TITLE: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND IN 1994

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THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
PROJECT INFORMATION:

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COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 808-21

DATE: June 28, 1994

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* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983). The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author.
Church-state relations in Poland in 1994 present a mixed picture. On the one hand, the church enjoys a privileged position in the state and has achieved most of its cherished goals. On the other hand, its very success carried with it seeds of future decline. This was particularly true in several areas where the church's aggressive and arrogant behavior has proved counter-productive: compulsory religious education; anti-abortion legislation; Christian values in mass media; antisemitism; murky church finances and the concordat with the Holy See. As a result, there has been a steady decline in popular support for the church which itself has developed some serious rifts in its supposedly united posture. It may be hypothesized that the power and influence of the church have peaked in the early 1990s and that its future policies will be less aggressive and controversial and more accommodating.

Church-state relations in Poland in 1994 present a puzzling picture. On the surface the relationship could be described as excellent: the church enjoys a privileged position in the state and its head, Primate Glemp, is recognized as one of the highest dignitaries in the country. Although all of the political parties strongly supportive of the church's interests were defeated in the September 1993 parliamentary elections, and the church's public image has deteriorated rather badly in recent years, it does not seem to bother the church which has continued to demand additional privileges from the state, as illustrated by its shrill campaign for the ratification of the concordat. The church's financial status appears to be sound and the episcopate easily defeated attempts to impose additional taxes on its income. The mass media controlled by the church are flourishing and in recent months the church has been trying to move into new fields, such as television. Thus, to an outside observer, the Polish catholic church must appear as a powerful, independent institution whose ultimate goal is to make Poland into a fundamentalist, confessional state.

Yet, the above picture does not tell the full story. The record shows, for example, that public support has been eroding steadily for the past several years and that the process continues. The loss of support has been visible not only among the ordinary people-in-the-street, as witnessed by the results of the 1993 elections, but also among the educated elites which for decades provided the intellectual underpinning for the church's struggle against the communists. In both cases, the root cause of the growing disenchantment was the striking arrogance of the church which manifested itself in insatiable greed for more power and influence and in an open contempt for the democratic system and its followers.
At times, one almost had the impression that the church felt more comfortable with the communist regime than with the democratic one. At least in the former case the church knew where it stood: the enemy was clearly identified, the lines of conflict were sharply drawn, and the church could easily play the role of a besieged fortress, fighting for survival. This was a highly useful posture which appealed greatly to the West and also proved valuable at home. <2>

Democracy was different. The church was no longer threatened as it achieved just about all it was striving for. But then its appetite for more power continued unabated, yet gaining additional objectives proved increasingly difficult. Under the communists the church could always play a martyr, mobilize support at home and abroad, and ultimately force the communists to surrender. Under a democratic system such tactics was no longer possible and other means had to be used, such as consensus building, compromise, and tolerance. The problem was that the Polish church did not know their meaning: it had never in its history coexisted with a democracy and it simply never learned how to be tolerant, how to build a consensus or how to compromise. <3> After 1989 it continued to follow the same strategy that was so successful under the communists. <4> At first the strategy again proved successful but when the government and public opinion began to resist further advances, the church’s reaction was anything but christian-like and at times one had a feeling that in the eyes of the church the democratic system was a worse enemy than its communist predecessor.

Let me illustrate with reference to some selected cases:

Mandatory religious education: Chronologically, the first area of conflict between the church and the state concerned compulsory religious education in elementary and high schools. During the 45 years of communist rule, this issue occupied the attention of both the state and the church for longer than just about any other issue, and on the eve of communist collapse, it appeared to be satisfactorily settled, at least from the viewpoint of the authorities and the parents: religious classes were offered on a regular basis, except that they did not form a part of the official school curriculum and the instruction took place outside the school buildings.

There was no evidence that this arrangement met with fierce resistance on the part of students and parents. Yet, one of the first moves made by the church after 1989 was to engage in a shrill campaign demanding the reinstatement of compulsory religious classes - a campaign which ultimately forced the Ministry of Education in August 1990 to issue an "instruction" which reintroduced mandatory religious education in public schools. There was neither a public
discussion nor a parliamentary debate on the issue, the excuse being that if the religious classes were to begin in the new academic year 1990-91, there was no time for a lengthy debate. <5>

When the official civil rights spokesman or ombudsman asked the Constitutional Tribunal for a ruling on the legality of the "instruction," the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Ministry of Education. A new Law on the Educational System, passed by the Sejm in September 1991 formed the basis for a new set of regulations issued about six months later by a new Minister of Education, a close confidant of Primate Glemp. <6> These regulations were again challenged by a new ombudsman, himself a practicing catholic and a former member of Glemp's Social Council, and once again the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against the ombudsman.

The whole campaign about religious education was full of innuendos and insinuations, in which the church seemed to excel. The church's attack on the ombudsman was led by Glemp who called for the former's ouster on the ground that "he did not represent the will of the nation," <7> and by some of the most aggressive political supporters of the church, recruited mostly from the Christian-National Union, who called the ombudsman worse than the communists. <8> The ombudsman himself reacted by accusing the church of trying to introduce a confessional state. <9>

In time the controversy died down but the whole fight left a bitter taste in people's mouths. The church presumably learned its lesson and has only rarely interfered in religious instruction. <10> On the other hand, the teaching methods and especially the pressure on the students to attend religious classes, often left much to be desired. <11>

**Birth control:** Chronologically, the second most important issue was that of legalized abortion. Until the early 1990s, Poland, together with the other East Central European countries, had a very liberal abortion law which the Polish women used mostly as a means of birth control. Although the majority of the population disapproved of the laxity of the law, there was no evidence of any great outpouring in favor of changing it when the communist rule came to an end in 1989.

As was to be expected, the church assumed the leadership in the fight to amend the existing legislation and used whatever authority and influence it had to persuade the Sejm to pass a new anti-abortion law. In this case also the episcopate was helped by political zealots, recruited mostly from the Christian-National Union, who finally mobilized enough support in the parliament to pass a tough anti-abortion law on January 4, 1993. <12> The law, only a shade less restrictive than that of Ireland, compared unfavorably with similar legislation passed
in such catholic countries as Italy and Spain. It allowed interruption of pregnancy in only very few cases, excluding, for example, difficult social conditions, and it introduced stiff fines, including prison terms, for doctors who disobeyed the law. There was a major effort to have a popular referendum on the subject, and close to one million signatures were, in fact, collected supporting the idea, but the parliament, which constitutionally had to approve the referendum, rejected the attempt and instead passed the controversial law by a small majority. <13>

The church applied all-out pressure for the passage of the legislation. Glemp was a frequent and highly visible visitor to both houses of parliament and used the catholic mass media to intimidate the opponents of the law. Additional church pressure was also put on the Polish physicians who adopted a highly controversial "Code of Medical Ethics," strongly opposed to abortion. <14> Altogether, the church was basking in its triumph, but it soon turned out that it was another Pyrrhic victory which was to last less than two years. <15>

This is not the place to discuss in great detail the consequences of the new law but it suffices to say that the attitude of the church and the highly restrictive nature of the law succeeded in generating a strong opposition committed to amending the legislation at the earliest opportunity. The promise to do so became a part of the election campaign of 1993, conducted by the left-of-center parties. With the defeat of the Christian-National Union and other parties seen as loyal handmaidens of the church, it was only a matter of time before the proposed amendments would be placed on the legislative agenda. It took eight months for it to happen and it was finally in June 1994 that the Sejm amended the law. <16> As was to be expected, the amendment allows the factor of "social circumstances" to be used in future abortion cases.

The case of anti-abortion legislation provides another excellent testimony to the arrogance of the church which in its quest to have its way not only ignored the results of public opinion surveys but also fiercely opposed the idea of a referendum. <17> In its rhetoric the church again compared the opposition to the communists and rejected any idea of a compromise solution. The outcome was further polarization of Polish society and the mobilization of the opposition which ultimately succeeded in amending the restrictive law.

Christian values: On December 29, 1992, the Sejm passed a law regulating radio and television in Poland, which included two highly controversial items: one (article 18, paragraph 2) stated that "programs should respect the religious feelings of their audiences and, in particular, respect the system of christian values," and the other (article 21, paragraph 2) which reaffirmed the previous point that "public radio and television should respect the system of
christian values." Both articles were inserted by deputies from the Christian-National Union, who were also behind the previously discussed anti-abortion legislation.

The passage of the law in a sense represented a return to censorship which, it was thought, disappeared in 1989 together with communist rule. The main problem here was a lack of a clear definition of what constituted "christian values" and who was to be the ultimate judge of them. There was considerable confusion among both the politicians and clergymen as to which programs would violate christian values, that obviously did not augur too well for the future implementation of the law. In answer to a question as to who should decide whether a violation did take place, the pro-church politicians suggested creating commissions either representing the episcopate alone or including both the clergy and members of parliament.

Critics of the law believed that it reintroduced the old distinction between the "good", conformist citizens and those who were "bad" and disloyal. Just as in the past when good citizens constantly referred to the "leading role of the Polish communist party," this time the communist party would be replaced by the catholic church. But just as was the case in communist Poland, it could be assumed that writers and television and radio producers would quickly learn how to get around the law, thus rendering it meaningless. As to the meaning of the christian values themselves, some public utterances of Primate Glemp and others regarding not only the anti-church opposition but also such issues as antisemitism, homosexualism or AIDS, strongly suggested that if there was an institution badly in need of an injection of christian values, it was principally the Polish catholic church.

A group of deputies from the Democratic Left Alliance (former communist party) asked the Constitutional Tribunal to rule on the constitutionality of the law. After some delay, the Tribunal ruled in early June 1994 that the articles focused on christian values were constitutional since all they did was to ask for the values to be respected, no more and no less. Whether the law will eventually be amended - as was the case with the anti-abortion legislation - remains to be seen. While the Democratic Left Alliance refuses to give up, it may have considerable difficulty mobilizing sufficient parliamentary support.

Mass media: Already in the interwar period the church could boast of an impressive network of newspapers, journals and publishing houses. Although its size was somewhat reduced in the wake of the communist takeover, the circulation figures for daily and periodic press, as well as for the printing of books appeared surprisingly high. The principal institution behind it was the catholic lay organization PAX, which from its beginning tried to build bridges between
the communist regime and the church, with varying degrees of success. The church also sponsored the best known "loyal opposition" weekly, the Tygodnik Powszechny, which attracted some of the best known non-communist writers in Poland.

Following the downfall of communism in 1989, the church made a considerable effort to expand its influence in the field of communications and mass media. A clarion call to that effect was a pastoral letter from the episcopate, issued on a "Sunday of Mass Media," September 15, 1991. The letter strongly criticized the existing Polish media, accusing them even of atheism, and stated that supporting the catholic press was strictly a matter of conscience for all catholics.<25> One of the church’s first priorities was to own a daily newspaper that would represent the church’s interests. To the surprise of many, at the beginning of 1993 the episcopate took over a near defunct daily, Słowo Powszechnne, which for 46 years has been published by PAX and which has often been criticized by toeing the government line and for attacking the church. The daily, renamed Słowo katolickie, had a circulation of less than 10,000 and has been losing money steadily.<26> At the same time, an attempt was made to boost the circulation of weeklies put out by some dioceses and of some other church-friendly periodicals.

The overall results of the campaign can only be described as mixed. While there has been a significant increase in circulation, this was not accompanied by an improvement in the quality of the various publications. Far from it. With very few exceptions, the periodicals faithfully followed the line dictated to them by the increasingly arrogant episcopate, and their favorite target was the non-church media, which were accused of various heinous crimes, including atheism.<27> One of the by-products of the campaign was a growing conflict between the "new" catholic press and some of the "old," well-established weeklies, such as the previously mentioned Tygodnik Powszechny which was feeling increasingly alienated from the aggressive organs of the church and which began to disengage itself from them.

But then the church discovered radio and television and here again its early successes were unmistakable. In 1990, an agreement between the episcopate and the Ministry of Communications, responsible for the allocation of radio frequencies, granted 64 concessions to the church, 28 of these to individual dioceses and 32 to a station called "Radio Maryja," with a main transmitter in the city of Torun, whose programs have been rebroadcast to several major cities around the country.<28> In addition to rebroadcasting various religious services, Radio Maryja carried interviews with politicians and other persons favoring the church’s stance on various issues. Especially the latter part of the program consisted mostly of attacks against those who dared to disagree with the church.<29> In 1994, Radio Maryja applied to the
National Council for Radio and Television for a license to establish a nation-wide radio program. The application was turned down, presumably reflecting the Council's unhappiness with the direction of the Radio which also caused some concern for the episcopate.<30>

The church also applied for an all-Polish television network but the National Council rejected the application in the belief that the Franciscan Fathers who submitted the application would not be able to sustain the program in the absence of commercials and other sources of income. Instead, they received a license for a local television program to be seen in the vicinity of Warsaw.<31>

The final move on the part of the church was the establishment, in the fall of 1993, of a Catholic Information Agency (Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna). Organized with financial support from the United States Bishops' Conference and Catholic News Service in the United States, the Agency was to supply news about Polish church activities. It was to be independent of the episcopate and was to be run by a foundation whose board of directors would include both church officials and lay media specialists.<32>

To conclude, the church, just like any other institution, had a perfect right to create mass media sympathetic to its cause. So, the problem was not with the ultimate objective but with the ways and means of reaching that goal. As was the case elsewhere, it was the church's tactics that left much to be desired. Above all, it was the language used in both the official pronouncements of the episcopate and in the statements made by its allies, such as the Association of Catholic Journalists, which precluded the possibility of a rational discourse and which portrayed the opposition, including that among its own ranks, in the blackest possible colors.<33> The result was a growing disenchantment with the church's policies even among its erstwhile strongest supporters, and a growing schism within the catholic intellectuals which, in the long run, was to hurt the image of the church.<34>

Church Finances: The issue of church finances is both murky and ticklish.<35> In the interwar period, based on the 1925 concordat, members of the clergy were paid salaries by the state, differentiated according to their ranks. With the suspension of the concordat in 1945 and the confiscation of church lands in 1950, different sources of income had to be found. One of them was the so-called Church Fund which collected revenue from the land seized from the church, that the state used for various purposes.<36> Until the collapse of the communist system in 1989, the church survived partly because of some payments from the Fund and partly thanks to the voluntary contributions of the faithful, payments for services such as weddings and funerals, gifts from abroad, including presumably the Holy See, and revenues
from some economic activities carried out by the churches. Because of the continuing efforts by the communists to apply economic sanctions, including taxes, against the church, as a defensive measure the accounting of the church's finances were shrouded in strict secrecy.

In this respect not much has changed since in 1989. On the one hand, the church has been claiming that its financial situation has worsened considerably because of a reduction of support from abroad and a decline in voluntary contributions caused by the general impoverishment of the parishioners. The gradual return of church lands seized in 1950 and of other property apparently proved of little help because of the high cost of putting them to proper use. <37> The church also claimed that it received no support from the government. <38>

On the other hand, popular perception contradicts the church's plea of poverty. While the revenue from voluntary contributions may have declined, judging from the fees charged, income from various services must have increased. It is also a well-established fact that the church as an institution is exempt from taxation. The individual clergy who, unlike the rest of the Polish population, do not file income tax returns, pay income tax estimated on the basis of a formula based principally on the size of the parish in which the priest happens to be serving. Not surprisingly, there are striking differences between the rich and the poor parishes, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that in general the life style and living standard of the great majority of the clergy are clearly well above those of an average person. Another highly visible sign of the church's opulence has been and is the number of new churches springing up like mushrooms around the country.

Toward the end of 1993, the newly elected Sejm, while discussing the state budget, debated the possibility of raising the amount of taxes collected from the church. The reaction of the episcopate and of its political supporters was predictable, and the deputies favoring higher levies were immediately denounced as worse than the communists. Once again, the language used by the church precluded a rational dialogue but, at the same time, the church authorities, while pleading worsening poverty, refused to open their books, making various excuses. <39> Ultimately, the church scored another major victory as only the revenue from its industrial and commercial activities was to be taxed, leaving all other revenues tax free.

Antisemitism: There is little doubt that one of the important sources of antisemitism in Poland before the war could be found in the teachings of the catholic church. The record shows that Polish antisemitism survived the Holocaust and that instead of fighting it, the Polish church hierarchy further contributed to it, as illustrated by its reaction to the infamous Kielce pogrom
of July 1946. While the church found itself under attack from the communists in the next 20 years, it had no opportunity to concern itself with that issue. However, during the excesses in March 1968, when the church leadership could have spoken out against the government's antisemitic witchhunt, it chose to remain largely silent. A decade later, the same leadership in the person of Primate Wyszyński, instead of supporting the growing intellectual opposition, engaged in some innuendos regarding the ethnic composition of the dissident movement.<40>

This was not a pretty record. While this is not the place to discuss the roots of the church's antisemitic stance in great detail, it had much to do with its inherent conservatism and parochialism - most visible during the sessions of the Vatican II Council - with the peasant origin of its leaders and with their strong nationalism. As a result, the Polish church appeared immune even to the efforts of its own son, Pope John Paul II, to build bridges to the Jews in order to close the chasm that had for so long separated the two faiths.

Still, by the mid-1980s it appeared that the church was beginning to see the light and mend its ways: the episcopate even established a special Commission for a Dialogue with the Jews, headed by one of its ablest bishops, and on the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1983, Primate Glemp celebrated a memorial service honoring the victims, the first time in history that a Polish bishop actually prayed for the Jews.

But then came the infamous episode involving the Carmelite nuns and the Oswiecim (Auschwitz) concentration camp which in a relatively short time destroyed the goodwill accumulated in the previous few years and effectively ended the promising dialogue between the catholics and the Jews.<41> The conflict was far from being inevitable and it could have been settled quickly and painlessly. While both sides overreacted, there is little doubt that the main fault for the escalation of the dispute lay with Glemp who once again succeeded in raising the ghost of antisemitism in Poland. It took years plus a direct intervention of the Pope to have the conflict brought to an end but some of its after effects can be still felt today.

The above selective summary of some of the activities, attitudes and policies of the church does not present a pretty picture and goes a long way in explaining the significant drop in its popularity in the past few years. The sad thing is that the above tells only a part of the story and that the behavior of the church in several other areas was not much better.<42> Once again, it was mostly the language and the style of behavior of the church dignitaries and its allies that has given the church a bad name.

One can mention here the provocative statements by Primate Glemp and others regarding the ratification of the concordat with the Holy See, signed in 1993, which succeeded in polarizing the Sejm as well as the educated public. The result was that the chances of the
parliament approving the treaty, which looked reasonably good only a few months ago, appear much less so today. <43>

Despite his preoccupation with christian values, Glemp’s publicly stated views regarding AIDS and homosexuals could be described as anything but charitable, <44> and the same was largely true of the attitude of many church leaders with regard to other christian religions, which clearly contradicted the spirit of ecumenism proclaimed by the Vatican II council.

Despite its often repeated promise not to get involved in politics, the church’s sponsorship of the Catholic election alliance "The Fatherland" (Ojczyzna) prior to the 1993 elections, strongly suggested that the church’s promises should not be taken too seriously. The recent discussions about the revival of Catholic Action (Akcja Katolicka), which played a controversial role in the interwar period as a political arm of the church, can only mean that the church does not intend to remain politically passive. <45> Moreover, the frequent, highly publicized appearances of church leaders during parliamentary debates on issues of special interest to the church, as well at various state occasions, also point in the same direction.

Although its leaders strenuously deny it, all of the policies mentioned above strongly imply that the ultimate goal of the church is to make Poland into a confessional state. <46> A case can be made that public support for such an idea is not inconsiderable. Starting at the top, President Walesa who can hardly be seen in public without his personal chaplain, has always been a strong advocate of church interests. <47> Although all the political parties close to the church were soundly beaten in last year’s elections, they have been regrouping in preparation for the 1997 elections and can be counted again to act as mouthpieces for the episcopate. Even among the government coalition partners, the Polish Peasant Party is not likely to oppose the church and the same is true for the largest opposition party, the Freedom Union.

Insofar as the Polish people are concerned, the peasants, who still account for close to one-third of the population, would most likely stand behind the church. The majority of the urban population would probably oppose any further expansion of the church’s influence, except for those of its segments which voted for the Christian-National Union and other pro-church parties.

Thus, at least on the surface, the chances of the church for further aggrandizement of its already powerful status look promising. And yet it may be argued that the picture appears distorted and that, if anything, the foreseeable future may actually witness a decline in the church’s power and influence.
Somewhat paradoxically, the main reason for that lies in the church itself. Throughout this essay it has been tacitly assumed that the Polish church has acted as a well-integrated, united and homogenous machine. The reality, however, is quite different. The image of unity was carefully nurtured during the communist rule as a defense mechanism and it was greatly helped by Primate Wyszynski, who, as a well-known disciplinarian did not tolerate any deviation. Things began to change following his death and his replacement by the little known Glemp.<48> The new Primate could hardly be counted on filling his predecessor’s shoes and was most likely resented by many of members of the episcopate who felt better qualified for the post of the Primate and who must have also been shocked by some of Glemp’s language and ideas.

Although Glemp managed to survive his first 13 years and was, in fact, recently re-elected chairman of the episcopate’s conference for the next five years, there is growing evidence that the Polish church in 1994 can be divided roughly into three groups which can be loosely called the fundamentalists, the pragmatists and the liberals.<49>

The fundamentalists (some may call them zealots), grouped around Glemp, consist of the older bishops and clergymen, many of them veterans of the communist period, who believe that arrogance and aggressive posture which served them well in the past, guarantee success in the future. They are the ones who pushed for the tough anti-abortion legislation, for compulsory religious instruction, for christian values in mass media and for the concordat, and having achieved victory continue pressing for additional privileges, using the same tactics.<50>

The pragmatists, led by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, who last year replaced the star conservative Bishop Alojzy Orszulik as the secretary of the episcopate, realize that the arrogance of the fundamentalists has become counterproductive. They read the public opinion surveys which show a striking decline in public support for the church and they try their best to tone down the harshness of the conservative utterances. They are aware of the growing alienation of the best known catholic writers and intellectuals and they attempt to repair the damage by curtailing the church’s political involvement, by calling for greater transparency in the murky church finances, and they also express readiness to renegotiate some of the most controversial points in the concordat.<51>

The liberals, whose unofficial spiritual guide is Reverend Jozef Tischner, probably the most interesting catholic philosopher and writer in today’s Poland, are numerically the weakest but they also represent the most dynamic element in the catholic community.<52> Intensely disliked by the fundamentalists and looked at with some suspicion by the pragmatists, Tischner
and his followers are trying to modernize the Polish church by forcing it to internalize the
decisions taken by the Vatican II Council, to shed its secrecy and open it to lay influences. to
embrace ecumenism and to learn to live in a pluralist democratic society. <53>

If the above truly represents the state of affairs in the church today, then it can be
hypothesized that the alliance of the pragmatists and the liberals will prove strong enough to
stop the conservatives from seeking more power and from pushing Poland on the path to
becoming a fundamentalist, confessional state.

In this they are likely to be helped by the popular reaction, increasingly hostile to the
church, best illustrated by the results of the September 1993 elections, as well as by the Sejm
decisions to reverse some of its earlier pro-church laws such as those dealing with abortion,
and not to be bullied into ratifying the concordat.

Moreover, the pragmatists and the liberals know that the catholic church is in trouble
worldwide and that, ironically, the only reason the Polish church has so far escaped some of
the negative trends, has been the iron curtain. With the curtain lifted some five years ago, it is
only a matter of time before Poland becomes exposed to some of the ills that have affected the
church in Western Europe, the United States and Latin America. It is for that reason that the
pragmatist-liberal coalition has tried to defuse the influence of the fundamentalists, thus better
to prepare Poland for the coming crisis.
NOTES

1. There is by now an impressive collection of survey data showing a decrease in the support for the church. See, for example, Dominika Wielowieyska, "Zabrac kosciolowi, dac policji?" Gazeta Wyborcza, February 5, 1992; Piotr Pacewicz, "Kto jaki koscioł widzi," Gazeta Wyborcza, April 10, 1992; Grzegorz Polak, "Kosciolowi co koscielne," Gazeta Wyborcza, January 18, 1993; "OBOP: Zbyt dużo kosiola w polityce," Zycie Warszawy, March 2, 1994.


16. Associated Press, June 11, 1994. The law must still be passed by the Senate and signed by President Walesa, who said he would veto the bill.

17. In March 1992, about 60% of the people favored legalized abortion, with or without some restrictions, while only 11% were in favor of a total ban on abortions. 64% of the respondents supported the idea of a national referendum. "Co sadzimy o aborcji," Gazeta Wyborcza, March 16, 1992. See also, "Biskupi przeciw referendum," Gazeta Wyborcza, May 5, 1991. More than two years later, 58% still favored amending the law. "Ustawa wraca," Gazeta Wyborcza, June 9, 1994.


20. ibid.

24. On the eve of World War II, there were in Poland more than 200 catholic journals, not
counting periodicals published by local parishes. The circulation of the catholic press accounted
for about 30% of the total press circulation in the country. "Falszywy alarm" (Interview with
Bishop Adam Lepa, the head of the episcopate 's Commission on the Mass Media) Lad, January
26. "'Słowo Katolickie' d. 'Powszechne'" Gazeta Wyborcza, December 31, 1992-January
27. For a good example, see Wojciech Tochman, "Reportaż na niedziele," Gazeta
Wyborcza, August 7-8, 1993.
32. "O kościele bez gaf," Gazeta Wyborcza, March 8, 1993, and Barbara Janikowska,
33. See, for example, Zdzisław Bradel, "Jakie radio? Jaka telewizja?" Lad, January 2,
1994; Jan M. Ruman, "Postulat z sierpnia '80," Lad, January 27, 1993; and "Kościół - duch czy
zaduch?" Gazeta Wyborcza, August 18, 1993.
36. For a good discussion, see Grzegorz Polak, "Kościół w Polsce - biedny czy bogaty?"
Tygodnik Powszechny Apokryf, no. 1, April 1993, p. 4.
37. In some cases the greed of the church for acquiring property is inexcusable. In 1991,
the church demanded the return of property seized by the czarist government in 1864. After
independence in 1918, that property was taken over by the Polish government and not returned to
the church, which now wants it back. "Uniwersyteckie czy kościelne?" Zycie Warszawy, January
8, 1992.
38. This is simply not true. The Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environmental
Protection, controlled by politicians close to the church, have been transferring considerable
funds to the church for various purposes. Eryk Mistewicz, "Lakomy duch," Wprost, April 4,
1993.
39. "Dlaczego kościół nie miałby produkować samochodów?" (Interview with Bishop
Tadeusz Pieronek, Deputy Secretary of the episcopate), Zycie Warszawy, December 16, 1993.
40. For an excellent brief summary of the church's attitude toward the Jews, see
58-61.
41. For a brief, objective summary of the conflict, see Jerzy Turowicz, "Ani obiektywne,
ani rzetelne," Tygodnik Powszechny, November 29, 1992. Mr. Turowicz was a member of
the group which tried to end the Auschwitz dispute.
42. For a good analysis, see Marta Fik, "Spor o kosciol w III RP," Puls, vol. XV, no. 3, May-June 1993. See also, Adam Michnik, "Rozmowas z integrysta," Gazeta Wyborcza, November 7-8, 1992.


47. The ubiquitous presence of the President’s personal chaplain has been proving embarrassing to the church. Jaroslaw Kurski, "Nie kosciol poslal ksiedza Cybule," Gazeta Wyborcza, December 16, 1992.


49. For a somewhat different view, see Miroslaw Usidus, "Trzy koscioly w jednym," Rzeczpospolita, February 14, 1994.


52. For a good example, see Grzegorz Polak, "Kto zdradza chrzescijanskie wartosci," Gazeta Wyborcza, March 20-21, 1993.