TITLE: CULTURAL WARS AND THE RECENT RUSSIAN ELECTIONS: THE STRANGE ALLIANCE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND CHRISTIANS

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CONTENTS

Abstract ............................................................................................................. 1

I. BACKGROUND
   Church-Party-State Relations under the Old Regime ...................................... 2
   The Orthodox and Contemporary Politics .................................................... 3

II. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE
   Nationalism and Patriotism ................................................................. 4
   Illiberalism and Xenophobia ................................................................. 4
   Conservative Morality and Culture ......................................................... 6

III. SMOOTHING OVER THE DIFFERENCES ................................................. 6

IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 9

Endnotes ........................................................................................................... 10
For the recent presidential election in Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [KPRF] created a coalition of "national-patriotic forces" that included conservative members of the Russian Orthodox clergy. Despite the history of communist antipathy toward religion, conservative Orthodox found that today’s Communist Party leaders shared their nationalism, xenophobia, conservative morality, traditional artistic tastes and their longing for a positive patriotic culture. The KPRF ideologists have struggled to reinterpret or erase past events that contradict their new national patriotic image. Ultimately, they have relied on conspiratorial theories of a fifth column within the old Communist Party to explain such unpleasant episodes as the persecution of the Church, the repression of innocent citizens in the purges, and the break up of the USSR. The danger of embracing a world view based on suspicion and paranoia, however, lies in the possibility that anger and intolerance will dominate the national-patriotic alliance’s battle for political power and influence.

In the last weeks of the recent Russian presidential campaign, advertising promoting Boris Yeltsin’s candidacy featured the slogan "The Communist Party hasn’t changed its name and it won’t change its methods." Yeltsin and his allies sought to revive unpleasant memories of the Soviet past in order to rouse disaffected voters and to weaken the coalition that had coalesced around Gennadii Ziuganov, the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). In response, at every campaign stop Ziuganov stressed that he was the candidate not just of one political party but of a block of patriotic forces comprising some two hundred associations. The deliberate juxtaposition of red Soviet flags and banners depicting Christ, Mary, and St. George in traditional iconic style at its rallies dramatized the block’s extraordinary amalgamation of forces ranging in orientation from radical Bolshevik to conservative Orthodox. Ziuganov’s strong showing in the polls lends credence to his contention that the national-patriotic block had successfully united diverse social forces. But how did loyal communists and sincere christians reconcile the obvious irony of a Communist Party leader seeking an endorsement from the Russian Orthodox Church and receiving one from some clergymen? Had the Communist Party, contrary to Yeltsin’s charges, really undergone profound ideological change?

An obvious reason for politics to make strange bedfellows is the desire to defeat a common opponent. Dissatisfaction with Yeltsin certainly predominated in Russia at the start of the campaign for the Russian presidency. In the December 1995 parliamentary elections, many voters had shied away from parties and blocks associated with Yeltsin and his reform policies—whereas a reinvigorated KPRF captured 22 percent of the seats, more than any political group. And multiple
public opinion surveys in the spring of 1996 showed the President’s popularity at an all time low, lagging behind that of all the other major contenders. Economic uncertainties, declining standards of living, widespread corruption and crime, the drawn out war in Chechnia, and the plight of ethnic Russians stranded across new international borders created by the breakup of the USSR proved powerful sources of unhappiness with Yeltsin and his team. But distaste for Yeltsin alone cannot explain the convergence of many opposition forces into a single block led by a Communist candidate. After all, Russians had a plethora of parties and personalities from which to chose. And the Communist Party was not alone in promising a strengthened social safety net and a return to superpower status. An investigation of the sources of support for Zjuganov reveals other commonalities that held the national-patriotic block together. The most startling aspect of the block—the alliance between Orthodox clergy and the KPRF—illuminates new cleavages that cut across the communist-anti-communist dichotomy. In this short paper I explore the attractions of the KPRF’s newly crafted image for socially conservative voters.

I. BACKGROUND

Church-Party-State Relations under the Old Regime

During seven decades of Communist Party rule, state policies toward the Russian Orthodox Church, and toward other denominations as well, can only be characterized as hostile. In the years following the revolution, Bolsheviks closed places of worship, arrested and sometimes executed religious leaders, and harshly restricted religious education, training and organization. Although the level of persecution of religious believers varied over time, Marxist-Leninist ideologists consistently condemned religion as a hangover of the past which had no place in modern Soviet society. Nevertheless, Party leaders were not entirely blind to the continuing attraction of religion for some of their subjects. Thus, when Stalin needed to rally the populace to defend the USSR during World War II, he moderated policies toward the church and invoked the memories of Russian military heroes from the pre-revolutionary past. Such leniency did not long outlast the war, however, and new anti-religious campaigns in the 1960s again threatened believers. In particular, concerted efforts were made to control the church hierarchy by flooding seminaries with informers and agents. Significant relaxation of restrictions on church activity came only as part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s general liberalization program. Suddenly in the 1990s the Russian Orthodox Church found itself with new opportunities to serve the faithful and to expand its organization, as well as with new demands to muster more resources to cleanse itself from KGB collaborators, and to craft new church-state relations.
The Orthodox and Contemporary Politics

The influence of the Russian Orthodox church in contemporary Russian society is hard to evaluate. Despite the newly open atmosphere, it remains extremely difficult even to estimate the number of Russian citizens who can be considered among the Orthodox faithful. Surveys have revealed huge disparities between those who say they believe and those who regularly attend church services—50.5% versus 2.2% according to one 1995 poll. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent people look to church leaders for political guidance and to what extent they find it. Orthodox priests are neither forbidden from making political statements nor bound to follow some central political line. Therefore, the opportunity exists for priests to propagate their own political views. Certainly all of the candidates in the Presidential race seemed to perceive that the church and its faithful could be open to their courting. Moreover, the presidential contenders treated the Russian Orthodox church as an important institution. They visited churches and monasteries, displayed photos of themselves with Orthodox clergy or Christian symbols, and publicized their charitable donations to the church.

However, given the Communist Party's history of strict anti-religious propaganda and policies, the puzzle remains as to how Orthodox and Communists managed to make common cause. The cooperation between conservative clergy and KPRF ideologists is relatively new, but I will argue that it does not represent either a half-hearted effort or a purely one-sided attempt on the part of the Communists. Ziuganov, having acknowledged that "it is impossible to return to that [ideology] that led society for the last several decades," has proposed a new "ideology of state patriotism" based on "traditional spiritual and cultural values" and composed of "the Russian idea, supplemented by the contemporary realities of life, and those social gains won by socialism during 70 years of Soviet power." To this end, the KPRF has been working closely with a nationalist-religious oriented think tank to reinforce the traditional link between Orthodoxy and a strong Russian state and to "Russify Marxism" by incorporating nationalist, spiritual and statist elements strongly reminiscent of 19th century concepts of Russian exceptionalism.

The effects of ideological reform within the Communist Party on public opinion seem mixed. One of Ziuganov's top advisors—Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the ultra-nationalist newspaper "Zavtra"—admitted that he expected only a minority of Orthodox to support the national-patriotic forces in the presidential election: "Some are obeying the Patriarch, some think that Yeltsin saved the nation from Communism," he explained. Indeed, although Patriarch Aleksii II did not directly endorse Yeltsin, he repeatedly called on Russians to contrast what the church endured in the past with the religious freedom it currently enjoyed. But over a dozen priests openly called upon voters to choose Ziuganov. And many voters found religious faith and communism compatible: one poll even showed that 40 percent of the KPRF's electorate considered themselves Orthodox believers.
II. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE

Nationalism & Patriotism

When the Soviet Union began to break apart in the wake of the failed coup attempt by hardline Communists in August 1991, Russian nationalism had already materialized among several different groups. Boris Yeltsin had latched on to the cause of Russian sovereignty for pragmatic reasons. The position of Russian President allowed him to create a personal power base from which to pursue radical political and economic liberalization. Notions of Russian exceptionalism, meanwhile, had been embraced by both religious-nationalist groups and by a powerful faction within the Communist Party. Yeltsin's acceptance in December 1991 of a Russian state based on the borders of the Russian Republic within the USSR drove the other nationalists closer together. Russia's perceived loss of historical territory, its decline in global status, military strength, and cultural influence led both anti-Soviet and Communist nationalists to regard Gorbachev and Yeltsin as traitors.

Moreover, Communists and Orthodox nationalists began to discover a set of common beliefs about Russia and its position in the world. Ziuganov advocates a traditional imperial vision of Russia as the center of Slavic and Orthodox civilization. While brushing aside accusations of pernicious nationalism, he characterizes the Russian people as a nation which gathers together other peoples and which is a natural great power [narod sobiratelem, narod derzhavnikom]. Unlike the democratic parties, the KPRF boldly declares its desire to reintegrate the former Soviet republics into a single Moscow-centered state. Meanwhile, a common, though not always articulated, sentiment among the clergy is that a strong Russian state would be the most conducive setting for a strong Russian church. The Moscow Patriarchate considers itself to be the center of orthodoxy, but its sphere of influence has declined along with Russia's. Its loss of control over congregations in the newly independent states of Estonia and Ukraine has made the Moscow Church acutely aware of the price of Russia's geographic losses. At least one clergyman justifies his vote for Ziuganov on his belief that Ziuganov intends to restore his "historic homeland" and to end the continued splintering of the nation and the church; on the other hand, a vote for Yeltsin, he argues, equals "an involuntary admission that Russia's development over the course of a thousand years from separate principalities into a great nation was in error."

Ililleralism & Xenophobia

Both the Church and the Communist Party also feel their existences threatened by the West. The lifting of the Iron Curtain that accompanied perestroika opened the door not only to Western economic ideas but to Western books, music, art and religion. Today traditional Western denominations and new age sects have established themselves in cities across Russia. The Orthodox church establishment as a whole fears competition from Western religious groups and recently the Moscow Patriarchate responded to Western groups' proselytizing activity by creating its own
missionary program that, in the terms of its director, aims to support the construction of new churches, rehabilitate cult victims, and defend Russians against foreign faiths. The KPRF views liberal market ideology as another form of foreign faith that threatens native Russian communism. Both groups are willing to compromise on free speech and pluralism to protect what they see as Russia's special inheritance from alien ideas. In fact, a Communist deputy heads the parliament's committee on religion that has tried to overcome Yeltsin's objections to legislation--lobbied for by the Moscow Patriarchate--to restrict the rights of foreign missionaries.

The threat to Russia posed by foreign influences looms far larger in the imagination of conservative clergy than in the Patriarchate's official pronouncements. Conservatives recoil from any overtures from international religious organizations, decrying "the disease of ecumenism." They link foreign influence to attempts by reformers within the Church to make Orthodox rituals more accessible to modern worshippers. The rhetoric of religious conservatives' editorials, like that of Ziuganov's campaign appeals, often features references to mysterious international plots against Russia. Ziuganov's most ardent clerical supporter, Father Aleksandr Shargunov, writes--in a manner that would, ironically, be familiar to American conspiracists--of a secret world government represented by the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. He also warns of a dangerous domestic alliance of protestants, baptists and evangelicals. Ziuganov plays on similar fears, averring, "We won't allow Russia to be turned into a spiritual dumping ground, into a field of play for dark global forces, false prophets, and false teachers..." Other conservative religious figures, most notably the late metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg, blame Russia's misfortunes on the Jews. Though Ziuganov seems to have cut back on making openly anti-semitic statements, he continues to inflame prejudices with veiled references, omissions and pernicious stereotypes. For example, he argues that it is "normal" for Russia to grant equal rights to "three classic religions--orthodoxy, islam and buddhism, religions that always placed spiritual-moral values higher than mercantile-consumer ones." In general, communist and religious extremists seem quite at ease with adopting each other's inflammatory language: their opponents are traitors, soulless, even agents of Satan, policies which they dislike are genocidal, leading the nation toward "extinction."

Underlying the xenophobic attitudes and policies of conservative clergy and contemporary communists is an old belief in the distinctiveness of the Russian character. Religious and communist nationalists aver that Russians share a collectivist mentality absent in the West. Hence Ziuganov's equation of capitalist values with foreign religions. By contrast, Ziuganov's supporters treat religious communitarianism [sobornost'] as virtually the same as Communist collective spirit. They praise the ideal of the pre-revolutionary peasant commune and allege that Soviet village life was marked by the same spirit of selfless mutual aid. In contrast to the West where "each pulls the blanket over himself," boasts one Ziuganov adherent, "We were raised on the principle of all for one and one for all... In our village we never respected the man who did everything for himself, who..."
lived as a recluse—he was regarded with suspicion, no matter how well he managed for himself."21 The natural Russian "lifestyle" accordingly is incompatible with liberal individualism. It is no accident that the Church and the KPRF treat the village as a home of true Russia; today both enjoy their strongest support from among the elderly rural population.

Conservative Morality and Culture

Feelings of xenophobia and Russian particularism spill over into a final ideological sphere where communists and conservatives find common ground—that of cultural and moral values. In the cultural arena the clash of tastes between liberals and conservatives can clearly been seen in the presidential contenders' campaign styles: while Yeltsin danced on stage with rock musicians, Ziuganov toured with singers of traditional Russian folk songs, and his supporters hawked bootleg cassettes of popular songs of the Soviet period. Nationalists see Russian language and arts as under siege from the West, and they fear that in the clash of civilizations between the degenerate West and Orthodox East the "bearers of healthy traditional culture" are losing out to "the denationalized intelligentsia, who are totally deaf and insensitive to the treasure house of Russian art."22 Western culture, from the perspective of conservatives and nationalists, unites materialism, extreme individualism, violence and sexual permissiveness—all qualities notably absent in Soviet works of art, literature and film. Soviet censors, after all, followed both political and puritanical dictates. They screened out erotic materials in all genres and attempted to squash rock music and abstract art.

Today neither Soviet nor Russian classics seem to be faring well in the market economy. The most popular television shows are foreign made soap operas like "Santa Barbara" and movie theaters show primarily Western action movies. Ziuganov's stock example of Western cultural colonization is that Moscow's statue of the revered Russian poet Pushkin is surrounded by a welter of English language shop signs and advertisements. The clergy direct their ire at pornography and advertising for birth control, neither of which were permitted under Soviet rule. And, like the Western religious right, Orthodox Christians think rock music is full of Satanic messages.23 Orthodox and Communists see a simple solution to the problem of cultural decadence. The state should subject art, literature, music and film to a double litmus test: they should be national and not prurient. The government should return to subsidizing high culture, sanitizing sex scenes, and limiting Western programming in the media.24

III. SMOOTHING OVER THE DIFFERENCES

It may be easy to hang icons and red flags side by side, but it is harder to reconcile different memories of the same national history. The patriotic culture which the church-communist alliance desires rests on pride in the past—especially in Russia's military and artistic achievements. To build their alliance the religious believers have had to set aside their recollections of persecution by the
communists and communists have had to temper their nostalgia for unadulterated Soviet rule. Selective forgetting thus has been the order of the day for the national-patriotic block. Spokesmen on both sides have struggled to find points of reference acceptable to each other. A mutually appealing set of heroes and triumphs has been found only at the expense of great swathes of Russian history.

Both sides relish Russia’s military triumphs and revere its generals. Ziuganov, for instance, notes that good communists were raised on the exploits of the saintly princes Aleksandr Nevsky and Dmitrii Donskoi and of the tsarist generals Suvorov and Kutuzov. But the patriots must gloss over the essence of the Civil War when Russians split over faith in tsar and church versus adherence to Communist ideals—the message today is that the patriotic block combines the Red ideal of social justice and brotherhood and the White ideal of a great and indivisible Russia. And the Russian revolution cannot serve today’s communists as the defining national moment. Lenin’s atheism and internationalism are hard to reconcile with the new state patriotic ideology. Thus, while citing Lenin as a great man, Ziuganov rarely initiates discussions of his achievements. When pressed to defend Lenin, Ziuganov credits him with halting the territorial and economic disintegration underway when he arrived in Russia in April 1917—in this interpretation Lenin is a bearer of order rather than a revolutionary.

The most unambiguous event in modern Russian history for Orthodox and Communists is undoubtedly World War II. The war against Hitler represents a time when common people showed their devotion to nation and Party, when Russia demonstrated its new economic and military might, and when the church and state worked together. The extraordinary wartime moment now makes an interesting frame for interpreting important personalities, relationships and events. In the light of the war, Stalin can be remembered as the leader of a heroic struggle against alien invaders rather than as a ruthless executioner of his own people. Indeed, for many who lived through that period, the Communists’ triumph over the Nazis atones for a variety of previous sins. Thus, when one of Ziuganov’s supporters is charged with hypocrisy for decrying the Bolsheviks’ execution of the tsarist family and yet displaying the red Soviet banner on Victory day, she confidently replies, “That which is dear to the people is dear to us. Under this banner they built their country and conquered the enemies.” Moreover, church state cooperation in World War II provides a frame for reconciling religious faith and socialism. For example, when confronted with the question of whether he attends church, Ziuganov temporizes: “It is not required that one go to church to carry goodness and brotherhood in one’s soul. Marshal Zhukov was not a churchgoer, but it’s said he carried the icon of the Kazan Mother of God, the protector of soldiers.” And the current battle with the democrats, Father Shargunov insists, is like World War II—a time when the issue was not one of communism or anticommunism, but of Russia’s survival.
Defining the achievements of Russian culture also presents somewhat of a problem for the conservative Orthodox-communist alliance. Christians must de-emphasize the effects of CPSU censorship on the culture of the Soviet era, and communists must embrace pre-revolutionary art and literature regardless of their bourgeois origin and unsocialist themes. Ziuganov condemns the fact that the CPSU treated everything from pre-revolutionary Russia as tainted. With chagrin, he admits that up until the 1930s the Bolsheviks even ignored Pushkin. Empire-building and cultural achievements redeem pre-revolutionary Russia for him. Likewise, he insists that the emergence of the writers Mikhail Sholokhov, Valentin Rasputin, Iurii Bondarev, and Aleksandr Tvardovskii during the Soviet period makes it "a great epoch, worthy of study..." These writers' themes of peasant life, military service, and love for Russia lie close to the hearts of Russian nationalists. Thus, Bishop Tikhon is willing to assert that, although the Soviet regime made creative people work as hacks for its propaganda machine, "more and more often the living voice of genuine Russian culture broke through..." As regards art, the realist aesthetic provides conservatives with grounds for appreciating work by both religious and socialist painters. Communists and clergy, in contrast to Western collectors and Russian liberal newspaper critics, admire realist art and disdain the work of early 20th century Russian avant-garde and contemporary abstract artists. As the head of a new association of realist artists argues, it is not important whether artists are drawing "priests or commissars"—what matters is that they are idealists who seek to celebrate and not distort the world around them. Thus conservatives prefer from both artists and historians the same relentlessly positive patriotic tone.

Whitewashing the past is not without its costs. Ziuganov and his colleagues could not win over Orthodox voters nor create a Russian patriotism that restores the links between pre-revolutionary and Soviet history if they totally denied the mistakes and misdeeds of CPSU leaders. Yet, if they distance themselves too much from the CPSU, they might lose those voters who welcome them as the heirs of the original Bolsheviks. To explain their partial repudiation of the Soviet past, the KPRF's leaders have propagated the idea of an internal fifth column. "In the CPSU there were always two parties," claims Ziuganov. "There was the party of patriots. Those who fought honestly and worked honestly. And they had only one privilege--to be the first into battle and to work to their utmost." By contrast, he argues, "there was another party, the party of Trotsky, Beria, Iakovlev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. It looked upon Russia as its own personal gold mine." The efforts of the well-intentioned majority of Party members, in other words, were undermined or corrupted by a fifth column consisting of Jews, foreigners or those with foreign ideologies. Here the communists are following the tactic adopted by Russian nationalists who have attempted to set new cultural norms by dividing all prominent writers into true Russians versus merely Russian-speaking or "false-Russian" authors, and accusing the latter of victimizing the former. While the two camp
strategy of interpreting the past has the advantage of giving the "true patriots" an aura of martyrdom.

it also encourages the most paranoid and intolerant coalition members.

IV. CONCLUSION

In response to public cynicism provoked by America's loss of face in the Vietnam war and in the Watergate scandal, conservatives in the US turned to "a rigid patriotic orthodoxy--tightly linked with political and cultural conservatism, baldly insistent on a singular version of the American past, crudely celebratory of the United State's history of war making." In the aftermath of loss of empire, a sudden introduction to global mass culture, and economic shock therapy, many Russians were struck by national self-doubt. Liberal Russian intellectuals reveled in the opportunity that perestroika gave them to subject all aspects of the national past to harsh scrutiny, and hesitated after the fall of the Soviet regime to pursue a new national idea because they associated state ideology with totalitarianism. The communists, on the other hand, quickly realized the potential of Russian nationalism to provide the basis for a new patriotic culture. Like American conservatives, they sought to craft a single version of the past that would celebrate traditional national culture and values. The problem, of course, was that the CPSU had itself often trampled on that culture and ignored those values in the past.

For many middle-aged and elderly Russians the combination of nostalgia for the economic stability of the 1970s and longing for an idyllic, strong orthodox Russian empire has overcome any cognitive dissonance presented by a mix of communist and religious symbols. Young people, thus far, have proven less susceptible to the appeal of the new conservative, patriotic culture. But Ziuganov has been reminding them of the old regime's guarantee of free higher education and stirring up their resentment at frequent media depictions of Russia and Russians as "second class" compared to the West. Nevertheless, the plausibility of the KPRF's new patriotic image hinges on a drastic rewriting of the past that casts aside communism-anticommunism as the most important political orientation. One can look at the Orthodox-communist coalition as resembling the "fusion paranoia" currently uniting American extremist groups, in other words, a coming together of the far left and the far right around a "more primal polarity: Us versus Them." For the Russian patriotic alliance the "Them" is foreigners--meaning people from different nationalities, religious creeds or cultural traditions as well as people who have adopted allegedly Western ideologies and tastes. Perhaps then the question for Russian liberals should not be whether the Communist Party has changed ideologically, for it certainly has, but whether it has changed its inflexible, messianic ways. As a purveyor of paranoia, the KPRF may be raising the likelihood of more harsh, even violent confrontations within the mainstream of Russian politics.

2. Nathaniel Davis tracks variations in church-state relations by measuring the number of open churches, the number of people permitted to pursue religious vocations, etc. A Long Walk to the Church (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).


4. Tat’iana Varzanova, "Nuzhen li veruiushchim religioznyi prezident?" Nezavisimaja gazeta, June 20, 1996, p. 5. Perceptions that the Orthodox Church has not yet purged itself of KGB informers may in part explain Russians’ alienation from organized Church activities.

5. For instance, a prominent poster for Vladimir Zhirinovsky consisted of a photo of the candidate embracing an elderly woman clad in conservative black garb outside an orthodox church and the slogan: "You are our final hope, our last source of support."


9. The Patriarch also tried to combat the view that orthodox christians should avoid contact with sinful earthly politics by not voting. He even allowed television reporters to film him as he voted for the first time ever at a special polling station set up in the Danilovskii Monastery. Gaiaz Alimov and Gennadii Charodeev, "Patriarikh Moskovskii i Vsela Rusi Aleksii II: 'Khotelos' by verit chto Rossians sdelaiut pravil'nyi vybor," Izvestiia, July 2, 1996, p. 1.

10. Varzanova, "Nuzhen li veruiushchim religioznyi prezident?"

11. The Russian branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formed in 1990? to provide a base of opposition to Gorbachev’s reforms and to rectify what nationalists perceived as a great slight--the fact all the republics except Russia had their won Party organizations. The absence of a separate branch for Russia, however, might better be interpreted as evidence that the all-union branch was really the Russian branch.


15. Ziuganov declares that the ideology of liberalism has "brought [Russia] unforeseen ills, tragedies, wars." "Dlia menia glavnoi partiei iavliaetsia Rossiia," in G. A. Ziuganov i o G. A. Ziuganove, p. 198: for an excellent explanation of the links between nationalistic and new communist economic theories of a Russian "third way," see Veljko Vujacic, "Between Left and Right: Russian Nationalism and the Third Road," unpublished ms.


24. Tikhon, "Korroziiia."


26. Ziuganov, Ia Russkii, pp. 16, 44.

27. "'Nashe znamia.'"

28. Vasilii Ustiuzhanin, "O zvezdah, o liubvi i prochem" (interview with Ziuganov) in G. A. Ziuganov i o G. A. Ziuganove, p. 274.


32. Tikhon, "Korroziiia."

33. Even strongly anti-communist clergy praise traditional realist art. One cites the work of the Russian Jewish avant-gardist Mark Chagall (whose stained glass window designs grace the Rheims cathedral) as the epitome of art inappropriate for Russian churches. Deacon Andrei Kuraev, Ramyshleniia pravoslavnogo pragmatika o tom, nado li stroit' Khram Khrista Spasitelia (Moscow: Otdel religioznogo obrazovaniia i katekhizatsii Moskovskogo Patriarkhata, 1995), p. 5; For liberal dailies that tout the Russian avant-garde of the early 1900s and current Russian conceptual art, see Kommersant-DAILY and Segodnia.

35. Bolshakov, "Fenomen," pp. 244-5: Ziuganov even divides the Komsomol into careerists (who are now the most notorious democrats) and those who developed themselves and their talents honestly through the youth organization. G. A. Ziuganov, "Uchit'sia patriotizmu" (Izboratel'nyi fond kandidata na dolzhnost' Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1996), p. 1.


