THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN RUSSIA

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SUMMARY

Russia's political institutions have changed in fundamental ways since September, 1993. Following the September, 1993, decrees by President Yeltsin dissolving the two-tiered parliament created in 1990, and his suppression by force of the October uprising against his action, elections were held in December, 1993, for a new parliamentary body established under a constitution that was also ratified by national referendum in December. In January, the deputies to the new Federal Assembly convened and the new single-tiered, bicameral legislature began to work. The early experience of the Federal Assembly provides a valuable opportunity to test theoretical predictions about the impact of institutional change on the evolution of parliamentary parties.

Accordingly, in this paper we analyze the forces shaping the system of parliamentary parties in the Russian Federation. To be sure, it is too early to say much definitive about the direction of development of the Russian party system. As of this writing in late 1994, the Federal Assembly is in only its second session and mass-based electoral parties are just beginning to form. Yet, parliamentary parties have been operating for nearly a year and have already shaped the procedures, structures, and policy products of the Duma, the lower house, in basic ways. We believe that this sequence--parliamentary elections, creation of parliamentary institutions, formation of electoral parties, and subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections--is critical to the particular form that parliamentary parties will take. Therefore, we think that careful study of this early, although probably transitional, period will prove essential to understanding of the longer developmental sequence for Russian parliamentary parties and institutions.

We ask, in light of the electoral system and the arrangement of political institutions, whether the party system is evolving in the direction of a two-party system, a multi-party system, or some hybrid, and the implications of this direction for parliamentary parties. We consider what institutional or political changes might be required to yield a majority for any given party or partisan coalition. And, going beyond the usual focus on the number and cohesiveness of parliamentary parties, we examine the place of parties in the decision-making process of the Federal Assembly's lower house, the Duma. We consider the influence of parliamentary parties on the organization of leadership, agenda setting, and voting on the floor. We conclude by assessing the principal factors that might shape the future of parliamentary parties.
The 1993 electoral system had powerful consequences for the organization and procedure of the new Russian Duma. The Duma is a much more strongly faction-oriented parliamentary body than the parliamentary bodies of the 1990-1993 period. Only around 100 members have failed to join party-based factions, and nearly all the rest have entered groups which operate in the same way as party factions. Members of party factions tend to vote in a disciplined way (although levels of discipline are far lower than in European parliamentary parties), both those on the two ends of the spectrum and those in the center. Cohesiveness is much lower for non-party groups. Evidently electoral considerations play a part in ordering behavior in the chamber.

The new Standing Orders adopted by the Duma, as well as the working practices of the Duma, confirmed the multi-party rather than majoritarian character of the distribution of party power. In several cases, divisive issues were decided through consultation and agreement among faction leaders who then persuaded members to accept the decision. We noted that these included the distribution of leadership positions, the amnesty package, and the 1994 budget bill. Faction leaders are also the final point of decision in preparing the daily agenda that is proposed to the full chamber. In each case, decision-making favors consideration of the interests of multiple parties rather than fostering a crystallization of political forces into two competing blocs, "government" and "opposition."

But the future of parliamentary parties in the Duma turns on several factors that remain in flux.

First, the 1993 electoral law will be replaced by a new one before the next parliamentary and presidential elections. Basic issues remain to be determined, such as the mix of Proportional Representation (PR) and Single-Member District (SMD) systems in parliamentary elections. As we, and the Russians, have noted, choices about these electoral arrangements will have direct consequences for the evolution of electoral and parliamentary parties. For example, some of Yeltsin's advisors appear to favor reducing the number of PR seats in order to reduce the number of seats given to Zhirinovskiy's party. Many district deputies also express the belief that parties exercise excessive influence in parliament, and would prefer to reduce the share of list seats. The ability of party factions to structure decisions of the Duma in a such a way as to protect their interests, however, may well be sufficient to ensure that the new electoral law retains the 50-50 proportions of the old law, as well as the 5% threshold, single federal-wide district, and single round of balloting, all of which tend to preserve the advantages of the parties already in parliament.
Second, some basic institutional arrangements are not settled. The role of the Council of the Federation remains uncertain. The decree-making power of the president is yet to be tested in court. Indeed, the Constitutional Court still has not resumed operations. And the timing of elections for the president and the Duma remains an open question. The two-party tendencies of presidential elections are more likely to reach into parliamentary elections if the two elections are scheduled together.

Third, the unsettled partisan and policy preferences of the Russian electorate make it difficult for political strategists to adjust electoral and institutional arrangements to their interests. They also make it difficult for us to predict the direction of change in the party system.

Finally, the existing party structure will influence the direction of change in parliamentary parties. Already there are signs that Duma faction leaders will use their influence to preserve the party-list seats that serve as the basis of their power. As we have seen, they already exercise great control over the legislative process by virtue of their role as members of the Council of the Duma.
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Russian Parliamentary Parties in Comparative Context

What direction would we expect the development of Russian parliamentary parties to take? For guidance, we turn to the comparative literature on political parties. Research on political parties in stable as well as transitional settings has concentrated on four influences on the development of party systems.

The most thoroughly researched influence is electoral law. A central argument of the literature on electoral law and party systems is that the method by which parties win seats in parliament creates incentives for parties to proliferate or consolidate. For example, proportional representation (PR) systems, as a general rule, produce more parties than single-member district (SMD) systems because parties receiving even a small percentage of the vote may gain seats in PR systems (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967; Sartori, 1976; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). And other features of electoral systems are of critical importance, including district magnitude, one-stage versus two-stage elections, electoral thresholds, suffrage, and eligibility requirements for parties.

Another argument of the electoral-law literature is that control over ballot access--nominations--influences the cohesiveness of parliamentary parties. In most PR systems and some SMD systems, party leaders exercise control over nominations and, therefore, have a source of leverage with potential candidates and office holders. In contrast, the primary-based systems, such as those in the American states, reduce the control that party leaders have over the behavior of legislators (on the relationship between electoral and parliamentary parties, see Epstein, 1980). The fractionalization of party systems is also often associated with party cohesiveness.

A second influence, somewhat less well researched, is the arrangement of political institutions (but see Mezey, 1979; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Mainwaring, 1993). The presence of a single, elected president with substantial powers encourages parties to consolidate into large but incohesive parties in order to compete for control of the presidency and to give the president a basis for securing parliamentary majorities. Such systems tend toward two major parties. This tendency is enhanced when presidential and parliamentary elections are held at the same time, so that parties forming to compete in a presidential election find it convenient to compete in parliamentary elections as well. In fact, whether parliamentary elections just precede or just follow presidential elections appears to influence the number of political parties. In contrast, the incentives to form large incohesive parties are weaker in parliamentary systems that allow for coalitions of parliamentary parties to form governments.

A third influence on party systems is the alignment of preferences in the electorate. The "spatial theory of electoral competition" suggests that parties form and position themselves in response to the distribution of voters across the one or more dimensions that organize political attitudes (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Iversen, 1994). Parties are motivated to form, or move to positions, where
significant blocs of voters are located in the space of a political system. Unidimensional, and unimodal and bimodal, alignments encourage two-partyism, while multidimensional, multimodal alignments encourage multiple parties. Needless to say, the alignment of voter preferences influences the relative success of electoral parties and therefore the balance of parliamentary seats.

A fourth important influence, in our view, is the degree of stability in the relations among the inherited system of parties, electoral law, and institutional arrangements. Parties, laws, and institutions create constraints and opportunities for future development depending on the willingness of the dominant coalition of political actors to retain the existing system or to overturn it. It is often observed of the United States that the two major parties have imposed election law and districting formats that greatly disadvantage third party movements and thus tend to preserve the existing two-party system. And, in other systems, there appears to be a tendency for the establishment of a PR system at a moment of constitutional transformation to lock in a stable multi-party system (Lijphart, 1984, 1992a; Nohlen, 1984). Even a parliament’s own inherited rules and procedures, which make it more or less difficult for non-major legislators to influence public policy, may directly or indirectly influence party formation, electoral law, and institutional arrangements.

In sum, electoral law, constitutional arrangements, voter preferences, and the stability of the relations among these create incentives for party leaders. In the case of Russia, however, the impact of these features on the direction of the development of parliamentary parties is not straightforward. Let us consider the effects of each of the four influences.

First, the presidential decree providing for the December, 1993, parliamentary elections provided for half of the 450 seats in the lower house, the Duma, to be chosen on the basis of nationwide proportional representation and half to be chosen from single-member districts.[2] The PR threshold for gaining seats was set at five percent, a relatively high level, so we would expect the development of multiple parties although we would expect some minor parties to fail to meet the threshold for seats. Ballot access for the party-list ballot was tightly controlled by party elites, although candidates were allowed to run on both the party-list and district ballots. Voters had no opportunity to register a preference for one candidate on the list over another in the party-list voting. The arrangement of candidates on the list, therefore, was fixed, which gave the leaders who structured the list a free hand in placing loyalists at the top of their lists. This selection process leads us to expect that parliamentary parties would be dominated by the party leaders, who put themselves at the head of the party lists, and that parliamentary parties would behave as cohesive groups.[3]

The open question at the start of the 1994 session was whether SMD deputies would be readily incorporated into a party-based system within the Duma. Deputies from SMDs were free to affiliate themselves with any party or group and some associated themselves with more than one party or group. The German experience with a mixed PR/SMD electoral system suggests that the sharp partisanship imported to the parliament with the PR deputies would overshadow the local orientation of the SMD deputies. But some hybrid arrangements for the Duma’s parties might be expected.
Second, the Constitution, ratified in a referendum run simultaneously with the 1993 elections, provided for a separation-of-powers system.[4] As in other transitional polities in the region, presidentialism was introduced in Russia after 1990 (Olson, 1993; McGregor, 1993; Remington, 1994; Roeder, 1994). Creation of the Russian presidency altered the distribution of resources and partisan strength between the Russian executive and legislative institutions, which culminated in the violent confrontation between Yeltsin and the legislature of September and October, 1993 (Remington, 1993). The new Constitution created a strong presidency, whose incumbent enjoys a number of advantages vis-a-vis parliament, including the right to dissolve parliament under certain circumstances and the power to issue decrees with the force of law.[5] The Constitution created four-year terms for both the president and Duma deputies (after the deputies' first two-year term, as provided by presidential decree), although the timing of elections is left to federal law. If the current schedule is not modified, Duma deputies would be elected six months before presidents every four years.

The strong Russian presidency should create incentives for the consolidation of parties and groups into two large parties. However, the PR parliamentary elections that precede presidential elections create incentives for the maintenance of a multi-party system. Elsewhere, such mixed incentives have produced in-between results--more than two parties but fewer parties than are found in other PR systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992; also see Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993; Lijphart, 1991, 1994).

Third, the alignment of voters' preferences about parties in Russia is relatively unstable. The number of respondents who identified with a party in a large national Russian survey conducted in March-April 1994 was only 23%; parties as institutions were accorded less trust than any other institution. Only 6% expressed confidence in parties: 12% in parliament; 18% in the president (Rose, 1994, p. 53). Moreover, as studies of public attitudes in the transitional settings of the post-communist region have shown, voters' party preferences are not stable, so that in very few cases--and certainly not in Russia--did the first set of transitional elections solidify an initial party system (Bogdanor, 1990; Kitschelt, 1992; Evans and Whitefield, 1993). A characteristic pattern is the formation of broad popular opposition movements that sweep the first round of elections but subsequently splinter before beginning a gradual process of consolidation (Olson, 1993). Moreover, in several countries of the region voters have brought back into power forces associated with the old regime. That this is due to a major shift in voter preferences rather than change in the structure of the party system is indicated most clearly in Hungary, where virtually the same parties were returned to parliament in 1994 as in 1990, but now with an absolute majority for the socialists.

A reasonable inference from surveys of Russian voters' attitudes is that the alignment of voters' party preferences is quite unstable in Russia as well. Social change is occurring so rapidly that the structure of interests and the link between individual preferences and partisan identities remains fluid (Reisinger et al., pp. 216-218; Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Whitefield and Evans, 1994). Moreover, while a reform/anti-reform dimension appears to be the most significant feature of Russian politics, other cross-
cutting dimensions associated with ethnic, federalism, national, and international issues also are important.

Consequently, we would expect instability in Russian electoral and parliamentary parties and coalitions. The multidimensionality of Russian politics encourages multipartyism, which itself keeps the party system somewhat fluid. Furthermore, we would expect the fluidity in the public's attitudes to have political repercussions for parliamentary parties. For example, we expect parties in the new parliament to find it difficult to use the results of the December, 1993, elections as a guide to predicting the effects of alternative models on their prospects in future elections. And we would expect parliamentary parties to be cautious about joining with each other or with the president to form larger coalitions.

Finally, we anticipate that the interaction of these factors will influence the future development of parliamentary parties. First, the timing of future elections will affect whether the system remains multi-party or tends to move toward a two-party system. A factor favoring multiple parties in Russia is the fact that parliamentary elections were held in December, 1993, and are scheduled again for December, 1995, giving a multi-party system an opportunity to become established before the first presidential elections are held in June, 1996, under the new Constitution. Parties whose leaders believe that they can capture the presidency next time and dominate a winning coalition in parliament tend to want simultaneous elections. Thus, both some strongly pro- and anti-Yeltsin groups favor holding presidential elections early so as to encourage the formation of a broad coalition that can capture both the presidency and the parliament. A second way in which the interaction of inherited features is likely to influence future development of parties concerns the rewriting of the electoral law. A major issue presently being debated is whether to reduce the number of seats in the Duma that are allotted to parties in the PR vote. (Two related issues which are less divisive at present are whether to break the single federal-wide district up into several multi-mandate districts, and whether to reinstate the two-round balloting system.) Since the 1993 elections produced a multi-party parliament with no stable majority coalition, we would expect that there is no single coalition strong enough to impose an electoral system that would greatly advantage its prospects in future parliamentary or presidential elections. Retention of the half-and-half PR and SMD system is therefore a strong likelihood. We will discuss other implications of the 1993 elections below.

Overall, our expectations for parliamentary parties in the Russian Duma are mixed. At the time of the 1993 elections, the strong short-term tendency would have been a multi-party system with a strongly party-oriented legislative process. Moreover, the fluid character of party preferences in the electorate encourages the creation and recreation of multiple parties. And these parties would organize the Duma and have a decisive role in shaping an electoral law to govern future elections. However, the multi-party tendency might be offset by the tendency of plurality, SMD elections to produce two large parties. And the place of SMD deputies in that system was hard to predict, given the shortage of other cases of mixed PR/SMD systems. Over the longer term, the strong presidency creates an incentive for contending parties to form two large party blocs, a motivation that is undercut somewhat by the timing of elections under the current schedule. The historical precedents for a presidential-parliamentary system with a
PR/SMD mix for parliamentary elections are nonexistent, as far as we can determine (see Shugart and Carey, 1992).

We turn now to the results of the 1993 elections for parliamentary parties, detail the decision-making role of parties in the Duma, and examine the partisanship exhibited in Duma roll-call voting during the first year of the new parliament.

The 1993 Elections and Russian Parliamentary Parties

The PR system for the 1993 Duma elections had just the effect that PR has had historically—the formation of multiple parties and the creation of a multi-party and party-oriented legislative process. But these effects must be assessed in historical context. So we begin with a brief discussion of the origins of the 1993 electoral system.

Partisanship and the Origins of the 1993 Electoral System

The radical political and social transformation of Russia of the five years preceding the 1993 election greatly influenced the formation of parties in 1993. Still visible behind Russia's multi-party system are the dim outlines of a two-party system, both in the elections and in the organization of parliamentary parties. Beginning with the mobilization of radical anti-establishment sentiment in the 1989 and 1990 elections by democratic political activists, political organizations and parliamentary factions associated with market-oriented and liberal democratic values have challenged communists, ultra-nationalists, and representatives of the traditional bureaucratic power structures (McFaul, 1993a, 1993b; Tolz, 1990; Brudny, 1993; Chiesa, 1993; Kiernan, 1993).

The 1990 elections pitted a coalition of democratic reformers called Democratic Russia against a bloc of socialists and nationalists, both in the national elections and in many local races. These elections, as in Soviet elections in the past, were conducted in single-member districts exclusively: the country was divided into as many single-member electoral districts as were required for the number of seats mandated in parliament. The system, it appears, created incentives for reformers and their opponents to form large enough coalitions to win the elections in the districts, in most cases in the second, run-off round of voting.

In turn, the bipolarity of the campaign carried over into the alignments of deputies in the new Russian parliament. Despite the splintering of political forces into over a dozen political factions, a strongly bimodal distribution of ideological positions among deputies can be detected at most of the Russian Congresses (Remington, et al., 1994; Sobyanin, 1994). Signs of the same polarization between democrats and opposition could be found in the 1993 electoral campaign but these were overshadowed by internecine divisions among democrats, who were represented by several parties, and by the strong 'third force' campaign run by the Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his party, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).

It is often thought that since the new constitutional and electoral
arrangements employed in 1993 were decreed by President Yeltsin, they were entirely the handiwork of his supporters and were therefore strategically designed to maximize their advantages (Urban, 1994). Only in some respects is this the case. Both the new election law and the constitutional draft submitted to the voters were the products of long discussion among a wide variety of political groups.[6] The election law had been debated in parliament for well over a year before Yeltsin issued it as a decree, and virtually all political groups supported a mixed PR-plurality system. To be sure, there were unresolved questions about the electoral law at the time that the old parliament was dissolved by Yeltsin, including the size of the Duma and the proportion of seats to be assigned by PR. Nonetheless, interviews with a number of parliamentary and party leaders in spring of 1993 suggest that most democrats and many others agreed that party lists (in some combination with SMD seats) should be used to stimulate the further development of electoral parties. These features were part of the draft electoral law being worked on in parliament.

Democratic activists close to Yeltsin were quite aware of several practical considerations that influenced their view of the electoral system. The mixed PR/SMD system allowed candidates to run on both the party list and in districts, which increased the prospects of top democrats to be elected to the parliament. After all, democratic leaders were largely drawn from an urban political elite and were expected to have trouble recruiting quality candidates and mounting effective campaigns in many local districts. The party-list mechanism meant the democratic forces could count on a substantial representation in the new parliament without having to field candidates in districts throughout Russia. Communists were considered to be greatly advantaged in local contests because of their extensive local organization, ability to nominate known personalities in nearly all corners of the country, and influence over local election officials. Furthermore, the PR voting and seat allocation was conducted on a nationwide basis rather than on the basis of a larger number of multi-member districts. This was done to reduce the chances that parties with a strong regional or ethnic appeal might win seats. The short time the parties had to organize and mount campaigns put some of the just-suppressed opposition groups at a disadvantage.

There was disagreement, however, within the reform camp over the number of seats that should be allocated to list candidates. Some wanted to limit the number of list seats to one quarter or one third and encourage democratic forces in local districts to ally with entrepreneurial and managerial forces in a centrist coalition. Others believed the communist forces to be so strongly entrenched in the districts and democratic forces so weakly organized that it was necessary to maximize the number of list seats. At the last minute, the latter camp succeeded in persuading President Yeltsin to alter the decreed election law and mandate a half-and-half system.

Given the potential for corruption in the 1993 election, the relationship of the presidential administration to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) also was considered important to the reformers. Yeltsin appointed Nikolai Ryabov, a communist and member of the oppositional parliamentary leadership under Khasbulatov in the 1992-93 period but one who began to defect from the Khasbulatov camp after the
April, 1993, referendum, to be Chairman of the CEC. However, there is no
evidence that Ryabov loyally supported Yeltsin in everything (as Urban
tells, though, he was hardly neutral about getting the constitution
passed). There is little evidence of partisan gamesmanship in the merging
of the 900 existing territorial electoral districts into 225 new ones--
requiring, for the most part, joining four old into one new one.[7] And
there has been little hard evidence to support claims of partisan bias by the
CEC in its method of tallying votes, the disqualification of certain parties from
running, decision to limit access by observers to the raw vote data, and
the like.[8] More persuasive is the argument that the CEC acted so as to favor
Yeltsin's interest in seeing the constitution ratified and the desire of many
regional chiefs of administration in being elected to the Council of the
Federation. This theory holds that high reported turnout was required to
validate the constitutional referendum; in turn, the excess votes were
distributed in such a way as to ensure the election of regional chief executives
in the races for the upper chamber (who were directly in charge of summing
votes from election districts in their regions) and were distributed among
various opposition parties in the party list votes for the Duma. Since the CEC
has never allowed independent observers access to the ballots or the raw data
and has never published a full tally of votes, one cannot dismiss these charges
(on the accusations of election fraud, see Vyzhutovich, 1994; Lyubarskii, 1994;
Sobyanin and Sukhovol'skii, 1994; Sukhovol'skii, Sobyanin and Gel'man, 1994;
Aidinova, 1994; but see also Vedeneev and Lysenko, 1994).

Moreover, despite the obvious efforts of some Yeltsin supporters to take
advantage of their government positions in the 1993 elections, Yeltsin himself
refused to involve himself in party-building activities.[9] This appeared to
contribute to the fragmentation of democratic forces into multiple parties,
which may have cost them both PR and SMD seats. Indeed, the president's
public posture and that of many senior members of his administration
suggested that the outcome of the parliamentary elections was largely
unimportant; only passage of the constitution mattered, and that was largely a
question of turnout.

The 1993 Election Outcomes

The party-list results, as a percentage of the national vote in
December, 1993, and as counted by the affiliation of deputies in April,
1994, are provided in Table 1. The table also lists the total seats for each
parliamentary party, a number that includes SMD deputies who chose to
affiliate with a parliamentary party. Plainly, the PR system had the
predicted effect--deputies from multiple parties were elected to the
Duma. And a majority of the SMD deputies eventually affiliated with a
parliamentary party, although a sizable minority chose to form new
parliamentary groups (New Regional Policy, Russia's Way, and the
Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12).

The Duma's parties cover the entire political spectrum. However,
neither of the two major blocs of parties--listed as the reform-oriented
and opposition parties in the table--came close to taking a majority of the seats
in the Duma. The reform-oriented parties comprise just over a third of
the Duma, while opposition parties comprise about 40 percent. The small
group Russia's Way is allied with the opposition parties, as is a more recent
formation called Derzhava (Great Power), made up of a handful of defectors
from Zhirinovsky's party.

These results must be viewed in the context of the parties that
failed to gain seats in the Duma. Yeltsin's election decree set very high
thresholds to registration of parties. Only 21 parties submitted lists to
the CEC by the deadline, and only 13 of these were certified as valid.
Five of the 13 parties competing for the list vote failed to clear the five-
percent hurdle. On the other hand, less than nine percent of the voters
cast party-list votes for parties that failed to reach parliament. This is a
far smaller proportion of "wasted votes" than is typically found in
plurality systems and even in many proportional systems (McGregor 1993).
Overall, however, these features of the electoral law had a very
substantial effect: Of dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations that might
have attempted to field candidates, only eight succeeded in entering
parliament through proportional representation.

The mixed PR/SMD system appears to have had several important
consequences. The most obvious effect of the PR system was to give the
Zhirinovsky party, the LDPR, a strong position in the Duma. This nationalist
party garnered 23 percent of the nationwide PR vote but fielded very few SMD
candidates and only won one district seat. As Yeltsin strategists seemed to
expect, the other major opposition parties, the communists and the agrarians,
did much better in the SMD contests, winning 34 percent is the SMD seats but
only about 20 percent of the PR vote. Democrats' strength in parliament is
evenly balanced between seats won in districts and on party lists--they won
about 34 percent of the seats in both the PR and SMD contests.

Parliamentary Parties in the Duma

After the dissolution of parliament in October, 1993, President
Yeltsin appointed a number of friendly deputies from the old parliament to
a commission charged with preparing the rules and legislative agenda of
the new parliament. Guided by the draft constitution and the electoral
decreee, the commission proposed draft rules for the two houses that
differed substantially between one another and from the past rules with
respect to the role of parliamentary parties. Parties figured prominently
in the rules proposed for the Duma. Although the commission's draft rules
were further modified in important ways before adoption, the final
version retained the principles of a party-dominated Duma. This suggests that
the new institutional arrangement commanded support from more than just
Yeltsin's political allies.

The Formation of Parliamentary Factions

The terminology used by president's commission and later by the
Duma related to party is important. The Duma's rules refer to fraktsii, or
factions, rather than to parties. The term was used by the transitional
Supreme Soviet and Congress, whose deputies had been elected without
formal party attachments. The transition parliament developed rules that
allowed its members to form factions and granted them certain parliamentary
privileges. In the Duma, the parties that won PR seats were given faction status automatically but other groups of deputies could register factions as long as they met minimum size requirements. Thus, parties and factions cannot be equated, even though most factions are party based.

The president's commission initially proposed that the steering body for the Duma be a council comprising the leaders of the factions. The commission was strongly influenced by its members' reaction to the autocratic practices of the chairman of the transitional Supreme Soviet and Congress, who exercised his power through the presidium (an executive committee comprised of committee chairs that exercised broad agenda-setting powers and controlled the administrative apparatus of the parliament). The proposed rules provided for only limited powers for the Duma's chair and did not create a central presidium. Members of the commission envisioned the new governing structures of the Duma as being horizontal--based on agreements among the factions--rather than vertical--exercised hierarchically through the chairman, the presidium, and the committees.

As it turned out, opposition factions, which played no part in the presidential commission planning for the new parliament but were stronger than Yeltsin's strategists had expected before the elections, deferred little to the commission's recommendations. Indeed, the Duma's new chairman, Ivan Rybkin, had been a leader of the communist faction in the old Supreme Soviet. By the end of its first six months of operation, the Duma developed both a strongly party-oriented system for leadership and coordination and committee-oriented system for the drafting of legislative details. On balance, we will show, the party-related elements--factions and the Council of the Duma--have proven to be somewhat more important than committees in the chamber's decision-making process.

Even before the Duma convened for the first time, party factions began asserting claims to leadership positions in the chamber. Faction leaders were able to assert these claims on behalf of deputies because they had substantially more influence over members than had faction leaders in the transitional parliament. On the opening day, deputies confirmed the official status of registered party factions and adopted the rule, proposed by the president's commission, that the principal governing body of the Duma be a council composed of the leaders of factions.[12]

The initial, provisional rules adopted provided that any electoral association which had elected deputies on a national party list could form a faction of deputies in the Duma, no matter how few members it had. Accordingly, the smallest, the Democratic Party of Russia enjoyed the same formal status as did the largest, Russia's Choice. With just a couple of exceptions, deputies elected on party lists joined a corresponding faction early in the session. Nearly all other Duma deputies, those elected from districts, either registered with one of the eight party factions that had elected party-list deputies or joined one of the other groups that eventually formed.[13]
Traces of the 1993 Elections in the Duma Organization

Several issues concerning factions arose immediately, including representation on the Council of the Duma, the size threshold for registering non-party groups as factions, the parliamentary privileges of party and non-party factions, the power of party factions to expel party-list members, and the distribution of leadership positions. Each of these issues was resolved in a manner that accommodated multiple interests rather than a single group's domination. The coequal status of factions in the Council of the Duma has in turn reinforced the multi-party and non-majoritarian distribution of power.

For instance, the absence of a majority bloc of deputies influenced the structure of the Council of the Duma. The issue concerned equal versus proportionate representation for factions on the Council. A majority bloc might have been able to gain proportional representation for the Council, thereby guaranteeing its control over the agenda-setting organ of the Duma. It must also be said that the eventual decision was influenced by Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky's demagogic approach in the first days of the session affected most deputies, even communist and agrarians, by reinforcing their interest in ensuring equality of rights for members and factions and not permitting excessive centralization of power in parliament. The Duma agreed that the Council would be composed of factions on a parity rather than proportional basis.[14]

The issue of the minimum size of membership required for a group to register as a faction reflected the presence of SMD deputies without a party affiliation. Independent deputies favored a lower threshold, while, for the most part, larger factions tended to prefer a higher threshold for registration. The issue was important because the privileges associated with faction status were expected to be significant. In addition to representation on the Council of the Duma, faction representatives are recognized to speak on the floor ahead of other deputies; only registered factions were able to claim committee chairmanships and other leadership positions; and space, staff funding, and office budgets were granted to registered factions.

A series of recorded votes produced a threshold of 35 as a compromise between the threshold of 50 demanded by Zhirinovsky and the threshold of 15 demanded by some independents. Only one of the three independent groups met the 35-member threshold, the New Regional Policy group, which soon attracted over 60 members. Each of the other two attempted to persuade the party factions they were most closely aligned with (the communists in the first case, and Russia's Choice in the second) to "lend" some members for the purpose of meeting the threshold, but both groups were initially unsuccessful. By May, after benefiting from some defections from other factions and the support of more independent deputies, the Union of December 12 met the threshold and was duly registered.[15]

The issue of an "imperative mandate" concerned the obligations of party-list deputies to their faction (and party) leaders. Proponents of the imperative mandate argued that party-list deputies had an obligation to adhere to the policy positions established by their factions. Indeed, as
the term implies, proponents believed that support for the faction was a necessary condition for continuing membership in the Duma. In their view, party-list deputies would undermine the purpose of party-list elections if they failed to vote with their parliamentary faction. Needless to say, in the fractionalized Duma, the outcome on this issue would affect the bargaining power of faction leaders and influence policy outcomes from time to time. The issue arose as an amendment both to the standing rules and to the Law on the Status of the Deputy. Under the amendment, party factions could remove from office any party-list deputy who violated party discipline. The expelled deputy's seat would then be filled by the next candidate on the list.

The imperative mandate was endorsed initially by Russia's Choice, LDPR, communists, agrarians, and the Democratic Party of Russia, but was eventually rejected on close votes. Again, a negative reaction to Zhirinovsky may have played a role. The rule's most ardent defender was Zhirinovsky, who clearly intended to use it to strengthen his personal control over his party in the face of strains and defections among his followers. Many deputies, in responding to our questions, indicated that they favored the rule initially but were persuaded by Zhirinovsky's behavior at the founding congress of his party--when he was elected "leader for life" and the party agreed not to hold another congress for ten years--that the imperative mandate would give Zhirinovsky a disproportionate advantage in building a personal power base. In the end, Russia's Choice and other democratic factions voted against the proposal.

Factions have adopted a variety of formal rules on voting discipline. Some factions use a "solidarity vote" procedure, with either two-thirds or simple majority vote within the faction needed to impose the expectation of a party-line vote faction members. Some participants claim that the LDPR is distinctive in its application of the "fuhrer principle"--that Zhirinovsky can order compliant voting behavior from LDPR deputies on his own authority. Most factions seem to tolerate defections on matters subject to a solidarity vote with stipulation that members carefully explain their position and that they not directly and actively oppose the faction. Nonvoting is often a convenient option for deputies in such cases. Members of nearly all factions claim that solidarity votes pertain only to "matters of principle." Some factions appear to have adopted a solidarity-vote rule as a defensive response to solidarity-vote rules adopted by other factions. Fearing that they would be disadvantaged in competition with more cohesive factions, some factions have backed into solidarity-vote rule that might not have otherwise done so.

Finally, even before the final results of the December elections were known, but as soon as it was clear that no faction or bloc would gain a majority in the Duma, faction leaders began negotiating over chamber and committee leadership positions. Because the factions had somewhat different substantive interests, faction leaders found it possible to agree on a plan. The result was a classic logroll, which was approved by an overwhelming majority on January 17 and settled nearly all of the outstanding problems of matching faction demands with committee and leadership positions.

The most important component of the package deal was the
distribution of committee leadership positions. To accommodate factions' demands for positions, faction leaders agreed to expand the number of committees from nine, as initially proposed by the president's preparatory commission, to twenty-three. This created more chairmanships and deputy chairmanships to spread among the factions and assured factions with special policy interests that a committee would address their concerns. The chairmanships were allocated with a bidding system. Each position was assigned a weight—a committee chairmanship was worth more than a deputy chairmanship—and each faction was given "chips" in proportion to the number of seats it held. Faction leaders then took turns bidding on positions, with the highest bidder winning. The typical result for a committee was a chair and deputy chairs from different factions.[16]

The package deal also balanced faction representation in the four deputy chairmanships of the Duma itself. After the Agrarian Ivan Rybkin was elected to the chairmanship of the Duma, the post of first deputy chairmanship was assigned as part of the package agreement to Russia's Choice deputy Mikhail Mitiukov. Three other deputy chairmanships went to members of the communist, Women of Russia, and LDPR factions. A fourth position was eventually filled by a New Regional Policy member.[17] It is important to note that only the New Regional Policy deputy chair is an SMD deputy. The others are from the top of party lists.

Factions are now a regular feature of the work of the Duma. The Council of the Duma provides for faction meetings in its regular schedule. Typically, factions meet twice a week, usually for two or more hours each time, and often hold special meetings. Deputies report that most factions conduct their meetings so as to allow open, wide-ranging discussion on all important policy and political matters of concern to their members. In many cases faction members specialize in particular legislative areas, allowing them to exercise policy leadership on an issue in which they have particular expertise or a particular interest. They then are the rapporteurs on that issue at faction meetings, and head the working groups which develop the legislation. Discussion at faction meetings often serves to establish the members' position on current legislative business even when they do not decide to oblige the membership to vote the party line.

The Importance of Faction Leaders and the Council of the Duma

Plainly, factions are far more important than their predecessors in the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies during the transitional period. Their importance is enhanced by the central place of the Council of the Duma in the legislative process. A few details of the legislative process and a brief illustration will make our point.

Much of the standard legislative process of the Duma was inherited from the Supreme Soviet, including the placement of agenda-setting responsibilities in the hands of a central executive committee (Remington and Smith, 1994). In the case of the Duma, the Council of the Duma refers legislation to committee or committees, reviews the legislative reports of committees to determine if legislation is ready for floor action or whether it should be returned to committee for further work, proposes floor agendas and the manner in which amendments to legislation will be
considered, and coordinates the work of conciliation commissions with
the Council of the Federation (the upper chamber). In many legislative
bodies, these functions are at least formally distributed among separate
individuals or units, but in the Duma they are concentrated in one
multimember body.

A real test of the Council of the Duma occurred on the government's
1994 budget. Reform-oriented factions such as Russia's Choice and
Yabloko opposed the budget because it included too little funding for
social programs such as education and science and too much funding for
agriculture and defense. Opposition groups demanded huge increases in
defense spending. The bill was also subject to a turf battle between the
Budget Committee and the Economic Policy Committee, with the latter
favoring much more defense spending than the government proposed. And,
while the Budget Committee succeeded in defending its jurisdiction and
gaining adoption of a special procedure for processing the budget bill, the
committee's chairman, a member of the Yabloko faction, openly opposed
the bill. Deadlock over the bill was a serious possibility, one that
threatened the Duma's role in budget making.

At each major step in the process, the Council of the Duma and the
chairman were able to devise crucial compromises and construct
majorities for the budget bill. At first reading, Chairman Rybkin used the
Council of the Duma to mediate a compromise between faction leaders and
the government that avoided the likely vote to send the budget proposal
back to the government for redrafting. At second reading, the Budget
Committee's handiwork, and timely Duma action, was threatened by about
300 amendments that had been submitted by deputies. Only after Rybkin
recessed the Duma, met with faction leaders in the Council in executive
session, and reconvened the Duma was the Budget Committee's
recommendation adopted by a one-vote margin. It appears that Rybkin
convinced faction leaders, who, in turn, were able to convince enough of
their colleagues, that the budget would be impossible to adopt if the
committee's recommendation was open to amendment.

Another instance in which the faction leaders achieved compromise
agreements which passed on the floor and avoided an internal crisis or
deadlock were the agreement to amnesty individuals arrested for participation
in the September-October 1993 uprising and its suppression, to dissolve the
parliamentary commission investigating these events (which might have
proven politically embarrassing for the president), and to free individuals
from jail who were serving time for economic crimes committed under the
communist regime. Another was the agreement between faction leaders and
Chubais over the post-voucher privatization program, which required
compromise on both sides, but which failed by a narrow margin in the Duma.
These package deals have tended to moderate the Duma's decisions and to
prevent direct confrontations with the executive.

Agenda-Setting

The legislative agenda in the Duma is proposed by the Council of the
Duma to the floor, where it is debated, amended and adopted. The Council of the
Duma, prepares a draft agenda for each day that the Duma is in session. This is
drawn up in accordance with the members' judgments about the urgency and state of readiness of legislation to be discussed on the floor. The proposed agenda is then presented to the chamber at the beginning of each day's session. The agenda proposed by the Council of the Duma is subject to amendment and vote on the floor. Debates over the agenda begin each day's session and they often are the occasion for complaints about what is and is not brought to the floor. Members may offer amendments to the agenda, such as amendments calling for a vote on a bill at first reading. Once the agenda is approved, debate on the legislation proceeds. The agenda debate normally lasts about an hour.

The Council of the Duma also attempts to draw up a longer-term plan of work for the session. For instance, opening the fall session of the Duma on October 5, 1994, the chamber's Deputy Chairman, Mikhail Mitiukov, reported that there were 264 items in the legislative docket to be dealt with by the Duma between October and December. Of these, 68 were said to be urgent, as were another 17 bills that had been rejected by the President or Council of the Federation and returned for further action by the Duma. This list was prepared following an intensive two-day discussion between representatives of the presidential administration and the government with the chairs of the Duma's standing committees about the priority of various legislative matters. After the Duma took the proposed autumn plan under advisement, Mitiukov held a second meeting with committee chairs and representatives of the president and government, where the plan was further expanded by including several more legislative items that participants deemed urgent. In developing the longer-term plan of work, then, a broad spectrum of interests is invited to take part. Specific decisions about what matters to present to the Duma for a given day or week are, however, made by the Council of the Duma for presentation to the floor. Here a cross-factional political judgement is required about the importance of an issue and the likelihood of its passing. Since the pool of available legislative items is many times greater than can be realistically considered over a given term, the collective decisions of the faction leaders about the Duma's agenda determine the chamber's priorities.

Factions and Voting

Is the faction-oriented legislative process reflected in floor voting behavior? Assessing the importance of parliamentary factions in voting within the Duma requires a basis of comparison. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no other national legislature that has been studied carefully casts recorded votes as frequently as the Duma, which cast more than 2100 recorded votes in just its first seven months in operation. The votes are cast in 20-second voting periods and take the place of voice-vote and unanimous-consent decisions that are cast in some other legislatures. Many of the votes, it almost goes without saying, concern routine and procedural matters. But the number of votes on such matters makes treacherous direct comparisons between the Duma and other legislatures.

Furthermore, analysis of voting alignments is complicated by the chamber's voting practices. To be adopted, a motion must receive support from a majority of all elected deputies—which is currently interpreted as meaning 450 rather than the number of deputies elected and serving—rather than just a majority of deputies present and voting. Nonvoting counts as a
nay" vote. Deputies take advantage of this arrangement, so nonvoting is commonplace. In fact, for the January-July, 1994, period, the mean number of "yea" votes was 211 and the mean number of "nay" votes was 49. so the typical motion was defeated (211 is less than a majority) because of nonvoting. The obvious solution is to count nonvoting as voting "nay." The problem of nonvoting, of course, makes it still more difficult for the Duma to override the Federation Council or President, or to pass a "constitutional law," since these require a two-thirds affirmative vote. When the recent vote of no-confidence in the government failed, some 303 deputies took part while nearly 150 did not cast votes. How many were deliberately acting so as to bring about the defeat of the motion, but without allowing their positions to be recorded? Note that a resolution condemning the government's performance as unsatisfactory did pass two days later.

No entirely acceptable solution to the problem of nonvoting exists so we report the results of two approaches. First, we count nonvotes and nay votes. Because we know that absenteeism is a problem in the Duma, we know that this approach introduces significant measurement error.[18] Second, we apply a participation rate standard--at least 70 percent of the deputies had to vote for the vote to be included--and replicate the first approach except that we recode nonvoting as a mean value. In both cases, we limit the analysis to contested votes.

Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of deputies across the dimension that emerges as the dominant factor in a principal-components analysis for the two approaches.[19] The alignment is quite polarized. Russia's Choice anchors the right side of the political spectrum, while the agrarians, communists, and Zhirinovsky faction cluster as the opposition factions at the left side. It is reasonable to speculate that there is a basis for two large parties in Russian politics but that the party-list system creates a strong countervailing tendency for fragmentation of the party system on the basis of differences on less important policy dimensions and politicians' ambitions.

The larger factions comprise both district and list deputies. We have seen that on certain issues, this distinction gives rise to political differences that cut across party ideology. Across the broad range of issues voted on by the members, however, there is no significant difference in the average scores on the dominant political dimension between those members of factions who represent territorial districts and those elected from party lists.

As Table 2 shows, the opposition factions appear to be less cohesive than the reform groups when we use the first method. However, we have reason to believe that nonvoting is far more common in reform factions than in opposition factions, so the reform factions' cohesiveness is likely to be artificially inflated by counting all of the nonvoting as nay votes. The differences in cohesiveness between the reform and opposition factions disappear when nonvoting is not treated as voting nay and a modest participation threshold is used for the inclusion of roll-call votes. But the two factions composed primarily of SMD deputies, December 12 and New Regional Policy, still show much lower than average cohesiveness. And the Agrarians, who are usually viewed as tightly knit
on agricultural issues but not other issues, remain fairly incohesive overall. Indeed, on certain certain measures supported by the government, support by elements of the Agrarian faction allowed passage despite the opposition of the Communists and Liberal Democrats. Among these are the no confidence vote of October 27. The Agrarians split and many failed to support the motion after President Yeltsin appointed the Chairman of the Agriculture Committee to be Agriculture Minister.

**Conclusion**

The 1993 electoral system had powerful consequences for the organization and procedure of the new Russian Duma. The Duma is a much more strongly faction-oriented parliamentary body than the parliamentary bodies of the 1990-1993 period. Only around 100 members have failed to join party-based factions, and nearly all the rest have entered groups which operate in the same way as party factions. As Table 2 shows, members of party factions tend to vote in a disciplined way (although levels of discipline are far lower than in European parliamentary parties), both those on the two ends of the spectrum and those in the center. Cohesiveness is much lower for non-party groups. Evidently electoral considerations play a part in ordering behavior in the chamber.

The new Standing Orders adopted by the Duma, as well as the working practices of the Duma, confirmed the multi-party rather than majoritarian character of the distribution of party power. In several cases, divisive issues were decided through consultation and agreement among faction leaders who then persuaded members to accept the decision. We noted that these included the distribution of leadership positions, the amnesty package, and the 1994 budget bill. Faction leaders are also the final point of decision in preparing the daily agenda that is proposed to the full chamber. In each case, decision-making favors consideration of the interests of multiple parties rather than fostering a crystallization of political forces into two competing blocs, "government" and "opposition."

But the future of parliamentary parties in the Duma turns on several factors that remain in flux.

First, the 1993 electoral law will be replaced by a new one before the next parliamentary and presidential elections. Basic issues remain to be determined, such as the mix of PR and SMD in parliamentary elections. As we, and the Russians, have noted, choices about these electoral arrangements will have direct consequences for the evolution of electoral and parliamentary parties. For example, some of Yeltsin's advisors appear to favor reducing the number of PR seats in order to reduce the number of seats given to Zhirinovksy's party. Many district deputies also express the belief that parties exercise excessive influence in parliament, and would prefer to reduce the share of list seats. The ability of party factions to structure decisions of the Duma in a such a way as to protect their interests, however, may well be sufficient to ensure that the new electoral law retains the 50-50 proportions of the old law, as well as the 5% threshold, single federal-wide district, and single
round of balloting, all of which tend to preserve the advantages of the parties already in parliament.

Second, some basic institutional arrangements are not settled. The role of the Council of the Federation remains uncertain. The decree-making power of the president is yet to be tested in court. Indeed, the Constitutional Court still has not resumed operations. And the timing of elections for the president and the Duma remains an open question. The two-party tendencies of presidential elections are more likely to reach into parliamentary elections if the two elections are scheduled together.

Third, the unsettled partisan and policy preferences of the Russian electorate make it difficult for political strategists to adjust electoral and institutional arrangements to their interests. They also make it difficult for us to predict the direction of change in the party system.

Finally, the existing party structure will influence the direction of change in parliamentary parties. Already there are signs that Duma faction leaders will use their influence to preserve the party-list seats that serve as the basis of their power. As we have seen, they already exercise great control over the legislative process by virtue of their role as members of the Council of the Duma.
Table 1: Parties in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party</th>
<th>Party-List Vote Percentage</th>
<th>Party-List Seats Received</th>
<th>Total Seats as of April 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform-Oriented Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Choice</td>
<td>15.51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centrist Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party of Russia</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Parties That Failed to Reach the 5% Threshold</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of Russia/New Names</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity and Charity</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDR</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms</td>
<td>4.08</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Parliamentary Groups Forming after the Elections</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regional Policy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Way</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Acronyms:
PRES = Party of Russian Unity and Accord
KEDR = Constructive-Ecological Movement 'Cedar'
Yabloko = Bloc "Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin" [the names of its three leaders]
Table 2. Standard Deviations for Duma Factions on the Major Dimension, Calculated for Both Forms of the Analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Party</th>
<th>Nonvoting As Voting Nay</th>
<th>Treated Nay</th>
<th>Participation Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform-Oriented Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia's Choice</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centrist Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party of Russia</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliamentary Groups Forming after the Elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regional Policy</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia's Way</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Deputies on Principal Component. With Faction Mean Scores, January-July, 1994.
Figure 2. Frequency Distribution on Reform Dimension for High Participation Votes.

- R. Choice (-1.26)
- PRES (-1.00)
- Dec 12 (-1.08)
- Yabloko (-0.70)
- NRP (-0.32)
- Comm (1.27)
- Women (0.17)
- Agrarian (0.94)
- LDPR (0.93)
- R. Way (0.69)
- DPR (0.57)

Std. Dev = 1.00
Mean = 0.00
N = 453.00

REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1
ENDNOTES

[1] The research reported here is supported by a grant from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which does not bear responsibility for any of the content or findings of this paper. Much of the information based on personal observation and interviews with members of the parliament, the staff, and political experts in the course of trips in December 1993, February 1994, March 1994, May-June 1994, and October 1994, as well as on contemporary newspaper accounts and published records of the parliament. We would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Moshe Haspel of Emory University; and to express our appreciation to Irina Andreeva, Director of the Parliamentary Library in Moscow, for helping us obtain needed documents. The rollcall voting records were obtained from INDEM, a Moscow-based political research firm.

[2] The upper house, the Council of the Federation, is composed of two deputies from each of the 88 constituent members of the Russian Federation. Under the presidential decree for the 1993 elections, the deputies were selected on the basis of a single ballot, with the top two vote getters winning the seats. After the first two-year term, scheduled to expire in December, 1995, the Constitution provides merely that the two deputies from each region be selected from the legislative and executive branches of regional governments. It does not specify the manner of the election and does not set a length of term for Council deputies.

[3] Here and elsewhere, we use the term party to simplify an already complicated set of distinctions between types of political organizations. The electoral law provided that registered 'electoral associations' (izbiratel'noe ob"edinenie) that met a certain threshold of signatures could both nominate candidates in single-member districts and run candidates on party lists. Some of the electoral associations that ran candidates in the 1993 elections did constitute themselves as parties, while others, such as Yabloko, constituted themselves as 'blocs,' and still others as 'movements.' For simplicity, we shall refer to all electoral associations as parties.

[4] The arrangement of Russian political institutions falls into the presidential-parliamentary category of the Shugart-Carey (1992) typology. Historically, this form appears to be uncommon and unstable. Presidential-parliamentary systems give both the president and the parliament a voice in dismissing a government and therefore create conditions conducive to stalemate and the assertion of dictatorial presidential powers. However, in the new Russian variant, the president has the upper hand. The government or individual ministers may be dismissed by the president. The government also may be subjected to a vote of confidence in the Duma. If the Duma votes no confidence in the government, the president may choose to ignore the first such vote but must either dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma if the Duma votes no confidence a second time within three months. The prime minister may submit a motion of confidence to the Duma, which, if denied
by the Duma, leads the president to decide whether to dismiss the
government or dissolve the Duma.

[5]. Decrees (ukazy) carry the force of law until legislation is enacted that
supplants the decree. Yeltsin's decrees have been quite important,
extending to privatization, banking reform, and criminal procedure,
although they have been issued with an invitation to the Federal Assembly
to pursue substitute legislation. Not surprisingly, Yeltsin's decree-
making power has been questioned by critics who charge that the
president may not use the power to override existing law. If the
president's interpretation of the power stands, the Russian president will
be able to modify the policy status quo without action by the parliament
and then use the veto power to resist a legislative response, should the
two houses be able to formulate one.

[6]. The Congress of People's Deputies had approved the basic principles of
the new parliamentary model back in December 1990 but had never passed
a specific constitutional draft. The general outlines of a directly-elected,
one-tier parliament with a popular lower house and an upper chamber with
equality of representation from all constituent members of the federation
had been broadly accepted. These provisions were also part of the model
proposed by Yeltsin's "constitutional assembly" in the spring of 1993. The
controversial issues had to do with the relative powers of president and
parliament, and with the constitutional status of republic and ordinary
units of the federation.

[7]. In fact, the officials drawing new district lines faced certain
limitations on their ability to draw new district lines: they could not
cross existing administrative borders. Thus certain national-territorial
units of low population had an electoral district with a much sparser
population than others.

[8]. Two Russian analysts have claimed that it was radical supporters of
Yeltsin who eliminated the institution of district and city electoral
commissions and then later accused Yeltsin's enemies of doing so in order
to have a free hand to falsify the election results. See Vedeneev and
Lysenko. 1994. An area of legitimate concern is the CEC's count of turnout
in the 1993 constitutional referendum. Yeltsin's decree required that a
majority of eligible voters cast referendum ballots for the ratification of
the Constitution to be valid. If the turnout was close to a majority, as it
was, it is reasonable to surmise that there would be considerable
political pressure on the CEC to certify the validity of ratification. In
fact, subsequent analysis of the referendum results cast some doubt about
whether a majority turnout occurred (Vyzhutovich 1994).

[9]. We must note that the presidential team designed certain provisions on
implementation of the new constitution in ways intended to benefit
Yeltsin's political supporters. For example, the constitutional draft
contained transitional provisions that required new parliamentary
elections in two years, rather than in four, as was to be the case
thereafter. The effect of the provision was to limit the risks attendant to
the election of a new parliament and to make deputies face the electorate
earlier than the president, whose five-year term was set to expire in
June, 1996. The rapid succession of elections may also have the effect of
speeding the formation of electoral parties.

[10]First, parties and electoral associations had to have been registered by the Ministry of Justice to form lists. Second, they had to collect 100,000 signatures nominating petitions, of which no more than 15 percent could be obtained in any one province. And third, they had to gather the signatures and submit them to the Central Electoral Commission by November 6. On the effect of the electoral law on the campaign, see Urban (1994, pp. 136-9).

[11]The CEC disqualified eight on the grounds that some of the signatures were invalid or too many were collected in one region.

[12]Committee chairs were given the right of participation in the Council of the Duma, although without a vote.

[13]All three are comprised mainly of SMD deputies. New Regional Policy has a heavy representation of state enterprise directors. Russia’s Way has a strongly nationalist and communist bent. The Union of December 12 (named after election day) has a predominantly reformist outlook and is close to Russia’s Choice on substantive policy questions, but its members sought to establish a separate political identity. Most of its members are young, professional, and concerned with maintaining strong district ties. By mid-1994, only seven deputies chose not to affiliate with a faction.

[14]By the same token, it gave a strategic advantage to the representatives of the small parties in ensuring a hearing for their preferred issues. For this reason, one deputy called the council Travkin’s “political club.” (Biulleten’ zasedaniia gosudarstvennoi Dumy, 14 January 1994, no. 3, p. 20).

[15]Defectors included six members of the LDPR who later joined the Union of December 12, only to leave it and form a group called Derzhaava. The group’s registration remained in force even after the same six later left the group, citing irreconcilable ideological differences with it. Only Zhirinovsky’s faction demanded the retraction of the registration. On June 15, the Organization Committee declared that it had rescinded the registration of the group on the grounds that at least two of the signatures of the members had been falsified. The Council of the Duma took the matter under advisement after heated protests by the December 12 group to the effect that the Russia's Choice faction—and particularly the chairman of the Organization Committee, Vladimir Bauer—were in effect allying themselves with Zhirinovsky against the group by illegally denying it recognition. In this, the group’s members declared, the Russia’s Choice faction was joining in the general denial of rights to members from single-member districts in favor of party list deputies.

[16]The Agrarians, who most observers agree operate more as a single-issue lobby than as a party, are worth special note. They concentrated their chips on the agricultural committee, over which it acquired overwhelming control (the chairman, first deputy chairman, and 19 more of the 26 members are from the Agrarian faction). Consequently, few other leadership positions in the Duma were acquired by Agrarian Party members.

[17]Zhirinovsky had demanded that he be given the fourth deputy
chairmanship. Other factions, including the communists and agrarians resisted his demand, but had not been able to agree on an alternative candidate until June, 1994.

\[18\] We hope to eliminate much of this problem in the future by taking advantage of the Duma's daily registration votes.

\[19\] Both figures show regression factor scores for the first factor extracted from a principal components analysis (no rotation). All roll-call votes for the January-July, 1994, period on which there was a 70-30 split or closer were included in the analysis. No other factor explains as much as five percent of the variance. In Figure 2, only votes with at least 70 percent participation, including abstentions, and closer than a 70-30 split were included.
REFERENCES


