TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF INTOLERANCE:
THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

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TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ETHNIC INTOLERANCE: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

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SUMMARY

We seek to establish a new theory of ethnic/national intolerance based on an analysis of the relative density and spacial arrangement of groups with different ethnic/national identifications in the former Yugoslavia. This theory builds on insights and limitations of modernization theory and the ethnic competition model. It goes beyond these theories in specifying how minority enclaves can generate extremes of intolerance through the combination of fear/anxiety and latent power. The model is tested using 1989-90 survey data (N=13,442) from the former Yugoslavia, immediately prior to the country’s dissolution. The findings provide substantial support for what we refer to as an "enclave theory" of ethnic/national intolerance. Majority group members living in minority group enclaves are less tolerant than any other group. Minority group members are also more intolerant when living in enclaves than when dispersed among majority populations. This structural theory of ethnic/national intolerance based on population densities may prove particularly useful for analyzing ethnic relations and conflict in the former Soviet Union and other areas of Eastern Europe in the period of uncertainty and realignment following the end of the Cold War. It may also inform policies regarding the resettlement of refugees following ethnic/national conflicts.

The support this work provides for various aspects of modernization and ethnic competition theory, and the support it lends to our own enclave theory, cannot overshadow a similarly significant finding. Minorities are more tolerant than majorities. In only five of the 26 cases of minority populations in our analysis do minorities exhibit higher levels of intolerance than the dominant majority in the same republic: Muslims, Serbs and Albanians in Montenegro; Croats in Bosnia; and Albanians in Macedonia.

Perhaps even more importantly, the absolute level of tolerance is higher in more diverse republics and autonomous provinces. This was found earlier by Hodson, Sekulic and Massey.

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(1994), but was based on less detailed analysis than is presented here. What our less aggregated analysis of *opcina*-level data shows is that there is a combined effect of diversity of republic and minority/majority status structuring national tolerance. For example, Croats in Slovenia (a very homogenous republic) are predictably more tolerant than the majority Slovenes. They are less tolerant, however, than Croats in the more diverse Croatia. Muslims outside Bosnia are usually more tolerant than the dominant group of a republic, but within the more diverse republic of Bosnia itself Muslims are even more tolerant.

In enclaves of Bosnia, such as the Krajina and Sandzak, minorities who are local majorities, and so have more limited contact with others, exhibit strongly intolerant attitudes. There is support for our enclave theory as well in the finding that majority persons in minority-dominated *opcina*, what we have called 'major minorities', are highly intolerant as well, despite the large number of contacts they have with persons unlike themselves. Thus, diversity and the dispersion of minorities fosters greater tolerance, while both localized enclaves and homogeneity of republics foster intolerance.

The irony of our findings are that they recommend a course of action quite out of keeping with what many people would think reasonable and advisable. Persons who feel threatened will seek to live in areas where they feel safe. In the former Yugoslavia this will mean living among people who similarly identify themselves in national terms. As well, policy makers and those responsible for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord may hope that the hundreds of thousands of refugees could return home, but it is likely that they, too, will conclude that compensation and restitution of lost homes, farms and businesses can be achieved without all refugees returning to the locale from which they fled or were driven. As a consequence of the war, greater homogeneity along national lines will be accomplished, and enclaves will be more 'pure' than previous to the war. Our findings tell us that this is a formula for greater intolerance and may well sow the seeds for future conflict.
TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ETHNIC INTOLERANCE:
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INTRODUCTION

The shifting political landscape following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communist party hegemony in Eastern Europe and the Balkans has given rise to an upsurge of interest in ethnic conflict. In the vacuum of power created by these events, ethnic identities have become the main condition for political mobilization. The recrudescence of ethnic/national parties challenges social scientists who often dismissed ethnicity as an epiphenomenon of social class or a cultural artifact of a rapidly fading historical moment. Social science theories of the Cold War period usually focused either on economic development or class struggle to explain societal conflict. These approaches are poorly equipped to offer guidance, in the face of these new realities, to policy makers in their efforts to mediate among competing groups and to offer negotiated settlements in the place of fractional warfare.

Under the sway of Ernest Gellner’s seminal work on modernization and ethnicity, it has long been thought that ethnic conflicts are atavistic and destined to atrophy with the advancing forces of modernization (Nairn 1995). Conversely, the ethnic competition view suggests that ethnic group identities and the structuring of inter-ethnic competition are a normal part of the process of modernization. Modernization leads to rivalries and conflict between previously spatially or socially separate groups in direct economic or political competition. In some cases ethnicity and class overlap to create an ethnic stratification system that uses ethnicity as a reinforcement of class identification and loyalty. Neither of these perspectives, however, anticipated the extent to which world politics at the start of the Third Millennium would be dominated by ethnic/national identifications and loyalties. Nor does either sufficiently anticipate the structural factors that make ethnic/national loyalty the basis for conflict.

THE STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR INTOLERANCE

Gordon Allport’s (1958) seminal work on racial and ethnic prejudice began several decades of very fruitful research focusing on contact between potentially hostile groups as a major factor influencing levels of prejudice and discrimination. We begin with the very basic notion that the demographic, and specifically the spatial relationships between groups of differing identities is a significant factor in levels of ethnic and national tolerance. We spell out the model in general terms, then apply it to the former Yugoslavia.

The idea that current ethnic nationalism is a return to the past, that the “peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are resuming their ancient quarrels” (Dobbs 1991) is predicated on some notion of primordial ethnicity. Clifford Geertz’s original positing of primordial
sentiments and Joseph Gusfield's (1996) recent reiteration lose any nuanced meaning in the hands of most journalists and political pundits. The Western media typically attributes these conflicts to long-standing but politically suppressed ethnic hostilities. It is not surprising that, once armed conflict begins, many people develop feelings of fear, and in some cases hatred, toward other nationalities (Smith 1981). But it is not at all certain that ethnic hatred as a universal underlying sentiment among groups who are in some way different is the key operational factor in explaining the outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The undocumented nature of the assumption that these 'hatreds' were both widely held and a leading cause of current conflicts should encourage skepticism among social scientists. Arguments based on primordial sentiments typically are not subjected to empirical examination, especially regarding the possible social structural and demographic underpinnings of current animosities. Sociological theories of modernization, ethnic competition, and enclave status suggest the application of structural explanations for intolerance and ethnic antagonisms, without recourse to theories of primordialism (Deutsch 1961).

In this paper we offer the existence of ethnic enclaves and the relative density of, and relationship between, populations with different ethnic identities as a significant and unexplored phenomenon that can help to fill this lacuna. This is especially important in conditions of transition: when political arrangements and the distribution of power are uncertain; when people have the desire and hope to acquire more sovereignty over their affairs; and when external sources of support are uncertain.

Recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union suggest the need to look more closely at the densities of majority and minority populations in order to explain levels of intolerance and, in turn, bellicosity and conflict. At least three qualitatively different bases of intolerance can manifest themselves in these situations. Where a majority population holds clear numerical superiority and power commensurate with this, they often appear to have a confident intolerance of minority populations. Examples of such situations include Croatians in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia, and Russians in Russia.

Dispersed minority persons within such regions are generally apprehensive, even fearful, and often manifest quiescent intolerance. They hold relatively tolerant attitudes appropriate to those who are in no position to challenge the prevailing situation.

Intolerance is well recognized in regions with a large, concentrated minority population, what we refer to as minority enclaves. The combination of pride in numbers and potential, even incipient power, linked with numerical and often legal inferiority within the larger political unit, may lead to contesting intolerance. The mix of pride and resentment, potential injustice and latent anxiety finds examples among Croats in Serb-dominated areas of Bosnia and Chechens in Russia.
The past several decades of research in the social sciences has laid a firm foundation for a structural theory of ethnic/national tolerance. The contributions of modernization theory and ethnic competition theory first will be briefly reviewed, prior to introducing some new considerations about the nature of ethnic/national relations in enclave situations.

**Modernization and Ethnic Identification.** Modernization theories see industrialization and its increasingly complex division of labor, enhanced communication and transportation, urbanization, and rationalization of social institutions as leading to more universalistic principles and more cosmopolitan identities and allegiances (Schermerhorn 1970). This perspective, derived from the American functionalist tradition of the 1950s, was developed against the backdrop of Third World modernization and development in the 1960s and 1970s.

Modernization theory treats ethnic identification as pre-modern, provincial, traditional and particularistic. Its structural basis is the village; its structural support is the persistence of a cultural, political and economic way of life that reinforces ethnicity as part of a value system lending coherence and consensus to the community (Isaacs 1975; Seton-Watson 1977, Chapter 4).

In the course of modernization the village ceases to be the focal point of social life, while more inclusive cultural, political and economic systems come to dominate the social landscape. This vision is also consistent with the Marxist view that posits class as superseding ethnic relations in the process of industrialization. Where ethnic mobilization and ethnic nationalism occurs with development, it is a prelude to more inclusive class-based social stratification.

Traditional ethnic boundaries are more easily maintained when there is little contact between groups (Allport 1958; Belanger and Pinard 1991); the greatest intolerance is expected where there is the least contact between persons of different nationalities (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Increased national diversity and mixing results from industrial development, urbanism, and population migration. In modernization theory these are seen as important contributors to tolerance. The young, urban residents, those with greater occupational status and higher educational attainment should express the greatest tolerance. Persons involved in non-traditional organizations and associations should also be more tolerant, as should those most exposed to the wider world (e.g., consumers of the printed and electronic media). Strong religious and traditional values are seen as providing support for intolerance and nationalist political agendas (Hannan 1979, 255; Ragin 1979).

**Ethnic Competition.** The ethnic competition perspective emphasizes the elements of industrialization that foster and intensify ethnic identification and mobilization and encourage ethnic intolerance. As Hannan argues:

The primordial identity view suggests that ethnic distinctions will disappear as processes of modernization increase in scope and intensity. The reactive identity view suggests that this will not be the case as long as power and other institutional difference persist. (Hannan 1979, pp. 254-5)
The prediction that ethnic identification and mobilization will be intensified by modernization clearly differentiates the ethnic competition model from the modernization perspective. Far from being an aberration, ethnic conflict is seen in the competition model as stimulated by the process of industrialization. New institutions and social avenues emerge and diverse groups are thrown into conflict over scarce resources (Ahmad 1991; Barth 1969).

The ethnic competition perspective has spawned several notions about how increased ethnic competition takes place, highlighting both labor markets and political processes (Belanger and Pinard 1991). A variety of mechanisms are seen as facilitating the development of ethnic competition alongside modernization: racially split labor markets (Bonacich 1972), employment segregation (Bonacich and Modell 1980), the cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978), center-periphery conflicts (Hechter 1976), the replacement of local with more inclusive domains of control and sovereignty (Hannan 1979), and the expansion of state systems (Nagel 1986; Nielsen 1985). All of these developments hold the possibility that ethnic/nationalist competition for jobs, housing, and political power will intensify with modernization (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993).

The ethnic competition perspective suggests several more specific factors that may influence national tolerance. Olzak (1983, 358) specifies a rough equality of size among ethnic or national populations as important for fostering ethnic mobilization. Where there are multiple competing groups intolerance should be greater. It may be especially high among members of the dominant group because of the power base provided by numerical dominance (Barth 1969, 19; Belanger and Pinard 1991, 448; Korpi 1974; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993).

This proposition directly contradicts the 'contact hypothesis' of Allport (1958) which argues that tolerance will be fostered when different groups have contact under conditions of proximate equality and share interdependent goals—an argument that is at the core of the modernization perspective.

**Enclave Theory.** Although the history of the modern world is a history of population mixing, international contacts, cultural diversity, acculturation and assimilation, it is also a history of ethnic enclaves, ghettos, and practices of exclusion and segregation. Recognizing this as a potential source of intolerance and conflict is the starting point connecting enclaves and intolerance.

A theory of ethnic/national tolerance which includes a consideration of the enclave status of minority populations has the potential to extend the insights of modernization and ethnic competition theories. The central idea of enclave theory is that the demographic density of minority and majority populations is a crucial mediating factor in the emergence of attitudes and actions toward persons of other groups. We begin by identifying three major population densities, each with an associated outcome: numerical dominance, dispersion, and enclave status.
Numerical dominance of a majority group leads to a sense of confident power and mild feelings of intolerance towards other groups. A numerically dominant group may develop intolerance toward other groups as part of a legitimation for its aspirations of impending dominance (Brass 1985; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990).

Numerical inferiority of a dispersed minority group contributes to high levels of inter-ethnic contacts. It may facilitate a realistic appraisal of the other, but for the dispersed minority it may also lead to a sense of apprehension and reasoned acquiescence.

Anxious power such as that experienced by minority populations who hold numerical superiority in an enclave leads to the greatest feelings of intolerance and hostility based on the combination of fear and latent or stymied power. Instead of fear and latent power canceling each other out to arrive at a medium level of tolerance, fear and latent power reinforce one another, creating a situation of anxious power that generates harshly intolerant sentiments toward other groups. Analogous, exaggerated sentiments based on threatened power will be found also among majority group members who live in such minority enclaves.

NATIONAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN YUGOSLAVIA

Most of the people of the former Yugoslavia are ethnic Slavs, the major exception being ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. While writers in the West often refer to them as if they were members of different 'ethnic groups,' in fact most people have a common ancestry, speak the same language, and share in dress, food, and lifestyle a similar culture. There are religious differences to be sure, but there is little evidence that religious differences per se provide a sufficient basis for differing nationalist claims (Ramet 1984b; Denitch 1994). In addition to self-identified Albanians, there are non-Slavic peoples (e.g., Gypsies and Jews) and other national groups within what were the borders of Yugoslavia: Hungarians, Slovaks and Rumanians in the Vojvodine, as well as several thousand Turks, Italians, Poles, Russians, Germans, and Ukrainians throughout the country (Petrovic 1983).

The Communist Party rejected the idea of a distinctly Yugoslav nationality which would replace the historically formed nations of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (Sekulic, Massey and Hodson 1994). The idea that these nations were merely tribes and would provide the foundation of a new unified nationality was preeminent during the period of the first Yugoslav state: 1918-1941. During this period, however, such a vision was strongly discredited among non-Serbs, fearing it was a cover for the formation of Greater Serbia (Denitch 1994).

Hoping to avoid a repetition of the instability of the first Yugoslavia which was characterized by political conflict principally between Croats and Serbs, the Communist Party put its hopes on modernization. They reasoned that, in time, old national divisions and provincial animosities would wither. They had concrete historical evidence that any attempt to force
"Yugoslavism" would provoke even greater instability. Their formula for the transition period was federalism (Cohen and Warwick 1983), equal rights for all nations, and a vision that in the future, with the final victory of Communism and economic development, national affiliations would be eclipsed in importance (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey 1994).

The decennial census of Yugoslavia asked persons to identify themselves with a particular nationality or group of national origin. An elaborate official vocabulary was introduced to describe nationality. *Narod* meant Slav nations having only Yugoslavia as their mother state: Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins were such nations. *Narodnost* meant national minority: Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Italians, and others living in Yugoslavia but having some other 'mother state'. Gypsies were also included in this latter category. Commitment to the Yugoslav nation-state was identified through the concept of citizenship (*dravljanstvo*). Thus, Croats, Serbs, other nations, and other national minorities were all Yugoslav citizens having separate national identities or belonging to some minority nationality, but all had an ostensible commitment to the Yugoslav state. Persons who indicated that they were "Yugoslavs" were described as having no nationality. This reluctance to recognize a Yugoslav national identity on an equal footing with other national identifications was reflected in the fact that in the national census the Yugoslav national identification was subscripted with the explanation, "having no identifiable nationality."

The conventions followed by the census reflected the social consciousness of people in the former Yugoslavia. The vision of Yugoslavia is a "multinational" nation recognized foremost the historical experiences of groups of people who possessed distinct identities based only loosely on religious and other visible cultural manifestations, but who saw themselves as having unique historical experiences which distinguished them from one another (Banac 1984; Cohen 1982; Warwick and Cohen 1985).

In the 1981 national census, people identifying themselves as Serbs made up 36.3 percent of the nearly 23 million people in Yugoslavia. The majority (59.8 percent) lived in Serbia proper, 6.5 percent lived in Croatia, and 16.2 percent lived in autonomous provinces that came under Serbia's control in 1989: Vojvodina (13.6 percent) and Kosovo (2.6 percent). Of the 1.3 million Muslims in Yugoslavia, 81.5 percent lived in Bosnia. Another 7.6 percent lived in Serbia proper. Slovenes were heavily concentrated in Slovenia: 97.7 percent of Yugoslavia's 1.7 million Slovenes lived in Slovenia in 1981. Of 4.5 million Croats, nearly four out of five (78 percent) lived in Croatia, 17.1 percent lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 3.4 percent lived in Serbia. Among the 1.3 million Albanians, 70.9 percent lived in Kosovo and 21.8 percent lived in Macedonia. Concentrated similarly to Slovenes in Slovenia, 95.5 percent of all Macedonians (1.2 million total) lived in Macedonia.
The Vojvodine and Bosnia were the most nationally heterogenous regions of Yugoslavia, with no single nationality making up more than 54.4 percent (Serbs in the Vojvodine) and 39.5 percent (Moslems in Bosnia) of their populations, respectively. The most homogenous regions were Slovenia, with Slovenes constituting more than 90 percent of the population, and Serbia proper, where 85 percent of the population identified themselves as Serbs. Less dominated by one nationality was Kosovo, where 77.5 percent of the population was Albanian (though estimates are often given of 90 percent), Montenegro, with 68.5 percent of the population identifying itself as Montenegrin, Croatia, with three-fourths of the population being Croats, and Macedonia, with two-thirds of the population being Macedonian (Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije 1987, 449).

The analysis below focuses on the structural factors that contributed to different levels of tolerance and intolerance among the nationalities in the former Yugoslavia—many of which reflect the dramatic economic, social, and political transformations of socialist Yugoslavia in the post-World War II period. That people were willing and able to identify themselves in terms of nationality and the widespread belief that national intolerance was a significant factor precipitating the ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia make an understanding of these factors doubly important.

**HYPOTHESES ABOUT STRUCTURALLY DETERMINED INTOLERANCE**

While we recognize that majority-minority status is determined by a complex set of historical circumstances, these are frequently part of the vocabulary of motives used by groups to explain their sentiments rather than causal forces per se. The main principle guiding our hypotheses is that the level of tolerance is structurally influenced in predictable ways by the majority-minority status of the group in question. The numbers of persons, the size of the groups, and their relation—spatial and numerical—to the other groups is a principal determinant of groups’ level of ethnic/national tolerance.

Individuals identified as having specific ethnic, racial or national identities are often found in enclaves or nearly homogeneous communities of similarly identified individuals. In cities these may carry the suffix of 'town' (e.g., "Germantown") and in rural areas are towns or villages with distinctive names reflecting the language or dialect of the inhabitants. Such enclaves are often surrounded by people of another ethnicity, race or nationality. These surrounding areas, referred to here as contiguous areas, form a second population group, this one distinct from the first and nearly homogeneous in composition.

In some societies there is a further level of population that must be considered: the dominant ethnicity, race or nationality of the region within which the contiguous area is located. If a region is nearly homogeneous, save one or more areas containing a group identified as
being different in identity, and the areas themselves contain enclaves of the dominant identity, tolerance between these groups will be influenced by this arrangement.

This model can be expanded to include at least one more level, that of the dominant ethnicity, race or nationality within the nation as a whole, in which the region is located. It is even conceivable that an additional level, that of groups of nations or national blocks, could be added to these 'tiers of influence'. The important point is that spacial arrangements cannot be overlooked and may prove vital to any explanation of ethnic/national tolerance, especially in light of policies that seek to integrate or segregate populations in order to mitigate future hostility.

Our general theory can be stated in a series of hypotheses which can be tested with data from the former Yugoslavia. For brevity's sake, the term 'minority' will be used in lieu of 'persons whose racial, national or ethnic identity is different from that of the dominant population in a state or other meaningful geographical or political unit'. The term 'majority' will be applied to the numerically dominant group in the defining political unit. The dependent variable, 'strength of identity to a particular racial, national, or ethnic group,' implies feelings that racial, national, or ethnic identities are salient, e.g., that homogamous marriages are preferred or that political representation is best provided by one's racial, national, or ethnic group. We use the term 'tolerance' to denote values of this sentiment being low and intolerance to denote high values on this sentiment.

Gordon Allport provided an example of a level of analysis that is primarily demographic/spacial and hinges on contact between differently identified groups as critical to levels of knowledge, (dis)trust and (in)tolerance. Combining this insight of the contact hypothesis of Allport (1958) with aspects of the structuralist approach of Peter Blau (1977), modernization theory, ethnic competition theory of Hannan (1979) and Bonacich (1972), and our own enclave theory, we explain different levels of ethnic/national tolerance among groups living in different demographic situations in the former Yugoslavia republic of Bosnia. Our analysis expands the definition of who is minority and who is majority, allowing for two types of majorities: a global majority - for example, Croats in Croatia; and a minor majority - Serbs in Serbian-dominated regions of Croatia. Comparably, we designate two types of minorities: dispersed minorities - for example, Serbs in Croatia outside of Serbian-dominated regions; and major minorities, for example, Croats in Serbian-dominated regions of Croatia. Three other possibilities exist: 1) where members of the majority or 2) a minority live in a very nationally mixed locale or 3) where a group that nowhere has majority status (e.g. gypsies, Jews, Rumanians) lives in a mixed locale. Tolerance and intolerance are strongly affected by the position each group occupies relative to others.
Intolerance Determined by Contact/Non-contact. Dominant groups often bear culturally preserved prejudices (including intolerance) against minorities, and give exaggerated importance to markers (from eating customs and conversational habits to dialect and eye color) distinguishing themselves from others. The attitude toward those outside the dominant group can be positive, negative or some mixture of both. Based on the history of contacts and inevitable conflicts that occurred in the past, there is a general tendency for attitudes toward neighboring groups which are living in close proximity to be more negative than those toward more distant group. For example, Croats hold more negative attitudes (have more intolerance) toward Serbs than toward Americans or the Dutch. This line of reasoning is also developed and elaborated by Blau (1977:22):

If intergroup relations have these psychological consequences (extensive associations with persons who have different backgrounds and experience are likely to make people more tolerant) the theorems imply that structural conditions promote tolerance, widen perspectives, and stimulate intellectual activities among members of small minorities while having opposite influences on members of large majorities.

This leads to the hypothesis of moderate intolerance consonant with having the dominant role in a situation of clearly unequal power.

Hypothesis 1: Dominant groups will be moderately intolerant toward minority populations.

Defensive or Assimilationist Tolerance. Following Allport’s earlier formulations, Blau (1977, 21) proposes his theorem T-1:

[It follows that the rate of intergroup associations of the smaller group must exceed that of the larger. That means that the dispersed members of the minority have more contacts with the members of the majority group which surrounds them than the members of the majority group with the minority members. Any small group is more involved than a large one in the intergroup relations between the two, unless the two groups have no social contacts.

Minorities in the full sense of the word are likely to be quite tolerant. They can only with great difficulty be solidaristic with their 'mother’ majorities, because they are dispersed among the dominant population. In order to survive they must be assimilationist, de-emphasizing differences and emphasizing similarities between themselves and those among whom they live.

Hypothesis 2: Minorities are more tolerant than majorities where they are dispersed in the majority dominated territories.

Tolerance in Enclaves. In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia, much has been written about the Serbian "strongholds" of Pale and Banja Luka. Similarly, Croatian "strongholds" in Herzegovena, such as Susak, are considered the areas where the population is most intransigent.
about concessions that would lead to a peaceful and compromising solution to political issues and the problems created by the war. These enclaves, and the phenomenon of enclaves itself, pose a special interest to the study of ethnic and national tolerance.

That Slobodan Milosovic and Radovan Karadjic are Serbs raised in Montenegro, and many politically prominent Croatian nationalists come from Herzegovena are heuristic illustrations of the significance of 'peripheral nationalism'. In enclaves, situations where a minority forms the majority in an area, surrounded by a dominant majority are often found stronger sentiments of national pride and intolerance toward others than in the 'mother country'. The 'host country' is often the object of both fear and resentment. This suggests the hypothesis of anxious power leading to exaggerated sentiments of intolerance.

Being a localized majority, members of a minority group feel that, by emphasizing ethnic solidarity, they can withstand or subvert the political and cultural influence of the external majority. Resistance to this pressure may result in exaggerated solidarity manifesting itself in intolerance toward a majority that, being under no direct threat, is more tolerant than the minority.

**Hypothesis 3:** Minorities in enclaves where they are locally numerically dominant will be highly intolerant.

When an enclave is dominated by a minority, the members of the majority population also will be anxious and uncertain. The phenomenon of being in an enclave dominated by a minority, though identified as being of a dominant majority, will have the same effect on tolerance as for a minority surrounded by a majority.

**Hypothesis 4:** Intolerance on the part of a 'surrounded' majority in minority enclaves or in minority-dominated territories adjacent to majority areas is greater than for majority persons in majority-dominated areas.

**Tolerance in the "Mixed" Regions.** Mixed regions are defined as regions where there is no clear majority or minority. Here is an opportunity to examine the predictive statements of two theories. Ethnic competition theory proposes that ethnic groups of equivalent size will engage in more competition and consequently exhibit considerable intolerance. Contrary to this, the contact thesis predicts that in such areas there will be more tolerance as a result of higher numbers of contacts and more opportunities to work in concert. Previous research in former Yugoslavia (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey 1994) suggests the contact thesis is more likely to be supported.
Hypothesis 5: In nationally mixed regions will be found the highest level of tolerance for both the minority and majority populations of the larger political and geographic unit.

These hypotheses are tested by comparing minority group and majority group tolerance levels. The particular spacial relationship between the groups is the critical issue. Our approach says nothing about particular cultural content of a national, racial or ethnic identity, preferring to treat each group solely in terms of its minority/majority status and spacial relationship to others like and unlike itself.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

In the winter of 1989-90 the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia conducted interviews in workplaces and households in all the republics of Yugoslavia, utilizing a random sample of citizens. The completed survey included 13,422 adults ages 18 and older distributed across republics and autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) in accord with the size of each’s population. The occupational, educational, and age distributions of the sample closely approximated those reported in the 1981 census. The sampling design, however, resulted in a disproportionate number of male respondents. To adjust the sample so as to be representative of the gender distribution of Yugoslav adults, male respondents were weighted by a factor of 0.769133 and female respondents were weighted by a factor of 1.400747. The questionnaire asked over three hundred items, including questions that allowed us to construct indices of national tolerance and religiosity.

National Tolerance. Respondents were asked their level of agreement on a five-point scale with six propositions concerning tolerance toward other nationalities: 1) Nationality should be a central factor in choosing a marriage partner; 2) Nationally mixed marriages are more unstable than other marriages; 3) Every nation should have its own state; 4) People can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nation; 5) Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust; 6) Without leaders every nation is like a man without a head. All items had item-total correlations above .4 except the last item which scaled badly (61.5 percent of respondents were grouped in the strongly agree category). Accordingly, this item was dropped from the scale. The remaining items were reverse scored so that high scores indicate greater tolerance. The resulting five-item scale has a reliability index of .72.

Majority/Minority Status. Majority/minority status is measured in two ways. The first is a straight linear representation of the population percentage of groups within each republic. The percent of population of a particular group taps the potential power base of each national group in a republic (Petrovic 1983). Such group size is treated in ethnic competition theory as a basis
of group mobilization. Simple numerical dominance or inferiority captures the idea of tolerance as a reflection of numerical dominance (power) or numerical inferiority (fear).

The population percent does not differentiate between the typical situation in a political unit and enclave situations or situations in mixed regions where there is no clear numerical majority. To depict these situations, we devised a seven category classification of majority and minority groups in different situations. In the following discussion we treat opcina as the unit of a potential ethnic enclave. ‘Republic majority’ designates the numerically dominant group of the defining political unit (the republic) regardless of its numerical dominance in a given local (opcina) situation. Numerical dominance or inferiority in local situations is determined by the population composition of opcina (equivalent to a county). This makes possible seven conditions of minority/majority status:

1. Republic Majority/Opcina Majority (global majority)
2. Republic Majority/Opcina minority (major minority)
3. Republic minority/Opcina Majority (minor majority)
4. Republic minority/Opcina minority (dispersed minority)
5. Republic Majority/Opcina Mixed
6. Republic minority/Opcina Mixed
7. Secondary minority: Not a majority in any Republic or Opcina.

Each respondent was classified according to their status on one of these possibilities. Each new possibility was treated as a dummy variable in the regression analysis below (Table 2) with the sum of the mean score of these seven variables equaling 1.

**Diversity.** Modernization theory leads to the expectation that greater national diversity will lead to greater tolerance. Allport's contact hypothesis suggests that ethnic and national mixing will be associated with greater tolerance toward other groups. To test this, we devised several diversity indicators. National diversity is measured with the Index of Qualitative Variation (Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988, 76-7):

\[
\text{Index of Qualitative Variation} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} (1-p_i^2)}{(K-1)/K}
\]

where \( K \) = the number of categories and

\( p \) = the proportion of cases in the ith category

The index ranges from 1, indicating that the cases are spread evenly over the categories, to 0, indicating that all cases are in a single category.
Other Analysis Variables/Controls. Four additional sets of characteristics could be expected to influence tolerance toward other nationalities: demographic factors, social status, social participation, and religiosity. Demographic factors include age, birth residence, current residence, and nationally mixed parentage and marriage. Modernization theories of ethnic tolerance suggest that older people and rural residents are less tolerant, while young people and urban residents will be the ones most exposed to the forces of modernism. (For a contrasting view based on the ethnic competition model, see Olzak 1983, 367-8.)

Respondents were asked if they had been born in a village, village center, town, town center, city, or regional center, and were also asked a similar question about their current residence. The modal birth residence was village with the median being between village center and town. The modal current residence was also a village but the percentage living in towns increased and the percentage living in cities increased dramatically, rivaling village as the modal category.

Nationally mixed family structures are expected under modernization theory to lead to greater tolerance (Bonacich and Modell 1980). Nationally mixed parentage was ascertained by comparing the nationalities of respondents' parents. Nationally mixed marriage was ascertained by comparing the respondent's nationality with the nationality of his or her spouse. Approximately 8 percent of respondents were the offspring of nationally mixed parentage and 8 percent were in nationally mixed marriages. Gender and marital status are included as controls; these are coded as binary variables with male = 1 and married = 1.³ Approximately 71 percent of respondents are married.

Two aspects of social stratification, education and employment, are central to modernization theory. More highly educated people and employed people are expected to be more tolerant, according to modernization theory. Education is coded as years of schooling completed and averages just over 10 years. Occupational position is coded as four binary variables specifying the categories of employed persons, unemployed persons, peasants and retired persons. According to ethnic competition theory, persons who are unemployed can be expected to have increased feelings of intolerance towards other national groups because of intensified competition for jobs: "Economic contraction in combination with high immigration flows raises levels of ethnic competition, which in turn increases rates of ethnic collective action" (Olzak 1992, 37).

³Unmarried people currently cohabiting with someone were also coded as married under the assumption that their living arrangements would be more consequential for their attitudes of tolerance than the legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation.
Participation in political organizations and involvement in the broader society through reading the news are expected by modernization theory to increase the level of national tolerance and dilute allegiances built narrowly on ethnic solidarity. We use three sources of data on political involvement: membership in the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC), office holding in workplace organizations, and office holding in community organizations. Membership in the LYC was a widely dispersed status. Individuals who were members of the LYC did not necessarily hold elite positions and did not necessarily disproportionally enjoy the privileges such power might provide. Nevertheless, membership in the LYC can be expected to imply a greater commitment to explicitly articulated national goals, among which was tolerance for different nationalities and support for a pluralist, multinational state. The binary Party membership variable is coded "yes = 1" for those who either report currently being members of the LYC or having been members in the past. About 34 percent of respondents reported either being in the LYC currently (1989-1990) or having been in the Party in the past.

The other two measures of political involvement are participation in political organizations in either the workplace or the community. Respondents were asked if they occupied an elected position at their workplace. Positive answers are coded 1. Respondents were also asked if they held any elected positions in community organizations. Later in the interview they were asked if they were active in community organizations. A positive response to either question resulted in a code of 1 for participation in community organizations. About 18 percent and 20 percent of respondents reported active participation in work or community organizations, respectively.

Literacy and newspaper reading provide greater contact with the world and are expected to increase national tolerance under the modernization theory of ethnic relations. In addition, newspapers and television were directly under LYC control prior to 1989, and the explicit agenda of the Party was to encourage tolerance among nationalities. Other media such as radio and magazines were only slightly less controlled. Regularly reading the news can thus be expected to increase national tolerance. Respondents were asked whether they read the newspaper daily (4), weekly (3), monthly (2), or never (1). Later in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify their three most common leisure activities. Some identified "reading news" as their most important leisure activity (4), others as their second most important activity (3), or their third most important activity (2), or not at all (1). Responses to these two questions were summed to create a scale of reading the news that ranges from 2 to 8.

Level of religiosity is considered an important negative influence on tolerance by modernization theorists. Five questions were asked about religiosity. Respondents were also asked their level of belief on a three-point scale with the concepts of God, life after death and the idea that God created people. Also, they were asked how often they attended religious services (never, monthly, weekly or daily) and if their children attended religious schools. All
items scaled positively with item-total correlations above .4. The resulting five-item standardized scale has a reliability index of .86.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 (page 21) shows the tolerance levels for each republic and autonomous province in the former Yugoslavia by nationality within the republic or autonomous province and in aggregate. Bosnia and the Vojvodine were the regions of greatest tolerance, with levels of tolerance approaching 4 on a 5-point scale. The range between republics is considerable, with the nadir found in Kosovo at 1.71.

Tolerance also varies by nationality within republics. Persons who identified as Yugoslavs are among the most tolerant of all people, with tolerance scores above 4.00 everywhere except in Serbia. Minority populations in republics also evidence relatively high levels of tolerance, adding support to the idea that numerical inferiority leads to greater tolerance by way of enforced timidity. Such tolerance is typical of Serbs in Croatia (4.05) and Croats in the Vojvodine (4.05). The lowest levels of tolerance are evidenced in Kosovo for both the majority Albanians and the minority Serbs. Here the regional history of conflict and ill will appears to dominate over considerations of minority/majority status. Even in Kosovo, however, minority Serbs are somewhat more tolerant (1.91) than majority Albanians (1.67). Relatively low levels of tolerance also prevail in Macedonia. In Macedonia, however, majority Macedonians are more tolerant (2.74) than minority Albanians (1.68). This may results from the minority Albanians considering themselves an enclave in an alien state but having nearby 'motherlands' of Albania and the Kosovo region. Albanians are more tolerant (2.66) where they live as a dispersed minority in Montenegro.

Table 2 (page 22) presents the regression of our model of majority/minority status, diversity, and controls on ethnic/national tolerance. Model 1 of Table 2 includes only the control variables and the measure of national diversity. It serves as our baseline model. All of the demographic controls have significant effects on tolerance with the exception of rural/urban origins, indicating a strong influence of such characteristics on attitudes of tolerance. Men and married persons are less tolerant toward other nationalities than women and single or divorced persons. Greater tolerance is associated with increased age, although it is impossible to tell from these results if this is due to some factor associated with aging or to younger cohorts being less tolerant. Urban residence and nationally mixed marriages and/or parentage all lead to greater tolerance, as predicted by modernization theory.

The social status variables have less consistent effects on tolerance, leading to the conclusion that tolerance is less influenced by one's economic position than by one's personal
characteristics and living arrangements. Education has no effect on tolerance. The other four social status variables measure economic position with employed persons used as the baseline. The unemployed are less tolerant, as ethnic competition theory would suggest. Other effects are modest or absent.

The social participation variables have generally significant effects in the direction predicted by modernization theory. Participation in work or civic organizations and the assumed resulting contact with others of different nationalities increases tolerance. Membership in the Communist Party and reading the news, however, have no effects or negative effects, respectively. These findings may reflect the strong republic level control of Communist Party activities and the media by nationalist groups and parties in the period just prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Religiosity has a significant negative effect on tolerance, possibly expressing the important role of religious institutions in fostering ingroup/outgroup identities.

Diversity has a significant, positive effect on tolerance. Republics and autonomous regions with more nationally diverse populations evidence greater tolerance. This finding supports a principal predictive tenet of modernization theory.

Model 2 adds the linear measure of majority/minority status to Model 1, i.e. the percent of one’s group in a republic. The effect of this measure is small but negative: as the percentage representation of a group increases in a republic its tolerance decreases. Conversely, minority groups in republics are more tolerant. This effect supports the hypothesis of intergroup tolerance as conditioned by the numerical superiority/inferiority of one’s group in the relevant political unit, in this case the republic.

Model 3 drops the linear measure of majority/minority status in Model 2 and replaces it with a set of dummy variables measuring the specific nature of each group’s status as a majority/minority group. The increase in explained variance between Model 2 and Model 3 is statistically significant at the .001 level, indicating a significantly better fit with the data. True or "secondary" minorities which have no opcina in a republic where they are dominant serve as the reference category for this analysis.

As expected in Hypothesis 1, majority groups living as majorities (global majorities) are intolerant of other nationalities (-.260). Conversely, as suggested by Hypothesis 2, dispersed minorities are highly tolerant toward other nationalities. This effect is realized regardless of whether the minorities are living in majority dominated opcina (.134) or mixed opcina (.129). Where a minority lives in an enclave dominated by themselves (minor majority), intolerance is much higher (-.127), supporting Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 4 is also supported. The intolerance of majority groups living as minorities in opcina dominated by other groups (major minority) is greater (-.390) than where the majority lives locally as a numerical majority.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that majorities in mixed regions will be more tolerant than
majorities living elsewhere. Though majorities living in mixed areas are somewhat intolerant (-
.162), Hypothesis 5 finds support in the fact that this intolerance is not as great in mixed areas
as it is either in opcina where the majority is dominant or where they are a clear numerical
minority. Republic level minorities living in nationally mixed opcina (.129) are equally as
tolerant as dispersed minorities (.134). Minorities, however, are more intolerant where they live
as local majorities (-.127).

Table 3 (page 23) presents standardized tolerance levels for each republic and for the
seven enclave situations depicted in Table 2. These coefficients have been standardized on the
variables listed in Model 1 of Table 2. The regionally specific coefficients in Table 3 reinforce
the general patterns of those presented in Model 3 of Table 2. Majority status in a republic
lessens tolerance, and this effect is amplified rather than reduced (mean figures for tolerance are
smaller) when the majority lives as a numerical minority in an opcina dominated by another
nationality. Minority group members are more tolerant when dispersed or when living in a
majority-dominated opcina; when concentrated in a locale where they are the dominant group,
tolerance declines.

Modernization theory receives substantial support from the patterns of tolerance in
Yugoslavia in 1989 immediately prior to its dissolution. Nationally diverse republics evidenced
greater tolerance levels. Urbanization, mixed marriages and parentage, and participation in
work and civic organizations were also important positive influences on tolerance—all of which
are consistent with the expectations of modernization theory.

Ethnic competition theory also receives support from these results. Unemployed persons
are less tolerant of other nationalities, and young people were less tolerant rather than more
tolerant as expected by modernization theory. In addition, education and Communist Party
membership had no moderating effects on intolerance suggesting the capture of these institutions
by local or regional elites with nationalist sentiments. Perhaps even more telling in this regard is
the negative effect of reading the news on tolerance toward other nationalities.

Ethnic enclave theory receives substantial support from the patterns of tolerance in
Yugoslavia in 1989. Minority enclaves are the location of some of the most intense intolerance
observed in the former Yugoslavia just prior to its dissolution. In many situations this
intensification of intolerance applies equally to majority and minority groups living in the
enclave. Conversely, minorities living in dispersed situations evidence the greatest tolerance.
Mixed regions do not evidence the greatest intolerance but appear instead to have a moderating
influence on the intolerance of both minority and majority groups.
CONCLUSIONS

The support this analysis provides for various aspects of modernization and ethnic competition theory, and the support it lends to our own enclave theory, cannot overshadow a similarly significant finding. Minorities are more tolerant than majorities. In only five of the 26 cases of minority populations in our analysis do minorities exhibit higher levels of intolerance than the dominant majority in the same republic: Muslims, Serbs and Albanians in Montenegro, Croats in Bosnia, and Albanians in Macedonia.

Perhaps even more importantly, the absolute level of tolerance is higher in more diverse republics and autonomous provinces. This was found earlier by Hodson, Sekulic and Masse (1994), but was based on less detailed analysis than is presented here. What our less aggregated analysis of opcina-level data shows is that there is a combined effect of diversity of republic and minority/majority status structuring national tolerance. For example, Croats in Slovenia (a very homogenous republic) are predictably more tolerant than the majority Slovenes. They are less tolerant, however, than Croats in the more diverse Croatia. Muslims outside Bosnia are usually more tolerant than the dominant group of a republic, but within the more diverse republic of Bosnia itself Muslims are even more tolerant.

In enclaves of Bosnia, such as the Krajina and Sandzak, there is support for Allport’s contact hypothesis, inasmuch as minorities who are local majorities, and so have more limited contact with others, exhibit strongly intolerant attitudes. There is support for our enclave theory as well, and somewhat in contradiction to Allport’s hypothesis, in the finding that majority persons in minority-dominated opcina, what we have called ‘major minorities’, are highly intolerant as well, despite the large number of contacts they have with persons unlike themselves. Thus, diversity and the dispersion of minorities fosters greater tolerance, while both localized enclaves and homogeneity of republics foster intolerance.

The irony of our findings are that they recommend a course of action quite out of keeping with what many people would think reasonable and advisable. Persons who feel threatened will seek to live in areas where they feel safe. In the former Yugoslavia this will mean living among people who similarly identify themselves in national terms. As well, policy makers and those responsible for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord may hope that the hundreds of thousands of refugees could return home, but it is likely that they, too, will conclude that compensation and restitution of lost homes, farms and businesses can be achieved without all refugees returning to the locale from which they fled or were driven. As a consequence of the war, greater homogeneity along national lines will be accomplished, and enclaves will be more ‘pure’ than previous to the war. Our findings tell us that this is a formula for greater intolerance and may well sow the seeds for future conflict.
REFERENCES


19


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<th>Kosovo</th>
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<td>(1294)</td>
<td>(909)</td>
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes. Only cells with 30 or more respondents are reported.
Table 2. Regression of Tolerance on Demographic, Social Status, Participation, Religiosity, and National Composition Variables: Yugoslavia, 1989, N = 13,422

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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<td>14.56</td>
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<td>.003*</td>
<td>.003*</td>
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<td>-0.074*</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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Note: significance denoted by a = p ≤ .001, b = p ≤ .01, c = p ≤ .05 (2-tailed t-test).
Table 3. Standardized Tolerance Levels in Yugoslavia in 1989 by Republic and Minority/Majority Status

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<tr>
<th>Minority/Majority Status</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Bosnia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Vojvodine</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. as majority</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. as minority</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.76*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. as majority</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. as minority</td>
<td>3.67*</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.32*</td>
<td>4.00*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. in mixed area</td>
<td>3.17*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Min. in mixed area</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.93*</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.26*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary minorities</td>
<td>3.71*</td>
<td>3.92*</td>
<td>3.44*</td>
<td>3.95*</td>
<td>1.89*</td>
<td>3.00*</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These coefficients have been standardized on the variables in Model 1 of Table 1. Significance levels are for comparisons with majorities living as majorities except in the case of Bosnia where the comparison group is minorities living as majorities: a = p ≤ .001, b = p ≤ .01, c = p ≤ .05 (2-tailed t-test)