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Comparing the Roles of NATO, NACC, CFE and the CSCE as Security Institutions

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Executive Summary

The central security issue for states after the Cold War is to identify the threats to security and to assess strategies and instruments for dealing with them. In Europe, international security threats are generally taking the form of instability and spillover or horizontal escalation, but deliberately aggressive intentions cannot be ruled out, if only as a coercive political instrument still relevant to the relations among the former republics of the Soviet Union and certain countries in eastern Europe. While the clarity and certainty of Cold War security relations based on mutual threat have disappeared, the type of security problem that such threats create have not gone with them.

Consequently, states must adopt a variety of strategies for dealing with different aspects of their security problems, even in a region as relatively homogeneous and developed as Europe. Strategies for dealing with aggression may be different from those for dealing with insecurity spirals, which may be different from those for dealing with political and/or economic sources of instability. This is not a mere academic exercise, but is reflected in the current debates about whether institutions should play an important role in security strategies, upon which institutions states should rely, and whether institutions should be adapted to meet new security requirements.

Using simple game theoretic ideas in a rational choice approach, I demonstrate that institutions matter in security strategies because different institutional arrangements have different effects on strategies and outcomes. Different institutions, including NATO, NACC, CFE, and CSCE, address different types of problems and perform different types of functions. Changing the institutional arrangements changes the functions that can be performed and the security issues that can be addressed.

The first section of this paper argues that there are three broad security problems that, while empirically interrelated, are in fact analytically distinct and require different institutional arrangements. These problems are collective defense, collective security, and conflict
prevention. I show how collective defense institutions benefit from identifying clear external threats, which allows them to efficiently prepare for concrete military contingencies and thus mount credible deterrent threats. In addition, collective defense arrangements such as NATO, being limited in membership and scope of tasks, are more likely to hold together as multilateral security instruments because the common interests of their members are substantial and clear. Collective security institutions such as the UN (and in some respects, the CSCE) can address a broader scope of security threats, but suffer in terms of effectiveness by expanding their membership and having to address all possible sources of aggression, including those from member states. Conflict prevention, I argue, requires an entirely different set of institutional mechanisms because it addresses a fundamentally different strategic situation than do collective defense and collective security. The problem in conflict prevention is not to prevent aggression through deterrent threats, but to create transparency and assurance mechanisms to prevent security spirals. These tasks, I argue, are best addressed by institutions like NACC and the CFE treaty.

The second section further demonstrates how the three security institutions in the paper's title are able to deal with certain of these security problems, but that they may be incapable of dealing with others in their present form. I also argue that attempts to rely upon the wrong institution in security strategies can be not only inefficient, but counterproductive, as has been the case in Bosnia. In support of these claims, I present some evidence from interviews with German and Russian security officials and politicians that the different security problems are seen by decision makers, and that the institutions are having the varying effects on strategies and outcomes that I argue they should.
COMPARING THE ROLES OF NATO, NACC, CFE AND CSCE AS SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Celeste A. Wallander

The central security issue for states after the Cold War is to identify the threats to security and to assess strategies and instruments for dealing with them. In Europe, international security threats\(^1\) are generally taking the form of instability and spillover or horizontal escalation, rather than the deliberate intentions or designs of one state to launch a military attack on another. However, as events since 1991 have made clear, such deliberate intentions cannot be ruled out, if only as a coercive political instrument still relevant to the relations among the former republics of the Soviet Union and certain countries in eastern Europe. Therefore, while the clarity and certainty of Cold War security relations based on mutual threat have disappeared, the type of security problem that such threats create have not gone with them.

Consequently, states must adopt a variety of strategies for dealing with different aspects of their security problems, even in as relatively homogeneous and developed a region as Europe. Strategies for dealing with aggression may be different from those for dealing with insecurity spirals, which may be different from those for dealing with political economic sources of instability. This is not a mere academic exercise, but is reflected in the current debates about whether institutions should play an important role in security strategies, upon which institutions states should rely, and whether institutions should be adapted to meet new security requirements. I will argue that institutions matter in security strategies because different institutional arrangements have different effects on strategies and outcomes. That is, different institutions, such as NATO, NACC, CFE, and CSCE,\(^2\) address different types of problems and perform different types of functions. Changing the institutional arrangements changes the functions that can be performed and the security issues that can be addressed.

The first section of this paper argues that there are three broad security problems that, while empirically interrelated, are in fact analytically distinct and require different institutional arrangements.

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\(^1\) I will not deal with internal security threats in this paper, as I believe that they are conceptually a separate issue and require a different framework for analysis.

\(^2\) Acronyms are endemic in security studies, although these are probably familiar: NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NACC is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, CFE is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and CSCE is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
arrangements. These problems are collective defense, collective security, and conflict prevention. The first two are traditional security issues, while the third has become salient only in most recent times. The second section will argue that the three security institutions in the paper's title are able to deal with certain of these security problems, but that they may be incapable of dealing with others in their present form. Indeed, I will argue that attempts to rely upon the wrong institution in security strategies can be not only inefficient, but counterproductive. In support of these claims, I will present some evidence from interviews with German and Russian security officials and politicians that the different security problems are seen by decision makers, and that the institutions are having the varying effects on strategies and outcomes that I argue they should.

**Security issues**

In 1959, Arnold Wolfers argued that states which rule out isolation as a security policy option and which go the "collaborationist" route have two distinct options -- collective defense and collective security. In both cases, he notes, states commit themselves to assist others against attack, and therefore in both cases the victim of an attack expects its own defensive strength to be supplemented by that of other nations. This is reflected in the NATO charter, which provides that:

> the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.

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3 A fourth important security problem is domestic political and economic reform insofar as these contribute stability and support regimes with moderate foreign policy objectives. Although perhaps more important for long term security in Europe, and although these problems are addressed by some of the institutions I will discuss in this paper, I will not directly address them here because they are qualitatively different problems.

These are clearly the terms of a collective defense alliance. The two historical examples of collective security arrangements are the League of Nations and the United Nations, as their charters provided for the identification of an aggressor state and called upon all members to take military action against such identified aggressors. The CSCE as created by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 committed members to neither collective defense nor collective security, but instead aimed at a "comprehensive security" including military confidence building measures, political peaceful resolution of disputes, and human rights oversight. However, during 1992 the CSCE began to change and take on functions that moved it in the direction of a collective security institution as well as a conflict prevention institution, as I will argue below.

The commitment to aggregating defense forces against an aggressor is the only common element in collective defense and collective security arrangements, and not a very significant one for understanding the security problems they can address. In collective defense arrangements, the members of an alliance identify the state or states against which they need to mount a defense. This has three effects: it makes for more efficient military planning, it stabilizes the substantial common interests the members have in resisting any such aggression, and it makes apparent the substantial benefits the members see in maintaining their commitments.

First, defense planning is more efficient when the potential aggressor is identified in advance because efforts and resources can be directed toward identifiable contingencies, balances of capabilities and doctrines can be assessed ahead of time, etc. For example, to deal with the identified contingency of Soviet conventional attack, NATO forces were concentrated in Germany, not distributed equally among the NATO allies.

Second, common interests are substantial in a collective defense arrangement because states would not have committed themselves to such a constraint on their independence of action if they did not see such a larger relationship between their long term interests and the security of other members. We expect to see substantial collective defense arrangements only where interests in defense against a major threat are substantial and clear. It may also be the

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6 There is then the anomaly of the Warsaw Pact to be explained. On the one hand, one could argue that unlike NATO, it was maintained not through voluntary association, but through force. Another explanation would be that there were substantial common interests in the alliance, but they were the common interests of political and military elites (often installed and maintained in power by Soviet force), and were therefore entirely contingent on the domestic political make-up of the eastern European regimes. The speed with which the Warsaw Pact collapsed with reform in eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 supports the latter explanation.
case that the creation of collective defense institutions themselves enhance the common security interests of members by publicly committing them to one another’s defense and by physically integrating their military forces. In either case, a collective defense arrangement makes it more likely that in case of an actual attack, all the members of the alliance will see their security -- narrowly and selfishly defined -- at stake, and that by acting in accord with their interests, they would live up to alliance commitments.

Finally, the benefits of living up to a common defense commitment are more likely to be substantial in a defense alliance because they have identified the aggressor as a known and important threat to themselves. In doing so, they have announced publicly that they see immediate and selfish benefits in denying the aggressor its attempts to increase its power through military action. Such commitments are by no means always kept, as for example France did not stand by its defense obligations to Czechoslovakia in 1938 against Germany. But the argument is that relative to other collaborationist security arrangements, collective defense is more likely to be supported by its members because of the benefits, not that the probability of support is 100%.

Strong common interests and clear benefits are due to another feature of collective defense arrangements, which is that there tend to be fewer members in such alliances than in collective security arrangements. Security does not perfectly meet the conditions of a classic public good (that is, some states can be excluded from the provision of defense and under some circumstances the consumption of security by one state can reduce the security for others), but it can approximate the qualities of collectiveness or publicness. In that respect, there is an incentive for each member of an alliance that provides a collective security good to free ride. The ability to get away with free riding will be less, however, the smaller the membership of the relevant grouping, because it is more difficult to hide one’s misbehavior, it is more likely that each member will see its defection as eroding the public good, and the

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The fact that Gorbachev’s unwillingness to use force to maintain Soviet domination in eastern Europe was a necessary condition for its collapse supports the former explanation.

7 This is what Schelling meant by the “California principle”: to commit credibly to the defense of Berlin, the United States stationed American forces there and made Berlin “like California” in terms of American stakes. Thomas C. Schelling (1966) Arms and Influence, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press), pp. 56-60.

8 For example, there is a literature on alliances as public goods. The original study is Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances.” The Review of Economics and Statistics (August 1966), pp. 266-279.
collectivity can make sidepayments to reduce the incentives to free ride. In a collective
defense alliance of a limited number of states, it is easier to assess which members are living
up to their commitments. Furthermore, it is more apparent that failure to contribute to joint
military forces will have a concrete effect on readiness. Side payments can also be negotiated,
as for example in allocating military procurement contracts to certain alliance members,
thereby "privatizing" part of the public good of alliance defense. Combined with the potential
for excluding or sanctioning free riders possible when the good is not purely a public one, the
small numbers of a collective defense arrangement make it more reliable from the point of
view of each of the members.

These elements in turn have another effect unique to collective defense arrangements:
they increase the clarity of information being sent to potential aggressors about the costs of an
attack and the low probability that the allied forces will not hold together in the face of the
attack, a probability made lower (though certainly not made zero) by the substantial and
apparent common interests in the defense arrangements to which the allied forces have
committed, their recognized benefits from living up to alliance commitments, and the weak
incentives to free ride. In short, a collective defense arrangement is more likely to be able to
demonstrate a credible deterrent.

Collective security arrangements work by a different logic and have different features.
They do not provide defense against enemies. Instead, they are meant to protect against all
and any potential aggressors who might attack all and any states. Security is seen as
collective, so a threat to any member of the system is a threat to all others. This means your
ally can be your enemy if it is an aggressor, and your historical antagonist will be the object of
your defense if it is attacked, even by a close ally. It means you have a national security
interest in opposing any aggressor in support of any victim.10

This different definition of the security tasks has different implications for institutional
arrangements. Since all and any countries may be the aggressor, the members of a collective
security arrangement cannot plan for clear contingencies ahead of time. In principle, a
collective security arrangement has to be able to fight every state. In practice, the military
requirements of such a capacity would be unbearably costly, and it would seem to undermine
the principle of collective security to have the members armed to the teeth against one another.

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Therefore, in collective security arrangements, states do not generally arm or prepare for military contingencies in ways different from the general and individual requirements of national defense. There may be a high level of military-to-military exchanges, information sharing, periodic joint exercises by members, etc. But there will not be joint planning to deal with specific threats and capabilities, nor integrated or complementary command structures. States cannot integrate their military infrastructures with those of states they may be called upon some day to fight. This does not mean that states will be less capable of defending themselves, nor that any given state's military capabilities and planning could not deal with any given threat or aggression. Indeed, if there is no single definable threat, it is more efficient to have broadly based and broadly trained individual national defense establishments to be able to deal with the variety of contingencies that could arise. In the post-Cold War world it makes no sense to continue to plan for a massive Russian ground offensive in western Europe, and to maintain only that capacity would not meet any definition of defense efficiency.

However, these different requirements have implications for what the collective security arrangement can achieve with what probability. The gain in comprehensiveness entails a loss of effectiveness in meeting those aggressions that do arise. That is, the average probability for effective response may be good, but in any specific instance the probability of effective response may be low. At the very least, it slows the response time, as states must develop and coordinate their responses only after the identity of the aggressor has become apparent. Similarly, there is a trade-off in clarity. The value of not threatening any particular member of the collective security sphere in normal times is, as I have argued, intrinsic to such an arrangement. But the reduced clarity of the military capabilities available for defense weakens the deterrent value of the threat of a collective response. A potential aggressor is more likely to think that it can succeed in an attack, or that the costs will be low.

Indeed, Wolfers argues that the assumption of a collective security system, unlike that of a collective defense arrangement, must be that the system will fail at first with some regularity. Rather than a strong deterrence function, advocates of collective security see in it "a kind of learning process in which the punishment of one or more actual aggressors will deter subsequent would-be aggressors."\footnote{Wolfers, p. 184.} In the long run, collective security will be served, but in the short run, there are likely to be tests of the system that require effective response in order to build up its deterrent value.
The common interests in a collective security system are likely to be quite diffuse. This is not to argue that they cannot be an effective basis for security policy, but that they require different policies and procedures to reinforce them. As I’ve argued, if the Soviet Union had attacked Germany, Belgium’s common interests in opposing the action would have been substantial and concrete: the value of not having Soviet military forces right next door, the lives of Belgian soldiers lost in the attack, the issue of which market democracy would be next, and so on. While the interest of all countries in Europe to maintain a system where aggression is punished or prevented is clear (assuming no territorial or revanchist designs), this is a common interest based on the principle, not based on relations with other members, and we see this in action today. States in Europe are concerned about Serbian and Croatian aggressions against Bosnia and see them as a threat to this longer term general security interest. But in fact there are few states that share a common border with Bosnia, and Serbian leaders are unlikely to be planning future attacks on Paris or London. The nature of the common interests in a collective security system are qualitatively different from those in a collective defense alliance, and that requires different procedures to allow them to be acted upon. It is not the aggression in a collective security system which is qualitatively different from that against a collective defense arrangement. In any given case of aggression, many of the members of the collective security system are likely to feel themselves quite threatened by the prospect of armed forces on their borders. The qualitative difference is that in a collective security system, few of the members will have that direct common interest in the territorial integrity of the victim. It is the variability among interests that is the problem.

As this discussion implies, the benefits of living up to commitments in a collective security system are similarly more diffuse and less concrete, and they vary widely among the members of the system. The benefits to Greece and Hungary of a thwarted Serbian aggression against Bosnia would have been concrete and immediate, but other members did not share those interests. Nor did the nature of the collective security system under the UN allow states to develop a close identity of interests with Bosnia, which could have created more concrete benefits from defending it. The benefit, once again, would have been more diffuse and general.

These features are complicated by the problem of large numbers in collective security systems and its effect on the potential for free riding. Although such arrangements need not be universal (one could argue that the CSCE is developing as a regional collective security system), they do need to be large, both in principle and in order to have any chance of being effective. But large number groups are those most likely to be beset by problems of free
States have good reason to believe that their individual defections will be overlooked or not focused upon. They also have good reason to believe that their small incremental contribution to the collective good will not be crucial, and therefore will not be likely to be missed. Therefore, it is individually rational not to contribute in the expectation that as long as the other members do, you will still enjoy the collective good. But since this is true for all members, logically all will try to free ride and the public good will not be provided. In collective security, it is likely that no one will punish the aggressor.

Finally, it is interesting to note that unlike collective defense, collective security may actually meet the criteria of a public good. Since collective security is a principle and is not tied to territory or any particular state, if it is maintained, it is maintained for all. Similarly, if one member of the system benefits from maintenance of the principle, all others must be able to as well -- simply by definition. Therefore, a collective security system will have to be supported by procedures that address the tendencies that arise from a collective goods problem, whereas a collective defense arrangement will not necessarily be served by such procedures.

Having discussed collective security largely in terms of what it cannot do relative to collective defense, it is important to consider the advantages of collective security arrangements nonetheless. Unlike collective defense arrangements, collective security does not identify a state or states as the potential threat, and so it may be a more appropriate strategy when either a threatening state is not identified or when it is politically sensitive to base security policy on identifying certain states as potential aggressors. In related terms, when states believe that the main threat to their security arises not from the determination of certain states to attack but from security dilemmas or "spirals," the deterrence functions of collective defense arrangements will be counterproductive, while a robust collective security system would directly address the potential source of conflict by reassuring members of their mutual commitment to punish aggressors rather than to exploit others' restraint.

Collective defense systems have to decide where the "zone of peace" will end and not care about instability beyond it, because the arrangements cannot address problems of instability and unintended attack. If the primary threat to security comes from escalation and spreading local conflicts, collective defense systems cannot deal with such threats while they may be still small and tractable. Allies in a collective defense arrangement can only hope to

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12 I am indebted to Lisa Martin for this observation.

threaten states embroiled in such conflicts to keep away from their borders. It excludes such states in the hope of excluding their problems. Collective security arrangements may or may not be able to deal effectively with such sources of insecurity, but the potential is there because the system is meant to be inclusive. Collective security systems can also incorporate political consultations among potential enemies as a mechanism for seeking to deal with conflicts before they are militarized. Allies in a collective defense arrangement could consult with potential enemies, but the form of consultation would be between antagonists, or between member and outsider, not among members, as in collective security procedures.

One of the most important deficiencies of a collective defense system is not at all a problem for collective security systems, and that is the risk of entrapment, which is an especially relevant issue in considering NATO's future. Glenn Snyder points out that in alliance relations, there is a tension between the risks of abandonment and those of entrapment. Abandonment arises when states do not live up to their collective defense commitments in the case of an actual attack on one of the members. Entrapment occurs if one of the member states, confident in its security position because of its alliance commitments, by its reckless foreign policy involves its allies in a conflict. There is a tension because the actions allies take to reduce the chances of abandonment focus on strengthening the alliance commitment, which increases the members' confidence about their positions and may lead to reckless behavior. The actions allies take to reduce the risk of entrapment weaken alliance ties and increase the chances of abandonment. 14

Therefore, a strong and effective collective defense alliance in all likelihood has chosen to err on the side of preventing abandonment at the risk of entrapment. That was an acceptable choice given the membership and its substantially common identification of the source of the threat. Indeed, NATO was designed to be a regionally limited alliance and was strictly defensive (that is, the collective defense commitment was engaged only by aggression on the territory of one of the member states), so that the members, for example, were not entrapped in America's war in Vietnam. By increasing NATO's territorial scope ("out of area") or its membership, however, this workable balance between abandonment and entrapment may be disturbed.

In game theoretic terms, both collective defense and collective security arrangements present the members with strategic choices modeled as Prisoners' Dilemma. In both cases, all the members prefer mutual cooperation over mutual defection, but there is some temptation to

exploit your partners' cooperation by free riding (defecting). Since this is true for each member, we expect the result of a single play of the game to result in mutual defection, which is worse (from the players' point-of-view) than mutual cooperation. A long tradition of research in international relations has shown that this logic can be overcome under certain conditions: repeated plays of the games, the chance to sanction defections, small numbers, etc.\textsuperscript{15} I will note here only that these conditions are more likely to be met in a collective defense arrangement than in a collective security arrangement, for the same reasons I have discussed.\textsuperscript{16}

Conflict prevention is analytically different from both collective defense and collective security. As in collective security, conflict prevention is meant to be inclusive. Unlike collective defense and collective security, however, it is meant not to deter a state from attacking another, but to make clear to all states that there is no perceived interest on the part of any member to exploit an unclear or unstable security situation. Conflict prevention mechanisms focus on bringing the members together to reassure one another that their underlying preferences favor mutual cooperation. The task is not to provide for the conditions for retaliation, but to provide information that allows states to cooperate.


\textsuperscript{16} The game being played between the members of a collective defense alliance and its identified threatener may be different, and could be modeled by Chicken (see Figure 1). Unlike in Prisoners' Dilemma, the outcome of mutual defection (war) is the worst outcome for both players. This could lead to mutual cooperation (no attack and no subsequent retaliation) over repeated plays as in Prisoners' Dilemma as states try to avoid the worst outcome, but it is less likely and the dynamics are different. Assume in a Prisoners' Dilemma the players have created a repeated interaction of mutual cooperation, but now one player decides to exploit the other by defecting. She gets the better payoff on that turn, and the two players now appear to be at the outcome defect-cooperate (the lower left box in the game matrix in Figure 1). But on the next turn, we expect the other player to choose to defect as well -- this moves her from her worst outcome to a slightly better outcome at mutual defection. It is this ability to credibly threaten (the threat is credible because it is perfectly rational -- it leaves our second player better off than if she allowed herself to continue to be exploited) to retaliate that creates some incentive to continue to cooperate and resist the temptation to defect. Now let us consider how things work in Chicken. If there could be a stable repeated play of mutual cooperation, and on the next turn our first player defects in order to get her best payoff, there is nothing the second player can do. The game is now at the defect-cooperate outcome (the lower left box), which is the second player's second worse outcome. To threaten to retaliate, she would have to threaten to move to her worst outcome, which is by definition not a credible threat. Mutual nuclear deterrence is probably best modeled by Chicken, while conventional deterrence could be Prisoners' Dilemma or Chicken. The problem of nuclear deterrence comes down to one of two strategies for a deterring state: either make your retaliation somehow automatic so the issue of credibility is not a problem, or try to convince the other player that your preferences are actually modeled better by Prisoners' Dilemma.
Turning to game theory again, the security problem of conflict resolution is modeled best by Assurance.\(^\text{17}\) In this game, both mutual cooperation and mutual defection are stable outcomes -- once there, neither player will change her choice, because that would yield a worse outcome. This is different from Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which there is a temptation to cheat from mutual cooperation. The problem is whether the players will end up at mutual cooperation, or at mutual defection. Conflict prevention problems fit this game because the underlying assumption is that states prefer to cooperate and that it is difficult to do so because historical, political, or military conditions make states suspect one another of seeking to exploit them, or because some political or military shock to the system has appeared to shake them from an ongoing mutual cooperation. That is, states believe there is some chance that others have Prisoners’ Dilemma preferences and will seek to exploit them.

If states are to avoid mutual defection (armed conflict) in collaboration games such as Prisoners’ Dilemma (and collective security and collective defense), they require mechanisms that prevent undetected cheating and allow states to retaliate in order to avoid being exploited. In assurance games such as conflict prevention, the solution is information and transparency. All the two states must do is reveal their true preferences and provide evidence that they are stable (that is, that domestic politics favor security cooperation). Rather than focusing on monitoring and retaliation, states seeking to deal with conflict prevention security problems need institutions that reliably expose their foreign and domestic policy processes.\(^\text{18}\)

It would be difficult to imagine a multilateral security institution that could address all of these tasks, because they are in many respects contradictory. *Collective defense* requires an identified threat, high levels of political and military integration, mechanisms to allow sidepayments or privatized benefits among members. These conditions are most likely to be met in an alliance of limited numbers. Furthermore, because of the latent free riding and entrapment problems, there is a trade-off between effectiveness and size. *Collective security* requires effective monitoring against cheating (both in terms of a military attack by a member and in terms of whether the other members live up to their commitments to defense) and provisions for sanctions or retaliation. The norm of collective security must be very strong and resilient, because the military and political response will be less immediate and less certain than in a collective defense alliance. In particular, the system is going to have to be able to


endure a considerable amount of defection (in terms of both military attacks and free riding when a response is called for) because collective security is subject to the serious dilemmas of collective action. Finally, a conflict prevention system is predicated on the assumption that states do not seek to exploit one another, but need reliable information that they prefer mutual cooperation to all other outcomes. Therefore, in case of threatening crisis, states need mechanisms that allow them to consult openly and reliably on political and military matters in order to avoid mutually undesired outcomes, but they do not entail monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.

**Security tasks and institutional mechanisms**

If the reasoning I have advanced is correct, we should be able to see the effects of different collective defense, collective security, and conflict prevention requirements in the thinking of officials and politicians on NATO, NACC, and the CSCE (and any other relevant security institutions). I draw the evidence cited below from my interviews with Russian and German officials during 1992 and 1993. I will show that officials who thought of NATO as a collective defense institution oppose extending its membership; that officials who sought to make NATO a collective security or a conflict prevention institution sought to broaden its membership; that NACC was valued and developed in terms of its conflict prevention characteristics; and that officials were ambivalent about the CSCE's role in conflict prevention as opposed to collective security, and that this was one of the major reasons why it has failed in dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

Russian officials of all political leanings view NATO as a collective defense arrangement, and as a threat (to varying degrees) to Russian security. A reformist civilian official in the Russian Foreign Ministry told me that he believed NATO could adapt and become part of the "European security process" but that the "military staffs and forces of NATO are a problem" because they limit our development of political approaches to security by focusing on military issues. He favored reliance on conflict prevention approaches to European security, but was telling me that such goals could not be reconciled with NATO's collective defense nature, especially as Russia is the object or target of NATO's collective defense intentions. This argument was repeated by other high-level officials of the Russian

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19 Head of Bureau, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 16 April 1992.

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Foreign Ministry and by prominent Russian defense scholars. This is not to say that Russian officials see NATO as aggressive or actively planning for conflict with Russia. Indeed, nearly all the officials I interviewed pointed to NATO’s changes in doctrine and capabilities as evidence of the reduced “threat.”

The key is the view that NATO must either become a "political" security institution in which case it is relevant, or its members will try to maintain it as a "military" institution, in which case it would be irrelevant, counterproductive, and might become a threat where there are none. Most officials told me that in the end, NATO is on its way out. A former Soviet ambassador to Western Europe said "NATO? - - this also will end. it was clear even in 1990. In a few years, we will not recognize NATO. Everyone here sees that now. US troops were a deposit on European security, but I do not see that in the future. You see this through NACC: slowly, step by step, the meaning of NATO disappears." A Supreme Soviet deputy on the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations assured me that "it will be not too long until NATO turns into a political organization." NATO, he said, must deal with the real dangers in Europe -- not Russia, but nationalism; not state threats, but spontaneous crises and risks.

I heard similar reasoning from the opposite perspective from German officials and politicians. On the issue of widening, an official of the Chancellor’s office told me "You cannot have your cake and eat it. You have to have either a manageable group of countries with common commitments, or an unwieldy large set of diverse countries." The mandate of NATO, he continued, is to deal with an attack on the members, not to deal with conflicts such as those in Yugoslavia or the CIS -- in which cases there would not be agreement on the aims of intervention. In these kinds of conflicts, he concluded, we have to use CSCE conflict resolution principles, not security guarantees. That is, NATO is for collective defense, still possibly against Russia, and is based on closely common interests. To deal with more diverse

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21 Counselor, Office of Assessment and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 16 April 1992.

22 Member of the Supreme Soviet, Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Moscow, 26 May 1993.

security problems, you are not talking about defense, but conflict resolution (or prevention), and need a different set of institutions.

A NATO official answered this question in more specific terms. NACC, he said, was a solution to the problem of including the East in European security processes (especially in the form of military-to-military contacts), without letting them join NATO. NATO cannot choose among the eastern European countries, and it cannot be taken to the Russian borders for fear of antagonizing Russia. And should we then let in Russia? "Then who is the enemy -- China? I cannot imagine this. I suppose you could do away with Article 5 of the treaty, but then you would have NACC."24 Does that not, I asked, mean that the defense needs of eastern European countries are neglected? He agreed that NACC does not serve collective defense, but saw no way out of the dilemma. This is clear evidence that responsible officials are making the type of distinctions that I argue are intrinsic to the differences between collective defense, collective security, and conflict prevention, and that they see different institutions as solving specific security problems, but not the entire range of tasks facing states in Europe today.

NATO could, of course, shed its collective defense purpose and take on collective security or conflict prevention tasks. But that would require a political decision that Russia is no longer in any way a military threat, and that is a decision not yet made. Although German officials would correct me and maintain that there is not "threat", only "risks", when I pressed them they usually admitted that there is a latent potential threat from Russia, and NATO is "insurance" against this. A member of the Bundestag told me that the former Soviet republics could not join NATO because "that would deprive NATO of its function as a security entente and make it another CSCE."25

The distinction between NATO and NACC, then, is clearly that between a collective defense arrangement and a conflict prevention system. NATO's purpose is to assure members that they will defend one another against outside attack (primarily from Russia), and changing NATO's membership may change its purpose, because it may weaken it common purpose and credibility. NACC can be inclusive, because it is meant to deal with different security problems. It is meant to increase information among the members, enhance transparency, and particularly through its military-to-military contacts and educating function for eastern

24 Official, Political Department, German Delegation to NATO. Brussels, 30 November 1992.

European military officers, it is meant to bolster domestic support for conflict prevention goals and priorities. In NACC's words:

we will work to increase stability and confidence and to promote transparency....We reaffirm the importance of efforts to create modern, competitive market economies with a view to overcoming grave economic disparities and thus enhancing our common security and stability. We are striving to reduce armed forces and armaments to minimum levels consistent with legitimate security requirements and to ensure democratic control of armed forces.26

As a NATO official said "part of the NACC concept is to spread NATO's stabilization security function -- without extending commitments of NATO's defense."27 It is not an operational institution, but a consultation institution, he added. This is the kind of thinking and security objective that reflects preferences as modeled by the Assurance game: states assume that the others do not seek to exploit one another, they just need some help in revealing and reinforcing their primary interest in mutual cooperation. Therefore, NACC does not need (and does not have) monitoring or sanctioning provisions, as both collective defense (sanctions against enemies) and collective security (against members) institutions require.

This view of NACC is not mere wishful thinking on the part of NATO's members, as I have evidence that the same calculations affect official Russian views. Officials told me that NACC's purpose is for discussion of military strategy to facilitate cooperation and understanding, while another said that "NACC was established to make things flexible" as NATO cannot.28 Several officials pointed out that NACC had already served Russia concretely, by bringing these consultation, transparency, and education services to negotiations among the former Soviet states in their disagreements over how to allocate the force levels allowed the Soviet Union under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. One reformist scholar pointed out to me that it was better for Russia to negotiate its disputes with former


28 Head of Bureau, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 16 April 1992; Head of Bureau, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 22 April 1992.
Soviet republics in an open and comprehensive security institution rather than in "splendid isolation." 29 I found NACC’s consultation and transparency function to play a role in the thinking of even a high level military official. A Russian lieutenant general answered my question about the NATO "threat" by pointing out that he had just returned from Brussels and the NACC meetings, gesturing around his office and asking me to imagine that only hours before he was consulting with NATO military officers in NATO headquarters. Security now requires multilateral cooperation, he said "it is not possible to individually do things -- it is not the security only of East or West." 30 At the same time, it should be noted, when I asked if eastern European countries could join NATO some day, he said "That is NACC’s function. The area of NATO should not grow." In time, security guarantees against aggression might be possible, but in the long run, he said, we are looking for "non-bloc solutions."

CSCE began its history as a conflict prevention institution. and only in 1992 began to develop some collective security capabilities, but these were weak and late. For example, CSCE required a unanimity or "consensus" vote, so the vote of any one member could stop CSCE action. In early 1992, to enable the body to suspend Yugoslavian membership in light of Serbia’s role in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it developed the "consensus-minus-one" mechanism, preventing any one country from vetoing a CSCE decision. Though hardly a strong sanctioning power, this change was important, because it changed the CSCE’s sole operating assumption from facilitating openness and consultation (a conflict prevention requirement), to identifying a member that had violated CSCE principles (a collective security requirement). The members have not shown themselves willing to develop strong sanctioning powers, largely because of the diversity of interests and views on Bosnia. as the earlier discussion on collective goods would predict in this larger, more diverse security institution. I would argue that CSCE is hamstrung by its weak sanctioning, enforcement, and monitoring powers (so it is not an effective collective security institution), as well as by the ambivalence of its members about whether CSCE is for conflict prevention or for collective security.

For example, an FDP official told me:

NATO is a functioning body without a function. CSCE is not a functioning body, but it has a function...in order to control a risk, things have to be handled differently than with a threat. Of

29 Deputy Head of Department, USA/Canada Institute. Moscow, 15 October 1992.

NATO were to develop the capacity to handle risks, it would become the CSCE.\textsuperscript{31}

This implies the CSCE's function is conflict prevention, not deterring or sanctioning aggression by a member. In contrast, a Foreign Office official said:

The CSCE has a role. But the problem is that it was created to prevent conflict in cases where there is rational discussion by rationally operating political and military leaderships. But if you have people who do not want to keep a ceasefire, then force needs to be used to impose it, which means the UN Security Council under Article 7.\textsuperscript{32}

That is, the Foreign Office official agreed that the CSCE is for "controlling risks", but argued that the conflict in Bosnia is not about risks, but aggression, and requires a collective security response, which the CSCE cannot yet fulfill. The problem in Bosnia in 1992 was not that there was a conflict "spiral" based on misunderstanding, but Serbian exploitation of the willingness of the CSCE members to try to try conflict prevention approaches. The CSCE was playing Assurance, but Serbia was playing Prisoners' Dilemma. As a result, the CSCE (or actually, Bosnia) was exploited. In an effective collective security arrangement, Serbia would have been sanctioned when the members came to Bosnia's defense. Instead, CSCE's sanctioning mechanisms are terribly weak (they extend only to exclusion of the aggressor). While the UN in theory has substantial sanctioning powers as a collective security institution, in practice in the case of Bosnia, common interests and benefits are quite diffuse and free riding is endemic (as the US and European countries seek to make the other primarily responsible for some response). The result, as the earlier discussion implied, demonstrates the inherent weakness of collective security arrangements.

Why has the response of European officials not been to enhance the CSCE as a regional collective security institution that might be able to deal with aggression in its neighborhood? One reason is that compared to NATO and collective defense, CSCE looks weak to many in western Europe. A Bundestag official dismissed developing the CSCE: "CSCE is for talking

\textsuperscript{31} Official, FDP-Fraktion. Bonn, 7 December 1992.

and discussing. It is not for real conflicts -- for that we need a defense alliance. Another constraint is the Russian position. Although Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) favored developing the CSCE as Europe's security institution above all others, this is clearly as a "political" conflict prevention institution, not as a collective security institution with real monitoring and sanctioning powers. The reason is clear -- most CSCE conflicts are likely to be on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This might mean that Russia's disputes with its neighbors would be subject to CSCE rules, and it might mean that conflicts would bring military forces from Western Europe or the US to former Soviet territory.

Both these possibilities were an active consideration for the officials I interviewed. Although the government supported the consensus-minus-one rule and developments to enhance the CSCE's consultation powers, it does not want to create a "Security Council", but rather a type of European Court of Justice for peaceful arbitration. Another official whose responsibility had been government proposals to strengthen the CSCE, told me of measures that would enhance its conflict prevention capabilities, but nothing aimed at collective security. He spoke of "transparency of intentions", consultation, and establishment of a Conflict Prevention Center in Prague. Several officials warned me that the CSCE should avoid "interference in internal affairs", by which they meant not only conflict within Russia, but in the former Soviet Union. But the largest obstacle to CSCE as a collective security in terms of Russian policy is that under no circumstances could NATO peacekeeping forces be sent to the territory of the former Soviet Union under CSCE or UN auspices. All of the officials and scholars whom I asked about this possibility were united in deeming it impossible for Russian political reasons -- it simply would not be acceptable. With such a constraint, it is difficult to see how CSCE could function as a truly collective security institution with freedom to act against any aggressor-member.

Conclusion

Although the brief and limited evidence does not prove that a single institution could not blend diverse security requirements, I believe that it is consistent with the deductive reasoning


34 First Secretary, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 13 October 1992; Head of Department, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 24 February 1992.

35 Head of Bureau, Department of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, 22 April 1992.
I advanced in the first section and reinforces the case. Officials in Europe -- from very different perspectives, are coming to terms with the requirements and limitations of security after the Cold War, and finding that they have to make choices they do not like. Since they do not like these choices and trade-offs, it seems they are pushed toward them by the logic and realities of different security tasks and capacities.

I do not mean to argue that NATO cannot adapt and play a larger role in European security, but I do want to caution that small changes can have large effects, and those affects may be unintended and self-defeating. As one conference participant put it, NATO can go "from here to there." But we should all be aware that if that is our choice, once we are "there" we are no longer "here."