillance by the mass of unreliable information flowing in from informers (Riordan doubted the existence of this tendency since modern technology facilitates efficient storage and use of information for targeting of terroristic actions), (3) the development of political organizations independent of the state,
(4) reform from the top in the Gorbachev mode, (5) international war crimes trials as should be carried out for Pol Pot who remains still at large, and (6) humanitarian international intervention. Two major obstacles to successful intervention which were left undiscussed at the conference were the possibility of provoking the use of nuclear weapons and the probability that a newly installed, weak government could not beat back an assault by urban guerrillas aligned with the former regime. Riordan concluded by expressing a wish that more attention had been devoted to the subject of strategies for controlling terror and looking forward to another conference that would focus more on practical possibilities for action.¹

¹ Alex Schmid, Helen Fein, and John McCamant also contributed useful remarks to this session. They are not summarized here because they were more informal in nature and unfortunately were not written or recorded.