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<th>CONTRACTOR</th>
<th>Franklin and Marshall College</th>
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<tr>
<td>PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:</td>
<td>Anthony Ugolnik</td>
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I. Introduction

This report is a brief preliminary to a longer, more detailed report to be delivered upon my return from Ukraine and Russia, on a research trip from May 25 to mid-June 1993. The National Council should receive this second report by July 19, 1993. It will contain more detailed information as to specific programs administered through organizations described below. It will contain a profile and evaluation of the effects of U.S. aid on a series of religious and secular organizations in some Russian and Ukrainian cities, with an estimate as to what the prospects are for efficient return on future aid investments. It will also include an ancillary report on hospital administrative and supply structures in the Slavic republics, offering a comparison American hospital organization and suggestions as to how hospital aid might be delivered and administered more efficiently.

This is meant as a preliminary introduction to that longer report, with a profile of some problems which have arisen in aid delivered and administered through private and church-related channels from the first humanitarian food assistance given in the winter of 1989. This report is especially intended for those who will lead and implement secular and government developmental grants intended to stabilize and democratize the areas of the former USSR.

II. An Overview

The longer report to come will give an overview of church organizations delivering or administering aid to the former USSR. Lists of all private and public aiding agencies are available from other sources as well. This is an attempt to classify church sources as to type.
My work has touched upon this area in several ways. First of all, as an ecumenically active Orthodox scholar, I have had close contacts with Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish organizations which had or sought Russian links. I have sometimes advised them. In the year 1989-90, I worked in the city of St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) as a scholar studying at the Orthodox Theological Academy. There I met Frank Laetichius, a (west) German Lutheran who then began his studies in Russia. Mr. Laetichius was placed in charge of all aid from Germany delivered to St. Petersburg then and in the following winter. I worked with him on organization, computerizing lists, and generating structures; I saw firsthand the problems the Germans encountered and counseled with Mr. Laetichius as they attempted to solve them.

Living in close proximity to the Mennonite Central Committee, I have also been an advisor and in contact with this and related Protestant groups. As an occasional consultant on East Europe for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, I am informed as to the nature of Catholic involvement in Ukraine and Russia. I am consulted precisely on problems which arise from that aid. Finally, as an Orthodox priest I have been in close contact with our own organization, International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), from its inception. I am not presently on its board or serving IOCC, since I have wished to remain objective as an evaluator and critic. My perspective, then, has given me experience in confronting and solving problems related to aid in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in particular.

I am an Orthodox priest, yet I have not hesitated from offering critiques of our operations in East Europe. I work as a professor in a secular context; I consult also on a secular basis. I offer this report, then, in a spirit of objectivity.

III. The Nature of Church Organizations Offering Aid

A. Church organizations have different motives in offering aid. Some organizations, most notably those with little initial presence in Russia or CIS, offer humanitarian assistance in conjunction with growth and evangelization programs. Thus those people who express an interest in a religious organization will come into contact with those religiously related agencies which offer food, educational assistance, or even developmental and business related "seed money."
Many American organizations of a "missionary nature," such as Campus Crusade for Christ, the Salvation Army, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), and the Unification Church have been active on a number of different fronts in the area of aid and development. In almost all cases, these efforts at aid and assistance have been a facet of, but not central to, a program with a larger agenda. The key factor here is initial presence: if the organization has little "native structure" in Russia or CIS, then a good deal of energy is spent in establishing that structure. These organizations, on the whole, do not work as extensively with existing social agencies in East Europe. They use translators rather than established native adherents, and they form their own networks among new members as they organize.

B. Some church organizations have been institutionally present in Russia and CIS for a long period of time. Though these organizations were, of course, controlled to varying degrees by a designated State Agency (USSR Council for Religious Affairs, present in each urban area), they had a parish or congregational structure with connections both to the "grass roots" and to the government agencies which "oversaw" them. Among these groups are those communities covered by the former "All Union Council of Baptists and Evangelicals" of the old USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Lutheran, Catholic, or Reformed Churches in the Baltic Republics or Belarus.

These existing churches had links, of course, with the Western communities to which they correspond. Thus Baptists had extensive contact with Russian Baptists before the fall of the USSR; the Mennonite Central Committee, with its efficiently administered programs of humanitarian relief, had links with the All-Union Council, and the Orthodox communities in the U.S., particularly those with Russian, Belorussian or Ukrainian antecedents, were well connected with the Russian Orthodox Church before the era of glasnost. It is worth noting that the German Reformed Church, the "State" sanctioned Protestant Church of Germany, also maintained strong links with the Baltic-derived communities in St. Petersburg and Moscow. (This connection offered the government of Germany, which fully cooperated with the churches, its immediate start in the very first humanitarian efforts in the late '80's.)
Thus these groups, with both a native foundation and links with Western counterparts ready to give aid, had a substructure for aid already in place. They were also based in those very communities with a great need for aid and assistance: by and large, religious believers in the old USSR were deprived of status and economic success. The parish or congregational structure, then, offers an immediate infusion of assistance directly into the affected population. Problems, as this report will begin to document, are abundant; but a ready organizational structure awaits both the needy and the providers of aid and assistance.

The dimension of "proselytism" or socialization is less of a factor in these communities for many reasons. First of all, to some degree religious identity has a cultural as well as an ideological dimension. Secondly, the families of believers invariably include those who are not connected to the church. Finally, the churches enjoy a high prestige and credibility in these days because of the collapse of "faith" in the old order. Many pay these organizations their respect—and go to them for assistance—without being expected to pay a price of ideological allegiance.

These "native" church structures tend to work with government and civic organizations in their administration and distribution of aid. For one thing, these links predate the availability of aid. Tense and unjust as were the previous connections between church and government, the churches were in fact "administered." Thus mayors and civic leaders can now come to religious leaders or activist laypeople and document needs in the community. Though the former clients sometimes become the new patrons, aid administered in this way tends to infuse the civic structure. A civic organization often, in fact, "breaks free" of a church connection or dependency with the full cooperation of the aiding Western church agency. (My future report will concentrate on successful strategies for achieving precisely this end through Orthodox channels, in the IOCC.)

C. Finally, some religious bodies were present in Russia and CIS before the fall of the USSR, albeit illegally. Thus they were fully or partially "underground," sporadically administered but with a "native" and committed clientele. Among these groups are Ukrainian (variously also called "Greek," "Eastern," or "Byzantine") Catholics in Ukraine (and to a smaller degree in Belarus), some Evangelical and Seventh Day Adventist groups, the
"Synodal" or "Exiled" Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (which refused to acknowledge a Patriarch under Communist auspices), and various Jewish groups organized for study or worship.

With the fall of the USSR, these groups often achieved a new and sudden prominence. Thus the effective "concordat" between Gorbachev and the Vatican in 1989 gave the Ukrainian Catholics the tolerance of the civil authorities; Jewish groups in the West made more open and celebrated links with their counterparts in East Europe; and Evangelicals in the West began to sponsor and import "Soviet Pentecostals" to the U.S.

These newly legalized groups in Russia vary widely in nature, and they also differ in their adaptation to the new environment in CIS. Organizationally, they also occupy a ground between those who are based abroad and those who are locally rooted. With the exception of the Ukrainian and Roman Catholics, the humanitarian efforts of these groups have focused primarily upon emigration. That is, their Western counterparts have sought to "rescue" these previously persecuted groups through importing them to host countries. (My own county in Pennsylvania, for example, now contains a community of Russian and Ukrainian Pentecostals numbering several hundred.) Some concerned Westerners have recently tried to shift emphasis into relocation or support for communities within Russia or CIS itself: the German Lutherans with the aid of their government, for example, are now trying to establish "zones of development" for their Russian-German cousins within central Russia. The pressure for emigration, however, continues to contribute to a potential refugee problem for Germany and possibly other Western states.

The Catholic Church, with its central organization, has a complex relationship with Ukrainian and "Roman" Catholic communities in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. ("Roman" Catholics follow the Western liturgy; "Ukrainian" Catholics in form and structure resemble the Orthodox churches from which they are derived.) Politically, there are often ethnic tensions between the ethnically Polish "Roman" Catholics and Ukrainian "Byzantine" Catholics on CIS soil. Orthodox churches also view any Roman Catholic activities, even those which are humanitarian in nature, with some suspicion.

Catholic efforts, guided by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the U.S., have been sensitive to these concerns. The Catholics have sought both governmental and local
Orthodox cooperation in Russia; in Ukraine they have operated through "native" Ukrainian Catholic leaders who fled west Ukraine when it fell under Soviet rule after World War II. In Russia, efforts have focused upon large-scale food relief, spreading further eastward than that of most American groups. In Ukraine, aid has been channeled through emigre Ukrainian groups which focus upon needs of the local Ukrainian population.

In any case, this third group of religious agencies is marked by strong direction from the West, with an awareness that the local populations are accountable to the West for direction and assistance. Organization is either Western-generated or, in the case of Ukrainian Catholics, a "resurrected" structure made up of emigres and their supporters. Often there is a substructure of refugee assistance or assistance in emigration and relocation to the West or Israel.

In these groups, connection to local authorities is orchestrated on the side of Westerners acting on behalf of local clients. While aid is often available to all (as in the case of Catholic Relief Services' aid to eastern Russia), there is a clear understanding that Western humanitarians are acting in primary advocacy to one ethnic or religious portion of the local community. The effect, then, is to "lift" these clients either up above or out of the local community's economy. Humanitarian aid efforts, then, concentrate on one element of the population rather than its entire structure.

IV. **Contrasts Between Public and Private (or Secular and Religious) Channels in Offering Aid**

A. The two channels for offering humanitarian and developmental aid, "private" and "religious" on the one hand, "public" and "secular" on the other, differ in nature and in implication. If we list at this point just a few differences in their effects, we might achieve the most useful list of contrasts:

1. **Administration.** Aid from government to government, using existing administrative structures, tends to work from the "top down," despite efforts to speed assistance downward to the grass roots. In Russia and CIS, this is particularly difficult during this time of great instability. Many administrators are holdovers from an old and very cautious order. They are not known for innovation; thus far many have made no overt
commitments to radical reform. Aid in the form of monies or goods may be "hoarded," against a time when the nature of the future government becomes more defined. There is also a hefty kleptocracy at all levels in Russia and the CIS: there are few real guarantees that much of what is given will actually be received by those whom our own government wishes to reach.

Also, administrators who receive aid suddenly become immensely empowered. They can build a clientele and a power-base out of the aid which we offer them: thus, unless we are careful to target those who represent our own interests, we may well act to empower those who will one day resist civil liberties, a freer market, or democratic development.

The church organizations, on the other hand, reach the affected populations at the mid-level. Although there are also problems here with skimming and with patronage (religious structures, after all, reflect the Soviet order in which they so long were incubated), the link to the needy is more direct. Delivery is made through fewer intervening stages to those who need help: often even individual trucks can be unloaded in full sight of those who have already qualified for assistance. There is also the issue of credibility: church and humanitarian structures have more credibility than a government which is now widely mistrusted. Finally, there is a concern in these organizations for long term sustenance. Organizations with professional interests in ethics are now focusing on motivation and economic survival. They want to create a class of people who are self-motivated and who produce their own goods and services. Thus these organizations have already created the beginnings of cottage industries, incentive programs, and local cooperative aid efforts.

2. Ideology. Government in the former USSR has as yet no identifiable ethos. Communism is dead; yet it is unclear what exactly replaces it. "Democracy" is now more a label than a word: people, unfortunately, label the unfulfilled promises of their leaders with the word which, to us, means the full participation of all the governed. A prime motive of Western aid is to encourage democracy. Yet "on the street," many citizens in CIS cynically view Western aid as a prop to keep leaders in power. Government has to develop structures not only to encourage the structures of democracy, but also to develop the faith of the governed in those structures. This "faith" of which I speak is neither secular nor religious; it is simply the substance of human hopes in the future.
Government aid, then, insofar as it is directed toward improving and generating production and commerce, must pay attention to the context. The context is still unclear: who owns property, how ownership is to be allocated, what rights of ownership will be protected: this is all as yet unknown. Some of this uncertainty can be controlled through contractual relationships in joint ventures. Those who have guarantees will be more willing to invest. The same is true of government: yet it is difficult at present to know how deeply embedded in Russia are the democratic ideals we wish to foster. We need, as a function of our aid, education in democratic principles at the grass roots level. Aid and assistance directed by our own nation should be accompanied by an effort, "from the bottom up," to instill democratic ideals in youth and the citizenry.

In church aid, ideology is essentially irrelevant. It is irrelevant because it is already a given. Much of the financing for this aid is provided from the west by those who share the ideological "givens": a faith, of some kind, in what guarantees a moral, ethical, and brighter future. If these principles serve democracy and our goals as a nation, then the aid works in concert with that of government. If not, of course, then government has no interest in supporting it and may in fact want in some instances to discourage it.

The aid is administered and distributed, by manifest evidence, much more efficiently through these native, private channels than it is through government channels. There is less theft, broader distribution, and more investment in future development. What Western officers must monitor carefully, however, is the political effects of this aid. If, on the whole, it serves democratic development, then it is from our perspective properly administered. If, however, alliances form between any "aided" groups and zealously nationalistic, repressive forces, then we need to exercise much caution. Much more important, if strategies encouraged or conditions imposed by Western sources upon Russian aid can empower those who stand for private development and democratic structures, then there can be a subtle alliance between these two forces. (My subsequent report will contain concrete, specific examples of political uses to which Western aid has been put.)

3. Ethnic and National Divisiveness. As the Balkans have shown us, religious divisions in East Europe are manifestly political in nature and can be dangerous to American interests. Yet models of "separation of church and state," useful as they would be to the
public order, are often impracticable in the present climate in East Europe. Government or secular aid is offered to someone, presumably of some specific identity. As nationalist sentiment grows in the CIS, people inevitably compare the nature and amount of aid given and received among different communities. Secular agents of international aid can, however, do all parties a service if they make cooperation of some kind, based upon the humanitarian interests involved, a condition of the aid offered. The authoritarian structure of the Soviet Union discouraged cooperation at mid-level: collateral committees of mid-level management in different organizations were exceedingly rare. Having discovered this, and the resulting tendency of aided organizations to work against each other's interests, some religious organizations like IOCC are making such committees a condition for receiving aid. Government aid might well do the same, to insure that vertical as well as horizontal lines of communication open in East European administration.

Secular aid can avoid divisive religious issues, to be sure. Yet divisions stand in the way of even church organizations. In Ukraine, for example, there has been such bitter division among Orthodox communities that even Orthodox in the west have in fact hesitated giving any aid at all, for fear of precipitating further hostilities. Thus a group from the Greek Orthodox diocese of San Francisco sent an exploratory group last summer to examine the needs in west Ukraine. Hosted by one party, under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow, they developed ties to their hosts. Then shortly after they left, the computers, resources, and other materials they left were seized by another Orthodox jurisdiction seeking an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Disillusionment and confusion afflicted the poorly briefed Western delegation. There was no follow-up. This scenario has been reduplicated since.

Neither secular nor private agencies, then, are served by such divisions. Religious agencies have made some efforts, in the U.S., to counteract hostilities which occur abroad. Thus Orthodox/Catholic and Evangelical/Orthodox dialogues have made progress here in enforcing cooperation abroad. Secular grant-offering agencies can help by funding such efforts here and making aid in East Europe dependent upon enforcing recommendations made in a more peaceful American environment. (I am convinced that such efforts would have helped, had they been used two years ago, to alleviate the terrible hostilities in the Balkans.)
It also happens, however, that sectarian hostilities in the west can be reawakened by conflicts in East Europe. The "ecumenical movement," for example, has suffered somewhat through hostilities in the east.

In this area of nationalist conflict and reawakening right-wing fervor, Western secular and private agencies could help each other by working in greater coordination. Americans, whether secular or religious in their approach, can be easily used by nationalist or sectarian parties. It would be helpful if private agencies could target those elements in their constituency which are particularly hospitable to democratic reform. In the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant communities in East Europe, for example, there are both "right-wing" and "democratic" groups. Adherents of both sides are presently receiving some kind of support from the west. There must be continuous caution to see that those groups which foster human rights, private initiatives in ownership, and democratic pluralism are the ones to receive Western assistance.

There is no less danger in the secular arena. Those with the closest contact to power in Russia and CIS are, of course, those with links to the old order. If a Western government agency acts through its counterpart in East Europe, it can fund those who will exploit aid and assistance in order to accumulate greater power. Also, as in Ukraine, former Communists often become the most zealous of nationalists. Secular and private agencies, then, should act with some coordination to advise and provide checks upon each other.

4. Economic Development. Much effort of both secular and private agencies has been given, of course, to relief work. The hungry needed to be fed, and aid is needed simply to provide stability to this new phenomenon--a vast industrial state near collapse. Yet this kind of aid is of course only temporary, and to a degree it is self-perpetuating. The problem, indeed, is that of a near total "welfare" state; welfare programs, as the Russians well realize, cannot provide a solution. There is malaise and even bitterness among common Russians about this kind of aid. Although they receive it when they need it, they also resent it and malign it.

There is a need, then, for visible and prominent seeding of small businesses, joint ventures, and cooperative initiatives which can help a beleaguered people meet their own problems. Many private agencies are moving in this direction. In IOCC, such efforts are
yet in the beginning or planning stage, but careful research is preparing the way for them. The method used to target worthy recipients is through "seed money grants." A few thousand dollars given to a screened group is carefully followed through an accounting procedure, then evaluated, and those with the greatest success are given more funds.

When agencies move from groups to individuals, however, there are problems in choosing worthy individuals and distributing aid to them. In a society organized by patronage, approval and delegation comes from the top down. There are careful central controls at all levels. When individuals are chosen at the bottom or middle of a power structure, even when some criteria of merit are used, there is an innate suspicion of favoritism. Authorities are threatened and resist such aid. Also, religiously funded groups will naturally tend to promote their own adherents. This tendency toward rigid centralization, in both religious and secular structures, militates against the kind of initiative and freedom needed for grass-roots economic development.

In secular initiatives, there is an opposite problem. The tendency here is to find "reformers" at the upper end of structures in order to promote democratization and private ownership. This involves, however, an innate paradox. Russians and Slavs of East Europe are used to central authority; at times they long for a strong hand and look to a leader for initiatives rather than to themselves. Reformers can also fall into an authoritarian pattern. What is more, a "mafia" analogue grows in East Europe both in politics and in the economy. Patronage can be enforced, and graft is widespread. The compromise of reformers can entrap them in the very systems of corruption they intend to reform.

Private agencies approach the system from a different point of entry. Usually, Westerners use individuals who were at odds with the old order and who are, at some level, mavericks by nature. They also gravitate toward those young people who show initiative and idealism. If the Western agency works through its Russian counterpart, there are in fact often some conflicts as to rewards. Russian authorities, ecclesiastical or otherwise, do not delegate as easily and they like to control patronage. Thus in the Orthodox community I have argued for an effort to "free" aided parties from pure church sponsorship, and to break them free from ecclesiastical patronage even when the church initially spawned them. The
leadership of IOCC is in agreement with this policy, and this trip to Russia and Ukraine will provide them with assistance in this effort.

There are efforts, just beginning, to combine private and secular approaches to promote small business and joint ventures. Personally, I am most deeply committed to precisely this plan. Working with an American businessman, William Seachrist of PRODEX corporation in the Cleveland area, I have helped him develop a small program of "seeding" small businesspeople of promise with small cash grants. There is attention in this program to promoting and validating values related to small business development--independence, thrift, cooperation, employee investment. Good employers can be a vehicle of conveying such values to employees. These values are most successfully conveyed when presented in a native idiom, and here the private, religious agencies can make their greatest contribution.

Mr. Seachrist is also exploring a joint initiative in the peat industry, using peat reserves in Belarus to produce and manufacture products for a Western market. He is interested in using a percentage of profits from this initiative to "invest" in further development of small businesspeople. This model of a "secular tithing" could be used to good effect, and government could provide incentives to developers who engage in such a program. Our own experience in Belarus will provide, it is hoped, a useful model.

Experience with both religious and secular approaches in Russia and CIS demonstrates that those who grant humanitarian aid long for such private investment and involvement. Through existing private agencies, or through a public program designed precisely to "seed" small businesses and promote values related to their prosperity, direct contact between American businesspeople and promising Russian CIS applicants can short-circuit patronage structures and inject initiatives directly into the economy. Both private and public approaches could work in concert. The key, however, is to find those people who can enter the economic structure at the lower levels. Large businesses in the west will naturally connect with large, Soviet-derived management structures in the east. This management model is still afflicted with patronage and, to some degree, with graft. The greatest economic success will result when the aiding parties can identify and target the most promising entry-level management and the most enterprising of small businesspeople.
B. Having profiled the real and desired effects of private and secular aid to East Europe, we can deal, very briefly, with some specific problems which have arisen in implementation:

1. Kleptocracy. Even in the best managed of East European efforts, some people expect to be paid. Often, they need to be paid if the efforts are to proceed. In religious and private efforts, the amounts involved tend to be minimal payoffs to local officials. Large skimming operations at the higher levels are circumvented. Still, when management is placed in the hands of authorities of the Soviet vintage, whether in the church or not, power is measured in access to aid and its distribution.

2. "Mafia" Operations. These are not quite the same as those listed in the item above. In patronage, a leader is rewarded for administrative services. In these so-called "mafia" operations, an individual must pay for his or her own successes. "Business" belongs to an area circumscribed by the old order as illegal and, to some degree, immoral. Those who succeed at a given operation--say, selling hand-made shoes at a kiosk--must often pay both local police and a local strongman for the privilege of selling at that location. In "seed money" provided to help private initiatives, a portion can in fact enrich the coffers of those whose interests are anything but free competition.

3. Inertia. Both in government and in religious circles, a premium was placed on "stasis." Stability was measured in fidelity to established patterns. This proves a difficult factor as Westerners and easterners interact. Westerners measure initiative in "shake-up" patterns of reform. The expectations of Westerners are often disappointed when the most promising among the young, when empowered, fail to change structures as quickly as Westerners expect.

4. Unexpected Results. Westerners can unwittingly encourage those they wish to unseat. In St. Petersburg, for example, Germans championed a "law of religious return" whereby ecclesiastical property would revert to its original owners. They had hoped to reclaim German Lutheran churches from which they could lead their efforts at region-wide aid to needy, hungry people. Once the law was enacted, however, a Russian nationalist party within the originally Baltic community successfully claimed title to much of the coveted church property, claiming that their rights preceded those of the Germans. Having claimed
the property, they were then free to sell or lease it to private, secular interests. Russians quite naturally know their own system best; they can circumvent the intentions of unprepared reformers.

5. Political Involvements. Some Western communities, long absent from a Russian, Baltic, or Ukrainian environment, can misread the political effects of their own assistance. A pious, exiled and sometimes czarist Russian Orthodox Church Abroad can be attractive to fascist, anti-Semitic elements in modern Russia. Likewise, those who assist Jewish, Armenian, or Pentecostal refugees without screening them can export mafia or even terrorist elements from abroad. More attention is needed on the part of private, religious agencies to the local effect and American interest in their activities. The government can, through its own agencies, help in this effort.

6. "Business" as Bogeyman. Efforts to aid private ownership and small business are associated with "speculization," a cardinal sin. Some of these issues have been touched upon above. Jealousy and a cultural disposition against economic competition inhibit efforts at development. Thus development is as much a matter of reforming values as it is of reforming government or organizational patterns.

7. Lateral Organization. Soviet enterprises communicated with Moscow; they seldom communicated with each other. Individuals or organizations targeted for Western aid are likely to fall into a similar pattern. They will communicate with the granting agency, but not among themselves. Thus problems which could be more easily solved at a local level persist and even cripple the best efforts, when cooperation could save time and money.

8. Favoritism. Despite the best efforts, old prejudices and classifications pervade new efforts at assistance. Russian centralism also affects aid efforts. Agencies cluster in Moscow and around Russian models. Ukraine receives, proportionately, less aid attention; poor Belarus is virtually neglected. Whereas the greatest need and the greatest hope of affecting the future lies in the outer regions, Muscovite clients hang onto aid and patronage in both secular and private models.

9. Humanitarian Tourism. Some private agencies offer assistance programs in East Europe which can resemble "tours" rather than public service. Sent for short periods,
with few skills and no command of Russian, such delegations can do very little but come home, perhaps, with a commitment to fund raising.

C. These problems, of course, beg for solutions. Although the report to follow will profile specific organizations, their problems, and real and proposed solutions, following are some solutions which some private agencies have explored. They might provide some models for public, secular agencies meeting the same difficulties.

1. **Accountability.** In the interests of empowering the assisted, aiding agencies have often surrendered too much to the Russian counterpart. The assisted first need tutoring in Western patterns of accounting and accountability. Aid should be conditional upon providing satisfactory accounting. A native monitor, removed from the power network but reporting directly to those who provide the aid, has been successful as a channel for communication.

2. **Leverage.** As indicated above, hostile parties in CIS often have their counterparts in the west (Catholics, Orthodox; Russians, Ukrainians). Once these parties have decided upon possible solutions to problems, both parties can insist upon implementation as a condition for further aid. Similarly, secular authorities can cite these agreements as a condition for their own granting of assistance.

3. **Embargo.** Parties who are manifestly guilty of policies antithetical to human rights or American interests can receive warnings, and finally an interdiction from Western assistance. This demands cooperation among different agencies, but humanitarian guidelines should be voluntarily promoted for all those eligible for government grants or State Department assistance of any kind. The "Kievan Study Group," an association of Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox participants, have already promoted such guidelines for adoption among themselves.

4. **Values promotion.** The West, although it enjoys a pluralism of conscience, agrees upon certain human rights and property entitlements as a matter of consensus. Both private and public agencies should promote, at the grass roots level, dialogue and education in such efforts in Russia and CIS. Some agencies have already started such workshops in Ukraine and Russia, but more Russian and Ukrainian instructors and proponents need to be
trained. The Bolsheviks achieved great success in such popularization of its efforts. Granting agencies should seek counterparts in the present CIS.

5. **Legal Empowerment.** Russian law is in a state of flux, but Russian legal minds can foresee the results of Western initiatives more readily than can Westerners themselves. An American agency which would not think of doing without legal counsel at home can blithely proceed without a clue as to legal implications in East Europe. Western granting agencies need legal consultation in proceeding through models of social change.

6. **Prioritizing Local Aid as Opposed to Emigration.** Many agencies have erred in taking away from Russia and CIS the very talents needed in reform. Those agencies still exporting refugees to the U.S. should shift priorities to locating them within the CIS or directing them to other ethnically related nations willing to integrate them. Understandably, those with a yen to "do business" wish to come to America rather than implement their talents at home. Yet there is no reason why humanitarian motives or national interests should wish to denude Russia and CIS of those who can, with energy and assistance, effect a transformation. Likewise, some universities in Russia and the Baltics can now no longer even train their beginning students in needed specialties; classes have been closed as their instructors teach abroad. If we wish to stabilize these nations, we should resist rather than encourage emigration to the U.S. through our policies.

7. **Lateral Restructuring.** Some agencies have begun to demand "lateral" committee cooperation among those who receive their assistance. CIS has begun to insist upon periodic committee reports sharing problems and needs among receiving groups. Likewise, the Germans have in characteristic style created structured committees among client groups, giving even the smallest a voice in expressing their concerns. The aiding agencies can then select among these various groups "task forces" to address common concerns. From these task forces have grown some groups, formed among those who otherwise would never have communicated, to meet human needs like day care, elderly care, burial assistance and lobbying of local authorities (a new Russian skill).

8. **Creative Assignments.** It can be a lesson in tolerance to assign a Westerner of one ethnic origin or religious commitment to assist Eastern Europeans of another. Thus Robert Pianka, Catholic in origin, heads Orthodox efforts in Belgrade. Ukrainian Americans
have been assigned to Russia and Russians to Ukraine. Evangelicals school themselves in Russian Orthodoxy and struggle to bring assistance to the Orthodox. Such efforts have been very successful, and they have had an effect upon public perception. Those who witness pluralism with a positive effect can be useful in promoting pluralist tolerance.

9. **Coordinated Training.** Those who choose to assist in East Europe have been given better language and cultural training to do so. Briefings have been expanded, and "tour groups" have received less encouragement of late.

V. **Conclusion.**

In conclusion, it is clear that more cooperation among private and secular agencies would serve American interests in Russia and the former CIS. Grants with some specific intended effects can be very effective indeed when offered through private agencies. Public grants can both use the available, useful grass-roots ecclesiastical structures and encourage private economic development if they provide grants to those groups which "break free" of overt structural ecclesiastical patronage. Public, secular agencies, however, must realize the differing position and prestige of the new religious movements in East Europe and use them to good effect.

Likewise, private agencies must cooperate with each other to reduce hostilities in East Europe. These are opposed to both humanitarian and national interest, and they are antithetical to the private development which both private and secular agencies can encourage. Private agencies should privilege those clients with a demonstrated commitment to democratization. Both private and secular sources can assist American private businesses which combine joint ventures with a commitment to private development.

Finally, the interests of Russia, CIS and the U.S. dictate a sharp movement away from assisted emigration to the U.S. as organizational policy. Although some government agencies have recognized this fact, many private agencies have yet to alter their patterns in order to stabilize the nations they wish to assist.