NOTE

This paper is a preliminary draft of a chapter in a forthcoming book on regional politics in the CIS to be edited by the author and Theodore H. Friedgut and therefore should not be extensively cited without permission from the author.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The question to which the present paper is addressed is: What is the nature of opposition to economic and political reform at the local level of government in Russia and how solid is it? It is argued that any assessment of Yeltsin's ability to pursue a reformist agenda, especially on economic issues, must take this question into account. The present paper offers a preliminary analysis of this question based on survey interviews with 1280 deputies in five Russian oblast and city soviets conducted in March-June, 1992.

The paper begins by outlining the course of the struggle for power that developed in 1992 between Yeltsin and the reformists who dominate executive authority at the center and older elites whose institutional base of power is no longer located in the Party, but in the legislatures, especially at the local level. It is argued in the first part of the paper that to bolster their case for stronger executive authority, Yeltsin and his allies have characterized those elected to the soviets as the forces of counter-reformation. If this portrayal is accurate, then the growing success of national and local legislatures in asserting their authority would lead one to pessimistically assess the chances for reform.

The paper goes on to test the following hypotheses derived from the analysis in the first part of the paper and from the specialist literature using data from the survey of 1280 deputies in five regions of central Russia:
1) that there is support among soviet deputies in general for reforms aimed at the
development of a market economy and a more democratic political system;

2) that support for such reforms will be greater among younger, better-educated,
professionally employed and female deputies holding office for the first time;

3) that support for such reforms will be stronger among deputies to city soviets than
among those in the oblasts;

4) that support for such reforms will vary among different regions of central Russia.

CONCLUSIONS

The major thesis of the paper, based on survey data of March - June 1992, is that the
portrayal by Yeltsin and his allies of local soviet deputies as the center of resistance to reform
needs to be reconsidered. The findings presented offer little support for the view that deputies
to city and oblast soviets in the central regions of Russia are broadly opposed to free market
reforms and to democratic values. On the contrary, there seems to be more support for them
among the deputies than not.

Beyond this general conclusion, however, there do appear to be some significant
variations among the deputies in their levels of support, especially on issues of economic reform.
Demographically, we found consistently higher support for free market values among younger,
better-educated, professionally employed deputies holding office for the first time. Education
and gender proved to be the only significant predictors of deputies political attitudes with the
better educated favoring democratic values. Women deputies, however, were found to have
significantly more "conservative" values on both issues.
In comparing the attitudes of deputies to the city (oblast capital) soviets with those at the oblast level, consistent differences on economic issues were also found with city deputies more favorably disposed towards a free market economy. Patterns for political questions were much less apparent, and sometimes contradictory. On the question of whether the oblast soviet had too strong an influence on the city, the difference was consistent, strong and predictable: City deputies felt that they did; oblast deputies disagreed. In terms of composition, oblast deputies were more often older incumbents with a higher education. The composition of the soviets with respect to gender was not significantly different.

Broadly speaking, these findings held up across the five regions studied, despite the fact that there was considerable variation between regions in their support for "reformist" views. One tentative conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that while city deputies may be more "pro-market" in their attitudes than those in the oblast soviets, they do not necessarily hold stronger democratic values.

In short, if there does appear to be a vertical struggle for power between the center and the periphery, the findings presented in this paper suggest that the struggle is not over reform per se so much as it is over who will get to decide who gets what, when, and how. After all, why should older elites be opposed to democratic and free market reforms if they can control their implementation for their own benefit? The differences found between deputies on the city and oblast level on economic issues may reflect the fact that more of those at the oblast level are drawn from the ranks of the former managerial nomenklatura and see their control over the regional economy threatened. The differences may also be generational with younger deputies hoping to use their leverage to replace the local managerial elite.
All in all, there is some support here for the view that what is at stake is control over local resources. Having abandoned (or lost) their base of power in the obkoms, the old elites are seeking a new one in the economy and seek to use the soviets as a power base from which to do so. While that may be true, however, it does not necessarily make them forces of counter-reformation.
COUNTER-REFORMATION IN THE PROVINCES: HOW MONOLITHIC?¹

by

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THE PROBLEM

Perhaps the dominant fact of political life in Russia one year after the failure of the August 19, 1991 "putsch" is the continued struggle for power between those who held it under the old regime and those who would take it away from them; between the members of the old communist party leadership and their "nomenklatura" allies, and the "reformists" led by President Boris Yeltsin and free market advocate Yegor Gaidar, acting Chairman of the Russian government. It is a conflict whose roots can be traced to the policies of the former President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, especially those policies aimed at economic modernization within the old Soviet system. In pursuing policies of economic change, Gorbachev generated
widespread opposition among members of the Party apparatus and government bureaucracy who had a vested interest in preserving the status quo; Gorbachev’s proposed reforms of it directly threatened their powers and privileges.

While the protagonists in this struggle remain much the same, the venue has changed. In post-communist Russia, the institutional base of the opposition to the reformists is no longer the Communist Party, but the soviets, and, it is no longer in the center, but at the periphery. It is here that the old opposition regrouped; it is in the provinces that the forces of counter-reformation appear the strongest. This, at least, is the way Yeltsin and his allies see it. The metamorphosis of the old elites was described early on by, among others, Yeltsin’s State Secretary, Gennady Burbulis. In an interview published in Literaturnaja gazeta of 13 November 1991 he asserted that: "It is well known where the party nomenklatura at the territory, province, city and district levels have gone. Within a month, the vast majority of these people have emerged in the bodies of state executive power; many have remained in the soviets and where no positions were available for them, some had to be created".

What is even more alarming to the forces for change, however, is that momentum over the year since the attempted coup seems to have shifted to their adversaries. Yeltsin’s meeting in Cheboksary, the capital of the Chuvash Republic, on 11 September 1992 with the leaders of oblasts and territories in the Russian Federation is almost certainly a recognition of this. In his speech he charged that regional bodies of power "violate the laws of the Russian Federation and fail to fulfill Presidential decrees and government decisions". While ruling out "coercive means" in settling federal-regional differences, he demanded an end to what he referred to as "legal separatism" in the provinces. He then announced that he would postpone new elections to the
local soviets that had been tentatively rescheduled for December, 1992 and allow those elected to office in March 1990 to finish their five year terms. It was a recognition that those supporting Yeltsin and the reformists would probably lose locally. It was a sign of retreat.

Given the apparent strength of local opposition, and in light of Yeltsin's declining popularity, the prospects that he and his government can succeed in imposing reformist policies from above, especially those aimed at the creation of a market economy, would appear diminished (Reddaway). But are all local authorities necessarily or equally opposed to the reformist policies of the center? Based on an analysis of elite changes from 1985-1991 in 25 Russian and Ukrainian provinces, Joel Moses developed a political typology divided into those he labeled establishment, anti-establishment, and transitional (Moses). Even Yeltsin claimed in his speech in Cheboksary that problems with the local authorities were acute in only about half of the provinces of Russia. Moreover, his remarks were directed to leaders at the oblast level. There is reason to believe that greater support for reformist policies may exist among elected officials to the soviets at the city level, especially in the oblast capitals (Hahn, 1991; Slider, 1991; Moses). Finally, as Mary McAuley has argued, what is at stake may not be reform as such, but the issue of who will control local economic resources (McAuley, p. 76).

The question, then, to which the present paper is addressed is: What is the nature of opposition to reforms at the local level and how solid is it? Any assessment of Yeltsin's ability to pursue his reformist agenda, especially on economic issues, must take this question into account. The present paper offers a preliminary analysis of this question based on survey interviews with 1280 deputies in five Russian oblast and city soviets, conducted in March-June, 1992. In particular, we try to answer the following: What are the attitudes of locally elected
deputies to matters of political and economic reform? Are there significant differences between deputies in city and oblast soviets in their attitudes and orientations toward reform? If there are, are they consistent across different parts of central Russia? We will begin by trying to outline the development of the struggle for power just described as it unfolded in the first year after the coup attempt and to delineate what appear to be the major points of contention.

THE NATURE OF LOCAL OPPOSITION

The reasons for the political dynamics just described are not hard to find. They are rooted in the elections to local offices and to the RSFSR Parliament held in March, 1990. While relatively democratic by previous Soviet standards, the elections were held at a time when local control still rested largely with the local Party organization and those dependent on it. They were also held in the absence of multi-party competition leaving voters with little to guide their choices among a large number of candidates competing in a large number of districts often over the course of several elections (Hahn, 1992a). As a result, while many voters took their revenge on the local political establishment by "throwing the bums out", the old apparat managed to gain a foothold in the new soviets by finding safe seats (often in rural areas) or by mobilizing constituencies in districts open to their influence. In coalition with members of managerial elite and other nomenklatura controlled appointments, they were often able to form working majorities in the soviets, especially at the oblast level where a majority of seats came from rural constituencies (Helf and Hahn; Moses).

The "conservative" political coloration of many of the deputies elected to these soviets become readily apparent to the central leadership during their first year in office. Even before
the coup attempt, Boris Yeltsin, who had been elected President of Russia in June 1991, was determined to undermine their influence and to end their opposition to reform programs emanating from the Russian government. On August 14, 1991, he appointed Valerii Makharadze from Volgograd, one of the few reformist oblast soviet chairs, to the position of State Inspector with the task of overseeing the implementation of federal legislation at the provincial level. Support for the attempted overthrow of the Soviet government among a number of provincial leaders served to confirm Yeltsin's suspicions about their motives and a number were removed from office. In the wake of the coup, he took even firmer measures to consolidate his authority locally by appointing "Presidential representatives" and by moving to control the appointment of the new "heads of administration" (Teague and Hanson, p. 10; Slider, p. 10-11). Since both moves were central to his strategy for overcoming local opposition, they deserve brief discussion.

The presidential representative was to be a temporary position held by a presidential appointee who reported directly to Yeltsin on whether local authorities were carrying out the will of the federal government. They were not supposed to interfere directly in local administration and were to be removed after an undefined transitional period. The head of administration was a new position and represented a permanent change in the structure of local government. In conception, incumbents would be the sole chief executives at the local level replacing the chairs of the executive committee (ispolkom) which existed under the old system. At the city level, the head of administration could also be referred to as a "mayor" (meyr); at the oblast level, as a "governor" (gubernator). Instead of being elected by the soviets, and accountable to them, heads of administration would be elected directly by the voters. In this way the existing
organization of local government according to which there were two heads (a chair of the soviet and a chair of the ispolkom) would be replaced by one in which a single person was responsible for governing (known as the principle of edinonachalie). The heads of administration could veto decisions of the soviet which would need a 2/3 majority to override.\(^7\)

Prior to the August 19, 1991 coup attempt, elections for the new heads of administration had been scheduled for December 8, 1991. Sensing, however, that the likely winners of such a contest, especially at the oblast level, would be the incumbent chairs of the soviets, Yeltsin requested and (after initially being rejected by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet) obtained, in October, 1991, a postponement of elections. At the same time, he received the authority to appoint the heads of administration.\(^8\) In principle, Yeltsin made such appointments only after receiving nominations from the local soviet, but in practice he could disregard their choice if he didn’t approve of it and act independently, usually on the advice of his presidential representative. It may be helpful to use the example of what happened in Yaroslavl’ to illustrate the process and the politics behind it.

In Yaroslavl’ in the winter of 1991 there were meetings of both the city and oblast soviets to nominate candidates for Yeltsin’s consideration. In the case of the city, the incumbent chair of the ispolkom, Viktor Volunchunas, received the most votes and was appointed mayor by Yeltsin. At the oblast level, the incumbent head of the obispolkom, and a deputy of the Russian parliament, Vladimir Kovalev, also received the most votes from the soviet. He, however, was rejected by Yeltsin on the recommendation of the presidential representative, Vladimir Varukhin, in favor of Anatolii Lisitsyn, a former ispolkom chair from Rybinsk who had gotten only a few votes at the meeting of the oblast soviet. The likely reasons for Yeltsin’s rejection of Kovalev
were Kovalev's ties to the old apparat and his apparent support for the coup attempt. For his part, Lisitsyn promptly purged the old ispolkom of those with links to the old elite and named a new team loyal to himself, and, not coincidentally, to the President.9

In short, the thrust of Yeltsin's strategy was to outflank the soviets where he perceived his opponents were stronger. He did so by strengthening executive authority and by ensuring that the executives would be answerable to him.10 The reaction was predictable. As the soviets dug in against what they perceived as an encroachment on their authority, they were increasingly characterized as the chief bastion of nomenklatura resistance to reform. The battle was joined in the Spring of 1992 in anticipation of the 6th Congress of People's Deputies to be held in April. In an editorial published on 28 February, Izvestiiia charged that "The current alignment of forces in the oblast and district level soviets, where there is an established and growing conservative majority, threatens to undo the reforms, the fate of which is always decided at the local level". In a press conference reported in Rossiiskaya gazeta on 4 March, two political analysts associated with the government claimed that more than 80% of oblast level soviet chairmen and administrators were former party secretaries or held nomenklatura positions. The solution favored by these critics was to oust the incumbents elected in 1990 by adopting a new constitution, effectively abolishing the existing soviets, and by holding new elections.11

The soviets are not without their supporters, however. Matters came to a head shortly before the Congress opened when Yeltsin refused to sign the "Law on Krai, Oblast Soviets and on Krai, Oblast Administration" which was passed by parliament on 5 March 1992. He sent it back to parliament with a number of proposed changes all of which would have given the head of administration greater power, especially in matters of personnel. All were rejected by the
Supreme Soviet (whose chair, Ruslan Khasbulatov, is increasingly seen as the chief defender of legislative prerogatives) as giving the executive branch excessive control. According to Khasbulatov, the Law does a good job of defining the respective rights and obligations of the legislative and executive branches. The problem, he said, was that "some heads of administration don't want to be bound by any sort of law. They would like, according to their own wishes, to distribute such things as resorts and factories."\(^{12}\)

In response to the parliament's rejection of his proposals, Yeltsin suggested to the Congress that he would impose a moratorium on the implementation of the Law. He made his remarks in the context of emphasizing a theme which he would repeat often: the inadmissibility of legislative interference in the work of the executive branch.\(^{13}\) Sergei Shakhrai, the President's chief legal advisor, later informed Georgii Zhukov, the chair of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Work of the Soviets, that the Law could not be introduced until after new elections, effectively, if temporarily, blocking the assertion of greater legislative power locally. Not coincidentally, Yeltsin's announcement of Sept. 12 1992 postponing all elections until 1995 suggests that a similar delay in implementing the Law on oblast soviets is being contemplated.\(^{14}\)

Those making the case for the soviets rest their more favorable assessment on the fact that incumbent deputies were elected. The deputies, they argue, have a popular mandate which administrators presently do not; the later were appointed by Yeltsin and not popularly elected as stipulated in the law on the oblasts. Many critics of the soviets contend that the 1990 elections did not really accurately reflect voters' preferences because they were manipulated by the existing authorities. This view may have some merit, but there was little evidence of widespread cheating and it ignores the possibility that many people, especially in rural areas, and
among the elderly and unskilled, may have reservations about what the democratic movement would mean for them. Arguments that the soviets are "ineffective" because they resist policies made at the center obscure the fact that many voters are unhappy with these policies. As one angry deputy put it: "Representative bodies of power are called that precisely because they are called upon to represent the interests of their constituents, interests which are far from always the same as those of the executive branch" (Nemkov, p. 43).

The irony is that those calling themselves "democrats" now favor stronger central authority in the face of resistance from below. Noting this irony, Georgii Zhukov, a legal scholar as well as chair of the committee on the soviets, in the interview noted earlier included Burbulis, Shakhrai, Popov, Sobchak, and Makharadze, along with Yeltsin, in this category, and forcefully argued that, "The persecution of the soviets is a dangerous path. It in no way justifies the deliberate effort to give full control to the executive bodies. To do so would be unlawful; it would eliminate democratic oversight of their activities. It would be an irreversible step in the direction of dictatorship" (pp. 34-35). Whatever political reasons Zhukov may have had for making this argument, it may well resonate in a population increasingly restive with Yeltsin's reforms. The 7th Congress of People's Deputies scheduled for December, 1992 may prove to be a showdown on the issue of executive rule and it is far from clear that the reformists will carry the day as they were able to do a year earlier and again in the Spring of 1992.

DEPUTIES' ATTITUDES TOWARD REFORM

It seems clear from the review presented so far that the horizontal struggle between executive and legislative authority is interwoven with a vertical conflict between central and local
power (Hahn, 1991). The center has ascribed to itself the mantle of reform and cast its opponents in the role of defenders of the old order using the soviets as cover. For their part, local deputies and their allies in the parliament warn of impending return to dictatorship if executive authority is not limited. Behind this maneuvering, however, remains Harold Lasswell’s famous definition of politics as the process of deciding "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell). In the context of today’s Russian politics, will it be the old elite reincarnate or their "democratic" opposition who decide?

What is not clear from the foregoing is just what the attitudes of locally elected representatives towards reform really are. If we accept the characterization of the "reformists", deputies to the local soviets are, at best, ineffective meddlers in the affairs of pro-reform administrators, and, at worst, nomenklatura dominated opponents of reform who would secretly like to return to good old days. Yet, on the face of it, such a characterization is hard to accept, if only because of the homogeneity of views it ascribes to the deputies. To test this view, we now return to the questions asked at the outset: What are the attitudes of local deputies toward reform and are there any significant differences in their views? The answer may tell us something not only about the political dynamics of Russian politics today, but help define some parameters for the future as well.

HYPOTHESES

Based on previous research, some of which has been cited above, and in light of the analysis offered in the preceding, the major thesis of this paper is that the portrayal of local
soviet deputies as the center of resistance to reform needs to be reconsidered. In particular, we would expect that:

1) there is support among soviet deputies in general for reforms aimed at the development of a market economy and a more democratic political system;

2) that support for such reforms will be greater among younger, better-educated, professionally employed and female deputies holding office for the first time;

3) that support for such reforms will be stronger among deputies to city soviets than among those in the oblasts;

4) that support for such reforms will vary among different regions of central Russia.

DATA

The data on which the following analysis is based come from a survey of 1280 oblast and city (oblast capital) deputies in five provinces in central Russia conducted during the period of March-June, 1992. Since the total possible number of deputies in the areas surveyed is 2119, the average response rate was just over 60%. Breakdowns for each area are included in the descriptive information on each region which follows. The choice of the regions to be surveyed was dictated partly by the availability of qualified personnel to collect the data. Within that parameter, however, it was decided to concentrate on deputies from regions contiguous to Yaroslavl where the author has been conducting field research since February of 1990. At the same time, in an effort to determine how much variation would be found in other parts of central Russia, two other oblasts were added; one predominantly industrial in the southern Volga region
(Saratov), and one mostly agricultural oblast located in the black-earth region on the border with Ukraine (Belgorod).

The survey was conducted in the field by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion at Moscow State University using a questionnaire designed by the author in cooperation with Aleksander Gasparishvili, the director for research design at the Center. It was self-administered by the deputies under the guidance of trained local specialists affiliated with the Center. The questionnaire contained 171 items intended to elicit information about the activities of the deputies and the sources of influence on their decisions, including relations with constituents, others holding office, and the media. In addition, 30 agree/disagree questions measuring political attitudes were included which replicated some of the items used in the "Values in Politics" study, the results of which were published in 1971, and which are part of a current study called "New Democracy and Local Governance". Data were coded and processed by the Center in the summer of 1992 and made available to the author on diskette using an SPSS system file. What follows is a brief description of each region (in alphabetical order) used in the survey.

THE REGIONS

Belgorod. Belgorod oblast is a comparatively small region (27,100 sq. km.) in the central black earth zone on the border with Ukraine, the capital of which is located 695 km. south of Moscow. It is primarily known for agriculture and food-processing, but its population of 1,377,000 (40% rural) also are engaged in machine building, mining and metal-working. The population of the oblast capital is 286,000. The city soviet has 191 deputies of which 146 were
surveyed in April. The oblast soviet has 148; 119 were surveyed. Belgorod has long held the reputation of being a bastion of "conservatism"; the province was represented by Egor Ligachev at its last All-Union Congress. Politics in Belgorod oblast, at least, continue to be dominated by the old elites. After the failed coup there were no major personnel shake-ups. The oblast administration has been headed since December by Viktor I. Berestovoy, the former chairman of the oblast soviet, and the immediate past obkom 2nd Secretary. Given Berestovoy's continued tenure and the fact that Yeltsin has not appointed a presidential representative to Belgorod, it would appear the he has decided to accommodate rather than confront the local political establishment. It is worth noting, however, that despite continued "conservative" opposition to free market policies, 71 of the city's 183 commercial enterprises have been privatized.

Ivanovo. Ivanovo oblast is also relatively small (23,900 sq. km.) and is located adjacent to the Moscow oblast in the forested Volga basin to the northeast. Its capital is a distance of 318 km. from Moscow. The oblast population of 1,318,000 (18% rural and 97% Russian) is primarily engaged in light industry, especially in textiles, and forestry, although some military related industry is reported as well. 476,000 people live in the oblast capital. There are 190 deputies in the city soviet and 192 at the oblast level. Of these 70 and 52 respectively were surveyed in May. Politically, as in Belgorod, the coup did not precipitate any major personnel changes. The chair of the oblast soviet, Vladimir Tikhomirov, who had also been a member of the obkom, retained his post as chair after calling for a vote of confidence in the wake of the coup attempt. The vote apparently included the obispolkom chair, Adolph Laptev. At the city level, the chair of the soviet, S. Kruglov, was appointed head of administration by Yeltsin.
There is, however, also a presidential representative, V.I. Tolmachev, and it is unlikely that
Kruglov would have been appointed without his support. Ivanovo, because of its dependence
on Uzbek cotton faces tough economic times. 30% of the region was without heat in October,
1992. As elsewhere, the introduction of free markets is seen as beneficial primarily to the local
"mafia" and popular support is decidedly lukewarm with 10% using them and 65% supporting
the government's efforts to control street trade.

Kostroma. Kostroma's profile is similar to Ivanovo. It is larger in size, however,
(60,000 sq. km.), but smaller in population (797,000) of which 32% is rural. The oblast capital
numbers 273,000 and is located on the Volga river 372 km. northwest of Moscow.
Economically, Kostroma differs little from Ivanovo: light industry, textiles, timber. There are
175 city soviet deputies (126 surveyed in May) and 164 at the oblast level (125 surveyed in
April). The politics of Kostroma are less clear. Prior to the coup attempt the chair of the oblast
soviet was Vladimir Toropov, formerly obkom 1st Secretary. The chair of the obispolkom was
Valerii Arbuzov, also a member of the obkom. In the wake of the coup failure, however,
Arbuzov has become oblast head of administration despite active opposition from a group of
deputies known as "Narodnoye soglasie" but, presumably, with the approval of Yeltsin's
presidential representative, one Yurii Litvinov. The head of the city soviet remains V.I.
Maklakov, Kostroma oblast's KGB chief until his election in 1990. Despite the apparent
continuity of control by old elites, there is some evidence of an active reformist minority
favoring privatization in both soviets; 32 of 170 commercial city properties have been privatized.

Saratov. Saratov oblast is the largest of those chosen for this study in both size (100,200
sq. km.) and by population (2,628,000 of which 25% are rural). Ninety percent of these are
Russian and proposals to return Volga-German residents to the lands in Saratov from which they were evacuated in WW II are highly controversial. The oblast is located on the southern Russian steppe and its capital city of nearly a million inhabitants is a major port on the Volga river located 858 km. from Moscow. It is an economically diverse region with food processing, gas and oil refining, and machine building among the leading industries. It is a also home to a large aviation plant producing military aircraft since 1938. The oblast soviet has 295 deputies (106 surveyed in April); the city has 193 (146 were surveyed).

The political situation in Saratov is marked by conflict. There were some important leadership changes after the coup attempt. Most notably, Konstantin Murenin, the incumbent chair of the oblast soviet and previous obkom 1st Secretary was forced to resign. N.S. Makarevich was elected in his place. However, Nikolai Grishin, incumbent chair of the obispolkom, managed to avoid a similar fate and retained his position through the coup. Yeltsin moved quickly to appoint a presidential representative (V. G. Golovachev) and, within a few months, a new head of administration (Yuri Belykh). A classic division along the lines discussed earlier appears to have developed between a strongly reformist executive and a relatively "conservative" oblast soviet. A recent survey published in Saratovskie vesti on Sept. 5, 1992 (p. 2) showed scant support (17%) among the deputies for private ownership.

Yaroslavl’. Yaroslavl’ oblast is in the middle range in both size (36,400 sq. km.) and population (1,453,000; 19% rural). It is located north of Moscow oblast and shares common borders with it and with Kostroma, Ivanovo, and Vologda. Yaroslavl’ is primarily industrial with some food processing and timber. In the oblast capital set overlooking the Volga river, most of the 630,000 inhabitants are employed in factories building engines, ship construction,
petrochemical industries, and synthetic rubber for tires. It, too, is overwhelmingly Russian (96%). There are 185 deputies in the city soviet of whom 127 were surveyed in April and 192 at the oblast level (52 surveyed in May).

The politics of Yaroslavl’ have been discussed earlier in this paper and elsewhere in greater detail by the author. In short, however, prior to August 19, 1991, the conflict between a city soviet where reformists predominated and an oblast soviet controlled by the former party-state elites was evident. In the wake of the coup failure, Yeltsin moved to consolidate his hold over the executive branch by appointing a head of administration, Anatolii Lisitsyn, to replace the discredited former chief of the ispolkom, Vladimir Kovalev. The rest of the leadership remained in place, including the oblast chair, Anatolii Veselov, despite his apparat credentials as former 1st gorkom Secretary of Pereslavl’-Zalesski. Some tension remains, however, between the soviets and the executive, but mostly on the oblast level. The presidential representative, Vladimir Varukhin, does not appear to play a major role except, perhaps, on appointments.

METHODS

To test the hypotheses stated earlier, variables were chosen from the survey data which would indicate the attitudes of deputies on matters related to political and economic reform. The basic approach was to create scales which would provide a summary measure of how respondents felt about a market economy and about democratic values. These summary measures could then be cross-tabulated by level of soviet (oblast vs. city) for all deputies to see if there were significant differences. The results would then be broken down separately for each
of the five regions to see if any differences found for the deputies as a whole held up consistently in different parts of central Russia. In addition, individual items on respondents’ age, education, occupation, gender, and on whether the respondent had previously served as a deputy would also be used to determine if there was significant variation that could be explained by demographic or other factors. The first step was to obtain a frequency distribution for all variables. Not only was this essential to creating scales, but it would show whether there was much variation among the deputies in support for free market principles and democratic values.

To create the scales, factor analysis of 30 attitudinal variables was used to see if some variables clustered more than others. Those that did were then combined in a simple additive scale and tested for reliability using mean inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha. Scales used had to exceed a mean coefficient of inter-item correlation of .088 which is considered the minimum level acceptable at a significance level of .01 for a sample of 900 or more (Kuder and Richardson, 1937). Some items which did not scale, but which seemed potentially revealing were used independently.

In this way, five scales were developed to measure deputies’ attitudes: two economic, and three political. Of the two economic scales, one measured how the respondent felt about the accumulation of wealth. An "agree" response was unfavorable (e.g. "the scythe always cuts down the tallest blade first" mentality). The other economic scale tapped deputies’ feelings about a free market economy, only in this case an agree response indicated a positive evaluation. The scales measuring political attitudes dealt with the deputies’ feelings about popular participation in decision-making, their support for the principle of a strong leader, and their assessment of the work of the Russian Federation’s Supreme Soviet. All variables used
in the analysis are listed in the APPENDIX with a notation as to which were used to construct scales.

FINDINGS

**Hypothesis #1:** There is support among soviet deputies in general for reforms aimed at the development of a market economy and a more democratic political system.

The evidence presented in Table I (page 35) does not sustain the view that the deputies to oblast and city soviets are broadly opposed to free market reforms and democratic values. On the contrary, there is more support for them than one would expect, especially if one accepted at face value the portrayal of the soviets as the bastion of counter-reformation. On economic issues, the deputies do not appear to strongly share the view often ascribed to Russian folk culture that no one should do better than their neighbors. Only one third responded favorably to the idea that getting wealthy was a bad idea. A similar pattern shows up also in their answers to individual item 2 (var. 134); 38% agreed that "if some are poor, the government should see to it that none should be rich". On the other economic attitude measured, support for a free market economy is clearly apparent. Only 25% of the scaled response was unfavorable. Moreover, 79% of the of deputies agreed that the private sector should be expanded (see item 3, var. 148).

On political issues, the picture is less clear, but there is little in the data to sustain the view that the deputies would like to return to their authoritarian past. The balance of responses to our popular participation scale was more favorable than not (40%-28%) and 71% of the deputies agreed on the importance of all citizens having an equal chance to influence their
government (item 4; var. 128). There was also strong support for the emergence of a multi-party electoral system (item 1; var. 172). Another central democratic value is a preference for dispersed rather than concentrated power. Yet, the argument is often heard that what the Russian people want and need is "iron hand" (Migranian). As was noted earlier, even many observers sympathetic to the "democratic movement" are often in the forefront of those arguing for stronger central authority. This view does not appear to be widely shared by the deputies. Our scale measuring support for a strong leader show more opposed than in favor and when asked to agree that strong leaders are preferable to strong laws, 55% declined (item 5; var. 132). These findings may be interpreted to mean that deputies perceive strong authority as strengthening the center (read: Yeltsin and the reformists) and that they are opposed to that idea. However, the data do not permit us to rule out a genuine preference on their parts for a greater dispersion, or, if you will, balance of power.

Hypothesis #2: Support for reforms will be greater among younger, better-educated, professionally-employed, and female deputies holding office for the first time.

Age. There is evidence to suggest that there may be generational differences at work in explaining levels of support for reforms among the public, with younger people being more supportive than their elders (Bahry; Hahn, 1991). Is this also true of younger deputies? Analysis of the data from this survey suggest that there are clear differences on economic issues, but less so on issues related to democratic values. Younger deputies were far more likely to view the accumulation of wealth favorably (G=.25; p<.000) and were significantly more supportive of free market values (G=.12; p<.002). For the scales on popular participation and assessments of the Russian parliament, no significant differences were found. This was also true
for the item measuring support for a multi-party system. The one political issue on which there
was a modest, but significant, difference was on support for a strong leader. The younger the
deputy, the less favorably disposed.

Education. Education is generally regarded as a strong predictor of differences in
political attitudes and behavior in general (Milbrath and Goel) and in the former USSR (Bahry;
Hahn, 1991). Those with higher levels of education are expected to hold democratic values
more strongly (Almond and Verba). For our sample of deputies, there is some evidence that
education indeed has this effect. The differences between those with higher education and those
without were modest, but significant; higher education correlated with higher levels of support
for popular participation (.12) and for a free market (.13). On other scaled issues, no significant
variation was found. However, some individual items were revealing. Those with higher
education strongly rejected the view that profit brings out the worst in people (-.21) and
supported the effectiveness of private enterprise (.13). On political items, they clearly rejected
the view that popular participation leads to unwanted conflict (-.18) and that strong leaders can
do more for the country than strong laws (-.15). As with age, however, there was little
difference in support for a multi-party system or in their assessment of the Russian parliament.

Gender. The American elections of 1992 were often referred to in the press as ushering
in the "year of the woman". Supporters of this development argued that women would bring
a new perspective to the political arena, that they would somehow make it more humane, more
open, and, at least on gender issues, more liberal. What little survey work has been done on
Russian women, however, suggests the persistence of more traditional political values (Busza
and Hahn).
What about Russian women who hold office and who could, intuitively, be expected to have more reformist views? The data from this survey suggest the opposite: the attitudes of women deputies are relatively more "conservative" on some questions related to economic and political liberalism. Although there were no significant differences on scales dealing with the accumulation of wealth, free market values, or popular participation, women deputies were significantly more supportive of the idea of a strong leader (.14). On individual items they were far less likely to support a multi-party system (.20) and far more likely to agree that a strong leader may be better for the country than strong laws (.21). Finally, on individual economic items they were significantly more willing to support limits on income (.18) and to favor the idea that if some are poor none should be wealthy.

Occupation. Occupation is generally considered an important predictor of political attitudes (Milbrath and Goel). There may be additional reasons in the Russian context to expect that deputies with a professional occupational profile will hold views more supportive of reform. Leaders in other occupations, especially in government and management were part of the "nomenklatura" and therefore subject to approval by the corresponding Party secretary. One would expect them to hold more "conservative" views. As indicated in endnote #23, we have operationalized this variable to test for differences along these lines. The findings with respect to occupation are generally consistent with the findings for the other variables specified in this hypothesis, except gender. Those deputies coming from professionally related occupations score significantly lower on the "economic envy" scale (.16) and are much more supportive of free market values (.19). They are much less likely to look favorably on the need for a strong leader (.18) and are somewhat more favorably predisposed towards popular participation, though not
significantly (.07). There were no surprises among the individual items except one: Those whom we labeled "officials" were more likely to agree that "all citizens should have equal opportunity to influence government policies".

**Incumbency.** One of the questions asked in the survey, almost as an after-thought, was whether the deputies had held such office previously. As it turns out, having been an elected deputy before is a strong predictor of attitudes on reform. Correlation of incumbency with our scales showed incumbents to be far more opposed to the accumulation of wealth (-.27), and to free market principles (-.25), and more in favor of a strong leader (.15) than freshmen deputies (who, incidentally, make up 60% of those surveyed). On other political variables (do they favor popular participation or a multi-party system?) there was little difference, however. In retrospect, the findings presented here that incumbent deputies hold more "conservative" views make intuitive sense. Elections under the system which existed prior to 1990 were designed to ensure control by the local apparat over the formation of government. There was only one candidate for each seat, and their nomination had been fore-ordained by the party organization (Friedgut). Freshmen deputies, on the other hand, had been the first elected in a competitive environment, one which was not wholly dependent on the party organization's good graces, and whose views they did not necessarily have to share.

**Hypothesis #3:** That support for reforms will be greater among deputies to city soviets than among those in the oblasts.

The basis for this hypothesis comes from a growing body of literature suggesting that deputies to city soviets are more open to reform than those at the oblast level. Joel Moses found this pattern to be characteristic in at least two of what he labeled "transitional provinces", 
Odessa and Kaliningrad (Moses, p. 490-491). The implication, at least, was that such a relationship would be found elsewhere. Darrell Slider has referred to "the common pattern in the local elections [of 1990] of a conservative oblast soviet and a radical city soviet" (Slider, 1991, p. 8). This author contrasted the reformist-dominated city soviet of Yaroslavl' with that of the oblast soviet where nomenklatura candidates hold a working majority with members of the old apparat. He suggested that a vertical struggle for power would result, and that what was true for Yaroslavl' might be true elsewhere (Hahn, 1991).

But, if there are such differences, why should they exist? The major difference between city and oblast soviets is that oblast soviets draw on constituencies outside of the regional capital. Many of these seats are rural. In cities, and especially in provincial capitals, one might reasonably expect a better-educated, urbanized population to elect deputies to the city soviet more favorably inclined towards reform. If there is a pattern of the sort hypothesized here, it may indicate that an there is an urban-rural cleavage in Russian politics which is a permanent feature of the Russian political landscape (Helf and Hahn).

Does the evidence from our survey offer support for this view? There are significant differences between deputies to oblast and city (oblast capital) soviets, many of which, but not all, are anticipated by our hypothesis. Using four of the variables discussed in hypothesis #3, there are some clear differences in the composition of the deputies: those elected to oblast soviets are considerably older, much more likely to have higher education, and far more likely to have been deputies previously. Gender, however, does not vary significantly with the level of the soviet. Predictably, deputies to each level have strongly conflicting views (-.44) on whether the oblast soviet has too much influence over the city soviet or not (see var. 166).
On issues of economic and political values, the differences found on economic issues were the clearest, and they tend to support the hypothesis: City deputies are much more favorably disposed towards the accumulation of wealth (.26) and towards a free market (.16). Differences in political attitudes, however, were not significant, with one exception. On the one hand, deputies from oblast and city soviets showed little difference on the issue of a strong leader and on the question of a multi-party system. On the question of popular participation, however, oblast deputies were significantly more favorable than city deputies (.13). A similar anomaly, it may be remembered, was found among those professionally employed who liked the idea of a capitalist economy, but who were less favorably oriented toward popular participation. In short, what these data seem to suggest is that while city deputies may be more "free market" in their attitudes on the economy, they do not necessarily hold more democratic values. But, are these findings consistent across different regions of central Russia? That is the question addressed by our fourth and final hypothesis.

Hypothesis #4: That support for reforms will vary among the different regions of central Russia.

There are two ways to examine the question of whether there is variation in the political and economic attitudes of deputies to the soviets across different regions of central Russia. The first is to use data from all deputies in each of the five regions and look at their mean scores on the various measures being employed. These results are reported in Table II (page 37). The second way is to see if there are consistent differences in attitude between oblast and city deputies within in each region. We will follow this order in our presentation here.
In the first case, there is evidence of considerable regional variation for some of our variables. While the regions differ little in education and age, Belgorod clearly has a higher rate of incumbency; Yaroslavl' has the lowest. Yaroslavl' deputies are significantly more supportive of a multi-party system than those of Ivanovo or Belgorod. They also score lowest on the "economic envy" scale, and are second only to Saratov in supporting the idea of a free market. On democratic values issues, they rate highest in support for popular participation and lowest in their admiration for a strong leader, although generally speaking, the variation on political attitudes is not as significant as it is for the economic ones.

If Yaroslavl' deputies emerge as the most supportive overall of "reformist" values in our sample of regions, those in neighboring Ivanovo, appear the most "conservative". Deputies there are not only the most opposed to a multi-party system, but also to the idea of people getting richer than their neighbors. In their relatively unfavorable view, they are second only to Kostroma, although they are closer to Yaroslavl' in their discomfort with a strong leader. Kostroma, another neighbor of Yaroslavl', is antithetical to her in views on popular participation and on the desirability of a strong leader. To provide a summary score of the differences, points were assigned on the basis of rank for variables 4-8 used in Table II. Yaroslavl' was easily the most "reformist", followed by Saratov, with Kostroma, Belgorod, and Ivanovo bunched at the relatively more conservative end of the spectrum. Next we turn to differences within the regions between oblast and city deputies.

Belgorod. The findings for the Belgorod city and oblast deputies tend to follow the same pattern that was found for the deputies as a whole. Oblast deputies were significantly better educated (.43) and were far more likely to have held office previously (.48). There was little
or no difference in composition with respect to age or gender. Oblast and city deputies clearly disagree in predictable ways on whether the oblast soviet has too much control over the city (-.48). There are clearly conflicting views on economic issues with oblast deputies being much more critical of inequality of wealth (.49) and much less supportive of free market values (-.44). As with the deputies as whole, there was much less difference on political matters. They were more agreed than not on the popular participation scale and on the question of a multi-party system. The only area of modest disagreement (.14) was on the question of a strong leader with oblast deputies more apt to accept the idea that one might be good for the country. Their evaluation of the Russian parliament was also somewhat more favorable with oblast deputies more likely to agree that the press and the public undervalued the work of that body.

**Ivanovo.** In some respects, the findings for Ivanovo are similar. Oblast deputies are much more likely to be better educated, older, and incumbents. Women, however, are proportionately better represented in the city soviet. City deputies are far more apt to feel that the oblast soviet has too much influence on what they do. Beyond this the findings are less clear, and even contradictory. We do not find the kind of strong differences on economic issues found for the deputies as a whole. There do appear to be differences on political values, however, with city deputies more favorably oriented towards popular participation as a scaled item (.25) and on the question of a multi-party system. At the same time, city deputies also showed more support for the strong leader idea (.14), though this may be a statistical quirk. There also seems to be something of a populist sentiment among oblast deputies who were much more favorable to the idea that all citizens should have the equal right to participate (var. 128, g = .35) and that leaders are obligated to fulfill the will of the community even if they disagree
However, on other political values, they were more "conservative" than city deputies.

**Kostroma.** In Kostroma we see a pattern similar to Ivanovo in terms of the composition of the soviets. Those at the oblast level are much *more likely* to have higher education, to be incumbents and to be male. They are also somewhat older than those in the city soviet and, as we have come to expect, feel that the influence of the oblast soviet on the city is just fine. On political and economic views, there are not the clear divisions characteristic of Belgorod, and of the deputies as a whole. On economic issues, at least, there is a consistency of response, even if it is not strong: We found higher support for egalitarian economics and less for free market values among oblast than among city deputies. Politically, there were no striking differences, but what there was, was contradictory. Oblast deputies seemed a bit more comfortable with multi-party elections, but less so with popular participation. There was also a weak correlation favoring strong rulers.

**Saratov.** In Saratov, the differences between oblast and city deputies appear to be weaker than *in the* other regions that we've discussed so far, but what differences there are seem to follow the same pattern with minor exceptions. Oblast deputies are more likely to be older, male incumbents, but unlike the other regions, they are not better educated. On economic issues there is a weak correlation (.15) between oblast deputies and egalitarianism, but there are no differences with city deputies on the question of a free market (Table II indicates greater support for a free market generally in Saratov than in the other regions). On politics, there are no apparent differences on a multi-party system or on popular participation, but oblast deputies are more comfortable with the prospect of an "iron hand" (.23).
Yaroslavl'. There are some powerful cleavages between city and oblast deputies in Yaroslavl' on some issues, but not on all and in the case of politics, the directions appear contradictory. Oblast deputies are a bit better educated, but there are no significant differences in gender or age. They are, however, less likely to be incumbents, a reversal of the pattern found in the other regions. The deputies from the two soviets are widely divided over the question of whether the oblast soviet has too much influence (.75), a confirmation of the vertical struggle for power noted in Yaroslavl' by the author earlier. Economic differences of opinion are modest, though they are in the direction hypothesized with the city deputies more willing to allow inequalities in wealth and more in favor of a free market. Politically, however, there is an apparent contradiction: oblast deputies are much more in favor of a multiparty system, but at the same time are less well disposed towards public participation than are city deputies.

CONCLUSIONS

The central question which this paper set out to explore was: What are the views of locally elected deputies in the Russian Federation on issues of economic and political reform? What makes such a question salient is the portrayal, by the leadership of the Russian government, of local officials as the main source of opposition to the introduction of democracy in Russia, including the adoption of a market economy. It was argued in the first part of this paper that the struggle for power between legislative and executive authority was, in reality, a vertical struggle for power between old elites and new ones. To bolster their case for stronger executive authority, Yeltsin and his allies have characterized those elected to the soviets as the forces of counter-reformation. If this portrayal is accurate, then the growing success of national
and local legislatures in asserting their authority would lead one to pessimistically assess the chances for reform.

However, on the basis of the surveys conducted in March-June 1992, the findings presented in this paper offer little support for the view that deputies to city and oblast Soviets in the central regions of Russia are broadly opposed to free market reforms and to democratic values. On the contrary, there seems to be more support for them among the deputies than not. Beyond this general conclusion, however, there do appear to be some significant variations among the deputies in their levels of support, especially on issues of economic reform. Demographically, we found consistently higher support for free market values among younger, better-educated, professionally employed deputies holding office for the first time. Education and gender proved to be the only significant predictors of deputies political attitudes with the better educated favoring democratic values. Women deputies, however, were found to have significantly more "conservative" values on both issues.

In comparing the attitudes of deputies to the city (oblast capital) Soviets with those at the oblast level, consistent differences on economic issues were also found with city deputies more favorably disposed towards a free market economy. Patterns for political questions were much less apparent, and sometimes contradictory. On the question of whether the oblast soviet had too strong an influence on the city, the difference was consistent and strong. In terms of composition, oblast deputies were more often older incumbents with a higher education. Gender was not significantly different. Broadly speaking, these findings held up across the five regions studied, despite the fact that there was considerable variation between regions in their support for "reformist" views. One tentative conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that while city
deputies may be more "pro-market" in their attitudes than those in the oblast soviets, they do not necessarily hold stronger democratic values.

In short, if there does appear to be a vertical struggle for power between the center and the periphery, the findings presented in this paper suggest that the struggle is not over reform per se so much as it is over who will get to decide who gets what, when, and how. Why should older elites be opposed to democratic and free market reforms if they can control their implementation for their own benefit? The differences we found between deputies on the city and oblast level on economic issues may reflect the fact that more of those at the oblast level are drawn from the ranks of the former managerial nomenklatura and see their control over the regional economy threatened. The differences may also be generational with younger deputies hoping to use their leverage to replace the local managerial elite. All in all, there is some support here for the view that what is at stake is control over local resources (McAuley). Having abandoned (or lost) their base of power in the obkoms, the old elites are seeking a new one in the economy. While that may be true, however, it does not make them forces of counter-reformation.
1. The author would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York for the financial support to conduct the field research on which this paper is based and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for a grant which enabled him to have the time from teaching to analyze the results of the research and to write them up. Thanks also to Joel Moses, Gavin Helf and Henry Hale for their help in providing information on the five regions used for analysis in this paper and to my research assistant, Mya Anderson, for tracking down articles for me. Finally, my gratitude goes to Nurit Freedman of the Human Organization Sciences Institute at Villanova for her extraordinary efforts in providing the statistical tables I needed when I needed them.

2. For more on the meeting in Cheboksary see The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (hereafter CDPSP), vol 44, #37, p. 6-8. The reference to "legal separatism" is from the original speech.

3. There is a considerable body of literature on these important elections. See Hahn (1991), Mann, Embree, Colton among others.

4. There are obvious problems with using terms like "conservative" and "liberal" in the context of contemporary Russian politics and they can be misleading especially if the point of reference is Western ideology. (Are deputies favoring a radical free market and a strong executive branch a "democrat"? In Russia, they are.) Moreover, it is not clear that the old elites oppose market reform, for example, as long as they can control it for their own benefit. In defense of using the term, it must be said that Russians themselves regularly do so and seem to know exactly who they are talking about.

   In the present paper, the term "conservative", when used, will be narrowly construed to refer to those among the old elite who want to hold on to their power. Whether they are for or against market reform per se is one of the main questions which the present paper seeks to explore.

5. Izvestiia, 13 September 1991, p. 3. Darrell Slider also makes this point. (Slider, 1992, p. 10).
6. The role of the presidential representatives is described by Valerii Makharadze in an interview with Izvestiia on 13 Sept. 1991. He stated that they "have no right to interfere in administrative affairs," but could report violations of federal law and presidential decrees, actions which, however, could presumably result in efforts to remove offenders from office. The decree establishing the position was called "On Questions of the Activity of Executive Power in Russia" and was issued on 24 August 1991 (Izvestiia, 26 Aug. 1991, p. 3). Other articles dealing with this position appeared in Izvestiia of August 27 and 28 and suggested a more active role was being undertaken in some areas of the country.

Interestingly, the assertion of strong executive authority has had the general support of many intellectuals in varying degrees associated with pro-democratic sentiment. See, for example, the interview with Andranik Migranian in Moskovskie novosti, Oct. 6, 1991, p. 9 and the opinions of former Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov and of St. Petersburg Mayor, Anatolii Sobchak (Thorsen, 1992; Orttung, 1992).

7. On legislation pertaining to city soviets (which come under the heading of "mestnoye samoupravlenie"), see "O mestnom samoupravlenie v RSFSR", adopted by the Russian parliament on 6 July, 1991. The oblast soviets are to governed according to the Law of the Russian Federation "O krayem, oblastnom Sovete narodnykh deputatov i kraevoi, oblastnoi administratsii" which was passed on March 5, 1992, but has yet to be implemented by President Yeltsin. The later was published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 March 1992. Articles 35-40 of this law are the relevant ones here.

8. Initially, Yeltsin had requested the Russian parliament on 16 October, 1991 to postpone elections for heads of administration on the grounds that they were expensive at a time when Russia was in crisis and that they would result in friction between administrators and the elected soviets. He was denied the request, prompting his chief legal advisor, Sergei Shakhrai, to threaten resignation as chair of the Joint Committee on Legislation. Izvestiia, 19 October 1991, p. 2. He renewed his request for postponement on 29 October 1991 at the same time asking for the right to form executive power at the local level (e.g. to control appointments of heads of administration) in order to exclude the "blocking of central decisions by local administrative organs" (Izvestiia, 30 October 1991, p. 2). These powers were granted after four days of debate. As could be expected they were met with resentment in many areas. See, for example, Viacheslav Shchepotkin’s article in Izvestiia of Nov. 5, 1991, p. 2.

9. The information on the personnel changes in the Yaroslavl' oblast and city soviet come from the minutes of meetings which were made available to the author during his visits and to interviews conducted with those involved and with other deputies in January and April of 1992.

10. For a case study of the conflict between a reformist governor and a soviet dominated by former leaders of the local CPSU in Voronezh, see V. Novichikhina, "Bolsheviki namereny vernut'sia", Narodnyi deputat, #6 (1992), p. 32.

11. The Izvestiia article was published 28 Feb. 1992 on p. 7; the one in Rossiiskaia gazeta on 4 March 1992 was on p. 2. See also Nezavisimaia gazeta 22 February 1992, p. 2. A description of continued nomenklatura control within the government of Taganrog can be found...
in the account of a city deputy there, A. Nikolaenko, "Vivat, nomenklatura?" Narodnyi deputat, #5 (1992), p. 42-44.


13. Yeltsin’s speech to the 6th Congress of the Russian Federation People’s Deputies was reported in the CDPSP, vol. 44, #16. His comment on the moratorium can be found on p. 3.

14. See the interview with Zhukov in Narodnyi deputat, #9 (1992), p. 36.

15. In addition to the five sets of data for city and oblast deputies from Belgorod, Ivanovo, Kostroma, Saratov, and Yaroslavl’, there are interviews with 179 deputies from the Vologda city soviet which had originally been chosen for this study. The oblast deputies, however, refused to be surveyed due to political divisions among themselves and a survey from Ivanovo was taken instead. The data from the Vologda city deputies remains part of the base for analyzing the deputies as a whole, but not for the regions individually.

16. The original study was: The International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: The Free Press, 1971) and was edited by an international team of specialists. The value scales appear in the appendix. Findings from the "New Democracy and Local Governance" project were reported at a conference held at The Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. on November 5-7, 1992.

17. I am is greatly indebted to Professor Joel Moses (Iowa State University), and to graduate students Henry Hale (Harvard) and Gavin Helf (Berkeley) for providing the information on which these profiles are based. The information comes from various sources, but primarily from the local press and from RFE/RL archives in Munich. I also made use of the RSFSR Administrativno-territorialnoe delenie for 1986 published by the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The discussion of local politics in these regions represents my best guess of what is going on locally based on these collective sources, but are offered with the warning that I may be very wrong.

18. According to a report to me from Henry Hale, a graduate student from Harvard currently in Moscow, Belykh, head of administration, wrote an article in the oblast newspaper accusing Makarevich of instigating popular pressure against the administration to resist the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms. (Saratovskie vesti, Sept. 19, 1992, p. 1.)

20. One would expect that those who scored high on what I came to call the "envy" scale (no one should have more than their neighbor) would also be less supportive of a free market. And, indeed, the correlation coefficient for the two scales was .44 (p < .000).

21. On the basis of a frequency distribution, our population was divided into 4 roughly equal parts: 24-39 (25%); 40-44 (24%); 45-50 (21%); over 50 (31%). Although this division was based primarily on statistical considerations rather than an attempt to identify possible "generational" or cohort effects, those in the first two groups obviously were born after WW II and were no older than 7 when Stalin died.

22. Because most of our respondents reported having completed higher education (76%), the education variable was dichotomized into those who had it, and those who didn't. This obviously is not the most desirable distribution, but there was little choice in the matter. Since a question which better discriminated for type of education might have produced sharper attitudinal differences, the results reported here may understate the importance of education as an explanatory variable.

23. The variable used here for profession is dichotomous (professional; official) and was created by regrouping the 14 occupational variables originally employed into four categories: professional (including scientific, legal, medical, clergy and educational personnel), working class, specialists in industry, and officials (including workers in the government, the trade unions, and other social organizations; enterprise directors; military and police).

Unfortunately, the category "industrial specialist" was not broken down further (a major design blunder!) and neither that variable nor working class lent itself to the kind of monotonic measurement of the sort that normally appears in Western sociology and that would facilitate cross tabulation. Consequently those two groups (about half the population) were left out of the analysis in the interest of trying to get some basis for assessing whether professionals held distinct views.

24. The cells in the table seem to suggest that the correlation effect is due more to a noticeable lack of support among oblast deputies than widespread support among city deputies.

TABLE 1

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ATTITUDES OF DEPUTIES TO OBLAST AND CITY SOVIETS IN 5 REGIONS OF RUSSIA, 1992
(in percent; s=1280)*

A. Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Accumulation of Wealth</td>
<td>Unfavorable 1.</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favorable 3.</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X= 2.056</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid n= 1199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Market Economy</td>
<td>Favorable 1.</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favorable 2.</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavorable 3.</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X= 1.916</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid n= 1150</td>
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<td>3. Popular Participation</td>
<td>Favorable 1.</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>32%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavorable 3.</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td>X= 2.123</td>
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<td>4. Strong Leader</td>
<td>Favorable 1.</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favorable 2.</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavorable 3.</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>X= 2.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valid n= 1198</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Russian Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>Favorable 1.</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favorable 2.</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavorable 3.</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<td>X= 2.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valid n= 1155</td>
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</table>
B. Selected Individual Variables

1. (V. 172) Support for a Multi-Party System
   1. Definitly 39%
   2. More Yes than No 30%
   3. More No than Yes 22%
   4. Difficult to Answer 8%

   Valid n = 1241

2. (V. 134) If Some are Poor, None Should be Rich
   1. Strongly Agree 23%
   2. Agree 15%
   3. Disagree 27%
   4. Strongly Disagree 35%

   \( \bar{X} = 2.735 \)
   Valid n = 1213

3. (V. 148) Increase Private Sector in Business & Industry
   1. Strongly Agree 44%
   2. Agree 35%
   3. Disagree 12%
   4. Strongly Disagree 5%

   \( \bar{X} = 1.987 \)
   Valid n = 1213

4. (V. 128) Equal Opportunity to Influence Government for All People
   1. Strongly Agree 44%
   2. Agree 27%
   3. Disagree 17%
   4. Strongly Disagree 12%

   \( \bar{X} = 1.987 \)
   Valid n = 1223

5. (V. 132) Strong Leaders Able To Do More For Country Than Laws & Debates
   1. Strongly Agree 19%
   2. Agree 26%
   3. Disagree 31%
   4. Strongly Disagree 24%

   \( \bar{X} = 2.602 \)
   Valid n = 1227

*The full information for all items cited here, and which were used in forming the scales may be found in the Appendix.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Belgorod</th>
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<th>Yaroslavl</th>
<th>Saratov</th>
<th>Kostroma</th>
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<td>1. Education</td>
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<td>2. Age</td>
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<td>2.637</td>
<td>2.751</td>
<td>2.635</td>
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<td>(1.000=low)</td>
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<td>5. Accumulation of wealth</td>
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<td>7. Popular Participation</td>
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<td>2.067</td>
<td>2.013</td>
<td>2.060</td>
<td>2.095</td>
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<td>(1.000=favorable)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. View of Russian Parliament</td>
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<td>1.960</td>
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Summary Score of Reformism
(Based on ranking of each variable: 4 - 8)

18  | 20  | 17   | 14  | 6
REFERENCES


Milbrath, Lester W. and M.L. Goel. Political Participation. 2nd ed.


Teague, Elizabeth and Philip Hanson, "Nikolai Travkin Attempts Painless Economic Reform", RFE/RL Research Reports, vol. 1, #38, 25 September 1992
APPENDIX

Attitudinal Variables and Scales Used in this Analysis

A. Variables (survey question number)

1. (112) On the average, how many hours of contact do you have each month with enterprise leaders? 1) None; 2) 1 hour; 3) 2-5 hours; 4) 6-10 hours; 5) More than 10 hours.

2. (118) Russian Supreme Soviet is gradually learning to operate more effectively. 1) Agree; 2) Disagree; 3) Difficult to answer.

3. (119) The Russian Supreme Soviet's authority over the population has fallen during the past 12 months. 1) Agree; 2) Disagree; 3) Difficult to answer.

4. (120) In most cases, the Russian Supreme Soviet makes correct decisions. 1) Agree; 2) Disagree; 3) Difficult to answer.

5. (122) The press underestimates the positive role of the Russian Supreme Soviet. 1) Agree; 2) Disagree 3) Difficult to answer.

6. (123) The population underestimates the positive role of the Russian Supreme Soviet. 1) Agree; 2) Disagree; 3) Difficult to answer.

7. (124) The complexity of today's problems allow only the simplest questions to be exposed to the public's scrutiny. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely disagree.

8. (125) A high level of public participation in making decisions often leads to unwanted conflicts. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely disagree.

9. (128) All citizens should have equal opportunity to influence government policies. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

10. (129) Talented and strong-willed leaders always achieve success in any undertaking. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

11. (132) A few strong leaders might have been able to do more for their country than all laws and discussions. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.
12. (133) An upper limit should exist on earnings, so that no one accumulates more than anyone else. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

13. (134) If others live in poverty, the government should react and make it so that no one can become wealthy. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

14. (135) Wealthy people should pay more for societal needs than the poor should. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

15. (137) There are situations when a leader should not divulge certain facts. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

16. (139) A leader is obligated to execute the will of the community, even when he feels they are mistaken. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

17. (141) When resolving important problems, a leader should not pay attention to how the community feels about his position. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

18. (145) A system based on profit brings out the worst in human nature. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

19. (146) A system of private enterprise is effective enough. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

20. (147) State regulation of business usually brings more damage than good. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

21. (148) The share of the private sector in business and industry today should be increased. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

22. (149) People accumulate wealth only at the expense of others. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.

23. (151) It is the government's responsibility to ensure that the rights of minorities are observed. 1) Definitely agree; 2) Agree more than disagree; 3) Disagree more than agree; 4) Absolutely agree.
24. (166) On the city soviet the oblast soviet has, in your opinion: 1) Too strong an influence; 2) Such an influence as is necessary; 3) Too weak an influence; 4) Too difficult to describe the influence.


26. (172) Do you support the institution of a multi-party electoral system, where candidates participate in elections as representatives of parties and movements? 1) Yes, definitely; 2) More yes, than no; 3) More no, than yes; 4) Difficult to answer.

B. Scales

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Mean Inter-Item Correlation*</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Accumulation of Wealth</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.61</td>
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<td>vars. 133,134,135</td>
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<td>2. Support for Free Market</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>.65</td>
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<td>vars. 145(R),146,147,148,149(R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Popular Participation</td>
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<td>.44</td>
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<td>vars. 124,125,128(R)</td>
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<td>4. Strong Leader</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.33</td>
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<td>vars. 129,132,137,141</td>
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<td>5. Support for Supreme Soviet</td>
<td>.231</td>
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<td>vars. 118,119,120,122,123</td>
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* minimum acceptable correlation is .088 for .01 significance level for 900 or more cases (Kuder and Richardson, 1937). Wherever an "R" is indicated, the direction of the variable was reversed.