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NOTE

This Report supplements that of Charles Gati (April 1990) entitled "THE BLOC THAT FAILED: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition", and the textbook bearing the same title published by Indiana University Press in May 1990. It is one of a series of lectures given during the summer of 1990, all of which, together with the textbook and a course given at Georgetown University, were funded by the Council to strengthen East European studies.

The Report consists of an interpretive account of Soviet policy toward East and West Europe from the Brezhnev era to July 1990 and concludes with a brief analysis of the possible nature of future Soviet-European relations. It presents Soviet-West European, especially Soviet-West German, relations of the Brezhnev era as a major factor in subverting the Eastern regimes; analyzes motivations and perceptions underlying Gorbachev's departures, and describes in some detail the shifting Soviet policy on German unification.
The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was primarily caused by the disintegration of communist regimes within those countries imposed by the Kremlin and never accepted by their populaces. Gorbachev's moves within the Soviet Union to dismantle the apparatus of the repressive, bureaucratic communist system also hastened the demise of Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe. Yet there was a third factor that contributed toward the East European revolutions of 1989--the subversive impact of the Soviet-West European, especially Soviet-West German, detente of the Brezhnev era that ultimately helped to undermine Soviet power in Eastern Europe.

In the pre-Gorbachev era, Western scholars who examined the connection between Soviet policies toward Western and Eastern Europe or the impact of Soviet West European policy on Soviet East European policy usually came up with rather meager results. The whole subject was considered marginal to the study of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Indeed, before Gorbachev took power the Kremlin consistently sought to keep the two halves of its European policy discrete. This was particularly true of its relations with the two German states, although Brezhnev used the promise of closer inter-German

relations to seek concessions from the Federal Republic. In
general, Soviet policy sought to control Eastern Europe and
influence Western Europe.\textsuperscript{2} Under Brezhnev and in the early
Gorbachev years, the Kremlin tried to calibrate its policies
toward both halves of Europe. But it proved impossible to
calculate the effects of policy toward one part of Europe on
the other. In retrospect, what was advantageous for Soviet
Westpolitik proved to be disadvantageous for Soviet
Blokpolitik (policy toward Eastern Europe). Today, while
Moscow struggles to exert any kind of influence on Eastern
Europe or Western Europe, it is no longer possible for the
Soviet Union to separate the two halves of its European
policy. Indeed, while one can discuss Gorbachev’s policy
toward Western Europe, one can question whether the Soviet
Union indeed has a policy toward Eastern Europe.

This paper will examine the links between Soviet West and
East European policy by examining three areas. It will
discuss the Brezhnev era and the legacy of the interaction
between Soviet policy toward both halves of Europe that
Gorbachev inherited. Secondly, it will analyze Soviet policy
in the first four years of the Gorbachev era, when the Soviet
leader essentially tried to continue the more successful
aspects of Brezhnev’s policy toward Europe with a more active
West European policy than that of the waning Brezhnev and
interregnum years. Thirdly, it will discuss Soviet policy

\textsuperscript{2} See Hassner, op. cit. p. 285.
since the annus mirabilis of 1989, focusing on Soviet policy toward German unification, which symbolizes the demise of a dualistic Soviet policy toward the two halves of Europe.

THE BREZHNEV LEGACY

It is virtually impossible today in the Soviet Union to find one positive word written about the Brezhnev era, the "era of stagnation". This is as true of domestic policy, where immobilism increasingly characterized the latter years of Brezhnev’s rule, as of foreign policy, in which there was in fact much greater mobilism. Yet an examination of Brezhnev’s policies in Western Europe suggests that the Soviet Union, at least until 1979, reaped considerable benefits from its activities in Western Europe before detente began to undermine Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

From the point of view of Eastern Europe, detente between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic was the single most important aspect of Brezhnev’s Westpolitik that affected his


4 See Angela Stent, "Western Europe" in ed. Gerrit W. Gong, Angela Stent and Rebecca Strode, Areas of Challenge for Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980’s (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1984) pp. 1-51, 131-133
Blokpolitik. Initially, the Soviet Union’s international position was considerably enhanced by the rapprochement between the FRG and the USSR. After all, the government of Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel normalized relations essentially on Soviet terms by accepting the boundaries of postwar Eastern Europe. As a result of the 1970 West German-Soviet Renunciation of Force Treaty, the Soviet Union’s international status improved, its economy was strengthened by the significant improvement in Soviet-FRG trade, and the West German public became increasingly favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union and developed a stake in the continuation of detente. In the eyes of most FRG citizens, detente with the Soviet Union brought concrete results.

Brezhnev’s image became much more benign and there was a growing disinclination to follow the United States in adopting a harsher policy toward the Soviets under the Carter and Reagan administrations.


The single major reason for the West German perception that detente had worked was also the ultimate cause of the undoing of socialism in East Germany, namely the improvement in inter-German ties. The promise of closer ties between the FRG and GDR was the major quid pro quo that Moscow offered Bonn in return for the recognition of the postwar European status quo. The inter-German Basic treaty of 1972 undoubtedly enhanced the GDR’s external legitimacy, since it was now, for the first time, recognized by the world community and no longer an international pariah. But detente with West Germany ultimately challenged the GDR’s already fragile domestic legitimacy by facilitating the penetration of East German society by the West German media, despite the policy of Abgrenzung, or demarcation, that Erich Honecker so assiduously pursued. 7 The undermining of East German society was the most dramatic result of Soviet-West German rapprochement. But European detente also facilitated West German contacts with other East European states and contributed toward the breaking down of the real and symbolic walls between the two halves of Europe.

This development was also reinforced by the evolution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. CSCE was initially viewed in the West as a Soviet

triumph, since Moscow had been calling for the convening of an all-European conference that would legitimize the division of Europe since 1954. Yet, despite the fact that Basket One of the Final Act of 1975 recognized the current borders of Europe and Basket Two pledged both sides to increase economic cooperation, which was clearly more in the USSR’s than in the West’s interest, the Soviets ultimately paid a price for CSCE. Even though they observed Basket Three more in the breach than in its original spirit, it legitimized the claims of dissident groups in USSR and Eastern Europe whose voices became increasingly loud. Ultimately, CSCE contributed greatly toward the opening up of Eastern Europe to the West. 8

The desire to avoid the destabilizing political impact of thoroughgoing economic reform in the Soviet Union led Brezhnev to seek detente, calculating that the USSR could import economic modernization from the West rather than tackle it domestically. Initially, it seemed as if the increase in economic ties with Western Europe, especially with the FRG, had brought significant gains to the Soviet economy, especially when the post-1973 oil price rises brought windfall hard currency gains to the Soviet Union, increasing its ability to import western technology. But ultimately, the Soviets backed away from incurring too great a hard currency debt with the West and also began to realize that, without

domestic economic reform, Western imports had limited effectiveness in improving Soviet economic performance. Moreover, Eastern Europe acted as a brake on the full realization of Soviet-West European economic ties because of the USSR's need, for political reasons, to supply Eastern Europe with cheap, soft-currency energy supplies that it could have sold for hard currency in the West. 9

At the end of the Brezhnev era, therefore, growing restiveness in Eastern Europe was fueled by closer contacts with Western Europe. It had proved impossible to contain the impact of Soviet-West European detente on Eastern Europe. In the interregnum years, from 1982 to 1985, when the Kremlin was partially paralyzed in its ability to conduct foreign policy, these trends were exacerbated. As US-Soviet relations deteriorated, Eastern Europe became increasingly concerned that it would lose the economic and political benefits of detente, and cooperative efforts between such unlikely partners as East Germany and Hungary began to challenge Soviet

When Gorbachev came into office, therefore, he faced an empire that was determined to restore better ties to Western Europe and a Western Europe that shared the same interest. He responded by emphasizing the theme of the USSR’s Europeanness early on in his administration.

GORBACHEV’S FIRST FOUR YEARS

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU, he already was aware that Europe was a rather different place than the Europe depicted in official Soviet pronouncements and writings. As a result both of discussions with specialists at the various institutes of the Academy of Sciences and through his own personal travels in Western Europe, his understanding of European developments was considerably more sophisticated than that of his aging predecessors. He knew that the unprecedented military buildup under Brezhnev, out of all proportion to reasonable Soviet security needs, had significantly damaged Soviet interests in both parts of Europe and that this aspect of Soviet policy had

to be addressed immediately. Furthermore, he appreciated the significance of European integration and the success of the European Community (EC) despite the official Soviet disparagement and non-recognition of the EC. He viewed the EC as a potential model for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in two ways. The success of economic integration, despite tensions within the Community, was a striking contrast to the weakness of CMEA. Moreover, the prospect of a thriving single market of 320 million people after 1992 also made him aware that the USSR and its partners would become increasingly isolated from Western European economic developments and from the revolution in high technology if the relationship between the Soviet Union and the EC did not improve. The EC was also a political model, showing how countries that for centuries had been adversaries had reconciled politically. France and Germany were the obvious candidates here, in sharp contrast to the festering national hatreds within and between the CMEA nations.

A third lesson that Gorbachev had apparently learned before he became the leader of the Soviet Union was that the attempts under Brezhnev to drive wedges between the United States and its European partners, especially over the issue of INF deployments, had failed. Despite all the endemic

tensions within the Atlantic Alliance, the Western alliance was much stronger than was its communist counterpart.

One of Gorbachev's first pronouncements on European questions was to stress that the Soviet Union is a European power and to use the phrase taken from Brezhnev "Our Common European Home". The concept of the Common European Home has elicited much analysis both in East and West and some hyperbole, particularly in Soviet writings. It was initially viewed by the Soviets as a means of encouraging Western Europe to contribute to the economic development of Eastern Europe, implying that there would be a gradual rapprochement between both halves of Europe whose last act would be the unification of Germany. Initially, the Soviets were ambivalent on the question of the United States' role in this common home. As events in Europe unfolded, however, officials statements on the United States evolved until July 1989 when, during his landmark speech to the Council of Europe, Gorbachev declared, "The USSR and the United States are a natural part of the European international political

structure. And their participation in its evolution is not only justified, but historically conditioned. "Moreover, his chief foreign policy advisor, Aleksandr Yakovlev even before that had hinted that he could foresee a time when the Eastern rooms in the common home might have "Finnish furnishings". 14

The events of 1989 have to some extent rendered moot the question of how the common home will develop. German unification will precede European unity and Eastern Europe -- at least the Northern tier--has moved beyond Finlandization. Nevertheless, the common home metaphor appealed to West Europeans in the early Gorbachev years and also legitimized greater East European contacts with the West before the fall of communism.

In his first four years in office, Gorbachev pursued an active policy toward Western Europe, seeking to undo much of the harm done in the late Brezhnev era and under his two immediate predecessors. His policy toward Western Europe was much more active than that toward Eastern Europe. Its major successes were the conclusion of the treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces in December 1987, bilateral rapprochements with France and Great Britain and the CMEA-EC


14 Aleksandr Yakovlev interviewed in Die Zeit, May 12, 1989.
Treaty of June 1988 followed by a Soviet treaty with the EC in December 1989. His policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany was more cautious and began to gain momentum in 1987, although he waited until June 1989 until he visited Bonn. As the situation in Eastern Europe deteriorated, Gorbachev became more actively involved in a search for closer economic ties with Western Europe and between Western and Eastern Europe. Despite the changes in the Soviet foreign trade law to encourage joint ventures and much greater West European interest in the Soviet market, economic ties between the USSR and Western Europe did not develop as fast as the Soviets had hoped. Hundreds of joint venture deals were signed, but the difficulties in implementing them were considerable. The decline of the Soviet economy and the problem of hard currency revenues as energy prices remained depressed acted as a barrier to greater West European economic involvement.

By the summer of 1989, Gorbachev had in essence put his West European house in order. He had substantially improved Soviet bilateral ties with the major West European countries, he had begun the process of developing a multilateral policy toward the EC, economic ties with Western Europe had grown and, because of the concessions made in the INF treaty, the Soviet Union's image as a country sincerely dedicated to defusing tensions in Europe and to arms control was enhanced.

In Eastern Europe, however, the political, military and economic situation had deteriorated, as old-style leaders,
fearful that Gorbachev-style reforms would undermine their power, refused to liberalize and their economies became crisis-ridden. The economic problems and the growing ethnic difficulties within the Soviet Union increasingly preoccupied Gorbachev’s attention. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union moved from a commitment to controlling Eastern Europe to a realization that Eastern Europe would have to reform otherwise civil war might break out. Moscow was no longer willing to use its military to keep in power unpopular governments. Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennaidi Gerasimov somewhat disingenuously termed this new outlook the "Sinatra Doctrine" implying that the Soviets would now permit any Eastern European country to develop "its way." In fact, however, Gorbachev himself intervened at a number of strategic occasions in Eastern Europe—in Poland during the formation of the Mazowiecki government, in Hungary when the Hungarians decided to open their borders to Austria to allow thousands of East German refugees holed up in the West German embassy to emigrate, and in East Germany itself—to push reluctant communists toward reform. In other words, by the end of 1989, the Soviet Union had both passively and actively allowed the old regimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany and Rumania to be overthrown by popular demand. Gorbachev did not engineer the revolutions of 1989, but neither did he take a hands-off policy toward them.
GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY

Despite Gorbachev's role in facilitating the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the opening of the Berlin Wall, no-one in the Soviet Union--or, for that matter, in any other part of the world--ever dreamed that German unification would be completed a year after the Wall came down. In seeking to understand how Soviet policy toward Germany has evolved since November 9, 1989, we must remember that Moscow has essentially been reacting to events which, to a great extent, have moved beyond its control. It is now seeking to salvage whatever influence it has in this fast-moving situation.

Although there is much that is not known about the developments that led to the fall of Erich Honecker, the USSR's role was more than one of benign neglect. The revolution that deposed Honecker was indigenous, the product of decades of resentment at living under a repressive system that literally imprisoned its population. But, at the decisive moment in early October --when Honecker had decided to use force against the burgeoning demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities --the Red Army was clearly instructed not to assist this repression. The Soviets could have supported a GDR crackdown on dissent but chose not to, as it became increasingly clear that significant numbers of National Peoples' Army (NVA) officers had also decided not to support repression. When Egon Krenz replaced Honecker on October 18, Gorbachev's congratulatory telegram voiced the hope that the new leadership would be "sensitive to the demands of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennaidi Gerasimov implied that Gorbachev had warned the GDR leadership during his visit to East Berlin to commemorate the October 7 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR that they had to "go with the times". This understatement indicates what others have confirmed, namely that, during his visit, Gorbachev, who was the object of adulation by many demonstrators in East Berlin, gave his approval to the ouster of the old regime. Moreover, there is also some evidence that the Kremlin was involved in the decision to open the Berlin Wall on November 9, although the facts surrounding that decision are somewhat more questionable.

Despite this Soviet position, there is every indication that no-one around Gorbachev believed that unification would come as quickly as it did. The initial Soviet belief seems to have been that reform communism, in the person of Hans Modrow, who replaced Krenz in December would survive in the GDR for some time. This miscalculation about the durability of reform communism also influenced Soviet policy toward other East European countries. When FRG Chancellor Kohl proposed his ten-point plan for unification on November 28, envisaging a three-step process of contractual community, confederative


structures and finally federation, the Soviet reaction was negative, and Shevardnadze stressed that two German states were necessary for the security of Europe. 17 The official Soviet view began to soften in late January, and by February 10, Gorbachev had assured Kohl that he would do nothing to block German unity. 18 Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership only reluctantly adopted this position when it realized that the rapid movement toward unification was unstoppable.

The initial negative reaction to the prospect of German unity and continuing Soviet vacillation on future security arrangements for Germany are quite comprehensible given the fact that, for forty-five years, the Soviet Union has officially justified much of its foreign policy in terms of the need to prevent Germany from ever again threatening Soviet security, after two invasions of Russia by Germany in this century and over 20 million deaths in the last war. One can, however, debate whether, for the past two decades at least, the fear of renascent German expansionism has indeed had any basis in fact, or whether the Soviet leadership itself has believed it. After all, how could a non-nuclear country of 60 million people pose a threat to a nuclear superpower with 250 million people? Whatever the Brezhnev leadership really believed, the

German danger was the major justification given to the Soviet population for Soviet foreign policy and indeed was used to justify all the domestic sacrifices that the Soviet population had made. Indeed, during the Chernenko administration, the Soviet Union launched a major propaganda offensive against West Germany, alleging that it harbored new "revanchist" designs.\textsuperscript{19} When Gorbachev and his generation came to power, one began to see the waning of the obsession with Germany in official propaganda. But, for the older generation, it remains a major pillar of their world view. Thus, Gorbachev’s chief conservative critic within the Politburo, Yegor Ligachev, expressed a common view among members of the older generation and parts of the Soviet military, when he warned against the "new danger" of a reunified and powerful Germany.\textsuperscript{20}

After the March 18 election in the GDR when, contrary to the predictions of observers in the West and East, the center-right parties defeated the social democrats, it became clear that the pace of unification would again accelerate. Kohl’s ten-point plan was rapidly overtaken by events and on May 18 the two German governments signed a state treaty outlining the terms of the economic and monetary union that went into effect on July 1. On July 3, the Kohl government announced that the

\textsuperscript{19} See G. Kirillov, "FRG: Reviving the "Ewig Gestrige"
International Affairs (Moscow) no. 10, 1984.

\textsuperscript{20} Washington Post, February 8, 1990
first free all-German elections since 1932 would be held on December 7, 1990, in effect assuring that the internal aspects of unification will be completed by the end of the year. The Soviet Union is no longer able to delay the internal processes of unification, however disagreeable the prospect may be. The decision in October 1989 not to let Soviet soldiers in the GDR become involved in internal affairs essentially removed Soviet leverage in this situation.

The one area where the Kremlin does retain some leverage, however, is over the external aspects of German unification, in particular Germany's place in the alliance system after December 1990. Although the Soviets have modified their position on this question, there is clearly disagreement within the Soviet leadership on this issue. The initial Soviet position stressed that a united Germany had to be neutral. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, for instance, during Kohl's February trip to Moscow, said Germany must be neutral and demilitarized and, referring back to Stalin's 1952 note proposing a reunified, neutral Germany, said that this was "a good old idea that started in the 1950's". Since then, Shevardnadze has modified his position and has dropped references to neutrality. Valentin Falin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee's international department, has proposed that a unified Germany remain in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a period of 5 to 7 years after unification. But officially

21 Washington Post, February 11, 1990
the Soviets have not conceded that united Germany could be a member of NATO only, which is the Western position. After the first round of the "Two Plus Four" talks was held in May, Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov reiterated Soviet opposition to NATO membership for a united Germany. Non-government spokesmen have, however, been somewhat more flexible.

Vyacheslav Dashichev, a German expert and military historian and deputy to Academician Oleg Bogomolov at the Academy of Science's Institute for the Study of Comparative International Systems (formerly the Institute for the Study of the economies of the World Socialist System) who has been an outspoken critic of Brezhnev's policies, gave a major interview to the mass-circulation Bild Zeitung published on the day of the GDR elections in which he said that the Soviet union will accept a united Germany in NATO. He later on claimed that Moscow's opposition to German membership of NATO was only a negotiating ploy, prompting a foreign ministry spokesman to issue a disclaimer: "Professor Dashichev and his political allies are not among the circle of experts who participate in the formation of Soviet foreign policy."
As German unification comes closer, the negotiations between the four occupying powers and the two German states over future security arrangements have taken place at a dizzying pace and in a variety of fora over the past few weeks. The Western position remains that a united Germany must be a full member of NATO, although no Bundeswehr troops assigned to NATO will be stationed on the former territory of the GDR until Soviet troops have withdrawn from East Germany. The Soviet position remains that a united Germany cannot only be a member of NATO. However, it is quite likely that the Kremlin will eventually modify its position. At the moment, the NATO card is the one "German Card' that Moscow still has, and the Soviets are only able to exert leverage because the West Germans want to move toward unification by the end of this year. If they do not hold an all-German election this year, they would not be able to hold an all-German election until 1994. The West Germans are prepared to offer the USSR considerable economic incentives for a concession on NATO. They have already agreed in principle to take over all the GDR's economic obligations toward the Soviet Union for the 1991-85 Five-Year Plan Period, although one might question how a capitalist united Germany will fulfill contracts originally signed between two state-trading countries. 25 The West German

government on June 22 (the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the USSR) announced that it had extended a 5 billion DM bank credit to the Soviets, the largest ever extended by Western banks to the USSR. Other economic incentives may still be forthcoming. The Federal Republic is also willing to make certain security guarantees to the Soviets, including reducing the size of their armed forces and insisting that NATO be restructured to emphasize political, as opposed to military, tasks.

Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of these negotiations, it is likely that the Soviets will ultimately tolerate a unified Germany in NATO, but they may drag out the negotiations beyond the deadline for internal unification, which will complicate the process, although theoretically East Germany can vote to join the Federal Republic without its external security arrangements being fully worked out. If Gorbachev’s domestic economic and political troubles continue and intensify, then there might well be a delay in the Soviet resolution of this issue. However, in the next couple of years, it is probable that the new, enlarged Federal Republic will be in NATO and that eventually the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from East Germany. Thus, the Soviet Union will be faced with a situation that, officially at least, it has always depicted as its worst nightmare—a united, capitalist Germany, allied to the United States and firmly anchored in the European Community.
CONCLUSION--EUROPE AFTER UNIFICATION

In the next few years, the major benefit that the Soviet Union will reap from the fall of its empire and the unification of Germany will presumably be German economic largesse, ranging from credits and joint ventures to technology transfer and management training for the new Soviet entrepreneurial class. Whether this deepening German-Soviet economic relationship will be able to rescue the Soviet economy from its current crisis will to a large extent depend on the Soviet leadership's willingness to introduce more radical economic reforms and accept the inevitability of shock therapy for the economy.

Beyond the next few years, however, the Soviet Union hopes to reap benefits from the unification of Germany that few people today envisage. One faction in the Soviet leadership today, as in the past, has always upheld the 1922 Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia, the alliance between the two international pariahs that produced closer economic ties and also led to secret military ties, as the most desirable model from Moscow's point of view. The idea of a strong, neutral Germany, in alliance with Russia has, of course a certain appeal in the Soviet Union, as well as in some circles in Germany. It is highly unlikely, from today's perspective, that the Federal Republic would be interested in such an alliance. It would have to leave NATO and the European community, and be allied to an economically ailing nuclear
superpower. The prospect of joint Soviet-German condominium over Europe has marginal appeal in today's Germany.

Nevertheless, it is also true that public opinion within Germany is moving against future NATO membership. After all, the East German revolution of 1989 was about self-determination and liberation from foreign domination. The majority of East Germans currently favor a demilitarized, neutral Germany. A significant number of West Germans have always supported neutrality. Current polls indicate about 25 percent of the population favors neutrality, and 52 percent support continuing membership of NATO. No-one is sure what the psychological impact of unification on the German population will be; but is quite likely that many Germans will question why they need any foreign troops on their territory, since unification for them means that they have finally overcome the stigma of the Second World War and the foreign occupation that followed it. It is quite conceivable that before the end of the decade, a future German government, particularly a Social Democratic one, might review the whole NATO question. This does not necessarily mean a new Rapallo, but it does mean that the old security architecture of Europe as we have known it for the past four decades may have to change radically because of a shift in German policy.

On the other hand, even if NATO were to disappear, the Soviet Union's ability to benefit from this and assert its power and influence in Europe may be very circumscribed. Some
have ascribed to Gorbachev a grand design in which the fall of the empire was a conscious decision designed ultimately to increase Soviet leverage over Central Europe through the neutralization of Europe. It is, however, far more likely that the Soviet leader has no blueprint for either part of Europe, that he has been trying to exercise damage limitation in a situation over which he has decreasing control or influence. Indeed, it is quite probable that the Soviet Union will be so preoccupied with its own internal decline and potential for ethnic civil war in the next decade, that it will play a diminishing role in Europe. The Common Home may only include a small apartment for the Soviet Union, in which will be an absentee tenant unable to pay the rent. Even though the Soviet Union will remain a formidable military force in Europe, its political and economic ability to be a major player in the emerging architecture of a new Europe may diminish over the next few years. Thus, the dream of Rapallo may be replaced by the reality of increasing isolation from Europe, as the new Germany helps the emerging democracies of Central Europe to become viable pluralist states with market economies.

The Soviet external empire has collapsed. The internal empire is disintegrating. Probably the best that can come from German unification in the medium-term will be a massive

German economic aid program. After that, the future role of Soviet power in Europe will be greatly influenced by the policies that the new unified Germany pursues, once its Eastern part has been transformed into a fully functioning democracy and market economy. But the future German role in Europe is impossible to predict. Thus, the Soviet Union would be well advised to cooperate with the West in designing new security structures for Europe that embed Germany in an effective alliance system which will ensure a constructive German international role in the next century.