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ABSTRACT

Muscovites recently voted overwhelmingly to reelect Mayor Iurii Luzhkov. Luzhkov’s record as a masterful manager of scarce resources has earned him a national reputation. Although Luzhkov describes himself as an "economic pragmatist," he has invested considerable time, prestige and city funds in construction projects that offer no economic returns. The most grandiose of the monumental works undertaken by Luzhkov is the reconstruction from scratch of the Church of Christ the Savior—a nineteenth century cathedral in central Moscow that was destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 1931. Proponents of recreating or preserving cultural heritage everywhere point to heritage's potential to foster feelings of common cause and of rootedness in historic traditions. But the downside of heritage is that it can just as easily "glamorize narrow nationalism."

The history of the Church of Christ the Savior shows how several generations of urban planners have used architecture and city planning to make symbolic statements about the nature of their regimes. In the case of this cathedral, Luzhkov seized upon a project originally championed by religious believers and extreme Russian nationalists to try to inspire some broad positive form of patriotism in his fellow countrymen. By rebuilding the cathedral, Luzhkov shows that he is more powerful than past Communist leaders by undoing their handiwork. He also demonstrates that he is more capable than the tsars or the Bolsheviks by building his showplace in just a few years. But symbols’ meanings depend on their viewers’ perceptions as well as on their makers’ intentions. The Church of Christ the Savior was built as a Russian Orthodox church and a monument to the Russian victory over Napoleon; in its new apparition it creates the impression that the new Russian state, like the old, will use its patronage of monumental architecture to glorify military sacrifice, exclude religious minorities, and raise monuments to its leaders rather than to its citizens.

I. Introduction

Moscow today resounds with the noise of hammers and heavy equipment. The city’s dynamic mayor, Iurii Luzhkov, can often be found wearing a hard hat as he makes the rounds of city sponsored projects for road improvement, new housing developments, the city’s first ever parking garages, and ambitious office and retail complexes. Though Luzhkov’s populist style had attracted the criticism of more intellectual members of the democratic movement, it has contributed to his standing as arguably the most popular local politician in Russia today. Luzhkov won reelection in June with over 80% of the votes and is often mentioned as a possible successor to Boris Yeltsin. For all of his ties to the democratic camp however, Luzhkov claims to be a man without any ideology. He describes himself as a "khoziastvennik" or economic pragmatist. But one cannot take Luzhkov’s
self-description at face value. He has invested considerable time, energy, and funds to grandiose symbolic gestures and has consistently demonstrated interest in creating a new Russian patriotism. This essay looks at the symbolic politics behind Luzhkov's most expensive attempt to reshape Moscow's landscape—the rebuilding of the Church of Christ the Savior.

Under new laws protecting religious freedom and private property, religious communities are reclaiming and restoring their former places of worship. With the hope of attracting tourist dollars, some local governments are also investing in conservation or restoration of religious and secular architectural landmarks and historical sites. Businessmen have also recognized the potential value and prestige of historic buildings on prime downtown real estate when their interiors are converted into modern office space. Moscow's city government has brought together the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy and the new rich in the most massive restoration project in Russia today—the rebuilding the Church of Christ the Savior (CCS) from scratch. This cathedral, which once dominated the Moscow skyline, was completely demolished by the Bolsheviks in 1931 to make way for a planned "Palace of Soviets" that would have commemorated Lenin. Ultimately, the cost of realizing its show place deterred the Soviet government from building much beyond the foundation. But today, at the cost of millions of dollars, the reconstruction of the CCS is proceeding at a breakneck pace.

Given Russia's dire economic situation, why is so much state and private money flowing into the rebuilding a single church? After all, federal and local authorities must cope with the fact that, "even by official statistics one-third of the population lives in poverty, and one-quarter lives below the boundary of what's necessary for physical survival." And the Orthodox Church is struggling to find the means to restore or build parish churches for its faithful all across Russia. Industrial cities created during the Soviet period, for instance, have no church property to be reclaimed. Even in Moscow, where many churches in the city center have been reopened, not a single wholly new Orthodox church has been built to serve the vast bedroom communities surrounding the city. Nor is the reconstruction of CCS part of a general state program of financial support for various religious confessions. I will argue that Luzhkov, Patriarch Aleksii and Yeltsin are all using CCS to send a symbolic message to the Russian people.

Today's political and Church leaders, however, cannot entirely control the meaning vested in the new cathedral. In the process of making the rebirth of CCS a reality they are both deliberately and unintentionally changing the cathedral's symbolic content. Certainly recreating CCS's external form cannot simply reawaken old sentiments because the cathedral's viewers have themselves changed. The current authorities may be seeking to usurp the mantle of Russian patriots—like the civic activists they preempted, they recognize CCS's potential to link the pre-revolutionary and the post-Soviet past—but their heavy personal involvement, especially on the part of Luzhkov, cannot help but affect the public's perceptions of the cathedral's status and message.
II. The Birth of a Cathedral: The Church of Christ the Savior

On Christmas day in 1812 Tsar Aleksander I signed a manifesto announcing his intention to construct a cathedral dedicated to Christ the Savior in Moscow in gratitude for God's help in defeating Napoleon. Five years later, on the anniversary of Napoleon's expulsion from Moscow, the Tsar laid the cornerstone for the church in the Sparrow Hills, overlooking the city center. After Aleksandr I's death in 1825, his successor Nikolai I chose a different site and a different architect to build the cathedral. He selected the architect Konstantin Ton who had been a driving force behind the rebirth of "Russian style."

Nikolai counted on Ton to create a distinctively Russian monument. Ton's design was conceived in the new Russo-Byzantine style, drawing on the five cupola Kremlin cathedrals. But his cathedral stood 102 meters high and hence towered over the nearby Kremlin. He divided interior space between the church area (altar and iconostasis) and a gallery which ran along the perimeter and housed memorial plaques listing fallen officers and major battles of the war of 1812. In keeping with Nicholas' dictate that the decor show God's special kindness to the Russian autocracy over the centuries, interior murals and exterior sculptural compositions recounted episodes from both the bible and from Russian history. The Tsar meant the cathedral to be "a visible manifestation of the credo of 'Official Nationality,'" [that is] "Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality"—thereby linking the notion of one god and one emperor with the idea of the distinctiveness of the Russian race.

In 1883 as part of the general celebration of the coronation of Aleksandr III, the first prayer service was held in CCS. The construction of Ton's cathedral had taken 44 years, hampered in part by delays in the allocation of money from the imperial treasury. Despite the current prevailing myth that the CCS was raised on the basis of small contributions from ordinary Russians, the state provided the overwhelming majority of funds. The grand cathedral became the site for many important church ceremonies and assemblies. CCS also served as a working church where top metropolitans led daily services. As the largest war memorial in Russia, CCS also became an important site during Russia's new wars. During the Russo-Japanese war and World War I people travelled to Moscow to pray in CCS for Russian soldiers and sometimes to add in chalk the names of the newly fallen to the marble slabs listing the names of the heros of 1812.

Thus, the original CCS held several meanings and served different functions simultaneously. For the primary agents behind its construction, CCS sent a message of gratitude to God and reinforced among the Russian people the notion that they had a special destiny. The grandeur and scale of CCS also reminded foreign visitors of the might of the Russian state and of its triumph over Western invaders. The Orthodox Church used the CCS for daily contact with its parishioners. But it also no doubt enjoyed the awe inspired by the huge cathedral and its opulent decorations. For the few surviving veterans and for the many descendants of soldiers in the War of 1812, CCS was a memorial to their specific experience in the battle to liberate Russia from foreign invaders. And for
those visitors during Russia's later military campaigns, CCS was a place to seek divine intercession or to register their personal losses. Finally, the addition of a monument to Aleksandr III and plans for statues of Aleksandr I and Nikolai I for their services in presiding over the construction of the Cathedral made CCS a monument to its political sponsors as well.8

III. The Death of a Cathedral

The coming to power of the Bolsheviks in 1917 marked a new era in urban planning and in church-state relations in Russia. Moscow was to become the exemplar of the modern socialist city--graced with monumental art that celebrated the goals of the revolution, and free of reminders of past social inequalities. The Bolsheviks’ desire to rid Russia of its traditional religions, combined with their need to enshrine their own heroes, led to the destruction of CCS.9 Anti-religious city planners saw CCS as a too visible reminder of former close ties between state and church. They strove to depict the CCS as a monument to militarism and national chauvinism and to denigrate its aesthetic quality and popular stature.10 Several architects lobbied to have the site of the CCS selected for the new Palace of Soviets which would honor Lenin and the creation of the USSR.

In December 1931, having dismantled some of the church’s bas reliefs and removed fragments of its most famous murals, city workers used explosives to reduce CCS to rubble. Only much later was Boris Iofan’s design of a neo-classical building housing a conference hall topped by a gargantuan statue to Lenin finally selected to occupy the site of the former CCS. The CCS was only one of many churches and historical monuments to be purposely destroyed in the late 1920s-early 1930s. But the dramatic dynamiting of CCS and the identity of its intended replacement made the church a particular martyr in the eyes of believers and of those who disliked the new regime. The event was later compared to the Bolsheviks’ brutal murder of the Russian royal family and to the crucifixion of Christ.11 The Soviet government intended to build the Palace in two years--to open at the end of 1933--but the design competition alone stretched until the spring of 1933. The cement base was finished only in 1939 and some work on the building’s steel frame was completed before the outbreak of WW II. The need for steel during the war, however, led the Bolsheviks to dismantle what little framework they had completed. After the war, the idea of building the Palace resurfaced. In 1960, however, the government abandoned the competition for the Palace of Soviets and instead opened a large outdoor swimming pool on the place where the CCS once stood.12

IV. A Cathedral Mourned

In 1988-89 when Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost allowed the airing of many controversial subjects, the idea of rebuilding the CCS occurred simultaneously to different people. The sculptor Vladimir Mokrousov proposed that an ongoing dispute over how to commemorate WW II in Moscow could be solved by rebuilding CCS alone or together with a new smaller cathedral dedicated
to St. George "as a memorial to two fatherland wars."\(^{13}\) When his model of CCS was displayed at an exhibit in 1988, it attracted other like-minded people, including Father Grigorii Dokunin who recruited others. All of the believer-activists conceived of the reconstruction of CCS as an act of repentance. Moreover, they insisted that the CCS was first and foremost an Orthodox church dedicated to the resurrection of Christ and only secondarily an historical monument or architectural landmark.

The second source of civic initiative to rebuild, however, came from Russian nationalists, working through the newspaper *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, who initially made the case for the CCS as a monument to military sacrifice. They stressed the meaning of CCS as a monument to the war of 1812.\(^{14}\) *Literaturnaia Rossiia*’s writers’ slightly different interpretations of CCS’s status as "sacred space" may in part reflect a loss of belief in the role of divine intervention in military conflicts. Or it may simply reflect a perception of what reasoning would be better tolerated by Communist officials. Such fine distinctions, however, did not hamper the union of religious, patriotic-military, and literary social organizations in 1989 in a single foundation to promote the cause of resurrecting CCS. The foundation’s governing board elected at its founding conference included proponents of a positive, relatively inclusive nationalism like the writer Vladimir Soloukhin, virulent nationalists like the dissident mathematician Igor Shafarevich and monarchist sculptor Viacheslav Klykov.\(^{15}\)

Although *Literaturnaia Rossiia*’s first publication carefully argued that CCS was a fully international memorial because it was not Russian but "Christian" in character and dedicated to a victory of the multinational Russian empire (as opposed to the Russian people as an ethnic group), the newspaper soon began to feature the views of more extreme nationalists. Drawing on the myth of its populist origins, nationalists averred that the construction of the CCS was a defining moment in Russian history:

> It arose and was built in those times when our people were still tightly united by orthodoxy and autocracy. Consider just the fact that money for the construction of CCS was collected literally from all of Russia--it literally came by the kopek, except for some large donations. This phenomenon already in and of itself was proof that the people were Orthodox, that the Russian state [derzhava] was orthodox.

Reconstruction of CCS, therefore, offered Russians an opportunity to reassert themselves in the present as religious subjects of a strong state.\(^{16}\) The extreme nationalists, who regarded all of Russian history in the light of a perceived battle between Russia and the West, saw the CCS as a martyr from the beginning of its existence. Several contributors blamed Jews, namely the main Moscow city planner Lev Kaganovich and the Palace of Soviet’s architect Boris Iofan, for the destruction of CCS.\(^{17}\) Nationalists even attributed the criticism of Ton’s architecture by his contemporaries to CCS’s Russian, as opposed to classical, style. Similarly, they touted a new CCS as a bulwark against Western capitalism and artistic taste.
The CCS did not originally lack admirers among the liberal intelligentsia. They too perceived the cathedral as a victim of Stalinism. Thus, in 1991 the democratic civic movements marked the Bolshevik revolution by marching from the KGB's Lubianka headquarters to the site of CCS, where they held a prayer service for all the victims of communism.\textsuperscript{18} For many liberals, however, the destruction of CCS was just one of many outrages committed by the Soviet regime against citizens of all nationalities and religions. An architect analyzing the competition for Moscow's WW II monument harshly criticized "Orthodox" projects like Mokrousov's plan to honor World War II by rebuilding CCS with an additional new small church dedicated to recent veterans. The critic argued that Mokrousov's design did not suit the all-national commemorative purposes of the competition. Moreover, as regarded commemorating CCS he rejected the idea of trying to recreate the original cathedral, preferring to recall the history of CCS's construction and destruction. Thus, he praised Iurii Seliverstov's model of a small chapel devoted to repentance set in the center of a towering metal skeleton that outlined the dimensions of the original cathedral. Such a project would remind viewers of their loss and provide a place for believers to pray without the costly and perhaps technically impossible process of duplicating the old cathedral.\textsuperscript{19}

During perestroika, liberal politicians in general approved of civic initiatives like the drive to rebuild CCS, but they recognized the danger of national chauvinism and of state favoritism toward particular religious groups. The first democratic Mayor of Moscow Gavriil Popov prided himself on helping all of the city's religious denominations. In fact, he noted with evident satisfaction that he had paved the way for the reopening of a mosque that, like CCS, had been built with the blessing of Aleksander I in honor of the War of 1812--a historical fact that today's Russian "patriots" had forgotten.\textsuperscript{20} Despite Popov's warning about the perils of the state favoring one religion over another, however, Boris Yeltsin endorsed the rebuilding of CCS and in 1994 together with the present Mayor of Moscow Iurii Luzhkov and Patriarch Aleksii took over the fundraising and planning for the cathedral.\textsuperscript{21}

V. A Cathedral Reborn: The Church of Christ the Savior-2

After Yeltsin's endorsement of the project, Luzhkov and Aleksii settled the practical matters: CCS would be rebuilt with donations from private citizens and businesses on its original site and in its original form—with the exception of some decorative sculpture that would be difficult and astronomically expensive to replicate. Moreover, using the concrete foundation of the Palace of Soviets as a base for the cathedral engineers could add an extra floor below street level to house offices for the patriarch, a parking garage for 600 cars, and a conference hall with seats for 1,000.\textsuperscript{22} Also a new social council and fundraising apparatus under the mayor's office would replace the older civic groups which had thus far managed the collection of donations. The composition of the new council demonstrated the mayor's seriousness and his interest in supporting
some form of Russian patriotism: it was dominated by city government bureaucrats and professional construction engineers, but also included three members of the creative elite well known for their Russian nationalist sentiments—the writers Vasilii Rasputin and Vladimir Soloukhin and the painter Ilya Glazunov—and only one outspoken liberal, theater director Mark Zakharov.23

Since he adopted the idea of reconstructing CCS in 1994, Iurii Luzhkov has devoted considerable time, attention, and political and financial resources to the project. He reviews the blueprints, visits the site, chastises the builders and exhorts donors. Given that the cost of CCS is estimated to run around 400 million dollars, fundraising is an ongoing struggle. Here, Luzhkov has used his position to coax and coerce donations from private and state run businesses. The administrator of the CCS fund, admits that good relations with city government help in the solicitation of corporate contributions. After all, the mayor's office still controls access to much of the office space in Moscow.24 Officially, the city government offers tax breaks to organizations involved in construction.25 Despite its frequent public statements to the contrary, the CCS council has also asked for and received federal subsidies, including tax breaks for big donors. In the course of the 1995 budget debate a close Yeltsin advisor even labeled the CCS set aside one of two "sacred subsidies" that could not be reduced. (The other was the "Victory Fund" to provide special veterans benefits for the 50th anniversary of victory in WWII.)26 The amount of so-called "non-budget" revenues directed to CCS from city coffers remains a well guarded secret. But one city legislator who investigated the question estimated that only 1/10 of a daily expenditures at the site were paid for by charitable donations.27

Despite the rapid progress made in reconstructing CCS, there has been plenty of time for a debate in the press about the merits of the project. The ongoing disputes between the cathedral's supporters and naysayers reveal first and foremost a consensus that CCS is an important symbol, and second a division over its meaning and appropriateness. By examining the chief complaints of CCS's opponents I will trace how the symbol of "repentance" dreamed of by civic activists has taken on other connotations and messages.

The most frequently voiced complaint about the reconstruction of CCS is the cost, especially to citizens. Even some outspoken nationalists have protested the use of state funds for the cathedral given that social programs are so clearly in need of resources.28 The "khoziastvennik" response is simply stated by Luzhkov's deputy Vladimir Resin. Though Jewish himself, Resin considers CCS a "world-class achievement" and argues:

First, man does not live by bread alone. Second, surely the situation with housing wasn't better when they first built this cathedral. And it was quite bad when they blew it up. And who blew it up? Our relatives, our grandfathers... We didn't ask the believers when that was done. And the church is being built from donations and non-budgetary sources... So what's better? A non-budget cathedral or a budget swimming pool in place of fifty homes?"29
The CCS's religious defenders also point to the small cost when considered on a per capita basis, but even they admit that the Orthodox church as a whole has other pressing financial responsibilities. But, contends the deacon and religious scholar Andrei Kuraev, only a project of such scope and grandeur would attract such generous contributions. Hence, he insists the church would not have the money that is going to the CCS to spend on anything else. City officials, however, cannot claim that the restoration of CCS has brought the city new revenues. Indeed, potential income from tourism is rarely mentioned—perhaps because it is understood that CCS will genuinely become church property and any future earnings it brings will presumably belong to the church alone.

In general, both liberal intellectuals and nationalist activists have complained about the loss of popular control over the reconstruction project. Several liberal critics urged that the question of using public money for CCS be put to a referendum. In other words, let the tax payers articulate their financial priorities. A conscious donation might be seen as a sign of the desire to repent, they argued, but the same could not be said of passive contributions via tax payments. Nationalists generally accept the myth that the original was built on popular contributions and hence some also expressed discomfort with the shift of fundraising efforts to focus on wealthy businesses. Moreover, even among supporters, there is an awareness that original civic activists have been pushed aside to make way for high officials and engineering professionals.

Furthermore, the tempo and style of Luzhkov's construction contractors evoke unpleasant memories of Soviet era construction projects and feed the longstanding concern of some artists and aesthetes that the "copy" will be unworthy of the original. Ever since the idea of rebuilding the CCS arose in the 1980s, professionals have warned that the construction techniques and especially the craftsmanship of the painted interiors and sculptural exterior decor—which ironically were the cathedral's most praised and most "Russian" aspects—could not possibly be replicated. Even Luzhkov has at times suggested that some artistic features of the original would be too costly to attempt today. Several details of the new plan, moreover, directly contradict any pretense of authenticity—namely the concrete instead of brick shell and the underground office/garage complex. As the art historian Aleksei Komech points out, Luzhkov has adopted a principle of restoration/preservation that values appearances, facades, not authenticity. The mayor boasts that he is not just preserving but adding on to old buildings. Indeed, though Luzhkov can cite the merits of elevators and a modern ventilation system for CCS's durability and comfort, these changes clearly mark CCS II as a "novodel" [new model]. Kuraev rebuts such criticism of the building by noting that from a religious point of view what matters is the sincerity of the worship that takes place within the cathedral and not its age or appearance. And yet Russian Orthodox Church officials want a replica of their old cathedral badly enough to invest their own funds and prestige in it.
In part, the protest over construction techniques stems from the novelty of the church-state partnership itself. It strikes people as odd to hear construction engineers setting deadlines around religious holidays and to see a church built with the Soviet "storming" methods used to build secular communist monumental projects. The gigantomania and haste typical of Soviet construction has led skeptics to refer to the new CCS as a Palace of Soviets with a cross on top and workers to label themselves "shock workers of orthodox (as opposed to socialist) labor." At least one architect has complained that the city's construction contractors are ignorant of religious architectural traditions and hence have suggested at times such inappropriate measures as locating the garage directly beneath the sacred altar.

One serious complaint about the reconstruction of CCS raised only by liberals has to do with its perceived symbolic content. A public service television spot for CCS depicts an elderly woman, a motorcycle gang member and a wealthy businessman all converging on the cathedral and donating according to their means—the message: devotion to the church crosses age, class and gender barriers. But what about barriers of race and religion? Whereas nationalist critics acclaim the very Russianness of its style and the significance of its dedication to military victory, some liberals reject these very values. They see chauvinism in the boasts of today's construction bosses who echo their tsarist-era predecessors in claiming that not a single "foreigner" is laboring on CCS.

Contributing to CCS is clearly understood as a means of signalling one's inclusion in Russian society; thus, members of the Armenian community in Moscow have attempted to stress their belonging by collecting donations for CCS. Liberals, however, reject the idea that a Christian place of worship can unite all the citizens of Russia. Deacon Kuraev responds that no public project ever serves everyone's interests equally. He, for instance, received no benefit from state spending to upgrade St. Petersburg's athletic facilities for the Goodwill Games. Defenders also ascribe criticism of CCS to "Western tastes." Jealousy that patriot-painters like Glazunov will receive big commissions to decorate the church, according to Kuraev, lies behind the liberal intelligentsia's antipathy toward CCS. But Kuraev does not answer charges about substance with a defense of form; he accepts the premise that CCS is a demonstration of state power. Indeed, he warns government officials that the world will think their new democracy is insincere or weak if it cannot rebuild Russia's national holy sites.

The final bone of contention between supporters and opponents of CCS-2 is the project's moral significance. A few observers from both ends of the political spectrum have argued that reproducing the external form of CCS again rewrites history by in effect sending a false signal that the traces of the Communist period can be quickly erased. As the art critic Boris Kuz'minskii observes, "With a single act, admittedly fairly complex and lengthy, but purely mechanical, the psychological traumas linked with the long and confused history of Soviet rule are supplanted in the collective subconscious." In other words, "the city of an ideal bourgeois democracy" can be constructed
rapidly and painlessly by changing the backdrop against which politics is played. Papering over the sins of the past may contradict the ideal of atoning for them. And yet the cathedral’s strongest defenders all look upon reconstruction as the ultimate act of repentance. But repentance by whom? Arguably the transformation of the symbolic landscape affects all who see it, and not just pilgrims seeking some personal moment of transcendence—but the cathedral’s builders cannot entirely control that effect. Will the CCS be seen as the clergy would have it first and foremost as a monument to Christ and as a sign of return to an old faith? Or will CCS be perceived as another monument to a powerful state?

VI. Conclusion

After his cooptation of a civic cause, Mayor Luzhkov has been accused of building a monument to himself and his powerful construction bureaucracy in CCS. If CCS is perceived as a monument to Luzhkov, then with what implications? Luzhkov claims to be without ideology, but his actions reveal him to be both an anti-communist and a Russian patriot. Though not raised in a religious family, Luzhkov supports the Russian Orthodox church as an important, though not sole, source of values. According to him, city government should orient itself on: "Religion together with culture, family traditions, sport and morality." CCS appeals to him both emotionally—because it was grand, Russian, a victim of communists—and pragmatically—because it presents just the kind of managerial challenge that suits his past "khoziastvennik" experience. In sum, Luzhkov shows that he is more powerful than past Communist leaders by undoing their handiwork. He also demonstrates that he is more capable than the tsars or the Bolsheviks by building his showplace in just a few years. He restores the old order—giving the capital a cathedral worthy of international admiration—and yet improves on the original by adding modern conveniences. But, as in the original, the end result is a monument to the ruler. The populist roots are lost or sacrificed along the way.

Luzhkov’s interest in reviving a "Russian style" of architecture and his support for patriotic projects, such as the construction of Victory Park at Poklonnaia gora and the reconstruction of the Iverskie gates leading onto Red Square, have led one architectural critic to label the mayor’s urban planning record "realizing the imperial idea." Indeed, it would be naive to take Luzhkov’s professions of political neutrality at face value. The past cannot be reproduced or presented in some purely objective fashion, without some interpretation. Proponents of recreating or preserving cultural heritage everywhere point to heritage’s potential to foster feelings of common cause and of rootedness in historic traditions. But, as David Lowenthal points out in his study of the worldwide heritage movement, the downside of heritage is that it can just as easily "glamorize narrow nationalism." Democratic politicians seized upon Russian nationalists’ project of rebuilding CCS to try to inspire some positive form of patriotism in the citizens of their new state. But whose version of the Russian past will color perceptions of CCS and inform contemporary patriotism? Thus
far, the dominant impression is that the new Russian state, like the old, will use its patronage of monumental architecture to glorify military sacrifice, exclude religious minorities, and raise monuments to its leaders rather than to its citizens.

NOTES


3. The only totally new Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow is the Church to St. George built as part of the monument to World War II at Poklonnaia gora. Father Vladimir (Novikov), the pastor of the Boris and Gleb Church located in a bedroom community in southern Moscow, observes that his tiny church (built 1688-1702) serves a region of 300,000 people. Personal communication, October 27, 1996.


16. Zamanski, "Eto Khram."


28. For instance, Il'mira Stepanova, "'Kadilo blagodarnosti pozdneishikh rodov'?" Russkaia mysl', January 12-18, 1995, p. 16; regarding nationalists, see Lein, "Cathedral Reconstruction."

29. Nikolai Ziat'kov, "Kto stroit nash dom?" Argumenty i fakty, no. 34 (August 24, 1995), p. 3


32. Bossart, "Teatr."


36. Kuraev, Razmyshleniia, p. 4.

38. Viktor Shevegeda cited in Nikitina, "'Odnomu Bogu'."


42. Tumarkin in Lunina, "Tsentr."

43. Kuraev, Razmyshlenia, pp. 5, 12, 32.


