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THE VOLGA TATARS IN CENTRAL ASIA,
18TH-20TH CENTURIES:
FROM DIASPORA TO HEGEMONY?

Edward J. Lazzerini

Executive Summary

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the growing pressures for
micro-fragmentation along ethnic lines have highlighted the fragility of relations not just
among former union republics but, more ominously, within many of them as well. The
Tatar Republic, landlocked within the borders of Russia, is one of 31 such political units
grasping for sovereignty in various forms, but it is unique by virtue of history that has seen
roughly half its population living in diaspora, particularly in Central Asia, southern Siberia,
Caucasia, and Crimea. This has meant that for Tatars communal identity has been and
continues to be tied intimately to larger issues of cultural, linguistic, economic, and political
relationships with other Turkic peoples. My research suggests that these relationships were
determined in large measures by several factors: (1) that the Tatars were the first non-
Russian, Turkic-speaking, and Muslim people that the Muscovite (Russian) state incorporated
into its confines, doing so in the sixteenth century; (2) that the Russians found immediate and
long-term use for the Tatars in extending contacts with other Turkic and Muslim peoples
along the shifting southern and eastern frontier of their realm; (3) that this use stimulated the
dispersion of a significant number of Tatars throughout greater Central Asia; and (4) that in
the process the Tatars sought and frequently gained advantage from their diaspora
circumstances against both Russian and other Central Asian interests. Any effort to fathom
the forces currently at work in greater Central Asia and to appreciate the plausibility of
certain scenarios playing themselves out must acknowledge the Tatars and their diaspora.

Since the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan in the mid-16th century, when Muscovy
made its opening move eastward that would gradually carry the Russian banner to the Pacific
and into the heart of Central Asia, a significant proportion of the Tatar population of the
middle Volga region has been living outside its 'original' homeland. Initially fed by those
seeking to escape increasing colonial burdens, this diaspora received a boost from continued Russian expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries toward Central Asia and an attendant shift, by the reign of Catherine II (1762-1796), in imperial attitude toward the eastern borderlands. Where once the Tatars were considered loyal subjects of the empire only when they abandoned their Islamic faith and converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity, under Catherine they were now accepted for being Muslims and were encouraged by state patronage to serve imperial interests as merchants, mullas, and even intelligence gatherers among other Turkic peoples. To spread and consolidate the Islamic religion among the still nomadic Kazakh while trading for themselves and for Russia in lands further south to which Christian merchants were denied access, became opportunities for Tatars that not only extended the diaspora but also made of it a center for the emergence of Tatar ethnic consciousness and self-assertion.

By the early nineteenth century, significant socio-economic changes had begun to affect traditional Tatar cultural and intellectual perceptions, prompting some from among the intellectual elite to advocate reform of Tatar society. By the middle of the century such concerns had become the basis for a movement increasingly radical in its tendency toward secularism and a willingness to open up to other, principally Western, cultures. Thus emerged jadidism (or modernism), designed to restore wealth, power, and dignity to Tatar society and allow the mobilization of human resources to meet more effectively the challenges of the modern age. The process of transforming Tatar society inevitably spilled over into the larger Central Asian context. Without exaggerating the Tatar influence on neighboring Turkic peoples, significant evidence exists to support the contention that by the end of the 19th century the Tatar diaspora, with its reformist mentality and the economic resources to support a range of cultural activities (from publishing, to education, to religion), shaped a developmental model attractive to Turkic brethren. Accompanying this model, however, was an ideology combining pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in a unique blend that, while advocating primarily the cultural unity of all Turkic people, inevitably bore hegemonic features of a particular Tatar character. The self-assigned leadership role that the Tatars assumed for themselves in their dealings with Russia’s Turkic borderlands did not go unchallenged (e.d., by sometimes equally aggressive Azerbaijanis); nor did it fail to breed
ambiguous sentiments (even resentment) toward them on the part of Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Uzbeks, to name a few. But the appeal for unity persisted beyond the 1917 revolutions into the first decade of the Soviet era, finding new form in the theories most associated with the name of a favorite son, Mir Said Sultangaliev. Perceived at least by Stalin as a hegemonic competitor to Bolshevism, Sultangalievism—a potential *tatarshchina* (Tatar dominance)—was quickly suppressed; but like Party leader Sergei Kirov’s murder in 1934, its suppression led the way for a wide-ranging assault, in this case against ‘national communism’ in all its real and imagined manifestations. The consequences bore heavily on the Tatar people for the next fifty years. The reform and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, however, revealed the persistence not only of Tatar ethnic identity but of a diasporic mentality that poses interesting and potentially unsettling questions for the future of Tatarstan and the larger post-Soviet Turkic world.
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Since the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, Central Asia has been narrowly identified with those five republics whose titular ethnic groups are, respectively, the Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik. It is easy to argue, as many have who are more deeply acquainted with the region and its environs, that such a definition of "Central Asia" is artificial, ahistorical, and a function of political agenda rather than organic realities. At the very least, a substantial territory within the People's Republic of China, including the province of Xinjiang that sits astride a major stretch of the Silk Route and shares ethnic and deep historical ties with populations on the other side of the Sino-Soviet border, must be viewed as part of any broader concept of Central Asia. So too, I would argue, should territories extending from the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers south to the Caspian Sea and east across southern Siberia, inhabited since medieval times mostly by Turkic-speaking peoples.¹

Principal among these are the Tatars, an ethnic group whose very identity, however, has been the subject of much confusion for centuries. The seed of the problem was planted in the late twelfth century when tribes of Mongols united under one of their chieftains, Temujin (later Chinggis Khan), and embarked on an extraordinary military venture that would produce the largest empire in human history. In the process, numerous other tribes -- some Mongol, some Turkic -- were absorbed into the confederation, helping to swell the size of the armies sent against great centers of civilization. One of those tribes was named something akin to Tatar, and its presence in the Mongol horde from an early stage served to encourage the popular impression among outsiders, particularly in western regions, that Tatar and Mongol were one and the same. That impression survived the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire when Turkic peoples comprising successor states on the eastern frontier of medieval Russia (the so-called "Golden Horde" and its successors, the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimea, and Siberia) acquired the "Tatar" designation in Russian (and then European) historiography and folklore.

But the problem does not end here. Since the Mongol elements within the Empire and its successor states were always distinct minorities and were, in fact, assimilated over time by the larger Turkic pool, who the people later called "Tatar" were originally has remained a subject of intense debate. Are they descendants of the Mongol Tatars, or are they linked to the Turkic Bulgars who had formed a state centered

¹
on the upper Volga in the ninth and tenth centuries, but who can hardly be clearly distinguished from other peoples in “Central Asia” with Turkic roots? This is the kind of question applicable to most peoples inhabiting Central Asia, but it is one that acquired sharper focus in the second half of the nineteenth century when self-identity became a major issue for “Tatars,” and then reemerged in recent years under rather different circumstances. The need to represent and sustain corporate identity is strong everywhere, not least so in Central Asia; for Tatars it is tied intimately to larger issues of cultural, linguistic, economic, and political relationships with other Turkic peoples from the Central Asian republics, in Siberia, the Caucasus, and even Crimea. While much research remains to be done concerning these relationships, in the following pages I will suggest their outlines and argue that they were determined in large measure by several factors: (1) that the Tatars were the first non-Russian, Turkic-speaking, and Muslim people that the Muscovite state incorporated into its confines; (2) that the Russians found immediate and long-term use for the Tatars in extending contacts with other Turkic and Muslim peoples along the shifting southern and eastern frontier of their realm; (3) that this use stimulated the dispersion of significant numbers of Tatars throughout greater Central Asia; and (4) that in the process the Tatars sought and frequently gained advantage from their diaspora circumstances against both Russian and other Central Asian interests. The “Volga Tatars in Central Asia,” then, is a theme that is not a matter just of geographical interest but of social, economic, cultural, and political import as well. Moreover, to a greater extent than for many other communities, Tatar identity became shaped by exceedingly complex relationships that were, at the very least, riddled with ambiguities. Later in my discussion we shall see something of the ‘problem’ Tatars posed for other Turkic peoples; let me commence my excursion over several centuries of relatively uncharted terrain, however, by inviting brief attention to portions of two obscure yet revealing Russian texts that together suggest how and why the Volga Tatars became a ‘problem’ for their conquerors as well. The two realities are not unconnected.

On June 27, 1891, N.I. Il’minskii penned one of his many letters to K.P. Pobedonostsev, then Ober-Prokurator of the Holy Synod. Professor of Turkic languages at Kazan Theological Academy and Kazan University, and developer of a system of education that stressed basic reliance on native languages for non-Russians inhabiting the Empire’s eastern borderlands, Il’minskii had for decades functioned as Russia’s foremost lay missionary. Dedicated to strengthening the Russian Christian orthodoxy of oriental converts, he saw himself as a bulwark against the cultural and political advances of other religions, especially Islam. He also evinced an unyielding antagonism toward one of the major ethnic groups still committed to Islam despite being under Russian rule since the middle of the sixteenth century: the Tatars of the Volga region. The emotional sources of his hostility aside, in this particular letter to Pobedonostsev he offered an argument for promoting minority languages that was candidly linked to fear of Tatar influence beyond the confines of Kazan Province, where it would touch the lives of many others:
This is the dilemma: If from fear of separate nationalities we do not permit the non-Russians [of the eastern borderlands] to use their languages in schools and churches, to a degree sufficient to ensure a solid, complete, and convinced adoption of the Christian faith, then all non-Russians will be fused into a single race by language and faith -- the Tatar and Muhammadan. But if we allow the non-Russian languages, then even if their separate nationalities are thus maintained, these will be diverse, small, ill-disposed to the Tatars, and united with the Russian people by the commonality of their faith. Choose!

Three years later, an unidentified but presumably Russian correspondent writing for Novoe vremia from Kazan under the nom de plume "Zdeshnii" (A Local), produced an article entitled "Sovremennai a 'tatarshchina'" (Contemporary Tatar Hegemony). Typical of much late-imperial popular, as well as professional and scholarly writing, that labored under orientalist assumptions about Asian "others," this article imagined Tatars to be eternal aliens, people who "hold fast to their Asiatic distinctiveness [samobytnost'], their barbaric tastes and habits," and who, "in the depths of their souls... hate all Russians and everything Russian." Casting the Tatars as reprehensible and disreputable, the author proposed an explanation for their behavior that echoes classic anti-Semitic attitudes:

In a world where commerce is critical to the struggle for survival, the Tatar prepares himself from early youth for this kind of activity. Each Tatar, the father of a family, strives to place his son in the shop of a merchant. When this does not work out, he builds "his own business" without even a second thought. With just 30-50 kopeks, the Tatar youth purchases some wares and begins to hawk them. I can say with confidence that nine out of ten Tatars in Kazan are in business.

Anyone who looks closely at the business activity of the Tatars will easily see that the distinctive sign of that activity is their complete solidarity both in petty affairs and in the largest deals. Thanks to this solidarity, the Tatars play a rather appreciable role, and all their strength is directed always to the exclusive benefit of their class [soslovie], while, of course, to the detriment of Russian interests.

From Il'minskii and "Zdeshnii" we hear Great Russian voices speaking to different audiences -- one official, the other popular, with a disturbing message about a small segment of the imperial population. Represented negatively and stereotypically in extenso, the Tatars emerge as a threat disproportionate to their
numbers, but one resulting from a combination of demographic and cultural factors only hinted at in these sources. In truth, by the end of the nineteenth century the Tatars were a substantial diaspora group (*etnodorosnaia gruppa*, in recent Soviet ethnographic literature), numbering about two and one-half million, but spread over twelve provinces of the Volga/Trans-Ural region, with a significant and growing presence in the Kazakh Steppe, the lower Volga, and Central Asia proper, as well as in key urban centers of the Russian heartland, especially St. Petersburg and Moscow. The numbers are most impressive not as revealed statistically in, say, the census of 1897, but when placed next to those from earlier revisions or other sources. The pattern thus illuminated speaks much less of fertility than of migration and assimilation of other Turkic peoples (e.g., Mari, Chuvash, and even Bashkirs), as an on-going historical experience since at least the mid-sixteenth century.

Pockets of Tatars over a large expanse of imperial territory would never have generated a problem in some minds were not crucial socioeconomic and cultural trends, as well as a pattern of governmental policy since the mid-eighteenth century, coincidental with these demographic ones. Together a web of factors increasingly thrust the Tatars into diplomatic, political, commercial, and religio-cultural positions of influence that, as the Empire faced its late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century demise, opened up unusual hegemonic opportunities for a statistically minor *dispersnaia gruppa*. It would be among the diverse Turkic peoples of greater Central Asia that these opportunities would play themselves out most fully, and the Tatars would employ their diaspora circumstances to extraordinary advantage.

**Diaspora Beginnings**

Since the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan in the mid-sixteenth century, when Muscovy made its opening move eastward that would gradually carry the Russian banner to the Pacific and into the heart of Central Asia, a growing proportion of the Tatar population of the middle Volga region has been living outside its original homeland. Russian victory prompted an immediate exodus eastward and southward of at least several thousand Tatars, and episodes of intensified colonial pressure -- at times economic and social, at others cultural and religious -- through the first third of the eighteenth century ensured that additional thousands of Tatar peasants would become refugees. Most sought to continue their agricultural pursuits, but some turned to what would increasingly become a Tatar signature: commercial activity.

The traditional Tatar elite, comprising *murzas* (nobility) as well as men from other social strata, underwent mixed experiences in the century and a half following the Khanate's defeat. Some migrated with their social inferiors, whether motivated by a desire to continue resistance to Russian incursions, establish a new base for restoring the Khanate, or merely retain their social authority under new conditions. Many more seem to have remained within the recently-conquered territory and to have accommodated themselves
to the new power structure. Now classified as *sluzhilye liudi* (state servitors), these men moved relatively easily into Russian service and seem to have enjoyed varying advantages commensurate at times with those enjoyed by Russian elites themselves. Thus, we know that a decade or so after the conquest there were at least two hundred Tatar *pomest'ia* (fiefs in return for Russian state service) on the left bank of the Volga River alone; that several *murzas* had received large land grants from Ivan IV for participating in the suppression of peasant rebellions between 1552 and 1557; and that well into the seventeenth century special cavalry units of Tatar *sluzhilye liudi* served the Tsar's military. Moreover, in a period when Muscovy, for reasons of diplomacy, economics, and simple self-defense, found it advantageous and prudent to further long-established relations with the peoples and states of the steppe and Central Asia, Tatars were drawn into the Russian diplomatic service, staffing the *Posol'skii Prikaz* as translators, interpreters, guides, messengers, envoys, and clerks in its dealings with Asian lands. As those relations expanded, so too did reliance on *sluzhilye* Tatars, whose language Russia adopted for international communications beyond its eastern and southern frontier. With the establishment of Muscovite control of the entire Volga river and its arterial system by the 1570s, commercial opportunities with Central Asia (particularly the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara) were enormously enhanced, reaching a level of significance by the mid-seventeenth century that exceeded trade with Europe. Again, among those in the forefront of such activities were Tatars.

While Russian policies displayed little consistency before the reign of Peter I, revealing an ambiguous attitude rooted in the different priorities of *raison d'état* and religion in Muscovite society, their preponderant effect was discriminatory against Tatar nobles who refused to convert to Christianity. Owing to cumulative attacks on their agrarian economic base, they became collectively an impoverished group with severely weakened social authority. All found themselves eventually registered in 1718 with the Kazan office of the Admiralty, under which they were required to procure supplies and cart naval timber. The efforts to minimize traditional elite influence over Tatar society were complicated, however, by several realities. First, conversion from Islam to Christianity effectively transformed outsiders into insiders, and while the records of such acts were only minimally kept if at all, the Turkic roots of quite a number of “Russian” surnames may attest the significant level of Christianization. From the available evidence, the ranks of such elite *kreshchenye tatary* (baptized Tatars) appear to have provided much of the personnel that the Russian government increasingly found useful in its dealings not just with Tatar but with other Turkic polities which bordered them to the south and east. Secondly, frontier requirements put a premium on members of the Tatar elite, both secular and religious, who remained Islamic in faith and cultural practice. However helpful converted Tatars might prove to the Russian government, reliance on those who rejected assimilation for a more limited accommodation could not be checked. This was true early in Muscovite control over the Tatars and later when official policy turned more repressive under Peter I and his immediate
successors. Thus, information gathered for the Muscovite embassy to the Crimean Khanate in 1563-73 was provided by *sluzhiye* Tatars,\(^7\) while twenty-three were hired as translators in 1723 and seventy-six more were added to the corps of interpreters in 1726.\(^8\) Thirdly, bureaucratic ineptitude and inability consistently to enforce laws and regulations created opportunities for unassimilated Tatars to satisfy self-defined needs and aspirations while effectively reducing the impact of colonial power. On-going construction of village mosques in the face of repeated decrees prohibiting such acts, and others ordering their outright destruction, provides testimony to the limits of practical authority;\(^9\) so too does the growing involvement of Tatars in commerce despite the prohibition against it prior to 1686.\(^10\)

Much evidence exists to confirm that decades of Russian policy aimed at assimilating the Tatars by combined means of positive incentives and outright repression had achieved few intended results by the second quarter of the eighteenth century. Besides episodes of violent insurrection rooted in popular social and religious grievances, middle and upper levels of Tatar society undertook activities and voiced protests of their own -- most prominently to the Legislative Commission of 1767 -- that contributed to a growing sense among Russian authorities that changes were needed in official policy. So too did unresolved problems along the eastern frontier of the Empire, where a series of fortifications, command posts, and the settlements around them, running from Astrakhan through Orenburg in the direction of Omsk and Siberia, served as the forward line of Russian presence among the Bashkirs and then the Kazakhs -- the former more sedentary but long troublesome, the latter tribal, politically unstable, and uncooperative. Falling under Russian suzerainty between 1731 and 1740, the Kazakhs were proving an obstacle to Russian political and commercial interests further to the south and east. Disorder in their midst stemming from political rivalries and economic ruin created untenable conditions from the Russian perspective. Aside from the value of trade within the various Kazakh hordes, access through their lands was crucial to expanding commerce in the more settled Central Asian polities of Khiva and Bukhara. Moreover, security along the empire's fortified line following the Irtysh River would be compromised without pacification of the Kazakhs on its interior. To achieve these various Russian goals, the Tatars increasingly seemed useful agents. How this was so deserves a closer look.

Proposals to expel or otherwise eliminate the Kazakhs from their accustomed territory enjoyed some administrative support, first in the early 1740s, again in the 1750s, and finally in 1763. Imperial policy makers, however, rejected this option and came instead to heed the recommendations of a series of regional administrators, including A.I. Tevkelev (a Tatar), P.I. Rychkov, I.I. Nepliuev, and O.A. Igel'strom, all of whose years of service traversed the last three-quarters of the eighteenth century. Despite differences among them, these men were apparently imbued with the new anthropology associated with the Enlightenment. Belief in a hierarchy of peoples and cultures, the dependency of culture on climate and way of life, and the
possibility of changing culture (and, hence, behavior), led them to recommend policies that would force an ethnographic turn in the lives of the Kazakhs and reshape their mores, traditional customs, and very ethnic character. As nomads, the Kazakhs were believed to be inherently savage and rebellious, beyond the pale of civilization. Disabusing them of their native traits and turning them into loyal subjects of the Empire seemed more achievable by encouraging their involvement in agriculture and commerce (rather than caravan raiding) and by utilizing Islam as a civilizing force. Who better to serve as a vanguard in these efforts than the Tatars, a people deemed more civilized than the Kazakhs by virtue of their long tenure within the Russian orbit and their commitment to Islam? Besides, the Tatars had already proved themselves loyal enough (most recently by not participating in Bashkir uprisings), to warrant permission to settle on Bashkir lands. The most notable enterprise of this kind occurred with the establishment of a Tatar settlement in the vicinity of Orenburg in 1744, the so-called Seitov posad (suburb), initiated by the migration from Kazan of some two hundred families with commercial interests.

Pacification of the Steppe, fear of Ottoman influence in the region, the safety of Russian trade, and the prospects of further penetration into Central Asia combined during the decades surrounding the mid-eighteenth century to create an environment within which Russian authorities were encouraged to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the Tatars and to address some of their more pressing grievances. It was well into the reign of Catherine II, however, before anything resembling a coherent imperial policy could be identified, and even then its formulation was initially cautious. Nevertheless, by the 1780s, fearful of the potential for new outbursts of popular discontent following the nearly insurmountable crisis that the Pugachev Rebellion posed, and faced with the need in far-off Crimea to seize control of a faltering Turkic and Islamic society, Catherine grew convinced that the Russian frontier over the length of its southern and eastern portions could not be left to the self-government of natives. Accepting an enlightened view of Islam, and trusting in the faithfulness of the Tatars, she became the latter’s chief patron and encouraged their merchants, mullas, and intelligence gatherers to mingle and work among those ever resistant to Russian expansion. Under Tatar aegis, Islam received government subsidies in several forms: as salaries for Tatars appointed to head the Musul’manskoe Dukhovnoe Sobranie (Muslim Spiritual Assembly), established at Orenburg in 1788 but shortly moved to Ufa, for the purpose of organizing and strengthening the influence of a Russophilic Islam outward into greater Central Asia; as payments for the construction of new mosques, mektebs (Islamic primary schools), and caravansarais for the use of traveling Muslims; and as funds to finance the expense of printing texts for use in Tatar-run schools. The Seitov posad was rewarded with its own ratusha (town council) in 1782, and two years later the sluzhilye Tatars were granted equality of rights with the Russian nobility.
Without exaggerating matters, the opportunities for Tatars and their status within the Russian Empire had increased measurably by the end of the eighteenth century. They were clearly in the vanguard of Russia’s ‘oriental’ subjects, accepted for being Muslims (at least for the moment) and encouraged to pursue their own self-interest on the assumption of its compatibility with larger imperial aspirations. Tatars were now expected to spread and consolidate the Islamic religion among the nomadic Kazakh, trade for themselves and for Russia in lands further south and east to which Russian/Christian merchants were denied access, and assist as commercial middlemen between Central Asian traders and interior Russian markets. Largely for *raisons d’état*, then, the Russian authorities found convincing arguments to extend the Tatar diaspora and magnify its significance in their own eyes. During the nineteenth century these developments helped as well to unleash socioeconomic undercurrents that accelerated the emergence of a Tatar middle class and fixed its domination, induced fundamental shifts in the traditional Tatar Weltanschauung, and spawned Tatar ethnic consciousness. The consequences were profound for Tatar society, but they also had wider repercussions. By the turn of the twentieth century the Tatar diaspora, with its modernist mentality and the economic resources to support a range of reformist activities involving publishing, education, religion, economics, language, and social relations would shape a developmental model attractive to many Turkic brethren faced with the challenge of preserving known ways while evolving a modern society.

The forces propelling these trends are still poorly understood, yet by the first quarter of the nineteenth century, agitation within Tatar society, in the Caucasus, and across Central Asia (as well as the larger Islamic world encompassing the Ottoman Empire, Muslim India, and even relevant parts of China) becomes increasingly noticeable. Among the Tatars, apostasy of a large number of Christians (the so-called *starokreshchenye*, or “early converts”), the spread of *sufi* brotherhoods and radicalization of some (especially the Naqshbandiyya), as well as the call by certain *ulema* (Islamic religious authorities) for rejuvenation of society and the individual based on the traditional (tecdid) modality of reform, are major aspects of this ferment. The cumulative effects of contacts with Russian culture, and through its prism, that of Europe at large, coupled with contrasting experiences in the heart of Central Asia undergone not only by Tatar merchants plying their trade but also students sent to study in the great *medresses* of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent, further added to the brew.¹⁴

Meanwhile, particularly by the reign of Nicholas I, Russian authorities began having second thoughts about the merits of subsidizing Tatar enterprise and Islamic expansion. Great Russia’s own emerging national consciousness, and the latter’s intimate association with Christian Orthodoxy, explains much of the sensitivity to these matters, as does the threat to imperial integrity arising from the discontents with
colonialism epitomized but not limited to the drawn-out struggle with Shamyl and his forces in Dagestan. Finally, the specter of competition for control of important commodities in international trade moving between Russia and its southern and eastern neighbors, as well as the developing attitude that Russia had full and legitimate imperialist interests in Central Asia, added a sense of urgency to the opinion favoring modification of the compromise Catherine had effected. Under these circumstances, the Tatars appeared less necessary (even potentially dangerous) as middlemen for dealing with Central Asia. As pressure for establishing direct Russian influence in the region grew from the 1840s onward, influence that would be expected to produce a permanent and productive Russian presence in Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand, reliance on Tatars seemed less and less justified. Moreover, fear of the kind of Islamic unity that Tatar hegemony might produce loomed ever larger in certain Russian circles.

The middle decades of the nineteenth century, not surprisingly then, witnessed the eruption of a polemic between proponents of Great Russian nationalism and Tatars struggling to define their own identity and their relationship to other ‘others’ in the Empire, all in circumstances turning increasingly against them. Given little attention at the time, this polemic was, I believe, fraught with more than passing import. It voiced sets of firmly held but generally untenable assumptions, congeries of fears too often reflecting little more than blind cultural defensiveness, and bales of mistrust, all the while disguising more honest concerns and agenda. Much of the debate ratted on about the appropriate representation of Islam - its teachings, founder, and adherents -- typically at a somewhat ‘scholarly’ level. But the sticking point always seemed to be the Tatars. As one of the Russian polemicists declared with apparent exasperation: “Many write in the newspapers of the Polish question, the German question, and the Finnish question, but no one wants to recognize the birth of a Tatar question.” The author of these words was, of course, wrong, because many were bothered by the ‘Tatar’ question, not the least of whom were N.I. Il’minskii and the anonymous “Zdeshnii” cited at the opening of this discussion.

It was not just Great Russians, however, who railed against the extravagant and dangerous influence of this wide-ranging ethnic group, but also representatives from among some of the very ‘others’ it most influenced. The one who perhaps epitomizes such voices was Çokan Valihanov, the Kazakh aristocrat and prosvetitel’ (enlightener) who in several texts complained bitterly about Russian policy that fostered Islam among the Kazakhs and had allowed the Tatars, almost always described as “fanatical,” to implement that policy. “Islam has not yet eaten into our flesh and blood,” he wrote; It does threaten to disconnect our people from its own future.... In general, for the Kirgiz [Kazakh] people, the future has in store the disastrous prospect of gaining access to European civilization only after going through a Tatar period, just as the Russians went through a
Byzantine period.

However repellent Byzantine hegemony was, it nevertheless introduced Christianity, an indisputably enlightening force. What can the impressionable Kirgiz expect from Tatar culture, except dead scholasticism, capable only of inhibiting the development of thought and feeling. We must at any price avoid a Tatar period, and the [Tsarist] government must help us to do so.17

Written at the end of 1863 or beginning of 1864, these words warned of Tatar hegemony. They were prescient, but they missed a crucial point: the Tatars Valihanov believed to be a threat to his people were, in fact, being supplanted by a different breed less committed to the ways of the past than to the waves of the future. They were more likely to have been educated in Russian and even foreign schools, to have traveled extensively, to know Russian and perhaps a second 'foreign' language, and to be accepting of cultural diversity yet committed to the aspects of modern culture that appeared universal. They were cedidçiler (the “new people,” or modernists), determined to bring their own societies into conjunction with the progressive world around them, but they thought in much larger terms to include in their plans all Turks and/or all Muslims. Thus they were to varying degrees pan-Turks and/or pan-Islamists, arguing for one, the other, or both (depending upon the circumstances and the audience), in search of the power that derives from collective action.

Their modernism explains their cultural leadership by the late nineteenth century because it pledged a resolution to the growing disparity between the world of Muslims and Turks and the world of the West. Tatars were in the forefront of educational reform, economic development, women’s issues, publishing, and the basic assault on individual apathy and social stagnancy.18 Hegemony would come easier under these than under the older conditions perceived by Valihanov. Who could resist the call to be different so as to be better? Who could fail to see the benefits awaiting those willing to forego the comfort of the known for the promises of the unexplored? Of course, hegemony is double edged: it means preeminence and encourages imitation, but it also breeds resentment both among those whose own authority is displaced by that preeminence and those who object to being imitators. In view of the dearth of research, the reaction, for example, of the Bukharan religious establishment can only be speculated upon, but based on admittedly skimpy evidence I would contend that it was typically unfavorable to the Tatar influence especially when in the guise of religious modernism. This was true even in the early nineteenth century, when Bukharan domination of Islamic thought and training was still unchallenged. As for secular Central Asian intellectuals, with time many of them voiced animosity toward Tatar influence in the manner of Ghazi Yonis Muhammad-oghli, who described Tatars “as the last generation to obstruct Turkistan’s [Central Asia’s] progress.”19
Through their schools and publishing activities, Tatars offered new pedagogy and social visions not just to their own but to other Turkic peoples within the Russian orbit. Revolutionary educational ventures, both at the primary and secondary levels, led the way, attracting students from throughout greater Central Asia by the early twentieth century. Tatar publishing initiatives -- books, newspapers, and periodicals included -- made available an increasing array of secular information that suggested alternatives to theologically-dominated perspectives, even as they helped spread a reformist brand of Islam amenable to the demands and aspirations of modern life. The first printed books in Uzbek, Turkmen, Kumyk, Karakalpak, and other Turkic languages appeared thanks to the efforts of Tatar publishers; by 1917, the number of books in Kazakh was second only to those in Tatar itself, prompting A. Karimullin to conclude that “the appearance and development of book printing in the Kazakh language during the pre-revolutionary period was directly linked to the history of the Tatar book and book trade.” Likewise Martha Olcott has observed that before 1905, when the first typographer of Arabic script opened for business in the Steppe, Kazan served as the Kazakh intellectual center. Elsewhere in Central Asia, Tatar initiatives had similar results, although increasingly after 1905 virtually every major Turkic group was doing its own publishing, under its own auspices, and with its own equipment.

Valihanov’s assessment of Tatar influence notwithstanding, a more appropriate and accurate summation may have been proffered by the eminent orientalist, V.V. Bartol’d, when he wrote: “In the Middle Ages, culture arrived at the shores of the Volga from Bukhara and Khiva; in the nineteenth century, the Volga Tatars, imbued with European culture through the intermediacy of Russia, became the teachers of their Turkestan co-religionists.” Tatarization as much as Russianization, then, appears to have functioned as a critical process in the eastern borderlands in the last decades of the ancien régime. It received more than passing assistance from the Tatar commercial and industrial bourgeoisie (increasing both in numbers and wealth), who not only defended the cedid movement but became its most reliable patron throughout the diaspora, particularly by subsidizing construction and maintenance of schools, teachers’ salaries, establishment of public libraries and reading rooms, and mutual-aid societies.

The linkage between modern economic interests and the forces of cultural transformation -- neither trivial nor historically accidental -- both reflected and encouraged an overriding spirit of collaboration not only across social classes but also the full range of Turkic sub-groups, a spirit epitomized in the slogan that the Crimean Tatar cedidiçi, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, applied to the masthead of his widely-read newspaper, Tercüman, in 1905: “Dilde, fikirde, ister birlik” (Unity in language, thought, and action). Proponents of separate Turkic paths of development based upon emerging sub-ethnic identities and aspirations would increasingly voice opposition to calls for unity, but the appeal proved strong well into the third decade of the twentieth century despite often emphatic dissent.
In the midst of the agitation sweeping the Empire during the years surrounding the 1905 Revolution, the rallying cry for birlik (unity) took an inevitable political turn. Not surprisingly, Tatars once again led the way, taking advantage of their economic and cultural achievements and preeminence to coordinate collective action in the form of assorted gatherings locally and then at the all-Russian level, creation of an imperial-wide organization called Rusya Müslümanlarining Ittifaki (Union of Russian Muslims), establishment of ties with non-ethnic-based political parties (e.g., the Constitutional Democrats, the Bolsheviks, and the Octobrists), and formation of a Muslim Faction in the State Duma. 

Partly from their own experience and aggressiveness, partly from the failure of other Turkic communities to develop coordinated programs of political action, and partly from a near obsession with unity, the Tatars dominated at every turn. They needed a pan-movement to guarantee an appropriate place for themselves in an empire experiencing severe stress and facing an uncertain future with the potential for extreme social, economic, and ethnic competition. The Third All-Russian Muslim Congress held in Nizhni-Novgorod in August, 1906, offers a telling illustration of Tatar aspirations and dominance: ten of the fourteen members of its presidium were Volga Tatars, as were at least eighty percent of the eight hundred participants. Likewise, of the seventy-seven deputies elected to the four Dumas between 1906 and 1912, thirty (39%) were Tatars. For the short term, unity appealed to all the Turks; but its glamour would prove short-lived in the face of burgeoning nationalism.

The collapse of the Tsarist regime in early 1917 seemed to offer an opportunity not only to create a new Russia based on liberal ideals but also to restructure the relationship between traditionally dominant Great Russians and the multitude of typically oppressed minorities, among whom were the Turkic peoples. Of these the Tatars, by virtue of the longevity of their subordination to Russian rule, felt a particularly strong antipathy toward the mechanisms and policies of Russification. The most popular Tatar solution called for the establishment of a centralized, democratic Russian Republic within which the principle of extraterritorial cultural autonomy would operate for non-Russian peoples: all Turks/Muslims, while pursuing the social practices and symbols that reflected the diversity in their ranks would additionally focus on developing instruments for an overarching unity. This principle surely reflected the realities of the Tatar diaspora. Federalism, the alternative posed generally by Azerbaijanis, Crimean Tatars, and Central Asians (especially Uzbeks), was appropriate for those with clearly defined territories (homelands) within which dwelled the overwhelming majority of the titular group, but such was not the case for the Volga Tatars. Not surprisingly, a series of conferences and congresses in 1917, both provincial and national, found Tatars above all advocating the need for Turkic unity based on class, ethnic, and religious solidarity. This voice found expression through several periodicals, such as Ulugh Türkistan, that had the telling characteristic of being published in Tatar and Uzbek in Tashkent under the editorial auspices of various Tatar intellectuals.
and commercial interests. The appearance of such periodicals (six from April to December, 1917 alone), reflects the significance of the Tatar diaspora turned to political purposes.\textsuperscript{25}

The relative monolithism of Tatar views on statebuilding, however, began showing clear signs of fragmentation in the throes of the Bolshevik coup. Those Tatar socialists who had already joined Bolshevik ranks were followed by others drawn to a new regime seemingly dedicated to the eradication of ethnic as well as social, economic, and political inequities. The humanism of the communist ideology was clearly its most attractive aspect. With repeated promises from Lenin of the right to build ethnic life without hindrance, and with a series of goodwill gestures designed to win Tatar support for the October Revolution, hopes were raised for the institutionalization of genuine autonomy within the emerging Soviet system. By the end of the Civil War, however, communism in the USSR was revealing itself to have a Russian face. One by-product was the reemergence of a more typical Tatar perspective, this time under the guise of "national communism" and theories most associated with the name of Mir Said Sultangaliev.\textsuperscript{26}

Sultangaliev arrived at Marxism only after a long apprenticeship as a ceddçi. Becoming the most prominent Muslim Communist by the early 1920s and a leading figure within Bolshevik ranks, he remained imbued with the cultural concerns of his earlier years and with a vital commitment to the preservation of Tatar identity. In the still heady climate of debate among Bolsheviks before 1923, when he was arrested for the first time, Sultangaliev spoke boldly on issues of practical concern, but he is most remembered for articulating theoretical positions on several critical issues: the affiliation between Communism and Islam, the relationship between social and national revolution in the economically backward countries of the East, and the role of the Tatars in spearheading the revolution's expansion beyond the Soviet Union's southern and eastern borders. In brief, he saw the future of the revolution in the East and not in the West, among peasant and semi-colonial societies and not the advanced capitalist ones. He spoke of proletarian nations and not classes, of the need to preserve the cohesion of the Turkic/Muslim world and, therefore, of delaying indefinitely the playing out of any internal class struggles. On the highly charged issue of the formation of the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sultangaliev opposed the plans (supported by Stalin) for a federation of ethnically-based units, small and divided vis-à-vis the extremely large and powerful Russian Republic. Instead, he and other national communists advocated creation of a Republic of Turan, a pan-Turkic entity combining the territories of Central Asia, the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and the Middle Volga, governed by its own centralized, monolithic, and autonomous party and controlling its own army. Moreover, Sultangalievism called for the establishment of a "Colonial International" to focus attention and resources on the societies perceived to be most vulnerable to the revolutionary program. "If we want to sponsor the revolution in the East," wrote one Tatar communist, "we must create in Soviet Russia a territory close to the Muslim East, which could become an experimental laboratory for the building
of communism, where the best revolutionary forces can be concentrated.”

As for the Tatars themselves, Sultangaliev insisted that they were “the pioneers of the social revolution in the East.” Thanks to their more advanced cultural condition, they could inspire the development of more backward areas. “Already we witness people from all corners of the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia and Turkestan, Khiva and Bukhara, and even far-off Afghanistan arriving in Tataria with demands of its cultural leaders...” The implications of these words, as of the general program proffered by Sultangaliev and his supporters, are striking: Not only would communism take on a “Muslim” face, but it would likely speak Tatar and have as its headquarters not Moscow but Kazan! The challenge to Russian dominance of the international revolutionary movement was direct and blunt; if unobstructed, Sultangalievism would likely have carried Tatar hegemonic impulses to their logical political end, and, given the Tatar diaspora with its entrenched cultural and economic influence, would have done so with real advantage.

For Stalin, who had “placed himself squarely on the side of the central apparatus and identified himself with the Great Russian core of the party and state bureaucracy,” the challenge was too profound. As the party’s chief spokesman next to Lenin on nationality issues, as an adamant proponent of extreme centralization, and as one whom we know from hindsight to have possessed unlimited political ambition, the national communists would have to be defeated. The Tatars, “the worst of them all,” he is quoted to have said, were chosen to be broken first, and Tatar influence within the larger Turkic world dismantled. As early as the end of 1918, the campaign against the independence of “native” organizations was well underway; over the next several years, leading up to Sultangaliev’s first denunciation by Stalin himself, the pressure would continue, setting the ground for the all-out assault against national communism in the late 1920s. As with the murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934, the arrest and imprisonment of Sultangaliev in 1928 opened a flood-gate that trampled lives and alternatives to Stalinism far and wide.

The crusade against national communism resulted in the elimination of independent-minded ethnic leaders all across the Soviet Union; it was particularly devastating in greater Central Asia. By the eve of the Second World War, few if any such figures were left alive. As the most powerful public defenders of korenizatsiia, the policy of the 1920s by which formation and development of native cadres were encouraged along with the flourishing of indigenous cultures, their absence made full betrayal by Stalin of the Revolution’s ethnic promises largely unstoppable. Respect for diversity gave way to demands for conformity, and under the guise of “internationalism,” Russification became the objective. The ambition to create a new Soviet man and woman, as the Tatar historian and activist, G. Ibragimov, underscored in his 1927 essay Tatar Mädäniyeti nindi yul belän barajaq? (Which Way Will Tatar Culture Go?), would toll the death knell of native cultures. The threat was particularly grave to the Tatars, whose fragmentation
and isolation under diaspora circumstances made them especially vulnerable to centralizing and assimilative pressures. Soviet power and moral indifference shortly overwhelmed Tatar counter efforts, rendering them pitiable and tragic for their inefficacy. In somewhat of a perverse way, Central Asians proper (that is, those in the five recently established republics), benefitted from this development, in so far as Tatar influence over their cultures was broken and Tatars in their midst rendered innocuous.

The fabric of deceit and terror that increasingly clothed the USSR and its people from the early 1930s proved of the sturdiest quality to survive for decades after Stalin's death and withstand corrections to the system's functioning introduced by all of his successors. It is true, taking the Tatars as a case, that from the late 1950s the opportunities to recover bits and pieces of social memory, seemingly obliterated in earlier decades, were eked out little by little; but all such advances, important as they were, indirectly acknowledged the regime's continued viability and its unfettered control over Soviet society.

Hence the critical significance of Mikhail Gorbachev's espousal of a new social and economic discourse in the USSR since 1985, building as he did, of course, on initiatives launched by Yuri Andropov. While I believe his intentions were to preserve the essential features of a Leninist system and not to subject the political order to unmanageable forces, the proclamations of perestroika and then glasnost' quickly revealed the hopelessness (even pathos) of Gorbachev's conservatism. A shrewd and exceedingly nimble politician, he managed for the longest time to weather crisis after crisis, including the August 18 coup attempt, but he did so increasingly as a tail to a social movement of critical depth and force. Meanwhile, that movement has seized the moment even if it cannot yet control it.

One of the barely recognized consequences for Tatars (and Central Asians generally), has been a renewed diaspora consciousness. While it is too early to assess its long-term effects, the attention given to the dispersion of the Tatar people is one reflection of the larger question of identity and sovereignty riveting so many. Deciding who the Tatars are may well be the key to resolving numerous social issues. Thus, the debate over ethnos and ethnonyms among all the Turkic peoples rages not only as an esoteric concern of withdrawn intellectuals, but as a popular theme with clear political implications. Are the Volga Tatars the lineal descendants of the tenth-century Volga Bulgars? If so, then the name Tatar -- a much later colonial attribution -- ought to be replaced with Bulgar, as members of the recently-formed social organization, Bulgar al-jadid (The New Bulgar), have advocated. To adopt that argument, however, out of the legitimate desire to reject Russian domination, raises other questions, some of which are bluntly posed by the writer Robert Batulla:

Let's admit that we are Bulgars. What will then happen to the Kriashens?
Obviously, they are not Bulgars. What about the Penza, Siberian, Crimean, Baraba Tatars? Their ancestors did not live on the territory of
the Middle-Volga Bulgar state. This will lead to confusion, discord, and a terrible division of the ancestral inheritance. And after the division, only the chips of one great culture will remain... How can people not understand? We are a united multi-million Tatar people."

He might have included other Turkic peoples as well in his anxiety about "a terrible division of the ancestral inheritance."

Palpable concern for the diaspora elements of the extended Tatar family has manifested itself with growing scope at least since early 1988. Kazan Utları, the monthly Kazan Tatar literary review that has played a leading institutional role of cultural defender for many years, introduced a new section entitled “Tatar khälkä: Törle töbäklärdä, törle illärdä” (The Tatar People: In Various Places, in Various Lands), that carries information about Tatars abroad, whether in Finland, Japan, Turkey, or the United States. Moreover the journal has been publishing letters from individual Tatars in other countries, all designed to assist with “filling in the blanks” of history and bring the diaspora at least spiritually back to the hearth. Contributing to this task have been important articles by the Tatar literary scholar Ibrahim Nurullin and the historian A. Khalikov, both of whom have challenged the charge of treason long applied to those Tatars who had emigrated after October, 1917, and have criticized the “conspiracy of silence” surrounding emigré contributions to the Tatar heritage.

One striking cultural event has been the announcement from M.Z. Zakiev, director of the Institute of Language, Literature, and History (Kazan') concerning plans for compilation of a Tatar encyclopedia as part of a larger effort to “reconstruct the history of the entire Tatar people.” As Zakiev argues, this is a task “complicated even more by the fact that only one quarter of the Tatar people reside in their titular republic. Many Tatars, in fact, though remaining on the territories they have always inhabited [emphasis added], are found outside the borders of the TASSR. A significant number of Tatars make up a diaspora scattered throughout the Soviet Union.” The encyclopedia, treated as a project of immense cultural import, will apparently be international not only in content but in authorship.

On the sociopolitical scene, a congress of the Tatar diaspora convened from February 17-18, 1989 in Kazan', reaffirming “the sovereignty and indivisibility of the Tatar nation and the units of Tatar culture across the administrative territorial divisions of the USSR.” The Congress's resolutions called also for the "consolidation of the Tatar nation," and requested of UNESCO a Tatar-language version of its publication Courier. The final articles in the resolutions proclaimed solidarity with the Crimean Tatars and their struggle for return of their homeland. In June, 1990 we learned of a project for creation of a Volga-Ural Federation, although the geographical delimitations of that federation were left undefined. Two months later formation of a political party calling itself Itifaq (Unity) again saw stress placed on the return “home” of
diaspora Tatars and a call, at least temporarily, for a regional federation, presumably on the order of the Volga-Ural project. In October of that same year another party's founding was announced -- Vatan (Fatherland) - which, appropriately all-Union, aimed at the recreation of Tatar statehood either within the USSR or outside it, on the territory of the former Astrakhan, Kazan', and Siberian Khanates!40

In the extraordinary and unsettling times of late 1991 and early 1992, the outcomes of astounding processes underway throughout the Soviet Union defy easy prognosis. The fate of the Tatar Republic and of the millions of Tatars scattered about the former union will be subject to long, complex, and intense debate before being resolved. Creating new mechanisms for establishing close relations between the homeland and the diaspora will undoubtedly continue to consume the energies and imaginations of many; formation of a larger pan-Turkic federation (cultural and economic, if not political), involving some of the Central Asian republics, may well be part of any solution.41 Many will probably agree with the sentiments expressed recently by R. Kharis in Kommunist Tatarii that “to hold a wake for the past is to forget an old brotherhood,” or with I. Tahirov’s rhetorical question: “Is it pan-Turkism, this desire of related peoples, in this case of the Turkic peoples, to live together as brothers?“42 Still, the Tatar tendency toward what Edward Allworth terms “monoethnicity” is likely to be obstructed even by those who dream of [re]creating a Great Turkistan. The perspective from Central Asia’s many parts is simply too heterogeneous to carry this particular dream very far.
ENDNOTES

1. At a major conference that The Kennan Institute sponsored in 1983 on “The Study of Central Asia,” I was sustained in my own definition of the region by two participants in particular: Richard Frye, who suggested that “one might include in the widest sense of ‘Central’ Asia all the lands and peoples not part of the four major settled regions of the continent of Asia -- Russia, China, India, and the Near East... of Mesopotamia and Syria;” and David Nalle, who noted that the conference’s logo was borrowed from a tile panel decorating the shrine of Khwaja Abdullah Ansari on the outskirts of Herat and dating from the fifteenth century. The tile, composed entirely of Arabic calligraphy and containing a Quranic verse, nevertheless bears “unmistakable Chinese influence.” See Conference on the Study of Central Asia, ed. by David Nalle (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1983), pp. 11 and 1.

2. N.I. Il’minskii to K.P. Pobedonostsev, as quoted in A.A. Voskresenskii, O sisteme prosveshcheniia inorodtsev (Kazan, 1913), p. 38. Il’minskii was hardly exceptional in his attitudes, and his public as well as private writings represent merely a small portion of a considerable body of essentially anti-Tatar literature produced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.


4. In 1976, John A. Armstrong wrote a seminal article on diasporas in which he distinguished between archetypal (complete, permanent, and unable to constitute a compact majority anywhere), and situational (partial and temporary). Illustrative of the first have been the Jews, and of the second, the Chinese. Armstrong recognizes an intermediate type of diaspora (to which he gives no designation), characterized by possession of a territorial base that has long been under foreign domination and “had suffered an equally long period of economic and cultural eclipse compared to the affluence and vitality of the diaspora.” He cites the Armenians as typical; I would offer the Tatars as a second example. See “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” The American Political Science Review, LXX, No. 2 (June, 1976), pp. 393-408. Just as Armstrong fails to include the Tatars among diaspora peoples, so too does Frédéric Mauro in his examination of merchant communities that are largely diaspora as well. See “Merchant Communities, 1350-1750,” in The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. by James D. Trace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 255-286.


9. See *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu Akademii Nauk* (St. Petersburg, 1836), I, No. 358 (1593); *PSZ*, First Series, IV, No. 1946 (1713); *PSZ*, First Series, XI, No. 8664 (1742); and *PSZ*, First Series, XII, No. 8875 (1744).


12. Ottoman influence on the Turkic peoples inhabiting the Russian Empire has received little attention from scholars, except most notably at the hands of the French research team originally headed by Alexandre Bennigsen and focused largely on the Crimean Khanate. Ottoman interests in the Black Sea and its surrounding territories always troubled Russia for obvious geopolitical reasons, but those interests were frequently projected (accurately or not) by Russians onto Turkic communities further afield, in Central Asia proper, the Kazakh steppe, and the Volga region as well. Rumors of Ottoman infiltration, particularly by mullas functioning as some sort of subversive fifth-column fomenting mass anti-Russian sentiment and behavior, were common even as late as the early twentieth century.

13. On the creation of the Muslim Spiritual Assembly as well as definition of its duties and personnel, see *PSZ*, First Series, Vol. XXII, Nos. 16710, 16711, 16759, 16897, and 17099 (1788); on construction subsidies, *PSZ*, First Series, Vol. XXII, Nos. 16255 (1785); on the printing of texts, “Arkhib Grafa Igel’stroma,” *Russkii arkhiv*, No. 11
For a fuller treatment of this analysis and particularly the difference between tecdid and cedid modalities of reform, see my "Beyond Renewal: The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age," in Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change, ed. by Jo Ann Gross (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 151-166. That same volume also contains a very useful article on the prominent nineteenth-century Naqshbandiyya sheikh, Zaynullah Rasulev, in which the international linkages among expressions of ferment are effectively underscored. See, Hamid Algar, "Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev: The Last Great Naqshbandi Shaykh of the Volga-Urals Region," pp. 112-133.


M. Mashanov, Istoriccheskoe i sovremennoe znachenie kristianskago missionerstva sredi musul'man (Kazan, 1894), p. 261.


The best and most comprehensive work on this subject is Azade-Ayshe Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986).

Quoted in Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks from the Fourteenth Century to the Present: A Cultural History (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1990), p. 191. Allworth goes on to acknowledge Central Asian hostility toward Tatars as being rooted in fear of Tatar hegemonic agenda. This led, for example, to Central Asian charges that Tatars were distorting their history. Moreover, many Central Asians seem to have distrusted Tatars for their perceived association with the region's Russian conquerors. As Allworth puts it: "Turkistanians in the twentieth century and earlier regarded Kazan Tatars with suspicion because they laced their language with Russianisms and because their activity in Central Asia convinced Bukharans and Turkistanians, with some cause, that Tatars served as proxies or agents for their Russian masters."


22. V.V. Bartol’d, “Kul’tura musul’manstva,” Sochineniia (Moscow, 1966), VI, p. 203.

23. Work is desperately needed on the relationship between the Tatar entrepreneurial spirit and wealth and the evolution of cedidism. Good places to begin are: G.S. Gubaiduallin, “Iz proshlogo tatar,” Materialy po izucheniiu Tatarstana, vyp. 2 (Kazan, 1925), pp. 71-111; Kh.Kh. Khasanov, Formirovanie tatarskoi burzhuznoi natsii (Kazan, 1977); and Ahsen Bore (ed.), Gani Bay (Helsinki, 1945), a reissue of an important collection of correspondence (originally published in 1912) between Gani Bay Huseinov, a wealthy Orenburg merchant and philanthropist, and various prominent Tatars.

24. For general surveys of these developments, see A. Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, Chapter 9; A. Arsharuni and Kh. Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizma i pantiurkizma v Rossii (Moscow, 1934); and S.A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

25. The editorial position of Ulugh Türkistan, as Edward Allworth notes, was “evidenced by its sponsorship, audiences, and linguistic media -- Kazak, Turkistanian, and Tatar. By the newspaper’s definition, then, all the subregions and Turkic peoples of Tatarstan and of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and eastern (Chinese) Turkistan,... were partners in this Great Turkistan.” Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks, p. 180.


31.. The assault would include maneuvers to replace the Arabic alphabet with the Latin (ultimately, the Cyrillic). Separating the Turkic peoples from their literary heritage and atomizing them even more, this campaign had the added goal of further reducing the opportunities for Tatarization.


34.. For a scholarly treatment of the issues, see A. Karimullin, *Tatary: etnos i etnonim* (Kazan, 1989).


39. For a translation of the resolutions of the diaspora congress, see “The Tatar Public Centre (TOTs),” *Central Asian Survey,* IX, No. 2 (1990), pp. 155-165. A translation of the Center’s platform can be found in *Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle,* VIII, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 5-9. R. Batulla may have summed up most succinctly the popular attitude toward ties between Volga and Crimean Tatars: “Until the Revolution, more exactly until the replacement of the Arabic alphabet, Crimean and Kazan Tatars had one cultural life, subscribed to the same periodicals, exchanged artists and writers. The change of the alphabet severely divided our people. An artificial barrier was created.” See Batulla’s “labloka razdora,” *Vecherniaia Kazan’* (November 5, 1988), cited in Azade-Ayshe Rorlich, “Tatars or Bulghars,” p. 23.

