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ASYMMETRIES IN RUSSIAN FEDERAL BARGAINING

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal dynamics in Russia since 1991 have been characterized by extensive bargaining over jurisdictional prerogatives and by enduring asymmetries of power between Russian regions and ethnic republics.

Jurisdictional conflicts have not been limited to questions of subsidies and regional elections, but have ranged over a broad set of issues. These conflicts have been resolved differently for different territorial subjects, but until 1995 ethnic republics enjoyed a marked advantage. This persistent asymmetry is explained not by ethnic politics, but by the success of the ethnic republics in bargaining collectively with federal authorities. From this perspective, bilateral treaties signed with the republics can be seen as a federal tactic aimed at disrupting coordination among republican leaders. Recent "treaties" signed with oblasts and krais provide further evidence that the privileged position once occupied by ethnic republics is eroding. As a consequence, however, the constitutional basis of Russian federalism may be supplanted by a series of negotiated (and often secret) extra-constitutional agreements.

Introduction

What sort of state is Russia becoming: a loose confederation of regional units, a true federation, or a unitary state? Or, are asymmetries between the 57 predominantly Russian oblasts and krais and the 21 "ethnic homeland" republics producing a state in which "23 million Russian subjects will live in a federation and another 124 will live in a unitary state." It is too soon to provide any definitive answer to these question, but it is not too soon to begin the search for clues. This analysis will address two key phenomena: the persistence of asymmetries between oblasts/krais and republics and the recent reliance on bilateral treaties between Moscow and individual regions to resolve jurisdictional disputes. I will suggest that these outcomes can be best understood not as a consequence of evolving constitutional norms or of latent ethnic conflict, but rather as the product of ongoing political bargaining between federal and regional authorities. I will also suggest that the increasing reliance on bilateral treaties to regulate federal relations my be eroding the privileged status of the ethnic republics.

Some Definitional Issues

A federal state -- according to the definition developed by William Riker -- consists of two levels of government ruling the same land and people, each having at least one area of

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1This is the second of three reports from an ongoing research project analyzing and tracing changes in Russian federalism (center/periphery relations), from which additional reports are anticipated through June 30, 1967. [NCSEER Note]

2Ilya Glezer, Moscow News no. 7, 1992
action in which it is guaranteed autonomy. My focus in this analysis is on the "areas of action" in which levels of government are "guaranteed autonomy." In contemporary Russia, these political and administrative aspects of federalism have been at the heart of the struggle over state structure since the collapse of Communism.

This focus is particularly germane to the Russian case because 1) Guarantees of jurisdictional autonomy are the critical factors in contemporary theories linking federalism to economic growth and ethnic peace; and 2) Jurisdictional issues have been at the heart of most bilateral negotiations between Moscow and the federation subjects.

Since 1992, other republics and regions have pressed for the following powers:3

- control over appointments of sub-national officials (especially in the judiciary, internal affairs ministry, procuracy, and media branches)
- control over holding elections for sub-national legislative and executive organs (including the scheduling of gubernatorial elections and the re-election or extension of terms of regional legislators)
- control over the disbursement of federal funds earmarked for regional enterprises and organizations (under the fiscal mechanism in effect prior to 1996, these funds were sent to Moscow and distributed through the central budget to specific ministries, which then authorized payment of regional obligations; several regions have been granted the right to retain those funds within the region and transfer them directly to federal programs owed money)
- limits on inter-regional trade, especially to preserve regional price controls
- unilateral determination of tax rates, especially the federal-regional division of the value-added tax (NDS)
- establishment of territorial "citizenship,"
- nullification of federal legislation
- control the stationing of conscripts drafted from specific territory (particularly the use of conscripts in Chechnya)
- regional rather than federal determination of utility rates, particularly for electrical power

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3This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. It is condensed from reports in the Russian media and from a survey of political observers in nineteen regions conducted jointly by the author and the Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies (IGPI) in Moscow.
control over corporatization and privatization of state-owned enterprises and other state property

- licensing and regulation of banking activities on regional territory

- control over municipal policy

- control over land privatization and regional exemptions to the federal Land Code

- the right to pass regional Criminal Codes distinct from federal criminal legislation

Just as the salience of these issues varies from region to region, so too does the relative role assigned to federal and regional authorities. Thus, the degree of jurisdictional authority varies not only by issue area, but also across the federation even in the same issue area. To assess the degree of asymmetry within the Russian federation, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether there are consistent patterns to this variance, either geographically or over time.

Persistent Trends in Russian Federal Relations

An examination of jurisdictional negotiations over the past four years suggests two strong trends: a) the 21 ethnic republics have received preferential treatment to the remaining 68 "subjects" of the federation, and b) some federation subjects, by signing bilateral treaties with the center, have become "more equal" than others.

Preferential treatment for republics is manifest in several ways. As Table 2 (page 13) suggests, republics have been far more likely than oblasts or krais to be subsidized by the center and to retain a greater share of their own taxes. The vast majority of government decrees granting economic benefits to specific territories concern republics and not oblasts or krais. (In 1992-93, Presidential decrees (ukazy) and government resolutions (postanovleniya) had been published for 18 of the 20 autonomous republics (excluding Chechnya) but only 14 of the 58 oblasts and krais.)

The 1993 Constitution — despite declaring all subjects to be equal — grants the republics the right to pass their own constitutions (and, therefore, to elect their own presidents, rather than have governors appointed by Moscow). The Constitution also fails to explicitly nullify the even more asymmetrical 1992 Federation Treaties. In addition, governors of the majority of
Russian oblasts and krais continue to serve at the pleasure of the President. In 1996 alone, at least six governors have been summarily dismissed by Yeltsin.4

Governors of oblasts and krais have repeatedly called for an equalization of this two-tier structure, but to no avail. During the summer of 1993, as constitutional drafts were being circulated, the governor of Perm complained about the ethnic republics' "unjustified advantages and privileges" and declared "ideally our aim is ...exactly the same status the republics have." The Speaker of the Cheliabinsk soviet agreed that "the important thing is for us to get rid of discrimination."5 A year later, another proposal to reconstitute the federation into 14 economic zones was motivated by the observation that "administrative-territorial divisions are in an unequal position with respect to the other members of the Federation" despite the fact that "the majority of Russia's population lives in the krais and oblasts."6

Beginning in February 1994, Moscow's practice of signing bilateral "power-sharing" treaties with some republics deepened the perceived inequality between republics and oblasts/krais. While Tatarstan's treaty offered the republic few privileges not already in the federal constitution, the prestige of the treaty itself prompted other republics (and oblasts) to demand their own "special" treatment. (The chief concessions made to the "state" of Tatarstan involved limited control over natural resources, creation of a National Bank, greater independence in foreign economic activity and in conversion of defense industry.)

The treaty with Bashkortostan made greater concessions to the republic, both symbolic and substantive. That treaty explicitly reaffirmed the discarded Federation Treaty of 1992 (including the special annex that was a condition of Bashkortostan's signature), affirmed the "independence" of the republic, and gave the republic control over its own budget, judiciary, and prosecutor.

These and subsequent treaties were accompanied by collections of "agreements" (soglasheniia) between federal and regional ministerial organs; as a rule, these documents have not been published. These agreements often conferred material and jurisdictional advantages and benefits well beyond the more symbolic and political concessions contained in the higher-level treaty. The Tatarstan treaty, for instance, was accompanied by at least twelve such agreements, addressing such areas as inter-budgetary relations, customs, higher education, and

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4The governors involved were from Vologda, Kaluga, Chita, Ivanovo, Saratov, and Arkhangelsk. See R. Turovskii, "Boris Yeltsin's Urals Base," Moskovskiaia pravda, 28 February 1996, p.12.
5Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 July 1993.
6Trud, 5 May 1994; the idea resurfaced in the 1995 election campaign.
division of state property. Bashkortostan signed at least eleven such agreements, Sakha fourteen, and Komi eight.

In many cases, these agreements suggest the particular jurisdictional areas most at issue in center-periphery power struggles. Only Tatarstan, for instance, received agreements on "military affairs" and on "banking, credit, and hard currency policies." Tatarstan did not sign an agreement on the "agro-industrial complex," but Bashkortostan did (as did Sakha, Udmurtia, and Komi and several oblasts). Sakha signed a series of agreements on transport and communication, as well as on migration, employment and of course mining. North Ossetia signed an agreement on tourism and sanatoria (as did Krasnodar krai). Buriatia signed a special agreement on Lake Baikal.

Until January 1996, only republics were offered bilateral treaties. This bias aroused the resentment of many oblast leaders, and prompted complaints about excessive deference to ethnic claims for autonomy. However, while republics' elevated status derived initially from their Soviet-era designation as ethnic "homelands," it is important to note that most are not minority enclaves, and nationalism-based claims have been muted. On the contrary, as Table 1 (page 12) indicates, Russians constitute a majority in 9 of the 20 initial ethnic republics; the titular minority group represents an absolute majority of the population in just six of them. Significantly, treaties have not been signed with the most "ethnic" of the republics. In fact, there is no obvious correlation between ethnic composition and the conclusion of bilateral treaties.

Beginning in December 1995, however, Moscow has begun offering treaties to oblasts and krais. A treaty with Orenburg oblast was announced by Viktor Chernomyrdin on the eve of the December Duma elections, and may help account for the strong showing of Chernomyrdin's party in the oblast. In January, a treaty with Sverdlovsk was signed by Yeltsin amid great fanfare; the conclusion of a bilateral treaty with Moscow had been a key campaign promise of Sverdlovsk’s charismatic governor Eduard Rossel. At this writing, at least a half-dozen treaties appear likely to be signed before June's Presidential elections, including ones with Nizhnii Novgorod, Omsk, Primorskii krai and Novosibirsk.

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3Data in these paragraphs is taken from an analysis by V. N. Lysenko prepared for the Russian State Duma hearing on a draft federal law "On Principles of the delegation of responsibilities and powers between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation," May 1996. Unfortunately, since the agreements remain unpublished, it is difficult to determine whether the analysis is comprehensive.

8"Nash Dom Rossiia" received 12.3% of the votes cast in Orenburg, contrasted with 10.13% nationally.
We are thus presented with a paradox. Even the most cursory investigation into federal dynamics reveals the importance of the asymmetries between the treatment of ethnic republics and that of the Russian oblasts and krais. The state seems more federal for the former, and more unitary for the latter. Yet, despite the fact that non-Russian minorities are responsible for the very creation of ethnic republics, ethnic concentration seems to have played little role in deciding which republics have received the most preferential treatment. And despite jealously guarding their privileged status for five years, republics seem to have done little to block the extension of bilateral treaty negotiations with oblasts and krais.

How can we begin to understand these developments? If ethnic factors seem marginal, then why have the republics deserved their special treatment? And why did Moscow begin signing special treaties that undermine the constitutional order and suggest preferential treatment for some regions independent of their constitutional status?

Federal Bargaining

In the state-building phase of any system containing regional and national levels of government, we can portray the center-periphery struggle as an ongoing bargaining game over the ultimate distribution of powers in the future state. In the post-Soviet Russian case, the actors are the federal authorities in Moscow and regional authorities in the 89 "subjects" of the Russian Federation.

Russian constitutional development from 1990-94 offers some justification for portraying post-Soviet constitutional politics as a set of simultaneous ongoing negotiations between center and periphery over jurisdictional and distributional issues. During the 1992 Federation Treaty negotiations, and again during the 1993 constitution-drafting process, Russian regions (at least some of them) apparently had the power to prevent either the abolition or the deepening of the distinction between oblasts/krais and republics.

The leverage of the regions and republics has not been limited to their influence over the abortive constitution-drafting process. During 1992 and again in 1993, up to 30 subjects of the federation withheld their contributions to the federal budget and demanded special tax regimes or new federal subsidies. Partly as a consequence of these actions, and partly as a result of deliberate devolution of social policies to the provincial level, the percentage of overall government expenditures at the federal level dropped from 65% in 1992 to 35% in 1994. Using its remaining discretion over tax sharing levels, credit levers, and budgetary subventions, Moscow has tended to reward, rather than punish, those regions that were most
defiant during this period: this suggests a weak center seeking to co-opt opponents, even at the expense of its allies among regional politicians.

Furthermore, the massive privatization program begun in 1992 was largely conducted at the provincial level, with State Property Funds in each republic or region determining the terms of regional privatization. Control over the levers of privatization put massive resources under the direct control of regional leaders, and variation among the regions was significant. Finally, Yeltsin’s initial pursuit of a Federation Treaty in 1992 and convening of a Constitutional Assembly in 1993 essentially stipulated the indispensability of regional consent for the implementation of any constitutional plan.

Despite this catalogue of provincial bargaining assets, however, Moscow was hardly at the mercy of its provinces. Since the Soviet state had been highly centralized, most administrative, communication, transportation and information networks flowed to and from Moscow; any talk of regional autarky was mostly fancy. More important, Yeltsin claimed and exercised the right to appoint and dismiss the governors of the oblasts and krais, though not the presidents of the republics. In the wake of the October 1993 presidential coup, Yeltsin ordered all provincial legislatures disbanded until new elections could be held and suspended plans to hold gubernatorial elections; he did not, however, take any systematic action against governors who had failed to support him.

It is not immediately obvious, therefore, that either Moscow or her provinces held the decisive hand in the ongoing bargaining process. Instead, outcomes of this bargaining game were highly sensitive to the particular strategies employed at the federal and regional levels.

In any set of parallel negotiations actors bargaining with a common central authority can realize potential gains from bargaining collectively. In the case of federal bargaining, a block of territories that is able to act together can make a far a more credible threat of disrupting state affairs than any single territory acting alone; at the same time, agreement with a block of territories will strengthen the center in future negotiations with unaffiliated regions.

Collective action is difficult to achieve, however, especially among territories with different economic and social bases. Ideally, a bargaining block should be large enough to exact concessions from the center, yet small enough to discourage free riding. Ultimately, the viability of any bargaining coalition will depend upon whether sub-national actors distrust each other less than they each distrust the center. The presence or absence of effective inter-regional coordination mechanisms will be an important factor affecting the degree of inter-regional trust, and hence collective action.
Naturally, the center will not watch passively as sub-national collective action emerges or dissolves. Under some circumstances, federal authorities may prefer dealing with a few large blocks rather than a diverse set of unruly territories. However, since stronger regions imply a weaker center in this bargaining model, federal authorities are more likely to seek to limit regional coordination. For instance, they may offer the more powerful regions special deals in order to lure them away from emerging regional coalitions. To forge a stronger Union, in other words, actors in the center may try to act as union-busters.

**Republics' Defense of Asymmetries and Moscow's Response**

Collective action at the sub-national level has been substantial in Russia, but asymmetrical. To be more precise, Russia's 20 ethnic republics (excepting Chechnya) maintained a de facto coalition for almost five years that worked to preserve their privileges. The Russian oblasts and krais were unable to either strip the republics of their special status or unite to effectively bargain for comparable privileges for themselves.

The success of the Russian republics points to an interesting role for the "ethnic factor" in the Russian federation. In more conventional settings, ethnic organization can serve as a means to facilitate collective action. Ethnicity offers a mechanism for coordinating activity in pursuit of distributional benefits, while facilitating the selective exclusion of benefits from non-group members. From this perspective, ethnicity serves too conveniently to divide one group from another; for this reason, ethno-federal systems are held to be dangerously unstable.

In the Russian federal bargaining game, however, the leaders of the ethnic republics have focused on preserving the republics as a privileged class of subnational actors. While this distinction has been justified by reference to claims of cultural autonomy, its force has derived from the united front presented by all 20 republics, resource-rich and resource-poor. Ethnic claims, in other words, serve as a coordinating mechanism across different ethnic republics, distinguishing them from the Russian regions. Any proposal to eliminate the distinction between regions and republics was recognized immediately by each of the republics as a direct threat to its own interests.

Early in the constitution-drafting process, Moscow officials attempted to eliminate the emerging asymmetries in the federation by reorganizing the republics and oblasts into equal

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"zemli" (lands - patterned on the German länder) having equal status in the federation. The proposal failed to attract the expected support of the Russian oblasts, however, since it called for a nation-wide redrawing of the map that would have unseated regional and republican elites alike. Deprived of the support of the Russian regions, the proposal was subjected to furious attack by the ethnic republics. The republics - led by gold and diamond-rich Sakha, and oil-rich Tatarstan - threatened to leave the federation if the proposal was not dropped. The Congress of People’s Deputies refused to even consider the plan. Its author, Oleg Rumiantsev, later observed that the word "zemli" acted as a "red flag to the autonomies [republics]."

In response to complaints from the oblasts and krais about the privileges enjoyed by the republics, republic leaders perpetually cite the "special concerns" of the ethnic homelands. Typical is the justification offered by Muraza Rakhimov, President of Bashkortostan, for his bilateral treaty with Moscow:

"I feel that if we actually want to have a truly federative state, Russia must sign bilateral treaties with all the republics forming the Federation. Because it is not the krais and oblasts that form the Federation. The federation is made up of all the republics.... There are those among us who want to make the republics, oblasts ad krais completely equal politically. That cannot be allowed. Economically they must all be identical....But there are questions that arise, for instance, in Bashkiria and Tatarstan, that do not arise in the oblasts. In Sverdlovsk oblast, for example, the nationality question does not arise."12

The effectiveness, and limitations, of the coalition of republics was evident after the recent invasion of Chechnya. Opposition to the war was much more vocal from the ethnic republics than from the Russian regions. Citing opposition to the war from Karelia, which lacks any Muslim population, one political geographer noted that "the factor of status is also important, not simply religious and ethnic kinship." Seizing the opportunity to revitalize their coalition, a meeting in Cheboksary of seven republic presidents called for the re-establishment of the "Council of Heads of the Republics," which had been abolished in the aftermath of the October 1993 presidential coup. Most dramatically, the President of

10Stoner-Weiss, pp.76-78. See also Teague, "Center-Periphery Relations," pp. 30-32.
11Cited by Teague, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 31.
13For a sampling of reactions, see, "Regions’ Heads Feel Threatened by Chechen War," CDSP v.47, n.3 (1995).
15The meeting of the "Cheboksary Seven" (Cheboksary is the capital of Chuvashtia) was reported in Segodniia, 6 January 1995. For an analysis of the Council of Heads of the Republics proposal, see Nezavisimaiia gazeta, 12 January 1995.
Chuvashia signed an unconstitutional decree permitting Chuvash soldiers to refuse duty in Chechnya.¹⁶

Opposition to the war was more muted, however, from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan - Muslim oil republics, like Chechnya, but signatories to their own bilateral deals with Moscow in the previous year.¹⁷ Though leaders of these republics attended the Cheboksary meeting, they have responded to the invasion not with threats but with offers to mediate. Given the parallels between their republics and Chechnya, the lack of a more forceful reply was surprising to many. Indeed, Nationalities Minister Nikolai Yegorov acknowledged that the Chechen invasion would have triggered a Civil War had it occurred three years earlier; he speculated that Chechen president Dudaev had failed to realize that the situation had changed radically.¹⁸

There are other signs that cooptation by treaty has been effective. Presidents of treaty-receiving republics were loyal supporters of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s political bloc Nash Dom Rossiia in its founding stages (though enthusiasm soon cooled on the part of all provincial politicians) and have been supportive of Yeltsin’s bid for re-election. More significantly, Yeltsin has now signed five deals with oblasts and krais, finally breaking the republics’ monopoly on formal deals. Elected governors are more likely to be in a position to sign bilateral treaties with the Kremlin than Kremlin-appointed governors; fourteen regions currently have governors elected since October 1993, and more gubernatorial elections are scheduled in 1996.

Thus, Moscow’s strategy in pursuing ad hoc regional treaties might be seen as serving a dual purpose. In addition to placating restive regions, the center may have also weakened the coordinating mechanism that had permitted the republics to act collectively since 1990. If Tatarstan or Sakha, for instance, derives its special benefits from its bilateral treaty rather than from its status as a republic, then perhaps it will be less likely to incur costs to defend the interests of other republics. If this perspective is accurate we are likely to see the Kremlin tailoring concessions or sanctions more precisely to individual regions and republics in 1996, without extending identical treatment to an entire set or even subset of territories.

¹⁶The decree in question, “On the Protection of Servicemen,” issued on 11 January, did not mention Chechnya directly, but rather addressed the use of Army in domestic conflicts. It was promptly nullified by a countervailing Presidential decree signed by Boris Yeltsin. There is no direct evidence that the decree had any practical effect on the deployment of conscripts in the Chechen conflict. The president of Chuvashia, Nikolai Fedorov, is a former Russian Minister of Justice.
¹⁸OMRI Daily Digest, 29 March 1995.
Such horse-trading over jurisdictional prerogatives are likely to further undermine the shaky legitimacy of the federal provisions of the 1993 Constitution, and make achieving consensus on constitutional revisions even more unlikely. The preceding analysis suggests that these ongoing bilateral negotiations may ultimately supersede any constitutional norms for power sharing in Russia, provided the center abides by the terms of its deals.\textsuperscript{19} If it does, however, Moscow’s next great challenge will be to avoid a competitive frenzy of deal-making that could prove difficult to choke off.

\textsuperscript{19}The June 1996 Presidential elections will test the robustness of these treaties. To date, all the individual leaders who signed these treaties -- at the federal and regional levels -- remain in office. Should the Presidential elections result in Yeltsin’s ouster, his successor may challenge the legitimacy of these ad hoc agreements. Some observers (e.g. Economist 23 March 1996) have suggested that the fear of losing treaty gains is likely to mobilize elites in privileged regions to support Yeltsin’s candidacy. While there is some evidence of this, the Center’s reliance on bilateral bargaining might also allow Yeltsin’s opponents to credibly offer even better deals in return for support.
Table 1: Russia's Ethnic Republics and Other Federation Subjects Signing Bilateral Treaties with the Center 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Pop. (,000)</th>
<th>% Russian</th>
<th>% Titular Nationality</th>
<th>Bilateral Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Republics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>80.2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen-Ingushetia</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chuvashia</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuva</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>1 Jul 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>23 Mar 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>3,642</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>15 Feb 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td></td>
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<td>47.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Karachai-Cherkessia</td>
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<td>40.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sakha</td>
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<td>50.3</td>
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<td>29 Jun 95</td>
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<td>Altai Repub</td>
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<td>60.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Udmurtia</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>17 Oct 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buriatia</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>11 Jul 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
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<td>57.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>20 Mar 96</td>
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<td>Adygea</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>68.0</td>
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<td>Bashkortostan</td>
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<td>39.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>3 Aug 94</td>
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<td>Khakassia</td>
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<td>79.5</td>
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<td>Karelia</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td><strong>Oblasts/Krais</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk obl.</td>
<td>4,707</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>12 Jan 96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad obl.</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>78.5</td>
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<td>12 Jan 96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orenburg Obl.</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>30 Jan 96**</td>
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<td>Krasnodar krai</td>
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<td>85.1</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>30 Jan 96</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,811</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>na.</td>
<td>24 Apr 96</td>
</tr>
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</table>

19 Source: Russian media reports. Population and Ethnicity figures are from the 1989 Soviet census.

* This represents an amalgam of "Dagestani peoples"

** The treaty with Orenburg was preceded by an intergovernmental agreement signed on the eve of the December 1995 Duma elections. The agreement was signed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, whose was born in Orenburg oblast and began his political career there.
Table 2: Regional Status and Fiscal Indicators, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set of Territories (N)</th>
<th>Federal Share of Regional Budget (1994, %)</th>
<th>Share of 1994 taxes retained by regions</th>
<th>Net Interbudgetary Flow to Moscow (1994, per cap.,000Rbl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation (89)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Republics (21)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Russian&quot; oblasts/krais (57)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiumen' Autonomous Okrugs (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Tiumen' Autonomous Okrugs (9)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-1221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lavrov, "Russian Budget Federalism: First Steps, First Results," Segodnia 7 June 1995. The table does not show figures for autonomous okrugs, sparsely populated ethnic "homelands" subordinate to oblasts and krais. Except for two okrugs in an oblast which are home to major extractive industries, the remainder of these okrugs are heavily subsidized by the center.