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PEOPLE TO AUTHORITARIAN VALUES:
How Far Has It Gone? What Political Significance May It Have?

AUTHOR: PETER REDDAWAY and CATHERINE DALE
George Washington University

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CONTRACTOR: George Washington University
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Peter Reddaway
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Peter Reddaway and Catherine Dale

Abstract
In an attempt to measure the attitudes of the Russian population towards authoritarian values, the authors designed a questionnaire and commissioned a Moscow organization to conduct an opinion survey with it in July 1994. The organization asked seven key questions a second time, in a small follow-up survey, in February 1995. The results show rather high and growing levels of popular support for authoritarian, non-democratic values, as measured by respondents' views (often not uniform) on political authoritarianism. Russian national identity, Russian "imperialism," anti-Westernism, and the desirability of socialist as opposed to capitalist economics. They also support the conclusion that a gulf exists between most of the Russians who hold authoritarian views and those politicians who espouse the same views. These politicians have, in most regards, proven politically ineffective. As a whole, the results suggest that the political class has alienated most Russians, who see politicians as having allied themselves with Mafia groups in order to monopolize political power and economic wealth. Finally, the results suggest that the next generation of Russian politicians will have an incentive - in the form of potential mass support - to present themselves as authoritarians, outsiders, and perhaps also revolutionaries.

INTRODUCTION
One of the most profound consequences of the collapse of the USSR was the disappearance of the state ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This had provided a viable framework for government organization and action, and for defining national and personal identity. When Russia became independent, its leaders made a broad effort to substitute liberal capitalist democracy for Marxism-Leninism as the new country's main organizing principle. Hence the adoption of the office of the presidency, the attempts to create and ratify a new constitution, and the initial eager embrace of the premise, if not all the dictates, of economic shock therapy.

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However, the last few years have witnessed much material deprivation resulting from
government policies, and the growth of a psychological and moral sense of loss. Society seems
to have lost its sources of unity and coherence. To fill the void, many nationalist and
communist politicians have sought popular support by offering visions of what Russia is or
ought to be. Particularly in 1992-93, with the growing prominence of such politicians in
parliament, some observers saw the rise of a "red-brown" alliance and forecast a bright future
for it.

However, the violent confrontation of September-October 1993 between President Yeltsin
and Parliament's hardliners demonstrated the weakness of popular and elite support for, at the
least, an urgent, action-oriented "red-brown" agenda. Two months later, however, the stunning
electoral success of the Communists, the Agrarians, and Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic
Party suggested that popular disaffection had at last found a concrete form of political
expression. Commentators emphasized that Russian communists and nationalists shared an
agenda of "gosudarstvennost'", or strong state power, and argued that the election results
therefore constituted a popular mandate for a more authoritarian regime. Some, like Richard
Pipes, went so far as to suggest that such an outcome was virtually predetermined by Russian
political culture.

Did the Russian population indeed issue a broadly based call for authoritarianism? To the
extent this was the case, do people have a fairly uniform idea of what the "authoritarianism"
they want actually consists of? And can we conclude that the popular votes for nominally
"communist" and "nationalist" parties demonstrated a convergence of popular wishes and the
ideas of opposition leaders? Does any of this constitute sufficient grounds to foresee the likely
emergence before too long of a much more authoritarian regime in Russia?

The purpose of this report on our survey findings is to begin to dissect the Russian
people's somewhat - though not wildly - varied conceptions of "authoritarianism", and to
evaluate their significance for Russia's political future.

SECTION I: THE SURVEYS

The surveys are part of Peter Reddaway's longer term research agenda, which aims to
analyze the nature and potential political strength of the nationalist and communist opposition
in contemporary Russian politics. The subjects of the broader study include both parliamentary
and extraparliamentary opposition. The study addresses relations among members of the
opposition broadly defined, between the members of the opposition and government actors and
institutions, and between members of the opposition and the population. This report explores
the possibility that widespread popular support for authoritarian values might play a role in eventually bringing an authoritarian regime to power.

We designed our questionnaire to explore five components of what may loosely be termed authoritarianism, as well as more general attitudes toward Russia's leaders and institutions and the political and economic situation as a whole. This report will, therefore:

1) Discuss in detail the results of the survey, considering also evidence from a number of other recent surveys that corroborate, challenge, or elaborate on our results.

2) Discuss the five "dimensions" of authoritarianism, and how they correlate with one another, with other popular attitudes, and with demographics. (The sometimes inconsistent-seeming, but nonetheless rather decisive results suggest that authoritarianism is not a rigid, uniform concept for Russians any more than it is for Americans.)

3) Discuss the significance of these results by exploring in theoretical and practical terms how much popular attitudes, the politics of opposition figures, and the framework of current politics and its discourses relate to one another.

Methodology

The Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (RCPOMR, President - T. Zaslavskaya, Director - Yu. Levada) was jointly commissioned by USIA and by us to conduct the first survey. Its personnel interviewed 1779 adults (age 18 and over), who were representative of the population of the Russian Federation, from 15 to 31 July 1994. The face-to-face interviews were conducted at some 121 sampling points.

The demographic characteristics of the sample did not correspond exactly in all respects to those of the general population, according to data from the 1989 Soviet census. The sample overrepresented women and those with higher education, while those with secondary education were slightly overrepresented. Those with less than secondary education were decidedly underrepresented. The results were weighted to correct for these imbalances. Our slightly skewed sample suggests a possible explanation for something that appeared strange to us when we solicited bids from a number of survey organizations. Several mentioned that their survey results tended to underrepresent supporters of Zhirinovsky, but they offered no conclusive reason why this should be the case. The evident correlation in our results between support for Zhirinovsky and respondents with "less than secondary education", however, suggests a possible explanation, i.e., that there may be some tie between education levels and willingness to participate in surveys.

Subsequently, in February 1995, we commissioned the Russian Center to repeat in face-to-face interviews seven key questions from the July survey. That nationwide sample included
1004 adults aged 16 and over. Among these respondents, distribution with respect to education much more closely matched the pattern from the 1989 census.

SECTION II: SURVEY RESULTS--ATTITUDES

The results of the surveys do seem to justify the initial, superficial premise that there is demonstrable, widespread support in Russian society for a more "authoritarian regime" in each of the five areas we explored. By orienting the questionnaire toward different facets of authoritarianism, however, we may have introduced a bias. To control for such a slant, this analysis will place the responses to questions specifically concerning "authoritarianism" in the context of questions about more general attitudes, and will compare the results with those from other recent surveys that were less narrowly focused on authoritarian values.

Background

Our more general questions revealed a picture of striking popular disaffection with government, society, and the current situation in general. Most people rated the current economic situation as "fairly bad" (42.8%) or "very bad" (45.2%). While approximately 90% of each age group agreed that the situation was somehow bad, just how bad the situation was depended on age group. While only 32% of those 18-29 years old answered "very bad", over half of those in their 50's did so. Furthermore, over two-fifths of all respondents (41.4%) believed the economic situation would get worse over the next 12 months, and a further quarter (27.3%) believed it would remain the same.

A nationwide survey in October 1994 by the Institute for the Sociology of Parliamentarism (ISP) generally corroborated this degree of economic angst. 40% of respondents called the economic situation unbearable, and 37% called it bearable with difficulty, while 11% called it bearable and 1% found it propitious.

On a more personal level, most described the situation of their own household as "fairly bad" (43.4%) or "very bad" (22.7%). A majority (58.1%) even said that it had got worse as compared to the situation at the end of 1991, and a further 21.3% said it had not changed. This is striking if one recalls the bare store shelves that predominated in 1991, until price liberalization occurred in January 1992. It is doubtful whether household conditions were in fact objectively worse in the summer of 1994 compared to the situation in late 1991, but the perception that they were is significant.

In July 1994 this sense of economic deprivation was coupled with a sense of spiritual disintegration. A majority of all respondents (68.1%) believed that society's morals were declining, and 71.3% agreed that the influence on society of organized crime was increasing.
Disenchantment was clearly pervasive, and many believed that things were getting worse still, both economically and spiritually. This does not necessarily mean that life in Russia was almost unbearable. It is more likely that people perceived conditions as particularly bad in comparison to some other standard, such as that set by the increasingly visible nouveaux riches. Under the old system extravagant wealth was much better disguised. As today's wealthy emerge into public view, they may produce a demonstration effect, a sense of relative deprivation.

Interestingly, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where such wealth is most apparent, there was the least economic discontent. Respondents in these cities, which, our analysis shows, constitute a distinct demographic category in the survey, were more likely than those in other locations to have a positive view of their household situations. A possible explanation is the fact that inhabitants of these cities have particularly good opportunities to take advantage both of government agencies and of the sizable foreign communities. In any case, a further explanation for the deprivation felt by most citizens may be that conditions today seem bad or untenable in comparison with the sense of security people felt under the old regime. They now have no certainty they will be provided for in the future.

Does this pervasive lack of satisfaction mean that people are likely to take to the streets in protest? While political behavior cannot be projected exclusively on the basis of what people say they plan to do, it is striking, given the level of discontent, how few people say they plan to actively protest. Two other surveys confirm this. In the ISP October survey, when asked what they would do if society's problems were not resolved, only 7% were "ready to take part in meetings and strikes directed against the current leadership of the country." In a September 1994 survey of Russia's urban population by the Russian Center for Media and Opinion Research, only 4% said that demonstrations against the policies of the President and government last fall were going to be "inevitable". 30% found them "fully possible", but 31% said "unlikely" and 16% were sure none would take place. Asked what they would do if there were in fact such demonstrations, only 7% said they would take part, although 27% would support them while not participating.

Respondents to our survey conveyed little belief that any of the major political figures could or would do much to improve the situation. No such leaders evoked widespread popular confidence, and 64.3% of respondents said that most politicians are corrupt. Among institutions, only the Russian Orthodox Church and the Army had broad support. (Specific individuals and institutions are discussed in section III below.)

Nor did it seem to be any broadly shared popular sentiment that getting involved in the political process was likely to produce results. Almost half (47.9%) said that voting did not
give them a say in the political process, although 38.9% said that it did. A key reason may be that people perceive that once elected, officials are not responsible to their constituencies. In a USIA-sponsored survey conducted by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (ICSR) in October-November 1994, 80% of respondents agreed that public officials did not care much about what people like them thought.

Is this an indication, as some assert, that Russians are "withdrawing" from politics, removing themselves as actors from a process that, as they perceive it, is corrupt and affords them nothing? Elected officials have certainly provided sufficient grounds for such a response, and in any case they usually have a negligible amount of power compared to that of the Mayor or regional Governor, who in most cases has not been elected at all, but appointed by Yeltsin. Local politicians are widely perceived to be corrupt, and strong anecdotal evidence suggests that in any given district of any given city, most people know precisely whom one must pay, and how much, for various services. (On Catherine Dale's trip to Saratov in July 1994, for example, a number of local businessmen sketched for her the hierarchy of bribe-taking officials for each district.)

In Moscow, too, the top level political elite have discredited themselves in public eyes, almost regardless of the political orientation of the observer. The violent confrontation between president and parliament in October 1993 called seriously into question the credibility, and respect for the rule of law, of both. And Yeltsin's episodes of drink-induced disregard for decorum on the world stage, and his brutal policies in Chechnya, have, polls show, lost him the public's respect.

At the same time, the absence of eager, broad-based participation is not due only to the present leadership's blunders. The Soviet order instituted a deep separation between "public" and "private" spheres such that most Soviet people were not in fact political "subjects". Participation in single-candidate elections was merely pro forma, a comfortable and relatively low-cost routine, especially since workers were often given something of a holiday to allow them to vote. Thus voting was not normally a sign of avid voluntary support for the regime. If people had similar attitudes in today's much freer conditions, it would make more sense to marvel that about 40% of the population DOES believe their votes make a political impact.

The critical question, then, concerns the nature of that 40%. Donna Bahry and Lucan Way have argued that some demographic groups, particularly older groups and groups with lower levels of education, maintained a consistently high rate of political participation from the Soviet period and at least into 1993. They explain this finding by the persistence of the routines of daily life.
At the same time, other groups, characterized broadly as younger and more highly educated, seem to have responded not mechanically, but vigorously to the opportunities for political participation that were available from 1989, for example by voting in republican parliamentary and presidential elections in 1990 and 1991, and taking part in meetings and demonstrations. Those elections, in turn, further catalyzed the politicization of society and raised expectations for change. It is these groups, however, which, after entering the post-Soviet era with particularly high expectations, have apparently been the most disappointed by stumbling economic reform and governmental hypocrisy, and can no longer be counted on to vote at all.

The important idea, then, is that inclination toward, and faith in, political participation may vary significantly for different groups in society. This makes the question of how to stimulate real public debates that encourage people to become citizens and to participate all the more complex.

A. The Axis of Political Authoritarianism

In designing our questionnaire, we observed that predictions of impending authoritarianism in Russia seemed to have several different, though overlapping types of authoritarianism in mind. Our questionnaire was designed to disaggregate the types into their component parts. The first of these components is political authoritarianism. By this we mean the broad idea that political rule is "top down", that is to say, the political elite (individual or group) makes the rules and sets the norms for the functioning of government and society. Unlike totalitarianism, such authoritarianism does not presuppose that individual daily life is also strictly controlled. Virtually all nationalist and communist opposition figures advocate a much stronger state as the central plank of their programs.

The most obvious finding in this dimension is the striking popular support for very strong leadership. Over seven-tenths (71.5%) of the population agreed that Russia needs a leader to bring about order with an iron hand. And asked to imagine a leader appearing who would try to establish a dictatorship and bring order to the country, a full third (33.1%) said that they would support such a leader. A slightly higher percentage (35.3%) stated they would oppose him. The intention to oppose such a dictatorship was especially strong in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In the fall 1994 ICSR survey, 63% agreed that an iron hand leader is necessary for Russia. And the results of an August 1994 joint Russian-German survey project whose subjects were Russian military officers confirms the general trend. 62% agreed that "without
authoritarian rule we will never come out of the existing chaos. While the percentage is a bit lower, the terms of the question itself are more absolute.

These results show a strong constituency for greater law and order. The danger exists, though, of interpreting the desire for order as necessarily revealing a preference for authoritarianism, an idea which generally implies order at all costs, or order in defiance of the rule of law. A desire for greater order is not, in itself, zero sum. That people crave greater public order does not necessarily mean they want it at any price, nor does it tell us exactly what people mean when they say they want order.

What sacrifices, then, would people be willing to make for order? Would people, for example, support a leader who took away political freedoms in order to solve Russia’s economic problems? In July 1994 a plurality of 44% agreed with this proposition, versus 35.2% who disagreed. Support for it had grown sharply by the time of our follow-up survey only seven months later, in February 1995 (47.2% versus 27.9%).

A further difficulty is how to interpret the contradictions involved in Russians wanting both to enjoy their new freedoms and to see order decisively restored to society. In July 1994 almost three-fifths (58.9%) of respondents supported the view that the new political freedoms had led to a complete loss of order, while only one-fifth (19.9%) preferred the proposition that the new freedoms were worth the loss of some public order. In February, while the percentage of those deploring a "loss of order" had decreased slightly (53.9), the percentage of those arguing that the loss was worth it had decreased dramatically (to 9.7), and the percentage of those not responding had increased from 20 to 33.7%. At the same time, most respondents stated that each of a series of political freedoms was important for Russia, including the right to choose from various parties and to vote (66.5%); equality before the law (89.2%); the right to freely express one’s opinions (77.3%); and independent media (74.7%).

Is this necessarily a conundrum? The fact that most people hold certain values to be important does not necessarily mean those values are a zero-sum first priority. The critical moment is that of choice, when freedoms are counterposed to other values. Individual decision-making of that magnitude perhaps cannot be foreseen by paper-and-pencil question answering; people may well not be consistent or self-conscious enough to predict their own responses when their deeply held values come into conflict with one another. However, perhaps the fact that less than one-tenth of the population agreed by February 1995 that the new freedoms were worth the loss of public order is an indication of rather deep discontent.

What, then, might be the component parts of an "iron hand" regime? Part of the answer concerns a tough stance toward youth. Almost three-fourths of respondents (73.7%) agreed that "What youth need most is strict discipline". A different question that counterposed discipline to
"the opportunity to develop their own abilities" as alternative options for youth still showed strong support for discipline and obedience as the preferable alternative (53.8%). Another part of the answer offered to respondents for their judgment proposed increasing order in society by tightening the sentences for most kinds of crime. With this a resounding 84.8% agreed.

A third and more ominous manifestation posited by us for the iron hand was intolerance of people who are perceived to be different from the majority. A plurality (43.8%) agreed that life in Russia would be improved if all "foreign elements" were expelled, versus 41.7% who disagreed. Another set of questions asked whether certain groups should have equal rights with other citizens in society. A majority supported equal rights for gypsies (58.4%) but over a quarter of the population (26.4%) would deny them equal rights. A plurality (40.4%) would deny equal rights to homosexuals, and a majority (50.2%) would deny them to people from the Caucasus. While Moscow and St. Petersburg respondents tended to give far more "liberal" or "tolerant" responses, they were as opposed as everyone else to equal rights for Caucasians.

Do these responses constitute, as it appears, a glaring degree of intolerance? Or is it possible that, for example, people had in mind the sometimes violent groups of mafiosi that run the open-air markets, when they responded to questions about Caucasians and "foreign elements"? In some sense it might not matter politically whether these attitudes are generalized to apply to every member of "other" groups. A potential authoritarian leader might be able to capitalize on a fear of others even if it is not coherent and consistent.

A further component of popular ideas of authoritarianism concerns the locus of the relevant political authority. Most of our questions, and most analysis in general, presuppose one, central, Moscow-based authoritarian regime. However, it is perfectly plausible that the iron hand regime so many indicate they desire could be regionally based, aimed at bringing matters under control in the region where a given respondent lives. Do our data suggest that people might support this version? A majority (56.4%) agreed that it would be better for the regions if local leaders were to concentrate more power in their hands and to control the situation fully. Furthermore, a plurality (43.2%) agreed that the power of local leaders vis a vis the central powers in Moscow, should be increased. Not surprisingly, residents of regional centers, which would likely benefit most from such a rearrangement, were the most avid supporters of the idea.

Confirmation of all this came when respondents to the ISP survey last October were asked to name the institution, if such existed, that could bring the country out of crisis. "Regional and local authorities" were named in second place, behind only the army. This potentially burgeoning faith in local leaders must be weighed, however, against the very low overall levels of confidence expressed in them. The trend may primarily reflect the fact that
the federal leaders in Moscow have had more time, resources, and opportunity than local leaders to discredit themselves in public and to alienate the electorate.

B. The Axis of Imperialism

The second facet of authoritarianism we designated is "imperialism". We did so because evidence suggests that Russian policy toward the other former republics is becoming increasingly manipulative and even coercive, and that this tendency reflects a broader trend toward more hardline rule. Let us note, though, that "imperialism" is not a uniform policy supported by all members of the opposition. Some Russian nationalist "purists" such as Nikolai Lysenko advocate a state entity that would include only ethnic Slavs. By contrast, some Russian imperial nationalists, such as Zhirinovsky, aim to restore the Russian Empire, while others seek to reacquire the same territory in the name of reuniting the Soviet Union.

The recent rhetoric of some government leaders has taken on neo-imperial overtones and made the question more urgent still. On 20 April 1995, for example, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev advocated the use of "any means necessary, including military" to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the USSR's successor states.

This section, then, addresses the degree and nature of popular support for a strong Russian role in the post-Soviet states.

A strong majority of respondents (68.1%) agreed that "it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists", while 27.1% disagreed. This result, which appears to have held more or less constant over the last year and a half, clearly shows a sense of loss. However, from this response alone it is unclear which elements of the old order people regret losing. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that people regret the passing of the USSR for the same reasons. While some may indeed mourn the loss of the state and the social order in their entirety, others may simply feel a sense of nostalgia for the greatness and heroism of the popularly mythologized Soviet Union, without desiring a return of its specific features. Most respondents appear to regret above all losing the security that the old order provided. The general dissatisfaction and dismay with current economic, political, and social conditions would tend to support this conjecture.

What, then, do our survey data tell us about all this? To what extent, for example, is Russia seen to have inherited the rights and responsibilities of the Soviet Union? One key indication is that 35.8% of respondents agree that Russia has a responsibility to keep order in the former Soviet Union, while 54.1% disagree. This is far from a resounding cry for Russia to play a dominating role. Older respondents are far more likely to argue that Moscow should continue to keep order. And residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg are as likely as other
citizens to agree that Russia should adopt this responsibility. In February 1995, responses to this question had changed hardly at all, with 35.6% in agreement and 49.5% opposed. It may be that the bloody and unpopular war in Chechnya, fully unleashed on December 11, 1994, did not affect the responses because Chechnya is within Russia, and the question was seen as concerning only Russia's neighbors.

It is striking that in July 1994 a far greater percentage (60.7) agreed that Russia should use military force if necessary, to defend the rights of Russians living outside Russia. No less than 77.2% of Moscow and St. Petersburg respondents agreed with this view - further evidence which tends to debunk the notion that residents of those cities have a more "Western" or, less accurately, "liberal" stance on every issue.

Strong majorities also agreed that it was desirable that Ukraine (83.5%) and Belarus (84.1%) should reunite with Russia. Again, the residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg registered the highest support for Ukrainian reunification with Russia. In addition, over half of all respondents (55%) wanted Kazakhstan "back"; two-fifths (41%) wanted Central Asia; and over one-third wanted the Transcaucasus and the Bafts. In this regard, the population far outdistanced most political leaders, who are much more cautious about assuming financial responsibility for, for example, Central Asia.

At the same time, 61.6% ruled out the use of any kind of pressure to make former republics reunite with Russia, under any circumstances. The 27.9% who agreed that pressure might be used in some situations, were asked what form that pressure might take. Four fifths mentioned diplomatic and economic pressure. Only 5.7% of all respondents suggested that military pressure might be used to "encourage" reunification. This suggests a widespread perception that it is just simply "right" that other former republics reunite with Russia, that Russia makes the most ontological sense to many as the center of a larger, multifaceted entity, but that support for this idea cuts off to some extent when people are asked to commit resources and suffer costs.

When the question about pressure was asked again in February 1995, a somewhat higher percentage agreed that pressure might be used (36.8%), but a far lower percentage (37.8%) than before dismissed out of hand the use of pressure under any circumstances. Does a mounting sense of chaos produce ambivalence concerning issues that previously seemed perfectly clear? Media rhetoric concerning Russia's readiness to defend Russians outside Russia has definitely increased since early 1995, but it is unclear, for example, whether encouraging former republics to join Russia might be seen by Russians as the best way to guarantee the rights of ethnic Russians living there.
A further indication that popular desire for a recreated Union may be more passive than proactive, is the relatively low priority most people assign to the task of reunification. Evaluating the relative priority people assign to different goals is a good way to go beyond the palimpsestic quality of the myriad, sometimes contradictory ideas people may hold, and to underline which are most likely to have an impact on political behavior. Asked in July 1994 to select the three most important tasks facing Russia, only 21.4% named "re-establish the Soviet Union" at all, thus placing it significantly below all other tasks but one. At the same time, respondents were under no obligation to name any of the tasks, let alone a second or third one (most in fact did not name a second or third). Therefore, it is significant that one-fifth of the population believes the resurrection of the Union is one of Russia's most critical tasks.

C. The Axis of Anti-Westernism

The third facet of authoritarianism we designated is "anti-Westernism". Our premise is that a non-conciliatory attitude toward the West, and other countries in general, tends to reflect a general preference for order and control and military strength. In any case, virtually all the authoritarian opposition figures incorporate a strong anti-Western thread into their programs and appeals.

Our survey data suggest a strong and increasing sense of anti-Westernism that manifests itself in several ways. First, a majority (59.2%) agreed in July 1994 with the proposition that the West corrupts the minds of youth, versus 34.9% who disagreed. The variations in the responses according to age category were striking. Only 38.8% of the youngest group agreed that the West corrupts, while 80.8% of the oldest group agreed. Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg were far less likely than others to agree.

A second manifestation of anti-Westernism concerns what many respondents saw as the West's catastrophic impact on the Soviet Union and Russia. One-third (33.1%) of all respondents declared flatly that the West destroyed the Soviet Union. A majority (54.9%) believed that the West wants Russia to be a colony, and a plurality (46.7%) said that the West was trying to impoverish and fragment Russia. Both of these percentages rose significantly when the questions were posed again in February 1995 - to 59 and 55.1% respectively. The language of both statements is far from neutral; they both clearly imply more than a cautious or wary approach to the West. Furthermore, while younger people tended to view the West with less suspicion, those with the highest level of education were the most likely to agree that the West has colonizing ambitions. This fundamental and apparently growing suspicion may have ramifications for Western economic and security policy. This is especially the case, since
those Russians with the highest levels of education are perhaps the most likely to take an active
interest in Russia’s relations with the IMF and NATO, for example.

The picture, however, is not monolithic. In July 1994 a majority of respondents (54.3\%) agreed that Russia can learn from the West, and a more substantial majority (68.6\%) agreed that it is in Russia’s interests to work with the US. In Moscow and St. Petersburg 86\% agreed with this proposition.

Is this, then, a case of societal schizophrenia? Probably not. What it suggests rather, we believe, is a pervasive and escalating wariness about the West’s intentions, but also a realization that Russia is in deep enough trouble that it needs some sort of cooperation with the West if it is ever to "catch up". The dilemma is severe, since cooperation requires greater contact, and that, to nationalists, poses the threat of moral corruption by Western culture. Thus a feeling of suddenly being left out of world political and economic structures, and hence of inferiority, is producing what Liah Greenfeld, in her recent book *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, calls "status insecurity". Russians feel, and resent, the contrast between their traditional place in the old order, and their new, sharply reduced, inferior standing.

The need for political leaders to strike a fragile balance between cooperation with, and suspicion of, the West, creates an opportunity for challengers to attack either side of the equation. Cooperation with the West can be viewed as betraying all that is intrinsically Russian, while any leaning to isolationism can be cast as recklessly spurning opportunities that might "save Russia". Thus increasing anti-westernism, complicated by the evident need to establish at least a modus vivendi with the West, seems likely to play a critical role in Russian political discourse in the near term.

**D. The Axis of Russian National Identity**

The fourth dimension we explore of "authoritarianism" is the concept of Russian national identity. Our premise is that authoritarian regimes tend to adopt some coherent, if often primitive ideology which, together with some measure of coercion, provides a basis for organization and action in society. An emphasis on "the nation", through its implication of "us versus them", seems particularly appropriate for many who would establish a more authoritarian regime. In Russia, the platforms of almost all nationalist and communist opposition figures include some emphasis on the importance of "nation", whether ethnically or civically defined (russkii cf. rossiiskii). So, do our survey data show a link between popular conceptions of the Russian nation, and those of opposition figures?

Survey results do show strong identification with various ideas of what it means to be Russian. 73.4\% of respondents agreed that ethnic Russians (russkie) have always been
distinguished from other peoples by their deep spiritual nature. Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg were more likely than any others to agree with this. Furthermore, 60.3% agreed that no other country has done as much for science and culture as Russia. These results present two problems of interpretation. First, both questions sound like propositions with which one "ought" to agree. Even the most moderate person might consider it bad form to suggest that one's country is not spiritual, or has not made stellar contributions to the world. Second and more problematic, while both questions imply strong support for some conception of "Russia", neither makes clear what that conception includes, in the sense of the people and territory. What then is the entity, or idea, that most people seem to be holding in such high regard?

While most seem to consider some idea of "nation" very important, most also believe that this same nation is threatened in some way. 54.8% agreed that the Russian people (russkie) are faced with the threat of losing their national identity. Asked about society's morals, 68.1% replied that they have deteriorated, while only 3.5% said they have improved. This question did not force a binary choice. Respondents could select "stayed the same", but only 17.8% chose this option. While these figures are striking, and may indicate a sense of impending doom, the important analytical issue is the extent to which people are troubled by what they perceive as their nation's dissipating identity, and what they are prepared to do about it.

In response to questions of this sort, almost three-fourths of our respondents (73.9%) held that Russia can become a great country again only by reviving its traditions. Almost the same proportion (73.5%) went a step further and argued that "no insult to our national honor should go unpunished". In addition, 37.1% agreed that "we should be ready to fight for Russia, without questioning whether it's right or not". Positive responses to this last question declined sharply in February 1995 to 25%, probably indicating that media portrayals of the devastation in Chechnya had forced many to reconsider "fighting without question".

Popular responses to the Chechnya war illustrate some of the apparent complexity of conceptions of national identity. According to a USIA poll taken from 15 January to 6 February 1995, 57% found Russia's Chechen policy as a whole unacceptable, while 31% found it necessary for Russia's sovereignty. An even greater majority (73%) said the fighting should stop immediately (as opposed to resolving matters through continued fighting). But 42% wanted Russian troops to stay in Chechnya during negotiations, while only 32% would have them withdraw immediately. And a solid 73% wanted no other nations to get involved in the process of seeking a solution. Thus, despite clear opposition to the brutal aspects of the war, some form of national consciousness apparently prods many Russians to support keeping the troops in Chechnya as peacemakers, and to oppose any outside intervention.
What sort of a Russia is it that those troops are defending or preserving, and that, almost by definition, precludes outside interference? Suggestive here is the fact that while 20.5% said that Russia primarily belongs to Europe, 59.9% stated that Russia is primarily a separate entity.

This suggests again that many people have a strong, passionate conception of Russia as a unique entity. A critical element here is the extent to which ethnic Russianness plays a role. Questions using an ethnic definition of Russians tend to get a strong response, although it is possible that many respondents simply did not distinguish the civic from the ethnic when they answered the questions. Such a conflation of nation and state, in both the Russian and the Soviet cases, is grounded in 70 years of Soviet history.

Another indication of the pervasiveness of the idea of "nation" is that most political actors now find it necessary to incorporate some conception of nation into their rhetoric. Those with a clear anti-national track record, i.e., those perceived to have "sold out" Russia to the West through economic and security concessions or through a communist past in which "Soviet" identity took clear precedence over the national, are finding it increasingly hard to sell themselves as viable national leaders.

At the same time, the very nebulousness of the idea of nation raises the critical question: Who decides what is "Russia" and what is "Russian"? Which conceptions get internalized or come to seem "real", according to what standards, and by what means?

**E. The Axis of Capitalism-Socialism**

The final dimension considers support for different economic prescriptions for society, ranging from a fully state-controlled economy to a pure market economy. This dimension is slightly non-analogous with the others, in that there is not one end of the spectrum that is exclusively "authoritarian". Most current opposition figures do advocate a more state-centric economy than that which is currently taking shape. But as Igor Kliamkin suggests, authoritarian methods can, in principle, be used to install a capitalist system as well as a socialist system, and many people might well support such an approach.

Our results show no particular preponderance of support for either capitalism or socialism. A plurality of 47.6% agreed that ordinary people benefit from private property, vaguely defined, while 40% disagreed. But the balance was reversed regarding the necessity of free prices, with which 34.7% agreed and 45.2% disagreed; and also the right to sell land freely, which 40.2% supported and 47.2% opposed.

Where there is a near consensus, or even a plurality, it tends to center around mixed economic arrangements. Asked who should own enterprises of all sizes, 28.7% supported state
ownership, 16.1% answered private ownership, and a plurality of 47.3% advocated mixed ownership. The other point of near consensus (74.9% agreed) was that the primary beneficiaries of privatization have been the mafia and the former CPSU nomenklatura.

At the same time, almost half (44%) would support an authoritarian leader who could solve the country’s economic problems. This question does not necessarily imply, however, any particular method or path for resolving the crisis. Section III, therefore, addresses the correlation of different views of economic change with support for components of authoritarianism.

**SECTION III: RESULTS--INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS**

As noted above, the most striking feature of the current political landscape is the lack of resounding support for any individuals or institutions. The chart below shows levels of confidence in leaders from our July 1994 survey; approval of leaders in the August 1994 survey of military officers; and confidence in leaders in the ICSR project from October-November 1994.

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<td><strong>FOR VS</strong></td>
<td><strong>FOR VS</strong></td>
<td><strong>FOR VS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yeltsin</td>
<td>34.7 57.4</td>
<td>28 55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chernomyrdin</td>
<td>30.1 52.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozyrev</td>
<td>36.1 37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rybkin</td>
<td>20.9 37.9</td>
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<td>Shumeiko</td>
<td>22.5 45.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ziuganov</td>
<td>17.2 49.1</td>
<td>30 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhirinovsky</td>
<td>12.6 75.4</td>
<td>13 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaidar</td>
<td>27.6 67.2</td>
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<td>Baburin</td>
<td>14.1 46.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iavlinsky</td>
<td>33.6 35.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luzhkov</td>
<td>21.6 36.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rutskoi</td>
<td>27.8 51.1</td>
<td>30 45</td>
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<td>Lebed</td>
<td>60 18</td>
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<td>Gromov</td>
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No government officials register strong popular support. That Yeltsin’s support in particular had slipped drastically by October 1994 is confirmed by the ISP survey, which gave Yeltsin a 19% total favorable rating. Confidence in all government figures seems to be diminishing, and most register strikingly high negatives, particularly Yeltsin, Gaidar and Chernomyrdin. One exception is Kozyrev, but his support is based heavily in Moscow and St. Petersburg only. The second exception is Iavlinsky, but his support also is based primarily in the two largest cities, outside of which he has been little known, and his constituency is heavily weighted in favor of those with the highest levels of education. Lev Gudkov of RCPOMR has suggested that support for Iavlinsky tends to be quite high in times of non-crisis because many who know very little about him, perceive him to be a “safe” centrist. When the stakes are higher, as during election campaigns or presidential-parliamentary stand-offs, people tend to seek out more dynamic leaders, whom they perceive as capable of effecting significant change, as the December 1993 elections showed.

According to our survey, of the major opposition political figures, Rutskoi had a fairly substantial amount of support, but his negatives were very high, like those of Ziuganov, although Ziuganov had less positive support. Both registered significantly more support among older respondents. Zhirinovsky had remarkably high negatives (79%) and very little support. His constituency was significantly higher among those with less than secondary education, and those in Moscow and St. Petersburg were significantly less likely than those elsewhere to support him.

General Lebed’s majority support in the poll of military officers, and the fact that he registered more popular confidence than any other leader later last fall, deserve special attention. It is possible or even likely that he represents a specialized constituency outside of which he is not particularly well known. Both polls were taken, however, before Lebed’s very public criticism of Yeltsin’s policy in Chechnya, which would likely have increased public support for him.

Nor do people seem to place much faith in institutions, other than the Army (65.9% have confidence), and the Russian Orthodox Church (65.8%). The State Duma registered only 24.8% support, and local government only slightly more at 29.5%. On the ICSR survey in late fall, support for the Army had decreased to 54%, and this was before the overt invasion of Chechnya. Local government, on the other hand, earned the confidence of 32%, second only to the army and the Church, since support for all other state institutions fell sharply. This is most likely a reflection more of dismay with the center than of a renewed faith in local institutions.
SECTION IV: THE DIMENSIONS

Using questions from each of the five aspects of authoritarianism around which we designed our questionnaire, we created five dimensions. Each is a linear statistical amalgam of at least several questions. Answer choices to each question of the first four dimensions were arranged along a spectrum of increasing "authoritarianism". Answer choices to questions used in the economic dimension were arranged along a spectrum from "socialist" to "capitalist". Each dimension was created to maximize ideational coherence and sufficient representation of that aspect. The dimensions can be used to compare how strongly the different facets of authoritarianism correlate with one another, and with support for particular political leaders and parties. The table of correlations is as follows: [See the appendix for detailed descriptions of the dimensions.]

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<tr>
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<th>Polit</th>
<th>Natl</th>
<th>Imper</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Capitalism (pro-&quot;reform&quot;)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5007</td>
<td>.2607</td>
<td>.5417</td>
<td>-.4905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>.5007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2813</td>
<td>.4654</td>
<td>-.2902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>.2607</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-West</td>
<td>.5417</td>
<td>.4654</td>
<td>.2723</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.6138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitalism (pro-&quot;reform&quot;)</td>
<td>-.4905</td>
<td>-.2902</td>
<td>-.3448</td>
<td>-.6138</td>
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The higher any figure is (whether in the plus or the minus direction), the stronger the correlation is. We should also note that even the lowest figure in the table, .2607, indicates a strong relationship between the correlates. e.g., a respondent with strongly "imperialist" views is likely also to favor political authoritarianism. But he is still more likely to be, in addition, anti-capitalist (-.4905) and to favor a strong national identity (.5007), and most likely of all (.5417) to be, in addition, anti-Western.

The most significant finding from this table is that the first four dimensions, political authoritarianism, imperialism, anti-Westernism, and Russian national identity, all correlate with one another as expected. And support for "socialist" economics correlates with each form of authoritarianism. The twist, however, is that some of the correlations are far stronger than...
others, so that authoritarianism cannot be considered one neat, monolithic, and coherent syndrome.

The political, national, and anti-West axes do seem to form a rather cohesive bloc, but still each of the three correlates differently with each of the other two dimensions. The tie between "socialist" economics and national identity is especially low, for example, while that between "socialist" economics and anti-Westernism is extraordinarily high. This latter connection suggests a broader correlative if not causal relationship between increasing anti-Westernism and resistance to economic reform, both of which are evident in our results. The much weaker tie between "socialism" and national identity suggests that a strong commitment to some conception of "Russia" implies a specific economic program less than do any of the other ideas explored. In this connection it is noteworthy that specific economic programs tend to be a secondary matter for many nationalist politicians. Even the mechanisms of the "national capitalism" that Rutskoi describes are a bit unclear.

Imperialism correlates the least strongly across the board with the other dimensions, although it fits the basic expected pattern. This might well corroborate the hypothesis that the widespread Russian desire for reunification of key former republics with Russia reflects an almost essentialist conception of the right and necessary order of things. This would contrast with more proactive desires for a stronger regime that would enact given policies and take certain steps.

The bottom line of all this is that our findings call into question the assumption that support for an iron hand regime, or imperialism, or nationalism, or anti-Westernism necessarily indicates support for a more general authoritarian rule that encompasses all the other aspects. Regardless of how well these ideas may or may not fit together "objectively", they do not form a single cohesive unit in Russian popular thinking and feeling. In addition, since the spectra include non-authoritarian ideas as well, it may be safe to suggest that it is unlikely that many very coherent constituencies of any kind currently exist and operate in Russian society.

One clear consequence of this conclusion is that political leaders will find it hard or even impossible to appeal - in anything except the most general terms - to ideationally based constituencies, since these may hardly exist.

Another way of approaching the question is to explore the nature of the support for various major political players. As derived from our survey of July 1994, correlations for some key individuals are as follows:
Yeltsin has statistically significant "anti-authoritarian" correlations in all five categories, although the ties are much stronger regarding the political, anti-West, and economic axes than the national or imperial. Gaidar’s pattern is similar, although decidedly more anti-national and anti-imperial. Kozyrev and Chernomyrdin both reflect the same sort of distribution, although support for Chernomyrdin has no statistically significant correlation with national or imperial ideas either way, and Kozyrev’s has no connection with imperial views. A key observation is that the remarkably high support shown in the survey for certain conceptions of nation may mean that to be perceived as "anti-national" could be political suicide. Iavlinsky’s pattern, like Chernomyrdin’s, is in many respects mild and unremarkable.

Rutskoi and Ziuganov split the difference representing the opposite, "authoritarian" extreme. While Ziuganov’s support correlates more highly than Rutskoi’s with imperial, national, and iron hand values, Rutskoi’s corresponds more closely with anti-Westernism and socialist economics.

Zhirinovsky’s pattern is curious, largely for its relative mildness. His support correlates most closely with national identity, but not at all with imperialism. This is odd because he has publicly cast himself as the ultimate neo-imperialist. Moreover, his support is tied to “socialist” economic ideas, while his economic positions, though often ambiguous and changeable, have long tended to favor some form of market economy.

These results raise serious questions about making easy assumptions about the relationship between the ideas articulated by politicians and popular responses to these figures. Another ambiguous finding concerns Russia’s most prominent communist leader, Ziuganov. He tops the scales for "authoritarianism", thus corresponding well to the positions typically found on nationalist agendas: national identity, imperialism, and strong political leadership.

Conclusion: the political figure most successful to date at mobilizing people who ascribe to a full-blooded nationalist agenda is a communist. True, much of the explanation may lie in the
strongly nationalistic coloring that Ziuganov has given to the program of his party. But much of it may lie too, in the view - common enough even in sophisticated, Western, democratic politics - that the personality of a politician often counts for more than his political views.

Most strikingly, the political entrepreneur whose rhetoric best matches the extremes of the first four elements of authoritarianism, Zhirinovsky, appears to have been successful almost in spite of his views. According to our survey data, his constituency is highly inconsistent in its views. As noted earlier, the strongest coherent idea it expresses, support for a more socialist economic program, is one that Zhirinovsky himself does not usually advocate, and even opposes.

Support for major opposition parties follows patterns of authoritarianism similar to that registered for their leaders. The Communist Party (KPRF) correlates even more closely than does Ziuganov with each authoritarian axis. Interestingly, the tie is closest with socialist economics, which softens the conundrum over Ziuganov's appeal to nationalist values, and suggests that people do indeed associate the KPRF with a state-centered economic program. The Agrarian party (APR) has a very similar, but much weaker pattern, with virtually no correlation with imperialism or anti-Westernism. This suggests that the Agrarians and Communists do have similarly oriented constituencies, but that the APR's domestic agenda is the part of its approach that most resonates. This was in fact to be expected, since its leaders say little about foreign affairs.

Following the pattern set by Zhirinovsky, the LDP correlates far less dramatically with all of the dimensions, and yet registers highest in economics, where popular preference does not correspond well with the party platform.

Meanwhile, left out of this picture are the various popular majorities who gave "authoritarian" answers to many questions within each dimension, but who, according to our survey, did not express their ideas in the December 1993 elections by voting for one of the opposition figures who appealed to authoritarian values. Do they constitute a potential pro-authoritarian constituency? And what would it take to mobilize them to participate politically?

Another way to consider potential constituencies is to look at how different demographic groups are distributed along each of the five axes. Women, for example, express more political authoritarianism than men do, although men take a more "socialist" economic stance. On all five dimensions, those respondents in their 60's or older are decidedly authoritarian/socialist, especially in the political, anti-West, and economic categories. Those in the youngest age groups are definitely non-authoritarian, especially regarding iron hand politics. Both of these groups stand out from those in their 30's, 40's, and 50's, who are far less extreme or coherent
as groups. Those in their 50's do register authoritarian values, however, in the political, anti-West, economic triad; the magnitude is significantly less than that of the 60's group.

Those with the highest levels of education have a clear correlation with anti-authoritarianism, especially of the political variety, while those with the lowest education levels correlate with authoritarian values, particularly with the ideas of anti-westernism and socialist economics.

SECTION V: SUMMATION AND HYPOTHESES

Analysis to date of the results of our two surveys suggests that it may be necessary carefully to reconsider the nature of the links, or non-links, between popularly held ideas and political figures who propagate them. While there is apparently strong and significant mass support for each of the five aspects we explored of a broadly defined "authoritarianism", nationalist politicians, who for several years have been pitching a national-authoritarian line that seems to match popular concerns, have had remarkably little success in mobilizing people to participate politically, except for brief moments during national elections. Even in these the popular turn-out has usually been rather low, but it has been higher than the typical range, since December 1993, for regional and city elections, i.e., from about 5% to 40%. The most successful nationalist politician, Zhirinovsky, may have succeeded in spite of his often way-out ideas, by force of his generally anti-Establishment and demagogic personality. All of this fails to explain why no political entrepreneurs have tapped successfully the seemingly broad-based potential support for an iron hand regime.

If there is indeed, as these results suggest, no necessary link in Russia between belief in authoritarian ideas and acting politically on that basis, we need to ask why. What explains the very limited success of most nationalist and communist politicians to date? Why have they not been able to forge this necessary link?

The premise for the first part of our tentative explanation is that popular beliefs are not zero-sum, but rather palimpsestic. Individuals are under no objective constraint to be perfectly consistent. They may subscribe to any number of different and even mutually contradictory views simultaneously. What explains which ideas gain political salience?

Michael Urban has argued that current political discourse in Russia is characterized by a tendency to try to affirm one's own identity by denying the legitimacy of the self-identification of the "other". This tends to polarize elite level groups and prevent the development of coherent political identities that are different from, but related to each other. The result is a large measure of chaos in identity formation, and perhaps also in popular self-identification with political leaders.
The picture may, however, be even more complicated than Urban describes. Urban places his mechanism of polarizing discourse against a linear background, when it may be more accurate to view the range of programmatic options available to political entrepreneurs as circular, as Andrei Amal’rik suggested. Idealypical identities that name the individual, the nation, and the state as the primary ontological units might be spaced evenly around the circle. The stretches of circumference between them represent an infinite variety of locations for individual and collective identity. Self-identification is best conceived, then, as non-linear "sliding", or a search for untainted terms in which to define oneself, rather than a simple polarization. The practical result in today's Russia, where old-style communism and the new democratic capitalism have both been heavily discredited, is a channeling of virtually all political discourse through the prism of "the nation", the rhetorical realm long favored by the nationalist opposition. For ordinary Russians, this makes understanding the real, but submerged differences between the various politicians and political parties remarkably difficult. Who really represents the nationalist agenda?

The second and perhaps weightier part of our explanation for the apparent disconnect between authoritarian politicians and most Russians is different in nature. It finds support in the more general survey results reported in Section II, sub-section "Background", of this report. These showed very low and still declining levels of popular approval for all politicians and government institutions. Our explanation therefore posits a deepening alienation of most Russians from the political system as a whole, including from authoritarian politicians, since the latter are seen to be part of a system that has become indifferent to the problems of ordinary people. Hence these people do not support, except perhaps lukewarmly in national elections, even those politicians who express their own views. Since the politicians are viewed as hypocritical, ineffective, or corrupt, they are not expected to put these views into practice. So why bother even to vote? As our survey responses on political corruption and organized crime suggest, many ordinary Russians apparently believe that officials and mafia groups have now formed such powerful alliances, both locally and in Moscow, that no political actions by ordinary people will be able to change anything.

For the time being, we believe, this is probably indeed the case. In conclusion, though, our surveys do indicate a potential development for the future. Given the strength and growth of authoritarian values among the Russian people, and the alienation of many people from the status quo, the next generation of Russian politicians will likely feature individuals who present themselves as authoritarians, outsiders, and, very possibly, revolutionaries. And such politicians will probably have strong potential support among broad sections of the Russian people.
APPENDIX A: The Dimensions

Following are the questions we used to compose each of the five dimensions. Values were recoded to create a consistent spectrum of increasingly authoritarian answer choices. "Don’t know" and "No answer" were not included in the dimensions. ***Indicates the most "authoritarian" answer choice, or in the case of economics, the "socialist" one.

I. Political authoritarianism

NOTE: n = 961

Q7: Some think that it is more important to foster in children discipline, obedience, and respect for the authority of their parents, teachers, and elders. Others think that it is more important to give children the opportunity to freely develop their abilities. Which of these views is closer to your own?

***1. It is more important to foster in children discipline, obedience, and respect for the authority of their parents, teachers, and elders.
2. It is more important to give them the opportunity to freely develop their abilities.

Q10: Some think that the new political freedoms in Russia have led to a loss of order. Others say that the political freedoms are important enough that it is possible to reconcile oneself to a loss of order for now. Which of these views is closer to your own?

***1. The new political freedoms have led to a loss of order.
2. The political freedoms are important enough that it is possible for now to reconcile oneself to a loss of order.

For Q18B, Q18C, Q24A, Q34E, and Q36A

***1. Fully agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Fully disagree

Q18B: Any Russian government should regulate the opinions and views expressed on radio, television, and in the press.

Q18C: To fight crime, it is necessary to stiffen the sentences for many crimes.

Q24A: Russia needs a leader who would bring about order in the country with an iron hand.

Q34E: If there came to power a leader who could solve the economic problems, I would not object if he took away political freedoms.

Q36A: It is necessary to cultivate in our youth strict discipline and striving to work for the good of their families and country.
II. RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

NOTE: n = 1247. It may be problematic that the "authoritarian" response in each case involves agreeing with the given statement, which may introduce a bias of acquiescence.

For Q18D, Q36B, Q36E, and Q36F

***1. Fully agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Fully disagree

Q18D: There is no room in Russia for those who criticize their country.

Q36B: No insult to our national honor should go unpunished.

Q36E: Russia should do everything possible not to let the US be ahead in military power.

Q36F: We should be ready to fight for Russia without questioning whether Russia is right or not.

III. IMPERIALISM

NOTE: n = 1131.

For Q36C and 36D exactly the same answer choices were provided as those provided for the preceding set of questions (Q18D, etc.)

Q36C: Russia is responsible for maintaining order on all the territory of the former USSR.

Q36D: Russia should defend (ethnic) Russians living outside Russia’s borders, using military force if necessary.

Q41A-41K: I will read you a list of countries and regions which were part of the USSR. Do you think it is desirable or not that each reunites with Russia?

***1. Desirable
2. Not desirable

Q41A: Ukraine
Q41B: Belarus
Q41C: Baltics
Q41D: North Kazakhstan
Q41E: All Kazakhstan
Q41F: Transdniestre republic
Q41G: Moldova
Q41H: Armenia
Q41I: Georgia
Q41J: Azerbaijan
Q41K: Central Asia
IV. ANTI-WESTERNISM  
NOTE: n = 1065.

For Q8C, Q24C, Q34F, Q36G  
Q8C: Western mass culture is corrupting our youth

24C: Anti-Soviet forces in the West are primarily responsible for the collapse of the USSR.

Q34F: Western states, whatever they say, really want to turn Russia into a colony—a source of raw materials and cheap labor.

Q36G: The West is trying to impoverish and fragment Russia.

For Q8F and Q24F  
1. Fully agree  
2. Somewhat agree  
3. Somewhat disagree  
***4. Fully disagree  
Q8F: Russia could learn much from the West.

Q24F: It is in Russia's interest to work closely with the US and other countries of the West.

V. ECONOMIC  
NOTE: n = 977. *** = "socialist" response.

Q30: People have different opinions about economic questions. Tell me please, which of the following statements is closest to your own?  
1. The majority of enterprises, stores, and farms should belong to private owners. Only several branches of industry and spheres of services should remain as state property.  
2. A part of enterprises, stores and farms should be private, and part state.  
***3. The state should own the majority of enterprises, stores, and farms. Private property should be kept to a minimum.

Q31: What do you think—what is the state’s first task—to guarantee that the basic needs of its citizens are met or to create the conditions so that people can improve their lives by their own efforts?  
***1. Guarantee that basic needs are met.  
2. Provide conditions so that people can improve their lives themselves.
Q32: What do you think--What impact on our economy in the next decade will the creation of private firms and joint-stock companies have?
   1. "Big positive effect"
   2. Some positive effect
   3. No effect
   4. Some negative effect
***5. Big negative effect

For Q34A, Q34B, and Q34C
   1. Fully agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
***4. Fully disagree

Q34A: Private property will benefit ordinary people

Q34B: All citizens should be permitted to buy and sell land freely.

Q34C: Free prices are essential for economic renewal of Russia.