PROJECT INFORMATION:¹

CONTRACTOR: Emory University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith

& Evelyn Davidheiser

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 808-15

DATE: July 6, 1995

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded by Council Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within the Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, or make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without the written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law.

¹ The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s).
NCSEER NOTE

This paper has been substantially abridged by NCSEER Staff to eliminate some eight single-spaced pages discussing theories of political institutions, of democratization, and of collective choice. The original, unabridged version as submitted by the authors is available from the Council upon request [Tel. (202) 387-0168: FAX (202) 387-1608].
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The emerging parliament of the Russian Federation offers an opportunity to study the development of a new legislature in a large and complex political system. Elected in December, 1993, and convening for the first time in January, 1994, the Federal Assembly is bicameral and situated in a separation of powers system that grants certain decree-making powers to the president. Most features of the internal structure and procedure of the two houses are left for the houses to determine and the nature of the electoral law is left to be determined by law. Thus, important features of the new parliament remained to be determined after the constitution was ratified at the time of the December, 1993, elections. This paper, using an implication of positive theories of institutions as a framework, and focusing on the Duma, provides an introduction to the new parliamentary institutions of Russia. During the Duma’s first year substantial progress was made in overcoming the problems of collective choice that are major obstacles to democratization.

The history of crisis and discontinuity over the 1989-93 period overshadows important incremental choices and changes in crucial aspects of legislative organization and in the acquisition of knowledge and skills by parliamentarians themselves. These steps in the sequence of development of Russian parliamentary institutions may be leading toward a more stable set of arrangements. Already these arrangements have helped to overcome the problems of inducing credible commitment on the part of antagonistic political forces and of providing incentives to actors for maintaining their commitment to the system. The paper focuses on three such arrangements: the organization of leadership within the parliament; guarantees for minority rights in legislative decision-making; and the elaboration of internal structures to cope with the heavy workload created by the need to establish a legislative foundation for a post-communist society.

Russia’s brief post-communist history is rich in examples of failed representative institutions. In 1989, a new set of legislative structures engineered by Gorbachev and his colleagues was established, only to be dissolved in 1991, when it could not prevent the breakdown of the Soviet state. The analogous republic-level structures established in 1990 were suppressed forcibly in 1993 when Yeltsin decreed that a new parliament would be elected and new constitutional order created through popular referendum. A third system of representative institutions has existed since January, 1994.

Compiled and edited by National Council staff.
The present institutional arrangements of the Russian State Duma overcome problems of institutional supply, mutual monitoring by participants and credible commitment. The supply of institutional solutions came about by adapting elements of the earlier parliamentary practices, discarding others, and devising new forms. Initially these served the policy interests of President Yeltsin's supporters, but were modified to satisfy a majority of members of other political groups who shared a common interest in stimulating party development which cut across the deep ideological cleavage over market reform. The problems of commitment and monitoring were overcome at low cost by making the parliamentary steering body (the Council of the Duma) a site for inter-partisan consultation and decision-making. Cross-party agreements on a number of major issues have resulted from bargaining among party leaders in the Council--among them the distribution of committee chairmanships and leadership posts in January 1994, the amnesty package deal of February, the budget deal for the 1994 budget in June, the budget package for the 1995 budget in February 1995 and others. By representing each registered faction on a parity-basis, the current makeup of the Council is slightly biased against the opposition factions in parliament, which are stronger on the floor than the reform factions. This helps explain the fact that by a small margin communist and agrarian deputies would prefer to add committee chairs as voting members of the Council while reform deputies would keep the present system. But parties as such are able to exert greater control over legislative business by keeping the Council an exclusively party-oriented institution. The present rule, therefore, retains majority support over opposition from unrepresented deputies. The institutional arrangements of the Duma are therefore suited to the interests of a majority of party organizations, none of which can count upon a secure majority for its policy objectives, and which therefore share a common interest in protecting minority rights and guaranteeing numerous openings for individual deputies and registered groups to influence legislative outcomes.

We concentrate upon the Duma, where to a surprising degree a set of institutions has been devised that are neutral with respect to ideological preferences but serve the collective interests of Russia's nascent parties. But we have neglected two other critical centers of power in the central government: the Council of the Federation and the President. The Council of the Federation lacks both a presidium and a system of party factions. Its electoral base is substantially different from that of the Duma and it has frequently been at loggerheads with the Duma over policy. Most of its members work in it on a part-time basis. There are relatively few incentives to induce commitment or inhibit withdrawal and breakdown. To the extent it can block legislative decisions made by the Duma, therefore, the institutional features of the
Council of the Federation can weaken incentives for commitment by Duma members and therefore destabilize the new bicameral parliament.

A still more serious issue is the president's power. The problem that led to the breakdown of the last parliament still exists: the very strong presidential powers in the Constitution tempt Yeltsin and his supporters to rely on presidential decree power to enact policies rather than to build majorities and seek compromises in parliament. Opposition forces, in turn, are motivated either to modify or ignore the constitution. Several factors that will determine the outcome remain undecided. The Constitutional Court will soon decide on several disputes arising from President Yeltsin's use of his decree powers. If it restricts Yeltsin's power, and Yeltsin accepts the decision, the result will be to increase the incentive for credible commitment by both ideological wings to the parliament. Another factor is the way in which the president chooses to use his powers. On several important economic policy issues, the president has instructed the government to reach agreement with parliament through compromise rather than to confront it. A third factor is the timing of the next parliamentary elections. If the elections are held as scheduled in December 1995, using the election law that the Duma has passed, it is likely that roughly the same set of parties which now control decision making will return and that the institutional features outlined here will not be modified significantly. If the elections are postponed, however, or the election law is changed, the balance of party and policy interests in parliament will be affected. In that case, parliamentary institutions in Russia will probably undergo yet another major change.
COMMUNISM'S COLLAPSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS IN RUSSIA¹

Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith

The emerging parliament of the Russian Federation offers an opportunity to study the development of a new legislature in a large and complex political system. Elected in December, 1993, and convening for the first time in January, 1994, the Federal Assembly is bicameral and situated in a separation of powers system that grants certain decree-making powers to the president. Most features of the internal structure and procedure of the two houses are left for the houses to determine and the nature of the electoral law is left to be determined by law. Thus, important features of the new parliament remained to be determined after the constitution was ratified at the time of the December, 1993, elections.

In this discussion paper, using an implication of positive theories of institutions² as our framework, we provide an introduction to the new parliamentary institutions of Russia. Our focus is the Duma, which has been the focus of our recent research. During the Duma's first year, we argue, substantial progress was made in overcoming the problems of collective choice that are major obstacles to democratization.

Consistent with the premises of the institutional approach, some initial choices about electoral and constitutional arrangements have had a major impact on the developmental paths of the states in the region. If the question underlying earlier studies into the relationship between social change and democracy might be formulated as, "How much modernization is required to allow democracy to be institutionalized?", the analogous institutional question might be: "Given a particular set of social cleavages and policy agenda, which choices about representative institutions are likely to prove stable, and which are likely to break down?" In this paper we hope to offer some observations on this problem in the light of the Russian experience. In the post-Soviet successor states, new representative institutions have not arisen through negotiated pacts between old regimes and challenger elites. If they form at all, they emerge through an

¹Research reported in this paper was supported by a contract from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, which bears no responsibility for the content or findings of the research. We wish to express our appreciation as well to Moshe Haspel for invaluable research assistance.

incremental adaptation of inherited soviet structures. Our underlying question therefore is: "Can stable representative institutions form in a post-Soviet successor state after the collapse of the old regime rather than as a negotiated exit from it?"

We argue that the history of crisis and discontinuity over the 1989-93 period overshadows important incremental choices and changes in crucial aspects of legislative organization and in the acquisition of knowledge and skills by parliamentarians themselves. These steps in the sequence of development of Russian parliamentary institutions may be leading toward a more stable set of arrangements. Already these arrangements have helped to overcome the problems of inducing credible commitment on the part of antagonistic political forces and of providing incentives to actors for maintaining their commitment to the system. We will illustrate the way the present system tends to resolve these dilemmas by focusing on the organization of leadership within the parliament; guarantees for minority rights in legislative decision-making; and the elaboration of internal structures to cope with the heavy workload created by the need to establish a legislative foundation for a post-communist society.

Indeed, Russia's brief post-communist history is rich in examples of failed representative institutions. In 1989, a new set of legislative structures engineered by Gorbachev and his colleagues was established, only to be dissolved in 1991, when it could not prevent the breakdown of the Soviet state. The analogous republic-level structures established in 1990 were suppressed forcibly in 1993 when Yeltsin decreed that a new parliament would be elected and new constitutional order created through popular referendum. A third system of representative institutions has existed since January, 1994. What are the odds it will survive five years?

**Institutional Choice and Context in the Case of the Russian Federation**

We argue that the earlier representative bodies failed because the participants themselves were not committed to their survival. In our view, the principal problem with both of the immediately preceding sets of representative institutions was their inability to induce credible commitment on the part of major participants. In fact, even though all major political forces won representation in the new assemblies, the actors' strategies almost from the start were predicated on the system's failure. The two cases display a very similar sequence of defection and

---

3The following discussion reflects our continuing study of the evolution of Russian parliamentary institutions. Among the sources we draw upon are: the official records of the proceedings of the 1989-91, 1990-93, and current parliaments; interviews with many of the members and leaders of the parliaments in all three phases; observation of plenary, committee and faction sessions; surveys of the members of the deputies of the parliament in 1993 and 1994 and of candidates running for parliament in the fall of 1993; and the electronic voting records of the members.
breakdown. In creating the USSR Congress and Supreme Soviet system, General Secretary Gorbachev refused to bind himself to the constitutional rules he himself imposed on others (Urban, 1990; Kiernan, 1993). The design that he and his colleagues in the central party leadership worked out for the new USSR parliament made it certain that however active parliamentarism might be as a means of venting social tension and deliberating about legislation, control over basic policy decisions would remain securely in the hands of the monopolistic CPSU, which Gorbachev headed. Only when, in February 1990, Gorbachev abruptly altered his strategy and decided to create a presidency, did he endorse the relaxation of the communist party’s monopoly on power. Accordingly, first through the party’s constitutional “leading role” and later through the creation of a presidency, Gorbachev ensured that the parliament--the two-tiered Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet--would lack sovereign authority over policy.

Unfortunately, a direct test of our argument -- that the absence of credible commitments caused the failure of the “transitional” institutions of the 1989-1993 period -- is not possible. Direct evidence of the political objectives and strategies of key actors is difficult or impossible to obtain. At this point, we merely offer a review of events and some systematically gathered data that appear to be consistent with the argument.

Constitutional Choices

Soon after the creation of the Union presidency, Gorbachev sought authority to enact economic policy by decree. With no one reform plan able to command a majority of support within the legislature, the deputies granted Gorbachev the power he sought. The incoherent content of Gorbachev’s economic policy, which mixed highly conservative and moderately reformist elements, suggests that neither the reform movement nor the conservatives possessed a clear majority of power resources. Control over policy had shifted from the communist party to the presidency. Gorbachev grew removed from the legislature and ceased working to forge agreements with it over major policy decisions. His negotiations with the leaders of the union republics to draft a new treaty of union were conducted entirely outside the framework of the legislature, a fact which his successor as chairman of the Supreme Soviet bitterly resented and strenuously opposed. Indeed, on the very day when Gorbachev’s own prime minister appeared before parliament to seek consent for declaring a state of emergency in the country, Gorbachev was winding up secret negotiations on the treaty with the republics at a dacha outside Moscow.

Gorbachev’s extra-legal actions stimulated the withdrawal of other groups’ commitment to the new institutional arrangements. Gorbachev desired to bind others to the new arrangements -- forces such as the newly active democratic intelligentsia, national movements in the republics, and orthodox communist and nationalist backlash groups -- while remaining free himself to use other
political arenas to make policy. But few other actors were willing to be put at a disadvantage by committing themselves to a rigged game. They had no reason to make a long-term commitment to the new institutions if they could achieve their goals outside them. Consequently, participants took advantage of their status as USSR deputies to mobilize extra-constitutional bases of political power. The independence-minded popular fronts in the Baltic states in fact followed Gorbachev lead and withdrew from participation in the parliament, further weakening what modest core of democratic sentiment remained. Other groups plotted to declare martial law and restore the old regime. Still others transferred their energies to republic-level political movements. In the end, no major group of actors -- not republican leaders, conservatives at the center, democratic intellectuals, or Gorbachev himself -- had any incentive to save the Congress and Supreme Soviet. The Congress/Supreme Soviet system was the only USSR-level representative institution.

A similar story can be told of the Russian Congress/Supreme Soviet system. It is reasonable to suppose that Yeltsin and his supporters initially saw these new bodies as a means of pushing or challenging Gorbachev on union-level policy concerning Russia's autonomy and the depth and pace of economic reform. But, like Gorbachev, Yeltsin soon found it expedient to establish and gain election to a presidency. Shortly after doing so, much like Gorbachev a year before, Yeltsin demanded and sought emergency powers to enact policy by decree. He was now free of the necessity to seek majority support for his desired reforms while his opponents were not. But the withdrawal of some reformers from parliament, combined with significant shifts in attitudes among some former reformers, altered the balance of political forces within parliament, allowing his opponents almost to muster the two-thirds majority required to make constitutional revisions and depose Yeltsin from the presidency. The parliamentary majority refused to follow through on an earlier agreement to devise a new constitution and, some time later, reneged on their agreement to submit the issue of Yeltsin's power and policy to a national referendum. Instead, parliament sought to strip Yeltsin of his powers and to block his policies. Neither Yeltsin nor his opposition had any long-term commitment to these parliamentary structures: the opposition found a base of power in the system of Soviets as a conservative tide swept the democrats from positions of influence, and so found the congress/Supreme Soviet arrangement convenient, while Yeltsin had yearned to scrap it in favor of a "presidential republic" since 1991. But Yeltsin was unable to introduce a new constitutional system as he had shock therapy, by decree; he could not move his constitution through the congress. Opposition to his constitutional plans mounted as his economic policies proceeded. Ultimately, Yeltsin used a combination of force, political pressure, and popular referendum to create his new constitutional system (Remington 1995b).

In both instances, the development of the new parliamentary institutions was interrupted almost immediately by the leader's unilateral decision to add a powerful presidency into the
constitutional mix, and to shift power from assembly to presidency. Both histories ended in violence and near civil war. Yet, the Union did not survive, while Russia has so far. Is there any reason to suppose that the opposing parties now are any more committed to the parliamentary game than in the 1990-93 period, or that other potential wild-card players, such as Zhirinovsky, have any long-term commitment to making the new system work? Prospects for stabilization of the current arrangements are made dimmer by the violence with which they were launched. The plan for the new parliament was decreed into place by Yeltsin as was the scheme for elections. Under these conditions, what basis existed for renewed commitments to a new constitution?

One basis for an initial commitment to some orderly policy-making process was agreement between reformers and most of their opponents on the desirability of avoiding the disintegration of the Russian Federation. Order was preferred over civil war. Disintegration was a real possibility if Moscow elites failed to recover rapidly from the showdown between Yeltsin and the transition parliament. But for Yeltsin's opponents it appeared that challenging Yeltsin by force was impossible in the aftermath of the events of October, 1993. The opponents had little choice but to participate in the Yeltsin-decreed elections of December, 1993, if they wanted to protect their interests. And Yeltsin facilitated the participation of all groups, except those directly involved in the coup attempt in October, by decreeing electoral rules that allowed a wide range of groups to compete in the December elections.

Moreover, Yeltsin proposed a constitutional framework that was the product of months of discussion among the various political factions and parties of the transition parliament. While it created a stronger presidency than the one that existed during the transition period, the new constitution created a shared-powers system that gave the parliament the ability to check the president and the government. Therefore, even Yeltsin's opponents who were unhappy with the details of the constitution presented to the electorate at the time of the December, 1993, elections, had reason to hope that they could protect their interests by competing in the elections and participating in the new parliament.

Nevertheless, even after the December elections and ratification of the constitution, commitments by many Russian elites to the new institutional framework probably were seen as quite weak and tentative at best by their opponents. Some Yeltsin opponents, no doubt, hoped that the new constitution and parliament would fail. The deep divisions that remained among elected deputies and between Yeltsin and his opponents should have given the opposition some hope. So the December elections and constitutional referendum left open the question of commitment to the new institutions.
Parliament and Commitment

How might a new representative institution solve the problem of creating incentives for members to uphold their commitment contingent on others readiness to do so? Could parliament somehow transform these fragile commitments to participate in the new institutions into firmer, more reliable commitments that could motivate deputies to participate seriously and fully in legislative affairs?

The conventional way to conceive of the role and internal organization of parliaments in political systems is as the products of electoral and party systems. For example, proportional representation systems are associated with strong parties, which in turn tie legislators to the government (in parliamentary systems), create centralized leadership, limit the role of parliamentary committees, and dictate the behavior of rank-and-file legislators. This perspective is quite natural. After all, at least in the short run, electoral and party systems produce the legislators who comprise the legislature and are usually seen as temporally prior to the legislature.

In our view, the conventional treatment of parliaments as products of their political environment understates the influence of parliaments on those environments, particularly at early stages in democratization. In the early stages of democratization, the electoral system may be subject to alteration by law, political parties are often underdeveloped and usually lack national organizations, and interest groups are only beginning to form in many sectors of society. The parliaments provide a place for political elites to meet and organize, identify party and faction leaders, formulate policy programs, and attract media attention. Moreover, parliaments may act on electoral law as well as law providing for the creation and registration of parties and lobbying organizations. And parliaments are a place where elites can gauge the behavior of opponents, begin to interact with opponents, and build reputations for trustworthiness. These activities are central to the aggregation of preferences and coordination of activities among like-minded actors that are vital to gaining the commitment of elite actors who are skeptical about the consequences of new institutions for their interests. This characterization appears to fit Russia to date.

Parliamentary Institutions in the Transition Years

A nearly universal instrument by which politicians organize themselves, engage in mutual monitoring, and act to enforce rules in contemporary parliamentary institutions is a system of political parties. Yet parties, too, must overcome collective action problems to form and persist, something which history suggests is difficult (Rose and Mackie, 1988; Fish, 1995; McFaul, 1993). For our purposes, though, to the extent that parties can enable members who pursue contingent strategies to participate conscientiously in the rules of the parliamentary game, they contribute to the stability of the legislature. Some members shirk their responsibilities, failing to exercise the
influence to which they are formally entitled and pursuing instead private goals. What does one do with a deputy who never attends parliamentary sessions? Others may be tempted to go outside the rules and conspire to overthrow the system. A system of parties can mitigate both dangers by giving members enough individual influence over policy to make it worth their while to exercise the formal powers they have, and deterring them from turning to extra-constitutional means of achieving their goals.

Russia's parliamentary parties began to develop early in the sequence of legislative experiments launched by Gorbachev. When the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies formed at the start of the First Congress in May, many officials reacted with shock at this breach of communist party hegemony; it was the first organized opposition caucus in the USSR since Lenin's time. The authorities at first refused to grant it any rights, such as a place to meet or facilities for printing (Urban 1990, p. 133). Control of the Congress and Supreme Soviet was not affected by the formation of a radical democratic group, however. Decisions on such matters as selection of members of the Supreme Soviet (elected by the Congress), committee chairmen, and the agenda were made by Gorbachev, his deputy Lukianov, and a small coterie of senior officials outside the parliament; and were discussed and endorsed by the presidium, which was the steering committee for the legislature made up of its committee chairs. Power to govern the Congress/Supreme Soviet system was therefore exercised hierarchically from Gorbachev, plus his key associates in the party leadership and apparatus, via the presidium, and down through Lukianov, who was elected Gorbachev's deputy as chairman and who in turn controlled the highly centralized staff of the legislature. Finally, most deputies were organized into regional delegations that were dominated by conservative party officials. Later, when Gorbachev vacated the office of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Lukianov succeeded him as Chairman. Lukianov continued to exercise strong hierarchical influence over the proceedings -- but on whose behalf was not clear.

Neither Gorbachev nor Lukianov could be said to have been serving a party majority in the parliament because the communist party itself was experiencing serious internal political divisions.

---

4This has been a very serious problem in Russia. Consider the case of Sergei Mavrodi, the infamous head of the MMM investment firm, which collapsed under accusations by the government that it was a pyramid scheme and had defrauded thousands of investors in its worthless shares. Mavrodi was jailed on fraud charges but ran for a seat in parliament in the fall of 1994. As candidate, he was immune from arrest and prosecution. Spending lavish sums on his campaign, Mavrodi won with the votes of less than 9% of the registered voters of the district. As a deputy he is legally immune and so far the Duma has resisted the procurator's requests to strip him of immunity. Meantime, he has almost never appeared in the Duma. Frustrated by his cavalier behavior, the Duma voted in March to dock him of his February salary. It is unlikely that this will have much of an effect on the wealthy Mavrodi, however. What makes the issue important is the high threshold rule for voting in the parliament. (See below.)
(Kiernan 1993, 73-77). Later, when Lukianov began to part company with Gorbachev politically, roughly from late 1990, he apparently allied himself with the loose coalition of hard-line pro-union conservatives based in the army, KGB, state bureaucracy and party apparatus, who later attempted to seize power in August 1991. If this interpretation is correct, leadership within the 1989-91 USSR legislature was exercised not on behalf of a parliamentary party that commanded a majority but rather served as the agent of a party-state bureaucratic oligarchy.

Nonetheless, Lukianov tolerated -- in an interview with us, he claimed that he encouraged-- the formation of other deputy factions. His strategy, however, seems to have been to encourage so many other special interest groups to form that they outnumbered and competed with those with a more explicitly partisan cast. Deputy groups and factions proliferated. Lukianov gradually gave them regularized rights, such as the right to sit in on meetings of the presidium. The rights of deputy groups and blocs were subsequently given formal recognition in the Standing Orders of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. These included priority recognition on the floor and the right to have materials printed and distributed.

The USSR Congress and Supreme Soviet dissolved in 1991. In the meantime, the Russian republic had adopted a nearly identical system of legislative institutions through constitutional amendments. Russia’s Congress and Supreme Soviet began operation in May 1990 following the March elections. As had been the case with the USSR legislative structure, the previous set of Standing Orders was simply adapted to deal with the new two-tiered framework. Even the title (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) of the chief executive officer within the legislature was retained, despite the fact that both in the USSR and the Russian systems, the chairman was simultaneously chair of the Congress when it was in session, and the Supreme Soviet and presidium when it was not. As was the case with the USSR legislative structure that Gorbachev had established, the presidium served as the steering and agenda-setting body. Organization of the presidium underwent a sequence of steps from the pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet to the transition-era RSFSR Congress/Supreme Soviet system. Three stages in the evolution of the Standing Orders (Reglament) of the predecessor institutions with respect to the organization of central leadership preceded the current Russian Federal Assembly, where the parliament has no presidium and relies instead on the Council of the Duma for direction.

The three stages are, first, the old, pre-reform model, embodied with slight differences in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; second, the new 1989 USSR Congress/Supreme Soviet system, with one presidium for both the Congress and the Supreme Soviet; and third, the model prescribed for the new 1990 RSFSR Congress/Supreme Soviet system. In the course of this evolution, the presidium moved from being a purely ceremonial body which facilitated communist party control over the legislative body to one capable of making autonomous
decisions about the legislative agenda. Consider the rules specifying membership of the presidium. In the first and second stages, i.e. until the 1990 Russian rules, the presidium comprised the chairs of the presidia of the Supreme Soviets of lower constituent federal units. The 1990 rules dropped this provision -- which had already become irrelevant in practice, as these individuals did not attend presidium meetings. But, from the first to the second stages, the presidium membership rules were modified to provide for the inclusion of the chairs of standing committees. A related change in rules from the second to the third stages was the elimination of the "council of elders".

In the previous USSR and Russian Supreme Soviet structures, the rules provided for a council of elders made up of the heads of territorial delegations. This body met before the beginning of a legislative session to discuss the agenda, with the territorial "elders" then relaying appropriate instructions to members of their territorial delegations. Vestiges of this practice continued in 1989 and 1990 with the opening of the new USSR and Russian reform parliaments, despite the greater freedom of the elections which had returned deputies. Some deputies rejected the direction of their delegation heads and instead turned to members of their political groups for counsel and support. A remnant of the former, hierarchical system of party control over the Supreme Soviet, this feature of parliamentary organization then fell into disuse and was discarded as a formal provision under the Standing Rules when the new rules for the 1990 RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet were written.

Similar patterns can be traced in the evolution of the rules with respect to political faction rights. The second stage in the evolution of the rules made a minor formal modification when it recognized the right of deputies to form two kinds of groups: territorial and "other." Informally, as political and other interest groups of deputies developed, Chairman Lukianov began to give them the right to appear before presidium meetings and present their faction's point of view on a particular agenda item. Formal floor recognition of political factions began in the third stage, with the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet proceedings. In 1991, the political factions those equivalent to partisan caucuses -- sought and gained precedence over the rights enjoyed by ordinary interest groups. The Standing Rules were modified to provide factions with the right to be recognized ahead of either ordinary groups or individual deputies in floor debate. The Rules were further modified to give "blocs"--which were coalitions of at least three factions--the right to be recognized ahead of factions, thus further encouraging the coalescence of political factions. Moreover, informally, a Council of Factions formed with Chairman Khasbulatov's blessing actively supported his candidacy for Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to coordinate the positions on policy and housekeeping issues taken by the political factions.

In short, over the three preceding stages in the development of parliamentary leadership, evolutionary change is evident in: (1) change in the composition of the presidium from a body
whose membership reflected a purely honorific and ceremonial role to one which had to make substantial decisions regarding legislative agenda; (2) decline in the informal and then the formal powers and existence of the territorial form of deputy organization, through which senior party officials traditionally controlled the behavior of their delegations to the Supreme Soviet; and (3) rise in the informal, and then the formal, rights of partisan factions both in floor proceedings and in shaping the legislative agenda. There were still other modifications that we have not dealt with here, among them the formal loss of certain powers for the presidium over internal organization, staffing and budget of the legislature.

At the same time, we should remember what features of the old system for leadership did not change across the 1989-93 period. The presidium remained intact as the steering mechanism, despite a rising chorus of sentiment, both among democratic and opposition members of the legislature, that it had grown too powerful and independent under Khasbulatov. The presidium, moreover, served as the steering body for both the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, and as the Supreme Soviet’s governing body it directed the proceedings of both chambers. In effect, bicameralism was largely formal, and the Supreme Soviet tended to act as a unicameral body. Thus the presidium stood above both chambers, coordinating and guiding them to achieve the desired outcomes. A second constant across all the preceding phases was the nature of the chairman’s power. The chair was more than a presiding officer over floor proceedings, since he chaired presidium meetings and served as liaison between presidium, Supreme Soviet and Congress. He also controlled the staff and finances of the institution. He could cultivate relations of dependency through his powers of patronage; he assigned members to international delegations, for instance, and decided which members could be given full-time paying jobs in the Supreme Soviet. He had substantial influence over the selection of committee chairs and subcommittee chairs (Remington 1995). Although modified, therefore, the rules in stages two and three preserved certain aspects of the centralized, hierarchical model of organization characteristic of the pre-reform system, when power was largely exogenous to the legislature, and the chairman, presidium and floor simply translated into legislative form a small number of binding acts (such as state budget and output plan) which the regime deemed necessary to treat as laws rather than decrees.

---

5This was true both of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets of the transition period. In both, the chambers met less often than the whole parliament in joint session, and had little power to determine their own agendas. In both cases there were occasional instances in which one chamber refused to give a majority to a bill that the other had passed, but nearly always the leadership prevailed upon the chamber to round up enough absent members so as to pass it after a few more votes.
Unfortunately, we do not have precise information about how and by whom the rules changes in stages two and three were made. We can say, however, that the new Standing Rules of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress in 1989 and of the RSFSR Congress and Supreme Soviet in 1990 (and the modifications made in those rules subsequently) were all incremental adaptations of the old, pre-reform rules made by a small number of officials and experts, with a view to reflect changes in the composition and tasks of the legislature in the reform environment. In each case the floor passed the new rules by a majority vote. The supply of new institutions came at low cost because each rules change was a minor revision of preceding and familiar rules. In some cases the rules revisions codified existing practice (King 1994). In others, they anticipated it. In none did they start from scratch.

We have more evidence about the way in which the rules structuring leadership in the new Federal Assembly were established. For one thing, through interviews conducted in 1992 and 1993 as well as a small-scale survey of members of parliament in 1993 and a survey of candidates running for parliament in December 1993, we know something about the alignments of members' preferences on these questions as of the end of the 1990-93 period. These had a strongly partisan cast.

In June, 1993, we conducted a small-scale survey of deputies of the Russian parliament to test a survey instrument that we intended to employ for a full-scale survey in the fall of 1993. Before we could carry out the full-scale survey, President Yeltsin forcibly dissolved parliament. Consequently, our small pilot study is the only source of survey data we have on the views of deputies about institutional matters. Nonetheless, the results reveal a clear policy-driven cleavage on views of institutional questions. Our index of reformism/conservatism in this case is a question about whether deputies believed land should be privatized, on which we had fair variance across the sample. (See Tables 1-4, pp.30,31). There was a clear tendency for deputies of the reform wing to consider the presidium too strong, and to prefer a different form of organization for the future. Deputies of the anti-reform wing were much less critical. Reformers tended not to want any presidium in the future parliament; conservatives tended to prefer a presidium much as it was. Centrists were divided. Although most deputies preferred either no presidium in the future at all (half the respondents) or a different kind of presidium (one-third), deputies who were on the reform wing were clustered among the opponents of a presidium, while opposition deputies divided between support of and opposition to the presidium form. The number of responses is of course very small and cannot withstand tests of statistical significance. But the pattern of responses is consistent across several questions, and consistent with the results of our survey of candidates running for the parliament in November-December 1993.
The New Parliament

After Yeltsin set the new electoral campaign into motion, we surveyed 420 candidates, distributed across parties of the left, center and right, and across single-member district and party list electoral categories. Again the objective of the survey was to examine the correspondence between policy alignments and views of legislative organization. We found a clear policy-based alignment with respect to desired levels of centralization within the future parliament. Here our index of policy preferences is self-ascribed ideological placement (democrat; centrist; national patriot; communist; or a combination of these). Of the 420 respondents, 332 assigned themselves to one of these categories. Tables 5 and 6 (page 32) present the results of two questions about the presidium, one assessing the degree of power it had in the old Supreme Soviet, and the other asking about the future Federal Assembly. Self-described democrats and centrists were strongly concentrated among those believing that the old presidium was too powerful, and among those declaring that the new Federal Assembly did not need a presidium. Self-described communists, by two to one, considered that the old presidium’s powers were not excessive, and by a margin of almost six to one believed that the new parliament also required a presidium.

Consequently, we would expect that if the reform wing had the power to design the new parliamentary institutions, it would devise a parliament with no presidium. The necessity of winning a majority for any new leadership structure, however, required that the rights of individual deputies and organized minorities be given expression in any alternative steering mechanism that would replace the presidium. The president appointed a commission composed of sympathetic deputies to write an entirely new Reglament for the two new chambers. Their drafts were then modified after the December election as the commission consulted with leaders of the winning parties. Each chamber then debated, amended, and passed its own Reglament.

The solution proposed by the commission was a steering mechanism for the Duma represented a significant departure from the old presidium and chairman system. In place of the presidium there was to be a Council of the Duma: it would be different in that its members were leaders of political factions rather than chairs of committees. The new steering body was explicitly designed to operate on the basis of party: the intention was to replace hierarchical control of the assembly with a more egalitarian form of control in which each member would influence organizational and agenda decisions through his or her party membership (for details, see Remington and Smith, forthcoming). The chairman’s job was also significantly weakened by transferring many of the chair’s powers to a new committee in charge of housekeeping matters. Finally, the high degree of control that the old presidium exercised over parliament by unifying organizational and staff power in a single body supervising both chambers was ended with the
separation of parliament into two self-governing chambers, each with its own leadership and staff. Only the parliamentary library was to be common to the two chambers.

The direction of change across the 1989-93 period is not unilinear, as implied in a theory of legislative "institutionalization" (Polsby). The pattern combines incremental, adaptive change with a design initiated by one side to achieve determinate policy outcomes. But institutional solutions satisfying the conflicting policy objectives of rival political forces had to win a majority. Those that were found combined low-cost adaptations of familiar practices (conciliatory forms of agenda setting, regular consultations among political factions) with organizational innovations that served the interests of a majority of the organized political groups in the new parliament. The new Federal Assembly's organization and procedures were the product of a majority of party-affiliated deputies against a minority of deputies who opposed giving parties as such the dominant place in decision making. These deputies, principally from single-member districts and themselves independent of party ties, pressed to lower the threshold for registering a deputy faction and thus giving it a voice on the Council of the Duma. They pressed for a new election law that increased the share of plurality seats and reduced the share of PR seats. They resented the floor privileges enjoyed by party factions. The cleavage of party versus non-party deputies cut across that of reform versus opposition wings and provided a basis for majorities for a substantially new set of rules. In turn, the need to find a majority of party-affiliated deputies to outvote unaffiliated members meant that large parties had to concede certain rights to small parties: thus however small a party faction was, if it had elected members to the Duma in the PR vote (having cleared the 5% barrier), it enjoyed the same right to be represented by a single member in the Council of the Duma as did a large party. The outcome is a lower house which is party-oriented but not majoritarian in nature.

That the majority supporting such an institutional arrangement reflects a cleavage of party versus independent deputies is supported by the results of a survey of members of the Duma which we conducted in December 1994-January 1995. The sample consists of over 200 members of the Duma, selected to represent both party list and district categories and the full spectrum of reform, centrist and opposition party factions. As in the previous surveys, our objective was to determine the nature of the correspondence between these policy cleavages and the nature of preferences about institutional problems. Tables 7-10 (give the results. Table 7 shows the breakdown of responses by faction to a question asking whether the respondent believes that the influence of the Council of the Duma is excessive. It indicates that the Liberal Democrats, December 12, and New Regional Policy members are more likely than members of other factions to consider the Council too powerful. The communists are deeply divided over this question: almost as many think it too strong as think it too weak or about right. The results here accord with common sense. New
Regional Policy, although made up of independents, has a voice on the Council by virtue of being registered. The Liberal Democrats, under Zhirinovsky, constantly complain that they are not given enough power. December 12’s position is characteristic of deputies who belong to unrepresented factions: they believe that the Council is an instrument of parties used in a discriminatory way against them.

Table 8 shows the results of a question about Chairman Rybkin’s influence on the Duma. Again deputies were asked whether they considered his influence too great, about right, or insufficient. The results are striking. Every faction, with the exception of Zhirinovsky’s group, clusters strongly around the "appropriate amount" response. Clearly, Rybkin has exercised his power in such a way as to satisfy all of these otherwise deeply divided partisan factions. Table 9 asks about the influence of factions on the Duma. Here, again, the division between party and independent deputies is revealed, as the December 12 and NRP faction members are far more likely to consider faction influence excessive than are members of the party factions; members of the latter are heavily concentrated in the "appropriate" category. Finally, Table 10 asks whether members of the Duma regard the power of faction leaders over their factions as excessive. Once again, the December 12 and NRP groups are much more inclined to oppose as excessive the centralization of authority in party factions than are members of the party factions themselves.

Notable in these results is the similarity of views on institutional matters across party factions of left and right, and the difference on them between party and non-party deputies. This result contrasts starkly with the highly partisan alignment of preferences about leadership in the previous parliament, when the democrats bitterly opposed Khasbulatov’s use of the presidium structure to advance the political agenda of the communist-nationalist alliance. Many, of course, rather than fighting in an arena where they were increasingly outnumbered and outmaneuvered, chose instead to bolt the institution itself: by the summer of 1993, over 200 deputies had gone to work for the executive branch and had ceased participating in the parliament entirely. Here the opportunity to ignore the parliament and rely instead on the president’s enormous power to enact policy by decree outweighed the cost of losing influence in the parliament. This strategy, however, nearly resulted in civil war. The present arrangement appears to give each partisan group an equal opportunity to monitor others and influence proceedings. The excluded interests are deputies not organized in partisan or registered factions. So far none of the party factions has opted to withdraw its commitment from the institution. On the several occasions when Zhirinovsky’s faction has boycotted the parliament, its withdrawal failed to obstruct parliamentary action or inspire others to follow its example, and the faction returned again to take part.

A second aspect of parliamentary organization deserving attention is the protection of minority rights. We characterized the Duma as non-majoritarian, meaning that there is no stable
political majority controlling the institution. Rank and file members have many opportunities to try to influence outcomes. This principle is evident in (1) the widely distributed right to introduce legislation; (2) the opportunity to amend and approve the agenda of each day’s business in open debate each morning and the absence of rules restricting floor amendments during debate on legislation; and (3) the high threshold required for passage of legislation.

No bills are given privileged status in the Russian parliament, such as a "government" bill as opposed to a "private member" bill. In the past such a distinction would have been meaningless, and since 1989 the Rules have consistently provided for a very liberal distribution of the right to introduce legislation. Currently, the Constitution and the Reglament allow the President, the upper chamber and its members, the government, representative bodies of territorial units of the federation and any Duma member to introduce legislation, and the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Arbitration may all introduce legislation on matters pertaining to their purview. When competing versions of legislation are proposed, the first reading in the Duma determines which is taken as the basis of further work.

While broad, the “right of legislative initiative” in the current parliament is somewhat more narrowly defined than in the past: in the third stage rules, "public organizations in the person of their republican organs" also had the right to propose draft legislation, as did a few other official bodies which no longer are given this right. Some deputies had considered that public organizations had too much opportunity to influence legislation as a result of being able to submit the first draft of a bill and thus define its scope and purpose (while other deputies believed that this right gave the initiator of legislation no particular strategic advantage). The new Constitution and Standing Rules dropped this provision but continued to allow both the executive branch and regional legislative bodies to submit bills. This right has been substantively important. In 1994, the State Duma considered 211 draft laws. Of these, 47 were submitted by the president and 46 by the government, while 111 were submitted by deputies of the Duma; only seven were proposed by the other authorized sponsors (Remington and Smith, forthcoming 1996). At least in quantitative terms, then, the slight narrowing of the right of legislative initiative has not affected the ability of the executive branch to introduce draft legislation. Interviews indicate that deputies become policy entrepreneurs, choosing to take up issues that interest them and develop a draft law. In some cases a faction decides to associate itself with a particular bill or package of bills, and tries to solicit support for it through the committees to which its members belong. The faction may circulate the bill to other factions and hold meetings with them to win their support for it. In other cases a member works through a committee, seeking a chair’s support to develop a particular piece of legislation and to have it placed on the legislative calendar. As was the case in the earlier phases, members introduce many fewer alternative versions of legislation than do their American
counterparts, although the committees in both cases act as gatekeepers in deciding which version to recommend to the Duma for adoption in first reading. But since there is no government or majority party or coalition, no sponsor has an a priori advantage over any other in introducing bills.

Likewise, the Rules provide members with wide opportunity to propose amendments to the daily calendar. The Council of the Duma proposes a draft agenda to the floor, which is settled at a meeting held the previous evening. The Duma debates the agenda each morning. Although there is no written rule to this effect, custom dictates that the agenda debate should not take more than one hour. In practice, the debate generally takes between an hour and a half and two hours, after which a motion to close debate is voted on and the agenda, with any amendments that have been approved, is voted on. Recently the staff of the Duma calculated the amount of time spent on discussing agenda each day that the Duma is in session, and found that 21.8 of the time from January through March 17 had been devoted to the morning agenda debate; 310 items had been proposed, of which 59 were approved. Altogether he Duma had scheduled 274 questions onto the agenda during this period, of which it had failed to consider 58 (Segodnia, 23 March 1995).

Measured as a proportion of the scarce time expended by the body, then, the right of individual deputies to influence the agenda is a highly cherished commodity. No matter how often deputies express frustration at the waste of time spent on debating various proposals for legislative action (and it is the Zhirinovsky faction which is the most active in offering up amendments to the agenda), they have never agreed on a way to limit it.

Similar procedures apply to the adoption of the calendar for longer periods. At the beginning of a session (for instance, the October-December 1994 session), the leadership presents a draft agenda to the floor consisting of the bills which the committee chairs, the Council of the Duma, the government and the parliamentary leadership consider most urgent and most ready for consideration. This, too, may be modified by the floor before adoption. Shorter term (eg two week) legislative calendars are also sometimes proposed and debated. Usually a small number of amendments are approved, usually in the direction of expanding the agenda rather than reducing it. Because the time needed to approve laws invariably takes longer than the time planned, the Duma is forever falling behind its own schedule.

Likewise, there are no "special rules" restricting floor debate or rights of amendment for particular pieces of legislation. Debate proceeds until a motion to cut off debate carries. A committee, to be sure, can attempt to structure the outcome by the practice of presenting a bill at second reading with a list of amendments recommended for adoption and another of amendments recommended for rejection. Deputies then debate the committee recommendations, often accepting them en bloc: it is not infrequent for hundreds of amendments to have been proposed, and for the
committee to recommend acceptance of its package in order to avoid opening the legislation to a free-for-all. But no standing majority can guarantee acceptance of a committee’s recommendations. Some bills presented for first reading are rejected. Some bills presented for second reading (occasionally, some bills presented at first reading) are sent back to committee for further work. Some floor amendments carry. And deputies seem to cherish their rights to debate and amend legislation without ex ante restriction; few deputies would restrict floor rights, as Table 11 (p. 34) indicates; the largest number of deputies in most factions think the present balance of floor rights is about right. The exception is the members of the December 12 faction, who would prefer to expand them by an overwhelming margin. Once again, their position is probably a product of the fact that registered factions are given priority recognition in floor debate over unregistered groups and individual deputies, leaving their members to feel excluded from participation in debate. The current balance of floor rights, then, seems to suit most factions.

Perhaps the most interesting and controversial feature of the partisan but non-majoritarian character of the Duma’s procedures is the high threshold required for passage of legislation. As was the case in stages one, two and three, a majority of the total number of deputies is required to pass laws. (A lower threshold is specified for deciding procedural questions, and higher thresholds are needed for constitutional and other types of issues.) How is a majority of the total number of deputies defined? The issue was ultimately decided by the Constitutional Court, which affirmed President Yeltsin’s understanding of the matter, that a majority of the total number of deputies means a majority of 450 deputies in the Duma (and 178 in the Council of the Federation) even though one or more seats have always remained unfilled. To pass a measure must have 226 yes votes; attendance is usually between 300 and 350. In a legislature where as many as a quarter or a third of the members are absent on any given day, an absolute majority is hard to obtain. We calculated that of all votes taken and subject to electronic tallying between January and November 1994 (a total of almost 2500 votes), the average item received 204 favorable votes and only 44 no votes. Most motions fail. Very often, in fact, a measure commands the overwhelming support of deputies who are present, but fails for want of a few votes. In such instances, the speaker often summons members who are registered but away from their desks to return and vote again. Often, but not always, the speaker is able to gather 226 votes after several repeat votes (sometimes carried over into the next day’s session) when a measure seems to have sufficient support. No rule prohibits the chairman from conducting multiple votes on the same item.

The same requirement is imposed by the rules for the quorum: 226 deputies. There is usually little difficulty in meeting this threshold, but given the high absenteeism, the concerted effort of two or three factions to boycott the session could make it impossible for the Duma to
consider any legislation. So far, however, the LDPR’s attempts to persuade the communist and agrarian factions to join it in walkouts have failed.

The high threshold requirements have important implications for the parliament’s capacity to work. As was the case in stages two and three, they invite deliberate obstruction by frustrated minorities. The walkout tactic was successful in blocking action at times in the late stages of the Russian Congresses, prompting the communist-nationalist alliance to prepare constitutional amendments that would have made it possible to lower the majority requirement and eased passage of constitutional amendments—and allow the coalition to remove Yeltsin. Since non-attendance and non-voting by members who are registered but choose not to cast a vote on a particular motion are both equivalent to voting against every motion, many deputies choose not to participate in voting rather than to vote no. An illustration is the motion of no-confidence in the government which was voted on in October. Only 303 deputies cast votes; 194 voted in support of the no-confidence motion, 54 opposed it, and 55 abstained. How many of the non-participating members would have voted to defeat the government? That at least some of the non-voters deliberately preferred to sink the motion is suggested by the fact that a resolution condemning the government’s performance as unsatisfactory passed by a comfortable margin two days later.

The parliament referred the interpretation of the constitutional requirement of a majority "of the total number of deputies" to the Constitutional Court, which affirmed that 450 was the "total number of deputies" and a majority was 226, regardless of the number elected and serving. So far as we are aware, the parliament has never considered reducing the threshold to passage of laws to a far lower level, that of all deputies present and voting. Deputies appear to cherish their individual rights as legislators. We have further evidence on the point from our survey. As Table 12 (p. 34) shows, asked what threshold for a majority legislation should be required to clear, two thirds of the deputies preferred either the present requirement or the former requirement of all deputies elected and serving.

Consequently a substantial problem arises for deputies in requiring one another to take part conscientiously in floor proceedings. The same problem arose in stages two and three as well. Then the problem for deputies in binding themselves to participate conscientiously was complicated by the cumbersome two-tiered arrangement of the legislatures, under which members of the Supreme Soviet were to be rotated in and out by the vote of the Congress. Since not all who wished to be could be hired as employees of the Supreme Soviet, and some chose not to give up their outside employment while serving a term as Supreme Soviet members, Supreme Soviet sessions in both the union and RSFSR phases regularly ran into problems of meeting their quorum requirements and finding majorities for passage of legislation. Never, however, did deputies agree to impose an absolute requirement on themselves that members of the Supreme Soviet should give
up outside employment upon entering the parliament. First, in the union parliament's rules, a loophole was added to the effect that deputies were to give up their regular jobs as a rule. Second, when the Russian congress did finally agree to impose such a rule on those deputies who were elected to the Supreme Soviet, it added a grace period of several months before the rule took effect. Third, even then the body did not enforce its own rule. As of spring 1992, when the rule obliging members of the Supreme Soviet to work there full-time was supposed to have taken effect, only 72 of the members were in compliance.

The new Federal Assembly encountered the same problem but agreed to impose a still more specific rule on itself. First, deputies to the Duma must give up outside employment except in the fields of teaching, scholarship and the creative professions (Article 3). Second, they are obliged to attend sessions (Article 41). No means of enforcement exists, however, and as noted above, deputies have faced some frustration in dealing with chronic absenteeism. The problem was mitigated only slightly when the Chairman Rybkin threatened to punish scofflaws by publishing their names. Periodically the Duma debates the question of sanctioning non-attendance. Nonetheless, despite periodic suggestions to the effect that the threshold for passage should be lowered so that non-attenders do not impede decision-making, the deputies have retained the high threshold and reliance on moral pressure to induce attendance. An unfortunate side-effect, present in the earlier stages as well, is the common but illegal practice of registering and voting for other deputies. The chairs have winked at this practice in order to allow business to be conducted. Yet despite these effects, deputies have preferred to make passage of decisions difficult in order to protect individual rights in the process.

While it is easy to see why President Yeltsin and some of the reform-wing deputies might prefer the high threshold, it is less evident why a coalition of opposition deputies does not form to amend the rules and lower the threshold to passage. Evidently more than strictly policy objectives shape institutional preferences, among them the fear that any group or wing could easily find itself a powerless minority if it were easier for an opposing coalition to build legislative majorities. In respect to the protection of minority rights, then, the current parliament's rules preserve the non-majoritarian features of the old system but in a way serving a new set of political interests. In the past, the rules reflected the ideological presumption that decisions were not made by narrow "arithmetic majorities," as Lenin contemptuously put it; that decisions were made in the spirit of solidarity and unity. Of course under such rules, dissent stood out as illegitimate and punishable. That Soviet-era set of rules, particularly the broad access to the agenda, wide floor participation-right, and high thresholds to action, today protects a different set of interests: the interests of a set of multiple party factions, none of which wishes to be excluded from rights to influence legislative decision-making, and which therefore would prefer to make decision-making
inefficient than to put power into the hands of a narrow majority. They have therefore built in many safeguards against haste and many opportunities to require compromise. As Przeworski might predict, therefore, the deputies, not knowing beforehand how they would fare under the new rules, chose a system with multiple veto points and access points and guarantees of members’ equal rights. For that reason, they made it all the more likely that by diffusing rather than concentrating power, the system’s non-majoritarian, representation over efficiency qualities would replicate themselves into the future so long as parliament retained the commitment of its principal stakeholders.

If in the case of leadership the new parliament adopted a highly innovative organizational arrangement, and in balancing majority with minority rights the parliament tended to conserve and adapt older practices, in the third area, that of building institutional capacity for decision-making, the parliament combined innovation and adaptation. Over stages two, three, and four a progressive expansion of the autonomy and resources of committees occurred. Staff resources were highly centralized in the union parliament; staff were seconded to committees by permission of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet on the request of individual committee chairs. A scheme to assign each committee permanent staff of its own was just being developed as the union parliament dissolved. In the Russian parliament a system of dual or joint subordination existed whereby staff experts were simultaneously under the supervision of the central staff organization and assigned to committees (where they could keep an eye on committee activity). Committee chairs and individual members could also hire individual staff aides of their own and more on a volunteer basis. Only now, however, has the centralized staff apparatus of the past been significantly weakened. First, it has been separated into the staff structures for the two chambers. Second, a large number of staff were cut. Third, the rights of committee chairs to hire staff were expanded. Fourth, factions were given resources with which to hire staff.

Nonetheless, the suspicion of excessive staff power lingers. Asked whether the size of the central apparatus of the Duma should be increased, decreased, or left the same, deputies were inclined to prefer to decrease it; 102 preferred to see it cut, 73 to leave it the same size as at present, and only 2 to increase it in size. The rest were unsure. (See Table 13, p. 35) But the same deputies were far more sanguine about the power of committee chairs: in nearly every case deputies considered the degree of power enjoyed by the chairs over their committees to be the right amount. (Table 14, p. 35) The committees, rather than the chairman of the Duma, are the answer deputies offer to the question of controlling staff. Asked whether they would prefer to increase, decrease, or leave as is the power of the Chairman of the Duma over the central staff, deputies by a wide margin chose the leave as is response. (Table 15, p. 36). Similarly, asked where new staff resources should be added, deputies preferred to assign them to committees (Table
Elimination of the two-tiered framework has meant that all active members are full-time legislators and therefore devote themselves more fully to legislative work. Moreover, the passage of time has allowed some legislative expertise to accumulate: nearly one hundred members of the Duma were deputies at the union or Russian levels in stages two and three. Many of these deputies have become leaders of factions and chairs of committees. Deputies such as Vladimir Lukin of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Sergei Glazev of the Economic Policy Committee, and Mikail Zadornov of the Budget Committee have become influential figures in policy making who have been successful in working out compromises with the government and then winning passage for the resulting bargain on the floor. Both the 1994 and 1995 government budget bills passed after lengthy negotiations between parliament and government, with the Budget Committee successful in protecting its bill on the floor while ensuring that it reflected the interests of a sufficient number of deputies to be able to command a majority. Here the Council of the Duma proved to be crucial in helping to broker the necessary agreements.

The new rules thus changed the institutional arrangements of the past by stripping staff resources from the centralized apparatus and the chair and redistributing it to the separate chambers and the committees within each chamber. The resulting organization appears to satisfy a majority of the deputies regardless of factional affiliation. Within committees, deputies are given wide opportunity to become policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, interviews suggest that a set of informal norms seems to govern the relations between committees and factions (Remington and Smith, forthcoming 1996; Haspel 1995). That is, a certain division of labor between committees and factions appears to be generally agreed upon: committees are to concentrate upon "professional" work revolving around law-making, while factions stick to "political" concerns. To a surprising degree, these domains are kept separate. Many committee members report in interviews that they are able to work quite effectively on legislative matters with colleagues from other, even deeply opposing, factions. Most committees are composed of members of multiple factions (only the agriculture and geopolitics committees are almost entirely one-faction committees). Therefore committee agreement on legislative decisions requires a cross-factional consensus, which the norm of professionalism strongly promotes.

In committees deputies do continue to follow factional direction with respect to the political content of legislation. Tables 17-20 (pp. 36,37) detail the responses to three questions that asked about factional practice with respect to three areas of a member’s committee work: working on a particular bill, discussing issues in committee, and voting. In all three areas, with few exceptions, members indicated that they coordinated their positions with their factions--most commonly this was done "as a rule", and nearly all the rest of the respondents indicated that this was done in "special cases only."
Notwithstanding the ideal that legislative work can be separated from political work, the principle of committee autonomy in the "professional" sphere of law-making conflicts with the pressure for factional solidarity. This tension has become particularly apparent in the case of several well publicized disputes between committee chairs and factions. For instance, in at least three cases, committee chairs have left or been expelled from their factions (Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the CIS Committee, was expelled from PRES; Vladimir Bauer, chair of the Organization Committee, was expelled from Russia's Choice; and Viktor Ustinov, chair of Geopolitics, left the LDPR. Several other conflicts are widely rumored as well. But this awkward working norm of separation between the different spheres of activity of factions and committees carries enough force to allow deputies to work collegially and productively in committees. This norm had already evolved under stages two and three, when deputy factions were beginning to emerge in an environment where a well-defined system of standing legislative committees had allowed deputies to devote themselves to legislative work. Deputies accommodated these different interests and commitments by separating them into two parallel planes: a plane of high politics, where they sought to build public support for broad policy and ideological commitments; and a plane of "professional," legalistic, detailed work in drafting, refining and building support for legislation. This norm then carried over into the working rules of the Duma. Despite the much greater degree of factional organization and solidarity. Inevitably, then, those deputies most closely committed to the sphere of authority of committees resisted the cross-pressure of factional discipline. Tellingly, in every case of an open conflict, it has been resolved by the chairman's departure from the faction, rather than from the committee chairmanship.

We have detailed the ways in which the present institutional arrangements of the Russian State Duma overcome problems of institutional supply, mutual monitoring by participants and credible commitment. The supply of institutional solutions came about by adapting elements of the earlier parliamentary practices, discarding others, and devising new forms. Initially these served the policy interests of President Yeltsin's supporters but were modified to satisfy a majority of members of other political groups who shared a common interest in stimulating party development which cut across the deep ideological cleavage over market reform. The problems of commitment and monitoring were overcome at low cost by making the parliamentary steering body a site for inter-partisan consultation and decision-making. Cross-party agreements on a number of major issues have resulted from bargaining among party leaders in this Council--among them the distribution of committee chairmanships and leadership posts in January 1994, the amnesty package deal of February, the budget deal for the 1994 budget in June, the budget package for the 1995 budget in February 1995 and others. By representing each registered faction on a parity--basis, the current makeup of the Council of the Duma is slightly biased against the
opposition factions in parliament, which are stronger on the floor than the reform factions. This helps explain the fact that by a small margin communist and agrarian deputies would prefer to add committee chairs as voting members of the Council while reform deputies would keep the present system. (See Table 20.) But parties as such are able to exert greater control over legislative business by keeping the Council an exclusively party-oriented institution. The present rule, therefore, retains majority support over opposition from unrepresented deputies. The institutional arrangements of the Duma are therefore suited to the interests of a majority of party organizations, none of which can count upon a secure majority for its policy objectives, and which therefore share a common interest in protecting minority rights and guaranteeing numerous openings for individual deputies and registered groups to influence legislative outcomes.

We have concentrated upon the Duma, where to a surprising degree a set of institutions has been devised that are neutral with respect to ideological preferences but serve the collective interests of Russia's nascent parties. We have neglected two other critical centers of power in the central government: the Council of the Federation and the President. The Council of the Federation lacks both a presidium and a system of party factions. Its electoral base is substantially different from that of the Duma and it has frequently been at loggerheads with the Duma over policy. Most of its members work in it on a part-time basis. There are relatively few incentives to induce commitment or inhibit withdrawal and breakdown. To the extent it can block legislative decisions made by the Duma, therefore, the institutional features of the Council of the Federation can weaken incentives for commitment by Duma members and therefore destabilize the new bicameral parliament.

A still more serious issue is the president's power. The problem that led to the breakdown of the last parliament still exists: the very strong presidential powers in the Constitution tempt Yeltsin and his supporters to rely on presidential decree power to enact policies rather than to build majorities and seek compromises in parliament. Opposition forces, in turn, are motivated either to modify or ignore the constitution. Several factors that will determine the outcome remain undecided. The Constitutional Court will soon decide on several disputes arising from President Yeltsin's use of his decree powers. If it restricts Yeltsin's power, and Yeltsin accepts the decision, the result will be to increase the incentive for credible commitment by both ideological wings to the parliament. Another factor is the way in which the president chooses to use his powers. On several important economic policy issues, the president has instructed the government to reach agreement with parliament through compromise rather than to confront it. A third factor is the timing of the next parliamentary elections. If the elections are held as scheduled in December 1995, using the election law that the Duma has passed, it is likely that roughly the same set of parties which now control decision making will return and that the institutional features outlined
here will not be modified significantly. If the elections are postponed, however, or the election law is changed, the balance of party and policy interests in parliament will be affected. In that case, parliamentary institutions in Russia will probably undergo yet another major change.

Conclusion

Our modest purpose has been to outline theoretical approaches to the study of emerging democratic institutions and to illustrate one approach by describing the evolution of Russian parliamentary institutions. We have argued that the process of democratization entails working toward a solution to the problem of commitment to a new set of political institutions that will allows elites to overcome inherent and universal problems of collective choice. The creation of parliamentary institutions represent an effort to solve collective-choice problems. Equally important, parliamentary institutions, in the process of devising internal decision-making processes and developing legislation, may serve to further the development of parties, the identification of leaders, and the creation of other institutions that are critical to democratization. In future work, we hope to elaborate on the connections between theories of institutions and theories of democratization.
References


Nancy Bermeo, ed. (1992), Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).


25
Horowitz, Donald. (South Africa)


27
--- (1989b), "Intellectuals, the 'Middle Class,' and the Drive for Reform," paper presented to Conference on Soviet Domestic Change and Geopolitical Strategy under Gorbachev, SAIS, Washington, DC, February 1989.

Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and
A. Sobyanin and D. Yur'ev, "S"ezd Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR v zerkale poimennykh
golosovanii: rasstanovka sil i dinamika razvitiia politicheskogo protivostoiniia. (Moscow, n.p.,
1991); idem, "Reitngi podderzhki deputatami VI S"ezda pravitel'stva reform," (Moscow: n.p.,
1992.)
Jack Snyder (1988), "Science and Methodology: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign
David Stark (1989), "Coexisting Organizational Forms in Hungary's Emerging Mixed
Economy," in Victor Nee and David Stark, with Mark Selden, eds., Remaking the Economic
137-168.
--- (1992), "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe," East
European Politics and Societies 6:1, pp. 17-54.
--- (1990), "Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or from Plan to Clan?" East
European Politics and Societies 4:3, pp. 351-392.
Sidney Tarrow (1991), "'Aiming at a Moving Target': Social Science and the Recent
Boris Topornin, "Puti razresheniia konflikta zakonodatel'noi i ispolnitel'noi vlastei,"
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 March 1993.
George Tsebelis (1990), Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press).
Urban, Michael E. 1990. More Power to the Soviets: The Democratic Revolution in the USSR
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar).
--- 1987 [1979]. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms." in Matthew D.
McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pp. 131-146.
Using a question on favor for the principle of buying and selling land as our index of reform/conservative sentiment (the question was: “in your opinion, should land in Russia be subject to free sale and purchase by private individuals?” the possible responses were: yes, as a rule; yes, with certain limitations; no; hard to say), the distribution of responses to four questions about centralized leadership was as follows:

Table 1:
Do you think that the powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet are too great? (By support for purchase/sale of land)
Source: Survey of RSFSR Deputies, June 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>With Restrictions</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be strengthened</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Should the parliament in the future have: (By support for purchase/sale of land)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>With Restrictions</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A presidium such as at present</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A presidium of a different kind</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No presidium</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Should the presiding officer of the parliament have more discretion to resolve procedural questions on the floor? (By support for purchase/sale of land)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>With Restrictions</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Parliamentary leadership in the future should be vested in: (By support for purchase/sale of land)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>With Restrictions</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The speaker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A joint organ of the chambers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate chambers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A majority party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: How much influence did the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet have over the Supreme Soviet's Work? (By self-described political tendency)
Source: Survey of Duma Candidates, November-December 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Democrat-Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist-National Patriot</th>
<th>Centrist-Communist</th>
<th>National-Patriot</th>
<th>Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Does the Federal Assembly need a Presidium of the Federal Assembly? (By self-described political tendency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Democrat-Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Centrist-National Patriot</th>
<th>Centrist-Communist</th>
<th>National-Patriot</th>
<th>Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to say</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: How would you assess the influence of the Council of the Duma on the work of the Duma? (by faction affiliation)

Source: Survey of Duma members, December 1994-January 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insuffic.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: How would you assess the influence of the Chairman of the Duma on the work of the Duma? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insuffic.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: How would you assess the influence of factions on the work of the Duma? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insuffic.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: How would you assess the influence of the leaders of factions on the work of the factions? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insuffic.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Would you *increase*, *leave as is*, or *decrease* the opportunities of individual deputies to speak on the floor (vystupat' na plenarnykh zasedaniakh palaty)? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave as is</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: By what number of votes in your opinion should the Duma make decisions on draft laws? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A majority of all seats</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A majority of elected deputies</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A majority of deputies present and voting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on the issue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: Would you *increase, leave as is, or decrease* the size of the central apparatus of the State Duma? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave as is</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Would you *increase, leave as is, or decrease* the power of committee chairs over the work of the committees? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave as is</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35
Table 15: Would you *increase*, *leave as is*, or *decrease* the power of the Chairman of the Duma over the central apparatus? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave as is</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: In your opinion, to whom first of all should additional hired staff employees of the Duma be assigned? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual deputies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committees</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcom’s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central apparatus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: How often in your faction does a member working in a committee on a particular piece of legislation coordinate his position with the general position of the faction? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a rule</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In special cases only</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18: How often in your faction does the faction work out a position which a member is obliged to adhere to during discussion of an issue in a committee? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a rule</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In special cases only</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: How often in your faction does the faction work out a position which a member is obliged to adhere to during voting on one or another question? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a rule</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In special cases only</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Agree or disagree: the chairs of committees of the Duma should have the right to vote in the Council of the Duma? (by faction affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Dec12</th>
<th>PRES</th>
<th>NRP</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>