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TITLE: THE CHANGING SOVIET CITIZEN: Prospects for Economic Reform in the 1990's

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on surveys of Soviet citizens from the late Brezhnev to the current periods, this study concludes that the reforms shaking Soviet society today are driven by powerful popular forces which antedate Gorbachev, which he may have triggered and managed with skill, but which he cannot control from "above." Pressures in the society for political reforms were unambiguous and great, but those for economic change were mixed and contradictory - a lack of social consensus which lies at the root of the current conflict over measures for economic reform, and make remote its prospects for success.

Data Sources

There are three main sources of data upon which this essay has been based: the Soviet Interview Project (SIP), the Harvard Refugee Project (HRP) and opinion polls and surveys recently collected in the Soviet Union by Soviet pollsters and scholars.

The Soviet Interview Project completed several different subprojects. The first general survey (G1) was completed in 1984 based upon structured interviews averaging three hours each with a total of 2793 former Soviet citizens who arrived in the United States between January 1979 and March 1983. A second general survey was conducted in 1984-85 with 572 participants who had arrived in the USA between April 1983 and December 1985. These two surveys covered a wide range of topics, including questions on politics, daily life,
household economics and so forth during the last normal period of life in the USSR. Fifteen other small-scale intensive surveys were also conducted with individuals who had occupations of interest in the USSR or unusual life experiences.

The Harvard Refugee Project developed a profile of the Soviet society based upon extensive interviews in the 1950's with Soviet citizens still in Displaced Persons Camps in Allied-occupied territories in Europe.

Most recently, a number of Soviet-conducted surveys have become available of sufficient quality to be reliable in the main.

This study is based upon an analysis of all these sources.

Public Attitudes in the Period of Stagnation (1978-83)

There has been a tendency in the West to assume that Soviet citizens were always thoroughly dissatisfied with their lives, economic as well as political. The SIP data reveal, however, that this is not the case. For example, substantial increases in the standard of living took place during the 1960s and 70s, and Soviet citizens were keenly aware both of the improvement and of its declining rate of increase toward the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s. Recent reports from the Soviet Union indicate that
many citizens are looking back at the performance of the economy during the Brezhnev years with nostalgia.

Reviewing sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the close of the Brezhnev era as revealed by SIP, a clear pattern emerges. Individuals in their roles as suppliers generally reported satisfaction. Workers as employees were relatively satisfied too. Low productivity, insensitivity to the trading, partner, and low quality work yielded few or no costs to sellers. Managers patted themselves on the back for meeting quantitative targets and for ensuring bonuses for their staff and workers. Even the economic bureaucrats who staffed the state committees that set targets and prices and the like and those who supervised enterprise production bore few costs of the sellers' market. Buyers, on the other hand, bore these costs. They queued for scarce commodities, accepted shoddy goods rather than nothing at all, spent enormous time scouting for sources of supply, and felt they had been gouged when the goods were only available privately at market prices.

The most significant demographic discovery of SIP is the strength and pervasiveness of generational differences in Soviet society on the eve of the Gorbachev era. Older respondents reported themselves as more satisfied or less dissatisfied on every measure, and this was true for almost any pair of age-differentiated segments. The older generations represented therefore a conservative force in Soviet society, but one that is declining in force over time,
because the evidence suggests that the differences SIP discovered among generations are not merely life-cycle effects. In this respect, the SIP results contrast sharply with the findings of the Harvard Refugee Project of the early 1950's, in which youth correlated with greater satisfaction and regime support.

A second significant cleavage discovered by SIP to exist in the late and post-Brezhnev period stems from educational differences, with education acting corrosively on support for regime values.

Reforming the Soviet System

The picture that SIP results permit us to draw of the sources of support and alienation within the urban population of the USSR at the close of the Brezhnev era is mixed with respect to the reforms that Gorbachev has implemented, or proposes to implement. Pre-Gorbachev opinion was much more consistent with the political and civil reforms he has introduced than with the economic reforms he proposes.

Thus far, popular attitudes toward economic reform, as surveyed recently in the USSR, reveal the same ambiguities and contradictions found among SIP respondents. Soviet citizens are worried about losing the few economic advantages they have under the current system, and they are unpersuaded that the reformed economy will make them better off.

Conclusion: 500 Days and Counting

Gorbachev has been seeking consensus on both the political and the economic reforms he has introduced.
Although he has been the catalyst for reform, the one who actually lifted the lid on Pandora's Box, he has skillfully managed rather than directed developments from above. There were powerful demographic forces operating within Soviet society to foster change, and the leadership was in transition as well, with the frustrated "children of the 20th Party Congress" waiting through the Brezhnev stagnation in hopes of a continuation of Khrushchev's initiatives.

The population is understandably cautious about economic reform. They sense, correctly I believe, that the economic advisors to President Gorbachev do not really know how to get from the here-and-now economy to the new one. Many new economic institutions must be created before a modern centrally-managed, mixed market economy can be expected to function satisfactorily. These include a true central bank, a modern fiscal system, Western-style labor unions and labor arbitration agencies, unemployment insurance, private property, and a convertible currency. Soviet citizens are understandably leery of the impatience of many of Gorbachev's economic advisors, as has been Gorbachev. Prospects for successful economic reform therefore remain quite limited, although the direction of change is unlikely to be altered.

A maxim popular with economic advisors in the USSR is: "One cannot leap over a chasm in two jumps," with the implication that the chasm must be crossed in one jump. Wisdom, however, suggests building a bridge when the risk of failure is high and the cost enormous. The Shatalin plan for
a 500 day transition to a market-oriented economy could serve as a bridge so long as no one takes the time limit seriously.
The Changing Soviet Citizen: Prospects for Economic Reform in the 1990s

A great deal of space has been devoted in the press and by scholarly specialists to the question of whether Mikhail Gorbachev will be able to survive the political instability his policies have created and its corollary, whether perestroika and glasnost have become irreversible. Will Gorbachev's successor continue or reverse current attempts to democratize Soviet society and to create an open, market-oriented mixed economy? An aim of this essay is to reframe the debate about Gorbachev's political survivability into one involving the provenance and reversibility of the policies associated with his name.

Margaret Thatcher told a television interviewer in February 1990: "None of this would be happening today were it not for Michael Gorbachev." I shall argue in what follows that Mrs Thatcher is wrong, that Gorbachev's policies have in fact unleashed powerful forces that were already underway beneath the surface of the Soviet social system. Whether Gorbachev has merely opened Pandora's Box, releasing forces that will lead willy nilly to the ultimate disintegration of the Soviet polity, or whether, instead, these forces will eventually be harnessed to the benefit of a reunited, revitalized economy and society, remains to be seen. I shall argue that, although Gorbachev may have served as the trigger, the reforms shaking Soviet society today are driven
by powerful demographic, economic and ideological forces that
Gorbachev did not create and, in fact, cannot control "from
above."

Introduction:

Most Western scholars view the 1930s as a wholly
separate and in many ways more fundamental "revolution" from
those of 1917, and in this sense the period is particularly
relevant to Gorbachev's reforms. The fundamental character
of the Soviet economy on the eve of perestroika was a product
of the 1930s. Centralized supply planning, an administered
price system, collectivized agriculture, centralized capital
allocation, and a depecuniarized, closed economy were all
created in the 1930s, and Gorbachev's reforms are aimed at
the reversal or modification of each of these characteristics. He is opening the economy to global
economic forces, not closing it. In this, Gorbachev is
reacting to a new economic reality: the continuing prosperity
of the West, in contrast to the world-wide recession of
Stalin's time. Thus, Gorbachev's reforms are, unlike
Stalin's, based squarely upon a favorable appraisal of the
performance of the global market-oriented economy. Insofar
as there is a model for the reform movement, it would seem to
be a somewhat modified mixed economy, not a generically
different economic system from those of Western Europe.
Finally, Stalin sought to impose the new centrally-planned
and administered economy, and especially the collectivization of agriculture, in the teeth of majority opposition with the help of a band of dedicated zealots. Gorbachev has, on the contrary, been increasing and strengthening democratic institutions and civil liberties. He has also been seeking to use consensus rather than force to implement economic reforms.

It is clear then that Gorbachev is supporting a reformation in the true sense of the word for Soviet society, including of the party and its ideology. We need to discover, therefore, the extent to which this effort has broad support from Soviet society, that is, whether or not Gorbachev is pushing on an open door. What follows is an attempt to use the available survey data on Soviet attitudes and behavior to assess this question.

Data Sources

There are three main sources of data upon which this essay has been based: the Soviet Interview Project (SIP), the Harvard Refugee Project (HRP) and opinion polls and surveys recently collected in the Soviet Union by Soviet pollsters and scholars. The most important have been the National Center for Public Opinion Research (VTSIOM), founded by Tatyanya Zaslavskaya, and the survey arm of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences (ISAN) of the USSR. Each source has specific strengths and weaknesses.2
The Soviet Interview Project\textsuperscript{3} completed several different subprojects. The first general survey (G1) was completed in 1984 based upon structured interviews averaging three hours each with a total of 2793 former Soviet citizens who arrived in the United States between January 1979 and March 1983. A second general survey was conducted in 1984-85 with 572 participants who had arrived in the USA between April 1983 and December 1985. Approximately 82 percent of the respondents were \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Jewish\textquoteright\textquoteright according to the broad criteria used by Soviet immigration authorities. These two surveys covered a wide range of topics, including questions on politics, daily life, household economics and so forth during the last normal period of life in the USSR. The last normal period of life (LNP) referred to that span of months (or years for certain questions) that ended when the individual applied to leave the USSR, or when something happened earlier to cause him to decide to leave.

In addition to GI and G2, SIP researchers conducted an extensive survey of more than 600 former Soviet citizens with military experience. A major aim was to explore the relative efficiency and efficacy of civilian and military enterprise in the USSR.\textsuperscript{4} Fifteen other small-scale intensive surveys were also conducted with individuals who had occupations of interest in the USSR or unusual life experiences.\textsuperscript{5} Thus, for example, camp returnees, enterprise management personnel, lawyers, members of the economic bureaucracy and the like were interviewed. Typically, the number interviewed ranged
from 30 to 60, and the aim was to use these individuals as informants on various institutions in the USSR.

The discussion that follows is based upon all of these original sources as well as upon analyses of the data by members of the SIP research team and their associates.

A description of the SIP effort and a discussion of the limits and validity of the findings may be found in various published and unpublished sources. The principal aim of SIP was to construct a cross-section of the Soviet social system by means of lengthy conversations with recent emigrants from the Soviet Union. The sampling frame eventually exceeded 40,000 adult emigrants, and more than 5,000 recent emigrants were interviewed in all either about their everyday lives in the USSR or about institutions with which they were familiar as citizens of the USSR. The cross-section refers to the end of the 1970s and the early years of the 1980s. Quite serendipitously, then, SIP charted the features of what is now known as the "era of stagnation," that is, the last years of the Brezhnev regime. It represents, therefore, the best baseline measure available against which to compare the unfolding process of reform in the Soviet Union today.

A secondary purpose of SIP was to attempt to measure change in Soviet society by comparing our results with the profile of the Soviet social system that was developed in the 1950s by the Harvard Refugee Project (HRP). The HRP was based upon extensive interviews with Soviet citizens who had
elected not to return to the USSR after WWII and who were therefore residing in DP camps in Allied-occupied territories. SIP questionnaires and procedures were designed accordingly so as to facilitate such comparisons. We hoped to be able to detect changes in Soviet society and in the behavior of the Soviet citizen, and important changes were in fact identified. The pace of these changes was, of course, glacial when compared to those that have taken place since the mid 1980s, but the nature and direction are consistent with more recent developments.

The third source of data is composed of the increasing number of surveys that have been conducted in the Soviet Union since the policies of glasnost and perestroika have made serious sociological research again possible. One or two institutes have accounted for most of the surveys that have any kind of claim to scientific status.

Each of the sources of survey information upon which this essay is based has its own limitations and potential biases. The problems associated with the SIP and HRP studies have been discussed at length elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that extensive efforts were made in the data collection process to guard against biases derived from self-selection and memory decay and contamination. Extensive tests have also been conducted to identify and eliminate biases that remain. Used judiciously, these two data sets have proven their reliability and usefulness.

There are problems with recent Soviet surveys also. It
will be many years before a proper proportionate national sample can be used in survey research in the Soviet Union. There is an insufficiency of trained, experienced field workers, for example. A national sample survey needs to be administered in at least four or five languages, which would add greatly to the cost of questionnaire design and administration and has therefore not yet been attempted. Soviet rural society is largely inaccessible to research at this time for reasons of cost and tradition. Thus, most recent surveys have been confined to a single city (usually Moscow) or to a limited number of urban centers. The National Center for Public Opinion Research (VTSION) has perhaps the best developed network nationally, but even its most extensive surveys are restricted to sixteen cities, eight in the RSFSR and eight in other republics.

Thus the survey data presented here and the analysis that is based upon these data must be viewed with a certain caution. These are, however, the best data available and, fortunately, there are many internal consistencies among them.

Life in the USSR during the Period of Stagnation (1978-83)

Recent reports from the Soviet Union have claimed that living standards have declined since the onset of perestroika. Many citizens are looking back at the performance of the economy during the Brezhnev years with
nostalgia. There has been a tendency in the West to assume that Soviet citizens were always thoroughly dissatisfied with their lives, economic as well as political. The SIP data reveal, however, that this is not the case. Substantial increases in the standard of living took place during the 1960s and 70s, and Soviet citizens were keenly aware both of the improvement and of its declining rate of increase toward the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s.8

Even though SIP respondents had clearly voted with their feet to leave the Soviet Union, they were able to differentiate between positive and negative aspects of the Soviet social system. The respondents also represented a heterogeneous group with respect to their evaluations of life in the USSR. Thus, their responses can provide information on sources of support for and alienation from various aspects of life in the USSR, and variation among them may be used to analyze the characteristics that predispose Soviet citizens toward alienation from or support for specific Soviet institutions. In order to avoid contamination with the trials and tribulations of the emigration itself, respondents were asked about their attitudes and/or behaviors during the "last normal period" (LNP) of life in the USSR, which was defined as the period in the USSR ending at the time the respondent's life changed as a result of the decision to leave.

One portion of the SIP questionnaire dealt with sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with life in the USSR during the respondent's LNP. The interviewers stressed that
they were not interested in how respondents felt now, after living in the United States, but in their recollection of how they had felt or behaved while living in the USSR. Respondents were asked whether they had been "very satisfied," "somewhat satisfied," "somewhat dissatisfied," or "very dissatisfied" with their standard of living during their LNP in the Soviet Union (Table 1, Panel A). In the initial general survey (G1), approximately eleven percent, or 310 respondents, reported that they had been "very satisfied" with their standard of living in the USSR, and a total of 60.1 percent, or 1653 respondents, reported that they had been either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied."

The LNP ended for the majority of G1 respondents in 1979. The second general survey (G2) reflected an end of LNP for most respondents of approximately 1984 (Table 1, Panel B). Some 64% of G2 respondents, or almost 362 respondents, reported that they had been either "very" or "somewhat satisfied" with their standard of living at that time. And it is of some importance to note that length of time since departure from the USSR had no significant impact upon reports of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life in the USSR.9

These reports on satisfaction with standard of living are also consistent with the answers we received about reasons for leaving the Soviet Union. SIP coded up to three answers for each respondent to the completely open-ended
question: "What were your reasons for leaving the Soviet Union?" Only 27 percent gave an economic motive as either the first, second or third reason for leaving, as opposed to totals of 46 percent who cited a religious/ethnic reason and 43 percent who gave a political reason. Economic discontent was clearly not the prime motive for emigration in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The single most significant determinant of reported satisfaction with standard of living was satisfaction or dissatisfaction with housing (Table 1). Some 23 percent of SIP respondents on the GI survey rated themselves as "very satisfied" with their housing during their LNP, and 67 percent in all reported themselves to have been either "very" or "somewhat satisfied." Only 19 percent were "very dissatisfied" with their housing when they were living in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. Very similar totals obtain for the G2 survey, all of which suggests a much higher degree of satisfaction with housing, and thus with standard of living as well, than most Western observers would have predicted.

Many knowledgeable students of Soviet society have found these statistics hard to believe. Soviet living space is scarce even by European standards, and the quality of much housing in the USSR, often even when newly constructed, is also visibly poor in terms of finish, amenities and maintenance.
Home occupants have been queried repeatedly all over the world, however, and it is possible therefore to test the credibility of SIP respondents by modelling determinants of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with housing using objective data SIP also collected from them. As is true generally, Soviet householders were more likely to report satisfaction with their housing the greater the per capita floor space. Also, home owners normally report higher degrees of satisfaction than do renters. About one-third of SIP respondents owned their own housing in the Soviet Union, and they were indeed significantly more likely to report satisfaction than nonowners. Finally, and particularly significant in the USSR, is the extent to which families had to share housing space and facilities. Soviet citizens have unambiguously rejected communal housing, although many still must accommodate to it. The more sharing required, such as of kitchens, toilets, and the like, the less reported satisfaction. The least satisfied were students living in dormitories or individuals living in "corners" of other peoples' homes, who therefore were obliged to share essentially everything.

The salience of housing in the quality of life in the Soviet Union is clear from an analysis of "bureaucratic encounters" these former Soviet citizens reported having had during their LNPs. SIP asked, for example, whether the respondent had ever made voluntary contact about any matter
(other than emigration) with an official (state or party) or official agency during the LNP. Nineteen percent of the G1 sample had done so (15 percent of the G2 sample), and over half of these contacts had to do with housing (45 percent for G2). Interestingly, a majority of these respondents reported that their complaints (or requests) had in fact ultimately been satisfied in some degree. The high correlation we found between family size and square meters of housing space also suggests bureaucratic success in the allocation of housing space on a family-size criterion.

Additional confirmation of the general reliability of SIP G1 and G2 findings is provided by a parallel interview project that was modelled on SIP and conducted in West Germany by the Osteuropa Institute of Munich among former Soviet citizens of German extraction. The German sample (GSIP) differed from the SIP in that it had a significant representation of rural and small-city population and was heavily Protestant in religious affiliation. Despite these differences, answers to the satisfaction questions correspond very closely to those received by SIP. Sixty-nine percent of the German-Russian sample reported that they had been either "very" or "somewhat satisfied" with their housing in the USSR, and almost 61 percent reported satisfaction with their standard of living. These responses are essentially the same as those obtained from the SIP G1 and G2 samples.

The most satisfying aspect of economic life in the USSR
according to SIP respondents was employment. Almost 80 percent of the G1 and G2 samples stated that they had been either "very" or "somewhat satisfied" with their jobs. For the GSIP (German) sample the number was almost 77 percent. In both cases, women reported the highest levels of satisfaction with jobs, despite the fact that women earned only about 71 percent as much as men and suffered from the double burden posed by household responsibilities.

The main determinant of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with former employments in the USSR was whether or not the respondent had been able to work in the specialty for which he or she had been trained. Job security was also an important positive determinant of satisfaction, especially among blue-collar workers. With the exception of professional workers, however, job satisfaction depended only marginally upon satisfaction with income earned on the job. The high levels of job satisfaction reported is somewhat ironic, because SIP respondents also regarded productivity in their former places of work as relatively low. When asked to specify the reasons for low productivity, more than 60 percent cited inadequate material incentives, and this was particularly salient for regular shop workers and their foremen. Thus, strangely enough, Soviet workers appear to have enjoyed their jobs despite low productivity and poor incentives. The survey seems to verify the accuracy of the well-known Soviet witticism: "They pretend to pay us, and we
pretend to work."

Soviet enterprise managers and economic bureaucrats also appear to have enjoyed their jobs in the USSR, and they give themselves relatively high ratings for job performance as well, particularly their ability to deal with the chronic supply insecurities of the Soviet economy.13

Our respondents were not, of course, relatively satisfied generally with life in the USSR. The greatest source of dissatisfaction was with the availability of consumer goods and services (Table 1). Only about 5 percent had been "very satisfied" with the availability of goods during their LNP in the USSR, and an overwhelming 77 percent had been either "very" or "somewhat dissatisfied" with goods availability. This result is not surprising to anyone who has had to shop in the USSR. Although queues had diminished somewhat in the late 1970s, queues were still ubiquitous for fresh foodstuffs, meats and for quality merchandise of all types.

What is somewhat surprising and instructive in SIP findings is the fact that many goods that were reported as scarce in state retail outlets were nonetheless consumed with high frequency (Table 2). Meat, for example, was reported as "usually" scarce by over 80 percent of the SIP samples, but 62 percent of the G1 respondents claimed that they ate meat every day. Some 91 percent said that they ate meat at least several times per week, and about 8 percent reported that
they ate meat only several times a month or less. Similarly high weekly consumption rates were reported for cheese, kefir, milk and eggs. Scarcity of commodities and services in the Soviet Union do not necessarily mean, therefore, that people are doing without or that they are consuming less than consumers in other countries. Scarcity is the result of two intersecting vectors. First, prices on many consumer goods have been set at levels well below market clearing levels. Thus demand is constantly in excess of supply, and prices have not been free to rise toward equilibrium levels. Second, Soviet consumers are obliged to obtain significant portions of these "scarce" goods outside the official state retail network, either in legal private markets or by illegal or quasi-legal means at much higher prices. These private sources siphon off goods from the official retail distribution system, thereby transferring the "rents" consumers would have gained due to subsidized prices to (illegal) private entrepreneurs or to members of one's kinship or friendship network.

Historically, the state and party have created special distribution systems to reward membership and orthodoxy. In a society in which the good things of life may be obtained only through queuing, allowing selected individuals and organizations to "jump the queue" can be a powerful incentive. Special distribution of food products, of quality goods, of imported luxuries by place of work or for
designated economic or political status is therefore another drain on the official state retail network.\textsuperscript{14}

In general, the dissatisfaction SIP (and GSIP) consumers felt about the availability of goods did not arise from malnutrition or serious deprivation but instead from frustration with the system of production and distribution as a whole, frustration rooted largely in thwarted expectations. In fact, better-off consumers were the most dissatisfied. Contrary to what has been believed in the West, however, the dissatisfaction of higher-income respondents did not stem from an inability to spend their income, for they did not have higher rates of personal saving than their lower-income, less dissatisfied compatriots. Dissatisfaction stemmed instead mainly from an inability to purchase the assortment they preferred for their market baskets and from high prices in private markets.\textsuperscript{15} The highly-dissatisfied, better-off Soviet citizen is portrayed in SIP data as one who stole a disproportionate amount of working-day time for purposes of personal shopping and who also had to spend disproportionately on both legal and illegal private markets at higher prices.

Other things equal, buying goods and services in the Soviet Union requires a time as well as a money budget. Those with more time than money benefit differentially from the fact that the best items require queuing. Those with proportionally more money than time, which means
predominantly the better off, are forced (in the absence of privileged access to special distribution rights) into private markets where prices are higher if they are to validate their incomes. Consequently, as SIP respondents made clear, the better-off respondents did not prefer shopping in private markets when they were living in the Soviet Union. And almost no one thought that a proper solution would have been to raise prices in official state retail stores. The problem of shortages was seen as a production problem, not a distribution problem. That is, an overwhelming number of SIP respondents saw the problem not as one of underpricing but one of underproduction. The high prices they were obliged to pay in private markets were seen as gouging by the peasantry and by speculators, which was true in one sense, but the tens of billions of rubles the state has been paying out as subsidies belies the notion that underproduction is the main problem.16

In any case, SIP respondents generally believed that supply conditions had deteriorated over their LNPs, that is, during the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Current reports from the Soviet Union indicate that this trend toward increasing shortages is worsening, and that the number of "empty stores" is increasing. The uncertainties being generated by Gorbachev's political and economic reforms are aggravating a chronic problem of the Soviet economy.

The Soviet economy operates as a sellers' market at all
times. What this means is that the burden of consummating economic transactions falls upon the buyer, who must locate, evaluate, queue up for and transport the goods himself. The buyer operates, whether as an individual or as the manager or purchasing agent for an enterprise, in a climate of "scarcity mindedness." Thus, the buyer is obliged to carry inventories of scarce goods, and the costs associated with inventories, because the buyer cannot be assured that the goods will be available when the need for them arises sometime in the future. Even goods that are not actually scarce, for which the supply produced covers total demand, are often sold in "empty stores" because of breakdowns in the distribution system and inadequate incentives to sellers to correct deficiencies. In times of uncertainty, buyer inventory behavior quickly degenerates into hoarding, and empty stores proliferate. As soon as goods arrive, they are cleaned from the shelves.

As uncertainty and shortages grow, so too do the benefits of jumping the queue. Special distributions, illegal and legal middleman activities, and "connections" become increasingly important channels for the distribution and receipt of goods. Thus the state retail network becomes a sieve. The goods pouring into the top of the funnel not only contract, but the quantities that leak out before reaching the ultimate retail outlets increase too. In the end, the state retail network could collapse completely, and it
already has for many highly desirable goods, such as caviar, sturgeon, quality cheese and many meats.  

Reviewing sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the close of the Brezhnev era as revealed by SIP, a clear pattern emerges. Individuals in their roles as suppliers generally reported satisfaction. Workers as employees were relatively satisfied too. Low productivity, insensitivity to the trading partner, and low quality work yield few or no costs to sellers. Managers pat themselves on the back for meeting quantitative targets and for ensuring bonuses for their staff and workers. Even the economic bureaucrats who staff the state committees that set targets and prices and the like and those who supervise enterprise production bear few costs of the sellers' market. Buyers, on the other hand, bear these costs. They queue for scarce commodities, accept shoddy goods rather than nothing at all, spend enormous time scouting for sources of supply, and feel they have been gouged when the goods are only available privately at market prices.

Glasnost and perestroika have not created these problems, but they have undoubtedly enhanced them because of increased uncertainty and greater public exposure of the outcomes. Clumsy, partial economic reforms at the outset of perestroika contributed also. Soviet economic enterprises took advantage of reforms increasing managerial discretion to increase their monopoly power. The problems created by a
sellers' market obviously cannot be corrected by increasing the powers of the monopolies.

The evidence of SIP reveals that the Soviet population was becoming more receptive to economic and political reform during the last years of Brezhnev and the early 1980s. As indicated above, SIP respondents also believed that the economic situation was deteriorating during these years. This perception may not in fact have been the case. It may instead have been a matter of a slowing economic performance colliding with rising expectations, but what matters in any event is the perception. Attitudes changed in these years also because of major demographic changes in Soviet society.

The most significant demographic discovery of SIP is the strength and pervasiveness of generational differences in Soviet society on the eve of the Gorbachev era. Older respondents reported themselves as more satisfied or less dissatisfied on every measure, and this was true for almost any pair of age-differentiated segments. The older generations represented therefore a conservative force in Soviet society, but one that is declining in force over time, because the evidence suggests that the differences SIP discovered among generations are not merely life-cycle effects. The SIP results contrast sharply with the findings of the Harvard Refugee Project of the early 1950s, where it was the young who reported greater relative satisfaction with their lives as Soviet citizens and the
older respondents who were less accepting of the new society. In fact, the older SIP respondents prove to have been more satisfied as youths than today's youth. This is supported, for example, by the fact that when asked about brushes with the law and about participation in unconventional activities, members of older generations report such activities, if at all, as having occurred relatively recently in their lives. The postwar and post-Stalin generations differ significantly from earlier generations in degree of participation both in conventional public affairs and in unconventional activity. The generational differences are rooted, apparently, in different life experiences, not merely in a cyclical life style pattern driven by chronological age.

The dissatisfaction of younger generations with the economic, political and cultural stagnation of the late Brezhnev years is apparently offset for many senior members of Soviet society by still vivid memories of the costs of industrialization, the purges, WWII and postwar reconstruction, and of Stalinism in general. The very substantial gains that have been made since Stalin perhaps made these older citizens more tolerant of the slowing pace of improvement in the quality of life at the close of the Brezhnev years.

There is considerable evidence for this interpretation. Respondents were asked in SIP G1 a series of questions that required them to compare the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev
These questions sought to elicit, for example, under which leader censorship was the most intrusive, and when the least. Similar questions were asked about economic inequality and privilege, nationality policy and the role of the KGB. If one divides SIP respondents into those who were born in 1940 or earlier (the Stalin generation) and those born in 1941 or afterwards (the post-Stalin generation), one finds that a majority of the older group rated the Khrushchev era as the best and Stalin's as the worst. The younger group agreed that Khrushchev's era represented a kind of golden age, but they voted Brezhnev's as the worst in most cases. Those who reached political consciousness after Stalin's death look upon Soviet society differently than do those who remember his rule. The failure of the younger respondents to censure Stalin no doubt reflects something about the teaching, or perhaps the non-teaching, of history in the Soviet Union even after Stalin died. But there is also evidence that Brezhnev's salience with this group reflected the crushing by the "era of stagnation" of the hopes and expectations of "the children of the 20th Party Congress." 22

A second significant cleavage discovered by SIP to exist in the late and post-Brezhnev period stems from educational differences. The higher the educational attainment, the more likely the respondent was to express dissatisfaction with housing, standard of living, job, medical care or other
aspects of Soviet society. The less well-educated were less dissatisfied even with the availability of goods, and these differences persist when other differences, such as age, and region of origin are controlled. Once again, this finding contrasts with the HRP, which found that those who had advanced their educational attainments under Soviet power tended to have been the more satisfied and the more accepting of basic Soviet institutions such as public ownership of industry, restrictions on the right to strike, and so forth. The apparent success of the Stalinist regime in inculcating regime values in the younger generations led many to conclude that education (ideological brainwashing) was a source of long-term stability in the USSR.

SIP results show just the opposite for the effect of education upon regime support in the 1970s and early 1980s. If one controls for material compensation, the relationship between increases in educational attainment and decreases in regime support and in relative satisfaction with life in the SIP samples is uniformly negative, even at the lowest levels of educational attainment. Unlike the population studied by the HRP, SIP respondents reacted to increases in education as would be expected elsewhere: the better educated at each level of education were more likely to question regime values and its policies. Moreover, the negative effect of education generally outweighed the positive effects of higher material rewards, which usually accompany higher educational
Thus, the enormous Soviet investment in the education of its population was in fact corroding support for regime values and satisfaction with the quality of Soviet life among even the foremost beneficiaries of the system.

The influence of education reinforces that of generation, of course, because the young tend to be the better educated on average. Two powerful forces were operating during the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, to create fertile soil for reform. Interviews with important members of the Soviet reform movement have been published recently, and they reinforce this dimension of SIP findings. The leadership itself experienced a generational transition following Brezhnev's death, and the new, younger generation of leaders is much better educated too. Gorbachev's supporting cast again and again refer to their efforts during the period of "stagnation" to design and discuss political and economic reforms, which were filed away for future reference. And most of them stress the continuity of their efforts with the Khrushchev era. In fact, many accept the label as "children of the 20th Party Congress," children who became orphans during Brezhnev's retrenchment on anti-Stalinism. Thus, when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the mantle of General Secretary CPSU, Soviet society was ripe for reform, and reform was on the agenda of the mid-elites and intelligentsia as well.
The SIP surveys could not have anticipated Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika, and we do not know therefore how the population would have responded ex ante to them as reform proposals. The SIP questionnaires did, however, probe respondents about the kind of changes they would like to have seen in Soviet society. They were asked a completely open-ended question:

"Think for a moment about the Soviet system with its good and bad points. Suppose you could create a system of government in the Soviet Union that is different from the one which currently exists. What things would you want to keep in a new one?"

Although 20 percent stated that they would "keep nothing," most respondents listed as many as three things (only three answers were coded per respondent) they felt were worth preserving (Table 3, Panel A). Health care, free public education (through college), safe streets, job security and inexpensive housing topped the list. Note that each of these features of the Soviet system is classifiable as a welfare entitlement. All are provided free to the individual regardless of income. Just as in the case of subsidized consumer products, Soviet citizens recognize the benefits they receive from these entitlements, and they want to retain them. At the same time, they are critical of the logical
consequences of such broad-guaged entitlements: the need to queue, a tendency for quality to deteriorate and the stimulus they give to corruption, nepotism, and illegal petty middleman activity (spekulatsiia).

SIP respondents were also asked: "What things would you be sure to change?" (Panel B). Note that approximately 72% proposed changes in the economic system, specifically abolition of the collective farms and permitting the existence of private enterprise. Less than 10% proposed abolishing central planning! Most of the recommendations for change pertained to politics and to civil liberties, with some 40% percent calling for a change in the political system and another almost 17 percent for abolition of the one-party system. The abolition of controls over free speech and the protection of individual rights were mentioned by more than 50% percent.

The picture that SIP results permit us to draw of the sources of support and alienation within the urban population of the USSR at the close of the Brezhnev era is mixed with respect to the reforms that Gorbachev has implemented, or proposes to implement. Pre-Gorbachev opinion was much more consistent with the political and civil reforms he has introduced than with the economic reforms he proposes.

Let me stress at this point that the SIP sample populations were by no means radical in their behavior or attitudes while resident in the USSR. According to one
classification of the G1 sample,\textsuperscript{26} over one-half of the respondents (1401) qualified as "non-critical passives," for they reported themselves to have had neither thoughts nor overt acts of any sort that might have been construed as hostile to the regime during their LNP lives in the Soviet Union. "Critical passives" numbered 718 (or 26 percent of the sample), and they were defined as persons who held critical views of the regime and/or system, but who had not expressed criticism in even the mildest form, such as through participation in an unofficial study group. Only 16 percent of the sample (445) had been both critical and activist in any degree during their LNPs, and, of these, less than one percent might be considered active enough to have been labelled "dissident." Recall that these are individuals who elected to leave the Soviet Union and represent, if anything, a potentially more critical group than a random sample would have generated in the Soviet Union. The implication is, therefore, that the Soviet population is reformist, not revolutionary. And this conclusion is reinforced, of course, by the fact that this group was positive about a number of features of the Soviet social and economic system.

Reviewing the findings discussed above, and projecting it to a significant segment of Soviet society on the eve of Gorbachev's reforms, it is not surprising that the essentially political reforms associated with glasnost have made greater headway than the predominantly economic reforms

\textsuperscript{26}
associated with the policy of perestroika. Attitudes toward economic reform were much more mixed than those regarding democratization, openness and the new thinking. Given the SIP findings, the belief many have today that things were not so bad economically during the period of stagnation has considerable foundation. The resistance to free markets is clearly based also on appreciation for the welfare entitlements that may be lost or reduced. Although the population is critical of the failures of the Soviet economy, notably shortages, low quality goods and poor treatment by suppliers, it is unprepared to accept higher prices, job insecurity, or loss of welfare entitlements. It is clear that economic reforms will involve a redistribution of income, wealth and privilege that could hurt many.

The political reforms have been welcomed by a wide segment of Soviet society. Political reforms and the expansion of civil liberties have involved a redistribution of power from the few to the many, and it has occasioned less popular resistance for that reason. Also, although it was apparently not Gorbachev's intention, political reform has seriously undermined the CPSU, partly because segments of the party resisted reform, but also because the party had already suffered a severe loss of legitimacy before reforms began.

SIP respondents were asked to evaluate the competence and the honesty of a list of people in charge of major institutions of Soviet society (Table 4). The list included a
member of the Academy of Sciences, a colonel in the KGB, the manager of an industrial plant and a local party official. Sixty-six percent of SIP respondents agreed that "almost all" or "most" of the people in charge of the Academy of Sciences were competent. KGB officers were ranked as competent by 57 percent and the industrial manager came in at 49 percent. The local party official, however, was regarded as competent by only 29 percent of SIP respondents. The ranking on the honesty dimension was generally worse for all, ranging from 35% for the Academy of Sciences to 13 percent for the local party official. Many former Soviet citizens have described life before glasnost in the USSR as a life of lies. Obviously, even the Academy of Sciences did not escape this behavior according to SIP results.

The SIP questionnaire also sought to evaluate the role of the party as a functional unit in the economy. Respondents were asked whether the representative of the party in the enterprise in which they worked functioned to make things better, worse, or had no effect. Thirty one percent said "better," and 78 percent said either "worse" or "had no effect." A similar question on the Civilian-Military Survey, but referring in this case to the functioning of the military unit to which the individual belonged, yielded a 50-50 split between the two categories.27

A separate section of the questionnaire asked about the experiences of citizens who had contacted party officials
seeking assistance with personal, employment or other problems. In 50 percent of the cases the party official did not deign to respond at all in any way, and in only 20 percent of the cases was there a satisfactory outcome to the request.28

SIP respondents were also asked to evaluate various social groupings with respect to the "good things" of life they received and those they "deserved." The first secretary of the party was at the top of the list of those who received more than they deserved. Professors, collective farmers and medical doctors were among the most deprived of deserved goods things of life.29

When asked whether they would have advised a friend to join the CPSU, seventy-five percent said no and most gave a moral or political reason for not doing so. Of the 15 percent who said they would so advise a friend, 88 percent justified doing so on grounds of career advancement and material gain for the friend.30

These responses make it clear that the party had lost legitimacy before Gorbachev initiated political reforms. An organization that fails to respond to citizen requests, that is believed in any case to have little positive effect in enterprises, that is composed of careerists who are regarded as neither competent nor honest and who also earn more than their fair share of the good things of life, is clearly without legitimacy. The party has not been very helpful in
the reform movement either. It is not surprising, therefore, that glasnost and democratization have been welcomed generally outside the party and that political reforms have affected the party negatively.

Prospects for Economic Reform

The political reforms associated with Mikhail Gorbachev have been astonishingly successful measured by almost any standard other than the party's. Certainly the political and civil libertarian changes SIP respondents dreamed of in the early 1980s have been completely implemented, and the process continues. In many respects, of course, Gorbachev has opened a Pandora's Box, and good as well as unwelcome spirits have been released into the body politic. Uncertainty about future developments is a source of concern and dismay, but a return to the Stalinist past is no longer conceivable. The party no longer has either the will or the capacity to "mobilize" the population for such an end. It is very possible, in fact, that the party cannot be salvaged, that the "party is over," because it will be extremely difficult for it to regain legitimacy.

Prospects for successful economic reform are far more uncertain. The formal reforms to date have either failed altogether, almost before attempted implementation, or they have made things worse.31 As of this writing, agreement has
not been reached on the extent and nature of economic reforms. Disagreement centers in large part upon reform strategy, whether to leap into a comprehensive radical transition to some kind of mixed market economy, or whether instead to move forward step by step gradually. Thus far, popular attitudes toward reform in the USSR reveal the same ambiguities and contradictions found among SIP respondents. Soviet citizens are worried about losing the few advantages they have under the current system, and they are unpersuaded that the reformed economy will make them better off.

Today's fears and uncertainties have been revealed in surveys that have been conducted in the Soviet Union in recent years. Although these surveys leave much to be desired professionally with respect to coverage, methodology and expertise, they display a degree of consistency that compels attention.

An attempt has been made in the Soviet Union in recent years, for example, to ascertain how perestroika has affected perceptions of standard of living. Recall that 60 percent of SIP G1 respondents and 64% of G2 respondents reported that they were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their standard of living while living in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Table 1). A New York Times/CBS survey (N=939) conducted by telephone in May 1988, in Moscow only, [by the Institute of Sociology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ISAN)] asked: Has the material wealth of
your family improved, worsened or remained the same over the past three (3) years? Thirty-three percent claimed an improvement, and 53 percent reported no change, for a grand total of 86 percent for the two categories taken together (Table 5, Panel A). Only 12 percent said that their personal situation had worsened. When asked what their attitudes were towards perestroika, 73 percent said "strongly support," and another 23 percent chose "support with reservations," which would appear to be a ringing endorsement. These findings were consistent with an ongoing panel survey of 11,000 respondents, also conducted by ISAN, in the years 1987-88, and reported in the Soviet press in August 1988, where over 80 percent reported a positive attitude toward perestroika. Significantly, perhaps, support declined from 86.4 to 80.6 percent between 1987 and 1988.

A telephone survey (N=1000) conducted by Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Market Opinion Research and ISAN, in Moscow (only) in December, 1988, asked: What kind of impact has perestroika had on your personal financial situation the last three years? Thirty percent reported a "positive impact" and 51 percent "no impact," for a grand total of 81 percent who perceived themselves as better off, or at least no worse off, than before perestroika began (Table 5, Panel B). The proportion that claimed it was worse off, 17 percent, was the highest negative total to date, portending a decline in support for perestroika in the future. Even so, Gorbachev was
given an overwhelming approval rating of 91 percent, and
perestroika was favored "strongly" by 70 percent and "with
reservations" by another 23 percent.

The National Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM)
conducted a telephone poll (N=943) in Moscow (only) in
January, 1989, among predominantly blue-collar workers. They
were asked "Has your standard of living changed in the last
three years?" Forty-nine percent said "no," and 23 percent
said that it had improved, for a total of 72 percent. About
15 percent said that they were worse off (Table 5, Panel C).

Time magazine commissioned the Institute of Sociology
(ISAN) to conduct a wide-ranging survey by telephone, in
Moscow only, March 6-14, 1989 (N=1005). To the question:
"How has your material life changed during the past three
years, that is, since perestroika was begun?", 70 percent
reported that it had either improved (23%) or had not
changed. Twenty-five percent said that they were worse off
materially, which suggests an increase in this category from
January (Table 5, Panel D). The Time survey also asked how
well people felt that perestroika was progressing, and 76
percent felt that the policy was experiencing major or severe
difficulties, which seemed a rather ominous sign. Moreover,
63 percent of the respondents believed that opposition to
perestroika would grow as it unfolded.

A poll (N=?) conducted for the popular Soviet magazine
Ogonyek by VTSIOM in September 1989, was considered so
pessimistic by Gorbachev that he berated the editors in print. 32 To the question: "How has your standard of living changed over the past 2-3 years?", 23 percent reported an improvement, 52 percent said it had not changed, and 23 percent said it had gotten worse. Thus, the number who were either better off or no worse off was 75 percent, suggesting only a modest change since the beginning of the year.

Another major poll conducted in October, 1989, by VTSIOM for Gorbachev's then chief economic advisor, Leonid Abalkin (in advance of a meeting of economists to discuss economic reform with Gorbachev), surveyed respondents in sixteen Soviet cities (eight in the RSFSR, eight in various republics) (N=1148). The survey was unusually comprehensive in coverage and professional in conduct. To the question: "How has the material well-being of your own family changed over the past two to three years?", 70 percent reported either "no change" (47%) or an improvement, but only 2 percent reported a "significant improvement." Twenty-eight percent claimed that they were worse off, with 11 percent "significantly worse off" (Table 5, Panel E). These numbers are not strikingly different from those yielded by earlier surveys, but they do imply slippage in self-perceptions of well-being and a sense of gradual deterioration in the family's situation.

More striking was the sense of pessimism captured by several other questions in this survey. Although as indicated
above, 70 percent felt that they were, at the least, not worse off personally since perestroika began, a total of 75 percent of respondents judged that "the economic situation in general" had changed either "significantly" or "slightly" for the worse, and another 6 percent saw no change. In other words, Soviet citizens viewed the general economic situation as deteriorating to a much greater degree than their own personal fortunes, which suggests widespread pessimism. In fact, to a direct question, 57 percent said that they do not "feel confidence in tomorrow," and 42 percent thought that their grandchildren would live no better and possibly worse than they themselves live now.

Of particularly interest were the responses to the question: "Do you think the country's leadership has a well thought-out program of action to improve the economy?" Seventeen percent said "yes," and 39 percent believed that the leaders have only "the most general ideas of what is to be done under current conditions." Nineteen percent, however, said that the "leadership has no program at all. Decisions are made on the spur of the moment." The fact that the reforms announced by Nikolai Ryzhkov in December 1989, were never implemented has underlined this evaluation, as was the confusion and quick termination of a revised plan put forward in the spring of 1990 calling for a sharp rise in food prices in summer 1990.

President Mikhail Gorbachev explicitly rejected a
radical, swift transition to a market-type economy following a two-day cabinet meeting in April 1990, labelling those calling for "shock therapy" "irresponsible," and Soviet economists have split into several factions urging different policies. It was fair at that time to say, that the "leadership has no program at all."

Conclusion: 600 Days and Counting

One of the striking differences one notes between Stalin and his "revolution from above" of the 1930s and Gorbachev's reforms is the absence of ideological dogmatism and cant in Gorbachev's approach and his amazing willingness also to experiment, to revise and to extemporize. There is no question but that, like Stalin, Gorbachev is a superb politician and a great tactician. Unlike Stalin, however, Gorbachev has been seeking consensus on both the political and the economic reforms he has introduced. Thus, although Gorbachev has been the catalyst for reform, the one who actually lifted the lid on Pandora's Box, he has skillfully managed rather than directed developments from above. As has been shown above, there were powerful demographic forces operating within Soviet society to foster change, and the leadership was in transition as well, with the frustrated "children of the 20th Party Congress" waiting through the Brezhnev stagnation in hopes of a continuation of
Khrushchev's initiatives.

It is clear, however, that democratic political reforms and the creation of a civil society with guarantees of individual liberties have made the most progress. By contrast, economic reform has been without clear direction, fitful and highly controversial. The main reason for that is, as we have seen, the absence of a consensus on what should be done. Gradually the goals of economic reform are, however, being formulated. The decision has essentially been made to create a modern centrally-managed market economy, but disagreement remains about how quickly the transition can or should be made. The principal issue is not economic, but political. What rate of change will the people stand for? The ethic fragmentation of the USSR has complicated economic reform as well, for this has made it necessary to deal with perceptions of ethnic inequities as well as with individual differentiation.

The population is understandably cautious. They sense, correctly I believe, that the economic advisors to President Gorbachev do not really know how to get from the here-and-now economy to the new one. Many new economic institutions must be created before a modern centrally-managed, mixed market economy can be expected to function satisfactorily in the Soviet Union. These include a true central bank, a modern fiscal system, Western-style labor unions and labor arbitration agencies, unemployment insurance, private
property, a convertible currency and much, much more. Soviet citizens are understandably leery of the impatience of many of Gorbachev's economic advisors, and so, thus far, has been Gorbachev.

Prospects for successful economic reform therefore remain quite remote, although the direction of change is unlikely to be altered. Talk of price reforms is readily translated by the population as price increases. Talk of monetary reforms is read as confiscation of personal savings. Loose talk about "shock therapy" for the economy is destabilizing because it feeds the already rampant popular uncertainty about the future. Economies do not respond well to surges of popular uncertainty. Meanwhile, each Soviet household clings to the system it knows and has learned to work to its own benefit.

When asked to specify the "most difficult" problems they faced in a survey by the VTSIOM in March 1989, households (N = 1425) put "low incomes and high prices" number one. Number two was the "production of goods in inadequate amounts and of poor quality." The contradiction is patent. Raising prices radically will push many Soviet families over the edge from near poverty and drive the already poor deeper into misery. According to SIP figures, 22 percent received less than 70 rubles per person per month in 1979, and this was the unofficial poverty line at the time. According to recent official Soviet figures, in 1988 almost 13 percent of the
population had an average monthly income per family member of 75 rubles or less, where 75 rubles was the official poverty line. That amounted to about 36 million persons. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the proposal to leap directly into a mixed market economy at the March, 1990 cabinet meeting was rejected by Gorbachev:

"They want to take a gamble," he said. "Let everything be thrown open tomorrow, let market conditions be put in place everywhere. Let's have free enterprise and give the green light to all forms of ownership. Let everything be private. Let us sell the land, everything. I cannot support such ideas, no matter how decisive and revolutionary they might appear. These are irresponsible ideas, irresponsible."

The elites resist change too for less wholesome reasons than the poor and near poor. They have privileges to loose. But so too do many individual citizens who are not usually thought of as members of the elite. Special distributions and good connections are pervasive in Soviet society. What rational being would voluntarily surrender these advantages without an assurance of equal or better treatment after reform? And what about the "welfare entitlements," such as job security, free public health and education, subsidized housing and food? These have been among the recognized accomplishments of the Soviet socialist economy, and they have formed the economic foundation for the social contract
between the state and the individual. Will they be lost in the transition?

The economic problem Stalin faced was formulated as a dilemma. Successful economic development would require taxing the peasantry, and it was believed as an article of faith, however, that the peasantry would not stand for it. The problem Gorbachev's policy of perestroika faces is also being formulated as a dilemma. The creation of an open, modern, market-oriented mixed economy will require economic sacrifices by a large proportion of the population. Higher prices and housing rents, unemployment, a reduced standard of living, and greater economic insecurity generally are anticipated in the short run at the very least. It is argued by many of Gorbachev's advisors that the population will not stand voluntarily for the necessary reforms. As we have seen, others are therefore arguing in favor of radical reform imposed by fiat in the shortest possible time. This is what is meant by the term "shock treatment." Thus the old argument for the "primacy" of economic reform over political reform has reared its ugly head again today in the USSR by impatient economists. A maxim popular with economic advisors in the USSR is: "One cannot leap over a chasm in two jumps," with the implication that the chasm must be crossed in one jump. Wisdom suggests, where the risk of failure is high and the cost enormous, building a bridge.

The so-called Shatalin plan for a 500 day transition
to a market-oriented economy could serve as a bridge so long as no one takes the time limit seriously. The plan has a number of virtues that previous "rapid transition" plans have not. First, the plan calls for a "non-ideological economy," one in which all forms of property ownership, public, private, cooperative, collective, joint-stock, etc., are equal before the law. Second, the plan calls for a transition that is "not dictatorial," that is, one that creates rules and stages but that does not attempt to spell out all details or to seek all-union uniformity in its implementation. Thus, the various republic would be free to vary the timing as well as the proportions with which plan targets are met. Third, the Shatalin plan is designed to retain the main institutions of the social security network. Finally, and critical, the plan is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union will become a federal state, where all republics are equal and where the economic powers not expressly delegated by the republics to the central government remain with the republics. Thus, if implemented, the USSR would become a free economic union of sovereign states in which fiscal and monetary policies would be coordinated only to the extent to which the various republics agree. This last feature is the reason why the Shatalin plan cannot be combined with the Ryzhkov approach. The two documents make contradictory assumptions about the fundamental (constitutional) relationship between the
republics and the all-union government.

Although Gorbachev has been unwilling to accede to this principle of republican sovereignty, there seems to be no alternative basis to secure popular support for reform. Ultimately, therefore, some variant of the Shatalin plan seems likely to be adopted. It cannot be implemented, of course, in 500 days, and the extent to which privatization is promised (85%) may never be achieved. As SIP and recent Soviet surveys make clear, the Soviet population is wary of large-scale private enterprise and prizes its welfare entitlements. Nonetheless, the free market direction of change embodied in the Shatalin plan, its predication upon a "free union" of sovereign republics, and its concern to maintain essential welfare entitlements make the plan the most workable and likely alternative.

James R. Millar
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The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies
The George Washington University
**TABLE 1: Self-Assessed Satisfaction SIP General Surveys**

### Panel A: G1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LNP - 1979</th>
<th>How satisfied were you with:</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Health Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>N = 310</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 11.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Satisfied</td>
<td>N = 1343</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 48.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Dissatisfied</td>
<td>N = 694</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 25.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Dissatisfied</td>
<td>N = 403</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 14.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N = 2750</td>
<td>2770</td>
<td>2738</td>
<td>2238</td>
<td>2680</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Values</td>
<td>N = 43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: SIP General Survey Codebook. Release 3.1. Revised 9/25/87*

### Panel B: G2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LNP - 1983</th>
<th>How satisfied were you with:</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Health Care</th>
<th>Life as a Whole*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>N = 64</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 11.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Satisfied</td>
<td>N = 298</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 52.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Dissatisfied</td>
<td>N = 139</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 24.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Dissatisfied</td>
<td>N = 64</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 11.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N = 565</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Values</td>
<td>N = 7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question not asked in G1 questionnaire*

*Source: SIP G2 General Survey Codebook Freq. Revised 10/12/87*
TABLE 2: Dietary Frequencies: Meat, Cheese, Kefir, Milk, and Eggs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency:</th>
<th>How often did you eat/drink:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>Cheese</td>
<td>Kefir</td>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>Eggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>N = 575</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 62.4</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times per week</td>
<td>N = 265</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 28.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times per month</td>
<td>N = 16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>N = 56</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 6.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>N = 918</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Values</td>
<td>N = 4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% = 0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N = 922</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIP General Survey Codebook. Release 3.1 Revised 12/6/85
TABLE 3: What things would you keep in new system from the old?

Panel A:

"Think for a moment about the Soviet system with its good and bad points. Suppose you could create a system of government in the Soviet Union that is different from the one which currently exists. What things in the present Soviet system would you want to keep in the new one?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Answer</th>
<th>2d Answer</th>
<th>3rd Answer*</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Public Education</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Control *</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Security</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inexpensive Housing</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep Nothing</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: What things would you be sure to change?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Answer</th>
<th>2d Answer</th>
<th>3rd Answer</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Private Enterprise</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Speech</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective-Farm System</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforce Rights</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Party System</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Planning</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Passports</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Up to three volunteered answers were coded for each respondent.

Source: SIP General Survey Codebook. Release 3.1. (G1 only)
TABLE 4: SIP G1 Rating of Leaders of Institutions for Competence and Honesty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost All</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Any</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Honesty/Integrity**

| Almost All| 6.9%       | 4.6%        | 4.2%        | 4.4%        | 5.0%       | 10.3%    | 13.2%| 6.1% |
| Most      | 9.0%       | 8.9%        | 10.4%       | 7.9%        | 17.6%      | 24.7%    | 22.5%| 7.5% |
| Some      | 25.5%      | 34.3%       | 41.8%       | 35.1%       | 50.1%      | 46.5%    | 41.7%| 24.6%|
| Hardly Any| 18.2%      | 22.2%       | 23.4%       | 24.9%       | 14.5%      | 8.4%     | 10.9%| 19.2%|
| None      | 40.5%      | 30.0%       | 20.2%       | 27.7%       | 12.8%      | 10.0%    | 11.8%| 42.7%|

**The questions:**

*Here is a list of some institutions that exist in the Soviet Union. I would like you to think about how many of the people in charge of each of them you felt were honest during your last normal period [of life in the USSR]. For each one, circle the number under the category that best describes how many of the people in charge were honest.*

*Now turn the page over. On this side, think about how many of the people in charge at each of these institutions were competent, that is, did their jobs well. Remember, try to think about how you felt during your last normal period.* [Same response categories and order of institutions as in the "honesty" question]

Source: SIP Codebook. Release 3.1. (G1 only)
TABLE 5: Recent Soviet Polls

Panel A: May 1988

"How has the material wealth of your family changed over the past three years?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsened</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (volunteered)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK/NA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 939)


Panel B: December 1988

"Would you guess that perestroika had a positive impact, no real impact, or a negative impact on your personal financial situation during the last three years?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive impact</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No real impact</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative impact</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished manuscript: Project Understanding, Marttila & Kiley, Inc. (Boston, Ma., December, 1988). See also Scott Shane, The Sun (January 29, 1989).

Panel C: January 1989

"Has your standard of living changed in the last three years?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, for better</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, for worse</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 943)

TABLE 5: Recent Soviet Polls (Continued)

Panel D: March 1989

"How has your material life changed during the past three years, that is, since perestroika was begun?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It has improved</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It hasn't changed</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has got worse</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 1005)


Panel E: October 1989

"How has the general material well-being of your family changed in the last two to three years?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved significantly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved slightly</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly worse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significantly worse</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 1,148)

Endnotes


2. The principal survey houses have been discussed and rated by Vladimir Shlapentokh in an unpublished manuscript "Soviet Public Opinion in the First Half of 1989: A Sudden Upsurge of Democratic Views in Comparison with 1988," (no date), 49 pp. He quite correctly ranks TSIOM as the best (but still inferior to international standards) and ISAN as next, with others a step below, including those employed by the various mass media.


5. See Millar, "History, method, and the problem of bias," pp. 3-10, for a more extensive description of these special projects.


16. Ibid.


22. The phrase "children of the 20th Party Congress" was attributed to I.T. Frolov, then assistant to CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev in an interview with Paolo Garimberti for the Rome La Republica in April 1989, translated and telexed by FBIS as an open document, p. 0017. Frolov subsequently became editor of Pravda. Reference is to Nikita Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU.


27. Bahry and Silver, "Public Perceptions and the Dilemma of Party Reform in the USSR," Table 3 (no page number).

28. Ibid, Table 2.


30. Bahry and Silver, "Public Perceptions and the Dilemma of Party Reform in the USSR, Table 5 (no page number).


