TITLE: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA

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Parliamentary Elections in Postcommunist Russia

Executive Summary

This analysis of Russia's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections held December 12, 1993, provides what amounts to an "insider's" review of the actions of leading individuals and groups and their consequences, as well as an assessment of the distance still between the Russian process and western standards.

The elections were comparable to those of Western style democracies in that the national vote was structured by the presence of competing blocs and parties offering a range of programmatic choices described in detail by the press, which played an active role. Organized interests financed and supported the competing groups so that they could function to some degree independently of the state. More significant, however, was the persistent practice of "democracy by design" and from above, traceable back to the Soviet era. As with the 1989 elections to the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies, the 1990 elections to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and the presidential elections of 1991, one clique of elites controlling the state machinery attempted to create a system of voluntary mass participation but with a controlled outcome. Instead of resolving conflict, this determination to control the electoral process intensified it, and has produced continued instability.

The handling of the new Constitution was a classic example of "democracy by design", as it was imposed on the population rather than presented to it for consideration. Of the 13 parties and blocs participating in the election only Russia's Choice, the party most closely associated with Yeltsin, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by authoritarian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii, endorsed the draft. Yeltsin informed the others that they would lose their television and radio time if they used the airwaves to criticize it.

Although the government provided public funds for campaigns and allotted free time on television and radio to all the competing groups, Russia's Choice received by far the lion's share of state resources and airtime. In particular, Viachislav Bragin, head of State Television, was on the initial Russia's Choice list of national candidates, and that party enjoyed use of the airwaves to promote its leaders and programs during the "pre-campaign"

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1 This summary was composed by NCSEER staff.
period when other blocs and parties were forbidden from campaigning until the official date set for the beginning of the electoral competition.

Ironically, this monopolization of the media backfired. In an attempt to polarize opinion and deliver the anti-communist vote to Russia’s Choice, the campaign ran advertisements with footage of the violent events of October 3 and 4. That footage, however, did not project an image of leaders taking decisive action during a period of crisis, but rather identified the party, so closely tied to the government, with civil unrest.

Moreover, the Central Electoral Commission rejected a format of coverage providing for debates and forums proposed by the Director’s Council at Ostankino in favor of allowing the parties and blocs to use their free time as they wished. As a result, viewers were presented with boring monologues in which candidates could make any statement without being refuted. Zhirinovskii gained from the situation because his presentations were the most stimulating, as well as irresponsible, with his promises to lower the price of a kilo of meat by ten times and his contradictory pro-capitalism, anti-privatization stance, and wild revanchist schemes.

Russia’s Choice might have improved its chances by cooperating with the other democratically oriented parties to form a coalition. Instead it arrogantly dictated terms and alienated its potential partners. When, finally, agreement was reached to withdraw competing candidates in favor of the one with the highest opinion survey rating, the agreement broke down at the implementation stage. Not only were relations fraught with bitter distrust -- Apple compared Gaidar to Stalin and Grigorii Iavlinskii himself expressed a preference to work with the communists rather than a government "up to its elbows in blood" -- but the numbers in the ratings proved meaningless because so many candidates were virtually unknown.

In the outcome, Russia’s Choice and the pro-democratic groups lost much ground to the opposition. The country’s political spectrum changed literally overnight; whereas the communists and patriotic groups had once been labeled as the "implacable opposition," they were now seen as "moderate" forces. Most devastating was the victory of Zhirinovskii’s LDPR, which gained the most deputies on the national list and came in second to Russia’s Choice in the total number of Duma members elected.
Contrary to the perception that the LDPR profited by mere backlash against a reformist government, the corps of Zhirinovskii's support came from men between ages twenty-five and forty, including many who were active in the economy but frustrated with the disorder and corruption. Much support also came from businessmen left out of groups favored by the government such as the Association of Private and Privatized Enterprises headed by Gaidar. The LDPR had remarkable success in the Far East, hitherto a stronghold of Yeltsin and the "democrats", and received high support in many areas where the communists had been popular, principally in rust belt regions such as Smolensk, Vladimir, Vologda, and Ivanova, where the LDPR took about 30% of the vote.

The young men in the civilian economy were amply augmented by their counterparts in the armed forces who voted for the LDPR by a large margin. The Kantemirov Division which had stormed the parliament on October 4, for instance, turned out on December 12 to deliver 74.3 per cent of its ballots to Zhirinovskii. That result would appear to be among the most damaging to the designers of this election. Not only did the instrument, relied on to force an election, register its profound disapproval of both its mission and those who commissioned it, but the vote in the armed services would affix an immediate question mark to the loyalties of officers and enlisted personnel alike, thus instilling yet another element of uncertainty into the political situation in Russia that the elections had been designed to remedy.

The very policies implemented by Yeltsin and his circle created a society ripe for the rhetoric of Zhirinovskii who portrayed himself as a strong leader. According to studies conducted in the spring and late summer of 1993, fifty percent of the electorate said they would favor the introduction of dictatorship for the purpose of restoring order.
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA

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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA

The principal question attendant on a consideration of Russia's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections (December 12, 1993) concerns the degree to which they have moved that country's political system in the direction of those norms and practices commonly associated with electoral democracy. This issue appears as primary, precisely because it conditions the approach that one might reasonably take in setting out to analyze them. Obviously, the conventional methods of political science developed for the study of competitive elections in Western democracies would seem sadly out of place were they employed to study, say, those one-candidate "races" featured throughout most of the Soviet era. A certain amount of development in the institutions of the Russian polity would be required before these methods could be relied on to yield an analysis, rather than a caricature, of that collection of events which, taken together, make up an election. Has this development occurred?

In some respects it has. For the first time since 1917, the Russian election of December 1993 witnessed a national vote that was structured by the presence of competing electoral associations - parties and blocs - that offered the electorate a broad menu of relatively coherent programmatic choices. Despite the persistence of state restrictions and interference, the press played a lively and important role in the process, offering a more detailed and nuanced account of candidates, platforms and procedures than had been the case in prior elections. Society, too, had become more differentiated. Organized interests supported one or another party or bloc, often supplying them with private resources that expanded the scope of political activity by reducing dependencies on the state for printing facilities, premises, paid staff, information and the many and sundry matters that go into mounting an election campaign. Assiduous opinion polling of voters' preferences provided at least the appearance of an active electorate, divided in their support of various leaders, blocs and policy orientations.

Yet, while developments of this sort have moved the Russian system closer to the norms and practices of electoral democracy, they should not obscure for us another aspect of the December elections that would seem to be of even greater consequence - namely, the continuity that they evinced with a certain pattern of activity stretching back to the Soviet period. I call this pattern "democracy by design". By this, I mean to connote a situation and a practice whereby those in control of the state machinery attempt to fashion a set of institutions and procedures that allows for mass participation in the political contest thus arranged but circumscribes it so as to insure in advance an outcome not unfavorable to the designers themselves. This pattern, then, would place the Russian experience outside that sequence identified in the literature on democratic transitions in which an agreement or "pact" among competing elites has preceded the calling of general elections.¹ Rather than some
accord among rivals that would signal a common commitment to the rules of the political game. Previous competitive elections in Russia have been conducted within frameworks drafted and imposed by one of the contending parties. As such, whether we consider the 1989 elections to the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies, the 1990 elections to the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, or Russia’s presidential elections in 1991, it appears the new institutions resulting from these contests have not become sites for resolving conflict but for extending it, thus leading to troublesome consequences for the polity and designers, alike.

First, none of the institutions erected in these exercises has endured for more than a few years. Not only have both of the aforementioned legislatures been dissolved prior to the elapse of their first term, but the sole survivor, the presidency, has been less an established institution than a focus of political struggle, with majority in the Russian Congress during the last year of its existence attempting to eviscerate the office while its incumbent, Boris Yeltsin, conclusively fended off their efforts by decreeing an end to the Constitution and enforcing this decision with divisions of the Russian army.

Second, each of these three episodes recalls the poet’s wisdom regarding best-laid plans. Closer to the Russian idiom, they resemble Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s depressing image of Soviet urban planning captured in his description of the provincial town, Turfoproduct, where the table models so attractive to the town planners - tidy little blocks of housing arrayed along broad tree-lined avenues; here, a bakery, there, a vegetable shop - come to life for their inhabitants as hellish moonscapes distinguished by their stifling monotony and compelling sense of alienation. Similarly, Russia’s political reforms have been crafted by planners and presented to society: "Here are your new democratic political institutions. Participate in them!" In the case of his planned urban settlement, Solzhenitsyn describes the unhappy consequence as "drunks roaming the streets and, sooner or later, sticking knives into one another." For the institutions designed by the political planners, the results have scarcely been more inspiring. The 1989 elections yield a sizeable contingent of legislators who use the newly-provided institutions to destroy the Communist system; the 1990 elections take this process further by producing a legislature that declares for Russian sovereignty and thus advances the disintegration of the USSR by a giant step; the 1991 elections result in a presidency that within a year’s time finds itself locked in mortal combat with the same legislature that established the office.

The pattern of "democracy by design" was again evident in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Accordingly, the analysis, here, will foreground this feature of the process and focus on the activity of the "planners" - the dominant group in the Yeltsin administration, politically incarnate as the electoral bloc, Russia’s Choice - the institutions and procedures that they devised to replace those jettisoned with the previous Constitution, and their many
adjustments to these same designs made during the pre-campaign and campaign periods in an apparent effort to insure a preferred outcome. Of course, the actual outcome bore small resemblance to that which the planners had envisaged. Russia's Choice, in full possession of the "commanding heights" - the resources of government, the rule-making and rule-implementing bodies of the electoral arena, and the electronic mass media - fell short of the 15 per cent mark in the voting for national lists while most of the remaining votes went to its most extreme opponents.

In order to account for this result, I begin with a brief outline of the various "players" in this election - the 13 parties and blocs that appeared on the December ballot - paying particular attention to that player which simultaneously appeared in the capacity of designer. Thereafter, the discussion turns to the design itself, the rules that had been formulated to govern the electoral contest. Of particular importance for our concerns would be the elements of irony and, from the point of view of Russia's Choice, tragedy, as the designs implemented to advantage this contestant would prove in many ways to have a reverse effect. Finally, we focus on the campaigns waged by the various parties and blocs, showing how these enacted the consequences that have been associated with "democracy by design"; in this instance, the political defeat of the designers and the onset of a new round of crises within the institutions of the state.

The Players

In the wake of the failed coup of August 1991, Russia's political vernacular began to distinguish between the "parties of society" and the "parties of power". The former designation referred to the many new political parties that had come into existence since spring 1990 when the USSR lifted its constitutional prohibitions against political organization. These "parties of society", then, were so dubbed because they neither issued from the corridors of state power nor had any appreciable influence there. Rather, the state machinery belonged to another set of actors - the "parties of power" - a number of rival cliques within the government, each in control of some significant set of state offices, reminiscent of what some Sovietologists used to call "bureaucratic pluralism". This dualism in the Russian party system began to disappear during the constitutional crisis of winter and spring of 1993 when, in anticipation of national elections, the "parties of power" emerged from their administrative cloister, set about the task of organizing electoral-political associations and, in so doing, immediately consigned the "parties of society" to second-rate status. We begin our discussion of the players with the preeminent "party of power", Russia's Choice.

Russia's Choice. The origins of Russia's Choice can be traced to the efforts of Gennadii Burbulis and Mikhail Poltoranin - two individuals at or near the epicenter of Boris
Yeltsin's inner circle - whose newly-announced "Russian Union of 25 April" linked itself both to the broad political movement, Democratic Russia, and to the Administration of the President via the head of its Analytic Center, Petr Filippov. The announced "presidential party" thereby conceived was officially born a few weeks later as an organizing committee headed by the former acting Prime Minister, Egor Gaidar. The organizing committee included Burbulis, Poltoranin, Filippov, First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais, head of the Administration of the President, Sergei Filatov and Democratic Russia leaders Gleb Yakunin and Lev Ponomarev. It was christened "Russia's Choice" (Vybor Rossii), and consisted of an amalgam of both parties of society and parties of power. Among the former were Democratic Russia, the Peasant Party of Russia and others who would assume the role of foot soldiers in the coming campaign. In the latter category were state-related "private" interest groups, by far the most prominent of which was the newly-created Association of Private and Privatized Enterprises (APPE) headed by Gaidar, Filippov and Chubais, that exercised real decision making power within the bloc.

As Vladimir Gel'man has shown, Russia's Choice represented the third attempt by one of the parties of power to spawn a political organization. In this instance, the impetus came from Chubais' State Property Committee which instructed its regional organs in March 1993 to create "private" associations, which soon joined together in the APPE headed by Chubais' associate, Gaidar, then temporarily out of the Government. These developments reflected an interweaving of state and private offices that would blur, if not erase, distinctions between them. The state apparatus in possession of property to be privatized, and those emerging private interests to whom it has been passing this property, would represent the political-economic base of Russia's Choice.

Yeltsin's reluctance to endorse the organization openly and unambiguously meant that Russia's Choice would be unable to realize its aspiration of becoming the presidential party. However, the collection of high officials and personages present at its Founding Congress (October 16-17, 1993) - a score or so of top officers in the Government (including 5 first deputy prime ministers), the leading officials in the Administration of the President and their associates such as Burbulis - left no doubt that this was the premier party of power, metamorphosed into an electoral organization. Reflecting on its status at this juncture, Vladimir Shumeiko, First Deputy Prime Minister and a leader of Russia's Choice, seemed to sum up the bloc's self-assessment in his remarks that: "Yes, we have already become the governing party." As such, Russia's Choice was able to script this election. Its wing in the Administration of President designed the legislative institutions that the election would fill and wrote the procedures for filling them; its members and supporters in the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), in that Commission's local affiliates and in the State Commission
supervising the referendum on Yeltsin's draft constitution were positioned to interpret and enforce (or not) these procedures; others in the bloc holding the top posts in state broadcasting would have a free hand to shape the images and messages of the election transmitted to mass audiences via television and radio; and with its close ties to nascent capital, the bloc benefitted from the bulk of private campaign contributors. In sum, it appeared that Russia's Choice had positioned itself splendidly to score a sweeping victory at the polls. But as the campaign got under way certain fissures in this top-heavy "governing party" would widen into rivalries and discord, thus largely canceling the huge advantages that it appeared to enjoy. Here, we might mention two of the fault lines running beneath the bloc.

One concerned the tensions that emerged between the two elements of the electoral amalgam - the state officials directing operations from Moscow and their counterparts in the localities, namely, activists from Democratic Russia who had had no direct relationship with Gaidar and his associates prior to this election. Of particular note in this respect was the fact that the Moscow-based leadership not only dictated which candidates would be placed on the bloc's national list but they also decided who would represent Russia's Choice in the races held in territorial districts. The result was predictable. Marginalized by those from the party of power, many of those from the party of society contributed but weakly, if at all, to the local campaigns mounted by Russia's Choice.

The other fault line ran through the central leadership itself. As it widened during the campaign, elements in Russia's Choice began to pull in quite different directions. One instance of this involved a reported rivalry between, on one hand, Viacheslav Bragin and Poltoranin, and on the other, Gaidar and his associates. Bragin and Poltoranin were the heads of Ostankino Television and the Federal Information Center, respectively, and both were on the initial national list of candidates drafted by Russia's Choice (although Bragin later resigned his candidacy owing to the unseemly combination of these two roles). According to the view of at least one knowledgeable observer, the many unflattering images of Gaidar and others in his circle projected over the electronic mass media during the campaign were clear instances of Bragin and Poltoranin settling old scores with their rivals. A second instance was recorded in an episode that we examine, below, in which Shumeiko appealed to the CEC to disqualify certain other parties from the campaign for their criticisms of the draft constitution. Here, we might call attention to ruptures within Russia's Choice that the incident bespoke and how in this instance internal rivalries crippled the bloc's public campaign. If the leadership of Russia's Choice had concurred with Shumeiko's proposal in advance, then the entire affair would resemble a set up, whereby Shumeiko alone, since all other bloc leaders distanced themselves from his proposal, would bear the responsibility for this embarrassing episode. If, on the other hand, Shumeiko had acted on his own from the start, his initiative could easily be
interpreted - above all, by others in the bloc’s leadership - as a coup de main intended to ingratiate himself with Yeltsin who had been complaining publicly about the criticisms of the draft constitution registered by other parties and blocs during their allotted television time. In either case, we would have an instance of leadership rivalry that led to a debacle for Russia’s Choice, whose projected images of decisiveness and strength were punctured by the spectacle of a bold proposal advanced by one of its leaders that ended in failure, thus advertising at one go the fact that Russia’s Choice was prepared to take anti-democratic measures but was also too weak to make them stick.

Finally, we might note the relations between Russia’s Choice and its potential allies in this election, relations which were of great consequence to the outcome because of the first-past-the-post system adopted for deciding races in the territorial districts. If the "democrats" were to avoid electoral fratricide, they would have to cooperate here, arranging the withdrawal of all but one of their candidates in a given district and pooling efforts to support their remaining active candidate. From the onset, however, Russia’s Choice consistently eschewed any collaboration with potential allies. Indeed, the latter interpreted its behaviour as unconscionably arrogant. As one candidate from another of the "democratic" blocs put it:

After [the storming of the parliament on] October 4, Russia’s Choice expected all the other democratic groups simply to join it. They were surprised when this did not occur. After all, they were the big organization in control of everything. They expected just to dictate to others.22

As the campaign unfolded, this perceived hubris on the part of Russia’s Choice, along with the threats and one-sided rulings issuing from those governmental and electoral commissions that it controlled, did much to convert its apparent allies into some of its fiercest opponents.

The Democratic Opposition. Election campaigns were mounted by three organizations portraying themselves as "democratic" alternatives to Russia’s Choice: The Party of Russian United and Accord (or "PRES" in the Russian acronym), the bloc Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin (or "Apple", the collective namesake derived from the surname initials of the bloc’s leading figures), and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR). These divisions within the country’s "democratic forces" appeared to result from two not unrelated considerations. First, the matter of political ambition. Each of the alternative democratic blocs was led by a prominent national figure with his eyes on the presidency - Sergei Shakhrai, who topped the list of candidates fielded by PRES, Grigorii Iavlinskii and Anatoli Sobchak, who headed the national lists of Apple and the RMDR, respectively. The future presidential prospects of these three politicians had been rather widely mooted prior to Yeltsin’s dissolution of the parliament.
With his promise of both early elections to a new legislature in December and to the presidency the following June, the political aspirations of the leaders of these blocs assumed a certain immediacy, reinforcing the idea of organizing separate campaigns for the parliamentary elections which in turn would serve as preparation for the presidential contest anticipated for the spring. To one degree or another, the presidential ambitions of those leading these three blocs would influence the strategies adopted for the parliamentary race.

Second - and no doubt contingent on the desideratum of promoting the future presidential prospects of their leaders - all three fashioned profiles that would both tap into the "democratic" current in the electorate and distinguish themselves individually within it, as genuine alternatives to Russia's Choice. In principle, their programmatic statements maintained, they all endorsed the overall policy objectives of the governing party. However, they also insisted that the monetarist orientation of this policy was deeply mistaken and had already done severe damage to Russia's economy and national interests alike. The course of reform, they all agreed, should be "corrected". But, as we shall see, below, their differences with Russia's Choice over economic policy seemed to pale in significance in comparison to the political frictions and personal rivalries that broke out between them and Russia's Choice in the course of the election campaign.

Like Russia's Choice, PRES was built by one of the parties of power on the basis of those state structures that its leaders superintended. Its foremost figure, Shakhrai - apparently sensing an incompatibility between his own presidential ambitions and membership in the would-be presidential party being organized by Burbulis, Poltoranin and others in the administration declined participation in their organizational efforts following the April referendum and struck out on his own. Utilizing the resources and personal connections accruing to his position (First Deputy Prime Minister and Chairperson of the State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation), he rapidly assembled an ensemble of local organizing committees, often under the auspices of provincial heads of administration, of which sent representatives to a founding congress held in October in Novgorod. By now, other figures from the corridors of power had joined the national leadership: Aleksandr Kotenkov who had succeeded Shakhrai as head of the State Legal Administration; Ramazan Abdulatipov who had recently surrender his post as Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet's Chamber of Nationalities to become Shakhrai's deputy in the State Committee for the Affairs of the Federation; Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin; and Presidential Advisor Sergei Stankevich. Jilted by Grigorii Iavlinskii, with whom he had been organizing a separate electoral bloc during the
summer, Konstantin Zatulin, leader of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia, attended the congress as a guest and formally joined PRES within a few days.

During the campaign, PRES projected two images that would distinguish its policy orientation from that of Russia’s Choice. In each case, the message conveyed a measured but unmistakable note of patriotism. On the one hand, Zatulin and Shokhin concentrated their rhetorical fire on the invasion of foreign products and foreign financial concerns experienced under the reform bearing Gaidar’s name. Russia’s interests, they argued, required the introduction of protectionist measures. On the other hand, Shakhrai sharply criticized the inconsistencies and confusion that had plagued federal relations while Gaidar had been acting Prime Minister. He spun out a collection of inspiring slogans and images on this score, calling PRES both "the party of the regions" and "the all-national conservative party", advocating protection for Russian industry as well as for Russians in the form of quarterly indexation of wages. He summed it up in the slogan - "Family, Property and Motherland" - whose appositions more lyrically intoned the "strong regions, strong center" rhetoric of his days in government. After the draft constitution was promulgated on November 10, Shakhrai would take the part of those "family members" soon to be disenfranchised under its provisions - Russia’s regions and republics.

A second bloc within the democratic opposition, Apple, formed around the figure of Grigorii Iavlinskii, a prominent economist who through the analytic work of his Moscow institute (EPltsentr) and the practical applications of his brand of reform economics in Nizhnii Novgorod had built a national reputation that placed him a close second behind Yeltsin in opinion polls taken in the summer of 1993. With the scent of elections in the air following the April referendum, Iavlinskii had formed with Konstantin Zatulin the organization Entrepreneurs for a New Russia in June, a political party poised as an alternative to Democratic Russia and to the contemporaneous organizing activities of Burbulis, Poltoranin and Gaidar that eventually produced Russia’s Choice. Through summer and into early autumn, efforts to expand the base of this organization involved negotiations with a broad array of parties and groups, including both the "centrist" parties and others conventionally placed in the "democratic" column - the RMDR, the Republican Party of the Russian Federation (RPRF), the Social Democratic Party of Russia (SDPR), the Party of Economic Freedom, the Party of Free Labor, the Christian Democratic Union(KhDS), the parliamentary faction Accord for the Sake of Progress and others. Ultimately, Iavlinskii’s was the deciding voice and his own presidential ambitions the decisive factor in determining the bloc’s composition. Zatulin, offered merely a supporting role in the assembling cast, left with his Entrepreneurs to
join Shakhrai’s PRES. Most leaders and regional units of the RPRF, which had previously decided to join Russia’s Choice, were pulled over to Iavlinskii’s camp, along with the SDPR, the KhDS and some prominent personages from Accord for the Sake of Progress such as Viktor Sheinis.

The composition of its national list, along with the platform it developed for the campaign, provided clear indications of both the political space that Apple sought to carve out for itself and the particular content with which it would fill it. The gist of Apple’s platform called for an all-around market reform relying on accelerated privatization in some sectors combined with an active industrial policy in others. The intention was clearly to portray the policies of Gaidar as well-intentioned but one-sided and, consequently, destructive of the very objectives that they claimed to promote. Iavlinskii himself made this point frequently during the campaign, summing it up on one occasion as "not by monetary policy alone, not by that alone."

Apple’s national list of candidates resembled a totem pole, encoding through the images of its leaders its principal programmatic message of a sensible and superior alternative for realizing the goals of democracy and market reform. At the top stood Iavlinskii - symbolizing economic acumen, joining those qualities and skills that otherwise appear as discrete in the political pantheon. If Gaidar might represent bookish theory gone awry for lack of experience, while figures such as Arkadii Vol’skii may signify "experience" without a corresponding vision of thoroughgoing reforms, then Iavlinskii’s image would suggest a synthesis, that combination of the visionary (his close association with the program, "500 Days") and the practical (the reforms achieved under his direction in Nizhnii Novgorod) that would recommend him as the man to lead. Next on the list was Yurii Boldyrev, an individual who has demonstrated both his commitment and capabilities in waging a fight for clean government, a political martyr victimized by leading elements in Russia’s Choice. In the third spot was Vladimir Lukin, Russia’s Ambassador to the USA who had become a rival of Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister and a leader of Russia’s Choice. In contrast to the amateurism and unwarranted Western bias associated with Kozyrev, Lukin would represent both competence and a sounder foreign policy cognizant of Russia’s national interests. Lesser known names made up the remainder of the national list but these too - drawn from research institutions such as EPIItsentr and the Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, in addition to those awarded to the political parties affiliated with Apple (RPRF, SDPR, KhDS) - reinforced the overall image struck by the bloc’s leaders: intelligence grounded in practical experience, capability free of the taint of corruption, and an ample complement of energetic, youthful individuals connoting
the advent of novye luidi ("new people") and the chance for a fresh start after two years of
disappointment with the people and policies associated with Russia’s Choice. Apple thus
constructed itself as more than a mere alternative to "the governing party", the bloc appeared
as its alter ego, its bad conscience.

Ironically, this resemblance between Apple and Russia’s Choice was also apparent in
the internal frictions plaguing each during the campaign and contributing to their disappointing
finishes. For instance, while Boldyrev hammered on the culpability of Russia’s Choice for
corrupt government, his was a lone voice in the bloc. Similarly, the leaders took
contradictory positions on the draft constitution. Iavlinskii advocated converting the new
legislature into a constitutional assembly, while another prominent Apple candidate, Sheinis,
publicly called this position "pseudo-democratic demagoguery". Concerned that over-
exposure might injure his presidential prospects, Iavlinskii opted for a low-profile campaign for
the bloc as a whole, a strategy that he dictated on the basis of his "intuition". Consequently,
he not only eschewed television appearances himself but canceled some campaign swings to the
provinces arranged by others on the list. The dominant figure of Iavlinskii became
something of a vehicle through which rivalries within the bloc would express themselves. As
one Apple staffer put it:

Our office was supposed to be the analytic center for the bloc. But now there
are at least three such groups, ours and two others that have been set up by
other candidates whose ordinary professional work involves gathering and
analyzing information. They share nothing with us. They go straight to
Iavlinskii. They try to please him, to influence him, and to push us to the side.
And they have largely succeeded. We gather information but we are not much
involved with analysis and decisions.

Added to the discord within the top leadership was the gap between the national
organization in Moscow and its supporting organizations in the provinces. The candidates
entered in the district races were, in the main, completely unknown to the central office.
Sometimes Apple affiliates supported "their" candidates in these races, sometimes they backed
others, usually those of Russia’s Choice. However, in one particularly egregious case in
Saratov, top Apple organizers campaigned for Nikolai Lysenko, head of the fascist National
Republican Party of Russia.

The third of the parties in the "democratic opposition", the RMDR, represented the
rump of the Movement for Democratic Reform (MD) that appeared on the political map just
prior to the coup of August 1991 and disappeared with the collapse of the USSR a few months
later. Reconstituted with a substantially different leadership in February 1992, the RMDR
has subsequently failed to maintain either a consistent programmatic orientation\textsuperscript{42} or - with the exception of its most prominent figures, St. Petersburg's mayor Anatolii Sobchak and Gavril Popov, the former mayor of Moscow - a stable leadership. It fielded a rather eclectic collection of notables for its national list,\textsuperscript{43} but failed to project much of a distinct identity for itself during the campaign and, perhaps as a consequence, failed to garner the 5 per cent minimum of the national vote needed to seat it in parliament. Given its history as a party of intellectual and political luminaries from the perestroika-era, these elections might represent the eclipse of this party of power.

The "Centrists". This particular band on the Russian political spectrum first appeared in the spring of 1992 as a certain confluence of defectors from other political tendencies: the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) which had left the "democratic camp" the previous November but whose journey toward extreme nationalism was arrested by protests in its top council against party leader Nikolai Travkin's brief flirtation with the "patriotic" forces;\textsuperscript{44} Renewal, the political offspring of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), led by Vol'skii, himself a former MDR leader; and the heirs to the break-away legislative faction, Communists for Democracy, who, under the leadership of Aleksandr Rutskoi, took for themselves the name, People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR). United in the "centrist bloc" known as Civic Union, these parties appeared for a time as the likely successors to the "democrats", the severe consequences of whose economic reforms seemed to summon the sort of "corrective" that Civic Union would supply - an industrial policy based on "common sense" that would slow the pace and ease the transition to a market economy.\textsuperscript{45} As a bloc, however, Civic Union fared poorly. Programmatic differences and, above all, the ambitions of the strong personalities heading its constituent elements began to tear it apart before it celebrated its first anniversary. By June 1993, the DPR had left\textsuperscript{46} while Rutskoi had become a leader of the "intemperate" opposition by then in full control of the Supreme Soviet. With his arrest on October 4 and the subsequent banning of the PPFR, the shattered pieces of the once seemingly formidable centrist opposition entered the election campaign as three separate organizations: Travkin's DPR, Vol'skii leading a diminished Civic Union and remnants of the PPFR fielding a slate of candidates under the title, Future of Russia - New Names (FR-NN).

With their standard bearer, in prison and their party temporarily banned, a number of former PPFR leaders\textsuperscript{47} hastily cobbled together an electoral organization whose distinguishing profile would be the youth of its candidates.\textsuperscript{48} However, since this marker - novye liudi making a fresh start - had been claimed by Apple, FR-NN had trouble projecting a clear
identity for itself and fell far short of the 5 per cent threshold for representation in the Duma. Civic Union, on the other hand, assembled a list of candidates that partook more of the category "yesterday's people"\(^{49}\), while the DPR's defection and the dissolution of the PPFR deprived the bloc of most of its activists in the localities. Its remaining constituent groups, enterprise directors and local officials, generated little voter enthusiasm.\(^{50}\) As a result, the once seemingly formidable Civic Union staged a weak campaign and failed to capture even 2 per cent of the national vote.

The third of our "centrist" contenders, the DPR, had arguably represented that tendency most steadfastly opposed to both the discussion club and mass movement models of political organization in favor of developing a pragmatic, catch-all, Western-style political party.\(^{51}\) These elections represented that long anticipated moment when preparations for political battle would give way to action. Indeed, DPR leader Travkin had resigned his deputy's mandate in the wake of the April referendum to devote himself entirely to managing the DPR's campaign efforts, opening the first party campaign fund in Russia's postcommunist period, vetting candidates for the party's list, conducting voter surveys and hiring public relations specialists from the firm, Imidzh, all before the month of April had elapsed.\(^{52}\)

The DPR was alone among the "centrists" in capturing the minimum 5 per cent of the national vote required for seating the party in the Duma. Its success in this respect might be accounted for in terms of its active campaign both in the localities and, nationally, in its blitz of television with short advertisements repeating the party's slogan - "Better with us". The DPR also established a clear presence for itself in its longer TV spots that would feature Travkin flanked by the economist Oleg Bogomolov (connoting that maturity alleged to be lacking among Gaidar's "boys") and Stanislav Gavorukhin (perhaps the country's most vocal critic of the role of the authorities - to wit, Russia's Choice - in the October storming of the parliament).\(^{53}\) Unlike the other "centrists", then, the DPR staged a relatively effective campaign nationwide concentrating its fire on "the governing party" the possibility of whose victory at the polls it regarded as the number one danger confronting the country, arguing that to prevent this outcome a pact with the devil would be acceptable,\(^{54}\) and that in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) one would find more "normal" free-marketeers than in Russia's Choice.\(^{55}\)

**Neo-Communists.** The tag "neo-communist" can be applied with varying degrees of precision to three contestants in the December balloting: the CPRF, the Agrarian Party and Women of Russia. It is not used here to suggest shared political principles so much as to connote common organizational affiliations and past associations. From this perspective, the
CPRF appears as the urban-based successor to the CPSU while the Agrarian Party would constitute its rural counterpart. Women of Russia owed its inception primarily to the Women of Russian Movement, the Union of the Women of Russia and other organizations whose leading figures had been top cadres in the various women's organizations associated with the CPSU.

As might be expected, rural and gender-specific components of the neo-communist grouping sought to appeal to discrete constituencies on the basis of diffuse, conservative values. They both passed the 5 per cent barrier easily, garnering a section of the electorate that represented the "soft" backlash against the policies associated with "the governing party". Their national lists were saturated with figures who, however colorless, signified stability, predictability and, perhaps, a certain nostalgia for easier, if not happier, days. The CPRF, with the largest party membership party in Russia (500,000), a sizeable constituency of pensioners and veterans who could be relied on to turn out on election day and a national network of organizers and activists who, in regions such as Rostov, conducted effective door-to-door campaigns, appeared situated to capture a goodly share of the national vote. The fact that the CPRF's election day totals fell considerably below its apparent potential might be traced to two factors - one outside the party organization and the other inside it.

The external factor would refer to the harassment visited on the CPRF by the authorities. This included the banning of the party on the eve of the campaign (from 8-22 October) and subsequent threats from top figures in power to suspend the party's participation during the campaign itself (see, below). Along these same lines, the campaign mounted by Russia's Choice focused the bulk of its critical energies on the communists. Reinforced by the ostensibly non-partisan national television networks, these efforts probably succeeded in reducing the margin of the communist vote.

But, if anything, the CPRF's internal problems were of greater moment. These concerned leadership. Party Chairperson, Gennadii Zuganov, appeared as something less than a dynamic, inspiring figure. His ratings in opinion surveys trailed those of the party that he led - and by a wide margin. Relatedly, his lack of political stature was apparent in his failed attempts to recruit prominent figures from the "patriotic" camp such as Sergei Barburin, Victor Aksiuchits and Mikhail Astafev. The CPFR, then, entered the race without strong public leaders. And its programmatic statements did little to distinguish the party from its competitors, excising appeals to socialism in favor of moderate "patriotism" and a cautious reform orientation echoing the positions staked out by the "centrists" and paling in
comparison with the aggressive, hard-hitting rhetoric on these themes featured in the campaign of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Perhaps more than any other party or bloc contesting the December elections, the public face of the LDPR was identical with that of its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Arguably the country's most talented and tireless political entrepreneur, Zhirinovskii began his career in politics at the founding of the first political party in the USSR, the Democratic Union, from whose ranks he was immediately expelled. Shedding thereafter his initial social democratic plumage, he adopted that of liberal democracy - which in the twilight of the communist order represented an ideology much in vogue - and took the lead in organizing the Liberal Democratic Party which was officially founded in March 1990. The public profile of this party, one of the many coming into existence in Russia at this time, was remarkable in underscoring the two consistent impulses in Zhirinovskii's politics - Fuehrerprinzip and empire. Embedded in a program decked out with the politically popular shibboleths of the day - pluralism, free market economy, rule-of-law state and so on - were two proposals unique among Russian parties in that period. One called for the creation of a presidential system, the other, for the recreation in the USSR of Russia's pre-revolutionary territorial-administrative system with Russian serving as the single officially recognized language. Soon this party also expelled Zhirinovskii for collaborating with the KGB. Undaunted, Zhirinovskii pieced together his own Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, under whose banner he astounded the country by placing third in the 1991 Russian presidential elections, capturing nearly 8 per cent of the total vote.

Zhirinovskii and his party were almost universally discounted during the campaign for the new parliament. For instance, on the list of Russia's most prominent 100 political figures composed monthly by the newspaper, Nezavisimaiia gazeta, his name did not even appear on that published December 1 1993. As we see, below, the LDPR's stunning success at the polls derived in part from the activities and propaganda of Russia's Choice. But its own campaign tactics that capitalized so effectively on certain conditions prevailing in Russia deserve a word here. We can safely disregard, in this respect, LDPR programmatic statements as appeals to rational voters, for these are masterpieces of contradiction (pro-capitalism and anti-privatization) and crazy talk (for instance, the promise to lower the price of a kilo of meat about ten-fold, with a further three-fold discount available to party members and supporters). Rather, LDPR appeal seems to be anchored in two related factors: the "strong figure" of Zhirinovskii and its resonance with "outsiders" like himself. Zhirinovskii has often drawn a self-portrait of the "strict papa", that father figure who exudes the strength and
projects the will to set an otherwise chaotic house in order.\textsuperscript{71} In this respect, he appears to tap into one of the social bases of Yeltsin’s popularity. During the campaign, he brilliantly exploited the amorphous but palpable desire for such a figure among large sections of the electorate.\textsuperscript{72} His campaign statement to the voters in reference to “the governing party”.

Russia’s Choice, would provide an illustration. "You yourself see who has gathered there", he claimed, "all those who are guilty for all that has gone on, for all this tragedy that has unfolded on the territory of Great Russia since April 1985."\textsuperscript{73} In formulations such this, Zhirinovskii tacitly asked the reader/listener to identify with him by anticipating the other’s diagnosis and articulating it on his behalf. This political rhetoric was uniquely effective in the campaign. It spoke of things in a manner accessible to many ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{74} Its power resided in references to unrealized, throttled potential, sublimating both speaker and audience onto the grander plane of nation. The subtext of his narratives consistently called forth the biblical meek and their imminent inheritance transposed onto the vocabulary of nationalism. In sum, it read: "Our Great Russia has been denied. Just as you and I have, but her strength, once realized, would make her undeniable."\textsuperscript{75} Fuehrerprinzip and empire as one.

Complementing the brilliance of Zhirinovskii’s political rhetoric was the operational effectiveness of the LDPR in the campaign. In large measure this can be attributed to the collective profile of party cadres - energetic, enterprising and ambitious individuals, not unlike Zhirinovskii himself, who have not (yet) enjoyed the close associations with government and benefitted from its largess ("privatization") as would be true of, say, the business groups affiliated with the APPE.\textsuperscript{76} Money, naturally, figured importantly into campaign efforts, and the LDPR appeared to benefit to the tune of some millions of dollars donated clandestinely by European right-wingers and fascist organizations.\textsuperscript{77} And, unlike most of the parties surveyed here, the LDPR’s central offices worked closely with its regional units throughout the campaign, paying for local television and radio advertisements and building thereby a grassroots presence during the contest in places where the party had been effectively unknown.\textsuperscript{78} In a number of regions LDPR organizations, benefitting both from the party’s central war chest and from frequent visits paid to the localities by their leader, conducted especially aggressive campaigns in the local press and on local TV and radio, in the streets and over the telephone.\textsuperscript{79} Organizationally, they often appeared to reflect the energy and determination projected so effectively in the image cultivated by Zhirinovskii.\textsuperscript{80}

Other contenders. Two other hastily assembled organizations took part in the parliamentary elections - the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia, led by Liubov Lymar (leader of the Russian movement, Mothers of Soldiers) and Dignity and Charity (led by
Konstantin Frolov (Vice-Chairperson of the Russian Academy of Sciences). The former represented a section of the country’s once promising ecological movement, the latter sought to focus attention on the plight of Russia’s indigent and invalid population. Neither succeeded in attracting much attention during the campaign or enough votes to pass the 5 per cent threshold on election day.81

The Rules

The rules structuring party competition in the parliamentary elections can be divided into two broad categories, "primary" and "secondary". The first would refer to the established offices for which parties and independent candidates would compete; the second, to the various procedures and regulations that would govern this competition. Since an exhaustive treatment of either sets of rules would be beyond the scope of the present study, we might limit our discussion, here, to a brief examination of a few from each category that would most clearly illustrate our central thesis regarding "democracy by design" and its consequences.

Primary rules. The rules establishing public offices, assigning functions to them, distinguishing their respective spheres of authority and so forth fall into the category "primary". During the year preceding the 1993 elections, these rules had become the object of a bitter struggle between those political forces grouped around the presidency and those controlling the Congress of People’s Deputies and its Supreme Soviet. As this struggle ripened into crisis, the constitutional orientations of each of the sides to this conflict correspondingly polarized. Prior to its dissolution, the legislature’s preferences had switched from a "weak" presidency to no presidency,82 just as those in the opposite camp had graduated from a "strong" presidency to a lopsidedly "strong" one.83 The contrast between the branches of power over the primary rules was fought out by various means over shifting terrain - legislative battles and presidential threats against the legislature during the winter of 1992-1993, a national referendum in spring, a Constitutional Assembly in summer, a presidential decree, ultimately enforced by units of the Russian army, that established a new legislature in autumn. From the perspective of its authors and supporters, the Constitution that eventually issued from this struggle, and that was ratified by the voters in the December 12 balloting, was a constitution duly adopted by the Russian polity.

However, leaving aside both the rather minimal conditions set for ratification84 and indications of ballot fraud in this respect,85 Russia’s new Constitution can equally be regarded as one that has been "imposed", one that would fall within the category "democracy by design". Two reasons might be advanced, here, in support of this characterization. First
would be the matter of authorship and product within the circumstances prevailing in Russia at the time. In this respect, we find one party to the year-long constitutional crisis, that headquartered in the Administration of the President, both delivering the final blow to its opponents by annulling the extant Constitution and thus closing down legislative institutions under their control while simultaneously designing a new governmental arrangement insuring the future political hegemony of those structures in its possession. Considerations of friend-and-foe would likewise appear to account for the method of selection eventually adopted by the Administration of the President to fill both the upper and lower chambers of the new parliament, as well as the removal of restrictions that had hitherto prevented legislators from concurrently holding ministerial posts in the government.

The second reason pertinent to our "democracy by design" characterization of these rules involves the fact that the Constitution was not so much proffered to political society for its consideration, as it was imposed on it by those forces in control of the presidency. Among the 13 parties and blocs participating in the election, only Russia's Choice and the LDPR endorsed the draft. Moreover, Yeltsin served notice on all others during the campaign that they would be deprived of all their allotted television and radio time should they use the airwaves to criticize his project. Having conferred with Yeltsin on this matter, Nikolai Riabov, head of the CEC, laid down a new rule forbidding parties and blocs to criticize the draft, while the Arbitration Court for Information, just established by the President to ensure access to the mass media for all contenders, issued its own strictures against "baseless" criticisms in this regard. Inasmuch as these threats failed to staunch the criticism, Vladimir Shumeiko - newly returned to the Government as Press Minister, Chairperson of the Commission created by Yeltsin to supervise the Constitutional referendum and himself a Russia's Choice candidate for both the Council of the Federation and the Duma - brought charges to the CEC against the DPR and the CPRF, two of the more intemperate offenders against the gag rule. Since, by Shumeiko's logic, all candidates, parties and blocs participating in the election had tacitly endorsed the Constitution which provided the very offices that they were seeking, those criticizing this same Constitution had reneged on their tacit endorsement and, accordingly, should be collectively expelled from the race.

Shumeiko's mentality would speak of imposition. So would the illegal efforts of the Main Administration of the Armed Forces to encourage the troops to vote "yes" on the draft, as would the campaign to propagandize the merits of the proposed Constitution among the labor collectives of enterprises launched by Shumeiko in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission supervising the Constitutional referendum. And, perhaps, most indicatively on
this score, there was the spot that aired on television in which CEC Chairman, Riabov, while explaining the technical features of the December 12 ballot, paused on the final portion concerning the Constitutional draft and appealed to his audience thus: "As Chairperson of the Central Electoral Commission, I hope that we all will make the correct choice in support of the Constitution."96

Secondary Rules. Deploying officialdom to promote ratification of the draft constitution and discourage criticisms of this document would count as instances in which secondary rules were bent or abused in order to secure the adoption of primary ones. Focusing, here, on the effect of secondary rules in shaping the field of participants and their activities in the fall campaign, we observe a comparable pattern of "democracy by design" in which Russia's Choice constructed and manipulated electoral procedures in order to secure favorable results. That the combination of haste and hubris that went into these efforts often contributed in the end to the debacle experience by Russia's Choice on December 12 should not obscure the fact that "the governing party" made a number of efforts to design and interpret the rules to its advantage.

The matter of redistricting would provide an illustration of the haste attending the development of the secondary rules. While laying siege to the parliament, it may have occurred to those in the camp of the executive that plans for a new legislature would require redrawing the entire electoral map of the country in order to reduce the 1,068 existing districts to 225, the number corresponding to those Duma seats to be filled by candidates elected in territorial districts. But no one acted on this knowledge until after the cannonade that ended the siege had also incinerated the very data that would be essential to drawing the new map.

Preparations for redistricting the vast expanses of Russia only began on October 6 when the CEC assembled a working group composed of independent experts and specialists from the Administration of the President which developed a plan adopted by the CEC a week later. On the surface, the new electoral map appeared to be a masterpiece of gerrymandering and malapportionment, with constituency sizes ranging from 13,800 to 727,800 eligible voters.97 In fact, however, things were at once both simpler and more complicated: "simpler", in the sense that district boundaries were not redrawn for the purpose of advantaging any party or bloc; "more complicated", with respect to the confused and uncoordinated nature of the process. As the working group scrambled to piece together fragments of demographic data from various official sources (many of whom proved reluctant to share information with individuals with whom they had neither previous association nor direct administrative obligation), they were operating within the institutional framework commissioned by those
presidential decrees in place at the time that had specified that only the Duma would be filled by popular election. Intent on retaining a federal principle in the elections, the working group drew its new map to preserve the integrity of even the smallest units in the federal system. It was only after this plan had been adopted that the authorities changed their minds about staffing the Council of the Federation ex officio and decreed that this chamber, too, would be filled by election. Out of this interplay of decisions, non-decisions and reversed-decisions, Russia would have a two-chamber parliament in which the federal principle would be enshrined in the composition of both houses, thus producing a ratio of malapportionment in the lower chamber of some 53 to 1.

The haste apparent in drawing the electoral map for individual races was also evident in the process by which parties and blocs would be admitted to the arena of electoral competition. All parties and public organizations duly registered with the Ministry of Justice were afforded the opportunity to appear on the ballot by collecting a minimum of 100,000 signatures on nominating petitions, with no more than 15 per cent of those gathered in any one region. In addition to time constraints (less than three weeks were provided to accomplish this), parties and public organizations identified with the opposition also had to canvass in the face of rather widespread fear following the violent dissolution of the previous parliament. According to Travkin, leader of the DPR: "Many older people even refused to sign, saying 'Passport data [are required] here and who knows this person [the canvasser] who might take [my name] to the authorities". Some 21 parties and electoral blocs overcame these hurdles and submitted petitions with the requisite number of signatures by the midnight deadline on November 6. Subsequently, the CEC disqualified 8 of them on the basis of one or another irregularity - usually a disproportionate number of signatures gathered in one region. Since a number of those disqualified by the CEC were publicly well-known as leaders of the "patriotic" opposition - especially the Russian All-People's Union and the Constitutional Democratic Party - a perception arose in many quarters that the authorities may simply have pruned the field of contenders in order to produce a legislature to their liking. Another result, however, may well have had precisely the opposite effect. As Mikhail Savin and Aleksandr Smagin of the Institute for Social and Political Studies have argued, by eliminating what in context was the "moderate" nationalist forces, the authorities effectively diverted a large section of the "patriotic" vote to the extreme wing of this camp, Zhirinovskii's LDPR.

Similar results appear to have issued from the authorities' manipulation of political identification, apparently toward the purpose of inscribing their preferences into the
composition of the Duma. The strongest action in this respect occurred in the wake of the October violence when the Ministry of Justice banned some 16 of the country’s communist and patriotic organizations - along with 11 of the newspapers and periodicals subscribing to one or both of these political tendencies - for their (alleged) roles in fomenting civil disturbances. Although the ban on half of them was quickly lifted, the exclusion of many communist and patriotic groups, combined with the decision by others later allowed to participate to boycott the elections, deprived a large, if amorphous, patriotic constituency of its many familiar beacons and left it with no other appropriate outlet for its sentiments than to vote for the LDPR. A second consequence concerned oppositionist newspapers - especially Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossia - which would support the CPRF and the Agrarian Party in the field of available choices, but which remained under government ban throughout, or until very late, in the campaign.

Finally, the authorities fine tuned the secondary rules to the advantage of Russia’s Choice. One instance of this concerned the CEC’s directive to all district electoral commissions to exclude from the ballot the party identification of those candidates running in territorial districts. Since Russia’s Choice had by far the greatest number of candidates with high name recognition contesting these seats, this rule would work to its benefit and against the chances of other parties - particularly the LDPR that had begun its late surge when this order was issued - with high proportions of relatively unknown standard bearers in the localities. A second instance involved the drafting of parliamentary regulations by the presidential commission appointed for this purpose. The very existence of such a commission would itself indicate something of the tendency toward "democracy by design" evinced by the authorities, but its draft regulations would take this yet a step further, especially the one pertaining to the right of legislative factions to expel from office those of their members not voting with them on a given question. The designers also provided for a parliamentary staff, a matter worked out in advance within the Administration of the President. Not only did they economize here (for example, only 19 positions were established in the area of information and legal services, without an analytic capability as had been present in the previous parliament), but they subordinated the staff of each chamber to a "general apparatus" on the payroll of the Administration of the President.

The Campaign

The preceding discussion of the players and the rules has already touched on certain aspects of the electoral campaign. It remains, here, to complete our consideration of this
topic, focusing on three of its aspects: the electorate to whom the appeals of the contestants were pitched; the resources available to the various contenders and how they were used; and the relations among the various parties and blocs as they developed over the course of the campaign. We begin with some observations on the first of these sub-topics, the electorate.

The Electorate. Although Russian voters have had considerable experience as a group casting ballots in public elections, their past choices had only concerned individuals. In the Soviet period, they had been asked (and pressured) to vote for the candidates "of the party and the people", in the late-Soviet period, they usually received ballots that enabled them to choose one or another individual candidate; now, in the parliamentary elections of 1993, they would be asked to make three decisions in the voting booth - to select an individual candidate for the Council of the Federation and another for the Duma, and to chose one of the 13 parties or blocs that had registered their respective national lists. In principle, then, these elections contained a radically new element. Instead of simply endorsing an individual, voters had the opportunity to choose among more or less specific programmatic orientations represented by the platforms put forward by the 13 contenders.

Was this principle realized? In most cases, probably not. Perhaps in some measure this was consequent on the desperate conditions confronting most people, absorbed in the daily struggles of private life with precious little time or energy left over for the relative luxury of public affairs. Perhaps it owed something to the inertia of the old mentality, as some Russian commentators have argued, whereby selecting a leader and subordinating oneself to him has remained a more pronounced tendency than answering the call of citizenship in an extended sense. At any event, sociological data gathered at the time have indicated that the average voter navigated his/her way through this election not on the compass of party and program, but on that of personalities and leaders for which the matter of "images" would prove decisive.

While it would be foolish to engage in any detailed speculation about the issue of which "images" would resonate effectively with the mass electorate, one consideration along these lines seems to stand out clearly. Namely, in the face of the severe social dislocations endured by voters and their uncertainty, indeed, anxiety with respect to the immediate future, and given the generous attention afforded by the mass media to personalities and leaders rather than to parties and programs, a majority of eligible voters would seem to have placed at the top of their preference schedules the desideratum of a "strong" leader taking a "firm hand" in order to restore order in the country. This factor had appeared to weigh heavily in the public approval of Yeltsin whenever he had been taking apparently decisive measures against the
Moreover, according to Igor Kliamkin’s surveys, such approval for "tough actions" has not been attached to any specific outcome or objective in the minds of most who have displayed a positive orientation toward authoritarian solutions. Rather, the roughly 50 per cent of the electorate consistently inclined toward authoritarianism has evinced only an amorphous association between the "strong leader" and "public order". A major question in this campaign would then concern the ways in which this broad-based sentiment might be tapped by the projection of specific images capable of converting it into votes.

**Resources and Their Use.** Despite government provision of public funds for campaigns, and the allotment of one hour of free broadcast time both on television and radio to all 13 parties and blocs, the distribution of campaign resources among the contenders was heavily lopsided in favor of Russia’s Choice. Just how lopsided, however, would be difficult to specify, owing to the near-total absence of accounting procedures and the reluctance of all but one of the competitors to make a public financial statement. According to one account, huge sums of money were pumped into some campaigns - especially that of Russia’s Choice - by banks and other financial-commercial interests, in many cases purchasing places on the respective national lists of these organizations.

In addition to the privileged access that it enjoyed to government property that would be used for campaign purposes - paper and printing, telephones, automobiles, physical premises, staff and so on - Russia’s Choice also controlled the national airwaves. Since the April referendum, the content of the most powerful mass medium, television, had begun to resemble its Soviet predecessor in its one-sided coverage and uniform interpretation of domestic events. The State Television Company, Ostankino, headed by Bragin of Russia’s Choice, much resembled in its political reporting one long "infomercial" for the "governing party". Although campaigning was forbidden by the authorities prior to the date that they set for commencing the electoral competition (itself a remarkable example of "democracy by design"), Russia’s Choice had full run of the airwaves for projecting its leaders and their messages during this "pre-campaign" period. In the days that followed, national television - with the exception of the time allotted to, or paid for by, other parties and blocs - would be difficult to distinguish from partisan programming authored by Russia’s Choice. Three aspects of their programming strategy are of particular concern to us, here.

First, the absence of coverage of those in the democratic opposition during the "pre-campaign" period would appear to have resulted from a decision to establish the impression that the voters faced a choice between either the communists or the democrats, with Russia’s Choice alone representing the latter. The paid campaign advertisements run throughout
the campaign by Russia’s Choice, featuring footage of the events of October 3 and 4, would support this view of a strategy aimed to polarize public opinion and deliver to Russia’s Choice those votes cast against the communists. By reprising the images of civil disturbance, accenting the need for strong leadership but supplying only the weak surrogate that Russia’s Choice had on offer, these advertisements probably aided the cause of that party most robustly preaching the gospel of Fuehrerprinzip. For instance, take the sequence frequently displayed in the television campaign mounted by Russia’s Choice. Here we have strong images of political crisis - barricades and citizens gathered in a smoky mist in defense of the Moscow City Soviet during the early morning hours of October 4. Such scenes could not but remind the viewer of the turmoil and violence besetting the country. They may also have recalled the role of Russia’s Choice in bringing about this particular national tragedy. But shots of Gaidar, megaphone in hand addressing those assembled, scarcely projected the images of heroism and firm leadership their producers might have intended. Patently miscast in this role, Gaidar would signify instead the absence of that leadership made requisite by the very situation portrayed in these spots.

Second, at the behest of all parties and blocs, the CEC took the decision to reject the program of coverage - including debates and roundtables involving tele-journalists - that had been proposed by the Directors Council at Ostankino in favor of a format in which parties and blocs could use their allotted free time as they saw fit. These rules hardly made for stimulating television, as one after another party spokesperson droned on in monologue about his or her organization’s program for the country. Of greater moment, however, was the fact that whatever might be uttered could be uttered with impunity. There was no critical voice exercising any check on what was expressed, no matter how absurd or irresponsible it might have been and regardless of (the unexpressed) implications that it might have had. The net effect, then, favored the LDPR whose campaign advertisements were arguably both the most stimulating and the most irresponsible.

Third, a revealing contrast in the use of television was evident between Russia’s Choice and Apple, the two electoral organizations whose early leads in opinion polls suffered steep declines as election day approached. For Russia’s Choice, the problem seemed to have been over-exposure, especially in view of the responsibility that "the governing party" might bear in voters’ eyes for the deterioration in the conditions of life borne by the population since the onset of shock therapy. Over-exposure, in this respect, would function as a reminder - regardless of the surface content of one or another electronically-mediated message - of where the blame could be placed. To the extent that this was the case, Russia’s Choice employed a
counter-productive media strategy involving a literally scandalous degree of one-sidedly favorable television reporting on its candidates, the patently illegal hijacking of public service announcements for electioneering purposes and, by a wide margin, the most extensive purchasing of broadcast time among all parties and blocs in the race.

For Apple, the shoe was entirely on the other foot. Concerned that too much coverage might injure his future presidential prospects, Apple's leader, Iavlinskii, made a conscious decision to avoid the TV camera. By the final days of the campaign, one study found that the frequency of his appearance on the television screen placed him in fifty-fifth position among all candidates. Moreover, Apple purchased no broadcast time for campaign appeals, although they did not lack for funds to do this. This deliberate under-exposure would seem to have contributed to the decline in this bloc's fortunes. Having gone into the campaign with a ranking in opinion polls placing them second behind Russia's Choice, Apple finished sixth in the voting.

Before turning to the relations among the parties and blocs during the campaign period, a word might be in order here on the relations between the two sub-topics thus far addressed in this section - the electorate and the use of campaign resources, principally television. In this respect a certain analogue suggests itself, one between economy and polity, each of which in Russia represents the site of an unusual combination of processes and significations that had been separated by more or less distinct epochs in the experience of developed democratic-capitalist states. In the economic sphere, Russia might be regarded as undergoing that "primitive accumulation" characteristic of early capitalism which had elsewhere featured the cultivation of a particular set of virtues in the population - discipline, responsibility, delayed gratification and so forth. However, "primitive accumulation" has been transpiring in this case under altogether different conditions which can be likened to advanced capitalism's "high-intensity market" wherein advertising beams out powerful messages of instant gratification to a mass audience, associating all manner of needs satisfaction with the acquisition of one or another commodity, thus stimulating a culture of consumption.

The telescoping of these epochs in Russia has produced some extraordinary results. The great majority of people have been regularly exposed by the "democratic" medium of television to sophisticated marketing pitches designed to convince them that the commodity in question - an automobile, a pleasure trip, space-age kitchen ware - will supply some critical ingredient hitherto missing in their lives. Yet the promises of social status, tropical splendor or the appreciation of family and friends cannot be redeemed at the cash register by the impecunious many. However, we need not conclude that this advertising has had no effect on
those unable to purchase the specific commodities that are featured. Rather, the continuous cascade of messages would contribute to the emergence of consumer culture, and individuals often participate in it according to the means available to them. Consequently, a number of tobacco companies on the Russian market have prospered by associating their brand of cigarettes (say, "Kansas" or "Texas") with images of "the real America" portrayed by cowboys in pick-up trucks travelling dusty roads to a bar bulging with affable patrons, obviously enjoying their cold beer, a game of pool, the rough-and-ready camaraderie of plain folk and, of course, celebrating the manifest delight of their lives with another puff on a Kansas cigarette. It would appear that many Russians, unable to afford the BMW or the get-away vacation to some exotic locale nonetheless have been able to experience by synecdoche this "real America", purchasing certain brands of cigarettes that, ironically, would be unknown to actual Americans.

An analogous set of relations appears to prevail in the polity as well. Here we find, on the one hand, voters as little practiced in distinguishing among alternatives as are so many of Russia's (new) consumers in the market. On the other, we have the means of mass communication stimulating (however amorphously) certain desires - whether for exotic places in the travel commercials or strong leadership in the political images projected by state television. In the same way that the ricochet of images in commercial advertising has created a consumer niche filled by Kansas cigarettes, so its political counterpart would seem to have created one for Zhirinovskii. And his television spots, featuring powerful images of the candidate in the role of national leader pledging solemnly to satisfy all manner of popular needs - from sausage at give-away prices to the recovery of national greatness via the reacquisition of Alaska - exploited this opportunity with remarkable success.

Two street-level episodes might be recounted in order to illustrate something of Zhirinovskii's campaign tactics and their effectiveness within the contemporary Russian milieu. On the evening of December 10, the present writer stood for a little more than an hour with three Apple activists who were campaigning outside the metro station, Time'arezkaia, in north-central Moscow. During this time, perhaps a thousand commuters exited the metro, passing the activists and their wall display, a large placard with a photo of Apple's candidate in that district, Vladimir Lysenko, under which was arrayed certain planks from the bloc's platform. Perhaps two score of the passers-by stopped for a closer look and, although all declined the hand-outs proffered by the campaigners, every third or fourth one moved closer to ask them a question - uniformly, one and the same. Pointing to Lysenko's picture, they queried: "Is he a Jew?" In consequence, the three rather knowledgeable and articulate Apple supporters - a
dotsent on the Russian Politics faculty at Moscow University, a teacher of foreign languages and a university student - discovered that their actual opportunities to stump for their candidate had been entirely reduced to repeating the reply: "No, he is Russian!" At the very moment that this was transpiring at the Time‘arezkaia metro stop, the LDPR’s sound truck had parked itself in front of the Bolshoi Theater, booming out a Zhirinovskii jingle (whose melody bore more than a passing resemblance to the theme song from the cartoon series, the Flintstones) that drew in the crowd¹³³ that ended up as that sea for hopeful and inspired faces depicted in that evening’s 30-second item on the nightly news that has been mentioned, above, in this study.¹³⁴

Relations Among Competitors. Since Russia’s Choice represented itself as "the governing party" and held the position of front-runner until the very end of the campaign, its presence in the race became the hub of relations among parties and blocs throughout the contest. With respect to those forces outside the "democratic" camp, relations with Russia’s Choice could be generally described as implacably hostile. Inasmuch as there was no apparent point in seeking any accommodation or finding any common ground, the character of these relations might be understandable.¹³⁵ However, among those in the "democratic" camp, the situation was quite different. Since all four of these parties and blocs had fielded candidates in the district races for the Duma and the Council of the Federation, there was a definite incentive to coordinate their activities. Otherwise, they might end up dividing by as many as four ways that sector of the electorate to which they were all appealing, thus making it possible for other parties or independent candidates to capture seats in the districts with relatively small pluralities of the vote.

Although some attempts were made by the four "democratic" contenders to coordinate their activities in district races, these came at the eleventh hour and proved singularly unsuccessful.¹³⁶ The gesture toward cooperation was simply drowned in a sea of bad blood that had gushed forth among the "democrats" in the race. Initially, Russia’s Choice seemed to have felt itself sufficiently strong to be able to go it alone in the districts, expecting, if anything, that others in the democratic column would eventually come to their senses and withdraw their local candidates in its favor. When things turned out differently - Shakhrai repeating a demand that Russia’s Choice withdraw its entire national list,¹³⁷ Apple comparing Gaidar to Stalin¹³⁸ and Iavlinskii preferring cooperation with communists to that with a government already "up to its elbows in blood"¹³⁹ - Russia’s Choice began to signal its readiness to find some method for electoral cooperation in the districts.
For a time, in fact, it appeared as though the "democrats" had arrived at a mutually satisfactory method for coordinating their efforts, one based on the principle that in each district candidates enjoying the highest rating in a voters poll should remain on the ballot while all other "democratic" candidates would withdraw and support him or her. This agreement broke down on implementation, however, when sharp discrepancies were noticed between the ratings and the numbers on which these were based. It seemed that since all the candidates on whom the voters were polled were virtually unknown to the public, the percentage differences separating the ratings of leaders from other contenders were actually meaningless. As the campaign came to a close, Russia's Choice was delivering mixed messages about its willingness to cooperate with other democratic organizations in the district races, while representatives of Apple - the only bloc to withdraw its candidates (in two districts) in a gesture of cooperation - were denouncing it for what they claimed was its unwillingness to concede a single district race to them. The consequences of this fratricidal warfare among the "democrats" would be difficult to determine with precision. But in some districts it doubtless accounted for the victory of their common opponents, while nationally the spectacle of squabbling democrats may well have contributed to the success of the most disciplined party in the field, the LDPR, which gathered the vast majority of its votes during the final stage of the campaign.

Results

A consideration of the results of Russia's parliamentary election would begin with the fact that they did not occur according to some schedule codified in law or tacitly understood in the political culture. Rather, they were called by a government that, having lost confidence in the legislature, decided to dissolve it and to form a new one, assumedly one with a preferable composition. Using the concept "democracy by design", we have had occasion to comment extensively on the lengths to which the government went in order to produce the desired electoral outcome. Accordingly, the analysis of the election results presented here will focus on the extent to which the government succeeded in this endeavor.

As a first cut, we might consider the matter of turnover. If the government's goal in calling these elections was to produce a new corpus of legislators, then one negative measure of its success would include that complement of deputies elected to the Duma who had also served as deputies in the old parliament. The data assembled in Table 1 (page 31) indicate that, indeed, considerable turnover occurred. Only 68 of the 444 seats in the Duma were filled by candidates who had previously been deputies at the national level (15.3 per cent),
while a somewhat higher proportion were returned to the Council of the Federation (49 of 171, or 28.7 per cent). Moreover, since the government’s interest in renewing the composition of the legislature would not extend to former deputies now associated with Russia’s Choice (the re-election of these individuals would be preferred from its point of view) the overall proportions for each house should be reduced by their number - 24 in the Duma and 13 in the Council of the Federation. Subtracting this group from the overall total of returning deputies would leave a remainder of 44 deputies in the Duma (9.9 per cent) and 36 in the Council of the Federation (21.1 per cent) whose re-election would have run counter to the preferences of the government. On the basis of these data, it would appear that the elections largely accomplished one of the government’s purposes.

However, turning to another (positive) measure of the government’s degree of success - the election of candidates whom it would prefer - the results tell a different story. Table 2 (page 32) provides a breakdown of the election returns for those eight parties and blocs that crossed the five per cent threshold and were allotted a number of seats in the Duma (row 2) in correspondence with their respective shares of the popular vote (row 1). On a national basis, both Russia’s Choice, with less than 15 per cent of the total vote, and its would-be coalition partners among the "democrats" - Apple, PRES and the RMDR (which failed to garner the necessary 5 per cent) - polling an operative combined percentage of less than 15 points, experienced a bitter defeat. To be sure, the seats that Russia’s Choice picked up in the territorial districts (row 3) offset the national results to some extent, pushing its deputies total ahead of the national leader, the LDPR, and making it the largest single faction in the Duma. But opposition parties - especially the Agrarian Party with its rural strongholds in the collective and state farm sector - did very well in the district elections too. With respect to the notion of "democracy by design", then, it would appear that the overall results of the December balloting would be roughly comparable to those of competitive elections held in Russia during the Soviet period. If in the past the "democrats" had foiled the plans of Communist authorities, now it was neo-communists and the LDPR returning the favor.

This characterization would be supported by the immediate, and rather traumatic reactions of both Russia’s Choice and the government to the election results. The former seemed to have spent the first few post-election days in collective denial, blaming a host of others - other "democrats" in the election, journalists, even Yeltsin - for the defeat that they had suffered and announcing their intention to lead a broad "anti-fascist" coalition in the new parliament based (incredibly) on an intensified renewal of economic "shock therapy".148 The latter confirmed a broadly-shared suspicion that the government regarded the public
airwaves as a private preserve for broadcasting its partisan message by making its first response to the election returns an information black-out and its second a decision to sack the head of state television, Bragin, whose manipulation of the electronic mass media had obviously failed to achieve the desired results. Within a matter of days, Yeltsin issued an executive order revamping the entire structure of the electronic mass media and locating control over them squarely in his office.

In the same way that the outcome of the elections to the Duma undid the designs of the government, so those to the Council of Federation represented another source of disappointment. Recalling that this election was called only when the previous Council of the Federation proved unwilling to back the president in his fall show-down with the parliament, the intentions of the political planners were openly to break the hold of the "regional lobbies" in the Council and secure a new composition more amenable to their purposes. Overall, the results would indicate a large-scale defeat for the authorities in this area too. Heads of administration and of soviets in the regions - some of whom had just been fired by Yeltsin or put out of a job when their respective soviets were dissolved - along with their associates in the various regional elites, captured an overwhelming majority of seats on the Council, indicating that those "regional lobbies" which had found support previously in a Supreme Soviet seeking allies in its contest with the president would now dominate the upper house of the national parliament. Indeed, even the majority of the seats (19 of 37) in the Council of the Federation won by candidates affiliated with Russia’s Choice were filled by top officials from these "regional lobbies".

Perhaps the most significant, if not shocking, result of these elections was the success of Zhirinovskii’s LDPR. It rearranged the country’s political spectrum literally overnight. Whereas the communists and patriots had comprised the "implacable opposition" to the course set by the previous government, they now appeared as a "moderate" or event "centrist" opposition in comparison with the LDPR. The government, too, has obliged in this political restructuring, both turning to a more state-centered orientation in economic policy as advocated by these groups, and pushing "shock therapists", most notably Gaidar and former Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, out of executive office. Having commented already on some of the features of the electoral process that contributed to the LDPR’s success at the polls, as well as on its ability to capitalize on certain currents of opinion prevalent in the mass electorate, we might conclude our account with a mention of one other important factor - viz., that the majority of LDPR voters can be identified in socio-economic terms as members of those social
groups that have emerged as a consequence of the particular conception and implementation of reform policies pursued in the Russian economy.

Contrary to some impressions that the vote for the LDPR was mainly a backlash against "the governing party" mounted by those dispossessed by its economic reforms, Zhirinovskii received a large portion of his support from some sections of Russia's new business class. Much like the cadres of the LDPR mentioned above, these would appear in many instances to have been ambitious and energetic individuals not advantaged by associations with those state structures passing out concessions to certain business interests, such as those organized in Gaidar's APPE. Rather, the effect of government actions had created a sizeable group of "outsiders" in the ranks of Russian business, and much of this vote appears to have gone to Zhirinovskii. In the Far East, hitherto a stronghold of Yeltsin and the "democrats", the LDPR scored remarkable successes, in part because of the deleterious effects of government policies on local business interests. Elsewhere, too, Zhirinovskii managed to capture a portion of the electorate previously oriented toward the "democrats", especially during his surge in the late going.

If Zhirinovskii was able to take votes away from the "democrats" in their strongholds, he did the same with respect to the communists in many of theirs, principally in rust belt regions such as Smolensk, Vladimir, Vologda and Ivanova where the LDPR polled about 30 per cent of the vote. Irrespective of region, however, the core of Zhirinovskii's support appears overwhelmingly to have been young men (25-40 years of age) who were active in the economy (often involved with more than one occupation), but frustrated by the conditions they perceived around them - especially the disorder and corruption, suggesting strongly their "outsider" status. This group of young men in the civilian economy was amply augmented by their counterparts in the armed forces who voted for the LDPR by a large margin. The Kantemirov Division which had stormed the parliament on October 4, for instance, turned out on December 12 to deliver 74.3 per cent of its ballots to Zhirinovskii. These results would appear to be among the most damaging to the designers of this election. Not only did the instrument, relied on to force an election, register its profound disapproval of both its mission and those who commissioned it, but the vote in the armed services would affix an immediate question mark to the loyalties of officers and enlisted personnel alike, thus instilling yet another element of uncertainty into the political situation in Russia that these elections had been designed to remedy.
Table 1. Former People's Deputies Elected to the State Duma (444 seats*) and the Council of the Federation (171 seats**)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State Duma</th>
<th></th>
<th>Council of the Federation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Candidates</td>
<td>Candidates of Russia's Choice</td>
<td>All Candidates</td>
<td>Candidates of Russia's Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By National List</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Districts or by Regional Lists***</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Valid elections did not take place in six territorial districts; hence, 444 of a possible 450 deputies were elected to the Duma.
** Valid elections did not take place in 7 instances; hence, 171 of a possible 178 deputies were elected to the Council of the Federation.
***For seats in the Duma, this row concerns those elected directly in districts and those on regional lists of parties and blocs named by means of a complicated arithmetic procedure used by some national parties and blocs to reward regional affiliates by allocating to them a number of seats that would otherwise have been filled by their national lists.

Sources: Calculations for this table were based on data on former deputies compiled by the CEC (I am grateful to Andrei Berezkin for these) and on a list of candidates - directly or loosely associated with Russia’s Choice - who stood in electoral districts for seats in either the Duma or the Council of the Federation - compiled by A. Murashev and A. Sobianin and published in Argumenty i fakty, No. 49 (Dec., 1993), p.9.
Table 2. Election Results for Eight Parties and Blocs Securing Duma Representation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>Russia's Choice</th>
<th>PRF</th>
<th>Agrarians</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Apple</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>DPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of National Vote</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Deputies from National List</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates Elected in Districts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of seats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

This study has been supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. I am grateful to a number of individuals who supplied very useful information, help and advice: Sergei Mitrokhin, Andrei Berezkin, Viacheslav Igrunov, Vladimir Gel'man, Il'ia Kudriavtsev, Galina Luchterhandt, Sergei Markov, Michael McFaul, Ralph Clem, Dmitrii Levchik, Aleksei Melnikov, Vladimir Grishenko, Vladimir Todres, Vitalii Karpukhin, Aleksandr Frolov and Mikhail Forin.


7. One example of how these terms have been used is O.V. Grigor'ev and M.V. Maliutin, Vlast' i sobstvennost' v Rossii oxen'iu 1991: Kto pobedili i chto dal'she? (Moscow: Public Center of Moscow City Soviet, 1991).


12. Vladimir Gel'man, "Goskomimushchestvo kak partiia vlasti", Nezavisimaia gazeta (9 June 1993), p.2. The previous two attempts, according to Gel'man, included the Movement for Democratic Reform in fall 1991, and failed attempts the following year to build a presidential party on the basis of Yeltsin's presidential representatives in the regions.

13. Indeed, Yeltsin's decree of February 5, 1993 that, in the view of Vasilii Kononenko, transformed his representatives in the regions from monitors of regional government into "purely political" actors who would be responsible for implementing presidential policy, along with his dismissal the following month of Yurii Boldyrev, Head of the Control Administration of the President, for bringing charges of corruption against a number of regional officials who were allied with presidential authority, would indicate that the political ground had already been prepared for this union of state and private structures. Kononenko's observations can be found in his "V sluchae provedeniia referenduma prezidenta podderzhit bol'shinstvo Rossiian", Izvestiia (18 Feb. 1993), p.1. On Boldyrev's sacking, see the interviews that he gave to Moscow News (No.9 [25 Feb.1993], p.4) and Rossiiskaia gazeta ([6 April 1993], p.4), as well as: Ol'ga Kondrat'eva, "Za vse neset otvetstvennost' El'tsin", ibid. (10 Mar. 1993), p.2; Indira Dunaeva, "Kabinet Boldyreva opechateli", Nezavisimaia gazeta (10 Mar. 1993), p.1.


19. Vladimir Gel'man and Ol'ga Senatova, "Vybor v federal'noe sobranie v regionakh Rossii: khod, vozmozhnye rezultaty i posledstviia" (Moscow: Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, 1 Nov. 1993), pp.5-6.

20. One local backlash (in Kuban) which divided the region's "democratic" forces is reported by Vitalii Portnikov, "Kubanskie demokratty ob'ediniautsia", Nezavisimaia gazeta (9 Nov. 1993), p.3. Other instances are mentioned in The December 1993 Elections in the Russian Federation, p.12.

22. Interview with Aleksei Melnikov, elected to the Duma on the Apple list (13 Dec. 1993). His comments were typical of those that I heard from a number of observers of, and participants in, the election campaign.

23. Petr Sidorov points out that even the newspaper published by the State Committee was converted into a political organ for PRES. See his "Tendentsii rossiiskoi politiki v avguste 1993 goda", *Politicheskii monitoring*, No. 8 (Aug.,1993), pp. 17-18.


25. Both Zatulin and Shokhin made this case at the press conference that they convened on November 22 (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this information). Their positions on these matters have been noted in *The December 1993 Elections in the Russian Federation*, p.19.


29. Iavlinskii has summarized this analytic and practical work in his *Uroki ekonomicheskoi reformy* (Moscow: EPItsentr, 1993).


31. Dunaeva et al., "Formiruiutsia predvybornye bloki".

32. E.g., Apple's pamphlet "Blok: Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin" (Moscow, November 1993).

33. Iavlinskii made this remark at a voters' meeting attended by some 2500 people at the Cinematographers' Union in Moscow, 9 December 1993.

34. For instance, Aleksandr Protsenko, "Iurii Boldyrev: Otvetstvennost' za khapug-chinovnikov lezhit na prezidente", *Megapolis-ekspress* (30 Nov. 1993). (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference). According to Aleksei Melnikov, a candidate on Apple's national list, Boldyrev used all of his appearances on television - which were numerous in St. Petersburg where he was campaigning for a seat on the Council of the Federation - to blast the government for corruption, but he was alone among Apple candidates in so doing (interview 13 Dec. 1993).

35. See the item in *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (3 Nov, 1993), p.2.
36. Quoted by Maksim Sokolov in Kommersant-deili (15 Nov. 1993). (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference.)

37. This information on Iavlinskii’s "intuition" and his consequent strategy was supplied by numerous staff members and candidates in the Apple campaign.


40. This information has come from Viacheslav Igrunov, an Apple candidate who campaigned in Saratov where he discovered this disturbing fact.


42. For instance, whereas both Popov and Sobchak favored awarding considerably more power to executive institutions at the expense of legislative ones and advocated the unitary principle over the federal one, the campaign platform of the RMDR reversed these preferences.

43. Among its leading candidates were: businesspeople (including the eye surgeon-entrepreneur, Sviatoslav Federov) and the leader of the Independent Union of Miners, S.G.Shaposhnikov; figures from the world of arts-and-letters (Oleg Vasilashvili and Oleg Gazmanov, among many others) and Marshall Evgenii Shaposhnikov, former chief-of-staff of CIS forces; glasnost architect and Gorbachev advisor, Aleksandr Iakovlev, and radical critic of glasnost' and Gorbachev, Iurii Kariakin.


46. See the item in Izvestiia (11 June 1993), p.2.

47. Vladimir Zharikhin and Irina Vinogradova from the PPFR’s central leadership were among the organizers of Future of Russia - New Names, as were Oleg Sokolov and Viacheslav Lashchevskii, former Komsomol secretaries who had become leaders of reconstituted youth organizations associated with the PPFR.


49. Much of Civic Union’s national list resembled a roll-call of perestroika luminaries from the industrial and political sectors. Among the former were found: Arkadii Vol’skii and Aleksandr Vladislavlev, Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the RUIE, respectively; Nikolai Bekh and Petr Semenenko, directors of KAMAZ and the Kirov Works; and Igor Iurgens, Chairperson of the United Confederation of Trade Union. Among the latter were publicists such as Fedor Burlatskii and Aleksandr Tsipko as well as activists such as SDPR leader and former Secretary of the Supreme Soviet’s Constitutional Commission, Oleg Rumaintsev, and Vasilii Lipitskii, Chairperson of the temporarily banned PPFR.
50. Indeed, Civic Union's local base appears to have become torpid even prior to the banning of its erstwhile member, PPFR, as industrial directors from the Soviet era attempted with small success over the summer of 1993 to organize party structures in the regions. See Gel'man and Senatova, "Politicheskie partiit v regionakh Rossii", p.31.

51. On the social composition and attendant political orientation of the DPR, see Mitrokhin and Urban, "Social Groups, Party Elites and Russia's New Democrats".

52. Ol'ga Kondrat'eva, "Nikolai Travkin bol'she ne deputat...no ot politiki ne otkazyvaetsia”, Rossiiskaia gazeta (29 Apr. 1993), p.2.

53. For instance, the article compiled from Govorukhin's research by Dmitrii Muratov, "'Ia Rodon-22...'", Novaia ezhednevnaia gazeta (3 Nov. 1993), pp.1-2.

54. These remarks are quoted by Maksim Sokolov, "Chto bylo na nedele", Komsersant-deili (27 Nov. 1993).

55. Travkin made this remark on television on 30 Nov. 1993. (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this information and for the reference cited in the note, above.)

56. This associated between leaders and the images projected by each organization was perhaps stronger in the case of the Agrarian Party. Its list was headed by Mikhail Lapsin who led the Agrarian Union faction in the former Supreme Soviet, followed by Aleksander Davydov (Chair of the Agro-Industrial Workers Union, the successor to the Agricultural Workers Union from the Communist era) and Aleksandr Zaveriuka (Minister of Agriculture). The remainder of the list’s upper-half was filled out by a combination of top functionaries from the agrarian sector such as Vladimir Shcherbak (Deputy Minister of Agriculture) and Magmedtagir Abdulbasirov (the Chairperson of the Food Industry) plus a gaggle of former Communist stalwarts who joined up after the October events - Vladimir Isakov (former Vice-Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet), Ivan Rybkin (previously a leader of the parliamentary faction, Communists of Russia), Igor Klochkov (former leader of that organization which succeeded the old Soviet trade union apparatus, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions) and Vasilii Starodubtsev of the Agrarian Union of Russia and past member of the State Committee for the Emergency Situation which had seized power briefly in the USSR in August 1991.


58. For instance, a poll taken in early November by the Fund of Public opinion found 7 per cent support for the CPRF but only 4 per cent for Ziuganov. (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this information.)


60. In addition to Ziuganov, the top of the party’s list was composed of rather stale personages: Viktor Iliukhin and Gennadii Seleznev - journalist with and former Editor-in-Chief, respectively, of Pravda; Valentin Chikin, Editor-in-Chief of Sovetskaia Rossiia; and Anatolii Lukianov, former Politburo member, former Chairperson of the USSR's Supreme Soviet and indicted co-conspirator in
the coup of August 1991. Perhaps the list’s most popular member was Vitalii Sevostianov, a one-time cosmonaut.

61. A good overview of the weak profile established by Ziuganov and the CPRF for the campaign can be found in Vladimir Gel’man, Vladimir Platonenko and Dmitrii Lozoban, "Levo-pravaia oppozitstia v izbiratel’noi kampanii - tendentsii i perspektivy" (Moscow: Institute for Humanities and Political Studies, November, 1993). See also the interview given by Ziuganov to Valerii Vyzhutovich, Izvestiia (19 Nov. 1993), p.4.

62. This identity between party and leader appears fully congruent with the views of the leader himself. Zhirinovskii regularly substitutes the pronoun "I" when speaking of his party, what it represents, what problems it faces, and so forth. For instance, see the interview with him that appears in McFaul and Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy, pp. 246-257.


63. At the time, Sergei Gryzunov et al. noted that Zhirinovskii’s LDP was the first party to call for the establishment of a presidential system. See their "Novye partiit", Soviuz, No. 24 (June, 1990), pp. 10-11.


68. It would appear that Zhirinovskii’s entrepreneurial efforts were in full display during the presidential elections, relying on communist forces in Russia’s Congress of People’s Deputies in order to be placed on the ballot, and on communist organizational resources to conduct his campaign.

69. In Nezavisimaia gazeta’s survey published after the elections on December 31, however, Zhirinovskii placed second behind Yeltsin.

70. The party’s bi-weekly organ, Juridicheskaia gazeta published two distinct electoral platforms in its fall numbers, No. 38-39 and 40-41, 1993.

71. I.S. Kulikov, Fenomen Zhirinovskogo (Moscow: Kontroling, 1992), p.32.

72. Public opinion studies conducted in spring and late summer of 1993 indicate that about 50 per cent of the electorate would favor the introduction of dictatorship for the purpose of setting Russia’s chaotic house in order. See I.M. Kliamkin, "Politicheskaia sotsiologiia perekhodnogo obshechestva", Polis, No.5 (1993), pp. 49-54; idem, "Rossiiskoe obshehestvo v preddverii 21 sentiabria", ibid., pp. 55-78. (I am indebted to Tsuyoshi Hasegawa for these references.)

74. Zhirinovskii’s television spots run during the final week of the campaign featured this tactic. Standing in front of a kiosk, he would ask the audience questions which suggested their own answers: “Why does this cost so much?” “Why are these products all foreign made?” “Why is it that we Russians cannot afford these things?” In terms of effectiveness, his style would place him light-years ahead of politicians such as Gaidar or Iavlinskii who seem to think that they have the answers and that it is somehow their responsibility to convey them to the voters, as a professor might convey information to his pupils. On Zhirinovskii’s television campaign, see Maksim Sokolov, "TV-vybor", Kommersant-deilii (7 Dec. 1993).

75. Unlike other politicians in Russia, Zhirinovskii has long practiced his skills in reading the popular mind and locating those themes that resonate with it. Most weekends during the summer of 1993, for example, he could be found speaking with crowds of Muscovites in Sokolniki Park. For an example of the images of strength in his arsenal, see the text of Pravda Zhirinovskogo, No. 18 (1993), which is one long string of signifiers associating the concepts "power", "Russia", "the state", "the military", and, at the negative end, "foreign". A lucid account of his style - mimicking the modes of expression available to the average citizen in public matters, violating thereby the conventions of polite political discourse but sounding like straight-talk to millions of Russians - can be found in S.N. Plekhanov, "'Ia - odin iz Vas'", in Fenomen Zhirinovskogo, pp. 82-95.

76. A survey of the delegates to the LDPR’s April 1993 Congress reported that half were employed in technical-engineering professions and the sciences, while over two-thirds had higher or some higher education. See Mikhail Savin and Aleksandr Smagin, "LDPR: slagaemye pobedy", Nezavisimaia gazeta (18 Dec. 1993), pp.1-2. For profiles of some of these individuals, see Aleksandra Lugovskaia, "Znakom’tes: tenevaia komanda 'liberal-demokratov'", Izvestiia (18 Dec. 1993), p.4.

77. My source for this information is an official with the US State Department.


80. A particularly telling moment in this respect was visible on Russian television during the evening of December 10. While Gaidar was shown for an hour with his family at home, casually dressed, comfortably ensconced on a sofa, and Iavlinskii appeared on a television interview show - less casually dressed but apparently quite comfortable - trading quips with an interlocutor and callers-in, Zhirinovskii occupied about 30 seconds on the nightly news. He was shown standing on a sound-truck parked in front of the Bolshoi Theatre, overcoated with fur hat, face chiselled into a driving sleet, haranguing a sizeable crowd whose gleaming faces stood out against the inclement weather.

81. Information on these two electoral organizations can be found in The December 1993 Elections in the Russian Federation, pp. 33-34.

82. This “weak” presidency variant can be found in the draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation completed by the Supreme Soviet’s Constitutional Commission on March 2, 1993 and promulgated 10 days later. The “no” presidency variant was contained in the proposed amendments
scheduled for adoption at the Tenth Congress of People's Deputies which was to have taken place in November 1993.

83. To be sure, presidential powers as outlined in the Constitutional draft promulgated by the President in the wake of his victory in the April 1993 referendum were toned down by the Constitutional Assembly that he summoned in June and July. But after the dissolution of parliament, the draft that issued from this conclave on July 12 was rewritten by the Administration of the President as an even stronger version of presidential government than that contained in their scheme that had appeared at the end of April.

84. To be sure, its passage was eased by the lax restrictions implemented by the President's team - namely, only 50 per cent of the electorate was required for a valid vote and only a simple majority of those voting was required for passage.

85. For indications of ballot fraud, including reported voter turnout exceeding 99 per cent in some regions, inordinately high percentages of disqualified ballots and lax monitoring by international teams of observers, see: Mikhail Leont'ev, "Zvonol prozvenel", Segodnia (16 Dec. 1993), p.3; Anne Barnard, "Vote Counting Stirs Speculation", The Moscow Times (18 Dec. 1993), p.3.

86. This process - executive bodies closing down legislative ones at subnational level - began in Moscow the day after the storming of the Russian parliament with an order issued by the Mayor, Yurii Luzhkov (see the item in Nezavisimaia gazeta [6 Oct. 1993], p.1). Some four days later a series of presidential decrees was initiated extending this practice to the entire country. For details, see: Ivan Rodin and Radik Batyrshin, "Prezident khochet odnim makhom reshit"", ibid.(12 Oct.1993), pp.1-2; the item,ibid.(28 Oct.1993),p.1; and Sergei Chugaev,"Prezident El'tsin postavil tochku v istorii sovetskoi vlasti", Izvestiia(28 Oct.1993), p.1.

87. The Alice-in-Wonderland provisions of this Constitution concerning the president's authority to dissolve the lower house of the legislature (State Duma) would indicate the point. According to article 111, section 41, should the Duma thrice reject the President's nominee for Prime Minister, the President has the authority simply to appoint whomever he chooses and to dissolve the Duma. According to article 117, section 2, the President may dismiss the Prime Minister at any time independently of any consideration on the Duma's part. Section 3 of this same article enables the President to dissolve the Duma should it vote "no confidence" in the Government and maintain that verdict for three months. Obviously, this provision would tend to muzzle parliamentary criticism, inasmuch as a pro-government deputy could call for a vote of confidence at any time and critics would be forced either to recant or face the prospect of (at least temporary) unemployment.

88. Initially, Presidential Decree 1400 which created the new legislative institutions established a Duma with 400 members, 130 of whom would be chosen nationally on the basis of party vote, and a Council of the Federation (the upper chamber) composed of the chief legislative and executive official from each region or republic. (The text of this decree can be found in Izvestiia [24 Dec.1993]). Thereafter, the composition of each house was altered by subsequent decrees and by the Constitution's final draft that appeared on November 10. In the case of the Council of the Federation, popular election replaced the previous ex officio arrangement, apparently because a majority of the individuals holding the offices initially scripted to fill the chamber did not support Yeltsin in his showdown with the Congress of People's Deputies. At any event, after the first two years of this chamber's existence, one-half of its members will be appointed by the president. In the
case of the lower chamber, its memberships was expanded to 450, with one-half of the seats reserved for candidates on the national lists of the parties participating in the election. Since Russia's Choice was expected to capture some 40-50 per cent of the popular vote at the time that this emendation was made, it appears to have been undertaken principally to advantage "the governing party". For details, see Boris Pugachev, "Konstitutsiia - eto yal", Novaia ezhednevnaia gazeta (12 Nov. 1993), p.1; Stepan Kiselev, "Russia enters electoral campaign", Moscow News No.43 (22 Oct. 1993), p.2; "Verkhovnaia palata parlamenta budet izbirat'sia", Izvestiia (12 Oct. 1993), p.1; Ivan Rodin, "Ocherednoe izmenenie vybornykh pravil", Nezavisimaya gazeta (19 Oct. 1993), p.2.

89. Given the number of sitting ministers who appeared on the candidates list of Russia's Choice, it may be that this restriction was removed by the Administration of the President for reasons other than the compelling force of certain constitutional arguments. See Ivan Rodin, "Prezident meniaet eshche odno svoe reshenie", Nezavisimaya gazeta (10 Nov. 1993), p.1.

90. The powers of the president authored by Yeltsin's team was apparently quite attractive to future presidential hopeful, Zhirinovskii, whose one draft constitution was effectively identical to that approved by the voters on December 12. See Oleg Maliarov, "Variant zhirinovskogo i prezidentskii proekt", Nezavisimaya gazeta (8 Dec. 1993), p.5.


95. The text of Shumeiko's telegram to ministries and departments of the government that launched this campaign was reprinted in Komsomolskaia pravda (4 Dec. 1993). (I am indebted to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference.)

96. Riabov's remarks were quoted in an item that appeared in Nezavisimaya gazeta (30 Nov.1993), p.1.

97. Districts and their corresponding totals of eligible voters can be found in Izvestiia (13, 14 Oct. 1993), p.4.

98. This information comes from Andrei Berezkin who headed the group of outside experts that designed the new districts (conversation, 6 Dec. 1993). A discussion of the redistricting process can be found in Andrei Berezkin and Peter Craumer, "Russian Electoral Districting Democratic?", The Moscow Tribune (17 Nov. 1993), p.8.

100. Interview given by Nikolai Travkin to Aleksei Novikov, Novaja ezhednevnaja gazeta (10 Dec. 1993), p.4.

101. These parties and blocs are listed in Ivan Rodin, "Poka do vyborov dopushchen 21 izbiratel’nyi blok", Nezavisimaja gazeta (9 Nov. 1993), pp.1-2.


103. Since these rulings were handed down by an organization (the CEC) which by no means behaved as a neutral arbiter in the election, and since there was no other appeal available, many people - including candidates from those organizations whose petitions were approved - were unconvinced that these determinations were "clean".

104. Savin and Smagin, "LDPR: Slagaemyi pobedy".


106. For a list of those organizations for whom the initial ban was not lifted and who were, therefore, prohibited from participation in the election, see Ivan Rodin, "Polozhenie o vyborakh snova izmeneno", Nezavisimaja gazeta (8 Oct. 1993), p.3.

107. Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia returned to print in the latter part of November. On the occasion of the decision to permit Pravda to reappear, Iu. Luchinskii, head of State Inspection for Defense of Freedom of the Press of the Russian Federation told an interviewer from the newspaper Voronezhskii kur'er (23 Nov. 1993), that he considered Pravda's reappearance "as a personal insult". (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference.)

108. This order was not published. Its existence comes from one source claiming direct knowledge of the matter (Aleksandr Frolov, a candidate on the CPRF's national list and in the Central Electoral District of Moscow - interview, 8 Dec. 1993) from many others claiming second-hand information on it and from the fact that (to my knowledge) while district electoral commission printed ballots for local races that included Soviet-style information on the candidate (age, occupation) none supplied the most important item - their party identification.

109. Aleksandra Lugovskaia, "Novyi reglament iskliuchaetsia pojavlenie v parlamente novogo Khasbulatove", Izvestiia (24 Dec. 1993), p.1-2. In addition to setting legislative precedent, this regulation would not be neutral in impact. At the time of its drafting there was considerably more concern about the many politically prominent figures in Russia's Choice preserving party discipline than there was suspicion that those LDPR deputies catapulted from complete political obscurity into the Duma solely by virtue of their appearance on the party’s list would break ranks.

111. It seemed that only about two-fifths of the candidates running in territorial districts for both houses were affiliated with the parties and blocs competing in the election. Although party identification did not appear on the ballot in these cases, it was possible for the interested voter to determine party affiliations by consulting, among other things, the biographies of the candidates that were posted on the walls of the polling places. On the proportion of party-affiliated to independent candidates, see Ivan Rodin, "Byudet li v gosudarstve 'nezavisimye deputaty'?", Nezavisimaja gazeta (11 Dec. 1993), p.1.


114. At a seminar at Stanford University (11 November 1993) public opinion specialist, Yurii Levada, outlined the rise and fall of Yeltsin's ratings over the previous year as dependent on the image of strong leadership prepared to take decisive measures. In this respect, it is of particular interest to note that prior to his dissolution of parliament on September 21, Yeltsin's approval had been plummeting to about 25 per cent of the population, whereas almost three-quarters of those expressing an opinion on his actions in the wake of the storming of the parliament voiced their approval.

115. Kliamkin, "Politicheskaia sotsiologiia perekhodnogo obschestva"; idem, "Rossiiskoe obschestvo v preddverii 21 sentiabria".


119. As mentioned, above, Bragin stepped down as a candidate, but only on 18 November, the day prior to the final registration of candidates lists. However, others at Ostankino including his deputy, Kirill Ignat'ev, remained on the list of Russia's Choice.

120. See the items in Nezavisimaja gazeta (29 Oct. 1993), p.2 and (19 Nov. 1993), p.1, that mention the prohibition against campaigning prior to the established date as well as some of the violations perpetrated by Russia's Choice. The transparent nature of some of these was often ludicrous. For instance, sports coverage of a tennis match might feature an interview with Gennadii Burbulis delivering "expert" commentary on the competition inasmuch as (1) he happens to play tennis and (2) he is leader of Russia's Choice.

121. Perhaps the single, most egregious instance of this type involved an hour-long documentary on Vladimir Zhirinovskii that was aired on central television on the evening before election day.
documentary - however accurate - was nothing short of the character assassination. The timing of 
this broadcast certainly insured Zhirinovskii no time to make a reply and probably came too late to 
achieve the intended impact. It did illustrate, however, the attitude of the authorities toward the use 
of television.

122. This point is made by an item in Nezavisimaia gazeta (19 Nov.1993), p.2.

123. On this strategy of Russia’s Choice to portray the election as a campaign fought by the forces of 
light (its own) against those of darkness (the communists) see Viacheslav Novikov, "Seans 

124. Russia’s Choice apparently favored control over its own free airtime because it would then, as 
"the governing party", have to face neither the criticism of the other participants nor those of 
journalists. The other 12 groups seemed to favor it because of the partisan reputation that Ostakino 
had already earned and their consequent suspicions about how the authorities might use their own 
airtime against them.

125. According to one study, television viewing in Russia declined by some 20 per cent during the 
election campaign. Evgenii Kuzin, "V resultate televisor stali smotret’ na 20 protsentov men’she", 


127. The Russia-American Press Center issued a study toward the close of the campaign that outlined 
both the extent of ostensible TV reporting that functioned as political advertisement for Russia’s 
Choice as well as the hugely disproportionate amount of time its leaders spent before the camera. For 

128. During the campaign the television spot produced by USAID for the purpose of publicizing the 
country’s privatization program was rebroadcast in doctored fashion. In place of the original - "Your 
voucher, your choice" - functionaries at Ostankino inserted - "Your choice, Russia’s Choice". The 
law prohibits any party accepting assistance from foreign governments, and the use of the USAID 
video would appear to have constituted a clear violation. But the CEC though otherwise.

129. According to Izvestiia (10 Dec. 1993), p.4, Russia’s Choice purchased 180 minutes of time on 
Ostankino and 44 minutes on the network, Rossiia. The comparable figures for its two nearest 
competitors in this category, PRES and LDPR, were 77 and 77 minutes, and 90 and 59 minutes, 
respectively.


131. This poll was taken by the Fund for Public Opinion which released its results on 14 November 
1993. (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this information.)

132. On the concept "high-intensity market", see William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1976).
133. I thank my colleague, Ralph Clem, for his perceptive account of the Zhirinovskii rally.

134. See note 80.

135. Perhaps emblematic of the relations between Russia’s Choice and those parties and blocs not in the “democratic opposition” was a debate held at the Moscow Pedagogic Institute on December 8 between Nikolai Vorontsov, former Chairperson of the USSR’s State Committee for the Environment and standard bearer for Russia’s Choice in Moscow’s Central Electoral District, and Aleksandr Frolov, a journalist with Sovetskaia Rossiia and CPRF candidate in that same district. Vorontsov had called for and supported the dissolution of the previous parliament; Frolov had remained in the parliament building until the defenders eventually capitulated to overwhelming force on the afternoon of October 4. During the debate, both candidates’ demeanor appeared to resurrect discursively the political barricades that had physically separated them during these events. Each stood at opposite ends of a long table facing the audience. Each recounted his own biography and the main planks in his party’s program. One spoke of the horrors of Communist Party rule, the other of those associated with the “bourgeois democracy” that has followed it. Neither addressed a word to, nor directed a glance at, the other.

For its part, the audience seemed divided into two groups - one, anti-Russia’s Choice, the other, anti-CPRF. Each peppered its corresponding nemesis with hostile questions, evincing little interest in the replies made to them and often displaying open contempt toward the replies themselves. It became clear over the course of these isolated “debates” conducted between each candidate and that section of the audience hostile to him that two entirely separate political universes had overlapped. On every imaginable issue - whether the goals that government should pursue, the nature of those policies that the government had been pursuing, the actual impacts of these policies or information of any kind related to them (socio-economic data, legal texts, the dates and places of certain events or even whether the events, indeed, had occurred) - disagreement was total and uncompromising.

136. Vecherniaia Moskva reported on November 19 that Vladimir Lukin of Apple pledged his bloc’s cooperation with Russia’s Choice in this respect in order to prevent communists from capturing seats in the district. On the same day, however, Aleksandr Shokhin of PRES made a public statement in which he eschewed such cooperation for the same reason - namely, that in his view it was Russia’s Choice and its economic program that had been paving the way for communists to return to power. (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference.)

137. “Vyborgi Rossiia”, Vechernii klub (16 Nov. 1993). Shakhrai claimed on the television program, Itogy (20 Nov. 1993) that his party would back some of the candidates of Russia’s Choice in the districts on condition that Russia’s Choice withdraw its national list. (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this information.)

138. “Ziuganov i Gaidar - bliznetsy-brat’ia?”, Kuranty (27 Nov. 1993). (I am grateful to Sergei Mitrokhin for this reference.)

139. Sokolov, “Chto bylo na nedele”.

141. Dmitrii Volkov and Natal’ia Gorodetskaia reported a statement made on December 9 in which Gaidar claimed that Russia’s Choice was seeking cooperation with other "democrats" and was already supporting their candidates in 12 district races ("'Vybor Rossii' za koordinatsiiu usilii liberalov", Segodnia [10 Dec. 1993], p.2), while on December 10, Arkadii Murashev, the campaign director of Russia’s Choice, was quoted as saying that his party had no intention of dropping any of its district candidates in order to support other "democratic" contenders. His statement can be found in Vera Kuznetsova’s "Partiia Shakrai schitaet chto ona ne proigrala", Nezavisimaja gazeta (16 Dec. 1993), p.2.


143. Volkov and Gorodetskaia, "'Vybor Rossii' za koordinatsiiu usilii liberalov".

144. The most outstanding incident of this type occurred in the St. Petersburg race for a seat on the Council of the Federation. There, right-wing television-show personality, Aleksandr Nevzorov, emerged victorious with only 26 per cent of the vote while three of his democratic opponents, all refusing to withdraw in support of the others, split 38 per cent of the ballots. Aleksandr Pozdniakov, "Nevzorov izbran v Gosdumu", Segodnia (16 Dec. 1993), p.3.

145. On the basis of survey data from the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, Leont’ev makes this argument in "Zvonok prozvenel".

146. Nikolai Medvedev, Head of the Department for Work with Territories in the Administration of the President, provided formal acknowledgement to this rather obvious point in the interview that he gave to Vil’ Dorofeev, Nezavisimaja gazeta (29 Dec. 1993), p.5. Although somewhat less proximate to the inner circle of the government, Mikhail Piskotin’s statement on the dissolution of the previous parliament and election of another would reinforce it as well. See "Bez avtoritetnykh predstavilel’nykh organov net demokratii", Rossiiskaia Federatsiia, No.2 (1993), pp.2-3.


149. For election night, Ostankino television had prepared a special program, allegedly modelled after Western-style coverage of election returns, but actually consisting of a distinct specimen of the genus,"democracy by design". This show, "The Political New Year", gathered scores of political luminaries from all bands on the spectrum to sit in a pseudo-night club venue in the Palace of Congresses (as if at a New Year’s celebration), to receive the voting results as they were tabulated, to discuss them and, perhaps, to dance to the orchestra or do whatever else people might on such an occasion. A bubbly hostess, Tamara Maksimova from the program "Public Opinion", spent the first hour or so of the proceedings grinning and gliding her way around what resembled an especially well-appointed hospital ward in which most of the patients appeared to have been heavily sedated. As she began to read the early returns on the "big board", which ran strongly in Zhirinovskii’s favor and against Russia’s Choice, a sense of shock was evident among many in the room. Suddenly, the board went blank and Maksimova announced that the show would go on without the voting results, lost due to "technical reasons". This planned celebration of a Russia’s Choice victory became a scandal for its
organizers, just as the election that it was to celebrate ended as a disaster for its designers. On this TV show, see: Dmitrii Muratov, "Samolet po-prezhdemu udialaetsia v storonu moria", Novaja ezhednevnaia gazeta (15 Dec. 1993), p.2; Mikhail Karpov, "Kak vstrelish’ novyi god", Nezavisimai a gazeta (14 Dec. 1993), p.1; and the interview given by Tamara Maksimova and Vladimir Maksimov to Elena Vladimirova, ibid. (18 Dec. 1993), p.5.

150. Bragin was removed shortly after a resolution calling for his dismissal was passed by the Council of Directors at Ostankino and sent to Yeltsin. Dmitrii Zul’, "Vosstanie direktorov 'Ostankino'", Segodnia (16 Dec. 1993), p.2.

151. See the item in Nezavisimai a gazeta (24 Dec. 1993), p.2; and the interview given by Yurii Baturin to Tamara Zamiatina, Izvestiia (29 Dec. 1993), p.4.


153. These figures for the total number of successful Russia’s Choice candidates in the elections to the Council of the Federation and the sub-set of regional officials within that number were derived by comparing data provided by the Central Electoral Commission (for which I am grateful to Andrei Berezkin) against the list of Russia’s Choice candidates compiled by A. Murashev and A. Sobianin and published in Argumenty i Fakty, No.49 (Dec., 1993), p.9.

154. One poll taken among businessmen showed a higher level of support for Zhirinovskii (37 per cent) than for Civic Union’s leader, Arkadii Vol’skii (26 per cent). Delovoi mir (2 Dec. 1993).


