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"Normal Life":
Identity and the Unmaking of the Ukrainian Working Class

Daniel J. Walkowitzz

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The strike by the coal miners in the Summer of 1989 precipitated a crisis of social identity for these industrial workers, a crisis which could well determine their ability to shape an effective response to the restructuring of social and industrial life. Democratization and the beginnings of a market economy have made this a unique modernist moment in Soviet history for the industrial worker. But the political openings created by the overthrow of the centralized State have created a political quagmire for miners. The State had endowed them with an identity as a labor elite for its own economic and political reasons. The miners' movement since 1989, however, had disavowed the State. Without such external validation, then, what constituted the basis of their status and identity?

As they look about them for ways to re-imagine and remake their society, miners may chose from many alternative possibilities. On the one hand, their imaginings are fueled by the omnipresence of new colonizers, ranging from U.S. missionaries to economic developers; on the other hand, as we shall see, media images of what Ukrainians call "normal life" pervade daily life, images which range from Disneyland to Pittsburgh. Of course, the circumstances of Ukrainian material and political life affect the miners' ability to realize any of these possibilities. Ukrainian material conditions -- natural resources, a decayed and outdated infrastructure and access to capital -- represent substantial obstacles to redevelopment of the economy. However, comparative work on recently restructured European steel cities suggests that the political role of the organized working class in Donetsk will also be a critical element in shaping the city's future.

This essay draws on three research trips to Donetsk in 1989, 1991 and 1992, to document changing worker perspectives as well as living and working conditions through videotaped oral histories.¹ Co-directed by Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel J. Walkowitzz,

¹A complete archive of videotapes, transcripts and translations from 1989, 1991 and 1992 will be established at the University of Pittsburg.
since 1991 the interviews have focussed on the Kuibyshev raion (borough), a working-class district in the northwest quadrant in which approximately 15,000 miners work in three large mine complexes.

Life has changed dramatically in the years since our initial meetings with the miners of Donetsk’s Kuibyshev raion during the Summer of 1989, and, as we shall see below, their understanding of the United States has helped to shape their thinking. In 1989, they were citizens of the Soviet Union; now they live in an independent Ukrainian republic. Independence from Moscow, however, had cultural as well as political implications with different meanings in Donetsk and Kiev, Ukraine’s capital in the central and more ethnically Ukrainian part of the country. Ever since coal was first mined extensively more than a century ago, the Donbass has been an ethnically Russian outpost, attracting largely peasant migrants from the central Russian provinces. Meanwhile, led by strong nationalist sentiment elsewhere in the country, the national government in Kiev has sought to establish a Ukrainian identity. New legislation has mandated instruments of national political sovereignty such as visas and a distinct Ukrainian currency. Among the more controversial and conspicuous cultural changes, however, has been the decree making Ukrainian the primary language of school instruction.

The identity of miners and other Donbass industrial workers threatened to be profoundly altered in a second way since 1989 as their privileged status began to erode. Most workers retained a skeptical eye on proletarian ideology which, for example, they recognized also strove to increase their workload and quotas. But in 1989, they remained celebrated in official propaganda as heroes of the socialist state; the new Ukraine, however, favored entrepreneurship. Miners’ social and economic status eroded with the ascendance of the heroes of free market ideology: "bizness" and the entrepreneur. By 1992, rising anxieties brought on by continuing political and economic instability further generated hostility towards the miners’ privileged status. Whereas citizens saw the 1989 miners' strike advancing all of society, as the Donetsk economy continued to deteriorate, people not only increasingly blamed high prices, shortages and instability on the high wages of miners, but, perhaps equally telling, felt emboldened to say so publicly. Miners themselves expressed an increasing skepticism about mine labor, and a new self-consciousness about long-standing grievances began to reverse the tradition of the miners’ dynasty.
As the years since 1989 had seen the miners spiral into a crisis of identity and survival, the United States has stood as a cultural as well as industrial model in which to anchor their future. Much as Disney had shaped the dreams of Americans and the West, Fantasyland and the American Dream Factory had established a beachhead in the former Soviet Union. Cultural messages are, of course, reshaped by audiences in often unexpected complex ways; and, Donetsk miners interact with the West and its culture by borrowing from, being shaped by, and in turn re-shaping it in ways yet to be analyzed. Since 1989 many miners in the former Soviet Union had become aware of superior mining conditions in the United States, and what they knew about them shaped their expectations. Indeed, the story of Ukrainian transformation lies embedded then in the politics of representation and the representation of politics.

The model for the social transformation envisioned by miners and city officials has been the experience of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. But, as a model for their modernity, they point to only one version -- the upbeat one -- of Pittsburgh’s recent history. The final part of this essay contrasts the experience of deindustrialization in Pittsburgh with that in several West European steel cities. Noting that democratization preceded industrialization in the U.S., it notes that Europe’s more political trade-union movements and labor parties have been more successful at defending worker interests and easing the deleterious impacts of economic restructuring. The essay concludes that the ability of Donetsk’s miners to forge an organized political identity with a social platform will determine how they fare in a restructured economy. While images of American culture, stretching from Disneyland to Pittsburgh, fuel the Ukrainian social and political imagination, the new society’s celebration of the entrepreneur may hold the key to their future. The tragic irony of the miners’ quest for affluence and opportunity is that the celebration of entrepreneurialism may disempower the voice and authority of the industrial working class to speak for and defend its own interests.
Citing the upheavals in Eastern Europe, the social theorist Marshall Berman has concluded that "1989 was not only a great year, but a great modernist year" as men and women "were all trying to make the modern world their own." Berman could well have been profiling the industrial community of Donetsk, Ukraine, whose miners in July 1989 joined those in Russia's Kuznets coal basin in sparking demands for radical democratization and economic renewal in the Soviet Union. For Berman, such modernists both "celebrate and identify with the triumphs of modern science, art, technology, economics and politics," and "demand deeper and more radical renewals," that is, they seek to "become the subjects as well as the objects of modernization."

While industrialization and economic growth were central missions of the Soviet State since the 1920s, political and economic modernity of the post-1989 era combines growth-oriented planning and production with the development of pluralist politics. And it is this latter development -- democratization and the beginnings of a market economy -- that make this modernist moment in Soviet history different for the industrial worker. This essay will argue that the political openings created by the overthrow of the centralized State have created a crisis of identity and a political quagmire for industrial workers such as the miners of Donetsk. The State endowed miners' with an identity as a labor elite for its own economic and political reasons. The miners' movement since 1989, however, had disavowed the State. Without such external validation, then, what constituted the basis of their status and identity?

As they look about them for ways to re-imagine and remake their society, miners may chose from many alternative possibilities. On the one hand, their imaginings are fueled by the omnipresence of new colonizers, ranging from U.S. missionaries to economic developers; on the other hand, as we shall see, media images of what Ukrainians call "normal life" pervade daily life, images which range from Disneyland to Pittsburgh. Of course, the circumstances of Ukrainian material and political life affect the miners' ability to realize any
of these possibilities. Ukrainian material conditions -- natural resources, a decayed and outdated infrastructure and access to capital -- represent substantial obstacles to redevelopment of the economy. However, comparative work on recently restructured European steel cities suggests that the political role of Donetsk's organized working class will also be a critical element in shaping the city's future. As we shall see, social democratic societies with organized labor parties have been more successful at minimizing the deleterious impact of deindustrialization on workers than have societies dominated by narrower bread-and-butter trade-unionism. In this regard, how the miners' politically resolve their crisis of identity will shape the status and authority of their voice in the new Ukraine.

Every place has its unique social and cultural formations. Ukrainian nationalism, the dilapidated conditions of Donbass mines and poor quality of its highly sulphuric coal, and limited timber reserves only begin to suggest some of the singular conditions which challenge the social and economic transformation of Donetsk. Moreover, the city has a leadening social and political legacy which it shares with other parts of the former Soviet Union. For instance, centralized state institutions have long provided a panoply of social services on which workers have come to depend; similarly, Communist Party leaders in industrial enterprises have instilled habits of worker-class quiescence and traditions of managerial corruption. As these Ukrainian workers seek to effect a transition to some new economic and social system, some of these habits -- both of mind and behavior -- persist, albeit in altered form. Other habits, of course, will have to emerge; success in a market economy demands initiative and independence which run counter to their habits of dependence and security. But the experience of the Donbass miners illuminates the effort to forge a new identity, a set of shared values, habits and attitudes which would enable them to become, in Berman's words, both the subjects and objects of modernization.

I.

Life has changed dramatically in the years since our initial meetings with the miners of Donetsk's Kuibyshev raion during the Summer of 1989, and, as we shall see below, their understanding of the United States has helped to shape their thinking. In 1989, they were citizens of the Soviet Union; now they live in an independent Ukrainian republic. Indepen-
dence from Moscow, however, had cultural as well as political implications with different meanings in Donetsk and Kiev, Ukraine’s capital in the central and more ethnically Ukrainian part of the country. Ever since coal was first mined extensively more than a century ago, the Donbass has been an ethnically Russian outpost, attracting largely peasant migrants from the central Russian provinces. Indeed, at present, people describing their nationality as Russian outnumber Ukrainians in Donetsk by 54 to 39.5 percent. Nearly four of every five people (78.6 percent) declare Russian as their native language. Meanwhile, led by strong nationalist sentiment elsewhere in the country, the national government in Kiev has sought to establish a Ukrainian identity. New legislation has mandated instruments of national political sovereignty such as visas and a distinct Ukrainian currency. Among the more controversial and conspicuous cultural changes, however, has been the decree making Ukrainian the primary language of school instruction. Gennady’s fifteen-year-old step-daughter, Marina, explained how the switch would stymie many Donetsk children who had been raised speaking Russian:

Many schools in Ukraine are switching completely to Ukrainian. I don’t think it can work. For example, I personally studied all subjects in Russian up to the eighth form. It will be difficult for me to study algebra or geometry in Ukrainian. I simply won’t understand many words.²

For adults like Tatiana Samofalova, a technician at the local chemical reactive plant who has relatives in Russia, Ukrainization represents more than a problem of language: for such people, Ukrainian sovereignty entails restrictions rather than signalling independence.

I have been converted into a Ukrainian to such an extent that it’s no problem for me to speak Ukrainian. Even Ukrainians themselves have forgotten how to speak Ukrainian…. But it’s not enough to live in an independent Ukraine. There are my relatives, my aunt, my cousin. It has become a problem now to go and see them. We cannot meet with each other very often; letters don’t get delivered. Why should I want such independence? What am I independent from? From my own relatives? What for? I don’t want such independence.³

The identity of miners like Gennady and other industrial workers threatened to be profoundly altered in a second way since 1989 as their privileged status began to erode.
Most workers retained a skeptical eye on proletarian ideology which, for example, they recognized also strove to increase their workload and quotas. But in 1989, they remained celebrated in official propaganda as heroes of the socialist state; the new Ukraine, however, favored entrepreneurship. In the past, every manufacturing establishment acclaimed its Heroes of Socialist Labor and the month's "best" workers on large billboards welcoming visitors to the plant. Similarly, public billboards celebrated workers honored by the City Soviet. Indeed, the narration accompanying a compilation film produced by Donetsk's official television station in 1970 to chronicle the history of the city reflected the society's proletarian culture in which the industrial working class was king:

Donbass has followed a great historic path throughout history. Today, as always, it is a world of self-sacrificing labor, of great people. The traditions of the heroes of the first five-year plans are being perpetuated by miner Ivan Vstrenchenko, steel worker Vladimir Holyarko, by thousands of leaders of communist labor. Such is the strength of the tradition of the working class.4

Ironically, while the success of the 1989 miners' strike reflected the miners' considerable political capital, it indicated their already deteriorating economic position. A halt in coal production could paralyze the country; consequently the miners still had considerable economic leverage. But that the miners had to make a demand for soap, which had come to symbolize their plight, made them feel demeaned, and merely underscored the ways in which they had begun to feel state policy since Brezhnev had increasingly favored party apparatchiks. One striking miner, even as his question remained unanswered, caught the miners' sense of a status lost:

Why did all this happen? Because the working class is no longer the ruler of the country. ("His Highness, the Working Class," as Lenin said.)5

By 1992, rising anxieties brought on by continuing political and economic instability further generated hostility towards the miners' privileged status. With their high salaries, miners continued to be the city's labor aristocracy, earning approximately thirty percent more than other industrial workers, and three times the salary of doctors or teachers. While formal data is scanty, this ratio appears to have remained relatively unchanged since the strike. But,
whereas citizens saw the 1989 miners’ strike advancing all of society, as the Donetsk economy continued to deteriorate, people not only increasingly blamed high prices, shortages and instability on the high wages of miners, but, perhaps equally telling, felt emboldened to say so publicly. For instance, after the usual obligatory toasts of vodka and cognac which followed an interview, Gregory Mikhailovich Kolomoets, a bank director in the Kuibyshev raion, revealed his animus toward the miners and the working class. Initially Kolomoets had given a circumspect analysis of the local economic situation for public consumption; now, finding his personal voice, he placed his criticism on the shoulders of the peasants. With his permission, we turned the tape recorder back on.

The prices imposed now are the highest in the Donbass, in Ukraine, and in the former Union. It is caused by the strike movement which took place in 1989-1991.... Miners were the first to initiate the strike movement. Certainly we shall find a way out of this economic crisis. But unfortunately, peasants have negative attitudes towards the workers’ movement. That is why food has become so expensive. That is why they pour out milk on the collective farms.6

In a more generous spirit, many other interviewees did not blame miners for their plight; still, they openly voiced a desire that society be reordered. A case in point was Aleksandr Yatsenko, a professor in the Donetsk Polytechnic Institute. Speaking from the point of view of an intellectual worker, Yatsenko articulated the ultimate logic of such a reordering, expressing a familiar Western valorization of non-manual labor that would reverse the historical dominion of manual labor in Socialist societies:

I don’t see anything good in our immediate future, because our society is turned upside down. Only manual labor has been appreciated here. Intellect was not appreciated and is still not appreciated in our society. There is no other society where a physicist-theorist is paid less than a gutter cleaner.7

Not surprisingly, the break with an often discredited socialist past extended to the miners themselves. In our interviews, miners did not themselves iterate this anti-working-class position, but, in an extraordinary reflection of the appeal of new social attitudes and possibilities in 1992 Donetsk, many of their children voiced an interest in alternative careers.
that would profoundly alter generations of worker tradition: the miners’ dynasty. Consider this 1989 exchange between Gennady Kushch and his then-wife, Liudmilla:

GENNADY: ...[I]f you count my father, it’s a second generation [in the mines]. If you go by my mother and grandpa, it’s the third. My grandpa was killed in the mine.

LIUDMILLA: Yes, yes, yes. We are all miners. My brother is a miner, and the other brother, too. We all graduated from the Polytechnic Institute. Well, [we’re] a miners’ dynasty.8

Moreover, reflecting on his thoughts as he sat in the central square before the Communist Party headquarters during the July 1989 strike, Gennady Kushch, with dramatic poignancy, acknowledged the miners’ obligation to their sons’ futures as miners:

I knew that it was an historical moment on the Square, and that if we got through the strike, if we won all, then it would mean that when my son goes to the mine, he will inherit all these rights. I don’t have much time left, but he still has to work. The next generation will go ... well, my son-in-law will go, and the nephews I have, they also will go to the mine.9

In 1992, Arthur Kushch, now age 15, still dreamed of working below ground, but now spoke of following his elder cousin to the Polytechnic where he would learn the trade of an electrical fitter in the mine.10

Contrast these views with those of Tatiana Samofalova toward the prospect of all men in her household working in the mines. Tatiana had absolutely no interest in seeing her two-year-grandson enter the mines: “The only thing I would not want him to do is become a miner like his grandfather. It is scary. Every time he [Valery] goes down into the mine, I worry. I wouldn’t want my grandson to repeat his grandfather’s way.” Tatiana’s husband, Valery, who had chaired the Kuibyshev Mine’s strike committee during the 1989 strike, still labored as a face worker. And Tatiana’s twenty-one-year-old son-in-law also worked at the mine, but in the maintenance department above ground. Fortunately for Tatiana she did not have to worry about her son, Sergei, working in the mines. He had no such intention: “The work in the mine is not for me. Everyone has his own destiny. I don’t want mine to be a miner.”11
Neither mine danger nor Tatiana's fears were new, of course; but all the political agitation over the horrendously unsafe conditions of Donetsk's mines, possibly combined with rising expectations about jobs in other industries, had lessened the automatic acceptance of the miners' dynasty as their fate, and empowered women like Tatiana to say so. By 1991, the Samofalov family's skepticism about the inevitability of the miner dynasty had given way to a new self-consciousness within the mining community of how bad the work was. The views of two of the co-chairs of the City Strike Committee, both veteran miners, are illustrative. Asked whether he wished his sons to become miners, or his daughter to marry one, Nikolai Volynko replied, "My daughter will herself choose whom to marry, but if it's a miner, I wouldn't want him to be working in the same conditions as we do." Striking a similar skeptical note, Mikhail Krylov spoke of his ninth grade son: "I don't want him to be a miner, but he'll decide for himself. It's enough that I spent twenty-five years working in the mine." And, indeed, the lighthearted views of a couple of teenage girls randomly interviewed in a Kuibyshev raion park suggest that if a young man were to decide to become a miner, it no longer assured that he would win the fair maiden's heart:

Girl 1: Marry miners?
Girl 2: They make more money. [laughter]
Girl 1: [seriously] Yes, it's true.
Interviewer: You personally, would you do it?
Girl 1: Well...
Girl 3: We, personally, are going to America. [laughter]13

Miners' social and economic status also eroded with the ascendance of the heroes of free market ideology: "bizness" and the entrepreneur. Two privately owned companies -- the Intertour travel agency and DOKA-TV -- facilitated our work in Donetsk. And while our evidence is anecdotal, as it inevitably must be with oral history, in both instances our contact person was someone who had worked with or for the miners. Intertour's director, Vladislav Nikolskii, was the former organizer for the Communist Party's Kuibyshev raion committee. Seizing the opportunity provided by the recent Soviet law permitting private cooperatives, and disillusioned with the possibilities of promotion, Nikolskii in 1988 joined some friends who were then starting up Donetsk's first private travel agency. Nikolskii provided our
initial 1989 access to the strike committee at the mine. The strike leaders at the time, Valery Samofalov and Gennady Kushch, were both party members in the raion.¹⁴

Our guide and liaison with DOKA-TV during June-July 1992, Viktor Zadorozhnyi, had an even more direct tie to the mines. High wages drew men to mining, irrespective of their formal training. Such was the case with Zadorozhnyi, who had been trained at the university in economics. Now, for the past eight months he had worked as chief economist for Donetsk’s fledgling cable television station. But the previous thirteen years had found him employed at the October Mine. After eight years as a mining foreman, he had served six years as secretary of the Young Communist League, the Komsomol, at the mine, most recently completing a housing program for younger miners. Still convinced that socialism provided "a basic level of social protection," Zadorozhnyi had left the mines in order to work in the field in which he had been trained.¹⁵

One final anecdote attesting to the new infatuation with "bizness" comes from the mouth of the former leader of the Kuibyshev strike committee, Valery Samofalov. Samofalov’s effort to open a beer hall catering to miners illuminates both how the persistence of old institutions complicates the development of new ones, and the complex economic environment in which any change would have to proceed. On the political level, Samofalov remained the most vocal proponent of trade-union independence and militancy at Kuibyshev, but on a personal level, he looked toward opportunities in private enterprise. He wished, he explained, to open "a bar near the mine where I could sell beer to people in nice surroundings, politely, without cheating them." Having been a miner in a state enterprise for the past twenty years, he looked toward the mine for capital. Mines, after all, provided housing, vacations, health care, and consumer goods, while private banking, which was still in its infancy, remained, like the economy, in disarray. Samofalov’s overtures to the mine director, however, were rebuffed. Anti-capitalist charges against him, he snickered, only masked their interest in protecting their personal gains:

I got the answer: ‘You’ll be a millionaire.’ It was [the mine’s] chief accountant who said that. I suggested that he buy the equipment and build the necessary premises. I said, I will share the profits with you till I pay back your expenditures, that is, the mine’s. When I pay it back, it will be mine.’ When you
share profits with the mine, it's considered OK; when you buy it and be-come a 'millionaire,' that's bad. But I don't understand why it's bad. My attitude towards business is positive. Nowa-days there is no business. Only a few people are honest in business. And the state hasn't done anything for the develop-ment of business....

Now they suggest privatization, when they have already enriched themselves by cheating others. If you visit the apart-ment of anyone who has been working in the area of trade for five years, you will see that he lives five times better than I do.16

As Valery Samofalov's story suggests, the tumultuous economic and political upheaval which continuously wracked the raion's daily life between 1989 and 1992 compli-cated the Kuibyshev's miners' crisis of identity. In 1989, miners struggled against a centralized State that had provided seventy years of political stability (for those who did not challenge it); in 1992, they confronted what was for most of them unprecedented political and economic instability. For instance, the suzerainty of the Communist Party until August 1991 had been replaced less than a year later by a dizzying array of perhaps as many as a half dozen political parties and factions. Their range varied at least as much as the clarity of their programs. Former Communists had organized a Socialist Party, but there were also several competing factions of Rukh, the nationalist movement, a Liberal party, and compet-ing factions of Democratic Rebirth of the Ukraine.17

Charges of corruption, long a staple of Donetsk political discourse, grew with the political uncertainty. In 1989, the head of the official trade union served as the focus for the Kuibyshev miners' anger over corruption. They demanded the leader's accountability, found it lacking, and fired him. By 1992, however, the centers of power to which they had objected, in the mine, and, with the overthrow of Gorbachev and declaration of Ukrainian independence, in Moscow, had been removed. Donetsk workers now directed their political attack toward Kiev and their economic grievances toward the "mafia."

The elusive identity of the mafia probably has enhanced its power over both economic life and the imagination. Few could agree on who constituted the mafia, but everyone could agree it was the new source of corruption. For Vladislav Nikolskii, the mafia resembled the Western crime syndicate which used strong-armed tactics, "beginning with hooliganism and
finishing with very effective methods of influence," to extract money or goods from merchants and individuals for personal gain. But, for others, the western meaning missed a more general problem with social relations rooted in Soviet dependence on state institutions. Thus, for Valery Samofalov, it was institutionalized bribery as the way of doing business throughout the Soviet area: "In my opinion, the whole 100 percent in Soviet trade are thieves. It doesn't happen because all of them are bad, but because of the circumstances.... It means that the director of a shop has to overstate the price to me in order to pay the director of the warehouse, who pays someone on a higher level. This is our mafia."18

Larissa Sartania, our Donetsk translator, shared Samofalov's view that the problem was systemic, not personal. Frustrated with the variety of answers provided by our respondents, she injected her own perspective.

People in mafia are mutually interconnected, so that it is difficult to know where administration begins and where it finishes, where authority begins and distribution begins. We have been living all these years on these three pillars which were called the state. How did we depend on these three pillars? They gave us apartments and cars. They gave us everything that was in short supply beginning with thread and needles, and finishing with expensive things like vouchers, for example.

...The more you gave to the authorities, the bigger and better apartment you were given.... It is all interconnected. So it is difficult to say now where mafia begins and where it ends. Maybe the word 'mafia' does not suit; 'corruption' is perhaps better. It is because there are too many things here which cannot be defined in one word. It has been developing for years and decades.19

Widespread corruption, however, only begins to touch on the region's economic troubles. Rather than working an economic miracle, independence had often only brought the miners and their families new problems. Something of the scale of hyperinflation can be gleaned from the change in the value of the ruble during the course of our research. When we arrived in Donetsk in July 1989, the ruble remained at its official, and longstanding, rate of 60 kopeks to the U.S. dollar; the black market paid 5 to 10 rubles to the dollar. When we returned in May 1991, the difference between the two rates had evaporated and travelers received approximately 30 rubles to the dollar. One year later, high inflation had been
superseded by hyperinflation. The rate between our June arrival and departure a month later rose from 100 to 135 rubles per dollar. A year later, the exchange exceeded the 1000 ruble per dollar mark. Conservatively, in four years there had been a hundred-fold increase from the 1989 black market rate.

According to Viktor Bychkov, the Deputy Chair of the Donetsk City Soviet, the "wild growth of prices" increased the incidence of poverty in the region. Miners, in his analysis (and as we heard others suggest), were partially responsible for the problem. Miners, whose coal was felt to be even more necessary to fuel the sluggish economy, could demand substantial wage increases to keep pace (somewhat) with inflation. Others could not, however, and the result was "a big gap in our region." Bychkov summarized the situation:

I have already mentioned that miners get twelve to twenty thousand rubles. Those who work in the sphere of culture, 800 rubles; teachers 1,200 rubles; doctors 1,400 rubles; bus drivers 2,000 to 2,500 rubles. That's a big gap.... We have many pensioners: one third of the population of the city. That makes 400,000 plus those who work in the areas I just mentioned,...almost 70 percent of the city population lives below the poverty line.²⁰

Ukraine's decision to create its own currency, temporarily called the coupon, worsened the economic situation. As Russia refused to accept Ukrainian currency, it soon failed to hold its value against the ruble. Moreover, without a convertible currency, travel and economic exchange between the two countries slowed to a trickle. For both individuals and industry, barter, like in days of primitive accumulation, became one of the only ways to secure desired raw materials or consumer goods. In turn, the wheeling and dealing fueled rumors of corruption everywhere, stories which seemed to take every possible form.

For the mines, Ukrainian independence and the lack of a convertible currency also had immediate consequences on productivity, safety, and ultimately, the standard of living. Ukrainian mines traditionally depended on Russian timber reserves for lumber to prop up new and decayed tunnel shafts. Safety conditions in Ukrainian mines, as throughout Eastern Europe, have been notoriously bad, and miners reported that the curtailment of Russian timber only worsened the situation. The miners' life expectancy is only about 49 years. and accidents kill, on average, 30 to 40 Donetsk miners every year. Ten thousand Soviet miners
died on the job between 1979 and 1989, eight times the number in the U. S., though to be fair, labor-intensive Soviet industry employed perhaps as many as eighteen times the number of miners. Still, as Yuri Makarov, a miner and co-chair of the City Strike Committee, reminded local critics of miners, "Miners pay for their wages with their blood"; indeed, during our 1992 research visit, 65 miners lost their lives in two Donbass cave-ins. In comparison, the entire U.S. mining industry in 1991, employing roughly the same number of miners as work in Donetsk, incurred 61 fatalities.21

Since 1989, many miners in the former Soviet Union had become aware of superior mining conditions in the United States, and what they knew about them shaped their expectations. Their information came mostly from contacts with Western journalists and visits to the United States organized and paid for by the AFL-CIO for a few of their leaders. Thus, as Alexei Bokarev, a Siberian miner, emerged from Virginia-Pocahontas Mine 6 of the Island Creek Coal Company in Oakwood, Virginia, he noted, "If Americans had to work in Soviet mines, they'd refuse. They'd spit on our mines." In the United States today, mining production is higher and fatalities lower than ever in our history, with life expectancies for miners not appreciably lower than for the general population. Donbass mines, much like mines throughout East Europe, are comparatively unhealthy, dangerous and inefficient. It takes Kuibyshev miners, for instance, one hour to reach the face, making their effective workday only six hours. At its peak in the late 1980s, labor-intensive Soviet mining, employing approximately 2.5 million people, produced 800,000 tons of coal; at the same time, U.S. mines employed only about 140,000 men, but their output exceeded 1 billion tons.22

While these numbers suggest an upbeat picture of the mining industry in the United States, it also has its downside for miners, developments which bode poorly for Donetsk miners. As U.S. mines mechanized, were made "modern," the number of employed miners steadily dropped. For instance, just in the years between 1986 and 1990, the number declined by 25,000 (15 percent). Unlike in Donetsk, U.S. miners were not the best paid workers, although the $40,000 annual wage of union miners working underground placed them in a middle-income category. This wage must be measured against services traditionally provided in Soviet state industries: U.S. miners have to turn to the free market and not the
United Mine Workers for housing and vacation resorts, and labor watchdog agencies report that union pension plans and medical benefits are undercapitalized and in crisis. Less fortunate still are the 50 percent of the underground miners who remain nonunion. Often working without pension plans, these men can find themselves mining in nonunion "dog-holes" for subsistence wages of $15,000 a year.23

Donetsk miners know about the higher production standards in the U.S. coal industry, and are aware that their modernization has serious implications for the future of mining in Donetsk. Yuri Makarov, co-chair of the City Strike Committee, acknowledges that the Donets coal basin is "too old, too tangled" and miners "don’t advocate preserving coal enterprises of the Donbass at any cost." The development of Ukrainian capitalism, however elusive, will mean the diminution if not the end of state subsidies for industry and new market criteria for mine productivity, criteria under which continuance of the mines themselves will be jeopardized. The high sulphuric content of coal in the Donbass would make its use unprofitable in the United States; U.S. miners would have no chance "to spit" on such mines because U.S. coal companies would close them down. Donbass coal can and will still be used for domestic consumption, but everyone in Donetsk, from mine directors and labor leaders to politicians, acknowledges that the mines will be allowed to dwindle during the next twenty years. So, with a bleak long-term prospect for mining in Donetsk, in July 1991 the raion opened its first unemployment office, and then turned its eyes toward the West for help, advice and a model for its salvation.

II.

Everywhere one went in 1992 Donetsk commercialized versions of the United States appeared. Let us consider the home of Gennady Kushch, a Kuibyshev miner and labor activist, whom we had met four years earlier as a strike leader. Kushch was conducting a tour of his home for our camera, giving an insider’s view of local living conditions. The living room was much like those we had seen in countless other homes: a large patterned "oriental" rug hugged one wall; across from it stood a mahogany-stained breakfront proudly displaying folkloric china, glassware and an extensive collection of books. We could not help but be impressed by the range of classical literary and political texts on display. But,
grinning broadly, our host pointed instead to the television blaring behind him. "It's American," he laughed -- and, indeed, it was Huey, Looey and Dewey prancing across the screen on DOKA-TV, Donetsk's new cable television network.

The presence of Walt Disney cartoons in this quintessentially Soviet -- and now Ukrainian -- setting, while seemingly surreal, was, in fact, prescient. Much as Disney had shaped the dreams of Americans and the West, Fantasyland and the American Dream Factory had established a beachhead in the former Soviet Union. Cultural messages are, of course, reshaped by audiences in often unexpected complex ways; and, Donetsk miners interact with the West and its culture by borrowing from, being shaped by, and in turn re-shaping it in ways yet to be analyzed. But as the years since 1989 had seen the miners -- once cast as the heroic Soviet proletariat -- spiral into a crisis of identity and survival, the United States has stood as a cultural as well as industrial model in which to anchor their future. Several teenagers with whom we spoke, for example, pointing to posters adorning their bedroom walls, sheepishly claimed Hollywood's Sylvester Stallone, "Rambo," if not Arnold Schwarzenegger, the transplanted Austrian, as their hero. Against a backdrop of complaints of Mafia corruption, wall boards throughout the city advertised the "Godfather" movie trilogy. Moreover, both television commercials and many of their products were often wholly new phenomena. Thus, new television commercials heralded the virtues of "Tampax," while Pervaia Liniia (First Line), which claims to be "Donetsk's mass city newspaper," advertised Dr. Vladimir Kirillovich Chaika's new gynecological clinic. Calling "Dear Girls and beautiful ladies! Young women and future mothers!", the clinic highlights "treatment at the level of a western European clinic."(emphasis added)

At the same time, of course, much had not changed. Many of the institutions of Soviet life retained their functions, especially the pervasive presence of state enterprises as the source for housing, food, child care, vacation resorts, medical care, and so forth. For many workers like the Kushches, social conditions had not improved, and, if anything, had worsened: as we have seen, mine safety had deteriorated, and inflation accompanied a decline in their standard of living.

The United States -- both as a political and economic superpower and as a cultural force simultaneously experienced and imagined -- influences how these Ukrainian workers
interpreted their experience and envisioned their future. But both Ukrainian and U.S.
understandings have also been mediated and, at times impeded, by the failure to recognize
the different meanings that language and institutions take on in different contexts. The cases
of cooperatives and free enterprise stand as warnings to analysts and participants on both
sides of the Atlantic of linguistic and conceptual confusion which needs to be confronted.

Cooperativism, for example, such as in the case of the Intertour travel agency
directed by Vladislav Nikolskii, must be understood as a private initiative in the context of
Donetsk's socialist past. While Ukrainian cooperatives originate in worker collectives, they
function as alternatives to state institutions, free to set their own prices and wages. In the
United States, however, producer and consumer cooperatives in which participants share
profits have collectivist and sometimes socialist roots as nineteenth-century alternatives to
private and corporate enterprises.25

A second example involving the language of privatization and free enterprise further
suggests some of the difficulty in applying Western categories to Donetsk's situation: the
Ukrainian industrial organizations which "reformers" seek to privatize are very different
from their Western counterparts. As the sociologist Simon Clarke has observed, "The Soviet
enterprise is almost as different from the capitalist enterprise as was a feudal estate from a
capitalist farm. Like the feudal estate, the Soviet enterprise is not simply an economic
institution but is the primary unit of Soviet society, and the ultimate base of social and
political power." While the administrative-command system has collapsed, the social
relations integral to the enterprises have not changed. Mines, then, still provide kindergar-
tens, infirmaries, housing, foodstuffs, and the like, and the debate over privatization must be
seen in this context.26

The story of Ukrainian transformation since Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the era of
glasnost and perestroika lies embedded then in the politics of representation and the
representation of politics. Americans have celebrated the overthrow of Eastern Europe's
communist regimes as an "end to the Cold War" and the "victory of capitalism"; at the same
time, Ukrainians have idealized U.S. living standards and our way of life. More specifical-
ly, the model for the social transformation envisioned by miners and city officials from the
Kuzbass and Donbass regions -- respectively the Russian and Ukrainian centers of the former
Soviet Union's industrial heartlands -- has been the experience of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. But, as a model for their modernity, they point to only one version -- the upbeat one -- of Pittsburgh's recent history.

III.

Pittsburgh and Ukraine have deep associations. Immigrants from Ukraine first settled in western Pennsylvania almost a century ago. Both were industrial areas built on coal and steel production. Not surprisingly, then, in 1989, Donetsk forged a Sister City relationship with Pittsburgh, and in 1992, Novokuznetsk, a major Kuzbass city, proposed to become one as well. Summarizing their reasons for also cementing a special relationship with Pittsburgh, R. Babun, the chairman of the Novokuznetsk City Soviet, and other city officials, explained to Pittsburgh's mayor, Sophie Mazloff, that they "know about the remarkable experience of the City of Pittsburgh in the structural overhaul of its economy... [and we] are committed to implementing a similar structural overhaul in our area."28

In countless Donetsk conversations during the past four years with a broad range of the city's people -- workers, managers, intellectuals, businessmen and politicians -- we heard the same celebration of the U.S. experience (sometimes generalized to that of the West) cited as "normal," "modern," or "civilized life," terms usually used interchangeably. As Nikolai Volynko, co-chair of the Donetsk City Strike Committee told us in 1991, "even the peasants have started to understand that this system won't let them live normally."29 In such accounts, people understood Pittsburgh as a place which had been transformed from a decaying industrial city into an up-to-date, thriving urban center. As the Novokuznetsk leaders wrote Mayor Mazloff, "we know" Pittsburgh has replaced "technologically backward and ecologically hazardous production lines by modern methods," and that "this substantial recovery in the state of the environment occurred with the simultaneous increase in living standards of the population."30

Since Pittsburgh's history, both real and imagined, has played a particularly important role in fueling the social imagination of Donetsk's citizens, for comparative purposes, the final part of this essay examines the recent experience of both Pittsburgh and some comparable Western European cities. Understandings of the West, and especially that
of the U.S. as viewed through imported television programs, films, advertising and tourism, have of course shaped the desires and plans of "underdeveloped" peoples throughout the world -- including America's own poor and underclass -- and not just the peoples of Eastern Europe. But the ways in which Donetsk men and women, both workers and entrepreneurs, understand Pittsburgh's experience in particular shapes their use of its history as the model for solving their plight. For while Donetsk seeks to emulate Pittsburgh, we shall see, the Steel City's history is not as it may be imagined in the former Soviet Union.

There was every reason for Donetsk officials to look longingly towards Pittsburgh. The city had suffered its own crisis of identity and changed its image. Although it was long viewed as the quintessential smokestack city, in a 1985 review of U.S. cities, Rand McNally editors issued the astonishing pronouncement that Pittsburgh was now the "most livable" city in the country: it was now "a smoke-free city of tall office buildings set in a stunning natural setting of rugged hills and river valleys, with plenty of recreational parks and a fine waterfront."\(^3\) Four years later The New York Times Magazine heralded this transformation to a national audience in a Sunday color feature.\(^3\)

For Pittsburgh's working class, however, this transformation had been less a Renaissance than a Dark Ages. Pittsburgh may have been among the "safest, most affordable" cities in the nation, but that was only if you had a job! "There are two Pittsburghs," explained a local laid-off steel worker, Bob Anderson, "There's the upscale Pittsburgh of the renaissance downtown, and there's ... the Pittsburgh most people don't see."\(^3\) The reality of urban beautification and corporate growth contrasted with another reality: abandoned mills, decayed housing and under- or unemployment brought on by deindustrialization.

Since the 1970s, Pittsburgh's industrial backbone had been broken as the steel industry, like many others, restructured worldwide. In the reorganization of steel companies, a range of corporate strategies have been adopted to increase productivity and cut costs. In addition to new technologies, these have involved global rationalization of international operations in which production is shifted to cheap labor markets, cost shifting through union concessions on benefits and wages or bankruptcy proceedings, reorganization of production into more tightly supervised small-scale shops dedicated to specialized production, or
cooperative partnerships and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to raise worker loyalty toward the company.\textsuperscript{34}

In Pittsburgh, the reorganization of the steel industry has transformed the city from an industrial center with large numbers of well-paid workers into a corporate city with a more bifurcated labor market. In the last decade, 60,000 jobs had been lost in industry, primarily in metals, and 40,000 in other durable goods. Jones & Laughlin Steel, founded in 1861, had closed, putting 17,500 out of work. Westinghouse Electric had let go another 15,000. U.S. Steel's six facilities employing nearly 42,000 as recently as 1978, had been reduced by 1986 to two plants with less than 6,700 workers. Home to such corporate giants as the Mellon Bank, U.S. Steel (USX) and PPG [Pittsburgh Plate Glass] Industries, Pittsburgh's manufacturing base had been replaced by a vast service sector.\textsuperscript{35} The 10th largest U.S. city in 1950 with 675,000 people, by 1987 Pittsburgh ranked 41st with less than 400,000. The city had cleaned up its air and water, but in the interim, it had lost almost forty percent of its population! Those who remained were either affluent, unemployed or too old to leave: Pittsburgh had the dubious distinction of having more people over 65 than any county in the country save Dade County, Florida, the home of Miami Beach.\textsuperscript{36}

Deindustrialization has hit the steel industry particularly hard. Defined by economist Barry Bluestone as "a wide-spread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's basic industrial capacity," deindustrialization has taken place across a broad spectrum of heavy industry and manufacture in the United States in the last twenty years, including the manufacture of autos, textiles, chemicals, household appliances, clothing and shoes.\textsuperscript{37} But steel workers have fared less well than other displaced workers. Thus, in a national 1984 survey of displaced workers, of 220,000 displaced in steel, more than half (54 percent) were still looking for a new job, and 16 percent had left the work force entirely. The survey concluded, "the employment status of the workers displaced from primary metal jobs was far worse than that for the entire universe of displaced workers."\textsuperscript{38}

The human repercussions of deindustrialization in cities such as Pittsburgh has been dramatically different depending on people's age, race, gender and class. The results of one 1989 survey of 2,192 former Pittsburgh-area steelworkers which typifies the plight of the former steel worker bodes ill for Donetsk's coal miners. Three years after losing their jobs,
60 percent had found work, but only two-thirds were full-time. Their new jobs they "rated as vastly inferior to those they had held in the steel mills," and, indeed, in material terms they surely were. The new jobs paid 40-60 percent less than their old ones, and only 23 percent now had union representation to advocate for them.39

Deindustrialization had a particularly deleterious impact on the social life of the worker community. If Donetsk’s desire to re-industrialize promises miners a "civilized" [i.e., higher] standard of living, Pittsburgh’s deindustrialization has provided former steel workers the opposite. When new work is found, wages are consistently lower. The higher salary of those with 12 to 20 years of seniority -- older workers more rooted in a community and less prepared psychologically to strike out in a new direction -- makes them least likely to be re-hired. And, one development has especially ominous implications for Donetsk miners who find themselves struggling to redefine their trade unions: a large percentage of displaced workers, when they do find work, move from unionized jobs with health, disability, and pension benefits to nonunion jobs without any benefits.40 As a leading analyst of deindustrialization concluded, "Workers are not being freed from lower-productivity, lower wage jobs for work in higher-productivity, higher-wage jobs. The opposite is occurring. Workers are skidding downward in the occupational spectrum, not moving up to better jobs and a better standard of living."41

Restructuring does create some new jobs, but the process can disrupt older coherent communities and involve a profound shift in the family economy and social relations. In Pittsburgh, for example, "economic redevelopment" has also meant the isolation of the city’s black community, the disruption of old neighborhoods and shopping districts, and a further decline in the housing stock.42 In addition, one in four new jobs is outside of manufacturing, and the new faces in low-paid service sector jobs reflect the changing racial and gendered composition of the city and urban poverty. Such jobs are filled increasingly by African-Americans and Latinos, and as the literature on the feminization of poverty demonstrates, by women.43

The restructuring of work and the labor market suggests a different future for women in the corporate city than that projected by one Donetsk economist. Irina Zadorozhnaia, an economist on extended child care leave from a Kuibyshev raion bank, predicts Donetsk
women will be the first to be fired during restructuring, a fate familiar in the U.S., for example, to women during the Great Depression and to Rosie the Riveter following World War II.\textsuperscript{44} But in restructured U.S. cities, women increasingly find themselves with a different, albeit perhaps equally cruel fate: low paid jobs, the double day of labor at home and in the workplace, and disaffected unemployed husbands. Sociologist Herbert Hammerman has found, for instance, that women are almost three times more likely than men to be hired in many new assembly and service sector jobs. But, like the loss of benefits, women's jobs, paying less than those in the steel mills, diminish the family wage. One study estimates, for instance, that it take 163 electronic assembly jobs for women to provide wage parity to 100 steel workers. These women may appreciate the opportunity to work, but the job takes its toll on their spouses and children in stress and the disruption of traditional gender roles. Noting that his thirteen-year-old son looks at him differently, one ex-steel-worker who had been reduced to being the homemaker, poignantly allowed as how in the eyes of his son, "I'm not a man like I was before."\textsuperscript{45}

IV.

Which version, or reconfigured versions, of Pittsburgh's past is to be Donetsk's future? Are there other models that could prove instructive? Comparing the ways that several European steel cities have responded to the global restructuring of the steel industry, the historian Herrick Chapman, while not providing any answers, does suggest some useful ways of thinking about Donetsk's alternatives. Pittsburgh's experience contrasts in important political ways with that of Sheffield (another of Donetsk's Sister Cities) and Birmingham, England, Saint-Etienne in France, and Essen in Germany's Ruhr Valley.\textsuperscript{46}

Chapman notes that America's political traditions give it a distinct history of class relations and reform politics in two important ways. First, "democratization preceded industrialization" in America; second, in a long and complicated history that a summary can not begin adequately to convey, workers in cities like Pittsburgh became "hostage to the local elite" through electoral politics. There was, of course, considerable worker militancy, but in the dominant tradition, trade-union politics remained limited to bread-and-butter issues rather than local politics or social transformations. Against worker militancy, Pittsburgh's cohesive
elite, led by local bankers (the Mellons) and U.S. Steel (USX) magnates, destroyed ("reformed," they called it) a ward-based political system that it saw as too beholden to the working class. With the support of the local "reform" politicians, Pittsburgh's economic elite instituted two redevelopment projects, Renaissance I and II, to enhance its economic position and remake the city.47

In contrast to Pittsburgh, the metallurgical cities of England, France and Germany, with strong working-class social democratic movements, have more successfully preserved their local steel industry and worker jobs. In Germany, an insurgent socialist movement compelled industrialists to seek alternative economies. In France, a socialist government provided state support to the industry in order to preserve jobs. In England, the Labour Party and an interventionist state combined to contain the impact of restructuring on steel workers with a housing program and industry incentives. To be sure, there are similar sources of strength within U.S. and European worker communities: cities in all these regions have preserved their old ethnic character and, as in the Kuibyshev raion, their workers continue to draw strength from neighborhood stability and continuing reliance on extended family networks. But the salient point for Chapman is that the more collective and political response of workers in Europe than in Pittsburgh has resulted in more job programs and less dislocation.48

The comparative histories of restructuring provide inconclusive lessons but important warning signs for Donetsk's miners. Reversing the order of the U.S. experience, Donetsk's workers seek to institutionalize democracy well after industrializing, and they are doing this with a long tradition of worker dependence and state control. U.S. trade unionism and economism exemplifies one model for worker democracy, and the AFL-CIO has, in fact, been active in Donetsk promoting its version of democracy.49 European social democratic movements suggest alternative models.

It is uncertain which path Donetsk miners will take, but the various roads have many pitfalls. Although they seek rationalism, stability and material progress, Donetsk miners appear to be living in a society that is moving toward the instability of nationalist, ethnic conflict and identity confusion. Harsh material realities such as meager timber reserves and banking resources limit their possibilities. Meanwhile, distrust of and disrespect for the
concept and privileging of an industrial working class appears to grow as the new Ukraine lauds an "end to the ideology" that made the working class the hero of the socialist state. Ironically, in their leadership in the strike movement miners have played a central role in the making of their own crisis. As I suggested at the outset, in breaking with the Soviet state, miners have disavowed the source of their own privileged identity as a labor elite.

If the comparative history of steel is any measure, the ability of Donetsk’s miners to forge an organized political identity with a social platform will determine how they fare in a restructured economy. While images of American culture, stretching from Disneyland to Pittsburgh, fuel the Ukrainian social and political imagination, the new society’s celebration of the entrepreneur may hold the key to their future. The tragic irony of the miners’ quest for affluence and opportunity is that the celebration of entrepreneurialism may disempower the voice and authority of the industrial working class to speak for and defend its own interests. If the future of miners like Viktor Zadorozhnyi is to join an affluent middle class, for too many others, it will be, as in the other Pittsburgh, to become members of a dislocated society in material decline.
END NOTES

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1. Marshall Berman, "Why Modernism Still Matters," in Modernity & Identity, edited by Scott Lash and Jonathon Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 55. For the impact of modernity on a third-world city, see Paul Rabinow, "A Modern Tour of Brazil," in Modernity & Identity, pp. 248-264. Jonathon Friedman, "Narcissism, Roots and Postmodernity: the Constitution of Selfhood in the Global Crisis," in Modernity & Identity, pp. 331-367, provides a good summary of what he calls "cultural strategies" for both the modernist and the decline of the modernist identity (into a postmodern identity). He describes the modernist identity as "progressive evolutionist," expressed politically in "institutions conducive to democratic solutions...; in terms of economic growth; and social modernization, that is modern institutions." The postmodern identity is "consumptionist," that is "the presentation of self via the commodoty construction of identity." In a postscript that speaks legions to the turmoil that has shook post-Soviet eastern Europe, he adds that, he adds that postmodern identity is "highly unstable and can easily switch over to religious or ethnic solutions." (pp. 360-361)


17. Viktor Grigorevich Bychkov, Deputy Chair, Donetsk City Soviet, interview with the editors, June 18, 1992.


21. Felicity Barringer reported in The New York Times (*U.S. and Soviet Miners Meet and Find Surprises,* January 22, 1990: A10). An estimated 130,000 miners work in Donetsk and Barringer reports 2.5 million in the former Soviet Union, compared to 140,000 across the entire U.S.

   Information on mine safety and productivity in American coal mines is available from the J. Davitt McTeer, Occupational Safety and Health Law Center, P.O. Box 40037, Washington, D.C. 20016. See also, U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Injuries and Worktime, Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: Mine Safety and Health Administration), January-September 1991; and Fact Sheet: MSHA 90-2.

   Makarov is quoted from: Yuri Leonidovich Makarov, interview with the editors, Donetsk, June 18, 1992. See Interview 15.


24. Pervaja Liniia began publication in June 1990. This advertisement appeared on the back page of a Winter 1993 issue, provided courtesy of Zhenia Nikitenko and Lewis Siegelbaum.


Andrew Carnegie's Homestead Plant are Slavs, but that category covers a multitude of national origins, including Poles, Slovaks, Croats, Russians, and so forth. See also, Ewa Morawska, "The Internal Status Hierarchy in the East European Communities in Johnstown, PA, 1890-1930's," Journal of Social History 16, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 75-107; and, Nora Faires, "Immigrants and Industry: Peopling the 'Iron City,'" in City at the Point, pp. 3-31.

28. R. Babun, Chairman of the Novokuznetsk City Soviet, et al., to Sophia Mazloff, Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh, July 10, 1992 letter in the possession of the author.


30. Ibid.


33. Bob Anderson, as quoted in Ibid., p. 58.


42. Weber, "Rebuilding a City," p. 233-34.


44. Irina Zadorozhnaia, interview with the editors, Donetsk, July 5, 1992. See Interview 20.


47. Ibid. Chapman notes that the second Renaissance plan in the 1980s was more progressive than the first, but argues this must be seen, in part, as a response to Black activism in the 1960s. Chapman acknowledges that immigration to the U.S. and the "ethnicization of consciousness" also shapes working-class formation and its political consciousness.

48. Ibid.