TITLE: STATE-BUILDING AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL ASIA

AUTHOR: ROGER D. KANGAS, The University of Mississippi

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
PROJECT INFORMATION:

CONTRACTOR: The University of Mississippi

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Roger D. Kangas

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 808-10

DATE: April 17, 1995

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded by Council Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within the Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, or make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without the written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law.

1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s).
STATE-BUILDING AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Roger Kangas
University of Mississippi
Project Information

Contractor: University of Mississippi
Principal Investigator: Roger Kangas
Council Contract Number: 808-10
Date: April 17, 1995

Copyright Information

Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER's own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale.

*The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.
CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...................................................... i
Text .............................................................................. 1
State-Building and Civil Society ........................................... 2
The "Mixed Tradition" of Central Asia .................................... 3
The Creation of the State in Post-Soviet Central Asia ............... 5
Civil Society in Central Asia: Political Parties ......................... 8
Civil Society in Central Asia: Ethnic Minorities .................... 10
Policy Implications: Foreign Relations in Central Asia ............. 14
Conclusion .................................................................... 18
Endnotes ....................................................................... 19
"STATE-BUILDING AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL ASIA"

Dr. Roger D. Kangas
Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi

Executive Summary

Much has been written on the prospects for democratization in the republics of the former Soviet Union, with attention being directed towards the process' necessary and sufficient elements. I contend that an important part of this systemic transition is the role played by civil society. However, if it does not already exist in a given society, can a civil society be created? The Central Asian successor states pose additional problems: first, they possess a political culture that includes pre-Soviet and Soviet era influences, both of which repudiated a civil society; and second, because the state-building process is still underway, a framework conducive to establishing a civil society remains largely non-existent; and third, because the leaders of these states are primarily concerned about stability and filling the power vacuum created by the fall of the Soviet state, the incentive to even create such a framework is questionable.

In order to understand the linkage between state-building and civil society, as well as how it varies among the Central Asian states, it is essential to first define the terms. From there, the paper's discussion turns to evaluating the state-building efforts underway in each state. Two critical elements in the formation of civil societies, namely the roles of political parties and ethnic minorities, will be analyzed in successive sections. Finally, the policy implications of these issues will be reviewed, using foreign policy as an illustration. In short, the relationship between state-building and the evolution of a civil society is one that encompasses a variety of factors. How, and to what extent, these factors develop will directly affect policy formation and, ultimately, political stability in the region.

I conclude by noting that, with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan, all have worked towards establishing political systems designed to achieve short-term stability. The picture becomes clearer as successive rounds of elections and leadership transitions take place. Like the rest of the former Soviet republics, the Central Asian states are focusing on building institutions and consolidating power, sometimes at the expense of developing other facets of a
modern and truly stable political system. For countries as poor as the Central Asian states, this has been no easy task.

Equally important is the fact that not all of the Central Asian states are presently interested in developing viable civil societies. Although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan appear to be working in this direction, there is little evidence to suggest that the other three states are even interested in laying the foundation for such a system. In the end, by using state theory to analyze the performances of the Central Asian states, it is evident that the concerns noted above should remain part of any discussion of transition and stability in the region.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only signalled the end of Communist control in the region, it ignited a debate over the theoretical concept of "political transition" for the successor states. To date, much has been written on the prospects for democratization, with attention being directed towards what might be viewed as the process' necessary and sufficient elements. An important part of a systemic transition, according to these studies, is the role that civil society plays in establishing a foundation for democratization. That a certain political culture is necessary for a successful transition begs the question: if it does not already exist in a given society, can a civil society be created?

The Central Asian successor states pose additional problems to this line of questioning. First, these states possess a political culture that includes pre-Soviet and Soviet era influences, both of which repudiated a civil society. Second, because the state-building process is still underway, a framework conducive to establishing a civil society remains largely non-existent. Finally, because the leaders of these states are primarily concerned about stability and filling the power vacuum created by the fall of the Soviet state, the incentive to even create such a framework is questionable. The policy implications of this are clear: as states continue to limit citizen activity and prevent any meaningful participation, policies will continue to be directed by inclusive leaderships that seek to justify their own authority and, in the process, consolidate power.

In order to understand the linkage between state-building and civil society, as well as how it varies among the Central Asian states, it is essential to first define the terms. From there, the discussion can turn to evaluating the state-building efforts underway in each state. Two critical elements in the formation of civil societies, namely the roles of political parties and ethnic minorities, will be analyzed in successive sections. Finally, the policy implications of these issues will be reviewed, using their foreign policy as an illustration. In short, the relationship between state-building and the evolution of a civil society is one that encompasses a variety of factors. How, and to what extent, these factors develop will directly affect policy formation and, ultimately, political stability in the region.
State-Building and Civil Society

Simply defining the term "state" has resulted in a variety of approaches in the scholarly literature. At times, the state has been seen as the geographic expression of a country, an arena within which political groups will compete, or the possession of a particular class. Whether the state is an actor, an arena, or an abstraction, largely depending upon one's view of larger methodological and ontological questions.

A common element that runs through all of these approaches is the basic notion that a state possesses political institutions. These traditionally include constitutions, institutions of power such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries, and a means of promoting political views, often seen in the form of elections. While these elements are generally considered necessary for Western democracies, most are present in other systems as well, even authoritarian regimes. In non-democratic settings, questions may arise regarding the extent to which these institutions are held accountable. Very likely, they will be mere window-dressing for a centralized, authoritarian leadership. However, even in this setting, it would be difficult to characterize a political system as having a state without some semblance of institutional arrangements.

The question of accountability becomes important when introducing the term "civil society" to the discussion of the state. If we define civil society as those institutions and groups below the state-level that can challenge the state itself on certain issues, then the type of state must be considered. Presumably, a state that permits such groups to exist and advocate opinions in an unfettered manner can be classified as a democracy, or at least possessing democratic values. Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, would not likely allow such groups to exist at all, or only under strict control.

The relationship between the state and civil society becomes particularly important when speaking of a system in transition, or a transition to democracy. Not only must one consider the institutional developments, but the existence of, or potential for, a civil society. For the latter to exist, the state must be receptive to possible sources of opposition, and allow its population to actively participate. There must be a political culture conducive to political action. The extent to which a society's political culture reflects a more specified civic culture depends largely on the presence of a civil society as noted above. Each is intertwined and each can influence the development of the others. A civil society more demanding of a receptive state can, in some instances, force change. Poland in the 1980s is a good example of this. However, it is just as possible that a state resistant to the creation of a truly independent civil society can thwart similar attempts. The 1989 crackdown by the Chinese government of the Tiananmen Square protesters is a case in point. It is possible for a state to exist without a
civil society, especially in an environment lacking the requisite political culture. However, in such instances, the state often relies on force to maintain power. In the long run, this does not create a stable political environment. Such was the situation of the Central Asian states in 1991, when they received independence.

The "Mixed Tradition" of Central Asia

The political culture in Central Asia that exists in the 1990s is based on a structure imposed by the Soviet government. In addition, there remains a strong, regionally-based tradition of fealty and loyalty that can be traced to the pre-Soviet period. In both influences, the strict control mechanism of the state is crucial to the Central Asian experience.

The diverse and complex nature of Central Asian society makes it difficult to do more than generalize about the political culture in the region prior to the Soviet era. From the nomadic Turkmen to the sedentary Tajiks, perceptions of territorial possession, family-clan ties, and rulership varied. Prior to the Soviet delimitation of 1924, the region consisted of several, smaller, vassal-states and Russian landholdings. Before that, each level was part of larger, more region-encompassing emirates and empires. These successive experiences have contributed to the Central Asian outlook on politics.

During this pre-Soviet period, a traditional concept of the state dominated the region. In general, this meant that political dynamics relied on custom and familial networks. Power was defined by an intricate set of social and traditional norms developed over an extended period of time, which dictated behavior and communal interaction. States in the region, such as the Bukharan Emirate or Khivan Khanate, were controlled by a single leader who acquired the support of key families and clan leaders, who would pay tribute in exchange for territorial and military support. In short, politics became the art of family ties and loyalties that occupied the upper classes of society, with the lower social classes usually excluded from the dynamic. The absence of a civil society was accentuated by the fact that, as traditional societies tend to be agrarian-based, most individuals were occupied with subsistence living, sparing little time for politics and discourse.

The Islamic faith, as practiced in Central Asia, reinforced the state system. In particular, the indigenous rulers in the sedentary regions coopted the hierarchical nature of Islam to prop up their own regimes. Especially in the Emirates, the conservative clergy were in a position to control the educational and information systems, and thus limit access to foreign ideas. Consequently, any meaningful participation on the part of the masses was severely limited. Such was the political culture in the region until the nineteenth century.
At that time, Russian incursions into Central Asia resulted in territorial gains, particularly in the Kazakh steppes, that were gradually incorporated into the Russian administrative system. Others, most notably the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan and Qoqandian Khanates, were reduced to the status of protectorates. The administrative changes brought about by the Russian presence indirectly abetted in the formation of a nascent, modernizing, political culture that ran counter to that of the indigenous governments. The educated middle class in Central Asia, comprised of scholars, writers, and merchants, began to question the existing political dynamics in the protectorates. As these individuals become more familiar with outside systems and philosophies, there emerges a perception of traditional society as being stultifying, or backward. Groups of intellectuals, known as Jadids, represented this challenge. With organizations in almost all parts of the region, the Jadids sought to introduce to these societies the more Western notion of political accountability. However, the indigenous regimes’ control over the states and social structures thwarted any real effort at reform.

Success for the reformists was ultimately attained at the expense of autonomy. The Jadid elite courted, and were eventually coopted into, an outside political movement: the Bolshevik Party of the former Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party. After 1917, the strength to challenge the traditional power in the region largely came from this movement. The years from the 1917 Revolutions to the Russian Civil War witnessed the region’s political collapse, as numerous groups vied for power. By the early 1920s, Central Asia was incorporated into the new Soviet state, eventually being partitioned into five union republics that now stand as the independent Central Asian states.

The Soviet era in Central Asian politics ushered in a "double-tiered" system of power relations. On one level, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dominated the official political systems in Central Asia. Below existed the fluctuating role of the indigenous elite. After a period of korenizatsia, or nativization, in the 1920s and 1930s, in which the Soviet leadership sought to use indigenous figures almost exclusively, the Stalinist leadership eventually integrated a second generation of leaders into the Soviet system. In addition, various social and communal aspects of Central Asian society were controlled during this time. It was believed that specific social campaigns, such as attacks on Islam and the traditional roles for women, would facilitate greater modernization in the region, and simultaneously destroy the pre-Soviet political culture.

Politically, Central Asia took on a Soviet hue. Mass participation was expected in elections and in Party functions, but only as dictated from above. The controlling aspects that typified the Soviet regime as a whole, applied to Central Asia. In general, the Central Asians
were cut off from the political process. Group activity existed, but the dynamic was such that the Soviet system lacked the ability to establish an viable civil society in any meaningful way.18

Ironically, the Soviet structures meshed with the pre-Soviet political culture, especially with respect to regional and local politics. Real political activity was typically limited to a small nomenklatura, responding to pressures from above (Moscow) and below (regional loyalties). In spite of the Soviet strategies, there remained the strong, regionally-based tradition of fealty and loyalty that had characterized the previous political systems.19 Characteristic of this trend was the leadership of such figures as Sharaf Rashidov in Uzbekistan, or Dinmukhammed Kunaev in Kazakhstan. Regional loyalties also continued to be critical for career advancement, especially as leaders surrounded themselves with members of their own clans. Periodically, the government in Moscow would investigate such irregularities, occasionally resorting to limited party purges. In the end, perhaps because these arrangements promoted stability in the region, the Soviet regime permitted them to continue throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. It was not until the 1980s, that efforts were made to actually reform the system. Given the strength of such entities, however, the Andropov and Gorbachev administrations met with mixed results.20

Today, the leadership of the Central Asian states are faced with a dilemma: how can they build a civic culture receptive to change on a society that had previously been denied that very quality? More importantly, do the leadership of these states feel the need, or desire, to create a civic culture? As seen, the Pre-Soviet period lacked a participatory civil society.21 Furthermore, the Soviet influence included anything but the basis for its creation. The sudden nature of the Soviet collapse would, for a change, give the region’s leaders a chance to rectify this situation.

The Creation of the State in Post-Soviet Central Asia

Forced into independence, the Central Asian states have created institutional arrangements that rely on the previous Soviet structures, with a modicum of "democratic" influences. The latter is evidenced by the ratification of constitutions, the declarations of governing principles, and the holding of elections in some of the states.22 What varies is the level of state-building and the extent to which the states are pursuing democratic reform.

Uzbekistan, for one, is emphasizing stability over openness in its new political system. After the failed Moscow coup of August 1991, members of the Uzbek government called for independence, which was declared on 31 August 1991. The political priority of the new government, under the leadership of the former Communist Party First Secretary, Islam
Karimov, was simple: establish control over a political system that was now without a central authority based in Moscow.

In December 1991, a general presidential election was held, ostensibly open to all qualified and registered candidates. In the election that saw Karimov win 86 percent of the vote, only one opposition candidate, Mukhammed Solih of the Democratic Party ERK, was permitted to run. As the popularly-elected president, Karimov has restructured the political institutions at the national level, strengthening the powers of the president and the hand-picked Presidential Council. The Oily Majlis, or Supreme Soviet, meets in regular session, still playing the "advisory" role of past Soviet legislatures, with votes on presidential legislation passing by unanimous vote. A new round of elections took place on 25 December 1994, that establish a streamlined 250-person legislature. True to form, the only parties allowed to field candidates were the People's Democratic Party and the "loyal" Vatan Tarakiati, or Progress of Fatherland Party.

To further centralize his authority, Karimov signed a 1993 decree formalizing presidential appointment of all regional executive offices and Hokims. In addition, Karimov has also purged potential rivals from the executive leadership, as evidenced in his treatment of Shukhrullo Mirsaidov. This theme of a "strong leader" currently dominates Uzbek politics, at the expense of a system requiring checks and balances.

A parallel development can be seen in Turkmenistan, where Sapurmurad Niiazov has quickly and efficiently asserted his authority. In the June 1992 election, Niiazov ran unopposed, receiving 99.5 percent of the popular vote, reminiscent of the old Soviet-style elections. This "mandate" prompted Niiazov to extend presidential powers over national and state institutions, effectively creating a one-person political system. Under the new constitution, the president heads the Cabinet of Ministers, controls the appointment of all judges, and can circumvent the Mejlis, or legislature, in the decision-making process. A Khalk Maslakhaty, or People's Council, is the structural means by which the president can control the other branches, including the legislature. Made up of representatives of the various political institutions, the Khalk Maslakhaty meets when Niiazov deems it necessary. The authoritarian nature of this regime only strengthens a fast-developing personality cult which presents Niiazov as the only leader capable of successfully charting the difficult waters ahead for Turkmenistan.

Although the chief executives in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have also tailored their systems to ensure executive primacy, the situation in these countries is somewhat better than in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, an acknowledged proponent of economic reform, is cautious about opening up the political process too quickly. This is reinforced by a constitution that, although noting the importance of checks
and balances among the three branches of government, including the Judiciary, gives the
president significant latitude in decision-making. New elections for the Supreme Soviet in
1994 were presented as an opportunity for change. Unfortunately, evidence of pressures
against opposition parties and probable illegalities in the procedures have tarnished the initial
image of the Nazarbaev administration.

In Kyrgyzstan, the rhetoric of democracy has also been openly touted. President Askar
Akaev has been quite vocal on the matter of economic reform, and was one of the few Central
Asian leaders to quickly condemn the anti-Gorbachev coup attempt in 1991. As president, he
regularly meets with the various political parties, and has been supportive of an open press.
However, institutional changes have been less telling. The Supreme Soviet remains a body
dominated by Soviet-era politicians, although recent calls for elections should change that.
More recently, it seems that concern about economic and political stability have prompted the
passing of restrictions on the media and in the registration process for political and social
organizations. In spite of the fact that most opposition parties openly call Akaev a
"democrat" and support his leadership, his reluctance to further open the system has prompted
a few political activists in Kyrgyzstan to question Akaev's commitment to democracy. This is
particularly true for the ardent Kyrgyz nationalists and former Communists.

In contrast to the other four states, Tajikistan is still in the process of establishing
institutions. As a result of the civil unrest and leadership changes since 1991, there exists an
environment of chaos and instability. With the conflict between the Khojand and Kuliab leaders
on one side, and the Kurgan-Tiube, Garm, and Pamiri groups on the other, Tajikistan has been
mired in a complex web of inter-clan, religious, and nomenklatura rivalries that defy simple
explanations. Much of 1992 and 1993 centered around the conflict between "pro-Islamic and
democratic" forces and the traditional "pro-communist" elite. After several leadership changes
following the removal of Rakhmon Nabiev, the Khojandi elite returned to power and elevated
Imomali Rakhmanov to the office of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. From 1994 onward,
Tajiks have witnessed this current administration regain control of the country by swiftly
curtailing the activities of opposition groups, both within and outside of the country. The
presidential elections held in late 1994 only confirmed the ruling clans' power, although
internal rivalries and an estimated 40 percent support for the banned opposition groups
continue to threaten regional stability. Using the argument that an initial opening up of the
system to popular demands was what precipitated the crisis in the first place, the Tajik
government appears to be following what might be considered the "Uzbek model" of systemic
control.
Tajikistan is relatively calm, as the Russian-backed leadership consolidates its' power.

In sum, the institutional developments in the Central Asian states have several common elements. In all cases, the concept of a strong, authoritarian leader, is favored. Second, with the exception of Akaev, the traditional elites and Soviet-era nomenklatura are still in power, despite the advent, in some cases, of new political parties. Finally, the systems in question remain in a state of flux. State-building at this time seems to be a process of consolidation, with only two of the leaders attempting to attain some level of popular legitimacy. Compared to Karimov, Niiazov, and Rakhmanov; Nazarbaev and Akaev remain in charge of political systems that are relatively more liberal, responsive to change, and potentially suited for the establishment of civil societies. It is still probably premature to draw final conclusions on the Central Asian states' ability to establish systems of interlocking agencies, checks and balances, regular election schedules, and laws. And yet, it seems clear that only two are making efforts to do so.

Civil Society in Central Asia: Political Parties

While each state is attempting to construct stable institutions, the extent to which the respective populations are allowed to actively participate vary. It is in this regard that a divergence of state-building strategies becomes significant. Paralleling their institutional advances, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are also the most developed states in establishing political parties. There are a variety of parties in Kazakhstan, among them the ruling Socialist Party, the National Unity of Kazakhstan, the Azat Movement, and Alash. The Socialists are the heirs to the Kazakh Communist Party, and remain the dominant party in the system. The other parties tend to present alternative programs of reform with minimal political success. The immediate problem that these groups face is a restrictive registration policy. Briefly, all organizations must officially register with the Kazakh government. By using this as a weapon against certain groups, the Nazarbaev administration is effectively limiting a very critical building block for a Kazakh civil society. Indeed, if a true multi-party system is to emerge, this policy will have to be relaxed. That, and the disappointment of the March 1994 election notwithstanding, there does appear to be a base for a future, multi-party system in Kazakhstan.

In Kyrgyzstan, the situation is somewhat different in that the former Communist Party was initially prohibited from open political action after the August 1991 coup attempt. Although Akaev does not belong to a specific party, he has culled support from a number of parties that are attempting to establish themselves as legitimate actors. The Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan, the nationalist movement Erkin Kyrgyzstan, and Asaba represent the
fledgling party system in the country. At present, most of the party operations and platforms are personality-based and ever-changing, and offer little in the way of stable, party analysis.37

Ethnicity remains a critical issue in these countries, as political parties often coalesce around ethnic identities. On occasion, members of these parties, especially those from Erkin Kyrgyzstan, complain about their lack of input, and object to the perceived "preferential treatment" of Europeans living in that country. For the minorities, a key issue remains their concern over the domination of the primary ethnic group in the region. The Russian party "Lad" in Kazakhstan is an example of this. Add to this the institutional emphasis on a single leader, and one quickly realizes that, although permitted to exist without persecution, opposition parties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are still forming. This formation could, and should, lay the groundwork for viable civil societies in both countries.

The three remaining Central Asian states are currently much more restrictive with respect to political parties. For a brief period, Tajikistan experienced multi-party participation in the political process, which was soon followed by a severe crackdown on opposition groups. In addition to the successor of the Tajik Communist Party, members of the opposition Rastokhez, Lali Badakhshan, and the Islamic Renaissance Party actually staffed key positions the Tajik government in 1992. However, this brief experiment ended within months when these same groups that protested to gain access were thrown out of office when the "Pro-Communists" regained full power. Leaders such as Davlat Khudonazarov and Akbar Turajonzade were soon prohibited from holding office and have since become key figures in the opposition's struggle, even in exile.

In Uzbekistan, the primary political organization is the Peoples' Democratic Party, which, in line with the other Central Asian states, is the direct successor to the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Instead of allowing for open access or voice, however, the Uzbek government has cracked down on alternative organizations. Opposition parties and groups, such as Birlik and the Democratic Party ERK, are constantly being hounded and harassed. In 1992-1993, the parties were banned, with numerous opposition figures, such as Birlik's leader, Abdurahim Pulatov, being beaten by groups of "unknown assailants," imprisoned, and effectively silenced. By 1994, most of these key figures of the early party movements have fled abroad, either to Turkey or the United States.38 Several "loyal opposition" parties exist, such as the Vatan Tarakiati and the Peasants' Party, but they are basically appendages of the PDP. One exception might be the "Istiklal Yoli," a party founded in June 1994, that calls itself an active opposition group to the PDP. The December 1994 election, however, reaffirmed the virtual non-existence of a party system in Uzbekistan.
The same lack of party activity exists in Turkmenistan. Niiazov's party, the Democratic
Party of Turkmenistan, strongly resembles the Uzbek PDP in its development, political
structure, and purpose. To create the illusion of political diversity, an officially-registered
opposition party, the Peasant Justice Party, appeared in the Summer of 1992. Opposition
groups in the country, such as the Turkmen Democratic Party and Agzybirlik, are currently
declared "illegal" and face constant harassment. Essentially, the opportunity for real political
opposition is close to non-existent. For both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, this position is
defended on the grounds of trying to prevent another "Tajikistan," or of re-establishing a
political culture familiar to the region.39

In sum, the record is mixed on the opportunities for opposition voices to be heard in
these political systems. In the end, only two of the states, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, are in
the process of developing civil societies that include a broader, more active electorate. The
other three, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are much more restrictive of their
populations, prohibiting the basic elements of what comprises democratic civil societies. There
still is a sentiment that participation must be channeled or monitored, in order to achieve the
much-vaunted goal of political stability. Parallel experiences can be seen in press laws,
censorship rules, and the rights of independent unions and associations. As long as a particular
leadership feels threatened by the possibility of an unsupportive electorate, venues such as
political parties will be severely restricted.

Civil Society in Central Asia: Ethnic Minorities

As with the other successor states, the Central Asian nations are confronting serious
questions regarding their ethnic minorities. The titular nationalities in Central Asia now find
themselves in the position the Russians occupied prior to 1991: each is a dominant ethnic
group, confronting a variety of demands from the minority populations.40 According to the
1989 Census, the last official census before the break-up of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was
depicted as a region rapidly expanding in numbers, with the majority of the growth taking
place among the indigenous peoples.41 The five titular nationalities make up over two-thirds of
the region's population, with over 58 percent residing in their respective "titular" nation. Less
than 20 percent of the region's population is Russian, with all current estimates having that
number steadily decreasing.42 Although ratios vary in the specific countries, all possess
significant minority populations, with regional minorities and Russians making up the bulk of
them.43

Regional concentrations are especially evident when oblast-level data is used. Each nation
has regions with significant percentages of minority populations. Of the region's 46 oblasts, 35
have a minority group that exceeds 10 percent of the oblast population. Of these, 22 have a single minority at 30 percent or more. In the case of Kazakhstan, the figures are particularly astounding. All eighteen oblasts have a significant minority populations, with four actually dominated by non-titular peoples. The other states also have selected areas of concern. The Karakalpak region in Uzbekistan and the Osh region in Kyrgyzstan are two such cases. Further accentuating the concentrations of minority groups is the fact that, in all countries, Russians and other non-Central Asians tend to reside in the urban areas, with the rural populations having an even higher percentage of indigenous peoples.

Current estimates reflect an increase in the home nationality, due to the steady out-migration of the other groups and a slow return of the major nationalities to their respective countries. For example, Izvestiia reported that up to 30,000 ethnic Kazakhs left Mongolia for Kazakhstan during the first year of independence, with tens of thousands likely to follow. More violent occurrences, such as the Tajik civil war, also have resulted in the exodus of ethnic Kyrgyz to Kyrgyzstan. Such shifts resulting from migratory patterns, military policies, and citizenship laws in the past five years should alter the national and regional percentages even further, strengthening the positions of the respective titular nationalities.

Structurally, little has been done to institutionalize minority interests in each country. All have declared themselves unitary states and, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have not made efforts to establish formulas for minority representation in higher offices. Uzbekistan's declaration that Karakalpakstan is an "Autonomous Region" is suspect in this regard. Constitutionally, Karakalpakstan can function apart from the national Uzbek government, as long as it complies with Uzbek law. A similar situation exists in the Pamiri region of Tajikistan, which was "elevated" to the status of Autonomous Republic in 1992.

Ethnic issues are particularly acute when considering public policy in the five states. In fact, as each titular nationality adjusts to its new-found status as a genuine political majority, policies will tend to favor the "national ethnic group." For example, Karimov's campaign promoting an "Uzbek national state" is based on the rationale that, finally, Uzbeks are going to have an equal right to their own national culture. Kyrgyz and Kazakh groups are also asserting their respective identities, as evidenced by such as the Kyrgyz opposition party "Asaba." Problems arise when these national celebrations become chauvinistic, or when minorities perceive themselves to be isolated. This is particularly evident in citizenship and language laws.

Citizenship laws become important for the creation of stable populations. In most countries, there are either restrictions on dual citizenship, or outright prohibitions. The difficulty for the Central Asian states, and the successor states of the Soviet Union in general,
is the fact that the entire population once belonged to a presently non-existent country.
Selecting which country to belong to, based on ethnic ties or residency status, is a difficult
procedure for millions of people in the region.

In spite of these unusual circumstances, the Uzbek government, for one, has noted that
dual citizenship would destabilize the country. The Kazakh leadership has used the same
argument when Russia suggests that dual citizenship be allowed. The previously-noted group
"Lad," representing Russians in Kazakhstan, is actively seeking a dual-citizenship policy.
Akaev’s willingness to open up the discussion on dual-citizenship, after the legislature rejected
it in 1993, has put the leader in a political bind. The Kyrgyz nationalist parties, Asaba and
Erkin Kyrgyzstan, have been vocal opponents of this potential change in policy.50
Turkmenistan, going against the regional trend, signed an agreement in December 1993 with
Russia allowing dual citizenship between the two countries. With close to 10 percent of the
Turkmen population consisting of Russians living in Ashgabat, the government felt it important
not to alienate them. As Turkmenistan is currently accelerating its economic development
program, the largely Russian skilled and professional workers are desperately needed.51 In
Central Asia, citizenship remains a highly contentious, and unresolved, policy issue.

A similar situation exists with respect to the current discussion regarding language laws.
The high percentage and regional concentration of non-Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan has actually
resulted in minority groups, especially Russians, actively supporting official bi-lingualism.
Indeed, the situation almost necessitates that some concession be made, even if it be to declare
Russian a "special language," as suggested by Akaev’s supporters.52 The near-parity among
Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan has obligated President Nazarbaev to openly state that
restricting the usage of Russian would only have a detrimental effect on the large Russian-
speaking population.53 Consequently, the constitution was crafted with a clause stating that
Kazakh is the official language of the nation, and Russian is the "language of inter-ethnic
communication."54

The republics with higher percentages of titular nationalities have been more aggressive
in their push for a single language. Uzbekistan has quickly implemented its policy of Uzbek as
the official language. News broadcasts and other media are also switching over to a
predominantly Uzbek language format. For example, in the Summer of 1994, Ostankino ceased
broadcasting to Uzbekistan, making the entire television media Uzbek-Turkish only.55
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have also been active in promoting their titular languages,
although the unrest in the latter has clearly slowed the pace of any rapid transition to Tajik-
only usage. Shortly after independence, the Tajik government passed a resolution which called
for the replacement of the cyrillic script with the arabic script. The cost of this undertaking, however, will probably prevent it from taking place in the near future.

The relative uncertainty that presently surrounds minority policies has only perpetuated the exodus of minority groups out of Central Asia. This is especially true for the non-Central Asians. Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Jews, are leaving Central Asia for fear of a greater discriminatory backlash. In the Fall of 1993, the Kyrgyz government submitted a proposal to halt the outmigration of Russians, after it was reported that during the first half of 1993, over 30,000 Russians had already left the country, in addition to 27,000 other people. Akaev has repeatedly called for the non-Kyrgyz to stay, stressing their value to the republic as a whole. His commitment to accommodating the Slavic population was evidenced in the September 1993 opening of the Slavonic University in Bishkek. However, the emigration of Akaev's Deputy Prime Minister, German Kuznetsov, at the end of that year, is a sign that the ethnic question has remains unsolved in Kyrgyzstan.

Needless to say, the situation in Kazakhstan is even more precarious. Recent demographic accounts of Kazakhstan indicate that the country is experiencing a slowdown in the total population growth rate. This is not only due to the low birthrates of the Slavic population, but the steady outflow of non-Kazakhs. Through 1992, an estimated 77,000 Russians left Kazakhstan. To counter this, even non-governmental groups are trying to actively reverse the flow. Political activist Kamal Ormantaev's new National-Democratic Party has as one of its top goals the inclusion of Russians, and other non-Kazakhs, in Kazakh political affairs. By using such unifying themes as the environment and the Aral Sea, the NDP hopes that the current view of nationality-based parties can change. It is ironic that the two states most interested in maintaining liberal minority policies are the ones experiencing problems of ethnic flight.

The situation in the other three states is less dramatic, as the total non-regional populations are not as high. In Uzbekistan, the Russians are reacting in a similar manner to their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, it is the regionally-concentrated Tajiks and Karakalpaks that are having the greatest problems. The Tajiks in Bukhara and Samarkand have been critical of the current regime's emphasis on Uzbek traditions at the expense of others. Since 1991, groups have emerged attempting to represent Tajik interests, most notably the social organization "Samarqand." Karimov's advisor on ethnic relations, Sobir Saidov, declared that ethnic minority groups had ample opportunities to express themselves. Yet, at the same time, "Samarqand" has been prohibited from registering and its leader, Utkam Bekmukhamedov, has been harassed and arrested. Unlike the Russians or other immigrant populations, the Tajiks are indigenous to the region and will probably not leave.
Thus, the possibility exists that continued disenfranchisement may ultimately lead to increased militancy as time passes. Seemingly caught in the ethnic crossfire is the ancient Bukharan Jewish population, which, because of political and social pressures, is leaving at a rapid rate.60

The problems of ethnic minorities either attempting to leave, or feeling persecuted are repeated in Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan. The instability in the former case makes it difficult to evaluate the role of ethnic minorities. The Uzbek population in the north may face reprisals, in light of the poor treatment of Tajiks in Uzbekistan. In addition, there are reports of ethnic Kyrgyz fleeing northward to escape the unrest. Finally, minorities in the Pamiri region continue to face persecution as a result of the ongoing conflict and their support for the opposition.61

The significance of minority policies in establishing a civil society is two-fold. First, the pressures to migrate and the steady drain of skilled workers have, and will continue to, adversely affect the economies in the region. As these states attempt to establish stable institutions, it does not help that key ministries and infrastructural agencies remain shorthanded and in a state of flux. Second, the flight of minorities will only perpetuate an intolerance on the part of those who stay, among both majority and minority groups. If a basic tenet of a democratic civil society is a respect for minority rights, and the protection of minority groups, the Central Asian states will be hard pressed to work toward these goals. At present, the Kyrgyz government is attempting to do just that, although pressures from below are making it difficult. It is not surprising that the two countries with the most significant minority populations, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are also the ones most open to the creation of a more inclusive civil society.

Policy Implications: Foreign Relations in Central Asia

The evolving nature of the state in Central Asia and the embryonic status of civil society in the region have directly affected the priorities of the regimes’ foreign policies. The need to establish domestic stability has translated into a push for regional cooperation and security. For some, there is also a desire to emulate other state systems in order to justify particular courses of development. This quest for “models” has become a central component of Central Asian foreign policy.

In the area of regional cooperation, the most important element is economic trade. Given the fact that all were interconnected in the Soviet centrally planned economy, it not surprising that substantial ties remain. For Uzbekistan, bartering for agricultural equipment and other products was a stop-gap measure designed to maintain the economy during the initial period of
independence. Today, hard currency payments for cotton are the norm. Indeed, demands for hard currency for most products has become the hallmark of most interrepublic trade, creating friction among the Central Asian states, as well as with the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On occasion, Uzbekistan has cut off natural gas and oil supplies to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, arguing that they have not kept up with payments. Turkmenistan also has used the pipeline "valve" as a means to acquire increased payments from other states, most notably Ukraine. The problem, of course, is that these states were seen primarily as suppliers of raw materials that were manufactured in other parts of the Soviet Union, usually in Russia. And although they have the upper hand in these products, there remains a serious need to trade for manufactured goods.

This reality has forced each of the states to re-establish relations not only with each other, but with Russia and the rest of the CIS.62 The political rhetoric characteristic of the early months of "independence" has given way to economic reality, and trade among the CIS states has slowly increased since 1992.63 In addition, numerous bilateral agreements have been signed in the past several years between the Central Asian states themselves, especially Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In late 1993 and early 1994, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement that would reduce tariffs and assist in coordinating regional economic policies. Kyrgyzstan joined a short while later. This is quite a turnaround from May 1993, when the Uzbek government closed its border with Kyrgyzstan over the latter's introduction of the "som" currency. Cooperative efforts are also evidenced in the negotiations within the Economic Cooperation Organization.64

The migration disputes noted earlier have themselves raised questions regarding the states' borders. For example, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments have discussed the situation of their fellow nationals living in Tajikistan, even though Uzbeks are prominently represented in the Tajik government. Conversely, Tajik nationalists are calling for a redrawing of the borders with Uzbekistan because their fellow nationals are perceived to be discriminated against. For some, the situation will not be settled until Tajikistan is given the historic cities of Bukhara and Samarqand.

Border troubles also plague Kazakhstan. With the highest percentage of minority-dominated oblasts, almost all of which are located along the Russian border, Kazakhstan has had to deal with the question of potential break-away regions. In light of the battles over "Kazakh nationalism," three of the northern, "Russian" oblasts in Kazakhstan have begun forging ties with the bordering Russian Federation oblasts.65 If not resolved, such irredentist rhetoric may lead to actual inter-ethnic violence, an occurrence not uncommon in Central Asia.66
Like trade, regional security continues to be heavily influenced by greater CIS concerns. According to various CIS agreements, most notably the 1992 Tashkent Summit, there will continue to be a coordination of military policies among the successor states. For Tajikistan, this has meant that the 201st Motorized Division of the Russian Army remains in place. More recently, Kazakhstan has agreed to partially unify its military with that of Russia.67 To some extent, Uzbekistan has taken this trend to mean that it can become a regional hegemon in Central Asia. Having the largest population base and a central location greatly enhances Uzbekistan’s ability to dominate the region. This is furthered by Uzbekistan’s foreign policy priority of regional stability, which would be enhanced if it could better control or influence the other states.68

In January of 1992, Uzbekistan established a national guard that has become the basis of its military power. Uzbeks formerly enlisted in the Soviet Army have been called home, and new units are being established. These units will be integrated into the CIS structure and will be modest in size.69 On another occasion, the government has declared that the national army will be defensive in nature, and will promote the policy of "neutrality."70 Since late 1992, this policy has already been compromised, as Uzbek units have actively participated in the civil war in Tajikistan.71 The extent of involvement is unclear, but it is certain that Karimov supports the current regime in Tajikistan and has aided in the attacks on anti-government forces. In May 1993, Uzbek military units also performed exercises in Kyrgyzstan, without informing the Kyrgyz government. In addition, the Uzbek secret police has made forays abroad to apprehend political dissidents. Again, whether these are isolated incidents, or the beginning of a regional policy, Karimov considers it imperative that Uzbekistan show itself as a force of stability in the region. Thus, these actions may reflect a future pattern of behavior, a continuation of which may spark unrest among that country’s people. In searching for stability without a true civil society, such options may become more appealing to the Uzbek government in the future.

A final foreign policy consideration resulting from the state-building process is the incessant search for an appropriate "developmental model." For those Central Asian leaders that are attempting to justify their lack of desire to create civil societies, model-building has, in fact, played a significant role. Turkmenistan, for example, is negotiating an economic model of development for itself that parallels the Arab states in the Middle East. Given the potential for wealth derived from the oil and gas resources, Niiazov has remarked on numerous occasions that his country will follow the "Kuwaiti model:" a strong, non-democratic tradition that ensures material and financial wealth for the population if they accept the political status quo.72 Recent behavior suggests that Turkmenistan is beginning to achieve success and is fast
becoming an autonomous economic actor. Agreements signed with Ukraine, Russia, Iran, and other states indicate that the ability to remain independent of foreign aid and influence is the preferred strategy for Niiazov, who sees this approach as simply a return to more traditional Turkmen values.73

For Uzbekistan, the significance of any economic model hinges upon the political "strings" attached to it. In late 1991, Karimov announced that to improve Uzbekistan’s economy, his government was going to follow the Turkish model of development, a combination of market economics, secular politics, and Islam. However, discussion of the Turkish model dropped precipitously after 1992, when it became evident that Turkey’s aid would be modest in comparison to that of other states. Countries like China, Indonesia, and South Korea began to play a more prominent role in the economic development in Uzbekistan. In almost all cases, these economic strategies possess a common political theme: strong, central authoritarianism.74 The selection of such models only reinforces a state system that restricts a potential civil society.

The question of the evolution of civil societies is important when looking at the Central Asian states that chose to strengthen relations with the industrialized West. Although their behavior has not been directly a result of Western pressures, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have benefitted from a relatively positive image on these issues. Both have courted Western nations, particularly Germany and the United States, into helping them exploit natural resources or administer financial assistance. An example of this is Kazakhstan’s agreement with Chevron to exploit the Tengiz oil fields.75 In addition, both nations have not only signed the human rights accords of various international charters, but have actually accepted the conditions of political liberalization on economic assistance packages. They have even housed political refugees from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, indicating a willingness to adopt rules of conduct appropriate to nations in the international community.

In sum, the process of state-building and the varying degrees of civil society have had an effect on the region’s foreign policy. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appear to be pushing for more cooperative policy measures, while the other three are less enthusiastic. Indeed, Uzbekistan seems to be exhibiting the behavior of a nation bent on regional and domestic security, even if it means dominating or violating immediate neighbors. The fact that there are no internal checks on the government’s actions reinforces the view that a civil society is non-existent.
Conclusion

It seems evident that, with perhaps the exception of Tajikistan, all have worked towards establishing political systems designed to achieve short-term stability. The picture becomes clearer as successive rounds of elections and leadership transitions take place. Like the rest of the former Soviet republics, the Central Asian states are focusing on building institutions and consolidating power, sometimes at the expense of developing other facets of a modern and truly stable political system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, each state has had to fill a critical power void, often working under extremely difficult economic conditions. For countries as poor as the Central Asian states, this has been no easy task.

By examining the specific issues of political parties and ethnic minorities, it is also evident that not all of the Central Asian states are presently interested in developing viable civil societies. Although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan appear to be working in this direction, there is little evidence to suggest that the other three states are even interested in laying the foundation for such a system. Although the ultimate results of these choices are presently unknown, the policy implications are beginning to show. For example, in the realm of foreign policy, one can already see patterns of behavior that match the state and civil society limitations. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have conducted themselves more openly in the international arena. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan's attempt to present itself as the strong, central leader of the region falls in line with past behavioral patterns of other despotic states. The future test for the Central Asian states will be how they can solve the problems arising from the regional and ethnic divisions, which will continue to plague them.

Not only is there a need to create lasting, independent state structures, but these must also be responsive or accountable, with institutions, associations, parties, and open political discourse. It is only after such elements are in place, that a system can begin to establish itself as a democracy. Just as important is the fact that, without a mechanism for public accountability, the goal of popular legitimacy will be impossible to attain. If force is required to keep a given regime in office, chances are they will be less stable in the long run. If the citizens feel left out of the political process, the possibilities of future dissatisfaction and protest exist. In short, an authoritarian regimes' lack of popular legitimacy becomes dependant upon a means that further alienates the citizenry, which, in turn, threatened the regime itself.

In the end, by using state theory to analyze the performances of the Central Asian states, it is evident that the concerns noted above should remain part of any discussion of transition and stability in the region. Clearly, it is too early to predict the long-term viability of any of these regimes. However, it does seem that certain behavioral patterns are emerging that may
allow observers to judge when potential crises will occur, and the extent to which they will further affect politics as practiced in Central Asia.

Notes


2. Defined as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.


5. In this case, authoritarianism is defined as a state system "dependent on centralized executive control and coercion." In addition, it is a system whereby the state has control over society. See Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), p.24.


7. The term "political culture" has been defined a number of ways. In this instance, I am referring to a society’s system of values, beliefs, and symbols. This is a network that is learned, and evolves over time: that is, historical development of a given "political culture" is assumed. See Robert Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1987), p.1, and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & Co., 1965), p.3.

8. In this case, "civic culture" is defined as a political culture that supports an active civil society. Not only is there a general awareness of elections, but of party and interest group involvement. Usually, the application of this term is limited to liberal democracies.


10. Numerous works have been written on the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods in Central Asian history. A classic in the field which has been updated is Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).
11. It is important to note here that even group names, such as Uzbek, Tajik, and Kazakh, have dubious levels of importance during the pre-Soviet era. For the most part, people identified with their region, family, or clan, as well as with the Islamic community. It was not until the Soviet period that "ethnic" classifications were widely used.


15. The Khanate of Qoqand was actually liquidated in the 1870s as a result of repeated conflicts with Russia.


17. The hope was to use elites that had some credibility in the region, in order to assist in the Soviet power consolidation. By the 1930s and the Great Purge, Soviet policy shifted to that of employing more "loyal" regional leaders, who did not have autonomous power bases. Ironically, it was the very leadership supportive of the Soviet incorporation, exemplified by the Uzbeks Akmal Ikram and Faizulla Khoja, that were executed. See Donald Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-1983)," *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 5, nos. 3-4 (1986), p.91-132.


20. These included riots in Almaty (Alma-Ata) in 1986 when Kunaev was replaced with a Russian (Kolbin), and the "Cotton Scandal" that suggested Rashidov controlled a large-scale "mafia" organization in Uzbekistan. The investigation of this latter incident is still viewed as a Russian-Uzbek conflict and not a matter of corruption.

21. Exception could be made for the nomadic groups, such as the Kyrgyz and Kazakh, although any democratic element tended to remain at the local, or micro-level, and not at any state-wide level.


26. Mirsaidov, a Tashkent-based clan leader, was instrumental in bringing Karimov to power in 1989. However, shortly after independence, Karimov removed Mirsaidov as Vice-President, abolishing the position itself. Later, Mirsaidov was tried, convicted, and amnestied, for crimes against the state, effectively removing him as a political rival.
29. However, the constitution explicitly states that the President does not have undue authority. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, CSCE Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), p.192.
31. FBIS-SOV-93-039, 2 March 1993, pp.56-57.
33. In some ways, Tajikistan is still struggling with the fact that the Soviet collapse has left a power vacuum in the country that is still being filled. Izvestiia, 12 January 1993, p.5.
40. All but the Kazakhs also possess a majority in their respective countries.
41. Demographic information was obtained from Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia (Moscow: "Financy i statistika," 1991).
42. Russians comprise the following percentages: Kazakhstan, 37.8 percent; Kyrgyzstan, 21.5 percent; Turkmenistan, 9.5 percent; Uzbekistan, 8.3 percent, and Tajikistan, 7.3 percent.
43. In addition to the other titular nationalities and the Russians, there are also significant percentages of Ukrainians in Kazakhstan (5.4 percent) and Kyrgyzstan (2.5 percent); Germans in Kazakhstan (5.8 percent); Tatars in Uzbekistan (2.4 percent) and Kazakhstan (2.0 percent); and Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan (2.1 percent).
44. A fifth minority-dominated region is the Kyrgyz city of Bishkek.
46. FBIS-SOV-93-041, 1 April 1993, p.60.
47. This inability to act autonomously prompted Karakalpakstan's Supreme Soviet Chairman, Dautlebey Shamshetov, and Council of Minister Chairman, Aminbey Tajiev, to resign from office. Pravda, 16 June 1992, p.4.
48. Officially, it is the Pamir-Badakhshan Autonomous Republic.
51. The Turkmen government is also actively promoting a campaign to have Turkmen from other countries return, with the promise of automatic citizenship. Izvestiia, 2 June 1992, p.2.
52. Literaturnaia gazeta, 14 April 1993, p.2.
54. A version of the constitution was reprinted in FBIS-SOV-93-048, 19 April 1993, p.68-79.
55. The Ostankino broadcast officially ended at the conclusion of the broadcast of the 1994 Summer Olympics.
57. The 1990 unification of Germany, and the liberal repatriation laws in that country, have also prompted the Germans from Kyrgyzstan to migrate. RFE/RL News Brief, vol. 2, no. 42 (October 1993), p.9.
58. Kuznetsov left partly because of increased frustration with enacting reform legislation, but also because of what he perceived to be an increase in "Kyrgyz chauvinism."
60. Since 1990, almost half of the Bukharan Jewish population has emigrated, primarily to the United States or Israel. Unfortunately, the financial penalties imposed upon emigres by the Uzbek government are making it that much harder for the remaining population to leave.
61. An account of the individuals attacked or kidnapped by government agents is given in Pravda, 12 January 1993, p.1.
68. In this discussion, Kazakhstan is usually not included, partially because of its nuclear arsenal and also because of the large Russian population. Primarily, Uzbek aspirations tend towards Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even northern Afghanistan.
72. Izvestiia, 9 April 1993, p.3.