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Constrained Belief Systems, "Rational" Publics, and Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy

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Executive Summary

Do generalizations about foreign policy orientations that emerge largely from the study of American foreign policy extend to post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, and if so, which ones? This paper advances four arguments.

First, Gabriel Almond's classical trifurcation of elites, attentive publics, and mass publics (1960 [1950]) is, with some qualification, an appropriate set of notional categories for analyzing political orientations, including those toward some but not all foreign policy issues, in post-Soviet Russia. Elites have different policy orientations than attentive and mass publics. In foreign policy, they are both more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist than are either mass or attentive publics.

Second, elites are more constrained, in Converse's sense, in their foreign policy views than are mass publics, both in the sense that the range of ideologically driven beliefs is broader and that a central notion such as the extent to which the United States is a threat is systematically related to more policy orientations. The range of foreign policy issues about which attentive publics have coherent perspectives is not nearly as broad. As a consequence, foreign policy elites have more and more complex connections in their foreign policy preferences than others, but attentiveness is a stable predictor of the "connectedness" of core items such as whether the United States is a threat and a limited range of other foreign policy orientations.

Third, belief system constraint varies over time systematically; as the media has become more open, elites, attentive and mass publics have become more differentiated. Overall level of constraint depends primarily on these two factors; in revolutionary moments, high levels of attentiveness will be observed among a large fraction of the population while overall constraint will also rise as a function of increasing media openness as well. What remains to be addressed with data from longer time series is whether it is primarily attentiveness and media content that drive changes over time in levels of constrained beliefs or whether in a democratic system levels of constraint shift systematically with the intensity of political competition.

Fourth, while masses are less constrained in their belief systems than are foreign policy elites, Russian publics operate with some kind of schemata for assessing external events that
results in aggregate perspectives that "make sense" at least post hoc. This constitutes an important change since the 1970s and 1980s. Mass response patterns sometimes, as in the case of the contemporary assessment of the US threat, mesh with those of elites and attentive publics. The assessment of the US threat, moreover, has changed over time in ways that would have been predicted a priori if one assumed a modicum of rationality on the part of mass publics. In addition, when, as is often the case, public response patterns in Russia diverge from elite orientations, the deviations are readily interpretable by an appreciation of the roles elites and masses traditionally play in foreign and military policy implementation and/or by reasonable intuitions about the consequences of particular policies on elites and masses in a time of enormous and tumultuous change.

In brief, we find the conventional wisdom in American foreign policy that differentiates both the orientations and belief constraints of elites, attentive publics, and mass publics relevant to the study of post-Soviet Russia. At the same time, we also observe a kind of bounded rationality in the pattern of mass foreign policy responses in post-Soviet Russia which suggests that the views of Russian mass publics are not labile and capricious (attributes that used to be invoked as characterizations of American mass opinion) but rather reflect some appreciation of the effects of policies on their lives.

This has some broader implications for the role of mass publics in influencing the direction of Russian foreign policy. A minimal precondition for mass publics to play a role in the foreign policy process is that their policy orientations have some kind of stability such that foreign policy elites will be concerned about the effects of policy choices on mass orientations. A minimal precondition for effective elite-citizenry interaction is that knowledge drives some important policy orientations of at least some segments of the citizenry.

Both conditions exist in post-Soviet Russia. That being the case, elites are likely to continue to advocate policies that are both more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist than those favored by mass publics. Attentive publics will be drawn to ideologically consistent policies that bear intimately on Russia's domestic political economy and will thus be a potential constituency for elites to mobilize for foreign policies that favor market democracy. Masses will respond to elite cues that seem evidence of support, short of military force, for Russians abroad. In general, though, the growth of authentic political participation by masses will have Janus-like consequences for foreign policy. Mass involvement in the post-Soviet foreign policy process will constitute a drag on both the more militantly internationalist and the more cooperatively internationalist proclivities of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy elites.
With few exceptions, the empirical study of foreign policy has been the study of American foreign policy (Holsti, 1992). This paper is one of several at the 1994 International Studies Association Convention that attempts to make the systematic study of foreign policy more truly comparative. Do generalizations about foreign policy orientations that emerge largely from the study of American foreign policy extend to post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, and if so, which ones? That is the subject of this paper.

In it, we consider whether several aspects of two different assessments of democratic foreign policy behavior that emerge primarily out of the study of American foreign policy apply to the study of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. The first of these two assessments is what Ole Holsti has labeled the Almond-Lippmann tradition in American foreign policy studies—an approach that views public opinion as volatile, lacking in coherence and structure, and minimizes its impact on policy outcomes—which served as the consensus position about mass public opinion for a quarter century after World War II (Holsti, 1992, pp. 441-445). The second is the more recent consensus that has emerged in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. As Holsti notes (p.447), the more recent trend does not in any way make the claim that "the public is in fact well informed about foreign affairs" but it does argue that mass publics somehow or other do react in "an events-driven, rational manner" with the result that public opinion in United States foreign policy is moderately stable and coherent and, it is argued, more of a factor in determining policy outcomes than was thought the case thirty years ago.¹

We advance four arguments about contemporary Russian foreign policy orientations. First, Gabriel Almond's classical trifurcation of elites, attentive publics, and mass publics (1960 [1950]) is, with some qualification, an appropriate set of notional categories for analyzing political orientations, including those toward some but not all foreign policy issues, in post-Soviet Russia. Elites have different policy orientations than attentive and mass publics. In foreign policy, they are both more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist than are either mass or attentive publics.

Second, elites are more constrained, in Converse’s sense, in their foreign policy views than are mass publics, both in the sense that the range of ideologically driven beliefs is broader and that a central notion such as the extent to which the United States is a threat is systematically related to more policy orientations. The range of foreign policy issues about which attentive publics have coherent perspectives is not nearly as broad. As a consequence, foreign policy elites have more and more complex connections in their foreign policy preferences than others, but attentiveness is a stable predictor of the "connectedness" of core items such as whether the United States is a threat and a limited range of other foreign policy orientations.

Third, belief system constraint varies over time systematically; as the media has become more open, elites, attentive and mass publics have become more differentiated. Overall level of constraint depends primarily on these two factors; in revolutionary moments, high levels of attentiveness will be observed among a large fraction of the population while overall constraint will also rise as a function of increasing media openness as well. What remains to be addressed with data from longer time series is whether it is primarily attentiveness and media content that drive changes over time in levels of constrained beliefs or whether in a democratic system levels of constraint shift systematically with the intensity of political competition.

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used to be invoked as characterizations of American mass opinion) but rather reflect some appreciation of the effects of policies on their lives.

Sources

The data for this paper derive from three sources. One is a survey of elites² conducted during December 1992-January 1993 of 200 Russian foreign policy elites. Operationalizing eliteness is always a difficult matter, even in stable systems. It is especially problematic for a country such as Russia which is undergoing rapid social transformation. Such transformations are almost invariably accompanied by changes in power relations at the top of the political system, i.e., by changes in the composition of the elite structure. In the case of Russia, the days of the study of "the Party" are gone, presumably forever. Equally important, the cast of principal players now includes—new terms reflect new realities—the emergence of a biznes-elita (Kryshtanovskaia, 1992).

To account for these realities we defined the foreign policy elites sectorally and positionally. Our goal was to identify and interview a sample of those with resources that matter in foreign policy decision making; these, following Lasswell, we took to be those who controlled the instruments of coercion and persuasion, had specialized knowledge, or occupied key formal political positions. Expressed less ponderously, we interviewed a total of 200 foreign policy elites, 40 persons each from five key sectors of Russian society: the media, foreign policy relevant research institutes, the economy, the government, and the military. Where possible, we constructed what amounted to a population, for instance, of persons in the print and voice media directly concerned with foreign policy and then contacted persons randomly from that list. Those interviewed had real elite status: they were editors of major dailies, foreign policy observers for major television channels, persons on the committees touching on foreign affairs of the erstwhile Supreme Soviet. Even the persons on active military duty were leading specialists and experts on foreign policy and security matters, though unlike their civilian counterparts, they were not the leading figures in the institutions sampled, but rather a notch down. As a rule they were sector heads at military institutions and department heads in the military academies.

The size of the elite sample was such that we are able to make plausible inferences about overall elite orientations with respect to issues for which the sample was not constructed—for

²Both 1993 surveys were executed by ROMIR (Russia Public Opinion and the Market) directed by Elena Bashkirova.
instance, with regard to elite attitudes toward markets and democracy.\(^3\) The composition of the elite sample was sufficiently representative of the Russian foreign policy elite that we can extrapolate to its views on foreign policy. What cannot be done is to infer from this sample of foreign policy elites what elites in general think about foreign policy, the criterion on which the sample was selected.

The second source was a survey of a representative sample of ordinary citizens in the European part of Russia in February and March 1993. The 1243 people interviewed were identified by a five stage sampling design with sampling units selected with a probability proportional to unit size in the first three stages. After that narrowing process, households and apartments served as sampling units drawn from address lists (interviewers prepare lists of households in small villages lacking a household register) and then persons were randomly selected from the identified households. The care with which the sample frame was constructed and the persons interviewed were selected, given the design, was far greater than in surveys undertaken in the ex-Soviet Union as recently as 1988-89.

Substantively, the elite and mass surveys were virtually identical, with the only exception being that a handful of questions designed to measure knowledge of the outside world and political interest were not asked of the elite respondents. In addition, both employed questions that either paralleled or mirrored questions asked by Holsti and James Rosenau in their 1992 survey of American elites (Holsti, 1994). The result is that the two surveys not only make possible comparisons among elite and mass public orientations to policy but also comparisons between American and Russian elites (Zimmerman, Bashkirova and Melville, 1993).

Finally, we have managed to acquire eight surveys\(^4\) undertaken in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era to go along with the data from the Soviet Interview Project survey conducted of former Soviet citizens who had emigrated to the United States and who could serve as reasonable informants about life in the urban parts of the European Soviet Union in the late 1970s.

These surveys vary in quality, in the persons contacted, in the nature of the contact (two were telephone surveys, the others face-to-face), and in the referent sampling group (Moscow, the European part of Russia, the entire ex-Soviet Union).

\(^3\)We are indebted to Chris Achen for this point.

\(^4\)Special thanks to Vladimir Andreyenkov of the Moscow Center for Comparative Research and James Gibson of the University of Houston--Andreyenkov for making two of these surveys available to Zimmerman and Gibson for making one available.
We have thrown caution to the wind and attempted to use these surveys in order to make comparisons over time (Zaller, 1992). Fortunately, in many instances exactly the same question has been asked in several surveys. This greatly increases our confidence about assessments of patterns in attitude change and stability over time since it minimizes the potential problems arising from what are often enormous effects of question formulation on responses.

Elites, Attentive and Mass Public Orientations to Russian Foreign Policy

Almond's "The American People and Foreign Policy" represented an attempt to develop a normative case for the democratic nature of the foreign policy process in the United States in light of two important empirical realities. The first was that power and competence is asymmetrically distributed in all political systems. The second was that sizeable fractions of the public are stunningly ignorant about the world external to their immediate milieu. He coped with the first reality by distinguishing empirically between the nature of elites in the United States and in the Soviet Union. He dealt with the second by asserting that among mass publics there existed "an 'attentive public' which is informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and which constitutes the audience for the foreign policy discussions among elites" (1960, p.138).

Underlying Almond’s approach was the assumption that social standing and attentiveness had profound implications for how people oriented themselves to politics, including foreign policy. One way we addressed that assumption in the post-Soviet Russian setting was by comparing orientations to politics in our elite and mass samples. We wanted to ascertain whether positional and knowledge-driven hypotheses pointed to major differences in policy orientations.

They did. It is essential to an appreciation of the contemporary dilemma in Russia to understand that post-Soviet Russian elites differ fundamentally in the ways they orient to politics than do other Russians. In another paper (1994 forthcoming), Zimmerman discusses how this pertains to orientations to the domestic political economy. He shows that elite members are far more supportive of market or liberal democracy than are other Russians.

With respect to foreign policy (cf. above, p. 6) elites at least, the proposition extends to foreign policy orientations as well. With rare exception, the most salient being a question regarding whether respondents regard "the United States as a threat to Russia", foreign policy elites differ systematically from other respondents in their orientations to foreign policy (Table 1).
In general, moreover, they have broader and more internationalist goals than other respondents. To be sure, they are relatively less likely to regard the "defense of the interests of Russians," abroad (whether "in former republics of the USSR" or "in other countries") as very important than are other respondents.

They are, though, more likely to conceive of the national interests of Russia as "for the most part extending more widely than its current territory" and more likely to say that "Russia should send its army to aid other countries that request military assistance" both in reference to countries that were "previously part of the USSR" and elsewhere.

At the same time, they are more committed to economic reform and the international economic consequences that are concomitant with that reform. As a result, they are noticeably more inclined to decrease military spending, more prone to disagree with the proposition, "We can solve our economic problems without the help of the West," and distinguishably more likely to be coded as favoring global interdependence (Table 1). In brief, foreign policy elites are both, in Wittkopf's (1986) terms, more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist than other Russian respondents.

The neatness with which we can make the point about the sharp and nearly uniform distinction attitudinally between elites and others is not observed when we compare attentive publics with others in the mass sample (Tables 1 and 2). We used two indicators to define attentiveness, both knowledge-driven. One was to follow the well established practice of treating university attenders as constituting the attentive public. This tack had several attractive features. One major theme of the monumental transformations that occurred in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the empowerment of the intelligentsia. In the early 1990s university attendance in Russia is a reasonable first approximation of status as a member of the intelligentsia, it is easy to ascertain through a survey instrument, and it is roughly comparable in significance to university attendance in the United States when Almond first wrote about an American attentive public.

We also created a knowledge-based measure of attentiveness based on whether respondents could match five Western public figures—George Bush, Juan Carlos, John Major, Francois Mitterand, and Helmut Kohl—with their respective countries and whether the respondents knew that the Crimea was part of Ukraine. The respondents in the mass sample were almost exactly divided between those who knew Crimea was part of Ukraine and those

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5We also asked the respondents in the mass sample to identify William Zimmerman. We were enormously reassured to learn that only 11 per cent thought him the leader of any country.
who did not. These questions were not asked the elite respondents. In the mass sample, slightly more than a quarter (27 percent) of the respondents knew the five leaders and that Crimea was part of Ukraine; we identified this group as constituting the attentive public.

Disproportionately, those coded as members of the attentive public in this manner were university attenders, though in absolute numbers more of those identified as constituting the attentive public in this way had not attended university. In the scale as originally structured, we included three additional categories, the last being those who could only identify two or fewer foreign leaders and did not know that Crimea was part of Ukraine.

By either of these two criteria, the attentive publics situate neatly between other publics and foreign policy elites with respect to those foreign policy issues that are directly connected with Russia's evolving economy and its relation to the West. They were more disposed than other respondents in the mass sample to support decreases in military spending (and foreign economic aid) but far fewer of them supported decreasing military spending than did foreign policy elites. In like fashion, they were less inclined than other respondents in the mass sample to believe that Russia could extricate itself from its economic difficulties without the help of the West and correspondingly more comfortable with the consequences of global interdependence, just as they were less supportive of the overall mix of traditionally Soviet economic policies—state ownership of heavy industry, economic recovery without Western help, distrust of foreign economic penetration—associated with economic autarky.

At the same time, as in the case of military spending, they were more likely than were foreign policy elites to respond that Western help was not needed in Russia's economic recovery and to be coded as relatively more disposed to favor economic policies that were traditionally Soviet. Correspondingly, they were less likely than foreign policy elites to endorse propositions that constituted support for Russia's active participation in the global economy.

In most other foreign policy domains, by contrast, those we have identified as attentive publics did not differ noticeably from other mass publics. Neither university education, nor being "plugged in" to the world outside Russia, differentiates responses in a mass survey to orientations to Russians outside Russia, to a conception of the domain of Russia's national interests, nor to Russia's use of force whether on its periphery (the "near abroad") or elsewhere.

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6In comparison with attentive publics in other countries, this is a large number. In part this may be measure-driven but we also believe the external world was highly salient to a fraction of the Russian public in the early 1990s.

7 The correlation between the two alternative operationalizations is \( r = .30, p < .0001 \).
Moreover, this observation about the absence of linkage between attentiveness and attitudes to foreign policy on Russia's periphery extends to that component of our attentiveness variable which is closest substantively to Russia's relations with countries on its periphery, namely, being able to identify correctly that Crimea belongs to Ukraine. Knowing whether respondents can correctly identify Crimea as belonging to Ukraine provided no purchase on respondents' answers to questions about Russians abroad, use of force, or the domain of Russia's national interests (all n.s).

In a mass sample, attentiveness differentiates responses to items bearing on the present and future orientation of Russia to the world market but not to Russia's treatment of Russians outside Russia or to Russian relations with the "near abroad" and others on the periphery of Russia.

Foreign policy elites, by contrast, differ systematically from those in a mass sample in their response patterns both in respect to their orientation to East-West economic relations and in their preferences with regard to relations on Russia's periphery. The one instance among the foreign policy themes considered here where foreign policy elites did not manifest a different mix of responses than persons in the mass sample pertained to whether the United States was considered a threat to Russia. (Elites and the attentive public together were more inclined to reduce foreign aid than were other respondents.) The demise of the Cold War evidently was a phenomenon of such manifest salience to all (especially against the backdrop of Russia's immense domestic problems) that nearly three-quarters of all respondents—elites, attentive public, and others—across the board answered negatively to that question in the winter 1993, an enormous change from the responses given to that question in 1988-89 when in two different surveys approximately the same proportions of respondents, with and without university education, had asserted that the United States was a threat (Table 3).

Belief System Constraint

Another way elites and attentive publics have been thought to differ from masses is the extent to which the former two groups have constrained belief systems, while the latter, especially those who are least informed, have "non-attitudes" (Converse, 1964). We define the correlation of attitudes across a broad set of questions as the relative constraint of a person's belief system. As Converse did, we divided individuals' belief systems about politics into two broad categories, foreign policy related beliefs and domestic policy beliefs. (A more subtle approach is Holsti and Rosenau, 1988.) The conventional way the conception of constrained belief systems has been measured involves running bi-variate correlations for several questionnaire items, summing the absolute values generated by the correlation matrix, and
computing an average inter-item correlation. Not surprisingly by this criterion, elites turn out
to have much more coherent belief systems about the domestic political economy than do
others. Similarly, those we have identified as attentive publics—whether identified by university
attendance or by their level of knowledge of the external world—occupy second place (Table 4,
A and B). (The pattern is not, however, monotonic: the order among the three remaining
knowledge groups was two, one, three.)

When we consider foreign policy orientations, we are again confronted with somewhat
untidy findings. Using items that identify orientations to military assistance abroad both within
and outside the ex-Soviet Union, protection of Russians abroad, military spending, national
interest domain, need for help from the West, and the US threat, elites do indeed have more
constrained belief systems than do others by the conventional measure. If we take university
attendees to constitute the attentive public, then we can also assert that, by the traditional
criterion, there is an attentive public with more constrained beliefs than others among the mass
public in European Russia.

Where matters get messy is when we use our knowledge based measure to identify the
attentive public. Foreign policy elites clearly relate a wider range of items than do any groups
among the mass publics. Within the mass sample, however, constraint across a wide range of
foreign policy items is not ordered by knowledge of the external world, at least as
operationalized here. One likely explanation for this is question order effects. Those who knew
next to nothing about the external world nevertheless gave parallel answers to sequenced
questions about Russians abroad within and outside the former Soviet Union and to similarly
sequenced questions about use of force abroad. This has the effect of increasing the constraint
scores of the ill-informed.

That this may be much of the story seems borne out by considering a smaller set of
foreign policy items, those that are connected to East-West relations and Russia’s place in the
world economy and that relate consequently to core beliefs about the domestic political
economy. When items concerning military spending, whether the United States is a threat,
whether Russia’s economic problems can be solved without the help of the West, and trust in
administrators of foreign enterprises are correlated, the links between knowledge and
coherence become more apparent: foreign policy elites are sharply more constrained than
others, while university attendees and those with very high and relatively high factual
knowledge dominate the remainder (Table 4, "Narrow Foreign Policy").

A similar conclusion emerges when we consider the factors that correlate with a
particularly important and tangible foreign policy issue, namely, attitude to military spending.
Space considerations preclude a detailed elaboration in this paper. (See Zimmerman, 1994
It suffices here to report that across literally dozens of multiple regressions in which variable after variable proved to be unstable, depending on which other variables were entered into the regression, level of knowledge--whether the respondent was "plugged in"--remained a stable predictor of orientation to military spending in the mass sample. What this suggests is that in thinking about whether and how attentive publics differ from other publics, greater attention should be accorded to the other aspect, aside from range, of belief constraint identified in Converse's classic paper, to wit the notion of centrality (1964, p.208). (Converse himself did not give it anywhere the attention he accorded range.) The accompanying table (Table 5) draws on the same correlation matrices used to compute constraint across a range of foreign policy items. We assume that the assessment of the threat from the United States occupies a central place in the respondents' foreign policy orientations. (We take no position as to the direction of the causal arrows between responses concerning the US threat and other items.)

By inspection, elites link many more foreign policy issues than do ordinary citizens regardless of the latter's knowledge of the outside world. With one exception (about what would be expected by chance across 24 bi-variate correlations), there are no relationships among any of the respondents in the mass sample between responses pertaining to the domain of Russia's national interest, the use of force within or outside the former Soviet Union, or the importance to Russian foreign policy goals of ethnic Russians again either within or outside the former Soviet Union and the question of whether or not the United States is a threat.

At the same time, the relevance of a knowledge-driven conception of attentiveness becomes apparent in thinking about the connections between responses pertaining to the United States as a threat, Russian military spending, and economic help from the West. For these items, the correlation patterns are virtually monotonic and in the direction predicted by assuming that factual knowledge predicts more coherent foreign policy orientations (Table 5).

**Changing Patterns of Belief Constraint Over Time**

The notion of constrained belief systems attempts to capture the idea that individuals' attitudes about related issues should co-vary in a systematic way. For democracy to function well, members of the voting public must have reasonably consistent or constrained beliefs about various issues. In societies where individuals do not have well organized attitudes or beliefs about the government's role in economic and social matters, it may be difficult to generate the consensus necessary to implement policy, regardless of the nature of the policy. In a state where the mass publics attitudes are completely disorganized, political elites may be unable to generate policies which represent a majority view of the mass publics. While this
may not be a problem in an authoritarian regime, it would certainly pose a tremendous challenge to a newly democratized or democratizing state such as Russia. If the changes in Russia over the last five years have sufficiently altered the political environment in which Russian politicians must function, we should reasonably expect these changes to be reflected in levels of constraint of Russian belief systems.

Research about the United States mass publics' belief systems provides some clues about the types of belief system constraint we might expect to see emerge in Russia. Using a panel study of U.S. policy elites in their 1988 study Holsti and Rosenau (1988) tracked the correlations of survey responses across seven domestic politics questions and ten different groups of elites. They reported correlations that ranged from .16 to .47 for questions that probed aspects of domestic political liberalism among American policy elites, with the mean correlation being .33. For the questions regarding foreign policy or degree of internationalism, they found an average correlation of .36 among cooperative internationalism items, and an average correlation of .43 among questions regarding militant internationalism.

We have attempted, with the surveys we have, to approximate these studies in the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian context. For each of the surveys, we analyzed from three to seven questions for domestic and foreign policy. Within each survey, the subgroups depend on the types of control questions asked, and ranged from almost an exact match of those used by Holsti and Rosenau to quite limited ones. And indeed, across nine surveys conducted in the former Soviet Union and Russia, we observe an overall increase over time in the correlations among the responses to various domestic and foreign policy questions, offset somewhat by a downward trend in foreign policy items since 1991.

The correlations in Table 6 below are similar to those constructed by Converse in his earlier work on belief systems and to the method used by others more recently (Holsti and Rosenau). The initial belief correlations come from the Soviet Interview Project, a survey of overwhelmingly Jewish former Soviet citizens who migrated to the United States in the late 1970s and very early 1980s. (The year 1978 in Table 6 represents the approximate referent point chronologically for the respondents' answers to questions about their former life in the former Soviet Union. All other dates in the table refer to when the surveys were undertaken.) Both in 1978 and in a 1988 survey conducted by the New York Times, beliefs in the Soviet sample were remarkably unconstrained, the one exception being occupational elites in the SIP sample. Correlations in the groups of questions asked in 1978 and 1988 range from a high of .32 for the occupational elites' beliefs about foreign policy questions to .07 for those who self-reported a high interest in politics. Correlations for domestic policy questions rise consistently from 1989 to the most recent survey executed in early 1993, while those for foreign policy
items increase and then diminish somewhat between 1991 and 1993. Elites in the Russian sample closely resemble their counterparts in the U.S., though the attentive public seems less constrained with regard to foreign policy. The differences between domestic and foreign policy constraints across all groups are still considerably greater in Russia than in the U.S. with the correlations between foreign policy and domestic policy issues (except the March 1991 survey) remaining relatively low—though sharply higher than in the 1980s.

These changes in the correlations map well with the dramatic events that have shaped Soviet and Russian politics in recent years. Glasnost' resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount and quality of information to a broad cross section of society and may be reflected in the jump in constraint observed in the 1989 to 1990 period. The attempted coup and the collapse of Soviet power in 1991 is associated with another increase in foreign policy constraint. The emergence of two really different foreign policy arenas—on the periphery of Russia and East-West relations—coupled with some return to more nearly "normal" levels of political interest may be factors in explaining the slight drop since the collapse of the Soviet Union. (The variation may of course be stochastic but the probability of a substantive explanation is greatly increased by having three rather than two data points.)

A Responsive and, Arguably, Rational Public

Thus far, much of the argument has focused on the differences between both the orientations and the coherence and complexity of the views of elite and attentive publics on the one hand and those of mass publics on the other. That having been said, we would also stress, there is a kind of logic to contemporary Russian mass responses that suggests the operation of some kind of bounded rationality or schemata.

For one thing, as noted in the previous section, the overall level of aggregate constraint patterns is greater than it was in the late 1970s or late 1980s. In addition, the views of mass publics changed and changed dramatically during the years 1988-93 concerning the key issue whether the United States was a threat to the Soviet Union or Russia. Table 3 (below) reports the findings of five surveys over the period 1988-93 in which this question was asked in the Soviet Union or in Russia. The populations of the surveys vary—ranging from Moscow (May 1988) to the entire Soviet Union (May 1990). Consequently, one would wish to be extremely careful in extrapolating very much or very far from the marginals from any particular survey. What does not seem in doubt, though, is that in 1988-89 a sizeable majority

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*It should be noted, though, that the particular items in table 6 do not address Russia's relations with its periphery. If they were included the average correlation score would drop sharply.*
viewed the United States as a threat whereas in the early 1990s only a quarter thought that to be the case. The pattern precisely parallels that reported by Russett, Hartley, and Murray about American elite attitudinal shifts over essentially the same time period 1988-1993 (1994, p.18) (Table 3). The very least we can say is that, at least given a relatively open press, some changes in the outside world are so obvious that almost everybody, everywhere, gets the word.

Moreover, one can in fact tell a story that "makes sense" about the different mix of contemporary Russian orientations to foreign policy. Granted, elites think about interests more abstractly than do masses. Foreign policy elites in Russia are more disposed to say that the national interests of Russia extend beyond the boundaries of Russia but they are less prone to regard the lot of ethnic Russians abroad, whether within or, especially, outside the former USSR, as very important than are attentive or mass publics. That being so, it is nevertheless masses, and not elites or university attendees, who would make up the forces that would constitute the military aid to be sent abroad, either within the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, should those countries request such aid. Evidently this is not lost on our respondents and may contribute to explaining the relative reluctance of masses to support actually doing something about those Russians abroad, the protection of whom constitutes for them, more than for the attentive public or for foreign policy elites, a putatively "very important" goal of Russian foreign policy.

In like fashion, for elites and attentive publics, decreasing military spending leads to economic reform—and the closing of enormous numbers of factories that made up the erstwhile Soviet military industrial complex. For mass publics, decreasing military spending leads to economic reform—and the closing of enormous numbers of factories that made up the erstwhile Soviet military industrial complex.

For elites and the attentive public, similarly, solving Russia's economic problems without the help of the West implies the continued subsidization of state-owned factories and mines which are enormously inefficient and employ huge numbers of redundant employees. For mass publics, decreasing . . .

In brief, one does not have to impute very complex schemata to Russian mass publics to explain why their somewhat contradictory responses to questions about foreign policy are not the same somewhat contradictory responses to foreign policy questions that come from foreign policy elites.

Those who could not tell us that the Crimea was part of Ukraine and also could not identify more than two of five Western leaders were somewhat more likely than others in 1993 to say that the US was a threat.
Implications

We have argued in this paper that Russian foreign policy elites differ systematically from other respondents both in their orientations to foreign policy and in the coherence with which they approach foreign policy questions. Substantively, they are both more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist—they are more inclined to the use of force and economic interdependence. They think more abstractly, both in the sense that they are more inclined to think of foreign policy goals in terms of interests and less inclined to identify with people (i.e., Russians abroad) than others and that they, like elites the world around, have more constrained belief systems. Attentive publics, whether identified by having attended university or by their knowledge of the outside world, have coherent foreign policy views about matters that connect directly to the Russian political economy but not about other foreign policy domains. Mass publics manifest even less constrained foreign policy beliefs, though the aggregate level of constraint is noticeably higher in the 1990s than in the 1970s or 1980s. The pattern of constraint across elites, attentive publics, and mass publics is not a constant but has changed across time in ways that reflect changes in the nature of political system in the direction of political openness. Moreover, somehow or other, masses do manifest responses that in the aggregate make sense either because of the likely effects of the ongoing changes in the world around them or because of the part they would be likely called on to play in implementing foreign policy decisions.

These findings point to some important further research directions and have some implications for broader questions about the evolution of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy as well.

Why have domestic and (with qualification noted above) foreign policy constraints increased over time across the board? One obvious hypothesis flows largely from cognitive dissonance, the other is more intimately tied to the process of democratization itself. In the former hypothesis, consistent beliefs flow from the need for individuals to minimize their personal cognitive dissonance. People with greater political knowledge and sophistication on this account have more consistent beliefs, as we have observed in the Russian context. During periods when there is little or no political discussion or debate possible (periods when the media and public discourse are strongly controlled), coherence of beliefs will be low simply because the range of issues over which people must maintain consistent beliefs is very narrow. Once information is made available and public debate takes place, the consistency of peoples’ belief systems should rise quickly. If this hypothesis is correct, constrained beliefs should be a permanent and perhaps growing feature in post-Soviet Russia, as long as the mass media remains moderately free.
The second hypothesis would suggest that coherence of belief systems (correlation of attitudes) would vary significantly over time. During periods of intense domestic or foreign political conflict, or in periods where political groups and ideas are in no danger of being eliminated in the marketplace of ideas, peoples' beliefs will become less coherent due to some sort of political entropy. During periods marked by great conflict or competition, people will be forced to develop consistent beliefs in order to position themselves politically. On this assumption, the political change and turmoil taking place in the post-1989 Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia would be a major reason for the change in belief system constraint observed and the slight trend in the opposite direction in the case of foreign policy orientations evidence of the overwhelming preoccupation (vividly evident in the survey data) of virtually all Russians with domestic concerns.

These two hypotheses should be relatively easy to test with a longer time series. If the latter explanation is correct, we would see measures of attitude correlation fluctuate over time. These shifts should correspond to changes in the nature of the domestic political system and the degree of competitiveness of that system. If the first explanation is correct, levels of belief system constraint should be relatively stable. Under this hypothesis, we would expect some variation in beliefs to take place as various issue areas rise and fall in media coverage. We should, however, observe a higher baseline of attitude coherence overall than we would under the competition hypothesis and less variation. Such variation as occurs, moreover, should be greater in the foreign policy belief systems than in aggregate domestic beliefs, where stability is predicted.

Thus far, it appears that the mechanisms that drive foreign policy and domestic politics belief constraints are somewhat different, even when many of the foreign policy items bear on the evolving nature of the post-Soviet political economy. We observe greater volatility in the foreign policy beliefs than in the domestic policy beliefs across the entire set of surveys. Within subgroups, though, the relationship appears to be the opposite. There the trend with respect to foreign policy questions is toward more constrained beliefs than in the domestic policy questions. Figures 1, 2 and 3 (below) illustrate the changes in constraint over time by group.

Our overall findings, moreover, have some implications for the impact of mass publics on foreign policy making. A minimal precondition for mass publics to play a role in the foreign policy process is that their policy orientations have some kind of stability such that foreign policy elites will be concerned about the effects of policy choices on mass orientations. A minimal precondition for effective elite-citizenry interaction is that knowledge drives some important policy orientations of at least some segments of the citizenry.
Both conditions exist in post-Soviet Russia. That being the case, elites are likely to continue to advocate policies that are both more militantly internationalist and more cooperatively internationalist than those favored by mass publics. Attentive publics will be drawn to ideologically consistent policies that bear intimately on Russia's domestic political economy and will thus be a potential constituency for elites to mobilize for foreign policies that favor market democracy. Masses will respond to elite cues that seem evidence of support, short of military force, for Russians abroad. In general, though, the growth of authentic political participation by masses will have Janus-like consequences for foreign policy. Mass involvement in the post-Soviet foreign policy process will constitute a drag on both the more militantly internationalist and the more cooperatively internationalist proclivities of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy elites.
TABLE 1: Foreign Policy Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>University Attendees</th>
<th>Mass Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should Russia &quot;send military aid if asked to aid a country of the former Soviet Union&quot;?</td>
<td>% = 56%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To other countries?</td>
<td>n = (106)</td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>(300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you regard &quot;the defense of Russians abroad in the former Soviet Union&quot; as a very important foreign policy goal?</td>
<td>35 21 18</td>
<td>35 21 18</td>
<td>35 21 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other countries?</td>
<td>38 (76)</td>
<td>46 (197)</td>
<td>55 (736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed that &quot;for the most part the national interests of Russia extend beyond its current territory.&quot;</td>
<td>77 (149)</td>
<td>56 (147)</td>
<td>58 (466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should &quot;military spending&quot; be decreased?</td>
<td>62 (119)</td>
<td>48 (125)</td>
<td>37 (321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should &quot;aid to foreign countries&quot; be decreased?</td>
<td>87 (166)</td>
<td>86 (233)</td>
<td>72 (641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreed that &quot;We can solve our economic problems without the help of the West?&quot;</td>
<td>57 (105)</td>
<td>41 (106)</td>
<td>28 (234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support global interdependence.¹</td>
<td>56 (100)</td>
<td>43 (93)</td>
<td>31 (207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose autarky.²</td>
<td>64 (116)</td>
<td>40 (92)</td>
<td>26 (189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreed that &quot;the U.S. is a threat to Russia.&quot;</td>
<td>73 (141)</td>
<td>78 (206)</td>
<td>72 (596)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kruskal-Wallis test (correcting for ties) significant at p < .0001 for all the above except "U.S. threat" which is n.s. The grouping for reducing foreign aid is elite and university attendees vs. others (p < .0001).
1Support global interdependence is based on whether respondents thought Russia could solve its economic problems without the help of the West and thought you could trust the administrators of foreign enterprises.

2Support for autarky is an aggregate measure combining belief that "heavy industry should be state owned", lack of trust in persons who have their own business, and the belief that Russia can solve its economic problems without the West.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Attentive Public</th>
<th>Mass Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should Russia &quot;send military aid if asked to aid a country of the former Soviet Union&quot;?</td>
<td>( % = 56% )</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n = (106) )</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To other countries?</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (65) )</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you regard &quot;the defense of Russians abroad in the former Soviet Union&quot; as a very important foreign policy goal?</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (137) )</td>
<td>(264)</td>
<td>(733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other countries?</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (76) )</td>
<td>(170)</td>
<td>(451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed that &quot;for the most part the national interests of Russia extend beyond its current territory.&quot;</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (149) )</td>
<td>(194)</td>
<td>(420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should &quot;military spending&quot; be decreased?</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (119) )</td>
<td>(146)</td>
<td>(300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should &quot;aid to foreign countries&quot; be decreased?</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (166) )</td>
<td>(267)</td>
<td>(609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreed that &quot;We can solve our economic problems without the help of the West?&quot;</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (105) )</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support global interdependence.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (100) )</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose autarky.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (116) )</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreed that &quot;the U.S. is a threat to Russia.&quot;</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (141) )</td>
<td>(243)</td>
<td>(561)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kruskal-Wallis (correcting for ties) significant at \( p < .0001 \) for all the above except a) both questions concerning Russians abroad where \( p < .05 \); b) attentive public differ slightly from the elite and the masses (\( p < .05 \)) concerning the U.S. threat; and c) in the case of reduced foreign aid the grouping is obviously elite and attentive public vs others.
Table 3: The Ending of the Cold War

Perception of U.S. Threat between 1988-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>May '88</th>
<th>Jan. '89</th>
<th>Spring '90</th>
<th>March '91</th>
<th>March '93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreed U.S. is a threat.</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(488)</td>
<td>(631)</td>
<td>(723)</td>
<td>(189)</td>
<td>(288)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{\small Tau}_\xi = .40 \\
p < .0001
\]

*In 1988 and 1989 surveys were done in Moscow and the Spring 1990, the USSR. The March 1991 population is the entire Russian Federation. The March 1993 survey is based on a sample of the European part of Russia.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Agreed</th>
<th>Disagreed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreed</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreed</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Inter-item correlates of relevant domestic and foreign policy questions December 1992-March 1993

A) Knowledge-based

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Attentive Public</th>
<th>Mass Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.11 .14 .13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09 .11 .10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrower Foreign Policy</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.17 .14 .13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) University attendees equals attentive public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Mass Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrower Foreign Policy</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In A and B domestic items are drawn from an operationalization of respondents orientation to the domestic political economy (Zimmerman, Melville, and Bashkirova, 1993. Zimmerman 1994 forthcoming) and includes items dealing with a) the economy and b) the political system. A. The Economy: State ownership of heavy industry; whether economic competition is functional; whether it is natural for someone to become wealthy from an idea that provides employment for many; whether it makes sense to open a new business which might fail. B. The Political System: whether competition among parties is functional, whether dangerous ideas should be tolerated; and whether individual rights should be protected even if the guilty sometimes go free.

For foreign policy, see the text.
Table 5: Centrality and Foreign Policy Beliefs

Bi-variate correlations with U.S. threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Attentive Public</th>
<th>Mass Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very high knowledge</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military spending</td>
<td>.36****</td>
<td>.33****</td>
<td>.29****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West help not necessary</td>
<td>.41****</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National interest broad</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians in ex-Soviet Union</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to ex-Soviet Union</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians elsewhere</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid elsewhere</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05  
** p < .01  
*** p < .005  
**** p < .001
Table 6: Correlations of Soviet and Russian Survey Responses 1988-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Policy Correlation</th>
<th>Domestic Policy Correlation</th>
<th>For/Dom Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1978)</td>
<td>Everybody</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Everybody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites (By Occupat)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elites (By Occupat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>Union Leader</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomenklatura</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Leader</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>Int in Pol</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int in Pol</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>Nomenklatura</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables selected:
Domestic Politics...danger, indright, particip, stateagr, stateind, strike, politics
Foreign Policy...fundmil, hosusa, nukes, powusa, vietnam, fundee.

| NY Times            | Everybody                   | .06                         | Everybody           | .07                         | .07                         |
| (May 88)            |                             |                            | Education           | .06                         |                            |

Variables selected:
Domestic Politics...critgood, demonok, electman, ethdiscr, god1part, perestro, price
Foreign Policy...milforc2, permconf, sovintfr, sovmilaid, sovthret, sovwrdsc, ussr_afg

| Moscow              | Everybody                   | .14                         | Everybody           | .11                         | .12                         |
| (January 89)        |                             |                            | CPSU members        | .12                         |                             |
| Supervisor          | .14                         | CPSU members                | .12                 |                             |                            |
| CPSU members        | .09                         | Education                   | .11                 |                             |                            |
| Education           | .08                         | Supervisor                  | .10                 |                             |                            |

Variables selected:
Domestic Politics...ussrdir, trustgov, trans, sovmedia, offcare, narodsay, narodhap
Foreign Policy...milconf, milpow, nukes, reducimp, relatns, usattack, usthreat

| U of Houston        | Everybody                   | .15                         | Everybody           | .11                         | .11                         |
| (Spring 90)         |                             |                            | Attentiveness       | .26                         | Attentiveness               | .16                         |
|                     |                             |                            | Occupation          | .18                         | Occupation                 | .16                         |
|                     |                             |                            | CPSU Members        | .13                         | Education                  | .11                         |
|                     |                             |                            | Education           | .11                         | CPSU members               | .09                         |

Variables selected:
Domestic Politics...demgovt, econref, expopin, hiqualpr, revolt, secres, spen$dom, satmed
Foreign Policy...comparm, gorbsubp2, lithforc, relusa, secres, sovafour, spen$def, suafgh, usthreat

| U of Iowa           | Everybody                   | .21                         | Everybody           | .15                         | .14                         |
| (May 90)            |                             |                            | Attentiveness       | .31                         | Attentiveness               | .28                         |
|                     |                             |                            | Occupation          | .16                         | Occupation                 | .09                         |
|                     |                             |                            | Education           | .13                         | Education                  | .08                         |

Variable selected:
### Domestic Politics
- auton, ecolspen, educspen, order, passport, reform, stalin

### Foreign Policy
- defspen, fornthrt, forspen, gerthrt, troupout, ussumil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Policy Correlation</th>
<th>Domestic Policy Correlation</th>
<th>For/Dom Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Everybody</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October 90)</td>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variables selected:**
- Domestic Politics...stateind, dangid, partic
- Foreign Policy...milaid, mispend, sovus

---

| RSFSR                      | Everybody                   | .25                 | Everybody | .18 | .23 |
| (March 91)                 | Education                   | .18                 | Education | .18 |
|                            | Leaders                     | .09                 | Leaders   | .10 |

**Variables selected:**
- Domestic Politics...strikes, defgoods, edhealth, science, environ, intprob
- Foreign Policy...mispend, exthret, weapons, foraffr, exprob

---

| Andreyenkov                | Everybody                   | .22                 | Everybody | .16 | .14 |
| (October 91)               | Interest in Pol             | .26                 | CPSU      | .19 |
|                            | CPSU Members                | .20                 | Interest in Pol | .15 |
|                            | Education                   | .16                 | Supervisors | .14 |
|                            | Supervisors                 | .14                 | Education  | .09 |

**Variables Selected:**
- Domestic Politics...stateind, stateown, dangid, partic, indghts [indright], onephilo
- Foreign Policy...milpow, withdraw, mispend, milaid, usthreat, suthreat

---

| Russia                     | Everybody                   | .19                 | Everybody | .17 | .13 |
| (Winter)                  | Elites                      | .37                 | Elites    | .24 |
| 1992-1993                 | Attentive public            | .20                 | Attentive public | .18 |
|                            | Education                   | .22                 | Education | .18 |
|                            | Managers                    | .24                 | Managers  | .24 |
|                            | Mass Publics                | .14                 | Mass Publics | .11 |

**Variables Selected:**
- Domestic Politics...compol, danid [dangid], defindiv, richer, stateind, newbusi, compeco
- Foreign Policy...confadm, westhelp, usthreat, mlevz [mispend]

Correlations are the average of the Pierson R's across all the pairs of variables within a particular group (foreign policy questions or domestic policy questions). Each of the control groups consist of the most exclusive categorization among that particular group. For instance, in the education control groups, only those with university or post-graduate degrees are included. In the 1993 survey "education" refers only to graduates or post-graduates in the mass sample.
APPENDIX TO TIMES SERIES TABLE

AUTON — Should there be more autonomy for the Union Republics?

COMPARM, MILCOMP, USSUMIL — To what degree are the US and the Soviet Union / Russia comparable in terms of military power?

COMPECO — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Competition among industries makes our economy stronger?

COMPOL — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Competition among political parties makes our political system stronger?

CONFADM — What is your attitude toward managers of foreign enterprises in Russia?

CRITGOOD — What are your feelings about glasnost?

DANGID — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Society must forbid the expression of dangerous ideas?

DEFGOODS — To what extent is there currently a deficit in needed goods?

DEFINDIV, INDRIGHT — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Individual rights must be defended even if the guilty occasionally go free?

DEFSPEN, FUNDMIL, MILSPEND, SPEND$DEF — Should the Soviet Union / Russia spend more, less, or the same on defense?

DEMGOVT — Do you favor a democratic government or a strong one?

DEMONTOK — Should people with grievances be allowed to demonstrate?

ECOLSPEN — Should spending on protecting the environment be cut?

ECONREF — Do you feel that radical reform is necessary?

EDHEALTH — Do you think expenditures on education and health should be increased, decreased, or remain the same?

EDUCSPEN — Should expenditures on education and health be cut?

ELECTMAN — Should enterprise managers be elected?
ENVIRON — Do you think expenditures on protecting the environment should be increased, decreased, or remain the same?

ETHDISCR — Are ethnic rights violated in the Soviet Union?

EXPOPIN — Do you feel that you are free to express your views in an interview?

EXPROB — What is the most important external problem for the Soviet Union?

EXTHRET — How dangerous are "foreign threats" to the "stability of our country"?

FORAFFR — Do you think expenditures on foreign affairs should be increased, decreased, or remain the same?

FORNTHRT — To what degree are external threats a danger to the Soviet Union / Russia?

FORSPEN — Should the Soviet Union / Russia spend more, less, or same on foreign aid?

FUNDEE — Do you think aid to the countries in Eastern Europe should be increased, decreased, or remain at the same level?

GERTHRT — Would a unified Germany threaten the Soviet Union / Russia?

GOD1PART — Does one party promote democracy?

GORBSUP2 — Do you generally support the actions of M.S. Gorbachev?

HIQUALPR, PRICE — Would you prefer higher prices and better quality, or lower prices and shortages?

HOSUSA — How do you view relations between the United States and the Soviet Union / Russia?

INTPROB — What is the most important internal problem for the Soviet Union?

LITHFORC — Do you approve of the use of armed force in Lithuania?

MILAID, SOVMILAD — Should the Soviet Union / Russia send military aid abroad if asked?

MILFORC2 — What is a desirable US-Soviet military force ratio?
MILPOW — How much military power should the Soviet Union / Russia have relative to the US?

NARODHAP — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Soviet people are happy with their economic and political systems?

NARODSAY — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Average people don't have any say in government?

NUKES — Do nuclear weapons reduce the risk of war?

OFFCARE — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Public officials don't care what average people think?

ONEPHILO — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Only one correct philosophy exists?

ORDER — Is it better to live in order or in freedom?

PARTIC, PARTICIP — Should people have the right to belong to any organization?

PASSPORT — Should internal passports be abolished?

PERISTRO — What are your feelings about perestroika?

PERMCONF — Do deep differences mean permanent conflict?

POLITICS — How interested are you in public affairs?

POWUSA — How powerful is the United States relative to the Soviet Union / Russia?

REDUCIMP — Is the troop reduction initiative important?

REFORM — Is reform too rapid, yes or no?

RELATNS — Have US-Soviet relations improved or worsened lately?

RELUSSU — How do you view relations between the United States and the Soviet Union / Russia?

REVOLT — What do you think are the chances of a public revolt against the government?
RICHER — Is it normal for businessmen to prosper more?

SATMED — Are you satisfied with the accessibility of quality medical care?

SCIENCE — Do you think expenditures on science should be increased, decreased, or remain the same?

SECREP — Should the Republics be allowed to secede?

SOVAFEUR, TROUPOUT, WITHDRAW — Should the Soviet Union / Russia remove its troops from Eastern Europe?

SOVIDTFR — Do you think the Soviet Union / Russia should interfere in the internal affairs of other countries?

SOVMEDIA — Does the Soviet media give an accurate picture of life in the United States?

SOVTHRET, SUTHREAT — Is Soviet / Russian policy a threat to the US?

SOVUS — (is a composite variable concerning Soviet military spending given changes in US military spending.)

SOVWRDSC — Should the USSR spread socialism in the world?

SPEN$DOM — Should we spend more, less, or the same amount on domestic programs?

STALIN — Is Stalin not given enough credit today?

STATEAGR — Should agriculture be state-owned or private?

STATEIND, STATEOWN — Should all heavy industry remain in the hands of the state?

STRIKE, STRIKES — Should workers have the right to strike?

SUAFGH — Did the Soviet Union act correctly in sending troops into Afghanistan?

TRANS — How satisfied are you with the quality of public transport?

TRUSTGOV — How much of the time do you trust the government?

USATTACK — Will the US attack us if we are weak?

USSRDIR — Is the Soviet Union / Russia moving in right direction or not?

USSR_AFG — Were Soviet goals achieved in Afghanistan?
USTHREAT — Is US policy a threat to the Soviet Union / Russia?

VIETNAM — Was the USSR right or wrong to aid North Vietnam?

WEAPONS — Do you think expenditures on weapons should be increased, decreased, or remain the same?

WESTHELP — Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: We won't resolve our economic problems without the help of the West?

WITHDRAW — The Soviet Union / Russia should withdraw all troops from Europe.
Figure 1: Change in Belief System Constraint Over Time
Figure 2: Change in Domestic Politics Belief System Constraint: By Subgroup
Figure 3: Change in Foreign Policy Belief System Constraint: By Subgroup
Bibliography


