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International Security Institutions
and Russian-German Relations

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Executive Summary

(This paper is Part II in a series. Part I, entitled, "Russian Interests and Russian-German Relations," was distributed by the Council on April 7, 1993)

My project is a study of security relations between Germany and the former-Soviet Union. The central question is whether the end of the Cold War will bring a return to classic European competitive power balancing as the main instrument that German and post-Soviet leaderships use for security, or whether the existence of international and European institutions plays a role in national security strategies. This report is based on interviews with officials and experts in Moscow, and covers my findings on the role of security institutions in Russian strategies for dealing with German and Russian security issues more broadly.

My interviews revealed that even cooperation-oriented civilian officials do not discount NATO as a military threat. Officials and scholars told me that the military staffs and forces of NATO remain a problem for Russian security strategy, because as long as NATO as a military establishment exists, it has to be dealt with on a military level. However, while on an operational level NATO is still treated as a primary threat, it is not seen as a threat on a political level. In terms of what I would call an "intention assessment", Russian leaders and security specialists are relatively confident that the leaders of the NATO member states do not have aggressive intentions toward Russia, and therefore concrete NATO capacity is not an immediate or highly salient threat. I found relatively strong and general support for the view that the main reason why NATO was not an active threat to Russia was because it is on its way out.

There are certain conditions for this sanguine view of NATO. First, NATO membership must not be extended to the former Warsaw Pact countries, including of course any republics of the former Soviet Union. Second, any NATO peacekeeping operations must be carried out under the CSCE because it gives the appropriate "legal" and international cast to NATO, and of course it gives the Russian Federation a vote (if not quite veto power) over any such operations, since Russia is a member of the CSCE, but not of NATO. Finally, the third condition was that given the current political situation, under no circumstances (not
even under CSCE and/or UN auspices) could NATO peacekeeping forces be sent to the
territory of the former Soviet Union. The issue of NATO's form and future affects Russian
foreign policy in large measure by affecting Russian politics, that is, by affecting the balance
of conservative and moderate support for the Yeltsin leadership's security strategies.
Therefore, many of the officials and scholars I interviewed were very concerned that NATO
not appear to exploit Russian weakness.

In the role of "intention assessment," NACC (the North Atlantic Cooperation Council)
has played a significant role. NATO remains an exclusive security alliance, designed to
protect its members collectively from external threat. NACC, on the other hand, creates a
broader membership base and establishes a legitimate right to participate in certain security
areas. It does not change the basic fact of NATO's purpose, but my interviews show that it
does seem to have served the intended purpose of reassuring at least some decisionmakers of
NATO's non-aggressive security approach.

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was designed to limit the capacity of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to conduct large scale offensive military operations in the heart
of Europe, and would seem to be unimportant with the end of the Cold War. Yet ratification
of the CFE Treaty was an important issue in 1992, because the treaty could serve certain
purposes which did remain important or which became important as a result of the break up
of the Soviet Union. For the Russian leadership, the CFE Treaty serves basically two
functions: it engages Russia in a multilateral security process, and it is an international
constraint on the former Soviet republics. In terms of the first function, the CFE Treaty is
valuable as evidence to the Russian public that Russia is disarming not because it is weak,
but because it is living up to mutual commitments that enhance Russian security by gaining
other countries' arms reductions as well. In terms of the second function, although Russian
officials do not want Western "interference" in Russian security affairs, they do want
Western participation in security affairs when that means pressuring the former Soviet
republics to abide by international commitments to reduce and/or limit arms. Russian
officials were much more interested in the value of the CFE Treaty and CFE1A negotiations
as a tool in their security relations with the other countries of the former Soviet Union. I
specifically asked several officials if the purpose of Russian commitment to the CFE treaty was to assure a constraint on the German Bundeswehr, and all told me that it was not.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was almost universally the preferred international security institution among Russian officials and scholars to mid-1992. Insofar as the primary foreign policy officials of the Yeltsin leadership see security as a "confidence problem", they tend to favor developing the CSCE as an instrument of Russian foreign policy, because it is multilateral and comprehensive in scope. The major accomplishment of the CSCE in early 1992 from the Russian government's point of view was simply incorporating the former Soviet Union into a "European" security institution. In addition, a major function of the CSCE from the Russian point of view is to create an incentive for the other former Soviet republics to observe international norms, such as respect for Russian minorities within their borders. However, while all officials with whom I spoke were at least not opposed to the role of the CSCE in post-Soviet security issues, not many believed that it would be in the immediate or short-term future very effective or efficient. The modal reasoning for Russian preference for the CSCE centers on two factors: it is relatively unformed and thus formable, and it is designed for "political security" rather than "military security."

As I argued in my previous report, Russia's security concerns with respect to Germany are of a somewhat non-traditional cast, because Russian leaders, politicians, and officials do not view German power or intentions as a threat to Russian security. In comparison to the political and military threats arising in the areas of the former Soviet Union that are now independent states, Germany looks more like a resource for Russian security than a threat. Rather than engaging in grand strategies of "balance of power," Russian officials in 1992 began to rely on policies and strategies that took into account the existing international security environment in Europe, which included a variety of security institutions, of which NATO/NACC, the CFE treaty and agreement, and the CSCE played the most important roles.
I. Introduction

My project is a study of security relations between Germany and the former-Soviet Union. The central question of my research is whether the end of the Cold War will bring a return to classic European competitive power balancing as the main instrument that German and post-Soviet leaderships use for security, or whether the existence of international and European institutions alters the strategies of these leaderships in such a way as to make more cooperative relations a more efficient instrument for national security. I will not elaborate these theories in this short report, and refer the Council instead to an article I wrote late last year on this subject, since published in Problems of Communism, which I have sent under separate cover.¹

Soviet-German relations are key to this question, I argue, because of the historic relationship between Germany and Russia and its role in power balances and conflict in Europe. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the potential for a return to classic (and unstable) power-balancing would appear to have increased because of the larger number of states in Europe (namely, the former Soviet republics), and because of their competitive relations. Thus, while the passing of the Soviet Union has changed my focus from Soviet-German relations to those of Russia and Ukraine with Germany, the analytical issues I raised have not changed and seem to have become even more important.

This report covers my findings on the role of security institutions in Russian-German relations, and follows my earlier report on basic interests and issues in those relations. Additional findings on economic institutions and Ukrainian-German relations will be reported to the Council in my forthcoming book manuscript.

II. NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a major part of the security problem for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and played a central role in the security policies of all Soviet leaderships. NATO posed several related problems for the Soviet regime: it was a substantial military alliance which could (depending on one’s viewpoint) threaten the Soviet

homeland, threaten Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, or thwart Soviet designs for influence in Western Europe; it was the framework in which West Germany was allowed to become a major military power; and it was a concrete extension of American power and influence across the Atlantic. Dealing with the problem NATO posed was central to Soviet military and political policy. Even at the end of the Cold War in 1989 and 1990, after Gorbachev had already conceded that the eastern European countries -- including the German Democratic Republic -- could shed their communist regimes and even leave the Warsaw Pact, the prospect of a unified Germany in NATO was for a time a major obstacle to agreement in the two-plus-four negotiations.²

So there were three basic issues for me to investigate regarding NATO in the context of my research on Russian-German relations after the Cold War: is NATO still seen as the or a primary security threat to Russia, is German membership in NATO seen as an indication of German threat to Russia, and does NATO play any constructive role in Russian security?

Traditional international relations approaches would lead us to expect that NATO would still pose a threat to Russia, that German membership in NATO would be seen as a threat, and that NATO could not play a constructive role in Russian security. Despite the happy outcome of German unification within the Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet government had first strongly resisted that option in 1990. A Russian Foreign Ministry (hereafter, RFM) official told me that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had been against an agreement that permitted Germany to remain in NATO, but that through the process of negotiations and given the specific provisions of the 2 + 4 talks, that outcome came to be seen as acceptable. Indeed, he said, by July 1990 the majority view in the Foreign Ministry was that "structures make the situation stable, institutions contribute to stability."¹ While my findings do not unequivocally refute any of these predictions and I would not with any confidence rule them out, I did find that the situation is quite a bit more complicated and interesting.


¹Interview 26. See end of this report for positions of interviews subjects and dates of interviews.
I do not have direct evidence from the Russian Defense Ministry (having been repeatedly denied interviews with professional soldiers responsible for NATO and/or Europe), but I certainly expect that contingency planning for armed conflict with NATO goes on today much as in the past. In June 1992, Voennaya mys'l (Military Thought) published a draft Russian military doctrine which planned for conflict with NATO, as well as with areas to Russia's south. In that sense, NATO's existence and still impressive capacity for military operations in Europe is certainly still seen as a threat to Russian security. I did interview a high-ranking officer responsible for ministry policy, who also tried but failed to arrange interviews for me with Defense Ministry officials responsible for NATO/NACC and the CFE treaty -- he was told that this was impossible because these matters were "state secrets." 

I do have indirect evidence that even cooperation-oriented civilian officials do not discount NATO as a military threat. One, who argued that NATO is not contrary to the "European security process" and could in fact contribute to that process, did add that the "military staffs and forces of NATO are a problem." Why, I asked. Because they limit our development of political approaches to security by focusing on military issues. That is, as long as NATO as a military establishment exists, it has to be dealt with on a military level. Other officials and scholars also told me that NATO's military character limits the development of political and other approached to security -- which are more important to Europe today -- because it focuses attention on military structures and criteria.

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2When he told me this, I could not hide my amusement, and said that I actually had all the concrete information from my interviews in the German Ministry of Defense, all I wanted was the Russian point-of-view. So much for "state secrets" -- old habits die hard.

3Interview 12. He also told me that a Soviet Foreign Ministry department on NATO was formed after NATO's 1990 London Declaration. This seems to mean that previously NATO was dealt with purely through party and military organizations.

4Interview 40; Interview 41.
So I assume (although we have no direct evidence other than hints from the Russian press) that on an operational level, NATO is still treated as a primary threat. However, on a political level, it is not. There were two basic reasons given by my interview subjects: the change in NATO doctrine declared in Rome 1991, and the fact that NATO has a limited life in any event.

The first reason I would call an "intention assessment." While NATO’s military capacity remains high and a latent problem, Russian leaders and security specialists are relatively confident that the leaders of the NATO member states do not have aggressive intentions toward Russia, and therefore concrete NATO capacity is not an immediate or highly salient threat. The head of a department in the bureau on International Security pointed out that the new NATO concept focuses on the new types of dangers and risks, rather than threats, in and out of Europe. Our notion, he said, is the same, or at least similar.8 Another said that there are no ideological or political bases for problems with NATO, that there is a basic stability in Europe.9

I should note that this is also supported by a "capabilities" assessment. Several interview subjects referred to changes in NATO’s planning and operations as a reason for the low level of threat, and one retired military officer pointed out that there are now several countries between Russia and NATO, and this affords a higher level of security.10

I found relatively strong and general support for the view, however, that the main reason why NATO was not an active threat to Russia was because it is on its way out.11 A former ambassador to Western Europe who is now in the RFM Office of Assessment and Planning said "NATO? -- this also will end, it was clear even in 1990. In a few years, we will not recognize NATO. Everyone here sees that now. US troops were a deposit on European security, but I do not see that in the future. You see this through NACC: slowly,

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8Interview 12.
9Interview 40.
10Interview 17.
11Interview 24; Interview 11; Interview 41.
step by step, the meaning of NATO disappears."12 A Supreme Soviet deputy on the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations assured me that "it will be not too long until NATO turns into a political organization." NATO, he said, must deal with the real dangers in Europe -- not Russia, but nationalism; not state threats, but spontaneous crises and risks.13

This is not to argue that NATO is now a benign influence in Russian security calculations. As one academic security specialist said to me, "For people like me, NATO has been accepted. But there are many still in Russia who do not accept that."14 Early on, some officials repeated Yeltsin's position that Russia might some day join NATO.15 One scholar and retired military officer argued that while Russia would probably never actually join NATO, Yeltsin's strategy of working toward that end was constructive because it supported the goals of reform and re-organizing Russia's military by providing standards and technological assistance.16 But such ideas were less evident as the year went on, because of the obvious difficulties and because of domestic political realities. A conservative political activist ended this line of questioning with the response "the idea of Russia in NATO is nonsense."17

The issue of NATO's form and future affects Russian foreign policy in large measure by affecting Russian politics. I asked the head of a department in the RFM whether NATO should weaken to enhance Russian security. He said yes, but not because NATO is a threat. "It would support the arguments of liberals. Lower military levels and the development of NATO as a political institution is important."18

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12Interview 11.
13Interview 31.
14Interview 41.
15Interview 40.
16Interview 29.
17Interview 21.
18Interview 26.
In this role of "intention assessment," NACC (the North Atlantic Cooperation Council) has played an important part. Although NATO may be evolving, it remains an exclusive security alliance, designed to protect its members collectively from any external threat. Therefore, while NATO per se could have good relations with any particular country, ultimately such relations would be highly formalized and constrained. NACC, on the other hand, creates a broader membership base and establishes a legitimate right to participate in certain security areas. It does not change the basic fact of NATO's purpose and membership, but it does seem to have served the intended purpose of reassuring at least some decisionmakers of NATO's non-aggressive security approach. The function of NATO/NACC now, one official concluded, is for discussion of military strategy to facilitate cooperation and understanding.\textsuperscript{19} Another Foreign Ministry official said that "NACC was established to make things flexible," as NATO cannot.\textsuperscript{20} A related function is to link western and eastern security. One important approach in the government, a scholar told me is 'for Russia to reassert itself as a benign influence in the territory of the former Soviet Union. This way it can become a valuable security partner for the West. If it fails, I see a scenario for isolating this whole region.... The Cold War legacy has created a system of isolation. Integration has to be built up.'\textsuperscript{21} When I asked him how this could be accomplished, he said over the long term, through the CSCE, but for immediate security issues, NACC was already serving this purpose. He mentioned specifically NACC's role as a forum for the former Soviet states to negotiate distribution of the CFE ceilings and for informal discussion of conflicts and disputes in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Abkhazia. He himself expressed skepticism that this was wise, as it involves Russia in intractable conflicts, but in the end, he said, it was better for Russia to be included in discussions and solutions in regional security issues than to seek "splendid isolation."

\textsuperscript{19}Interview 12.

\textsuperscript{20}Interview 24.

\textsuperscript{21}Interview 9.
I realize, of course, that to a certain extent, my interview subjects would tell me what they thought I wanted to hear. The most striking example was my interview with a lieutenant general in the Defense Ministry responsible for general policy and strategy. He told me that NATO does not pose a threat to Russia because its main purpose now is to assist the East and its main approach is cooperation. He pointed out to me that he had just returned from Brussels and meetings of NACC there -- that he returned from meetings with Klaus Naumann (Inspector General of the German armed forces) to his work in the Russian Defense Ministry. The function of armed forces now, he told me, is to develop doctrines and forces based on reasonable sufficiency, and deal especially with nationalism, which is the main source of war today. This requires multilateral cooperation: "It is not possible to do things individually -- it is not the security only of East or West."22 This is consistent with stated political policy and I do not doubt that he meant it sincerely, but it certainly underplays the concrete fact that NATO’s purpose is defense of its members against potentially hostile non-members.

However, I also have evidence that there are certain conditions for this sanguine view of NATO. First, NATO membership must not be extended to the former Warsaw Pact countries, including of course any republics of the former Soviet Union (obviously with the exception of East Germany). Some asserted this in the context that these areas are too unstable and risky for NATO membership -- "NATO countries must think what they are taking -- what Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia would cost."23 "I do not see a good reason for either (NATO or CSCE) to interfere actively in CIS conflicts. Because the Western security alliance is in a pretty comfortable situation right now. It has two layers between itself and CIS conflicts -- former East European allies of the Soviet Union, and the

22Interview 30.
23Interview 40.
Slavic republics." A Foreign Ministry official turned the question around: "But do you want to become involved?"

But the real reason Russian officials and scholars believe NATO should not "move East" is not concern for NATO's integrity, but appreciation of what NATO extension to the east would do to Russian domestic politics, and therefore to Russian foreign policy. A researcher and advisor to the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations supported NACC membership for eastern countries, but said "NATO must not believe it extends to the former Warsaw Pact, because that would undermine the reform process and aid conservatives. You must not create a sense of isolation here." The general at the Defense Ministry said that contacts with NATO were useful in aiding the CIS countries to work out their collective security. But, he said, it is very important to keep separate the "zone of authority of NATO. In that zone, NATO must solve its own problems. And in the CIS zone, the CIS must solve its problems." NATO can be used, if adapted, in CSCE and UN missions in principle, he allowed, but it is not necessary in the CIS. What about Georgia and Azerbaijan, I asked (they are not members of the CIS). There it is also better if NATO's role is to consult and discuss, he answered. Similarly, he said the eastern European countries should not join NATO: "That is NACC's function. The area of NATO should not grow." The political aspects of NACC's role in Eastern Europe are more important, he said. He did allow that over time some kind of association arrangement and system of security guarantees against aggressions might be possible. But in the long run, he said, we are looking for "non-bloc solutions."

Second, any NATO peacekeeping operations must be carried out under the CSCE (and therefore under UN mandate, which is how the CSCE is constituted). There are two reasons for this: it gives the appropriate "legal" and international cast to NATO, preventing

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24 Interview 9.
25 Interview 12.
26 Interview 19.
27 Interview 30.
NATO operations from being unilateral and self-interested, and of course it gives the Russian Federation a vote (if not quite veto power) over any such operations, since Russia is a member of the CSCE, but not of NATO. Above all, one of my interview subjects told me, we must avoid the impression that NATO imposes any solutions on Russia. The activity of NATO, another warned me, has internal Russian effects.28

Finally, the third condition was that given the current political situation, under no circumstances (not even under CSCE and/or UN auspices) could NATO peacekeeping forces be sent to the territory of the former Soviet Union. One official was restrained in observing that NATO intervention would not be “useful” in Nagorno-Karabakh or Moldova.29 A scholar and advisor to the Supreme Soviet was more straightforward in saying this would be unacceptable in Russian politics. NATO might be used as an armed force of the CSCE, he said, but not in its present form. "The presence of NATO forces in any part of the former Soviet Union would permit the Right to increase its activities. It can then appear that the West wanted liberalization, marketization, and democratization in order to send NATO forces into the territory of the former Soviet Union, to move the line of conflict east."30

Given the threat assessment that I explained in my previous report, and that I referred to above, the traditional security policy response to a powerful state or alliance -- "balancing" -- does not offer much to Russian policymakers. In balancing strategies for security, a state seeks alliances of power resources after identifying which state or states are powerful and/or threaten it. For Russia, however, balancing against a powerful NATO does not make much sense: NATO is not seen as much of an immediate threat, and any potential allies are more interested in joining NATO themselves than in joining a Russian alliance. The states that do threaten Russian security, with the exception of China, do so not because of their deliberate intentions to attack Russia, but because of local and border conflicts, civil wars, the fate of Russian minorities, etc. (This may be changing as political and military disputes

28Interview 6; Interview 19.
29Interview 12.
30Interview 19.
between Russia and Ukraine become more entrenched and severe.) The task with respect to NATO is to keep tabs on its intentions and capabilities -- integration and cooperation within NACC accomplish this far better than seeking alliances with uninterested partners. The security task with respect to instability in the states of the former Soviet Union similarly is not solved by traditional approaches in the present context. The Russian leadership has instead relied upon a mix of unilateral intervention (Moldova, the Baltics, and Georgia), attempts to create collective security obligations (the Tashkent agreement of May 1992 which is the basis for intervention in Tajikistan), appeals to international principles (Estonia), and engagement of international institutions (NACC on the CFE Treaty, CSCE on Armenia-Azerbaijan). This means that there is an assessment that it is a reasonable policy to try to use NATO as a positive asset, in very limited and contingent ways, to serve Russian security priorities.

Thus, several interview subjects told me that they did favor NATO remaining in Europe for the medium term -- perhaps 5 years or so -- for two reasons: as a "stabilizing factor" and to keep the US involved in European security for the medium term, and as a residual constraint on German military power and political intentions. The view is that in the abstract it might be better to "free Europe from US forces," but given the reality of conflicts and potential political disputes across Europe, and given that it is clear that American motives and intentions are not a threat to Russia, on balance it is better for American forces to remain in Europe for the short to medium term.

III. CFE

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was somewhat problematic for the Gorbachev leadership, because it was based on the principle of equal numbers of conventional forces in the main potential military theaters in Europe, unlike its predecessor the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Treaty talks, in which the Soviets held the view that cuts should be equal, thereby preserving the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces in

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31 Interview 24; Interview 41.

32 Interview 17.
Europe. Nonetheless, the civilian Gorbachev leadership pushed hard for the CFE Treaty (despite what appears to have been active cheating by the Soviet military in removing some equipment to be limited by the treaty east of the Urals, where technically the equipment would no longer fall under the treaty limits), and it was signed in Paris in November 1990.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, however, the treaty apparently lost nearly all its technical value. The treaty was designed to limit the capacity of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to conduct large scale offensive military operations in the heart of Europe by limiting the numbers of "treaty limited equipment" (TLEs) -- primarily tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and attack helicopters -- in central and flank sub-regions of Europe. This would permit both sides to maintain territorial security at lower levels of military forces. From the Western point of view (assuming an improbable Russian intention to undertake offensive military operations against the West), however, this task was accomplished on the political level by the end of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy in Europe, and on the operational level by the disintegration of the WTO and its integrated military command, as well as the fact that to conduct any invasion of Western Europe, Russian forces would have to cross two probably hostile countries (Belarus and Poland). From the Russian point of view (again, assuming an improbable Western intention to attack Russia), such an attack would have to cross Poland and Belarus. Thus, the purpose for which the CFE Treaty was designed -- to make difficult a surprise massive conventional military attack in Central Europe -- was largely irrelevant by 1992, and certainly not a top priority.

Yet ratification of the CFE Treaty was an important issue in early 1992, because the treaty could serve certain purposes which did remain important or which became important as a result of the break up of the Soviet Union. For the Russian leadership now, the CFE Treaty serves basically two functions: it engages Russia in a multilateral process for security and it is an international constraint on the former Soviet republics. Consistently across various government offices, responsible officials told me that Russian policy firmly supports the CFE treaty. One RFM official responsible for international security affairs conceded that the treaty was created for old concerns, but said it was valuable as a "bridge" to a post-Cold
War European order. Another told me that there was quick and easy agreement in principle in January 1992 among the new former Soviet countries that the CFE treaty should not be amended or renegotiated, because that would re-open issues that had been previously negotiated, and that it might allow new disputes among the former Soviet states to delay or even prevent ratification.

Russian officials did not wax philosophic about a "European security process" in the abstract, but for quite concrete reasons. First, one official in the Foreign Ministry responsible for disarmament said that the reason for the CFE from the Russian point of view is that it embeds Russia in an active, high-profile multilateral effort that maintains Russian status as a major international player and demonstrates tangible benefits from the Yeltsin leadership's approach to foreign policy, which bolsters domestic support for the government. That is, this official told me, the CFE Treaty is evidence to the Russian public that Russia is disarming not because it is weak, but because it is living up to mutual commitments that enhance Russian security by gaining arms reductions by other countries as well. Similarly, by ratifying the CFE Treaty, the Russian government was able to press on for the CFE1A agreement (limited troop levels). I was told by one official that since "we are going to reduce anyway" to 1.2 or 1.4 million soldiers, we may as well get all the other European countries on board to reduce through an international commitment. A researcher echoed this view, and explained in more specific terms that the economy was more of a constraint on Russian forces than is CFE. He extended this observation to other countries in Europe, saying that a CFE1A agreement would be nice, but that even Germany would be limiting its forces further without an agreement.

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33Interview 12.
34Interview 27.
35Interview 27.
36Interview 24.
37Interview 19.
But there was more consistently an awareness that it is better to create a multilateral legal obligation to limit forces. I had been told by acquaintances at the US embassy in Moscow of American reluctance to press CFE issues too far for fear of interfering in relations among former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries. I asked a Russian official about this and he said he did not view efforts to ratify and implement CFE1 and CFE1A as interference because "it is in our interests to demilitarize ourselves, the other republics, and Europe. It is in our interests to reduce military expenses, and to have others reduce in the bargain. And it is in our interests to have a reduced army.... The reason for CFE is that to follow a path of unilateral military reductions would be difficult for the new democracies to explain or sustain."38

The abstract-sounding objective of participating in a multilateral security process has one more concrete objective, according to Russian officials and scholars, and that is the continuity of Western interest and participation in issues of CIS or former Soviet security. Although Russian officials do not want Western "interference" in Russian security affairs, they do want Western participation in security affairs when that means bringing the former Soviet republics to understand and be willing to abide by international commitments to reduce and/or limit arms.39

One aspect of this transitional function of the CFE is that it is an added constraint or incentive for re-organizing military forces in Europe. On a political level, the end of the Cold War has led to a generally accepted reduction in threat perception by making the changes in states' intentions clear. But military realities in Europe are not really keeping up with political changes. An official in the Foreign Ministry defined military security as a condition in which no state has superior power, and in terms of a military doctrine based on sufficiency concepts. But the Soviet military never permitted the development of these concepts, he said. The defensive orientation of military forces made necessary by CFE

38Interview 27. I asked an advisor to the Supreme Soviet the same question about Western "interference" -- he said that he did not see that the US was really all that concerned about observing the independence of CIS states. Interview 19.

39Interview 18.
limits will force the development and implementation of these concepts, he concluded.\textsuperscript{40} Yet he was also critical of CFE as it stands. First, he said that it will be too expensive for the former Communist countries to implement on their own, so the West should begin to think of ways to help. Second, he complained that the US was blocking an extension of new CFE negotiations to forces that were not covered but are important -- especially naval forces and American forces that can be rapidly deployed to Europe. He said that he agreed with the French complaint that Europe should not be the closed experiment for disarmament, but must more fully include America's military forces. He linked this to the observation that until now, conventional forces reductions have focused too much on quantitative controls. The significant advantages afforded by qualitative differences in equipment, he argued, make transparency through arms control and verification procedures all the more important for European security.\textsuperscript{41} I found this section of our interview very interesting, because this official was generally very supportive of reform and of the Kozyrev line on Russian foreign policy, which strongly favors cooperation and integration as the main strategy of Russian security policy. Yet he was concerned enough to complain to me that US military forces and generally higher quality NATO forces were not the direct subject of arms control negotiations. Why should that matter, I asked, if NATO is not a threat to Russia? Because, he argued, on a political level it is necessary for these matters to be conducted on the basis of equality and balance, and on the military level, we have to recognize that there is a lot of instability in Europe, and should disputes break out, it is essential that there be no room for misunderstanding or perception of hostile intentions from the start if such disputes are not to lead to armed conflicts. He did not say this, but the reason why these concerns are important is probably for domestic political reasons: to make arms control acceptable to more moderate or conservative groups in the Russian government, and to prevent political disputes in Europe from becoming immediately militarized without a chance to negotiate with the US in forums such as the UN Security Council or CSCE.

\textsuperscript{40}Interview 24.

\textsuperscript{41}Interview 24.
This interpretation was supported by my interview at the Defense Ministry. I asked whether the CFE was more important for its political or military-technical meaning. The general answered that CFE has very important political meaning, but that "it is not possible to underestimate its military-technical meaning. The system of verification is very important, as are the limits on questions of tanks." When I asked which limits on which countries were most important, he answered that it was the general system, rather than the limits on any one country. Then he shifted into a lengthy general statement about how these constraints created a lot of work for the Russian military in having to comply -- not so much to eliminate tanks, but because of the consequent logistical and doctrinal changes made necessary by the reduced numbers. Our way of thinking about how to organize units, he said, has to be re-worked because of the limits on tanks. He said that some Russian units would have to lose up to 80% of their tanks. All this, he complained, on top of the fact that the Soviet and now Russian military has had to re-organize since 1990 when it began to withdraw forces from Europe. He told me that this was all in the interests of security --- that the Soviet Union had been the first to come to the conclusion that its security required a withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe, and only now is the US realizing this as well. The Soviet withdrawal and agreement to the terms of the CFE, he admitted, was affected by the end of the Soviet Union and creation of the CIS and it has been necessary to adapt these obligations to the new situation, but we have come to terms with this and are accomplishing these tasks "in order to fulfill our obligations. It is a political act with military material."\textsuperscript{42}

Russian officials were much more interested in the value of the CFE Treaty and CFE1A negotiations as a tool in their security relations with the other countries of the former Soviet Union. One official told me that Russia intended to use its verification and observation right more to keep an eye on its former Soviet and WTO allies than against NATO.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42}Interview 30.

\textsuperscript{43}Interestingly, the Russians will be limited in the extent to which they can do this because of a curious provision of the treaty which limits the number of inspection missions a country can claim among its allies. That is, Russia can claim only so many intra-WTO missions. The reason for the provision was that during the negotiations in the late 1980s it was feared that the Soviet Union would use up all the missions Poland, East Germany, etc. were obligated to allow and thereby prevent NATO from being able to conduct missions and verify the treaty. Interview with German official in
For example, the head of a department in the Office of Assessment and Planning in the Foreign Ministry told me in April that of the Soviet Union's allocation of 13,000 tanks under CFE, Russia sought 7000-8000, and wanted Ukraine to receive 3000 (the remainder to be distributed among the other former Soviet states). But Ukraine, he said, wanted 4000 tanks, and wanted Russia's allocation to be smaller. I pointed out that Russia's preference would give it over a 2 to 1 balance, which seemed to indicate intentions to be able to carry out an offensive. He dismissed that, pointing out that Russia has more territory to cover, while Ukraine could concentrate its attention only on Russia. Coming from a non-military expert in the Foreign Ministry who was supportive of reform, this is an interesting indication of how serious is the concern to limit the military assets of Russia's new neighbors. Another major concern in negotiating allocations with Ukraine that some interview subjects raised was that because the best-equipped and -trained Soviet troops had been forward-deployed during the Cold War, these troops and the most modern equipment happened to end up in Belarus and Ukraine with the splitting up of the Soviet Army.

A researcher praised the role of NACC in getting involved when there were disputes among the former Soviet republics over who would get how much of the Soviet allocations under the treaty. He told me that in this way, NATO proved itself useful to Russian security by teaching the other former Soviet republics about defensive defense and their military requirements in a way that the other republics would not have accepted or trusted coming from the Russians. Another researcher spoke of the "syndrome of the center" (i.e., Moscow under the Soviet Union) and the problem that all the former Soviet states were determined to reassert their independence on all things merely on principle. He concluded that consequently NACC was necessary as a forum for negotiating CIS arms control


Interview 10. It is interesting that the Tashkent Agreement less than one month later gave Russia about 6000 tanks and Ukraine about 4000.

Interview 17; Interview 18; Interview 15.

Interview 19.
obligations, and pointed out that this was also proving to be the case with the START treaty.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, he told me, we have also seen this with tactical nuclear weapons. In March, President Kravchuk had suspended the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia as Ukraine had promised as part of its international commitment to deminuclearize. But Western "interference" helped, he said. Secretary Baker took a very firm position and told Ukraine that this was an issue of cooperation with the West, "then it was solved in a week."\textsuperscript{48} An official in the Foreign Ministry told me in April that the government was anticipating problems and setbacks in negotiating the allocation of the Soviet Union's CFE allotment among the new former Soviet states. He said that the objective was to get agreement at the CIS summit in Tashkent in mid-May. When I asked if that was reasonable, he pointed out that there would be a NACC meeting on 6 May immediately preceding the CIS meeting, and a CFE meeting in Oslo in June, so with these two constraints, the former republics should be able to come to an agreement. (They did in fact agree at the Tashkent meeting. Georgia was not a member of the CIS, so it sent a special representative to observe and approve the CFE measure.) I pressed him again on whether in practical terms there could be an agreement after months of delay, and with conflicts in the former Soviet Union beginning to emerge. He said "Well, they took on all the obligations. They understand that this is the development of a forum for the future."\textsuperscript{49}

Russia's concern is not merely hostile intentions against itself, but the general instability in the former Soviet Union and the potential for international arms control to limit the chance for war. A researcher who was involved in advising the government on the CFE treaty told me that official discussions on how to divide the CFE allocations were based on quite practical criteria: counting the length of borders, the amount of territory, and populations to be defended. Based on this, he told me, the calculation was that Russia should have

\textsuperscript{47}Interview 18.

\textsuperscript{48}Interview 18. He was referring to the fact that after the US became involved in discussions, Kravchuk lifted the suspension and the tactical nuclear weapons were all removed to Russia within the month.

\textsuperscript{49}Interview 24.
a majority of the allocations. He conceded that it was extreme to think that Russia would have to count all of the military forces of all countries on its borders as being directed for an attack on Russia. But, he said, Russian officials believed that at minimum the allocation would have to make Russia the equivalent to Ukraine in terms of military balances. I asked if these calculations were merely for the sake of political balances, but he said that he did not think so as far as the Russian government officials were concerned -- that the discussions were quite serious and based on concrete numbers and military missions. Their objective was not active planning for military attack, but creating the fundamental basis for a stable military balance based on reasonable sufficiency (which, he conceded, still had not actually made its way into operational military standards). But a close second to concerns about the Russian-Ukrainian military balance in Russian negotiations on the CFE allocations was concern about the Transcaucuses. He said that the negotiations showed that Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were demanding allocations to cope with one another at the highest possible levels of military equipment -- it was difficult to conclude arms control negotiations, he pointed out, when two of the parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) were officially at war with one another, and when another party was engaged in suppressing separatist movements (Georgia). I asked whether the concern was that these countries would have a high military potential that could be used against Russia, or whether it was fighting among themselves that was of concern to Russia. He said that the immediate concern was the latter, given that Russian civilians and even military personnel were involved in some of the conflict areas. But in the medium to long term, it was of as much concern that these countries would develop large military capabilities and pose a more direct problem for Russian security.

One scholar pointed out to me the difference in negotiating the split up of Soviet conventional forces in Europe -- which was heated and lengthy, but ultimately successful -- compared to the unsuccessful and quite acrimonious discussions between Russia and Ukraine.

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50Interview 18.

51This was before fighting in Abkhazia, a region of Georgia on the border with Russia seeking to secede possibly with active Russian military assistance, had really developed in May and June, further complicating the matter.
over dividing the Black Sea Fleet, and observed that at least one important difference in the two cases was the fact that the division of the Black Sea Fleet was not subject to an international treaty, so Russia and Ukraine faced only one another in negotiations. Of course, this interest in international security commitments is also a constraint on Russian options. In discussing the fighting in Moldova and the Russian role in it, the same scholar said "The 14th Army could take control of Moldova in several days. But it cannot do it in one day, and that is why nothing is done." He claimed that friends working in the defense ministry had told him that this was an active calculation among Russian military officials.

Not everyone believed that the CFE treaty would really be that useful as a constraint on the armed forces of the other former Soviet states. One scholar and advisor to the Supreme Soviet said that CFE is not really central to Russian security -- that it had always been more for the purpose of Western security. "It was for us not an issue of security but of being a member of the civilized international system." It may in theory have some value as a constraint on the military forces of Russia's neighbors, he conceded, but in the end the treaty would probably not work anyway because of the expense and difficulties in really implementing it.53

I specifically asked several officials if *the* or *a* main purpose of Russian commitment to the CFE treaty was to assure a constraint on the German Bundeswehr, and all told me that it was not. They conceded that ultimately Russia had to be concerned about the military forces of its neighbors and of as powerful a country as Germany, and in this respect the CFE treaty in particular and a multilateral security process in general played a useful role in keeping an eye on German capabilities. But this was very much a background feature of their priorities. One official lectured me that in asking the question in this manner I was thinking too much in technical military terms -- that the real value of the CFE treaty was the political process and the political transparency it afforded.54

52 Interview 43.
53 Interview 18.
54 Interview 6.
A researcher told me that he considered the CFE treaty and CFE1A agreement a "bitter mistake", although they would be ratified. First, he said, no one in Eastern Europe will be able to implement the treaty -- it is too expensive and complicated and the former Communist countries are simply incapable of meeting their obligations -- especially Russia, given that it is withdrawing its forces from Germany, and is unlikely to worry about the niceties of where to deploy them. This could then become a big political problem in Central Europe, as it begins to appear that countries are not meeting their treaty obligations. Another researcher put it well: we are "sharing the cake -- but sharing the problems." Second, "conventional arms control is one of the biggest threats to European stability. We are re-militarizing relations and creating an artificial focus on military balances." Another scholar also said that "pan-European" negotiations were not going to prove very useful for Russia's security because they are too general, when each crisis has its own characteristics. Defensive defense, monitoring and verification, he said, are meaningless outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact framework. "Most of the bipolar solutions are not workable at the micro-level" he concluded.

IV. CSCE

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was almost universally the preferred international security institution among Russian officials and scholars to mid-1992. This was true not only of officials responsible for CSCE functions (a bureaucratic interest we would expect), but also of officials responsible for NATO, Germany, etc. The head of the department on the CSCE discussed with me European proposals for developing the "consensus-minus-one" formulation and the creation of a "troika" as a basis for a quasi-Security Council in the CSCE, and told me that the Russian government strongly supported both

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55 Interview 19.

56 Interview 41.

57 Interview 20.
developments as a way to increase the effectiveness of the CSCE. However, another official in the RFM said that the CSCE did not need a Security Council, designed to impose solutions by a small set of countries, but rather a type of European Court of Justice or of Arbitration that would be created for the task of peaceful settlement of conflicts. He claimed there was such a proposal under consideration, proposed by the French and supported by the Germans, which would exclude the US. An official responsible for European security confirmed that a CSCE court of arbitration was an option being actively assessed.

Insofar as the primary foreign policy officials of the Yeltsin leadership see security as a "confidence problem", they tend to favor developing the CSCE as an instrument of Russian foreign policy, because in this view security issues in Europe "cannot be solved on a bilateral basis." The value of the CSCE over other institutions, he told me, has several aspects. First, it already has a good system of political consultation, with twice yearly summits (in which a number of officials of the RFM take part) and more frequent meeting as "hot spots" demand. Second, it is actively preparing further development and expansion to deal with the security tasks and opportunities of post-Cold War Europe. In that Europe, he argued, the main requirement for security will be "transparency of intentions" and CSCE is best suited to provide that. Third, CSCE is expressly designed to address and protect human rights issues, which have grown in salience for Europe after the Cold War. Furthermore, he argued, the

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58Interview 6. Before 1992, the CSCE could act only with unanimity. This made it impossible for the CSCE to condemn or punish any member, because every state had a veto. With the Consensus-minus-one rule, the offending state could not veto an action. Therefore, for example, in 1992 the CSCE voted to prevent Serbia and Montenegro taking Yugoslavia's seat in the CSCE because of its support for fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The "troika" is an informal leading consultation among three foreign minister: that of the country holding the position of chair of the CSCE (which rotates every year), the past chair, and the future chair. The idea is, again, to increase the effectiveness of the CSCE by limiting early discussions and options to a smaller set of decisionmakers.

59Interview 26. While I believe there was such a proposal, his view of the German position I found completely inconsistent with my interviews in Bonn. German officials were committed to developing a form of Security Council for the CSCE, and one of their overriding priorities in foreign policy is consistently to keep the US as involved as possible.

60Interview 24.

61Interview 24.
CSCE is adapting itself to be able to more effectively deal with human rights issues -- he pointed to the "Consensus minus One" provision by which an offending state would no longer be able to veto action or criticism of the CSCE against itself. Fourth, he said that the RFM in particular supported the establishment of a CSCE Conflict Prevention Center in Prague. The value of this center, he said, was in its focus on implementation of confidence building measures, and establishment of a forum in which any country can raise any issues of military-political security. The forum would also allow the calling of meetings regarding unusual military activities that any member detected, and to call an official meeting of this group, only 12 members would need to agree. To my observation that the CSCE had proven itself quite ineffective in dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, he said that was true, but that so had all other institutions -- "no one has the instruments. So the lesson is that we need to strengthen the CSCE, especially to permit fast decisions."62

The major accomplishment of the CSCE in early 1992 from the Russian government's point of view was simply incorporating the former Soviet Union into a "European" security institution. Of course, the problem is that by incorporating countries such as Kazakhstan and Tadjikistan into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the members diluted the European focus and basis for the institution's operation. When I offered this as a problem, an official in the RFM responsible for CSCE relations disagreed in strong terms. The problem, he repeated, was to bring the new states into security institutions, and so it was a good idea to invite all former Soviet republics, even the Asian ones, into the CSCE. After all, he said, this just "keeps the status quo" as these countries were members of the CSCE by virtue of Soviet membership. Especially in view of the integrated Soviet army, he added, which the countries of the former Soviet Union have inherited, it is important to include all the parts in the CSCE. He admitted that the armies would eventually be separated, but repeated that in this transitional time, what was more important was to use existing institutions such as the CSCE for integration and stability.63

62 Interview 24.
63 Interview 6.
Like the CFE, a major function of the CSCE from the Russian point-of-view is to
create an incentive for the other former Soviet republics to observe international norms, such
as respect for Russian minorities within their borders. When I asked this same official
whether the CFE or CSCE was seen by the Russian government as the primary non-CIS
mechanism for dealing with security issues among the former Soviet states, he said that it
was not yet clear what the real situation was, but that the preference was for the CSCE to be
the primary mechanism. He gave me two reason. First, the CSCE "is not really there yet
so we can make of it what we will." Second, the CFE Treaty "has too much of a military
character, too much of past approaches to security, and too many left-over problems."

However, while all officials with whom I spoke were at least not opposed to the role
of the CSCE in post-Soviet security issues, not many believed that it would be in the
immediate or short-term future very effective or efficient. Those who were most enthusiastic
tended to refer to rather abstract functions such as "integration" and "stability." Those who
were more skeptical pointed to the lack of strong commitment or common interests in
actively utilizing CSCE for solving conflicts in the former Soviet Union. An official in the
Foreign Ministry said that the concrete task facing Russia was to establish good bilateral
relations with countries such as Moldova and Ukraine, and that until that was accomplished
multilateral institutions could not be very effective. The general problem in establishing
these relations, he said, was that the republics viewed Russia with great suspicion, and
consider its policy to be imperialist. Among other obstacles to good bilateral relations,
Russia must be concerned about the rights of Russian minorities in these foreign countries.
This is where the CSCE could most help in immediate relations, he argued, because it is a
forum of equal European states and is a way to reassure other former Soviet republics that
their sovereignty and independence are not threatened in dealing with Russia.65

CSCE mechanisms provide a potential instrument for mediating and ameliorating the
ethnic and regional conflicts that now threaten many of Russia's borders. But this is
constrained by the Russian preference against "interference in internal affairs." The Russians

64Interview 6.

65Interview 38.
support CSCE peacekeeping missions in areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, but do not support the use of just any peacekeeping forces. Their first preference is for the use of Russian peacekeeping forces under the CSCE legal right, and the second preference is for CSCE but non-NATO forces.

At worst, officials would be indifferent to CSCE activity in Russian security. The foreign policy advisor to Vice President Rutskoi told me that he considered all these multilateral fora -- NATO, NACC, CFE, CSCE -- basically irrelevant. They were not serious, he said. More important for Russian security was bilateral cooperation, especially with Germany, which was going to be the most important country in Europe and with which Russia has natural and strong ties. The Defense Ministry spokesman had no particular objections to CSCE activity, including in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but he said he did not see it as necessary, given the international security framework of the United Nations, and given the close cooperation with NATO via the NACC. A Supreme Soviet deputy said that he thought CSCE (and the UN) a better forum for dealing with security issues than NATO, but then said that in the end the question of which institutions to use did not really matter, "they are all limited because they are from the bipolar era.... We should use whatever works. But there is not an existing institution that can deal with these security problems. I would say we need new institutions... or not really new institutions, but inter-parliamentary exchange." For the crises we face, he said -- in Yugoslavia, Moldova, between Lithuania and Russia -- none of the existing institutions has proven helpful. As for the question of a CSCE role in disputes among the former Soviet republics, he had no objections, but said it would not be effective. The US has its own internal problems, he said, and is not very interested. Europe is very interested in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but it is more preoccupied with its own problems and crises further west than the former Soviet Union. In any event, he concluded, the CIS is only for a transitional period,

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66 Interview 36.
67 Interview 30.
68 Interview 31.
and may be better able to deal with the problems of the former Soviet Union than these international institutions.

Even many Russians who think that the CSCE is a good idea have become very cynical that it will in practice be an effective instrument for Russian security policy. One scholar who argued that what Russia needs for its security is "integration" that had been avoided during the Cold War, argued that what is most likely to happen is that the West will seek to use institutions such as the CSCE merely to prevent local conflicts from spilling over, rather than trying to resolve them. From the West's point of view, he said, the priority is to try to localize these conflicts -- like Lebanon -- so that they "will not go to the heart of Western security." He said that this impression has prevented the Russian government from actively seeking the development of security structures such as the CSCE.69

There was a split in the views of those who were generally supportive of CSCE. Some officials and scholars said that they did not see any contradiction between the activity of CSCE and that of NATO.70 This is not to say that anyone supported active integration of CSCE and NATO -- quite the contrary. This was a perspective that there is plenty to do in Europe, NATO is suitable for some tasks, CSCE for others, and these are pretty much mutually exclusive.

Others supported CSCE primarily because they saw NATO on its way out. One official in the Foreign Ministry said that we want the US to remain in Europe because we see it as a stabilizing factor. But, he said, we also believe that NATO's future is declining. So, he concluded, this is another reason to favor CSCE -- "it is the only way to pull the US into Europe in the future."71

But I would say that the modal reasoning for Russian preference for the CSCE centers on two factors: it is relatively unformed and thus formable, and it is designed for "political security" rather than "military security." On this latter point in particular, both reformists

69Interview 9.
70Interview 12.
71Interview 24.
and government oppositionists can agree. The Yeltsin government has largely embraced the preference and emphasis for "political" and "mutual" security developed under Gorbachev by the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. For conservatives, preference for "political" security is an argument against the extension of NATO into the security affairs for the former Soviet Union. An official in the RFM with long service as a Soviet diplomat and a generally reformist point-of-view expressed the evolving compromise on this issue well early in 1992. He was critical of the leadership's neglect in negotiating concrete military and non-aggression treaties. Security, he argued, begins with an understanding of military relations and requirements, and these must be the basis of Russia's "security net." But, he said, these are just the basis: the real task of insuring security now is in the process of negotiation. Although the CSCE was irrelevant to this in the past, he said, as it dealt only with issues of human rights, now it could play such a role as a negotiation forum. 72

It should be clear from this discussion that a major theme that arose in my interviews was the value of institutions for dealing with the former Soviet states rather than for dealing with Germany. Insofar as Germany is not a major security threat in the view of Russian officials, restraining or controlling it is not a priority.

V. Other Arms Control

Because my research focused on Russian-German relations, I did not pursue in my interviews arms control issues beyond CFE. Since Germany is a non-nuclear state, it is not involved in nuclear arms control. Similarly, issues of arms exports outside Europe are only beginning to be a broader policy issue, involving countries other than the US and Soviet Union. However, at times such topics would arise in various interviews. I include such evidence in this section. It is not systematic or comprehensive, but I thought it may be of interest.

In broad terms, arms control negotiations and compliance are valuable to Russian officials across the political spectrum as an element of normalcy, stability, and maintenance of Russia's great power status. For more liberal officials and scholars, a commitment to

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72Interview 11.
arms control in Russian foreign policy is an extension of the "new thinking" line in Gorbachev's foreign policy, which valued reduction in international tension, cutting the Soviet military budget, etc., for the purposes of supporting Soviet domestic reform. For moderate or conservative officials, arms control is acceptable and even desirable in principle. It is an extension of the basis for Soviet-US relations to Russian-US relations. Insofar as the arms issues focus on nuclear issues and global arms sales, they elevate Russian foreign relations above those of the moderate military powers such as Germany. In short, they preserve a "special relationship" (quite unlike the Anglo-American special relationship) for Russia with the US. This was a source of some frustration for several scholars with whom I spoke. They would complain that the Kozyrev line in foreign policy focused too much on negotiations with the US for "liberal" reasons (integration with the West being focused on the US as the key to assistance and acceptance), and they complained of moderate and conservative great power pretensions as the source of their arms control focus. When an official responsible for disarmament in the RFM ran out of multilateral arms control measures to talk about, I asked him if there were any important bilateral arms control negotiations from Russia's point of view. The two he named were the treaties with Germany for the withdrawal for former Soviet forces (which is the joint responsibility of the Russian Defense Ministry, the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the RFM, and the German section of the European department of the RFM), and strategic nuclear arms control treaties with the US. 

My interview responses centered on two areas: nuclear arms control and arms exports. The primary concerns with respect to nuclear control were for stability and continuity, and for control of the former Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. I asked a Supreme Soviet deputy and member of the Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations whether nuclear arms control treaties remained important after the Cold War. He said of course, because they were a "fundamental sign. Ratification is a

73Interview 35; Interview 20.
74Interview 27.
sign of intention."\textsuperscript{75} These treaties, he said, are a most important political fact, because the control of the military capabilities of nuclear capable countries, including France, China, and so on, is still a matter of concern. Similarly, a scholar at the USA/Canada Institute and advisor to the Supreme Soviet on arms control dismissed my questions on specific arms control proposals or numbers negotiated in START and said that the value of these treaties and talks is mostly "just to have a system, not the specific concrete agreements. We must subject security to transparency, certainty, and verification systems. It is really not the numbers."\textsuperscript{76} In this regard, he said, START provided a better opportunity than CFE because it is a bilateral negotiation, though the issues were more serious for security. While CFE issues were less serious for Russian security, he claimed, the negotiations were far more complicated because of the number of countries involved.

Far outweighing the political and military reasons for nuclear arms control negotiations with the US in 1992, however, was Russian determination to use the existing nuclear arms control rubric to de-nuclearize Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (or maintain their technically legal non-nuclear status, depending on your point of view). When these countries declared their sovereignty in December 1991, they declared their intentions to de-nuclearize and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. They were then recognized by other countries, including the US, on this understanding.\textsuperscript{77} Shortly thereafter, the leaderships of Kazakhstan and Ukraine began to waver on this commitment. When I asked a Supreme Soviet deputy whether he saw American involvement in these nuclear issues cooperation or interference, he said "Neither, it is an issue of security for Western interests,"\textsuperscript{78} meaning that he was neither resentful of nor grateful for American efforts to de-

\textsuperscript{75}Interview 31.

\textsuperscript{76}Interview 18.

\textsuperscript{77}In an interesting contradiction, another condition for recognition was that all the former republics of the former Soviet Union were required to accept their "joint and several" responsibility for the debts of the former Soviet Union. The republics were expected to forego their successor state status in the area of nuclear weapons, but acknowledge it in the area of debt obligations.

\textsuperscript{78}Interview 31.
nuclearize Ukraine and the rest -- it was simply logical and self-interested. A researcher and Supreme Soviet advisor answered somewhat differently but in the same spirit when I asked if Russia could accept an American role in the disposition of post-Soviet nuclear affairs. Of course, he answered, "the non-nuclear status of these states is the goal of Russian foreign policy."79

This confidence that it was in American interests to de-nuclearize all the former Soviet republics but Russia was supplemented by equally firm confidence that those republics were vulnerable to American pressure in this regard. Several officials and scholars told me that the US and international community had made a big mistake in recognizing the republics before they had actually given up their nuclear weapons. A foreign policy advisor to Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov said that the mission of Secretary Baker in February 1992 to visit these republics was a big mistake because "they asked themselves, 'what do we have -- a human rights record, economic strength that brings him here? -- no, of course, it is the nuclear weapons'."80 The US, said another interview subject, should make these semi-nuclear countries abide by the NPT.81 Yet another said that because of its weakness and inexperience, "Ukraine is very sensitive, open to international influence."82

Russian officials and scholars were very aware of how different nuclear arms control provisions and proposals could differentially affect the former Soviet states, and were not shy about telling me how they sought to exploit such differences to serve Russian security interests. A scholar who advises the Supreme Soviet on arms control issues explained that the Committee on Defense and Security was looking at the possibility of supporting the "Bush proposals" for START II to ban all MIRVed missiles. Since Ukraine and Kazakhstan have only MIRVed ICBMs (SS-24s and SS-18s, respectively), he explained, this international agreement would automatically ban all their weapons and force their dismantling or with-

79Interview 18.
80Interview 5.
81Interview 18.
82Interview 19.
drawal, while leaving Russia with a substantial number. It would also leave Belarus with all its single-warhead ICBMs, but that country would find itself alone and under increased pressure to disarm under the provisions of the NPT. 83

It is by this time no secret that the policy of the Russian government is to promote arms exports where possible. The reasons given by officials in the open press are varied: to fund reform, to fund conversion, to prevent large-scale unemployment. Again, while I did not pursue this issue in great detail because it was not a major area of concern in Russian-German relations, I did learn some things that are of interest. First, the Yeltsin pro-reform government was interested in arms sales as an economic activity and foreign policy tool from early 1992. Its policy is not merely a response to criticism from the right or to difficulties in the economy that had become clear by summer 1992. In February, an official in the RFM responsible for arms control and disarmament policy said that the government would prefer to see an international agreement controlling arms sales -- at least the sale of offensive arms. "If everyone ceased, we would too." But, he said, as long as all other countries continue to sell arms, Russia will do so. In fact, he said, Russia continues to have comparative advantages in selling certain kinds of arms. He then enthusiastically told me about a new generation of Kalashnikov rifles which are smaller and lighter and therefore likely to be very much in demand on the international market. Why, he asked, should Russia forego these kinds of sales if other countries do not? Russia would lose money and markets, but arms would still be sold to those who want them. 84

Similarly, an official responsible for European security told me in April that he saw several problems in creating an arms export control regime. First is the issue of getting all countries to agree to a significant regime: "If we stop and Germany starts, what is the sense of it?" In particular, he said, he was doubtful that the US would ever agree to meaningful controls on dangerous conventional weaponry because the American economy is more dependent on high tech weapons. Without US participation, such an agreement would be meaningless. Second, foreign policy political interests and relations are too dependent on

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83 Interview 18.

84 Interview 27.
arms sales. For example, he said, India is dependent on Russia for equipment and spare parts, so that even if the economic costs of limiting sales to countries such as India could be borne, the political costs are too high. Third, he said, the idea of global arms export controls is too ambitious and involves too many countries with diverse interests. It would be more possible, he argued, to think about a regional system for export controls, under for example the CSCE. In that case, he said, the number of countries is more limited, there is a basic understanding of European security, and it is possible to identify likely sources of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{85}

I had a very useful background interview with a scholar who studies arms exports controls at the USA/Canada Institute.\textsuperscript{86} He said that the government had recently (this was in October 1992) reported that official arms sales in the current year were $1.55 billion. In theory, he said arms sales must be approved by the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation ("twenty people -- like the Politburo" he said), which is supposed to assess whether a given sale would be dangerous. This is not what happens in practice, he said, for five reasons. First, no one has established criteria for what "dangerous" sales would look like. There is neither a law nor even a Presidential decree establishing criteria. So in practice the committee can decide on whatever basis it wishes. Second, official policy and political pressures are such that the criteria upon which this committee decides are economic. He pointed out that Gaidar (at the time he was Prime Minister) stated that the priority for arms sale was Russian entry into foreign markets, and Petr Aven (at the time he was Minister of Foreign Economic Relations) said that the criteria for Russia's arms exports was based on providing resources for Russian defense conversion. In the end, he said, arms are sold where customers have the ability to pay. "Where we do not sell, it is because they buy from America." Third, the institutions represented on this committee all favor strong export sales policies. The RFM favors sales to maintain foreign political relations (this includes, he pointed out, relations with the new countries of the former Soviet Union which are dependent on Russia for many types of arms and spare parts), the defense industries favor it for obvious

\textsuperscript{85}Interview 24.

\textsuperscript{86}Interview 4.
reasons, the military in the Defense Ministry also have strong economic interests in arms sales, and the President's government has adopted sales as a priority. The only group of government officials which are interested in balancing the incentives and disincentives for arms sales is the civilian portion of the Defense Ministry under Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin. But even they, he pointed out, are in charge of conversion and therefore have a strong interest in promoting sales. Kokoshin's office had been given the responsibility to work out criteria for "dangerous" sales, but had not yet done so, because there is not a common view on what constitutes security or threats to Russia. So without criteria for controlling sales and with strong interests for selling, there is not much control. In short, "because there are no criteria, we cannot say if a sale is dangerous or not -- maybe for the experts we can see it -- but in politics..."

Fourth, he said that the countries of the former Soviet Union all have strong economic interests in selling arms for reform, and have failed to cooperate in any political area for mutual security. "There is for us a structural problem with the end of the Union," in that the integration and mutual dependence of the defense industries among the republics means that there are strong incentives to cooperate to sell weapons rather than to control them. He claimed that Russia had looked into the possibility of controlling export of certain types of advanced conventional weapons capabilities, such as advanced radar and anti-aircraft technology, to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular because of their close proximity and links to the Asian arms market, but in practice the level of integration was such that meaningful control of any set of technologies would bring inter-republic trade to a halt. That would only strengthen the incentives for countries such as Uzbekistan to go on the international arms market, he claimed, and the idea has been abandoned for now. As a final reason for the ineffectiveness of the Committee, he pointed out that fewer and fewer arms sellers are even bothering to seek approval for sales, but are simply accomplishing sales locally and off the books.

He pointed out that control of arms and technology was still operating for nuclear weapons and technology, and offered two reasons. First, under the Soviet Union there was a highly centralized, high-level, and effective system for controlling nuclear weapons and technology. This was inherited by the Russian government and is still functioning. Second, he noted that interests seeking to open up this trade (he called this the "military lobby") had
been working in the parliament to create more permissive laws and structures, but "in principle, where there are international agreements, this is less of a problem." That is, where there were effective Soviet domestic structures and established international agreements to control arms and technology, the control system is more effective.

VI. Other Institutions and Security

It is probably not surprising that my interview subjects did not see institutions such as the European Community as very important for Russian security, since its political importance (at least with respect to non-members) is minimal. Similarly, when I would ask officials and scholars about the West European Union (WEU), their responses were usually supportive in the sense of a future role or were dismissive. Those few who told me that the WEU either would or should be important in European security did so in the context of Germany's greater role.\(^87\) Those who dismissed it did so in comparison to the greater effectiveness of NATO and larger purpose and membership of CSCE.\(^88\) One official believed that the WEU would grow in importance, but not as an effective institution, merely as an instrument of German power and policy.\(^89\) In short, Russian officials are unconcerned by the WEU because it seems neither to help nor to threaten the problems Russia faces.

Also not entirely surprising given my research focus on Europe, I found very little interest in or attention to the United Nations. As I explained earlier, the idea of UN peacekeeping in Europe and the former Soviet Union generally did not raise concern and was preferred over inaction or NATO activity, but it was clear that the agent of any UN peacekeeping in areas of Russian concern would be the CSCE. I found somewhat more interest in the value of the UN for dealing with the former Soviet republics insofar as their membership obligated these new states to certain forms of behavior and observance of

\(^87\)Interview 11; Interview 40.
\(^88\)Interview 24.
\(^89\)Interview 36.
international principles that are generally in Russia's interests. But in terms of negotiations and concrete relations in 1992, Russian officials and politicians were more focused on bilateral relations and the potential of the CIS as a forum for security cooperation. I would expect that as the CIS's effectiveness as an institution did not materialize, Russian officials might be thinking more in terms of UN structures (as for example in proposals for UN peacekeeping in Armenia and Azerbaijan), but my research covered the earlier period.

Finally, I interviewed an official in the Department for Cooperation and Security in Europe responsible for policy on the Baltic Sea Council, which is a new association founded in March 1992 by ten countries bordering on the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Poland, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). I had read in the German press that the Council was created to deal with issues of regional economic importance, such as rail, road, and shipping links, communication, cultural cooperation, etc. But I had also read that the Russian delegation had come to the first session with an agenda for ensuring "democratic rights" and wanted to ask about this focus. The official told me that the Russian priority in supporting the BSC was to "contribute to democratic institutions in the former Soviet republics and in the general promotion of democracy." This, he said, was to be accomplished by insuring the member states' adherence to the principles of the CSCE on human and democratic rights, and in cooperation with the CSCE's Center of Democratic Institutions in Warsaw. He discussed with me the agenda for the upcoming meeting on 27 April 1993 in general terms. When I asked about Russian priorities, he said that Russia feels that establishment of a Commissioner for National Minorities is especially important. The BSC, he said, should deal with the "burning issues of today" -- ethnic minorities and nationalities. This problem had not received the attention and work it needs, he claimed, even in the CSCE which is focused on general issues of security in Europe for a large number of countries. Russia has specific interests in this sub-region, he said, because of the Russian minorities in the Baltics, pointing out that of Estonia's population of 1.5 million, .5 million were Russian who were being adversely affected by the law on citizenship Estonia

90 Interview 19.

91 Interview 22.
had adopted (this law has stringent criteria for citizenship which would exclude nearly all Russians in Estonia). When I pressed on why the BSC should be a focus of Russian efforts in this regard, given the CSCE's and UN's basic provisions on human rights, he said that the Western members -- particularly Germany by virtue of the former East German territories that lie on the Baltic Sea and are poorly integrated with East or West -- have their own reasons in economics, transportation, communication, and political stability for favoring development of such a regional sub-grouping. Although he did not say it directly, I understood him to mean that most members of the BSC were interested in it for sub-regional development issues, and Russia hoped to benefit from this interest by pressing its case for defending the rights of Russian minorities in the Baltic republics. As far as I understand from reports on the development of the BSC and of the Russian minorities issue, this objective was not realized.

VII. Some Conclusions

As I argued in my previous report, Russia's security concerns with respect to Germany are of a somewhat non-traditional cast, because Russian leaders, politicians, and officials do not view German power or intentions as a threat to Russian security. In comparison to the political and military threats arising in the areas of the former Soviet Union that are now independent states, Germany looks more like a resource for Russian security than a threat. Therefore, Russian policy has not sought to "balance" against Germany. Nor, however, has the Russian government sought to construct a classic European great power alliance with Germany, due to the very practical calculation that the German government would not be interested in reconstituting such a traditional alliance.

Instead, Russian officials in 1992 began to rely on policies and strategies that took into account the existing international security environment in Europe, which included a variety of security institutions. Three institutions in particular played a role in Russian strategies: NATO/NACC, the CFE treaty and agreement, and the CSCE. On the military security level, NATO has multiple effects on Russian strategies, that are in some respects contradictory. My interviews showed that Russian officials tend not to see NATO as an active military threat to Russian security, and in some important respects see it as serving
important transitional stabilizing functions. The NACC (designed to be a political forum) has also affected military security issues by increasing NATO's transparency and actively contributing to the resolution of some disagreements about conventional military forces in Europe. But it is also clear that NATO's military capabilities and the fact the Russia is not and almost certainly can never be a member means that it remains a latent threat, at least to significant portions of the Russian defense and foreign policy elite. In terms of security strategies, the Russian approach has been to use the forum when there are common interests between the major Western members and Russia to bring some influence to bear on Russia's neighbors, but to insist that NATO cannot be developed into a fully functional security institution for Europe. The importance of NATO in Russian strategies, therefore, is highly variable and depends on the instrumental value of the institution for Russian policies under particular circumstances.

My evidence points to a similar conclusion with respect to the impact of the CFE treaty on Russian security strategies, although Russian status as one of the primary parties to the CFE reduces the ad hoc nature of its impact. In comparing the responses of officials and scholars to NATO and CFE, a major reason for the similarities is that both are seen as potentially effective security instruments because they involve the West in important security dilemmas the Russian government faces. In explaining their differences, I return to the point that in NATO, Russia has no vote, whereas in the CFE, it is one of the most important signatories. The NACC is an interesting case of a more inclusive organization than NATO with a broader mandate than CFE, but it is generally seen as a political institution and not one that has (at least as yet) a large role in military forces and doctrine. This, plus the fact that the former Soviet and Soviet-allied countries are clearly junior members of the NATO/NACC organization, means that it does not play much of a role in Russian strategies.

For all these reasons as well, Russian officials and scholars generally focus on the more promising role of CSCE: it is inclusive, its mandate covers the broadest range of security, and Russia is not a junior partner. However, it is difficult to find policies and strategies in which CSCE has had a substantial impact on Russia's security policies. Its norms and expectations are a constraint on Russian relations with the new countries of the former Soviet Union, since the Russian government is concerned with its reputation on issues
of human and political rights. But nearly all of my interview evidence on the CSCE is about hopes, ambitions, and ideas, not practical effect. The CSCE remains a relatively weak institution, and that is reflected in its limited impact. In terms of the Russian case, that weakness is in turn a result of the government’s reluctance to turn over to multilateral international authority what are still perceived at largely "internal" problems that are an immediate cause for security concern. The tightly circumscribed nature of Russia’s multilateral strategy for the CSCE is well-illustrated in its priority on developing CSCE peacekeeping forces -- that would be composed of Russian forces when deployed on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

These findings and tentative comparisons support the general sense in the international relations literature that it is more difficult to overcome constraints on cooperation the scarcer security is perceived to be by a country’s decisionmakers. Russia is happy to cooperate with NATO countries to disarm Ukraine, because of its relative assessment of where the threat lies (with the important caveat that NATO may remain a longer-term threat). But it also supports the notion that where stronger and more stable institutions already exist, uncertainty and other obstacles to cooperation are marginally easier to overcome. How else can we explain the fact that NATO/NACC and the CFE system have had a larger effect on Russian strategies in dealing with security concerns regarding the other former Soviet countries? Of the three, the CSCE is least effective in terms of concrete rules and procedures and has been less consistently supported by the major Western countries. It is the institutional effectiveness of NATO, NACC, and CFE that has proven more important for Russian security strategies than the government’s abstract preference for the CSCE as the primary European security institution.
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20. Professor and Researcher, Moscow State University Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Moscow, 21 February 1992.


31. Member of Supreme Soviet, Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Moscow, 26 May 1993.

32. Member of Supreme Soviet, Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Moscow, 26 May 1993.
33. Member of Supreme Soviet, Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Moscow, 26 May 1993.

34. Deputy Director, Institute of Europe. Moscow, 27 February 1992.


36. Foreign Policy Advisor to the Vice President. Moscow, 28 May 1993.


42. Head of Department, Institute of Europe. Moscow, 29 April 1992.


44. Head of Bureau, Department on International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Moscow, 14 October 1992.