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TITLE: THE EXTERNALIZATION OF REFORM:
SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS UNDER
GORBACHEV

AUTHOR: RONALD H. LINDEN

CONTRACTOR: UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: RONALD H. LINDEN
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PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Ronald H. Linden

The principal aim of this research was to determine if the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was applying the same standards and employing the same practices in its reactions with the non-reforming East European states, as had previous regimes for different purposes. Specifically, the investigation sought to determine if the USSR was using its hegemonic position to promote change, in the form of glasnost, perestroika and reform of regional institutions, in the same way earlier regimes had acted to prevent reform.

While an answer to this question can be offered, the events of 1989 made this more of a historic than a current question. A broader approach to which this research was amenable was to look at existing Soviet policies in light of the revolutions of 1989 and determine what, if anything, remained of post war Soviet policy. The question of how it reacted to the recalcitrance of the Ceausescu leadership and how it has reacted to the changes in Romania and elsewhere in the region since the revolutions remains central. The main context of the research was Soviet-East European relations; that context remains but the dynamics changed dramatically enough to extend the research focus in time and breadth.
In sum, 1989 did see the abandonment by the Soviet leadership of the main premises of Soviet policy toward East Europe. These had been Soviet political, economic and military investment in: 1) maintenance of the monopoly of communist party power in each of the states; 2) maintenance of civil peace and; 3) maintenance of at least minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact. During 1989 the USSR made no move to intervene to prevent the elimination of communist party dominance or ensure a "stable" public order. Nor did it act to prevent steps which have led to the effective erosion of the Warsaw Pact. In fact the changes and the revolutions of 1989 were verbally encouraged by the Gorbachev policies. Until 1989 such encouragement had still included caveats about "the common interests of socialism." But during 1989 Soviet acquiescence to the change of regimes in Poland and then in the rapid revolutions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and finally, violently, in Romania made it clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.

Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu rejected the principles and path of reform underway in the USSR and during 1989 even moved to try to stifle the change in Poland. The Gorbachev leadership did little to hasten the end of Ceausescu despite his clear rejection of reform. It cannot be said that extensive or even substantial pressure, beyond a few critical
comments, was brought to bear to force Ceausescu into the reform camp. But support for the Romanian revolution when it occurred was clear and followed quickly by diplomatic and economic assistance.

Since the revolution in Romania and East Europe, Soviet policy has been both low key and unformed. Reactions are intermittent and to certain events, such as the banning of the communist party in Romania, or possible reunification of Germany, but are often ad hoc and even contradictory. Partly this is a function of the representation of a more diverse range of views in the Soviet press and partly it is the result of Moscow’s preoccupation with severe domestic, economic and political problems. A clear policy line which is continuing, however, is the Soviet desire to improve the economic relationship with the East European states by placing them on a more realistic and favorable basis.

United States policy of pressing Romania to move as quickly and directly as possible to a pluralistic, democratic system has been in evidence since the revolution. Despite criticism from the new Romanian government and possible temporary losses of economic opportunity, this policy should be continued.
I. PREMISES OF POSTWAR SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

Since World War II Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has been based on the pursuit of three kinds of security: physical, political, and economic. These goals apply to Southeastern Europe as part of the East European region and to its relationship with Romania. In most recent times the Soviet view of how best to secure those goals has changed, as this report will indicate, but it bears reviewing the premises of Soviet policy until the momentous changes of 1988 and 1989, stimulated in large part by the change of regime in Moscow.

Physical Security

The USSR has invested immense political, economic, and military resources to keep its western border free from potential attack by hostile conventional and, to a lesser extent, nuclear forces. This goal has little to do with the Communist nature of the Soviet government or with the existence of any actual current threat. The Soviet Union absorbed the brutal lessons of the past and, given the scope of the country's destruction and suffering in World War II, the maintenance of an adequate buffer in the west took on a life of its own as a foreign-policy given.
The threat emanating from Southeastern Europe, however, has clearly been perceived to be much less than the threat from Central Europe, a view that accurately reflects at least twentieth-century European history. Soviet troop-stationing patterns show a much greater emphasis on the central and northern regions of Eastern Europe than on the southern region. No Warsaw Pact troops were stationed in Bulgaria, and such troops were withdrawn from Romania in 1958. Outside the Warsaw Pact, neither Albania nor Yugoslavia has accepted Soviet troops.

Political Security
Political security has been a goal dating from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and the period between the world wars during which the USSR was the only socialist state. The operative premise has been that the Soviet Union must have in this region friendly states which in their domestic and international policies will be cognizant of and responsive to Soviet interests. This was certainly not the case during the interwar period, when large and small powers alike either ignored Soviet desires or were hostile to them. Political security since the late 1940s had until very recently been guaranteed in Eastern Europe by the dominance of Soviet-supported Communist parties in these states.
At a maximum, such as during Stalin’s time, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sought the duplication of its own forms and policies in each of the Eastern European states. Such an approach both provoked and was reinforced by the split with Yugoslavia of 1948. After Stalin’s death the policy of the Soviet leadership was to press for general adherence to, if not exact mimicking of, Soviet domestic and international initiatives. At a minimum, political security in this region meant resisting the influence of countries seen to be the key Soviet adversaries, primarily the United States but also, during the 1960s and early 1970s, China. Chinese diplomacy was very active in Southeastern Europe during the 1970s; Beijing succeeded in attracting a vocal if small ally in Albania and in maintaining full and supportive ties with Romania.

Since 1948 the Soviet Union has seen greater threats to its political security in Central Europe. The challenge in Southeastern Europe was complicated, however, because of the varied environment, which included WTO member Bulgaria, nonaligned Yugoslavia and hostile Albania. During the 1960’s and 1970’s Romanian pursuit of a distinctive foreign policy was also problematic but not directly threatening to Soviet goals. (See below)
Economic Security

The Soviet Union has clearly viewed Eastern Europe as a region whose resources are available to be used to satisfy Soviet needs. As a result, for the first fifteen or so years after World War II, the Soviets extracted by various measures (reparations, joint stock companies, unequal trade relations) immense material resources to build and rebuild the Soviet economy.¹ During the next twenty years, however, the relationship shifted to one in which the Soviet Union provided the raw materials and fuel and received in exchange more complex manufactured goods. Owing to declining terms of trade and increased involvement of several East European countries with the West, this relationship turned increasingly unfavorable for the USSR. The USSR, as Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous have shown, subsidized the East European economies, including those of Southeastern Europe,² in order to keep the alliance politically cohesive and, to the extent possible, to support the ability of some of the regimes to buy peace at home with better economic performance.

More recently, the Soviets began to call attention to the need to "restructure" the trade relationship more to their advantage and in a way that serves their greatest need: better-quality machines, equipment, technology, and technological know-how to help the Soviet economy.³
Historically, the Soviet search for economic security in particular has provoked greater conflict in Southeastern Europe than in other regions. Postwar attempts to force Yugoslavia to develop its economy along lines dictated in Moscow contributed to the 1948 break. Later, Khrushchev’s move to "perfect" the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) -- in a way that would have increased the specialization, and thus the advantage, of the more industrially developed northern-tier countries -- drove Romania to search for other economic partners and to accompany this search with a foreign-policy reassessment. Bulgaria, in contrast, consistently demonstrated its willingness to accommodate itself to the dominant premise of Soviet-East European economic relations and generally benefited from its extremely close ties with the USSR.

II. PRACTICES OF SOVIET POLICY
After Stalin’s death the Soviet Union attempted to keep the domestic and international behavior of the East European states within certain behavioral parameters. These boundaries were not rigidly applied over time, nor were they applied uniformly throughout the region. They were not even explicitly delineated, although some indicators are derived from authoritative pronouncements, such as that of September 1968 defining what became known in the West as the Brezhnev
Doctrine. In general, by forceful intervention of all types Moscow had, until recently, regularly indicated the following three boundaries of acceptable behavior: 1) Communist party dominance of the political and economic system; 2) at least minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact; and 3) maintenance of civil peace.

Communist party dominance of the political and economic system meant, in part, Soviet, and usually local regime, hostility to and suppression of challenges to the political structure, which ensured that the Communist Party maintained a monopoly on political power. Whether threats to this monopoly came from outside the political elite, as in the case of Solidarity in Poland, or from within the party itself, as in Czechoslovakia during 1968, the Soviet reaction had been, sooner or later, to brand such movements as "anti-Soviet" or "anti-socialist" and to link them to "counterrevolutionary" support from the West. All challenges were seen as threats to the goal of political and, in some instances, physical security, and were either directly or indirectly suppressed.

Minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact was enforced differentially, as might be expected, given the greater Soviet emphasis on northern and central Europe. For example, Soviet fears about breaching of the alliance by Czechoslovakia or Poland have been more pronounced, even
exaggerated, than those over Romania's deviance, despite the fact that Bucharest's participation in the Warsaw Pact was the least supportive over the past two decades. The USSR tolerated a low and sometimes declining level of defense expenditure by Romania and Bulgaria, consistent Romanian nonparticipation in maneuvers, and often some distance from Warsaw Pact foreign-policy pronouncements and initiatives. However, Romania remained a member of the Pact, renewed its bilateral and multinational treaties, and proclaimed its loyalty to the alliance and the necessity of keeping it in force.

Critical to the Soviet view of events in Hungary in 1956 and Poland during 1980-1 was the perception that the party was losing not just its "leading role" but the political initiative and the ability to maintain the order on which the postwar system - and their regimes - were built. The party was losing control of events in the streets. Especially because the original "revolutions" occurred in times of chaos and upheaval, the increasingly conservative Soviet leadership was sensitive to the appearance of situations that might allow popular disaffection and disruption to threaten either of the other two parameters.

In this regard the pace of change was an important factor, because a more moderate pace allowed the local regime to appear to be in charge, to avoid the uncontrolled growth
of "antisocialist" forces (and to execute tactical crackdowns against certain opposition groups), and to demonstrate the continued leading role of the party (and to try to reassure those who might be nervous in Moscow).

In establishing and enforcing these behavioral boundaries, the Soviets did not insist on uniform practices throughout the region. Even before the sensational changes of the past two years, the Soviet Union had tolerated a range of diverse social and economic phenomena both of a more capitalist nature (such as private agriculture in Poland) and a more retrograde character (such as Stalinism in Romania). Externally, states such as Poland and Romania pursued extensive contacts with Western countries before Moscow and other members of the alliance did, while Romania maintained good relations with China as well as a number of countries with whom the USSR had either few or hostile ties. For Warsaw Pact members, as long as the basic three boundaries were respected, the Soviets did not insist on duplication of the Soviet system and tolerated some diversity in domestic economic and social structure and on international issues.
Old Threats

For the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe as a whole, the greatest threats were those posed to the dominance of the political system by the Communist Party. Such threats were present in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and carried dangerous implications for other Soviet goals in the region. The possibility of full-scale overthrow or even radical reform of the political system was seen by the pre-Gorbachev leadership as potentially allowing a more fluid, less predictable domestic political situation, or even the possibility that antisocialist and anti-Soviet forces would take power. In addition, in Hungary and Poland during previous episodes the threats of civil disorder were real and growing. Foreign-policy adjustments or even major changes that might have eroded the Soviet power base in the region were not inconceivable.

Before 1989 these threats occurred most often in the northern tier. Indeed, in Bulgaria and Romania, except for a coup attempt in the former in 1965, communist party dominance and domestic tranquility were never really in question. In ideological terms, Ceausescu’s rule in Romania undermined the role of the party, in that the party was replaced by an individual, a return to the days of the cult of personality. And various aspects of behavior by Romania (e.g., its relations with China) clearly provoked displeasure in Moscow. But neither its domestic deformations nor its various acts
breaking ranks internationally, such as unilaterally and loudly announcing a cut in defense expenditures, were perceived as actionable threats against the three main Soviet goals. For its part, Romania was careful not to directly challenge Soviet security interests either in the region or globally.\(^7\)

III. SOVIET "NEW THINKING" AND THE REGION

Soviet "new thinking" on Eastern and Southeastern Europe has to be viewed in the context of overall Soviet foreign-policy changes. The Gorbachev era has seen demonstrable and significant revisions in Soviet foreign-policy conceptions about the world and, more important, about actions toward that world. Clearly, the Gorbachev leadership team has been striving to reduce Soviet exposure abroad, in order to cut the costs and consequences of an overextended foreign policy. This effort has involved several overtures toward China, the most important of which were Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the reduction of troops along the Sino-Soviet border, and the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia. These efforts produced visits to China by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in 1988 and in 1989 by Gorbachev himself. The Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan and pressure on Vietnam to do the same from Cambodia have served both the immediate Soviet goal of reducing the costs of those involvements and of warming the environment for improving relations with China
and the United States. Toward the latter, the continuous concessions on medium-range missiles followed by the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty were both preceded and followed by pressure for renewed and more vigorous strategic arms control measures -- both marked switches from the late Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko period. Soviet feelers for improved relations with Israel, as well as with a number of Arab states with whom the Soviets did not previously have relations, and support for an agreement in southwestern Africa have been complemented by a rapid growth of interest and opportunity for expanding economic relations with the West. This policy has been directed at private capital (e.g., through joint ventures), increasing bilateral trade, and capitalist global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.8

These moves and numerous others should not be interpreted as some kind of Soviet desire to "behave" according to standards determined in the West. Nor should they be seen as coming primarily in response to Western pressure. These policies stem from the Soviet leadership's perception of the needs of the country itself, its economy, its society, and its socialist system. The Gorbachev team explicitly recognizes that the Soviet economy is in desperate straits. Far from competing internationally with the advanced West, it is falling behind even the newly
developing countries of the Pacific rim and cannot even effectively provide what the country itself needs to function properly in manufactured goods, communication and information technology or computers; in food production, processing or distribution; in housing, health care or most areas of social welfare. In their discussions of these problems the Soviets acknowledge that the question may not be one of production; sometimes it is a problem of the application, distribution, and utilization of technology, goods, and resources. These problems are seen to be related to questions of investment, prices, and the social/cultural issues of initiative, incentive, and labor productivity. Finally, Gorbachev himself, more than any other of the current leaders, insists that without reform of the political system, very little of what is needed will be accomplished.9

On the international plane, Gorbachev has also made clear the link between domestic perestroika and new thinking in foreign policy. He and his supporters recognize the need to ease the pressure on the Soviet economy - and in some cases on the political system - stemming from global involvement and conflicts. Doing this allows both attention and resources to be devoted to the compelling domestic tasks.

With respect to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the new thinking is directly related to a critical assessment of the international role of the Soviet Union and to its domestic
needs. First, there is the question of whether the Soviet Union should and will seek to maintain this increasingly costly sphere of influence, by following the earlier policies. In their public statements, Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have gone out of their way to cast out "old thinking" on this score, rejecting the notion that they arrogate to themselves a monopoly on truth or that they want to duplicate Soviet systems in the region.\textsuperscript{10} Such statements have been cast as rejections of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," though at first they were not combined with acknowledgments of its existence.\textsuperscript{11} Long-time heretics such as Yugoslavia were assured that the Soviet Union accepts the idea of many and independent paths of socialist development.\textsuperscript{12} Nothing spoke as loudly on this score as the Soviet toleration of - and even reportedly granting of permission for - the installation of a non-Communist government in Poland in 1989.\textsuperscript{13}

The significance of this forbearance cannot be overstated. After more than forty years of insisting and insuring that only a Communist-dominated political system could provide the necessary reassurance, Moscow recognized the need to see if its goals could be secured through another arrangement. It was this action which marked the change in deed as well as word of Soviet policy in East Europe. It signified the jettisoning of one of the three key practices outlined above: the maintenance of communist party monopoly
of domestic political power. This action -- or nonaction -- indicated the threshold of new thinking in Soviet policy toward East Europe and gave a strong fillip to movements for change, which became revolutions throughout the region.

Even before this, however, Moscow had signaled its desire to reduce its political and economic exposure. The troop cuts and withdrawals announced by Gorbachev in 1988 included significant reductions in forces in Central Europe; several of the states then followed with cuts in their troops.\textsuperscript{14}

Soviet new thinking toward the region has also involved a rethinking of the role and function of CMEA. It is clear from Soviet writings on the subject that they are displeased over what is seen as an unfavorable economic relationship, in which the Soviets supply raw materials and fuel at great opportunity costs and sometimes lower than world prices in return for more expensive but often poor-quality manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{15} Aside from the price and cost factors, the benefits of such trade -- including the ability to improve and diversify the national economy and trade profile -- are seen as disproportionately accruing to the East European countries, especially the more advanced ones.\textsuperscript{16}
Under Gorbachev, Moscow also began to push for the organization itself to function better, to begin to act more as a genuine economic union, with more effective mechanisms for price formation, currency exchange, and specialization of production. The Soviets began to demonstrate increasing impatience with CMEA, particularly compared with the looming counterexample of the European Community. Finally, Soviet pressure to change CMEA has been driven by the Soviet commitment to perestroika, which has taken the form of pressure for the member states to restructure their own economies in a way that will allow more direct production ties between Soviet and East European enterprises, thus facilitating the spread of advanced science and technology throughout the region. 17

But until it was clear that the Soviet Union was indeed abandoning its hegemony, there was a tension between the Soviets’ pronouncements and actions; for example, between a stated willingness to let each state go its own way and the clear desire to get the region to improve its economic performance and change its relationship with the USSR. As has been clear since the revolutions of 1989, if in fact all the states pursue what they see as their own best economic interest, they would likely want to continue to rely on cheap Soviet raw materials and fuel, payable with goods, not hard currency. For their part, the CMEA junior partners’
incentives to accommodate the USSR on the issue of restructuring the trade relationship and to improve their own domestic situation conflicts with the evident advantages of continuing the current system, with their desire not to aggravate their already difficult economic situations, and with their desire to trade their more complex goods to the West. Such conflicting directions were already evident in the first post-revolutionary CMEA summit in Sofia.\textsuperscript{18}

For the Soviet Union, the problem now will be how to get the East European states to satisfy at least some of its economic needs without relying on "old thinking" (i.e., hegemonic interference from Moscow) and without pressing these states economically so much that their domestic situations become even more difficult or as unstable as is the case in East Germany.

Until 1989 there was also the question of whether "new thinking" and "new acting" were really to be applied to Eastern Europe. While Soviet declarations and actions seemed to reject the notion of intervention, a change in leadership in the USSR or in the perceived "security" situation in the region could have put this option back on the table. Before the emergence of the Solidarity government in Poland, statements by Soviet leaders made in Eastern Europe were always hedged by admonitions that the leaders of these parties had responsibility not only to their own nations but
to the "common interests of socialism." Soviet writings did not explicitly reject the basic premise of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Instead, Moscow essentially accepted the assessment of that period made by the regime in Prague, acknowledging mistakes but continuing to point to "antisocialist forces" and extensive Western influence.

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union, new thinking or not, will rapidly, or ever, abandon the desire for physical and political security in a region it sees as vital. The means of achieving these ends, however, clearly has changed and include a substantial broadening of the Soviet notion of what kind of regimes and what kind of region serves these interests. Even if the Soviet Union were to become a non-communist country, a scenario less fanciful now than at any time since the revolution, its great-power imperatives would continue to operate in this region. A new leadership in Moscow is still likely to work to protect its national security, very broadly defined. Moscow would still fret about and work against any military presence or threat in the area, and can be expected to react negatively against political developments in the region that make this threat more likely.
IV. SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE FALL OF CEAUSESCU

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Romanian-Soviet relations cooled. Under Georgiu Georghe-Dej and, after 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian party began to pursue a pattern of foreign economic relations quite distinct from those of the Soviet Union. This policy was aimed at securing for the country the wherewithal to achieve rapid and broad industrial development -- goals which had been enunciated as early as the 1950s and never renounced. In 1964 the Romanians rejected Nikita Khruschev's attempt to strengthen CMEA's international coordination, and argued that relinquishing planning and control of the economy would be inconsistent with national security - proletarian internationalism aside.21

Over the next decade Romania greatly expanded its ties with the west, both economic and political. Western trade grew rapidly and by 1967 constituted 40 percent of Romanian trade. Nearly three-fifths of its imports of machines and equipment came from the west.22 By 1974 the country's trade with developed capitalist countries was greater than its trade with CMEA states.

Trade relations expanded to broader economic ties such as with the European Economic Community (1973) and membership in GATT (1971), the IMF and World Bank (1972). Such ties
were part of and supported by a growth of distinctive political relations between Romania and non-East European countries. In 1967 Romania became the first East European country to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany and the same year refused to break relations with Israel after the Six-Day War, something each of its allies, plus Yugoslavia, did. In 1968 Bucharest did not take part in and criticized the pressure on Czechoslovakia during the "Prague spring" and condemned the Soviet-led invasion to end that reform in August of that year.23

During the 1970's Romanian-Soviet differences were less spectacular but Nicolae Ceausescu did continue to follow a distinct course. He expanded trade ties with the United States, including acceptance of MFN in 1975 under the terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. US-Romanian trade grew vigorously as did Romanian trade with West Europe, despite the occasional fluctuations due to Western oil price adjustments and resulting recession in mid-decade.24 Romania significantly expanded its ties with third world countries during this period, redefining itself as a "socialist developing" country and engaging in active diplomacy with the Nonaligned Conference Group of 77.

During this period Bucharest did not directly challenge Soviet security interests. Rather it asserted its adherence
to the general principle of economic and political sovereignty and was not above occasionally toning down its differences, for example, over Afghanistan, or sending mixed signals, as it did during the Solidarity period in Poland.$^{25}$

Romania's international economic and political ties underwent some change in the early and mid-1980s. Belated recognition and adjustments to increasing energy costs and mounting debt led the Ceausescu regime to severely cut imports from the West and try to expand exports. The domestic market was brutally squeezed, especially of foodstuffs, in order to satisfy Ceausescu's stated goal of rapidly paying off Romania's debt, which by 1981 exceeded $10$ billion. Similarly, Romanian trade shifted eastward. Trade with socialist countries which accounted for one-third of Romania's trade in 1980, counted for three-fifths in 1986 and fully two-thirds of the country's imports. Trade with the Soviet Union grew as well, with especially marked increases in Romanian imports of Soviet oil (From $350,000$ tons in 1979 to more than $6$ million tons in 1986).

Romania's political ties with the west eroded as well. As increasingly severe measures were used to squeeze the economy and retain tight political control in the wake of developments in Poland, the country's human rights practices drew attention and criticism. In particular the annual MFN hearings in the US congress provided an opportunity for
broader and sharper attacks on the regime's civil rights practices and treatment of religious and ethnic minorities. When in 1987 the congress included in its draft a provision calling for the suspension of MFN the following year, Romania unilaterally renounced MFN.\textsuperscript{26} In April 1989 the European Community suspended negotiations with Romania on a comprehensive trade agreement because of the country's poor human rights record.

\textit{The Romanian Rejection of Reform}

Under Nicolae Ceausescu the Romanian regime categorically and comprehensively rejected the reforms being implemented in the Soviet Union. Romanian rejection took on various forms.

The Ceausescu regime rejected the idea of reform in principle on various grounds. First, the RCP denied there was anything wrong with socialism or its tenets, only its application.\textsuperscript{27} Second, the regime outlined an elaborate theoretical argument reiterating the idea that there was no single unique model of socialism which would apply in all cases. Ilie Ceausescu, the President's brother, for example, argued in \textit{Era Socialista} that

Of course, as the problems of improvement are, in an objective way, different from country to country and the solution which one party or another chooses -- drawing from certain concrete conditions -- will carry in their very substance, their mark of the specific situations of respective countries, of the stage of development to which socialist society has come, of the accomplished experience of each governing party. This makes it necessary
to act in such a way. However, so as to no longer revive harmful practices or "unique models" dressed in "new" clothes of some improvement with pretension to general validity. 

This argument complemented the longstanding Romanian position that the fullest expression of national sovereignty did not allow the application of a form of socialism which did not fit Romanian conditions. "Socialism gives the principle of sovereignty a new and better framework for expression, . . ." the argument ran, "underscoring the right of each socialist state, of each socialist nation to choose its own forms and ways of socialist construction -- socially, politically, economically, culturally, etc. -- to develop its own model of socialist society through a creative application to the principles of scientific socialism." As it had earlier, this aspect of rejection of a "model" of socialism was accompanied by vigorous assertions of the need for foreign policy sovereignty in general.

At the same time, Ceausescu and those around him rejected the very need for reform, since they saw their brand of socialism as having brought Romania to a "golden era."

Anyone, friends and - to put it this way - also those who do not find to their liking the socialist development of our homeland and the development of socialism in general, can see what the socialist way of development has meant to Romania -- industrialisation, development of agriculture, science, education, culture, the steady raising of the people's living standard, materially and spiritually, a rational distribution of the productive forces and harmonious development of all zones of the country, of the counties, the creation of several economic and social centres in every
county, vast socio-economic constructions, houses, schools, hospitals and other establishments that, all together, have a decisive role in raising the degree of civilisation and development of our homeland.31

Failings, which were not only acknowledged but attacked under Ceausescu, were laid at the feet of individuals who failed to properly execute directives; they were not the fault of the system itself.

Ceausescu’s rejection was also specific. That is, he did not refrain from explicitly disdaining those measures being urged in the Soviet case by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Speaking of the moves to allow small scale private enterprises in the Soviet economy, Ceausescu said:

In no way can one speak of improving socialism by looking back, by speaking of the so-called market socialism, of free enterprise, and all this by invoking objective laws. There cannot be improvement of socialism through the so-called development of the small private property. Capitalist property, big or small, is still capitalist property. One cannot speak of socialist economy without basing it on socialist ownership of the productive means. This is an objective law, without which one cannot speak of the building of a better and more just social system. Our practice has demonstrated to the full that socialist ownership, as ownership of the whole people, no matter its form - state or co-operative -, its consolidation and development make the only way of translating into life the principles of social equity and justice, of powerful development of the productive forces of ensuring every nation’s welfare and independence.32
Increasing the autonomy of state enterprises was rejected. Politically, suggestions that the role of the party, of planning or of the control of the state be weakened were ruled out. In short, Ceausescu rejected the general need for reform and the specific measures being enacted in the USSR.

In some cases, however, while not accepting the need for thorough reform, Ceausescu tried to increase domestic pressure to insure better performance. He did this in ways which were occasionally not that different from those utilized by Gorbachev, for example by urging close association between the party and the people. Speaking to the Political Executive Committee of the party in October 1988, Ceausescu said

all leaders of social economic units -- local and central -- of all economic-social sectors must understand that to talk about self-management, self-administration, of improving and modernizing activity, presupposes putting into practice a new mode, to put an end entirely to attitudes of indolence, of tolerance, lack of exactingness. It is necessary to proceed from the necessity that each one in his area of activity -- both in collective arenas and in his own activity -- have in mind that he is responsible before the people, before the organs of workers revolutionary democracy, before the party for any kind of unfulfilled tasks that come due.

In practice, the regime's idea of reform was to increase rather than reduce state control. For example, restrictions were increased on small scale production, production from private plots and use of resources.
Other aspects of reform stimulated by the Gorbachev team were met with silence. This applies especially to the kind of political behavior which began to emerge in the USSR as well as to the greater openness in the press and newer political forms encouraged by glasnost. Ceausescu did not shrink from indicating that he held little in common with those who were raising questions about Soviet history. As Tass reported during Gromyko’s visit

Ceausescu said that the Soviet Union’s achievements are thought highly of in Romania. Over a short time the USSR has become a great industrial power, he noted, pointing also to the high appreciation in this country for what he described as the exceptional role played by the Soviet Union and the war against Nazism and in its routing.

"We do not understand those attempting to put these fact in doubt," Ceausescu continued. 37

Rather than abate as in the USSR, pressure continued and even increased against Romanian dissidents who spoke out, such as Mircea Dinescu and Doina Cornea. 38 Access to some Soviet publications was restricted.

While not acknowledging the Soviet political reforms, the Romanian regime frequently asserted that it was already doing what some other socialist states now needed to do. Greater democracy and full participation were already features of the Romanian scene, Ceausescu argued. A similar two-sided strategy -- denying or ignoring reform while asserting that the necessary improvements were already in place -- had been applied by the
Romanian regime during the first Solidarity period in Poland in 1980-1981. At that time the Romanian government also took steps to try to improve the living standards of key sectors of the population, such as oil workers. In this instance also nominal quotas for key provisions, such as meat, meat products, and sugar were raised. This time such actions were even more important because despite their best attempts the regime could not keep the population from knowing about changes and reforms in the USSR and later throughout Eastern Europe.

With regard to external issues, Romania also explicitly rejected the Soviet attempts to move CMEA in the direction of reform. Part of this was due to a rejection of the Soviet externalization of its own reform through CMEA. For example, Soviet leadership stressed the need to shift CMEA coordination from the state level to that of the enterprises, as it had tried to move the direction of the domestic economy away from the central state level. The Long-Term Program of Scientific and Technical Cooperation, presented in 1985, was the centerpiece of this aspect of CMEA reform.

While Romania signed this document, its views on implementation were quite distinct from those of its allies. In presenting the state plan for 1986 soon after the CMEA summit, Stefan Birlea, Chairman of the State Planning Committee barely mentioned CMEA. Prime Minister Dascalescu's report of the next year similarly gave only the briefest obligatory
reference.\textsuperscript{43} Compare this with Todor Zhivkov's statement to the Bulgarian party congress that "Bulgarian electronics must be united to maximum degree with the similar industries of the CMEA member states."\textsuperscript{44} In fact, Romania signed very few agreements for direct enterprise ties under Ceausescu, though they did sign an agreement for long-term scientific and technical cooperation with CMEA member states.\textsuperscript{45}

As they had during the 1960s, the Romanian regime also rejected explicitly the notion that CMEA reform should mean restriction of national prerogatives\textsuperscript{46} or specialization.

The improvement of co-operation and specialisation and the establishment where it seems necessary, of joint companies must be based on and must take into consideration the independent development of each national economy. Under no circumstances should we follow the example of the multinational imperialist societies, which as a matter of fact, have become means of oppressing other people.

Co-operation, I repeat, specialisation, when it seems necessary and is possible, must be based on the national property of each country and on the fact that the product or part of the national product should belong to each country and nation, in accordance with that country's participation in this activity. We cannot establish any kind of supra-national companies.\textsuperscript{47}

The RCP view was that the CMEA should do a better job in assisting the development of those members who were further behind the others.\textsuperscript{48}

Soviet discussion of reform of CMEA made it clear that reform of CMEA was linked to reform of the economies of its member states. Yuri Shiriaev, the Director of the CMEA
Institute of International Economic Research, said, for example, "However perfect CMEA might become, we cannot expect to be successful if conditions are not created in each country for enterprises and branch agencies to consider participation in the integration as being in their own interest. This will require the creation of suitable incentives within national economic mechanism." Gorbachev himself made it clear during Ceausescu's visit to Moscow that he saw the alliance's common goals achieved through the forward movement of each national economy.

Thus Romania's rejection of this aspect of Soviet reform was based on a mixture of old and new rejections: rejecting as they had in the past any form of CMEA organization which would remove or reduce national prerogatives, such as the greater use of direct ties, plus rejecting the kind of domestic reforms that the USSR clearly wanted the CMEA member states to begin implementing.

Romania had no objection to improving and expanding bilateral ties with CMEA partners, in particular the Soviet Union itself; trade increased substantially for 1986 (23%) and in 1987 and 1988 was still nearly 15% above the 1985 level. And, as noted, Bucharest signed long-term bilateral agreements on cooperation with both the Soviet Union and other CMEA members. The rejection, rather, was directed at the CMEA having increased power and/or acting as a vehicle
for Soviet reforms. In July 1988, when the member states pledged as a goal the creation of conditions for a free market of goods and services among themselves and toward a united market, Romania did not sign the declaration.51

The Problem of Soviet Foreign Policy Actions

Soviet new thinking essentially outflanked Romanian foreign policy as Moscow's policy initiatives took shape. Many of the issues upon which Romania had based its deviant foreign policy were removed by Soviet actions. For example, Romania had been more receptive to proposals by the United States regarding the question of nuclear weapons in Europe.52 Then when repeated Soviet concessions culminated in the INF treaty in 1987, the issue was effectively removed from the Romanian platform. Similarly, Bucharest had been consistently more vocal in support of conventional force cuts, and occasionally engaged in oblique polemics with Moscow.53 Romania announced unilateral reductions in its own defense budget in 1986 and 1987, the latter, backed up by a highly publicized national referendum.54 But when Gorbachev announced the unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal in Europe in 1988, this issue too lost what little play it had for the Romanians.

Soviet initiatives to improve relations with Beijing, initiatives in the Middle East which included improving relations with Israel, the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan and even its calls to strengthen the United Nations, effectively moved Moscow past positions held by Bucharest and offered as unique. In some cases in apparent attempts to retain distinct positions, the Romanians espoused increasingly strident views on issues on which there was otherwise international consensus, such as chemical weapons and the final document of Vienna's meeting of the CSCE on human rights.\textsuperscript{55}

But perhaps nowhere was Romania so shouldered out of the picture by Soviet initiatives and by its own policies as in its relationship with the West. Here Romania had occupied a favored position for more than a decade as the US tried to erode the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. US-Romanian trade had greatly increased with the granting of MFN in 1975; US Presidents Nixon and Ford had visited Romania and at various times the US had gone out of its way to publicly support what it saw as an independent state in the region.\textsuperscript{56} This was of course predicated on a continuous cold, or at least cool, US-Soviet relationship. Hence, when under Gorbachev that relationship began to improve, simultaneous with the serious deterioration of conditions in Romania, its "value" to the West declined. This was demonstrated by open US criticism of Romanian human rights practices voiced by administration officials, in the US Congress during MFN hearings, and the proposed suspension of MFN for Romania for six months in 1987.\textsuperscript{57}
Bucharest also moved further in a direction opposite from that of the USSR by cutting or reducing other ties with Western economic institutions. Ceausescu was increasingly critical of Western financial institutions and with the debt paid off, a law prohibiting new foreign credits was enacted. Romania, once the only East European member of the IMF, with special privileges and arrangements with the US and the EEC, found itself left behind in a warming East-West economic atmosphere.

Before the dramatic events of 1989 which swept aside the one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Soviet attitudes toward Romania and its rejection of reform were mixed, but by no means completely negative. As noted, trade did increase significantly, though Soviet-Romanian trade remained the lowest between the USSR and any CMEA member. In addition, in accordance with Romanian views on direct enterprise-to-enterprise ties and specialization, few such arrangements were signed.

After Gorbachev became Soviet party leader he did visit Romania, but it was last on his tour and occurred more than two years after he became General Secretary. During this visit in May 1987, Gorbachev was not shy about offering criticism. In his very first speech in Bucharest, which like most Romanian cities was having its old center destroyed
to make way for gigantic new buildings, he urged the Romanians to preserve the historical architecture and said whenever this had not been done in Moscow "we now regret it." Gorbachev complained that mutual trade was in low-quality products while the best production went to the West. Even more pointedly, in reviewing Soviet progress on reforms, he noted the problem of "the removal of those who are not coping with the matter in hand; who cannot keep up with the times; and furthermore, who have tarnished themselves with dishonesty, lack of principles, and nepotism and who in pursuit of profit have sacrificed the moral image proper to a party member. We all need to learn to work in conditions of democracy."

Disagreements had evidently emerged also in private sessions between the two as Ceausescu indicated that there was an identity of views only on a "majority of issues". Other visitors such as Soviet President Andrei Gromyko and Politburo member Mikhail Solomonstev had offered indirect but critical assessment of Soviet-Romanian relations and of the unilateral arms policy pursued by Romanians. Pressure was kept up to develop direct ties between enterprises, in accordance with CMEA's new approach.

The Soviet view, made explicit during Gorbachev's visit to Bucharest in May 1987 and Ceausescu's visit to Moscow in October 1988, was that indeed relations were based
on mutual respect and sovereignty but also "international solidarity, responsibility before the workers of each country and to the common interests of socialism and peace." As he had during his own visit to Bucharest, Gorbachev stressed to Ceausescu when he came the need to improve the quality of products in Soviet-Romanian trade. He also drew attention to the fact that "common ideological achievements become successes for each of us and, unfortunately, common loses can turn into failures."

During this period occasional slights were offered. When Ceausescu visited Moscow in October 1988 Gorbachev did not meet him at the airport, though both men were their country’s heads of both party and state. The Soviet press gave scant recognition to Elena Ceausescu -- despite her position as First Deputy Prime Minister and member of the party’s permanent bureau -- during their arrival and referred to the couple simply as Ceausescu "and wife." The next month Silviu Brucan, a former party leader and critic of the Romanian regime who had signed an open letter against Ceausescu in the spring of 1988, visited Moscow. He was not officially received however.

In general the Soviet press was not especially critical of Ceausescu or the situation in Romania. Many articles on the country were positive. Most reportage either did not report on the country’s overall situation or
attributed any difficulties to the debt burden.\textsuperscript{69} In some discussions the conclusion was drawn that the difficulties were derived from Romania's determination to repay the debt by the end of the decade but this usually was seen as necessary and successful.\textsuperscript{70} Whatever may have been said about him in private,\textsuperscript{71} press treatment of Ceausescu, virtually right up until his overthrow, was restrained and, if anything, only obliquely critical.\textsuperscript{72}

On a concrete level, Soviet Romanian trade increased during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule and would have increased further had Romania been able to pay for all the Soviet oil they wanted. Romanian cooperation in Soviet energy production grew during this period with Romanian involvement in the "Progress" gas pipeline. In October 1988, 30 new cooperation agreements were signed of which 16 were to be enacted in the USSR.\textsuperscript{73} At the time of Gorbachev's visit, there were more than 140 such projects operating in Romania.\textsuperscript{74} Before the Romanian revolution there was little evidence of pressure on Romania, apart from some public chiding, to fall in line with Gorbachev's \textit{perestroika/glasnost'} approach. During 1989 Moscow did include occasional items which bore on reforms in its Romanian language broadcasts, but it was hardly a propaganda campaign.\textsuperscript{75} Occasionally Romania would be reminded of the Soviet contribution to its well-being, most notably through its oil exports.\textsuperscript{76}
V. THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

In 1989 Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe were tested; the question was called as to whether or not the Brezhnev Doctrine was really dead. Specifically, the Polish elections in the spring of 1989 revealed the abject weakness of the communist party there. The inability to form a government then produced the first noncommunist government in Eastern Europe since 1948. While some critical comment was evident, the Soviet Union did not intervene to stop the process. Indeed, Soviet press comment on the Mazowiecki government was cautious but supportive. Moscow, in a phone call to Wojciech Jaruzelski acceded to the communist loss of power and the creation of a Solidarity government. 77

At this point it could be said that both in practice and in rhetoric the Brezhnev Doctrine was relegated to the dustbin of history. Of the goals indicated above as being central to Soviet policy in the region, the maintenance of the communist monopoly of power, Moscow clearly saw, could no longer be defended in Poland. Nor evidently could it be saved elsewhere in the region. In the next few months communist power was destroyed in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and ultimately and violently in Romania itself. In October Gorbachev
traveled to East Germany to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the state and indicated that East Germany’s communists too might find themselves out if they did not cooperate with "all forces in society." Soviet spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov reported that Gorbachev warned Erich Honecker that "he who is late is punished."78 Indeed Honecker found himself out of power ten days later.

His successor, Egon Krenz, lasted only long enough to open the country’s borders and start it down the road to unification with West Germany. Moscow approved the former action, supporting the new government and tried to slow the momentum toward reunification79 but Gorbachev’s evident acceptance of the inevitable reunification of Germany during a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Hans Modrow in January 1990 seemed to offer a green light to reunification on West German rather than on East German terms.80 Subsequently, the Soviet position seemed to be equivocal on whether or not a united Germany could remain in NATO.81 In the face of the rapid movement toward de facto integration, the USSR has displayed a degree of forbearance which borders on resignation.

While Moscow was not as visible in the Czechoslovak "gentle revolution" it was no more inclined to act to prevent it or the election to the presidency soon after of former dissident, Vaclav Havel. Eduard Shevardnadze called the
events of November, which toppled the Czechoslovak party leadership, "natural" and a "democratization of society." Nor did the changes in Hungary and Bulgaria bring the kind of heightened concern and warnings which had characterized Soviet reaction to developments in Eastern Europe at numerous times in the last four decades.

In fact, in an ironic reversal of position it was Romania that tried to organize allied action against change. In a desperate move to try to stop the formation of a Solidarity government in Poland, the RCP proposed to its Polish and Hungarian counterparts that they take "joint action" to defend socialism. Both parties rejected this move. Apparently in the Romanian view the doctrine of limited sovereignty had some merit after all. As this tactic failed and change began to engulf East Europe, the Romanian party sought allies elsewhere, among those regimes setting themselves against reform such as Cuba, and sought to bolster remaining East European conservatives. The Romanian press gave scant or selected coverage of developments in the region.

VI. SOVIET REACTION TO THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

In comparison to the reactions of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, all of which had by this time undergone their own revolutions, the Soviet reaction to the revolution was at first distinctly hesitant. As late as December 17 the
Romanian service of Radio Moscow was still only indirectly calling attention to the lack of changes in Romania by offering brief reports of changes in other East European countries. On December 19 Radio Moscow did go so far as to report the demonstrations in Timisoara and elsewhere, pointing out that no mention of these events was being made in the Romanian media. Meanwhile, other parts of the Soviet media became very active in reporting the demonstrations in Timisoara and Bucharest; they even reported to the Soviet audience Hungarian accounts of death tolls of from 300 to 400 in Timisoara.

Nevertheless, the Soviet government withheld official comments on developments in Romania. Speaking to the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies on December 21 -- after four days of demonstrations -- Mikhail Gorbachev said information was as yet insufficient to allow comment, a sentiment echoed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Politburo member Lev Zaikov did make statements about the need for the Romanian government to establish a dialogue with its people; in comments broadcast by the Romanian service of Radio Moscow, the historian Roy Medvedev called the regime "totalitarian." On December 22 the congress of People's Deputies expressed its "resolute support for the just cause of the Romanian people." The congress spontaneously burst into applause when Mikhail Gorbachev reported that Nicolae Ceausescu had been overthrown.
During the subsequent fighting between Ceausescu loyalists and supporters of the revolution, the USSR offered humanitarian aid to the new regime but denied reports circulated on December 23 that it was prepared to support the government militarily. Moscow did acknowledge that it had discussed with its Warsaw Pact allies the possibility of convening an emergency meeting of the pact's foreign ministers, but this idea was put aside as events stabilized in Romania. The Soviet media continued to provide extensive coverage of the battles in Romania, especially those in Bucharest, and Tass also reported heightened concern over the fate of Soviet nationals during some of the fiercest fighting on December 23. It said that "The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Soviet citizens and demands that those who have unleashed... actions endangering the life of the Soviet people should immediately stop them." The next day an unidentified "senior Soviet official" said that while a victory for the Romanian people would be "a hundred times more valuable" if the people themselves won it, "we would definitely act to prevent Ceausescu's return -- by now that has been made clear to all."

The Soviet Union was assured publicly that military intervention would have met with very little unfavorable reaction. On December 23 an official in the British Foreign Ministry said that Soviet intervention in Romania would be
"understandable." The next day French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said explicitly that his government would support such action as well as the use of volunteer brigades in Romania. Then, in a complete reversal of post-war US policy toward the region, Secretary of State James Baker commented in a television interview that Washington would be "inclined to follow the example of France." When asked directly whether that meant that the USA would not oppose military intervention in Romania by members of the Warsaw Pact, Baker responded: "That would be my view, yes." While the Bush administration later sought to diminish the significance of these remarks by declaring them "hypothetical," even a "hypothetical" suggestion by an American administration that it would not oppose the USSR's use of force in Romania represents a remarkable about-face in the US view of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe.

The overthrow of the Romanian government relieved Gorbachev of a recalcitrant ally who publicly criticized perestroika and even ridiculed Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. But it also increased pressure on Moscow to respond to the demands of the well-organized Moldavian Popular Front, which showed itself highly attentive to developments in Romania from the beginning of the troubles there. Aided by the extensive coverage given the Romanian developments in the Soviet media and by information from their own contacts, officials of all types in Moldavia were
especially critical of Ceausescu's actions. The Moldavian party's Central Committee, Supreme Soviet Presidium, and republican government issued their own statements expressing solidarity with the Romanian people. Coincidentally, a resolution passed by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies on December 24 declared that protocols to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact illegal, although a similar resolution had failed to gather enough votes for passage the day before. These protocols had opened the way for the USSR to incorporate the Baltic states and annex parts of what were then Poland and Romania; out of the annexed Romanian land was created the Soviet Republic of Moldavia.
Perhaps in recognition of the sensitivity and complexity of Soviet-Romanian ties, Gorbachev went out of his way to make a good start with the new Romanian leadership. Recognition was extended on December 25, the same day the Ceausescus were executed. Soviet reaction to this event was not even mildly critical. At a regular press briefing a foreign ministry spokesman said this constituted "part of the internal affairs of Romania" and that "the decision to execute the President has probably been made, taking into account the aspirations and will of the Romanian people." On December 27 Gorbachev spoke by telephone with the President of the National Salvation Front, Ion Iliescu. The same day he sent his personal congratulations to the new Romanian government, signing the message only "M. Gorbachev." This warm message complemented that sent to Prime Minister Petre Roman by the Soviet government. Finally, on December 31 Moscow announced that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze would visit Romania at the end of the first week in January. Shevardnadze did visit on January 6. He promised continuing economic and humanitarian aid, announced the end of Soviet importation of Romanian food products and said the USSR would respect the Romanian people's decision on political parties. For its part, the new Romanian government strongly affirmed that it would respect its foreign commitments, including its membership in the Warsaw Pact.
VII. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE SINCE THE REVOLUTIONS

What is Moscow left with in East Europe and how is it reacting to the new situation? While the situation itself is too new to offer an in-depth analysis, some patterns from the first months can be discerned.

First and most significant is that Moscow's reactions seem only to be intermittent. Having let the regions' states go their own way, the Soviet leadership now seems unwilling or unable to articulate a coherent vision of its new relationship with these states. Partly this is the effect of the appearance of a broader range of views on all subjects in the Soviet press. But is also a result of the fact that the reforms of glasnost and perestroika have unleashed changes within the USSR itself of a scope and breadth well beyond that which seems to have been anticipated. Thus the leadership has all it can do to try to manage internal change. Indeed it was the very pace and degree of that change that made Soviet forbearance during 1989 a policy of necessity as well as choice.

Now Moscow seems only to react episodically, when developments in the region cause it particular concern. The most prominent example is its attitude toward German reunification. This process has sped along faster than any
of the leaders of the concerned states foresaw, spurred by the spectre of economic collapse and virtual desertion of East German territory by its own population. Most states, but in particular the USSR, have been scrambling to articulate clear policies and effect the process in ways favorable to their goals. For Moscow this has meant trying to be firm about what it will accept in a new Germany, e.g. neutrality, and what it will reject, e.g. NATO membership. But this has been done in a contradictory form and apparently only when pressed by the immediate onset of negotiations, such as unexpectedly at the Ottawa "open skies" meeting.

An example of this with regard to Romania was the sharp Soviet reaction to the banning of the communist party announced by the Council of National Salvation when faced with a mob in downtown Bucharest. Though this was promptly overturned by the Council after meeting, Radio Moscow was quick to point to the possible negative implications of this act, possibly having in mind the infection of this idea into the USSR itself.

Indeed the most significant new aspect of Soviet-East European relations since the revolutions has been the "rebound" affect these changes have had on the USSR. Though the impetus for reform clearly belongs to Gorbachev and the reforms his team unleashed, developments in the region soon went beyond reforms to revolution. The creation of
noncommunist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the prospect of elections throughout East Europe and the blossoming of political parties in anticipation of these elections has reverberated through an East European and Soviet media now free of most political controls. The Baltic states have moved most quickly in this respect, with Lithuania formally recognizing noncommunist parties and holding open elections in March 1990, which led to a reassertion of Lithuanian independence. The CPSU and Gorbachev at the beginning of 1990 similarly supported the ending of the party's constitutional monopoly and multiple candidate -- though not multiparty -- local elections began to take place throughout the country.

One way in which the Romanian experience contributed to these developments was by negative example. During the discussion of the removal to the party's guaranteed monopoly, frequent references were made to the need to avoid a "Romania" in the Soviet Union: that is, the explosion of violence against an unyielding regime leading to a murderous struggle and the death of the regime as well as its chief actor. 104

In a few respects Soviet post-revolutionary policy resembles that before 1989. One of these is a continuing interest on the part of Moscow for reform in the East European economies. The Soviet Union still needs a "better"
relationship from its point of view; it still needs to get more value for what it sells to the East European states, chiefly raw materials. Thus its apparent willingness to support the idea that inner-CMEA trade be put on a hard currency, world price basis. At the same time it needs to have the economies of these states operate efficiently because it needs more than ever to be relieved of the burden they constitute. Evidence of this is seen in announcements of reduction in Soviet oil supply to several East European states. More effective economies in East Europe will presumably both improve the quality of supplies to the Soviet Union and underpin a stable political environment thus preventing further turmoil or the emergence of more hostile governments in the area. In this respect there is a continuation of Soviet interest in a degree of stability in the region and in having the renewed communist parties continue to play a role.

But on balance Soviet policy in the region is characterized by more reversals than continuities. Soviet acquiescence to the changes of course is the most significant example. Another key component has been Soviet willingness to negotiate and actually begin troop withdrawals from those states where Soviet troops remained: Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. While developments in the last case will likely be affected by the pace and effects of German reunification, in the first two instances, troop
withdrawals began in early 1990. Given that these Soviet troops played a relatively marginal role in defense against a putative Western attack and that their major role was to enforce respect for the existing parameters of behavior in the region, Soviet abandonment of those parameters both mandates and is confirmed by these withdrawals.

With regard to Romania, Soviet troops are not the issue, but ironically the question of security may be greater now than it was under Ceausescu. First, there is the prospect that, given changes both in Romania and in the USSR, turbulence in Moldavia could lead to clamor for changes in that republic's status. This could take the form of pressure for increased Moldavian sovereignty and reduced central control, full separation from the USSR, or even union with Romania. There is little evidence that the last is a strong factor, but the Moldavian Popular Front is proving an effective political actor and Moldavian absorption into the USSR, like Lithuania's, was a product of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Thus both the legal and political basis for a challenge to Soviet rule are present. It is perhaps not accidental that just after the revolution it was announced that Moldavian party and government leader Petar Luschinsky would accompany Eduard Shevardnadze to Bucharest, but he did not.
The second cause for concern, which had been dormant previously is the reappearance of the issues of the Hungarian minority in Romania and indirectly, the territory of Transylvania. Serious tensions continue over the minority issue and new, more open politics, in both countries allows the voicing of various and sometimes more nationalistic views, especially during elections. The possibility exists, that this issue could seriously provoke tension in the region, and even conflict, and undermine what had been a relatively secure area for the USSR.

Finally, there is the situation in Romania itself. The revolution is barely three months past and despite the promise of elections, and a transition to greater democracy, there is uncertainty and instability in the country. Already the National Salvation Front has offered itself as a provisional government, a competing political party and then as a member -- the most powerful one -- of a new Council of National Unity. Numerous political parties have emerged of uncertain heritage, program and allegiance. Observers cannot be as sanguine about the steady movement toward popular democratic rule in Romania as is possible, for example in Czechoslovakia. This very uncertainty and lack of movement could provoke further action and possibly violence by those who feel the revolution has been "hijacked". This would be worrisome to Moscow, especially since this feeling
is directed at communists who were once powerful in the Ceausescu regime and who remain in the new government. This "second stage" of the revolution could thus take on an even more radical and decidedly anti-Soviet character than that of December.

VIII. UNITED STATES POLICY

The United States promptly recognized the new government in Romania and offered some economic assistance. But the US quickly became displeased with the pace of democratic development and began to publicly pressure Bucharest to move more effectively and quickly. US concern was demonstrated both by statements and by visits of US Secretary of State James Baker and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Schifter. Washington has indicated that restoration of MFN will not be immediately forthcoming unless the rudiments of democratic rule are established in the country. This posture, plus what is seen as a low level of US aid, has provoked some criticism in Romania and relations at the beginning of 1990 could only be described as correct.
Economic constraints and perhaps past practice has caused the US to take a low profile in the Romanian scene. This is consistent with US policy in the last years of Ceausescu as the US tried to distance itself from an odious regime, and moreover conforms to the spirit if not the letter of the amendments to the trade law.

It is in US interest, however, that democracy take root and flourish in Romania and US public pressure should continue. The United States is not the most significant political or economic actor in the country, which has strong cultural ties to France and economic links to Germany. But it is the most prominent western democracy whose actions are seen as a key international indicator of the country's acceptance by the international community. The US is seen as having the most successful experience with a pluralist society, popular political representation, open media and market mechanism. With this authenticity and a prominence which guarantees international attention to whatever it says about Romania or any other country, Washington can bring to bear significant influence on Romania's leaders not to wander too far from the path toward democracy.

MFN should eventually be restored, assuming policy makers can satisfy themselves that basic human rights, including those for minorities are being observed. At the same time,
this should be accompanied by extension of protection by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Export-Import bank
loans and encouragement of private economic activity. If
holding off on these policies means that other more eager
partners will take the field, the economic loss to the US
will not be great, while the satisfaction of seeing responses
to US desires for the implementation of democratic principles
will provide compensation.
NOTES


(2) Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983).


(4) Ronald H. Linden, Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1979), pp.177-203.


(8) By the beginning of 1990 over 1200 joint venture agreements had been signed with western companies, though less than 200 were in operation, Financial Times, February 1, 1990. In March, 1990 the USSR formally applied for observer status in GATT.
In his own explication of the process, Gorbachev writes:

Politics is undoubtedly the most important thing in any revolutionary process. This is equally true of perestroika, therefore we attach priority to political measures, broad and genuine democratization, the resolute struggle against red tape and violations of law, and the active involvement of the masses in managing the country's affairs. All this is directly linked with the main question of any revolution, the question of power.


See e.g. Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet revolution, Moscow TV, March, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, March 4, 1987, pp. 22-4]; Izvestia, June 15, 1988, p. 5.

See e.g. the interview with Vyacheslav Dashichev, head of the foreign policy department of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, in *Der Spiegel*, July 4, 1988 [FBIS-Sov, July 8, 1988, p. 18-21]; "East-West Relations and Eastern Europe (An American-Soviet Dialogue)" *Problems of Communism*, XXXVII, 3-4 (May - August), 1988, pp. 55-70. See also Gorbachev's statement in Helsinki, Finland, and spokesman Gerasimov's suggestion that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been replaced by the "Sinatra doctrine"; i.e. "Hungary and Poland are doing it their way," *New York Times*, October 26, 1989.


Data can be found in US Information Agency release, September 17, 1989.


See e.g. Gorbachev's statement in October 1987, before the 43rd (extraordinary) session of CMEA, Pravda, October 15, 1987; the statement of the Soviet permanent representative to CMEA, Deputy Prime Minister A.K.Antonov, Novoe Vremya, October 16, 1987, pp.2-3; "CEV: po puti intensifikatsii sotrydinchestva" [CMEA: on the path of intensification of collaboration] Vneshnaya Torgovlaia, #2, 1987, p.11-12; "CEV: Nauka, promyshlennost', - rynok" ["CMEA: science, industry, market"] Izvestia, June 1, 1987, p.2


See, for example, Gorbachev's statement in Prague, Soviet TV, April 10, 1987 [Summary of World Broadcasts, April 13, 1987, p. EE/8541/C/0]. Gorbachev voiced a similar sentiment to Karoly Grosz when the Hungarian leader visited Moscow in July 1988; Pravda, July 6, 1988, p.2. See also the comments of Aleksandr Yakolev in Hungary, Pravda, November 13, 1988, p.4.

Aleksandr Kondrashov, "Ob antichekhoslovatskoi kampanii na Zapade" ["About the Anti-Czechoslovak Campaign in the West"], Izvestia, August 22, 1988, p.3; Tass, August 19, 1988 [FBIS, August 22, 1988, p.41]. But somewhat divergent assessments were offered by the Soviet Ambassador to Italy (Financial Times, September 12, 1988, p.12) and Oleg Bogomolov, Director of the Institute for the Study of the Economics of the World Socialist System (Financial Times, June 27, 1988, p.2).


Linden, Bear and Foxes, pp.53-197.


See the discussion in Linden, Communist States, pp. 81-82.


(32) IBID; see also Agerpress, September 10, 1989.


(35) Romania Libera, October 4, 1988, p. 3.


(38) AP, September 28, 1989.

(39) Linden, *Communist States*, pp.74-75

(41) Text in Pravda, December 19, 1985, pp.1,4.

(42) This can be seen for example by comparing Soviet Premier Ryzhkov's speech to the 43rd CMEA session which emphasized direct ties with that of Constantin Dascalescu, the Romanian premier, who emphasized the role of the party. Both in Pravda, October 14, 1987, pp.4-5. Compare the statement by Marion Marinov, a Bulgarian deputy secretary of CMEA, Tass in English, March 25, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, March 27, 1987, p.BB14]


(44) BTA, April 2, 1986 [SWB, April 4, 1986, p. EE/8224/C/7].

(45) See Ceausescu's statement during Gorbachev's visit as they both toured a factory in Bucharest. While he acknowledged the need for cooperation in production, Ceausescu stressed that "implementation of these accords should be carried out by the workers' councils, the directors of enterprises, ministries, . . . and - including party organizations. Otherwise, our accords simply won't be implemented." [Soviet TV, May 26, 1987. SWB, p. EE/8580/C/11, May 29, 1987, emphasis added] See also the favourable discussion of a bilateral agreement with the GDR, ADN, May 30, 1988 [FBIS, June 3, 1988, p. EE/O/68/A2/1].

(46) At the last congress of the RCP Ceausescu spoke in favor of "strengthening collaboration in the framework of CMEA, which does not affect the national independence of each country." Radio Bucharest, November 20, 1989.


(50) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p. 2.

(51) Pravda, July 8, 1988, p.5.

(52) See, for example, Scinteia, March 22, 1981, p.1.


(56) See the statements by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Palmer before Congress, in Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 August, 1984, p.4 and Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, serial 98-22, 14 July, 1983, p. 56; see also Vice President George Bush's speech at the Austrian Foreign Policy Association, September 21, 1983 (Vienna: US Information Service, 1983).


(60) Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, p. 132.


(64) Pravda, May 16, 1988, p. 5.


(66) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p. 1, emphasis added.

(67) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p. 2.

(69) See, e.g. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, pp. 128-33.


(72) See, for example, the comments by Oleg Bogomolov in an interview in Komsomolskaia Pravda, July 23, 1988, p.3; Albert Pin, "Bucharest's silent music," New Times, #36, 1989, p.26-7. Radio Moscow did express some skepticism at Romanian harvest claims made during the last RCP congress, pointing out that this was especially encouraging news considering the continuation of domestic shortages. Radio Moscow in Romanian, November 26, 1989.

(73) Radio Moscow, October 5, 1988 [SWB, October 6, 1988]


(75) For example, in September this service reported Polish party leader Mieczeslaw Rakowski's remarks about the persistence of support for "socialism of the old type". Radio Moscow in Romanian, September 25, 1989. Also reported were the demonstrations in Germany, October 29, 1989, and the replacement of Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov, November 18, 1989.

(76) Pravda, May 25, 1987, p. 5; Krasnaia Zvezda, August 23, 1987, p. 3; Sovietskaia Kultura, August 22, 1987, p. 7. In fact, Moscow was quick to point to the sacrifice it made to keep its commitments and that "difficulties in the provision of the Romanian economy and population with fuel and power" were not its fault. Tass in English, February 27, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, May 3, 1987, p.F1]

(77) Shafir, "Soviet Reaction to Polish Developments."

(78) AP, October 7, 1989. Later both Soviet and East German officials confirmed that Moscow had tried to push Honecker toward reform. See the statement by Nikolai Portugalov, a CC member and advisor to Gorbachev on German affairs, Reuter, January 24, 1990 and that by Horst Sindermann, former speaker of the East German parliament, AP, December 27, 1989.


(81) Compare statements by various Soviet spokesmen: on February 6, 1980, (N. Portugalov, AFP same date); February 9, (A. Tolpegin, Reuter, same date); (V. Churkin, RFE News and Current Affairs, same date) and February 17 (V. Falin, AP, same date) with those of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze before and after the Ottawa "open skies" meeting at which reunification was discussed (Reuter, February 7, 1990; February 14, 1990; February 19, 1990).

(82) Interview with L’Unita, reported by Reuter, November 28, 1989. See also Pravda, November 27, 1989. On November 24, the day that Milos Jakes resigned, the Soviet Union hosted Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity Prime Minister of Poland in Moscow. For Soviet message of congratulations to Havel, see Tass in English, December 30, 1989.

(83) Radio Warsaw, September 29, 1989; Radio Budapest, October 2, 1989. The Soviet paper Trud, reported the Hungarian confirmation of this action, October 6, 1989, p.3.


(85) See, for example, the report of the last congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Scinteia, October 4, 1989, p.6, and of the resignation of the Bulgarian party leader Todor Zhivkov and his replacement by Petar Mladenov. Scinteia, November 11 and 12, 1989, p.6. Coverage also typically emphasized the difficulties evident in those states already engaged in reform; for example, inflation and the growing disparity between rich and poor in Poland were treated by Scinteia, October 5, 1989, p.6 and November 15, 1989, p.5 (which reprinted an article from The Times of London). In October Romania Libera ran a front page cartoon from le Monde which showed Polish Head of State Wojciech Jaruzelski with a cane and tin cup begging for help for the Polish economy (Romania Libera, October 18, 1989, p.1).

(86) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 17, 1989.

(87) Ibid., December 19, 1989.


(89) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 21, 1989.


(91) Radio Bucharest, December 23, 1989; Budapest Television, December 23, 1989; Tass, December 25, 1989. For a discussion of Moscow’s reported involvement with the National Salvation Front before the overthrow, see Michael

(98) AP, 26 December 1989.
(100) Rompres, January 7, 1990.
(101) See the interview with Minister State Secretary Corneliu Bogdan in Izvestia, 1 January 1990.
(103) Radio Moscow in Romanian, January 15, 1990. When authorities began to demolish a statue of Lenin in Bucharest, Moscow called for "more tactfulness in order not to hurt the feelings of many people, including those in neighboring countries." Radio Moscow in Romanian, March, 3, 1990.
(106) On debts owed to the USSR by all socialist countries, see Tass in English, March 2, 1980. Romania has no debt, according to these figures.

(110) In what can only be seen as a desperate attempt to use nationalism as a pillar of support one more time, Ceausescu unexpectedly raised the Moldavian issue at the 14th congress of the RCP. He called for the annulment of all agreements concluded with Nazi Germany and of "all consequences of those agreements." [Radio Bucharest, November 20, 1989]. Moscow did not respond directly but instead criticized western media for seeming to suggest that the border was being challenged. "No serious politician can raise, and in reality, raises the question of borders, including those between the Soviet Union and Romania," said Tass (November 23, 1989).


(113) See the statement of US Secretary of State, James Baker in Bucharest, Rompres, February 11, 1990.