TITLE: FROM THE FACTORY TO THE KREMLIN: MIKHAIL TOMSKY AND THE RUSSIAN WORKER

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Executive Summary

The successes and failures of trade unions in the 1920s illuminate the dangers in Russia's current failure to improve the plight, and ease the anxieties, of its 80 million workers. For all the differences in labor-management relations between the 1920s and the 1990s, at the beginning of both decades Russia abandoned a command economy and adopted capitalist methods. Policy makers in both periods confronted a similar challenge: how to reverse a drastic drop in industrial production while improving workers' standard of living. Whereas post-Soviet Russia has not met this challenge -- its economy and conditions for workers have deteriorated precipitously -- during the 1920s trade-union collaboration with, and pressure on, management enabled labor productivity and conditions for workers to improve dramatically, so that by 1927 real wages were higher than ever before (or would be for decades to come). But the trade unions' failure to address the high youth unemployment that accompanied the market-oriented economy of the 1920s allowed Stalin to undermine the position of the trade-union leadership and facilitated the rise to power of a political elite determined to end reliance on the market. In Russia today, the success of Communist groups and demagogic leaders in tapping worker discontent likewise endanger continued adherence to a market economy.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1921 to repair the damage done by the command economy of War Communism (1918-1921). This transition shares similarities with the post-Soviet transition. When NEP was introduced workers in nationalized industries were in a desperate plight. Many enterprises lost their state subsidies. The leaders of the recently emergent workers' organization in post-Soviet Russia, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, face a dilemma not unlike the one that confronted trade unionists in 1921 with the introduction of NEP's market-oriented economy: how far to go in cooperating with management's attempts to make grossly inefficient enterprises profitable. Workers desperately need effective trade unions to defend their interests in the transition to a market economy, while employers also need unions with which to negotiate if they are to avoid disruptive conflict.

When NEP was introduced much of the blame for the pitiful condition of workers was attributed to the workers themselves. Today's complaints about Russian workers' poor work habits are nothing new. Before the revolution the Bolsheviks denounced all management complaints about
worker discipline as the ranting of capitalist exploiters. But after the Bolsheviks themselves were in power, the political and trade-union leadership quickly changed its tune, as labor productivity sank to unprecedented levels. During the Civil War industry barely functioned, with absenteeism, drunkenness, and stealing of enterprise property rampant. As bad as work habits and attitudes are today, they were far worse at the outset of NEP.

The contributions of Mikhail Tomsky -- the subject of my research project was a member of the Politburo and head of the trade unions during the 1920s -- to early Soviet debates on how to simultaneously raise productivity, defend workers' interests, and control labor discontent are of contemporary relevance for Russian governmental leaders as they struggle to build a post "administrative-command" economy. Even without the mass bankruptcies of industrial enterprises that the IMF and others are calling for, hostility to economic reform is widespread and strikes and demonstrations by Russia's increasingly angry labor force are once again on the rise. Economic improvements, upon which a democratic future for Russia is dependent, could be torpedoed by a mobilized working class. Whether labor unrest will assume significant proportions in the short term remains to be seen, but how Tomsky dealt with labor issues in the 1920s should prove of interest to those concerned with the stabilization of post-Soviet Russia.

During the 1920s, with the trade unions resolved to stimulate labor productivity, it was necessary to overcome worker opposition to piece-rates. Tomsky agreed with other members of the leadership that wage raises were to be related to output. Through the collective agreements the unions negotiated they assumed joint responsibility with management for setting and enforcing work "norms." But while the unions sanctioned and enforced norms that workers commonly found unfair, the trade union leadership did ensure that those who worked hard and increased their skills were rewarded with higher pay. The piece-rates not only allowed the economy to grow rapidly. Workers' wages grew even more rapidly than labor productivity.

This increase in workers' average pay masked a growing disparity among workers. The trade union's support for piece-rates allowed the spread between the wages of the older and more skilled workers and the younger and more unskilled workers to increase rapidly. Tomsky and his cohorts -- the middle-aged, male, urban, former skilled workers who led the trade unions -- shared a disdain for the mass of unskilled workers, many of whom were undisciplined young men.

Youth unemployment aggravated the generational conflict. For all of NEP's achievements, there were elements of "shock therapy" in its high unemployment. Unemployment during NEP became a problem on a scale unprecedented in Russian history, prior to recent years. With the advent of NEP, many enterprises were forced to compete in the market. No longer receiving state subsidies regardless of their profitability, many enterprises cut costs by reducing the size of their
workforces. Tomsky and the trade-union leadership accepted the necessity of firing undisciplined and redundant workers.

It was largely on their own volition that Tomsky and the trade-union leadership supported NEP’s campaigns to raise labor productivity and opposed forced, non-market based industrialization. During the late 1920s, the trade-union organization, with its huge administrative machine and representation in every important state and party committee, was stronger, and more autonomous, than ever before. During 1928 the trade unions arguably were the most powerful obstacle facing Stalin and his supporters.

Today, as under NEP, it is the losers -- including young urban males -- who threaten to reverse economic reforms. Gennadii Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky are attempting to capitalize on working-class discontent, with fictional visions of past egalitarianism, just as Stalin was able to capitalize on this discontent in 1928 to undermine the position of Tomsky and the other so-called Rightists. With Stalin’s encouragement, it was the Communist Youth League, or Komsomol, which led the public attack on the trade unions at the Eighth Trade Union Congress in December 1928. Komsomol speakers sharply attacked the older trade-union leaders for ignoring the views and the interests of the young; especially their need for employment. The Komsomol attack, by undermining the trade-union leadership, played a key role in Stalin’s rise to power. Tomsky’s failure to devote sufficient attention to the unemployment crisis and the conditions of the least fortunate among the working class provided the wedge to undermine support for market reforms.
Trade-union collaboration with, and pressure on, management helped Russia during the 1920s reverse the free fall in economic output and conditions for workers that occurred between 1917 and 1921. During the Civil War industry barely functioned. By 1920 industrial production had fallen to one fifth of the 1913 level. Following the abandonment of War Communism's command economy and the introduction of market reforms, labor productivity and wages improved dramatically, so that by 1927 real wages were higher than ever before (or would be for decades to come). But the trade unions' failure to address the high youth unemployment that accompanied the market-oriented economy of the 1920s allowed Stalin to undermine the position of the trade-union leadership and facilitated the rise to power of a political elite determined to end reliance on the market.

The contributions of Mikhail Tomsky to Soviet debates on how to raise productivity, defend workers' interests, and control labor discontent are of contemporary relevance as Russia attempts to dismantle the command economy. Tomsky's dual responsibility during the 1920s, as a key member of the Politburo, which was trying to increase labor productivity to build a modern industrial economy, and as head of the institution responsible for improving conditions for workers, put Tomsky in the middle of the acrimonious debates that preoccupied the early Soviet leaders. For all his concern with improving immediate conditions for workers, Tomsky recognized that tough measures were necessary to combat worker absenteeism, drunkenness, embezzlement, and low discipline.

In the 1990s, as in the 1920s, Russia has resorted to capitalist methods to repair the damage done by a centralized, command economy. For all the differences in Russian labor-management relations between the 1920s and the 1990s, in both periods policy makers confronted a similar challenge: how to reverse a drastic drop in industrial production while improving workers' standard of living. In attempting to meet this challenge the leaders of the recently emergent workers' organization in post-Soviet Russia, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, face a dilemma not unlike the one that confronted trade unionists in 1921 with the introduction of NEP's market-oriented economy: how far to go in cooperating with management's attempts to make grossly inefficient enterprises profitable. Workers desperately need effective trade unions to defend their interests in the transition to a market economy.
while employers also need trade unions with which to negotiate if they are to avoid disruptive conflict.

Russia today so far has not met these challenges. The Russian economy and conditions for workers continue to deteriorate precipitously. Even without the mass bankruptcies of industrial enterprises that the IMF and others are calling for, hostility to economic reform is widespread. In addition to the discontent Russia’s eighty million workers have expressed at the ballot box, strikes and demonstrations by Russia’s increasingly angry labor force are once again on the rise. Whether labor unrest will assume significant proportions in the short term remains to be seen, but how Tomsky dealt with labor issues in the 1920s should prove illuminating to those concerned with the stabilization of post-Soviet Russia. A mobilized working class could torpedo the economic progress upon which a democratic future for Russia is dependent.

The economic collapse of the last decade pales in comparison to what occurred during the first years of Soviet history. Following seven years of war, revolution, and civil war, Russian cities were depopulated, its factories barely working, and its working class dissipated and to a large extent hostile. As conditions in the cities worsened during the Civil War, worker protests grew. Strikes occurred throughout the winter of 1920/21, usually over the issue of food supplies. In the desperate conditions of the time the overwhelming majority of workers refused to exert themselves in response to the trade union’s and others exhortations to sacrifice for the socialist future.

Although War Communism was distinguished from NEP by the idealism and enthusiasm of a small minority, to Tomsky and others in the leadership the gap between their revolutionary dreams and everyday reality were perfectly obvious. The trade unionists indicated their willingness to abandon egalitarian policies within the first six months of the Bolshevik seizure of power. The trade unions disliked piece rates -- they viewed them as a traditional method of exploiting workers -- but as early as April 3, 1918, the Central Trade Union Council reluctantly agreed that they were necessary to stimulate labor productivity. But at a time when the regime could barely afford to give all workers a starvation wage, it was impossible to widely use wage differentials to encourage productivity. In practice, the trade union’s factory committees tended to distribute supplies equally.

While Tomsky recognized that something significant had to be done to raise labor productivity, he opposed resorting to coercive policies. Ignoring Leon Trotsky’s criticism that he was an old-fashioned type of trade unionist who from habit encouraged workers’ “consumptionist” attitudes, Tomsky led the trade unionists’ opposition to Trotsky and others who advocated the compulsory “militarization of labor” to raise productivity. When, after the
end of the Civil War, economic output continued to drop, those in favor of using military methods argued that an economic turnaround could only be achieved by conscripting labor and imposing discipline through the Red Army and the Cheka. After its limited implementation on the railways, Tomsky successfully argued that the main effect of Trotsky’s policy to use the military apparatus to coordinate economic activity and conscript peasants into the labor force was the intensification of worker alienation. NEP abolished labor conscription.

Aside from Trotsky’s effort to militarize labor, the Central Trade Union Council supported government policies that were based on the notion that raising labor productivity depended on increasing the intensity of effort workers devoted to their jobs. It was largely of their own volition that Tomsky and the trade union leadership sought to make common cause with the state economic organs in the campaign to raise labor productivity. The trade unionists were not party hacks. The trade unions remained a powerful political and economic force after the implementation of NEP ended their managerial control over industry. The trade unions were well represented in every important state and party committee. In addition to Tomsky’s seat in the Politburo, a large number of trade unionists were on the Party Central Committee and on the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. Trade unionists, as part of the party elite, helped formulate the New Economic Policy. It was clear to trade unionists that to revive the nearly ruined economy raising productivity had to be a trade-union priority.

At the end of War Communism few skilled workers remained on the factory floor. Those skilled workers who had not been promoted into positions of authority in the trade union or some other bureaucratic apparatus, had typically either joined the Red Army or fled the hungry, cold, and diseased cities for life with relatives in the countryside. As a result, at NEP’s outset most workers were unskilled. Because they lacked what might be called an industrial worker ethic, much of the blame for the pitiful condition of workers at NEP’s outset, as in Russia today, was placed on the workers themselves.

Low worker discipline could not be blamed just on the hardships of the time. Poor work habits, particularly among unskilled workers fresh from the countryside, were nothing new. Before the revolution the Bolsheviks denounced all management complaints about worker discipline as the ranting of capitalist exploiters. But after the Bolsheviks themselves were in power, Lenin and other Soviet leaders, including Tomsky, quickly changed their tune. An exasperated Lenin exclaimed: "The Russian worker is a poor worker in comparison with the advanced nations...To teach the people how to work -- that is our task."

Absenteeism reached an unprecedented level under War Communism. In 1921, up to one-third of all industrial work days were being lost due to unexcused absences and other forms of shirking (progul’). An inordinate amount of worker absenteeism followed holidays.
due primarily to continued heavy drinking or the need to sleep off their sprees. Others failed to
appear at work because they had temporarily returned to their villages without permission to
engage in agricultural work. An inordinate number of workers simulated sicknesses or an
accident to escape work. Some workers refused to work on religious holidays. When they did
show up for work, they often appeared late or left early.

On the job, management and trade union officials complained about a complete lack of
labor discipline. The quality of work commonly was said to be "abominable" (otvratitel'nye).
As before the revolution, during water breaks workers quenched their thirst surreptitiously
with home-brewed vodka, which was always hidden somewhere near the water bucket.
Tomsky referred to instances of "scandalous behavior," in which drunken workers displayed an
"uncultured," insulting attitude towards foremen, medium-level technical personnel, and fellow
workers.³ It was not uncommon for fights, and even fatal attacks, to erupt on the factory
floor.⁴ Embezzlement and theft of state property, especially in consumer industries, was a
major problem.

To impose on the raw peasant the discipline of factory work was a task of enormous
difficulty. They were resistant to the values and tempos of urban-industrial life. Apathy, and a
sullen attitude towards both the regime and the factory, manifested itself in most workers'
general indifference to appeals to work harder or more efficiently. As bad as work habits and
attitudes are today, they were far worse at the outset of NEP.⁵

NEP policies, which gave management the power to deduct a day's wage for every day
of unauthorized absenteeism, or fire workers, successfully reduced the amount of shirking. The
percentage of days lost to progul', dropped by two-thirds, to 12.5 percent. By 1923, only 10.5
percent of all workdays were lost due to various forms of truancy. These trends point to the
gradual disciplining of industrial labor during the 1920s.

Workers should not, of course, be blamed entirely for the low productivity of the early
1920s. As trade unionists often emphasized, workers typically worked in outdated, dilapidated
industrial plants, without sufficient tools and materials.⁶ During the Civil War, when the trade
union's factory committees helped manage enterprises, they had no choice but to neglect
maintenance and repairs.⁷ It was hoped that NEP would encourage private investors, including
foreign companies, to invest in Soviet factories. Private Russian entrepreneurs took advantage
of the opportunity to lease small factories, but few foreign firms took advantage of the
concessions NEP granted in exchange for a share of their output. Nor, unlike today, was there
a World Bank or IMF to offer financial aid. Only higher worker productivity could revive the
devastated economy.
There were elements of "shock therapy" in NEP's attempt to raise worker productivity. NEP, in addition to privatizing all small enterprises, required large-scale nationalized industrial enterprises to operate according to commercial cost accounting (khozraschet). NEP also exposed industrial enterprises to market forces. NEP stripped many industrial enterprises of the state subsidies they had received during War Communism, regardless of their efficiency or profitability. Manufactured goods now had to be produced cheaply enough and in sufficient quantities to attract consumers. In even those large-scale industrial enterprises that continued to receive some state funding sales were increasingly required to provide the means to purchase materials and fuel, and to pay workers. As today, these changes favored light industry over heavy industry, which in Tomsky words, "experienced a most severe crisis." Many enterprises, which were now compelled to rationalize production and cut costs, laid off substantial portions of their workforces.

Most enterprises had excessive numbers of employees and auxiliary workers. NEP encouraged, and the contracts known as collective agreements worked out between management and the trade unions allowed, enterprises to dismiss redundant workers. The closure of some unprofitable enterprises led to further workforce reductions. The party was walking a thin line, for although closures were necessary to lower costs, a full unleashing of market forces would have resulted in massive layoffs. As today, the leadership generally refrained, for political reasons, from closing many unprofitable, but large enterprises. Even so, in 1921 almost one-fifth of the workforces affected by collective agreements were fired in Moscow province. Layoffs continued well into 1923, and although bloated white collar staffs were also targets of these reductions, more often than not manual workers bore the brunt. Unskilled young workers and older female workers disproportionally suffered during these layoffs.

Throughout the 1920s the problem of mass unemployment continued unabated. Unemployment during NEP became a problem on a scale unprecedented in Russian history. Despite the high rate of unemployment during NEP, the problem is usually overstated. The trade unions had reason to assert that the picture was not as bleak as it seemed. Following the layoffs of early NEP, the reason for NEP unemployment was not that workers were losing their jobs. They were not. Nor was it because there were not job opportunities. There were. The reason that, following 1923, there was a simultaneous rise in employment and unemployment was that, as the economy began to revive, prospective jobseekers flooded into the cities from the countryside in search of work, which produced a high rate of unemployment. NEP did succeed in producing dramatic, continual increases in the number of employed workers.
The unleashing of "free enterprise" under NEP placed new demands on the trade unions as they were thrust into contradictory roles as supporters of productivist economic policies and defenders of workers' immediate interests. Although the 10th Party Congress affirmed the duty of trade unions to defend workers' economic interests, it also emphasized their obligation to disavow trade-union involvement in management and assist management in ensuring the increased efficiency and profitability of enterprises. The crux of the trade unionists' problem during the 1920s was their ambiguous relationship to management in NEP.

The principle of khozraschet meant trade unions were no longer to be directly involved in economic management (under War Communism factory committess became semi-managerial organs). "It was," Tomsky stated, "impossible at the same time to manage a factory on the basis of commercial accounting and to be the spokesman and guardian of the economic interests of hired workers." The success of the restoration of industry required improved management, which Tomsky agreed could be achieved only if the factory manager, along with his technical and administrative specialists, whether Communist Party members or not, assumed sole responsibility for his enterprise. Tomsky instructed trade unions to follow party directives not to interfere in management beyond their duty to ensure the implementation of the collective agreement. Tomsky argued that the division of authority under War Communism led to a situation in which no one accepted real responsibility. Tomsky added, "Now, we are too poor and the general economic climate is too unfavorable to place workers in management." For these reasons Tomsky and other trade union leaders consistently defended the principle of one-man management during NEP.

It was not easy for the trade unionists to accept many management decisions. Members of the Trade Union Council spoke of the particular "pain" they felt in accepting greater independence for management, particularly when directors gave high bonuses to administrative and technical personnel. However much the trade union leadership accepted the rationale that it was necessary for industrial development to provide managers and technical specialists with monetary incentives, in practice they often balked because the specialists' privileged position created widespread resentment among rank-and-file union members. "Specialist-baiting" (spetseedstvo) was most pronounced among "new" peasant-workers and in industries with depressed wage levels, such as the railroad industry. The issue of the "bourgeois" specialists' salaries was repeatedly aired in discussions over wages and wage-scales at Party Congresses. Workers continued to greatly resent the high remuneration of the specialists and viewed with skepticism, to say the least, the Party leadership's claim that these bonuses were based on the workers' own long-term interests.
Of even greater concern to rank-and-file workers than specialists high pay was piece rates. Tomsky joined other members of the leadership in agreeing that an increased reliance on piece rates was necessary to spur greater worker efficiency. Workers were to receive wage increases only as a result of higher productivity. The use of piece rates, and bonuses for workers paid by the hour, were an integral aspect of NEP’s drive to raise productivity. By 1923, 40% of all industrial workers were on piece rates.

The improved labor discipline and intensity of effort resulting from the use of piece rates, as well as other factors including better management and technical improvement, explain why economic output showed such impressive gains during NEP. Overall industrial productivity in Moscow province in 1924/25 was 91.6% of pre-war levels, up from 72% in 1923/24. Industrial workers' efficiency slowly but steadily rose from the appallingly low level of the Civil War period.

The collective agreements set the piece rates that helped make these gains in productivity possible. Through the collective agreements the trade unions assumed joint responsibility with management for setting and enforcing work "norms." Setting norms of output -- a key factor in fixing piece rates -- was a task of immense sensitivity for the trade unions. It was not uncommon for the trade unions to sanction and enforce norms that workers found unfair. But while this remained a sore point among workers and many trade unionists, the trade union leadership did respond to worker complaints by ensuring that those who worked hard and increased their skills were rewarded with higher pay. The collective agreements generally enabled workers' wages to rise faster than output.

Despite all the talk about the necessity of tying wage increases to compensating increases in productivity, during the first years of NEP the increase in labor productivity lagged behind the increase in wages. For all of the statements such as the following by Tomsky, "The interests of today must be subordinated to the general class interests of tomorrow and of the immediate future," by 1924 the position of employed workers, as a whole, had substantially improved. By some accounting, wages already exceeded pre-war levels by the mid-1920s.

This increase in workers' average pay masked the growing disparity among workers. The trade union's support for piece rates allowed the spread between the wages of the skilled and unskilled to increase rapidly. The further extension of piece rates after 1924 threatened to widen still further the gap between skilled and unskilled workers. The growing disparity from the differential rates of pay, and unskilled workers resentment with it, led the trade unions to begin talking anew about the revolution's egalitarian principles. The trade unions negotiated improved bonuses for unskilled workers to address the growing spread between the highest and
lowest wage levels. Between 1924 and 1926 the gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers continued to widen, but less rapidly than earlier.

At the same time, with the recovery of wages, the government leadership reembarked on a campaign to oppose further wage increases without corresponding increases in the productivity of labor. The campaign for increased productivity of labor gathered new momentum as one industry after another approached its pre-war level of production. Wage policy was scrutinized more and more exclusively from the standpoint of its capacity to create capital. The "Left" argued that in order to raise the capital necessary to expand factories or build new ones, any further rise in real wages must be achieved not through raising wage rates, but by reducing prices through increased efficiency in production.

Workers' short-term interests necessarily ran counter to the campaign for increased productivity without an increase in wages. They looked to the trade unions to continue to defend their short-term interests. In the spring of 1925 this unremitting pressure for production led to a fresh wave of unrest among workers. At the 14th Party Congress David Ryazanov criticized the trade unions for "overdoing" the campaign for higher productivity. Large-scale strikes occurred. The ending of the wage-freeze in the spring of 1925 showed that considerable firmness was required if any substantial gap between increases in productivity and increases in earnings was to be maintained. During 1925/1926, as in 1924/1925, productivity failed to keep pace with wages.

The so-called regime of economy -- a new campaign for more intensive effort on the part of the worker -- which was announced in the spring of 1926, was intended as an all-out drive to increase output and reduce costs of production. But this tough policy proved difficult to maintain. The trade unionists pushed perhaps harder than ever for higher wages. During the second half of 1926 and the greater part of 1927 the trade unions and Vesenkha engaged in constant and often bitter debate over the issue of the relation of wages to productivity. The debate was carried on at conferences and congresses and in the columns of their respective newspapers. In the end, the pressure for wage concessions proved irresistible. Workers' demand for higher wages once again prevailed over the principle that productivity should rise faster than wages.

Tomsky's success in defending workers' economic interests made the latter half of the 1920s, in the words of Blair Ruble, a "golden age" for the trade unions. In 1926/27 wages rose by 12 percent as compared to a rise in productivity of 9 percent. By 1927, workers enjoyed a standard of living higher than ever before and the trade unions enjoyed considerable power.

This record of trade-union success was suddenly reversed at the end of 1928. The trade unions' failure to address the high youth unemployment that accompanied the market-oriented
economy of the 1920s allowed Stalin to undermine the position of the trade-union leadership and facilitated the rise to power of a political elite determined to end reliance on the market. All the trade unionists' fears with the "Left's" program of breakneck industrialization were realized following the Stalinists' defeat of Tomsky and his fellow "Rightists." Tomsky foresaw that Stalin's program of all-out industrialization, with its attendant deemphasis on consumer goods production, necessarily entailed an end to the years of gradual improvements in working-class wages and living standards, and that the tempo of industrialization being contemplated would bring to an end the traditional role and status of the trade unions by requiring the trade unions to play a new, far more coercive role in enforcing labor discipline. Stalin's introduction of the command economy ultimately proved to be the most important cause of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Workers were far less eager to abandon the moderate policies of the 1920s in favor of the Stalinist revolutionary upheaval than revisionists have suggested. Revisionist studies of late NEP have argued that popular opposition to NEP was crucial to the Stalinist outcome of the revolution: the "revolution from above" was also a "revolution from below." The two revolutions are thought to have "interacted, reinforced, and pushed each other along unforeseen lines." But, it seems to me, revisionist studies have not demonstrated that discontents during NEP constituted support for the Stalinist revolution.

Komsomol (Young Communist League) militancy has provided the best case for the revisionist argument. The activists who attacked NEP educational and cultural policies, the focus of Sheila Fitzpatrick's pathbreaking article, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," were young intellectuals in literature and the arts. But this is a group and arena too marginal, in itself, to support an argument that the Stalinist revolution was in important ways a popular revolution from below. Fitzpatrick suggests, however, that the revisionist argument is supported by strong pressures within "the industrial working class for more militant and radical policies."

My preliminary research into workers' responses to NEP suggests that workers were far less eager to abandon the moderate policies of the 1920s in favor of the Stalinist revolutionary upheaval than revisionists have suggested. While there is abundant evidence concerning worker discontent with wages, housing, managerial personnel, increased work norms, and trade-union bureaucratism and undemocratic methods, and the lack of trade-union attention to the needs of youth and women, I see little evidence in worker complaints of support for some sort of Stalinist solution, or any other revolutionary agenda for that matter.

The remainder of this report will examine the revisionist argument by analyzing the attack by the Komsomol on the trade unions in 1928, in particular how generational conflict
between the Komsomol and the trade unions contributed to undermining the clout of trade
unions, and thus their ability to prevent the Stalinist outcome to the Russian Revolution.
During 1928 the trade unions arguably were the most powerful obstacle facing Stalin and the
Stalinists.\textsuperscript{19} During the late 1920s, the trade-union organization, with its huge administrative
machine, was stronger, and more autonomous, than ever before. Tomsky, long a spokesman
for pragmatic domestic policies, was sure to be a formidable opponent to Stalin’s program
once Stalin decided to force industrialization. Two years earlier, in 1926, Tomsky and other
trade-union leaders, had been quick to oppose Trotsky’s program for rapid industrialization.
They foresaw that the Left’s earlier program, and now Stalin’s, of all-out industrialization,
with its attendant deemphasis on consumer goods production, necessarily entailed an end to the
years of gradual improvements in working-class wages and living standards, and that the tempo
of industrialization being contemplated would bring to an end the traditional role and status of
the trade unions by requiring the trade unions to play a new, far more coercive role in
enforcing labor discipline. Stalin recognized that through Trud, as well as the other daily,
weekly, and monthly publications issued by trade-union bodies on the national, provincial, and
regional levels, the trade unions had the ability to inform and mobilize its membership. For
these and other reasons, Stalin viewed Tomsky and the trade-union leadership as a particularly
important target.

But it was the Komsomol, not Stalin or his leading supporters, who led the public attack
on the trade unions during 1928, and the issues involved seemingly had little to do with the
trade union’s opposition to forced industrialization. Moreover, the Komsomol’s attack seemed
to be spontaneous, reflecting the concerns of its rank and file. (The Komsomol age group was
fourteen through twenty two.)\textsuperscript{20} These concerns, and the interest group politics involved in
the Komsomol-trade union conflict, were greatly aggravated by generational tensions between
the Komsomol and the middle-aged, male, urban, former skilled workers who led the trade
unions. (Their average age was 42 in 1928. At 48 years-old Tomsky was one of the oldest
trade unionists.)

It is clear, however, that Stalin encouraged the Komsomol-trade union conflict. But the
extent to which Stalin orchestrated the Komsomol attacks on the trade-union leadership, or
simply tapped Komsomol discontents, needs to be examined. One reason this question is
problematic is that Komsomol criticism of the trade unions was nothing new. It had been going
on for a number of years before 1928, for reasons I will turn to shortly. But at the same time
there is no denying that it assumed an especially nasty, sharp character in 1928. From the
spring through the winter Komsomoltsy and top trade unionists heatedly traded charges and
counter-charges over specific Komsomol grievances related to the accusation of trade-union
"bureaucraticism" and insufficient "self-criticism." The trade unions denounced the Komsomol’s criticisms as "scandalous rubbish."

This bitter feud in 1928 was emboldened, if nothing more, by Stalin’s closing address to the Eighth Komsomol Congress, which met in May of that year. This was about the time when the so-called Right opposition was beginning to form. At the Komsomol Congress, whose speakers repeatedly requested closer Party guidance, Stalin’s speech called for ruthless, mass criticism "from below" on "bureaucraticism." Stalin identified the trade unions, along with the party and the Komsomol, as an organ in which this evil of "bureaucraticism" was widespread. He then indicated party support if the Komsomol and its newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda heeded his advice and intensified their attacks on the trade-union leadership. To laughter and applause, Stalin stated that "We sometimes have to trample on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy....For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present mistakes and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing." Then, less than a fortnight later, while stating that "the strength of our revolution lies in the fact that there is no division between the our old and new generations of revolutionaries" Stalin hailed Komsomolskaia Pravda as "a warning bell that arouses the slumbering, encourages the weary, drives on stragglers, and scourges the bureaucratism of our institutions."

But it is important to note that following the Komsomol Congress and letter to the Komsomol paper in May, Stalin does not appear to have played a significant role in the Komsomol campaign against the Trade Unions. In fact, on June 26, Stalin, while praising Komsomolskaia Pravda, accused it of criticizing "for criticism’s sake, turning criticism into a sport, into sensation-mongering." Stalin went on to characterize Komsomolskaia Pravda’s recent attacks on the trade-union leaders Tomsky, Aleksandr Dogadov, and Grigory Mel’nichansky as "a whole series of impermissible caricatures." On November 29, as the struggle behind the scenes intensified, the Politburo removed the editor of Komsomolskaia Pravda for his refusal to cease his attacks on the trade-union leadership.

The struggle between the Komsomol and the trade unions came to a head at the Eighth Trade Union Congress, which opened on December 11 in an atmosphere of extreme tension. But during the first sessions everything seemed quite routine and harmonious. The trade unionists had reason to think that their fears might be unjustified. After all, only forty-five of the fifteen hundred delegates at the congress were Komsomol members. Moreover, the number of Stalinists in the Central Trade Union Council and its Presidium was small. Tomsky, who in October was declared a "faithful disciple of Lenin" at a plenary session of the VTsSPS, still...
enjoyed enthusiastic support among the delegates. His opening report to the congress was repeatedly interrupted with clapping and was followed by a standing ovation.

On the congress's third day, however, the congress turned abruptly belligerent, following the publication of an article in the now Stalinist Pravda, which denounced the trade unions for their "bureaucratic ossification." Trade-union delegates fired back on the plenary floor. "Only a fool or lunatic could believe this rubbish. Scribblers use self-criticism in order to slander the trade unions. We are against such self-criticism." The critics from the Komsomol were not to be deterred. Two Komsomol delegates used the guise of "criticism and self-criticism" to acidly accused the trade-union leaders of ignoring the views of the Komsomol and the interests of the young.

In his harsh and uncompromising speeches, I. P. Zhdanov, a Komsomol specialist on labor and education, voiced the Komsomol Central Committee's long list of complaints and demands. He protested against the continuous rise in juvenile unemployment and the failure to enforce the so-called ironclad minimum (bronia), which promised that a minimum percentage of jobs were to be reserved for young people. The minimum was supposed to be on average seven percent. The Komsomol leader was also angered by the failure of the trade unions to demand that management enforce the law restricting the length of young workers' workday, and the failure to equalize the wages of youth and adult workers. Zhdanov demanded that the trade unions send more young workers to trade-union sanatoria, rest homes, and summer dachas. Labor training and worker educational opportunities were also key issues. Zhdanov asserted that trade unions largely confined enrollment in the factory schools to the children of skilled workers, and protested the failure of the trade unions to provide more and higher student stipends to juveniles enrolled in technical and apprenticeship schools, rabfaks and universities. He also demanded that the trade unions share their funds more generously. But while these and other issues, such as concerns over health protection and working conditions, were raised and debated in some detail, much of the Komsomol leaders' anger stemmed from what they considered the inadequate Komsomol representation within the trade unions, and the trade unions' unwillingness to grant Komsomol members important positions within the trade-union bureaucracy. Zhdanov's colleague, L. I. Mil'chakov, was equally blunt and aggressive when he was given the opportunity to voice his criticisms of the trade-union leadership.

As was noted above, these criticisms voiced by the Komsomol had a long history. They far precede the power struggle between Stalin and the so-called Rightists during 1928. The dispute between the Central Committee of the Komsomol and the Central Council of the Trade Unions dates back to early in NEP, and the controversies had been extensively aired at earlier congresses and conferences, as well as in their respective newspapers.
For the Komsomol rank and file at the root of their discontent was the large number of worker youths under age eighteen who were unable to find jobs during NEP. But while over half of the country’s juveniles were said to be unemployed during NEP, as I discussed above the trade unions had reason to assert that the employment picture was not as bleak as the Komsomol argued. NEP did succeed in producing dramatic, continual increases in the number of employed workers. In the view of the trade unionists the problem was not that young people were not finding jobs, but rather that the continual influx of young, unskilled and inexperienced peasant jobseekers into urban areas made a high rate of youth unemployment unavoidable. Whatever the merits of this perspective, there was a sense, even among trade unionists, that Tomsky and the top leadership failed to devote sufficient attention to the youth unemployment crisis. In his reports to party and trade union congresses Tomsky referred only cursorily to juvenile unemployment. This at least partly reflected the generational conflict. The trade-union leadership, sharing the sentiments of adult workers, was irritated by the special privileges covering young workers, which the Komsomol demanded the trade unions enforce.

By law employed juveniles could work for only six hours. The assumption was that the young workers would devote the extra two hours to studying in the factory school, but as Tomsky pointed out, if a manager had a choice between an inexperienced and unskilled juvenile and a comparable older worker whose working day was two hours longer, could he be blamed for choosing the older worker? In addition, according to the law, juveniles working only six hours were to be paid the full eight-hour rate. The resentment this provoked among adult workers, as well as management, was aggravated when industrial enterprises were instructed to switch to the seven-hour day in 1928, and the Komsomol demanded that youths correspondingly be required to work only five hours. Given these special conditions for young workers, and the large number of unemployed adult workers, the trade unions were most interested in placing the children of their own members, especially the children of skilled workers, which Tomsky bluntly conceded. "From the point of view of an adult worker, a young worker is a son of an adult worker." And as evidence of rank-and-file worker irritation with special privileges for young workers, in archival sources adult workers often complain to the trade unions that members of the Komsomol, as well as Party members, were given preference in hiring, even when they lacked any skills.

But at the congress, on these employment issues the attitude of the trade unionists to specific Komsomol demands went largely unsaid. What was clear, however, was the trade unionists' opposition to the Komsomol demand that the employment problems of the young become their top priority. Tomsky declared sarcastically, "We are a class organization... If we
put in first place serving the young, and in second place serving women, who will defend adult
workers, the poor old devils."  34 After the laughter subsided, Tomsky further belittled the
Komsomol complaints by stating that as an organization of the whole working class the trade
unions represent all workers regardless of their age, gender, "or even the color of their
hair."  35 Likewise Tomsky responded to the Komsomol's demand that sick youths be
transferred from heavy to light work, by asking what reason was there to give priority to sick
youths. Women and the rest of the workforce were just as adversely affected by living and
working conditions. The "good times" had not yet come.  36 But while Tomsky argued that the
conflict with the Komsomol stemmed from the trade unionists attempt to serve all workers,
there clearly was merit to the Komsomol complaint that the trade union's primary concern was
to look out for the interests of skilled, adult workers. Tomsky's formative experiences before
the revolution, like those of most of his fellow members on the Trade Union's Central
Council, was as a skilled worker, and he shared his fellow trade-union functionaries' disdain
for the mass of young, unskilled workers, especially those illiterates fresh from the
countryside.  37 Rank-and-file older workers shared such attitudes. Younger workers disruptive,
hooliganistic behavior at worker clubs, and their absenteeism and general lack of discipline on
the factory floor, angered older workers.  38

Where Tomsky and the trade-union leaders appeared conciliatory was to Komsomol
criticisms about trade-union bureaucratism. Although the trade unions had reason to argue that
an organization that included eleven million members, with an annual budget of one million
rubles, had to be administered by a large bureaucracy, there was no denying that trade-union
elections and factory trade-union meetings commonly had a "formal" character.  39 Bristling at
the suggestion from these "outsiders" that he and his associates were not concerned, but forced
by the Komsomol attacks to engage in self-criticism, Tomsky agreed that much more needed to
be done to make the trade-union activists at the factory level work harder to rectify workers'
justified grievances, to make factory committee elections truly democratic, and to make trade-
union officials more responsible to their members. Trade-union officials frankly admitted that
lower-level officials often inhibited criticism at production meetings by dismissing their critics as
"grumblers" and "windbags. "  40

But there seems little reason to think that in 1928 the trade unions feared, or even saw
evidence of any "mounting class war" from young or any other workers.  41 A far greater
concern, if I may digress for just a moment, was the need to fight worker apathy, or "anti-
Soviet" sentiments, which suggests that support for radically increasing the tempo of
industrialization has been exaggerated. In 1928, as earlier, those who spoke out among the
rank-and-file workers, including the militants who had led strikes, endlessly complained about
the various attempts to make them work harder. While there was lots of discontent with "bourgeois" specialists and their other bosses, which I don’t think is evidence of support for a radical change in policy, previously secret reports on what was voiced at production meetings emphasize that the sort of democracy many workers stated they wanted was, to cite some common complaints, information about strikes at other enterprises, or giving Mensheviks and Trotskyists permission to speak at production meetings.42

On issues other than youth unemployment and trade-union democracy the generational conflict was at the fore. After making the requisite statements that they had made some mistakes, Tomsky and others not only defended the status quo, they indignantly struck back at the Komsomol, seemingly unconcerned about the political wisdom of such a tactic. Tomsky stated he had tried to be patient, that the trade-union leaders had refrained from responding to all the untruths published in Komsomolskaia Pravda during the recent months, in the hope that this would all blow over. Tomsky, who from a young age had to fend for himself on the working-class streets of St. Petersburg stated, "We did not speak out because we know that when a fight takes place, it is impossible to be courteous; a fight is a fight, shirts are torn to shreds and hair is ripped out."43 Tomsky angrily made it clear he viewed the young as ungrateful, "undignified whiners." When these young critics had just been kids in the provinces "adult workers carried out the revolution, knowing that they would not live to see developed communism... We fought for the young...but now we are accused of not paying attention to the needs of youth."44 The problem, in Tomsky’s view, was that the young only saw present problems; they failed to appreciate what had been achieved because they did not know firsthand what it had been like back in tsarist Russia. "As a result they raise demands that are impossible for us to satisfy at the present time, demands that will be quite legitimate in five years."45

But however legitimate such resentments were, Tomsky was without question condescending in his dismissal of most of the long litany of Komsomol complaints. On financial matters Tomsky portrayed the Komsomoltsy as ungrateful profligates incapable of properly handling their funds. Tomsky explicitly characterized Komsomol relations with the trade unions as that of a child to his father. "You complain when we criticize you for wasting workers’ hard-earned money and say we are tightfisted.... But if you want to receive money from your papa’s purse then you need to be careful with that money and you need to pay heed to your father’s advice."46

To the demand that youths be provided with holidays at sanitoria, rest homes, and summer dachas, and be provided with hot breakfasts and lunches in school. Tomsky stated that if someone makes such demands without indicating how they are to be paid for, they are
nothing but "chatterboxes." And even if it was feasible, Tomsky stated, "adult men and women would justifiably protest against the creation of a privileged strata within the working class." Proclaiming that he was not ashamed to admit that he was a conservative person, a careful person, Tomsky characterized the Komsomol demands as mindless. Their slogans were "beautiful, but empty." These and other gibes at the Komsomol met with the approval of the delegates who repeatedly interrupted Tomsky's speeches with laughter and applause.

On the issue of young workers' frustration with the lack of opportunity for "proletarian promotion" (vdyvizheniia), Tomsky refused to give any credence to the Komsomol complaints. After claiming that it hurt him to have to criticize the young, Tomsky justified not providing more responsible administrative positions to Komsomolsy by castigating the performance of the representatives the Komsomol had sent in the past to work as functionaries within trade-union organizations. He stated that they did not even pretend to apply themselves: that after self-importantly appearing for work, with their briefcases in hand, they quickly vanished, commonly failing to attend important meetings. Tomsky was clearly annoyed by what he viewed as their belief that they should be given important positions just because they were young. Another delegate indignantly declared that while these young people may play first violin within the Komsomol, they needed to prove themselves to the trade unionists.

Following up on this point, Tomsky stated that he would never, so long as he lived, flatter the young. Tomsky told Zhdanov he was a "capable but superficial man" who was wasting his talents. And after stating that criticism is a good thing, that it would be stupid to assert that the trade unions worked mistake free, he went on to declare that "one response to Komsomol criticism might be that the only ones who do not make mistakes are those who do not work [laughter]... or newspaper columnists [laughter]." In short, regarding complaints about the Komsomol's lack of representation within the trade unions, Tomsky argued that the Komsomol needed to prove themselves within the trade-union organization before they could become delegates.

There is not the place to discuss other areas of contention, but it should be clear that generational conflict aggravated Trade Union-Komsomol relations; that the trade-union leadership failed to take the Komsomol seriously. While giving lip service to the value of Komsomol criticism, Tomsky stated that criticism from the masses themselves was far more valuable. He suggested that criticism from the Komsomol was often just a game and that he was sick and tired of being subjected to what he characterized as heavy artillery fire.

If Tomsky thought his haughty, dismissive attitude toward the Komsomol would put them in their place, he was badly mistaken. The Komsomol representatives were outraged at the patronizing manner in which Tomsky dismissed their grievances. Mil'chakov bristled, "It is
wrong to make fun of the Komsomol... We are not chatterboxes... We are not little children." When Zhdanov strode up to the podium for the final time, he was more militant than ever. He stated that rather than being mocked, the two million members of the Komsomol had a right to expect a serious response to the issues they raised. Zhdanov proceeded, in a slightly veiled, but carefully prepared statement, to call for Tomsky's removal from the trade-union leadership. He proposed that we don't need as leader of the trade unions a person "who cannot recognize the full depth of our principled arguments with the trade unions on labor issues and can not understand the principles on which our joint work is based." This was the first time anyone had publicly called for Tomsky's removal.

At the Trade Union Congress, as elsewhere, the Komsomol spearheaded the attack on defenders of NEP. Their attacks highlight the rivalries that marked relations between the various state agencies and social groups during NEP. That the Komsomol was encouraged by Stalin does not belie the animosity that existed between the Komsomol and the Trade Unions, an animosity that was greatly intensified by generational conflict. But on Tomsky's own turf, the Komsomol attacks appeared to have had little affect in weakening Tomsky's support. The overwhelming majority of delegates at the trade-union congress shared Tomsky's disdain for the Komsomol leaders as well as for the mass of young workers, both of whom were thought to lack a strong work ethic. They also opposed dismantling NEP.

But the Komsomol's attacks laid the foundation for intervention from above, which took place not on the floor of the congress, but during the dramatic showdown at the trade-union's party fraction meeting, which the Politburo convoked ten days after the congress. The trade unionists at the party fraction initially refused to bow to the will of the party Central Committee, which had decided by a narrow margin to instruct the trade unionists to place Lazarus Kaganovich and four other Stalinist party leaders on the Presidium of the Central Council of the Trade Unions. Viacheslav Molotov was then called in, and in the end, by demanding party discipline, he was able to overcome the vigorous resistance within the trade unions to Komsomol and Party attacks. In this light the subsequent purge of the trade unions that Kaganovich conducted obviously can not be construed as any sort of revolution from below. It was imposed from above. As Kaganovich put it, "It could be said that this was a violation of proletarian democracy, but, comrades, it has long been know that for us Bolsheviks democracy is no fetish."

The successes and failures of trade unions in the 1920s illuminate the dangers in Russia's current failure to improve the plight, and ease the anxieties, of its 80 million workers. Today, as under NEP, it is the losers -- including young urban males -- who threaten to reverse economic reforms. The economic decline that began in the late 1980s was one of the basic
reasons for the massive loss of confidence in Gorbachev and the whole reform process. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the economic crisis deepened, youth unemployment began to rise significantly. Rather than train young workers themselves, management finds it preferable to hire qualified workers laid off from other enterprises. For those who find jobs in industry wages are low. Gennadii Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky hope to capitalize on the discontent of working-class youths, with fictional visions of past egalitarianism, just as Stalin was able to capitalize on this discontent in 1928 to undermine the position of Tomsky and the other so-called Rightists. Tomsky's failure to devote sufficient attention to the unemployment crisis and the conditions of the least fortunate among the working class provided the wedge to undermine support for market reforms.

ENDNOTES

1. The threat worker discontent poses to continued market reform has been ignored by journalists and scholars, whose discussions concerning the marketization of the centrally planned economy devote little attention to labor issues.

2. Tomsky and his fellow full-time trade union officials -- who typically came from skilled worker background -- shared the general Bolshevik disdain for the mass of unskilled workers.

3. Sedmoi s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov, 6-18 dekabria 1926 g.: Plenumy i sektsii: Polny stenograficheski otchet (Moscow, 1927), pp. 122-5.

4. For example, a textile factory in Ul'ianovsk province noted in its trade-union report that a young, male worker stabbed a young, female worker and "emptied her guts....This is considered a common occurrence here" (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi federatsii [GARF], f. 5451, op. 42, d. 137, l. 85).

5. Unlike today, attempts to raise productivity during NEP were handicapped by the labor force's low level of education and literacy.

6. Sestoi s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov SSSR, 11-18 noiabria 1924 g.: Plenumy i sektsii: Polny stenograficheski otchet (Moscow, 1925), p. 115.

7. Well into the 1920s workers complained that basic repairs, such as fixing leaking roofs, went undone (Sedmoi s'ezd, p. 58).

8. Stenograficheskii otchet ptiatogo vserossiiskogo s'ezda professional'nykh soiuzov (Moscow, 1922) pp., 507-9.


11. Shestoi s'ezd, p. 103.
12. At the Eleventh Party Congress Tomsky and his cohorts in the trade union leadership were instructed not only to acquiesce to the monetary incentives, but to explain the specialists’ economic value to their members in order to forestall worker discontent over the managers’ and specialists’ high pay. But the Party’s plea had little impact.


14. XIV s*ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)18-31 dekabria 1925 g: Stenograficheski otchet (Moscow, 1926), p. 730.


18. Fitzpatrick, Cultural Front, p. 7


725. Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveishei istorii (RTsKhIDNI), f. 17, op. 3, d. 714, l. 7.

26. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 714, l. 7; Langsam, *Pressure Group Politics,* 264.

27. Pravda (December 12, 1928), p. 4.


29. In mid-1926, more than two-thirds of the country’s juveniles were jobless (Chase, Workers, Society, and the Soviet State, p. 150).

30. GARF, f. 5451, op. 42, d. 136, l. 105.

31. In addition to generational tensions, skilled workers’ condescension toward the “benighted,” “country bumpkins” fresh from the countryside was involved here (Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society between Revolution, 1918-1929 (Cambridge, 1992), p. 207).

33. GARF, f. 5451, op. 42, d. 159, l. 82.
34. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 49.
35. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 48.
36. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 50.
37. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 32.
40. Sed’moi s’ezd, p. 151
41. Chase, Workers, Society, and the State, p. 282
42. GARF, f. 5451, op. 42, d. 159, ll. 55-56.
43. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 189.
44. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 48.
45. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 29.
46. Vos’moi s’ezd, pp. 49-50.
47. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 50.
48. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 51.
49. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 192.
50. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 191.
51. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 182.
52. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 193.
53. Vos’moi s’ezd, p. 52.
55. Vos’moi s’ezd, pp. 110-11.
57. Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and Constructed (London, 1994), p. 188.