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ETHNICITY AND EQUALITY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TRANSITION:
EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA'S REPUBLICS

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Abstract

For ethnically diverse societies, as in Russia, the post-communist economic transition implies a restructuring of the old cultural division of labor – the distribution of occupations and rewards among ethnic groups. The Soviet commitment to affirmative action policies for non-Russian regions and their resident minorities unraveled along with the USSR. And without central controls over employment and wages, education, and investment, the federal government has far fewer levers to impose quotas or to push industrial and urban development into minority areas. The question, then, is who bears the burden of economic dislocation and who benefits from new economic opportunities? This paper uses survey data to explore the connections between ethnicity and economic transition in three republics of Russia – Tatarstan, North Ossetia and Sakha (Yakutia).

Since the fall of communism, the social impacts of economic transition have become ever more visible. Efforts to marketize and privatize have redrawn class boundaries, undermined traditional job guarantees, and eroded the old social safety net. The result is a wider gap between rich and poor, especially in post-Soviet states.

For ethnically diverse societies, as in Russia, the transition also implies a restructuring of the old cultural division of labor (CDL) – the distribution of occupations and rewards among ethnic groups.[1] The Soviet commitment to affirmative action policies for non-Russian regions and their resident minorities unraveled along with the USSR. And without central controls over employment and wages, education, and investment, the federal government has far fewer levers to impose quotas or to push industrial and urban development into minority areas.

But how the advent of the market actually plays out among the Russian Federation's different nationalities is far from clear. Given the old CDL, with non-Russians typically concentrated in less developed ethnic homelands and in lower-paying sectors, the economic transition might well reinforce old disparities. On the other hand, dramatic devolution has given eponymous groups new powers to shape the local economy. Expanded home rule for titular nationalities could thus reward the in-group at the expense of local Russian residents.

The question, then, is who bears the burden of economic dislocation and who benefits from new economic opportunities? Do titular groups reap a disproportionate share of the pain or gain under home rule? Equally important, how do subjective assessments of equality mesh with the actual distribution of burdens and benefits?

This paper explores the connections between ethnicity and economic transition in three republics of Russia – Tatarstan, North Ossetia and Sakha (Yakutia). Tatarstan and Sakha have been leaders in the quest for expanded republic rights, garnering some of the most dramatic concessions from the federal government during the period of "high sovereignty" (1991-1999). Both republics won control over substantial shares of hard currency trade in local resources (oil in Tatarstan, and diamonds, gold, oil and gas, among other things, in Sakha). They have had the most discretion over local resources and arguably

the most leeway of any Russian regions in allocating rewards to local constituents. If home rule does afford privileges for titular nationalities, it should do so in these two regions.

North Ossetia, in contrast, has been far less of a pioneer on issues of federal relations. Lacking the resource endowments of a Tatarstan or a Sakha, and surrounded by conflicts in the North Caucasus, it had less to gain from pressing Moscow for greater autonomy. The local agenda has instead been dominated by disputes with neighboring regions. And these have in many ways reinforced local dependence on Moscow.[2]

The focus here is on the experience of economic transition among the two major nationalities in each region – the titular group and Russians, who together make up over four-fifths of the population in each case. The following section addresses the dimensions of inequality in postcommunist Russia; the likely effects on the two major ethnic groups in each republic; and the potential impacts of home rule. The paper then presents empirical evidence on the degree of inequality in experiences with economic transition in the late 1990s, and on individual perceptions of bias.

Economic inequality and ethnic stratification

Given the depth of Russian economic decline during the 1990s, the growth of inequality is hardly surprising. GDP dropped in real terms almost every year from 1990 through 1999.[3] By the end of the decade, it was 57 percent of what it had been ten years earlier.[4] Reported unemployment rose from around 5 percent in 1992 to nearly 12 percent by 1997.[5] And the Gini coefficient for disposable income doubled from the late 1980s to 1993-95.[6] During the first six years of Russia's market reforms (1992 through 1997), at least one-fifth to one-quarter of the population lived below the official poverty line.[7] Poverty was especially prevalent among single-parent households and those with more children; among people with less education; and among those living in rural areas.[8]

It was also more prevalent in Russia's republics than in predominantly Russian regions. In 1997, for example, 12 of the Russian Federation's 21 republics had a poverty rate of 30 percent or more, compared to just nine of 58 Russian regions. (The average rate for the Russian Federation as a whole was

20.8 percent.) Of the eleven regions in the federation with the highest poverty rates (40 percent or more of the population living below the poverty line), eight were republics.[9]

The implications for different nationalities within republics are ambiguous, however. If rural residence and lower levels of schooling were key determinants of poverty, then many non-Russians could be at risk. Despite Soviet affirmative action programs promoting education and urbanization, most non-Russian groups still lagged behind local Russian residents on these dimensions by 1991. Many of their gains in education had come in non-technical – and thus lower priority – fields, while Russians constituted the majority of engineers, industrial specialists, etc. When it came to careers, indigenous nationalities typically worked in lower-paying sectors such as agriculture, trade or public services, while Russians predominated in more lucrative fields such as heavy industry and construction.[10]

Research on Soviet-era employment and ethnicity in North Ossetia, for example, found that as of the last Soviet census (1989) Ossetins were under-represented in industry, and especially in machine-building/metal-working, but overrepresented in agriculture and trade.[11] Tatarstan had a similar division of labor.[12] Parallel research in Sakha revealed an even greater disparity among Russians and Yakuts, with far fewer of the titular nationality employed in any branch of industry, and far more in farming.[13]

Yet the old CDL could well be superseded with the rise of home rule. Resurgent ethnonationalism suggests heightened demand for indigenous leaders to reward their own, if only to compensate for past inequities. In fact, as Michael Hechter has argued, mobilization actually may require such selective incentives.[14] Since the quest for sovereignty typically faces low odds and promises only a collective good, ethnic leaders must find other ways of rallying individual supporters. The promise of patronage can thus be a key resource for leaders seeking to build a constituency for expanded ethnic rights.

Pressures to reward co-nationals should be especially intense in the postcommunist context. The old political system gave titular groups the trappings of statehood while denying them real home rule. Eponymous nationalities thus developed a sense of entitlement – of "owning" their territory and its

political institutions – without the corresponding right to self-determination.[15] Ignoring the expectations for ethnic capture in these circumstances could leave local leaders vulnerable to outbidding.

Such straight-out ethnic capture can be costly, however. Demands to redress the old CDL are likely to arise well before the titular nationality has enough skilled and experienced personnel to manage all key sectors of the local economy. Even where different ethnic groups possess similar levels of education and skills, they are still segmented by technical specialty, experience and professional networks. Rapid, wholesale replacement could thus undermine the local economy.

Moreover, wholesale replacement could hardly fail to alienate local Russians. As the new local out-group, they would provide a natural constituency for a central government seeking to contain regional demands. Indigenous leaders may therefore find it more useful to spread the wealth and promote solidarity at home. This would bolster their case for regional autonomy, and reduce their vulnerability to a "divide and rule" strategy from above. Local cross-ethnic solidarity could be particularly valuable when regional rights have been highly contingent on the political winds in Moscow.

Newly empowered indigenous leaders might thus opt for other, less disruptive ways of rewarding their own. Milton Esman shows, for example, that indigenous leaders in other ethnic transitions provide for co-nationals by expanding the public sector.[16] The strategy typically includes adding slots in education, and especially in public universities; expanding jobs in, and patronage through the state bureaucracy; and promoting new indigenous businesses via government contracts, credits and the like. The net effect is to create new sources of rewards for the indigenous nationality without radically displacing other groups.

As one example, Esman notes that the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s and the rise of the Parti Quebecois led to dramatic growth of the public sector in Quebec.[17] Part of the increase came in education, as the provincial government took over schooling from the Catholic Church and expanded opportunities in higher education. Another part came in the expansion of public enterprise and programs to support French-owned firms. The result was to boost Francophone advancement in both government and business, helped along by a language policy that made French the official tongue in the province in

the 1970s. By the 1980s, old disparities between Francophones and Anglophones had largely declined.[18] Research in the 1990's showed that Francophone social mobility was roughly equal to that of Anglophones in Canada as a whole; and French-speakers had come to dominate the managerial ranks previously held by English Canadians in Quebec.[19]

Esman points to a similar process in Malaysia after independence in 1957.[20] The new government sought to correct long-term economic disadvantages for the native Bumiputra via a combination of expanded public sector, public enterprise, and educational facilities.[21] It also adopted a language policy privileging the indigenous tongue in both the schools and the government.[22] With the language favored and with pronounced affirmative action for the indigenous population, the old cultural division of labor began to erode.[23]

Expanding the public sector can therefore provide a "positive sum" form of affirmative action for the indigenous group. But it also carries some limitations. One is that it may be time-bound. The ability and willingness to grow government may have been strong in the 1960s and 1970s, but the rise of neoliberalism has made such a strategy more doubtful since then. In fact, both Quebec and Malaysia later cut back public sector programs. More recent ethnonationalist movements might face much more resistance to government expansion – most especially where economic transition is designed expressly to cut back the role of the state. And government expansion presumes that resources are available to finance new public programs.

A second limitation is that adding programs may help to minimize disruption for the old dominant nationality (or other groups) but the "added" benefits may still be seen as preferential treatment. Positive-sum affirmative action does not necessarily prevent the long-term disaffection and/or outmigration of non-indigenous nationalities, especially when language exclusivity comes into play. Finally, members of the indigenous group might still see themselves as disadvantaged, despite their advances. In Quebec, Francophones continued to see their own group as subject to inequality into the 1990s.[24] And in Malaysia, indigenous nationals protested that advances fell short of full equality and short of the government's targets for its campaign to promote indigenous interests.[25]

Thus all options come with some serious costs. And each one is likely to yield a different pattern of inequality. Ethnic capture implies that the titular group would dominate in economic life, with a disproportionate share of new/private/foreign ventures, and with lower rates of unemployment, wage delays/cuts and unpaid leaves. Accommodation suggests that both titular groups and Russians would share pain and gain evenly, with roughly equal opportunities and equal incidence of dislocation. Finally, it may be that the dominant factor is simply the old CDL – which would yield structural inequality. In this case, pain and gain would be unequal, but depend more on the pre-existing CDL and distribution of specialties rather than ethnicity per se.

The experience of Russia's republics

Publicly, most republic leaders in Russia have taken pains to stress ethnic accommodation. Many framed inclusive, civic appeals to all ethnic groups, emphasizing citizenship rather than ethnic origins as the basis for the local state. Most also adopted relatively inclusive language policies that recognized both the titular language and Russian as state languages. And many republics pursued "soft" economic transitions, retaining state ownership, preserving the elaborate social safety net of the communist era, and maintaining direct or indirect controls over local prices.[26] The official rationale was to preserve stability. The strains of unmediated shock therapy appeared all too likely to intensify conflicts between Russians and titular nationalities.

The commitment to promoting ethnic peace was especially pronounced in Tatarstan and Sakha. Governments in both cases explicitly emphasized a civic agenda, calling for interethnic accommodation.[27] Both promoted the use of the indigenous language, but continued to use Russian as well in government, schools and workplaces. The government of Tatarstan also pioneered the concept of soft economic transition, with continued state intervention via price controls on local food products, a broader social safety net, and substantial subsidies for agriculture.[28]

In addition, Tatarstan pursued its own privatization policy, issuing separate local "privatization accounts" to supplement federal vouchers and limiting the resale of enterprise shares to designated buyers

(within the republic).[29] In effect, the republic thus kept a substantial hold on the local economy.[30] Sakha also retained major stakes in key local enterprises, most of them in the extractive industries. In fact, as Viktoria Koroteeva observes, a substantial portion of republic residents' vouchers had to be invested outside the republic, since so few local enterprises were subject to open privatization.[31]

In North Ossetia, the agenda has focused on conflicts with neighboring regions and on coping with a massive inflow of refugees. The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in the late 1980s and 1990s brought in an estimated 100,000 refugees from the South. And Ingush claims to the Prigorodnyi raion prompted open fighting in late 1992 (and sporadic violence since).[32] With respect to economic reform, some accounts suggest little enthusiasm for market transition in a region that kept the designation "socialist republic" well after other regions had dropped it.[33]

Yet whatever the approach to interethnic relations or economic reform, all three regions have experienced very similar patterns of political change since 1990. The indigenous share of public officialdom increased across the board.[34]

Table 1 (at the end of this paper) shows, for example, that the titular share of seats in republic legislatures rose substantially from 1990 to 1995. In Tatarstan, where Tatars accounted for 48.5 percent of the population in the 1989 census, their share of seats went from 58 percent as of 1990 to 73.3 percent five years later (Table 1).[35] Other data on public offices in the executive branch and in local government suggest a similar picture.[36] In North Ossetia, the titular group constituted 53 percent of the population as of 1989, and held 70 percent of the seats in 1990. By 1995, they held 86 percent.[37] In Sakha, the Sakha (33.4 percent of the population at the last census) increased their share of seats from 46.3 to 60.8 percent between 1990 and 1995 (Table 1). Other data suggest that they also dominate in other branches of government as well. As of the end of the 1990s they made up 59 percent of personnel in the executive branch, and 63 percent of personnel at the city and raion level.[38]

Thus where the USSR promoted ethnic "balance" in political representation, post-Soviet governments have rejected it. This is not to say that indigenous officials were underrepresented before;

far from it. But their increased representation is still striking, given the relative opening of the political system.[39]

The evidence is more mixed when it comes to economic pain and gain in the three regions. Some research on elites suggests indigenization in economic as well as political leadership. Lilia Sagitova has found, for example, that Tatars dominated the top slots in Tatarstan's major enterprises and government at the end of the 1990s.[40] In contrast, research on occupations suggests that the old CDL has endured. T. P. Petrova and E. T. Miarikianova thus conclude that Soviet-era occupational differences were still in place in Sakha, at least for Yakuts.[41] And research comparing economic transition policies and their consequences in Tatarstan and Sakha finds relatively little impact on ethnic inequality or life chances. As Koroteeva notes, home rule brought new access to local resources, but these funded social and economic policies for all republic residents rather than a particular ethnic group.[42]

Thus there are different perspectives on how economic transition has played out in the republics, depending on the particular focus of research. My aim here is to extend the focus by examining individual pain and gain more directly.

Data and analysis

To identify patterns of economic dislocation and privilege, the analysis here relies primarily on a 1997/98 survey in Tatarstan, Sakha and North Ossetia of roughly 1100 respondents each. (Details of the survey design and implementation are in Appendix 1.) Respondents were offered the choice of being interviewed in either Russian or the titular language, by same-nationality interviewers. Response rates in the three republics were 87, 91 and 84 percent, respectively. The analysis also relies on elite interviews I conducted in Tatarstan and Sakha from 1997 to 2001.[43]

To put experiences within the republics in context, I include data from Round VII of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), conducted in 1996.[44] (For details, see Appendix 1.) That round of the RLMS included 7812 adult respondents, 83.5 percent of them Russians and 16.5 percent

non-Russians.[45] It thus allows us to compare economic experiences of Russians and titular nationalities in our three republics with those of Russians and non-Russian nationalities in the country as a whole.

Economic advantage and disadvantage are assessed several ways. One set of measures explores the distribution of managerial posts, with questions on the nationality of respondents' supervisors and on whether respondents themselves were heads or directors of their workplaces. A second set of measures examines employment status and income – both critical, given the growth of joblessness and income inequality over the past decade.

Economic differentiation may also be more subtle, given the tendency to preserve jobs but delay or cut wages or hours, or send people on unpaid leaves. Various groups could also have differential opportunities in the more lucrative types of new businesses, such as private firms and joint ventures. Thus our indicators of an individual's economic situation include ownership at the workplace (government, foreign and private Russian), and experiences with unpaid wages, involuntary leave and pay cuts.

The scope of the public sector is evaluated several ways as well, in keeping with the patterns suggested by Esman: the number of employees in republic/local executive, legislative and judicial agencies; the number of places (students) in higher and secondary specialized education; and the share of local employment in state-owned workplaces.

The analysis also includes subjective assessments of individual experiences with ethnic discrimination and hostility, and perceptions of ethnic favoritism in general. These allow us to assess both individual and collective judgments about the economic effects of nationality.

One final observation before turning to the data: the allocation of pain and gain may depend at least in part on economic conditions in each region. Tatarstan has experienced the least dislocation, with higher growth of nominal GDP, and slightly lower unemployment and poverty rates than Russia as a whole (Table 2). Sakha has had a far higher level of GDP per capita, but also a higher cost of living given its location and limited transportation into the republic (Table 2).[46] It also experienced a higher-than-average unemployment rate and level of poverty. North Ossetia, like other republics in the North

Caucasus, has fared worse. GDP has been less than a third of the all-Russian average; unemployment has been twice as high or more; and the poverty level is substantially higher (Table 2).

Ethnic dimensions of economic dislocation

If the political systems in Tatarstan, North Ossetia and Sakha reflect the predominance of indigenous nationalities, the economic systems suggest more diversity. One indication is the distribution of managers. We asked working respondents about the nationality of their supervisors at their main job, and the responses show that managerial posts were more evenly divided than political ones (Table 3). We also asked people whether they themselves were directors or heads of organizations. Here, too, the results suggest a more even distribution, though the numbers are too small in this case to come to a firm conclusion.

Individual experiences of pain and gain were even more diverse. The survey included questions on various forms of dislocation, including unemployment, wage arrears, cuts in hours/pay, and unpaid leave. For the most part, these all tended to offset each other: if one group experienced somewhat more unemployment, the other might be subject to unpaid leave. On the other hand, income and wage data reflect a systematic Russian advantage (Table 5). The Russian "premium" ranged from nine percent for current pay in North Ossetia to 91 percent for Sakha. Indigenous groups held an advantage in only one instance – Tatar pensioners had higher incomes than their Russian counterparts.

Thus most of the data on economic dislocation reveal countervailing disadvantages between indigenous groups and Russians, while income and wage data reflect a consistent disparity. The picture is similar for the Russian Federation as a whole (Table 4). Differences in government-versus-private employment, arrears, wage and pay cuts between Russians and non-Russians were modest, though with slightly more of an advantage for Russians.[47] The gap in wages and incomes also favored local Russian residents.

Within this overall pattern, however, there were some notable differences across republics. In the case of Tatarstan, levels of unemployment, wage arrears, and unpaid leave were very similar between

Tatars and Russians (Table 4). Experiences with reductions in pay and hours were less so: Russians faced more cuts, apparently because they were more likely to work in big plants (such as Kamaz and the defense industry) and in the "new economy."

In Sakha, gaps between Sakha and Russians were larger, but also offset each other. In this case, the Sakha were far less likely to experience unpaid leaves or pay cuts, but they were somewhat more likely to be jobless, and less likely to work in private or foreign firms (Table 4). When it came to income and wages, they faced the largest gap among the three republics – not surprisingly, given the continued high concentration of Russians in diamond and gold mining and of Sakha in agriculture.

Economic differences also tended to balance each other out in North Ossetia, but with the positions of Ossetins and Russians reversed. Ossetins experienced higher levels of unemployment, and if they were employed, more frequently had jobs in private businesses. However, the private employment in this case appeared to be largely informal (such as chelnoki, seamstresses/tailors, drivers). This may be a product of the large number of resettled immigrants in the republic – lacking established networks, many people simply have had to fend for themselves.

For the most part, then, pain and gain have offset each other. This becomes even clearer from the multivariate analysis in Tables 6a-c. The analysis, in Tables 6a-c, includes five dependent variables: employment in a government-owned workplace; employment in a privately-, self- or foreign-owned workplace; experience with cuts in pay or hours; unemployment; and wages. The data are assessed two ways – first, with nationality as the sole explanatory variable, and then with a full model incorporating controls for social and political background. Background variables include rural residence, gender, education, and age. The models also include the sector in which respondents are employed, to tap the impact of the CDL. Two other variables are included as well – former CPSU membership (since that might confer economic advantage),[48] and immigrant status (i.e., whether people were born in the republic or moved there).

As the first row in Tables 6a-c demonstrates, ethnicity taken alone has only a limited impact. It proves significant across the board when it comes to government ownership of the workplace and

employment in the new economy.[49] But it has a less consistent effect on the other measures of pain and gain. And once we add in background or structural variables, its impact diminishes. Thus we can explain unemployment better by residence in a rural area. And we can explain the incidence of pay and wage cuts better by immigrant status. Government ownership, employment in the new economy and pay levels are better explained by economic branch.[50]

The data in Tables 6a-c thus reinforce the conclusion that social and economic structure carries more weight than nationality in shaping experiences with economic transition. This is borne out also by correlations with earlier data on the CDL. Using an "index of representation" across different economic branches for each ethnic group (the group's share of employment in a given branch divided by its share of total employment), the correlations between 1989 and 1997 are .82 for Ossetins and .90 for Russians in North Ossetia; .70 and .78 in Sakha; and .75 and .69 in Tatarstan.[51]

Still, the public sector model suggests that efforts to boost the fortunes of indigenous groups might be less overt. If Esman's model is correct, we should find that the republics have higher-than average numbers of employees in government agencies, numbers of students in higher education, and public sector jobs. But while government is still heavily involved in all three regions, there is only limited evidence that local political control has led to a larger-than-average public sector.

In fact, public sector data for Tatarstan and North Ossetia are very similar to those for the Russian Federation as a whole. Most people with jobs work in places where the government is a sole or part owner (Table 7, line E). The RF average is 72 percent, with Tatarstan somewhat higher (80 percent) and North Ossetia somewhat lower (68 percent).[52] Both republics are also close to the Russian Federation average for employment in republic and local government agencies (Table 7, line B). And both regions are similar to the average in higher education. Places in universities and institutes grew across the board during the 1990s, and grew at similar rates in Tatarstan and North Ossetia, while secondary specialized education declined slightly.

In contrast, Sakha diverges sharply from the Russian Federation average, and comes much closer to the public sector model. Government employment is more than twice that of the RF mean level.[53] This

might, of course, be a function of territory: Sakha accounts for 18.2 percent of Russia's territory, but 1.7 percent of regional and local government employment.[54] Other evidence, though, reinforces the conclusion that Sakha did indeed expand the public sector. Table 7 reveals a dramatic increase in the number of students in higher education over the period from 1990/91 to 1997/98 (69 percent in Sakha, compared to 15 percent for Russia as a whole).[55] If we limit the data only to expansion in state institutions, the increase is still 58 versus 8 percent. And secondary specialized education expanded in Sakha, while declining elsewhere.

Thus it appears that Sakha did pursue at least some parts of the public sector strategy that Esman identified. Education was in fact a centerpiece of Sakha president Mikhail Nikolaev's domestic agenda, and with good reason: before the advent of sovereignty, Sakha had a much lower-than-average number of students in post-secondary institutions. Table 7 shows, for example, that North Ossetia, with 2/3 the population of Sakha, had more than twice as many university students in 1990/91. Tatarstan, with 3.5 times the population of Sakha, had nearly nine times as many students. Standardizing these data to control for differences in the size of the student-age population yields the same picture. The ratio of college/university students to the total number of 18-to-24-year-olds was 20.8 percent for Russia in 1990, but 7.5 percent for Sakha.[56] By 1997/98, the corresponding figures were 21.7 percent for the Russian Federation and 11.7 percent for Sakha.

Perceptions of inequality

Thus far our data indicate little evidence of systematic ethnic differences in individual experiences of economic transition. Self-reported data on discrimination seem to bear this out: compared to the large numbers of people experiencing economic problems, relatively few people said that their rights had been violated due to their nationality (Table 8). More people reported that they had been exposed to hostile treatment, however.[57] And perceptions of discrimination and hostile treatment were more common among Russians than among indigenous groups. Only in Sakha – where ethnic differences encompass race – did the indigenous nationality report similar levels of discrimination and hostility.

But if individual experiences with discrimination were relatively limited, perceptions of collective discrimination were not. As Table 8 shows, a majority of Russians, and many Tatars, Ossetins and Sakha believed that nationality was important for access to good jobs and for high government posts. When people were asked which groups were favored, Russians overwhelmingly saw themselves as having limited access.

Conclusions

This essay began by asking how the burdens and benefits of economic transition are distributed when indigenous groups gain home rule. Our evidence reveals that the transition has followed two tracks in the republics studied here, toward indigenous political dominance but economic diversity. On the political side, indigenous groups gained disproportionate representation in elective and non-elective public office. Transition thus heightened local political consolidation – a critical asset in dealing with an unpredictable and divided central government. But on the economic side, the picture is much more varied. There is less evidence of consistent advantage for indigenous groups. Instead, experiences with the economic transition seem to be explained better by the continuing influence of the old CDL, with countervailing advantages and disadvantages for indigenous groups and Russians.

The analysis presented here also provides only limited support for the public sector model. Two of the three regions – Tatarstan and North Ossetia – show little sign of expanded public programs on key indicators such as government ownership, higher education or government employment. Only Sakha diverges, with substantially more employees in government, and more places in higher education. This seems to stem from two things – the greater initial disparities between the Sakha and Russians, and access to export revenues to help underwrite republic programs.

It could be argued, though, that the pattern of offsetting pain and gain outlined here does not capture some other elements of the transition. If the most mobile Russian residents left earlier, we would see relatively equal experiences only because one privileged group had already gone. But outmigration was substantial only in Sakha.[58] The two regions with the more equal incomes and wages – Tatarstan and

North Ossetia – were also the ones with far less attrition of the local Russian population. With data from 1997/98, we might also be missing earlier layoffs or other forms of dislocation. But other questions in the survey reveal little difference among indigenous and Russian respondents in rates of or reasons for leaving their previous job.

It could also be that our emphasis on unemployment, arrears, ownership and the like overlooks other, less visible ways that indigenous leaders rewarded their own. Presidents in both Tatarstan and Sakha, for example, channeled new local revenues from oil and diamonds into off-budget funds under their direct control, and full details are still lacking on how all of the money was spent. Both governments also adopted public programs that would provide disproportionate benefits for some constituencies.

In Tatarstan, sizeable agricultural subsidies not only helped build self-sufficiency in food; they also helped support farmers in a predominantly Tatar countryside. In Sakha, the republic government oversaw the creation of small diamond-processing plants in villages, as a way to counter rural (and thus predominantly Sakha) unemployment. But other government priorities in both republics would benefit Russians as well – such as Tatarstan's efforts to revive its lagging defense plants and Kamaz, and Sakha's efforts to promote its diamond monopoly.

This is not to argue that ethnicity is irrelevant. As Viktoria Koroteeva observes, many sectors of the economy in Tatarstan and Sakha reflect an internal division of labor.[59] Tatarstan's banks, for instance, included predominantly Russian and predominantly Tatar institutions; and it was the Tatar bank Akbars that served as the financial arm of the republic government. Established mining sectors in Sakha such as diamonds were overwhelmingly Russian, while new enterprises in Sakha's oil and gas industry tended to be run by Sakha.

Finally, the evidence here raises a puzzle: how to account for the gap between political indigenization and economic diversity. One explanation might be that political office was simply easier to control than an economy undergoing market transformation. But all of the evidence here, and the

public statements of each government, confirm that all three retained substantial control of the local economy.

Another explanation might focus on time: the economic situation may not change as quickly as the political system did. But other evidence challenges this argument. Titma, Tuma and Silver's research on Estonia found, for example, that the income differential there (net of situational factors) shifted from a slight advantage for Russians to a substantial premium for Estonians over the same period.[60] Changes in Quebec and Malaysia were also fairly rapid. Estonians, Quebecois and Malaysians did have the advantage of majority status, while the titular groups in the two "sovereignist" republics here (Tatarstan and Sakha) were minorities. But while the numerical distribution is important, it seems to be less critical than policies that privilege the indigenous language. These, as Esman notes, are used to "raise the value of the indigenous language," and can make a critical – and relatively quick – difference in rewards.[61]

A third explanation for the distinction between political indigenization and economic diversity may be that republic governments have sought to provide different "goods" for different publics: emphasizing political rewards and culture for the indigenous population and soft economic transition for Russians. Lilia Sagitova has found, for example, that discussions of republic rights were couched differently in Tatar-language versus Russian-language media in the 1990s. Tatar media focused on questions of language and culture, while local Russian media highlighted the economic side of local autonomy.[62] And Dmitry Gorenburg has argued that republic leaders emphasized the economic advantages of sovereignty in general but also quietly promoted ethnic revival among titular groups.[63]

The political payoff for republic governments seems to be mixed, however. Compared to the pervasive incidence of economic pain, relatively few people see themselves as individual victims of discrimination. But most local Russians see pronounced collective discrimination in access to government posts and good jobs. Measured transition may have limited the risks of heightened ethnic stratification, but it has had much less effect on the subjective sense of inequality.

Tables

Table 1. Ethnicity and Political Representation in Republic Parliaments

	Tatarstan		*North Ossetia*		*Sakha*	
	Tatars	Russians	N. Ossetins	Russians	Yakuts	Russians
A. Share of Population						
1989	48.5%	43.3%	53%	30%	33.4%	50.3%
B. Share of seats						
1990	58.0	38.0	70	24	46.3	34.2
1995	73.3	25.1	86	10	60.8	27.5

Source: Robert Kaiser, "Political Indigenization and Homeland-Making in Russia's Republics," Report to the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. (Washington, March, 2000).

Table 2. Economic Conditions in Tatarstan, North Ossetia and Sakha[1]

	1992	*1993*	*1994*	*1995*	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*
A. Population (thous.)							
Tatarstan	3,696	3,723	3,744	3,755	3,760	3,767	3,774
North Ossetia	695	651	650	659	663	665	663
Sakha	1,093	1,074	1,061	1,036	1,023	1,016	1,003
B. GDP per capita (thous. current rubles)[2]							
Tatarstan			3237.0	10067.2	15316.1	17813.5	
North Ossetia			1345.7	3526.6	4780.5	5127.4	
Sakha			8079.6	19756.0	26682.6	29678.1	
Russian Federation			*3583.7*	*9562.2*	*13230.0*	*15794.1*	
C. Unemployment (%)[3]							
Tatarstan	3.6	3.6	6.1	6.5	6.5	7.9	10.9
North Ossetia				23.3	30.1	22.2	26.6
Sakha	3.4	3.9	6	7.1	6.7	12.6	13.6
Russian Federation	*5.2*	*5.9*	*8.1*	*9.5*	*9.7*	*11.8*	*13.3*
D. Percent of popn below official poverty line							
Tatarstan			15.4	22.1	19.3	17.9	19.9
North Ossetia			33.1	42.8	38.5	33.9	35.3
Sakha			22.7	29.2	30.4	28.3	32.0
Russian Federation			*22.4*	*24.7*	*22.1*	*20.8*	*23.8*
E. Ratio of avg Income/poverty Level							
Tatarstan			238	205	217	242	217
North Ossetia			139	137	137	158	150
Sakha			200	163	169	187	163
Russian Federation			*240*	*195*	*206*	*226*	*197*

[1] Blanks indicate that no data are available for a given year.

[2] Data on GDP per capita for the Russian Federation represent the sum of regional products, excluding some services carried out only at the federal level and not distributed among regions.

[3] Unemployment data are defined according to ILO criteria: the percent of working-age population who do not have a paid job and are looking for one (p. 103). (I.e., the data are not limited only to people officially registered with employment services.)

Source for ratio of average income/poverty level, 1994: : *Regiony Rossii. Statisticheskii sbornik*, tom 2, (Moscow, 1998), pp. 110-111. All other data: *Regiony Rossii. Statisticheskii sbornik*. Tom 2. (Moscow, 1999), pp. 32-33; 97-98; 128-29; 134-35; 279-81.

Table 3. Nationality of Supervisors (Working-Age Only)[4]

	Tatarstan	*North Ossetia*	*Sakha*
Of all employed, % whose supervisers are:			
Indigenous	54.8	69.8	41.1
Russian	38.5	20.7	43.2
(N)	(530)	(333)	(609)
% of each group who are heads of ents/orgs			
Indigenous	0.8	1.9	2.3
(N)	(266)	(208)	(263)
Russian	1.3	1.7	1.6
(N)	(226)	(119)	(318)

[4] Includes only people who are employed and of working-age (for women, 18-54; for men, 18-59).

Source: Ethnonationalism and Democratization Survey, 1997/98.

Table 4. Employment Status and Job Dislocation among Titular Nationalities and Russians (Working-Age Only)[5]

	Russian Federation		*Tatarstan*		*North Ossetia*		*Sakha*	
	Non-Russ.	Russian	Tatars	Russians	Ossetins	Russians	Yakuts	Russians
A. Employment status								
Employed	66.8	72.0	79.5	75.6	58.5	61.3	72.5	78.0
Unemployed[6]	18.1	13.4	10.7	11.5	21.6	13.7	13.8	10.8
(N)	(769)	(4281)	(336)	(295)	(357)	(197)	(363)	(406)
B. Of those working:								
% employed in ent/org	96.7	95.9	96.5	93.7	79.5	90.1	92.3	92.1
% self-employed	3.3	4.1	3.5	6.3	20.5	9.9	7.7	7.9
(N)	(511)	(3140)	(259)	(222)	(210)	(121)	(259)	(316)
C. Of those working in ents./organizations, % owned by[7]								
Government	80.9	73.4	89.3	83.2	79.8	89.8	88.5	83.6
	(461)	(2858)	(243)	(202)	(163)	(108)	(235)	(280)
Respondent	20.1	19.8	15.1	14.1	8.4	6.5	10.6	16.4
	(483)	(2970)	(245)	(206)	(167)	(108)	(235)	(287)
Other private domestic[8]	28.2	33.8	8.0	12.6	9.6	7.0	4.8	16.5
	(458)	(2792)	(225)	(183)	(156)	(100)	(231)	(260)
Foreigners	3.2	3.8	2.1	5.7	2.4	1.9	2.2	4.6
	(463)	(2869)	(241)	(193)	(164)	(107)	(231)	(281)
D. Of all employed, % working in govt-owned workplace	78.0	70.2	81.6	75.0	61.9	80.8	79.7	73.6
	(478)	(2987)	(266)	(224)	(210)	(120)	(261)	(318)
E. Workplace disruption:								
Wages still outstanding	72.5	59.8	64.7	64.6	61.4	55.4	88.8	83.3
	(491)	(2992)	(266)	(223)	(207)	(121)	(258)	(311)
Sent on unpaid leave in last 2 yrs	--	--	14.2	16.9	19.9	20.4	14.8	27.0
			(239)	(207)	(161)	(108)	(236)	(281)
Wages/hours cut in last 2 yrs	--	--	18.3	30.4	27.9	32.4	23.3	42.8
			(241)	(207)	(165)	(108)	(236)	(290)

[5] The data read down the columns – e.g., of all working-age Tatars, 79.5 percent were employed and 11.5 percent were unemployed. "Working age" is defined as age 18-54 for women and 18-59 for men.

[6] Other responses, such as non-working student or pensioner, are excluded, so the column does not add up to 100 percent. "Unemployed" is self-defined here – and may not correspond completely to official data based on the ILO definition. I.e., some respondents may be self-employed or do odd jobs, and would not count themselves as having a "job."

[7] Each question about ownership was asked separately, to allow for multiple forms of ownership in a single enterprise. (I.e., the columns add up to more than 100% because of multiple ownership.)

[8] The questions on private ownership in the workplace are slightly different for the Russian Federation (in RLMS) and for the republics, and may slightly inflate the percentages for the RF. The republic questionnaire asked people if they themselves were owners of their workplace, and then if there were any other private owners. The Russian Federation questionnaire asked if there were any private owners and if respondents themselves were owners – and so might include some overlaps of the two.

Sources for Table 4:

Russian Federation: Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 1996
Republics: Ethnonationalism and Democratization Survey, 1997/98

Table 5. Income and Wages among Titular Nationalities and Russians

	Russian Federation		*Tatarstan*		*North Ossetia*		*Sakha*	
	Non-Russians	Russians	Tatars	Russians	Ossetins	Russians	Yakuts	Russians
A. Mean personal income[9] (thous. rubles)			451.5 (431)	497.4 (426)	478.0 (454)	536.9 (307)	678.2 (431)	996.0 (459)
Working-age only			506.1 (257)	618.0 (246)	562.4 (309)	654.3 (178)	689.6 (346)	1042.2 (368)
Pension-age only			370.4 (173)	332.5 (180)	298.7 (145)	374.2 (128)	631.6 (85)	807.4 (90)
B. Mean pay received from main job[10] (thous. rubles, working-age only)	492.7 (500)	528.0 (3079)	329.3 (266)	380.0 (223)	493.4 (209)	538.5 (120)	326.4 (260)	622.4 (315)
C. Ratio of Russian to indigenous:								
Mean personal income - total population			110.2		112.3		146.9	
Mean personal income - working-age only			122.1		116.3		151.1	
Mean personal income - pension-age only			89.8		125.3		127.8	
Mean pay from main job - working-age only		107.2	115.4		109.1		190.7	

[9] Total personal income for previous 30 days.
[10] Total pay received for previous 30 days from main job. Respondents who were working but did not receive a pay envelope were coded as "0".

Sources:

Russian Federation: Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 1996
Republics: Ethnonationalism and Democratization Survey, 1997/98

Table 6a. Tatarstan: Employment Status, Dislocation and Wages (Working Age Only)

	A. Govt. own	*B. New ec.*	*C. Cut hours/ Unpaid leave*	*D. Unempl*	*E. Wages*
1. Nationality only					
Russian	-.38*	.43**	.49**	.08	45.5
R2/Pseudo R2	.01	.01	.02	.00	.00
2. Full model					
Russian	-.52*	.16	.43*	.09	- 2.1
Rural	.34	- .20	-.28	- .80**	- 67.2
Female	.57*	- .03	.36	.08	- 39.3
Education					
Secondary	-1.34*	.75	-.15	- .89***	141.3*
Higher	- .79	.67	-.88*	- .92*	320.1***
Age	.07	- .09	.06	- .15	38.9
Immigrated to republic	-.19	- .14	.88**	.31	- 28.2
Cpsu mbr	- .64	.88*	.15	- .72	27.7
Work in:					
New ec.					164.9**
Ind/constr.	.50	1.31***	.10		-140.4**
Agriculture	1.47**	- .89	- .07		-270.8***
Humanities/svc	1.31**	-1.11**	-.61*		- 99.6
Trade	- .87	.89*	-.21		-295.7***
Intercept	2.63**	-2.79**	- .18 1.32*	-2.52***	601.7***
Adj./pseudo R2	.17	.22	.11	.05	.09
N	516	516	427	704	434

Columns:

A. Logistic regression estimates. Dependent variable=1 if workplace owned by government; 0 if owned by others.

B. Logistic regression estimates. Dependent variable=1 if R worked in a private or foreign enterprise/organization, 0 if R worked elsewhere.

C. Ordinal logit estimates. Dependent variable=1 if R experienced both a cut in hours/pay and unpaid leave in past 2 years; .5 if r experienced one of these; and 0 if neither.

D. Logistic regression estimates. Dependent variable=1 if R reported being unemployed; 0 otherwise.

E. OLS estimates on pay for previous 30 days, in thousands of rubles. People who did not receive a Pay envelope are counted as "0".

*** significant at $p \leq .01$
** significant at $p \leq .05$
* significant at $p \leq .10$

Source: Ethnonationalism and Democratization Survey, 1997/98

Table 6b. North Ossetia: Employment Status, Dislocation and Wages (Working Age Only)

	A. Govt. own	*B New ec.*	*C. Cut hours/ Unpaid leave*	*D. Unempl*	*E. Wages*
1. Nationality Only					
Russian	.94***	-.64**	.11	-.55**	42.6
R2/ Pseudo R2	.05	.03	.00	.02	-.00
2. Full model					
Russian	1.18***	-.53	.25	-.47*	68.8
Rural	.70	.78*	.13	1.02***	280.5***
Female	.20	-.22	.23	.51**	-343.6***
Education					
Secondary	.95*	.44	.61	.21	-639.2***
Higher	.64	1.14	.47	.23	-415.9***
Age	.29*	-.23	.08	-.11	- 6.0
Immigrated to republic	1.16**	.46	.53*	.64**	149.0
Cpsu mbr	.62	-.05	74*	-.62	-255.8*
Work in:					
New ec.					175.9
Ind/constr.	-.86*	.56	.81**		-69.3
Agriculture	.53	-3.05**	1.41***		-750.4***
Humanities/ svc	-.17	-2.12***	.06		-303.2***
Trade	-.57	1.33**	.80*		104.1
Intercept	3.14***	-3.26**	.92 2.38***	-2.37**	1043.6***
Adj./pseudo R2	.15	.24	.11	.10	.18
N	343	343	269	619	268

Table 6c. Sakha: Employment Status, Dislocation and Wages (Working Age Only)

	A. Govt. own	*B. New ec.*	*C. Cut hours/ Unpaid leave*	*D. Unempl*	*E. Wages*
1. Nationality only					
Russian	-.34*	.48**	.92***	.08	259.9***
Pseudo R2	.01	.02	.06	.00	.01
2. Full model					
Russian	-.27	.60*	.19	.20	55.1
Rural	.55	.24	-.43*	.63**	-314.0**
Female	.14	-.59**	-.39*	-.01	-117.9
Education					
Secondary	.05	.49	-.10	-.29	144.5
Higher	.07	1.23**	-.70*	-.48	692.8***
Age	.11	.20*	.11	-.53**	6.0
Immigrated to republic	.19	-.48	.62**	.19	69.9
Cpsu mbr	.31	-.55	-.22	-.22	-303.2
Work in:					
New ec.					25.2
Ind/constr.	-.18	.95***	.46*		-86.6
Agriculture	-.95**	.46	.13		-257.5
Humanities/svc	.83*	-1.39***	-.14		-79.4
Trade	-.73*	.47	-.42		36.2
Intercept	2.38**	-1.10	-1.22* .50	-5.71***	492.4
Adj./pseudo R2	.09	.17	.13	.08	.06
N	546	546	511	772	511

Table 7. Scope of Public Sector

	Russian Federation	*Tatarstan*	*N. Ossetia*	*Sakha*
A. Total govt employment per 1000 popn. 1997[11]	8	6	8	14
B. Total govt employment per 1000 popn excl. federal exec branch. 1997[12]	4.5	3.9	4.5	10.5
C. Students enrolled in all higher educ. institutions (thousands)[13]				
1990/91	2824.1	70.0	18.8	8.0
1997/98	3248.3	82.9	21.4	13.5
% change 1990/91 to 1997/98	15.0%	18.4%	13.8%	68.8%
% change in state insts only	7.9%	7.2%	11.2%	57.5%
D. Students enrolled in state secondary spec. educ. institutions (thousands)				
1990/91	2270	57.8	12.4	10.5
1997/98	2011.1	52.7	10.2	10.8
% change 1990/91 to 1997/98	-11.4%	-8.8%	-17.7%	2.8%
E. Of all employed, percent working in a govt-owned ent/org[14] (working-age only)	71.4 (3506)	79.7 (365)	68.4 (404)	76.6 (663)

[11] Includes federal, republic and local employees of "organs of state power," i.e., executive, legislative and judicial branches; excludes military and police.
[12] Excludes employees of federal executive agencies.
[13] The absolute number of students includes those in both state and non-state higher educational institutions.
[14] Includes all respondents who said that the government was an owner or part-owner of their enterprise/organization.

Sources:

Government employment, higher and sec. specialized education: *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik*. (*RSE*) M., 1998: 24-28, 54-55, 99-100, 280-81, 285-86; and *RSE* 2000: 195-96. *Regiony Rossii 1999*, tom 2. (Moscow, 1999): 186-87, 198-201.

Government ownership – RF: Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 1996
Government ownership – republics: Ethnonationalism and Democratization survey, 1997/98

Table 8. Subjective Assessments of Economic Status and Ethnic Discrimination (Working-Age Only)

	Tatarstan		*North Ossetia*		*Sakha*	
	Tatars	Russians	N. Ossetins	Russians	Yakut	Russians
A. Sense of individual discrimination						
Experienced ethnic discrimination	4.2 (331)	9.5 (295)	1.4 (357)	13.0 (193)	10.6 (369)	13.4 (402)
Experienced hostile treatment due to nationality	5.1 (336)	16.6 (290)	3.1 (356)	30.7 (192)	24.3 (358)	21.8 (403)
B. Sense of collective discrimination						
Nationality important to get good jobs	18.3 (328)	62.2 (283)	23.8 (345)	69.7 (188)	31.0 (345)	58.5 (395)
Nationality important to get govt posts	28.9 (329)	68.1 (279)	20.8 (341)	72.2 (187)	32.0 (338)	72.4 (392)
Other natls favored for good jobs	2.0 (302)	63.9 (244)	2.6 (308)	74.7 (162)	25.3 (296)	59.1 (347)
Other natls favored for govt posts	4.1 (316)	72.3 (264)	1.0 (308)	76.3 (169)	8.8 (307)	75.3 (364)

Source: Ethnonationalism and Democratization Survey, 1997/98

Appendix 1. Survey data

A. Design and implementation of surveys in Tatarstan, North Ossetia and Sakha

The surveys analyzed here were fielded by Paragon Research International (under the direction of Michael Swafford) and Polina Kozyreva and Mikhail Kosolapov of Demoscope in Moscow. Questionnaires were written in Russian, translated and blind-back-translated in each of the three titular languages. Questionnaires were pretested in each republic before being finalized.

The sample design was developed with two goals in mind: to compare responses of the titular nationality and local Russian residents, and to allow inferences about the entire adult population. Since Russians and titular groups were not evenly distributed within each region, the design included a probability sample with a target of 1000 respondents in each republic (including respondents of other nationalities), and an oversample in each case for the underrepresented group, to insure roughly equal numbers of indigenous and Russian residents.

The sample was stratified first by urban-rural units within each republic. (Some remote parts of Sakha were excluded due to very low population density and inaccessibility by public transport.) Urban areas were then stratified further by population size, the largest cities were chosen with certainty, and sample selection for smaller cities was based on probability proportional to size (PPS). Cities were then subdivided into districts, and districts were selected at random for inclusion in the sample. Within each district, field staff compiled a list of all dwellings and then chose dwellings for inclusion systematically starting with a random number. Within each dwelling, a respondent was chosen based on the Kish procedure. Rural areas were selected for inclusion from the regions that had been randomly selected in stage two. Within each one thus selected, villages were further stratified by ethnic composition (so that interviewers with the appropriate language fluency could be assigned to each village), and then those with at least 100 inhabitants were ordered by size and selected by PPS. Within each village selected, households were selected systematically from residence registration books, and within each household, a respondent was selected using the Kish procedure.

Interviewers made up to three attempts to contact respondents. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, in respondents' homes. Response rates were 87 percent in Tatarstan, 91 percent in North Ossetia, and 84 percent in Sakha. Respondents in all but a few cases were interviewed by same-nationality interviewers, and were given the option of using the titular language or Russian for the interview. Ten percent of the cases were checked ex-post, to insure that sampling and interview procedures had been followed correctly.

B. The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey

RLMS is an ongoing survey under the direction of the Carolina Population Center, first fielded in 1992. It focuses on the economic and social consequences of the transition for the Russian Federation. The data used here are from Round VII, fielded in the fall of 1996 by Paragon Research International and Demoscope. Respondents were drawn by a multistage probability sample, stratified by geographical factors, level of urbanization, and ethnicity. The sample included 38 primary sampling units (psu's), 32 in Russian regions, 5 in republics (the Komi, Chuvash, Tatar, Kabardino-Balkar, and Udmurt republics), and one in the Khanty-Mansiisk A.O. (Data from Tatarstan are excluded from the analysis here.) The sampling unit was the household, and interviews were conducted face-to-face with all adult members except those temporarily living away from home. All interviews were in Russian. For information on survey design and sampling, see the CPC website at www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home/html.

Appendix 2. Questionnaire items and variables used in the analysis

A. Republic questionnaire

1. Type of ownership at workplace: Respondents with a job in the previous 30 days were asked four questions about ownership:

   a. Is the government an owner or co-owner of your enterprise or organization? [yes; no]
   b. Is any foreign firm or foreign private entity an owner or co-owner of your ent/org? [yes; no]
   c. Are you personally an owner or co-owner of the ent/org in which you work? [yes; no]
   d. Is any other Russian private entity, group of enterprises, private firm or bank an owner or co-owner of your ent/org? [yes; no]

2. Employment status: Please look at this card and tell me what you mostly did in the past 30 days....

   a. Worked for hire permanently or temporarily
   b. Engaged in private enterprise (trade, business, farming)
   c. Was on maternity or medical leave
   d. Was on unpaid leave
   e. Was on pension and did not work
   f. Was a full-time student and did not work
   g. Temporarily unemployed
   h. Other

3. Work in organization or individually: Working respondents were asked,

   At that job, are you working in an enterprise or organization [1], or
   Are you working individually [2]?

4. Workplace disruption: Working respondents were asked,

   Have you encountered such things as _____ at that job in the past 2 years....

   Involuntary cut in pay or hours? [yes; no]

   Involuntary unpaid leave? [yes; no]

   At present, have you received all the money you were supposed to receive for that job, or not? [yes; no]

5. Personal income: Please try to remember your personal money income over the past 30 days. Include everything – wages, bonuses, profits, pay from odd jobs, pensions, stipends, material assistance, incidental earnings, and other monetary receipts, including those in valiuta – but translate the valiuta into rubles.

   _____ rubles

6. Wages: Respondents who were paid at work during the past 30 days were asked:

How much in all did you receive for that work in the past 30 days, after taxes?

_____ rubles

Those who worked but did not receive any pay were assigned a "0".

7. Nationality: What is your nationality?

_____

8. Education: Tell me, please, what is your education? [CARD]

a. No education, illiterate
b. Primary
c. Incomplete secondary
d. Secondary
e. Secondary specialized
f. Incomplete higher
g. Higher
h. Advanced degree
i. Other

9. CPSU membership: Earlier many people joined the CPSU. Were you a member or candidate member of the CPSU?

Member
Candidate
Neither

Recoded so that 1=member; 0=candidate or non-member.

10. Economic branch: Working respondents were asked:

Where – in what enterprise or organization are you working? We are not interested in the name. Please tell us what that enterprise/organization does, such as a factory, school, farm or a grocery store.

_____

11. Ethnic hostility: Have you personally encountered hostility in everyday life in this republic due to your nationality …

In open form
Not openly, but you felt it
Have not encountered hostility

12. Collective discrimination:

A. Do you think that a person's nationality in this republic affects his chances to get the best jobs?

Yes
No

B. Which nationality has more opportunities to get the best jobs in this republic?

_____

C. Do you think that a person's nationality in this republic affects his chances to hold a high government post?

Yes
No

D. Which nationality has more opportunities to get a high government post in this republic?

_____

B. . Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey

1. Type of ownership at workplace: Respondents with a job in the previous 30 days were asked four questions about ownership:

a. Is the government an owner or co-owner of your enterprise or organization? [yes; no]
b. Are any foreign firms or foreign private entities owners or co-owners of your ent/org? [yes; no]
c. Are any Russian private entities, groups of enterprises, or private firms owners or co-owner of your ent/org? [yes; no]
d. Are you personally an owner or co-owner of the ent/org in which you work? [yes; no]

2. Employment status: Please look at this card and tell me what you mostly did in the past 30 days....

a. student in secondary school or PTU
b. fulltime student in a higher educational inst. or tekhnikum
c. not working due to health reasons; invalid
d. nonworking pensioner
e. on paid maternity leave
f. on maternity leave with guaranteed return to job
g. housewife; caring for other family members, children
h. temporarily unemployed for other reasons and looking for work
i. temporarily unemployed for other reasons and not looking for work

j. Private farmer [fermer]
k. Entrepreneur
l. Working in an enterprise/organization
m. Working, but not in an enterprise/organization
i. Other

For Table 4, this was recoded so employed=e,f,j,k,l,m; and unemployed=h,i.

3. Work in organization or individually: Working respondents were asked,

> At that job, are you working in an enterprise or organization [1], or
> Are you working individually [2]?

4. Workplace disruption: At present does your enterprise owe you any money, which for some reason you have not received on time? [yes; no]

5. Pay: How much money did you receive from your main place of work in the last 30 days, after taxes? If you received some or all of it in valiuta, please translate that into rubles and give me the total sum.

_____ rubles

Notes

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[1] The term is from Michael Hechter, "Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology* 84, 2, 1978, pp. 293-318.

[2]Julian Birch notes, for example, that North Ossetia has relied heavily on aid from Moscow to cope with refugees from the South, and on political support from Moscow in the ongoing battle with Ingushetia. See "Ossetiya – Land of Uncertain Frontiers and Manipulative Elites," *Central Asian Survey* 18, 4, 1999, pp. 501-34.

[3]Branko Milanovic, *Income, Inequality and Poverty During the Transition from Planned to Market Economy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), p. 197; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *Transition Report 2000: Employment, Skills and Transition* (London, EBRD, 2000), p. 65.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Reported unemployment rates are from *Regiony Rossii: Statisticheskii sbornik 1998, tom 2* (Moscow, Goskomstat, 1998), p. 89; and *Regiony Rossii: Statisticheskii sbornik 1999, tom 2* (Moscow, Goskomstat, 1999), p. 97. These volumes give slightly different figures for the same year, but the differences are extremely small.

[6]Milanovic, *Income, Inequality and Poverty*, p. 41.

[7]*Regiony Rossii: Statisticheskii sbornik 1999, tom 2*, p. 134. The EBRD reports a poverty level for 2000 of 35 percent. *Transition Report 2000*, p. 204.

[8]Jeanine D. Braithwaite, "The Old and New Poor in Russia," in Jeni Klugman, ed., *Poverty in Russia: Public Policy and Private Responses* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1997), pp. 29-64; Michael Lokshin and Barry Popkin, "The Emerging Underclass in the Russian Federation: Income Dynamics, 1992-1996," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 47, 1999, pp. 803-829.

[9]The twelve republics with poverty levels of 30 percent or more in 1997 (and the total percentage of the population below the poverty line) included Ingushetia (76.9), Tyva (62.4), Dagestan (53.9), Mari-El (52.1), Kalmykia (46), Buryatia (44.3), Karachaevo-Cherkessk (41), Adygeia (40.2), Kabardino-Balkharia (39.8), Altai republic (39.2), Mordovia (38.6), and North Ossetia (33.9). Seven of these are in the North Caucasus. (No data are available for Chechnya.) The nine Russian regions with poverty levels of 30+ were: Chita oblast (61.2), Altai krai (45.7), Kurgan oblast (42.6), Novosibirsk oblast (39.3), Penza oblast (38), Stavropol' krai (34.8), Sakhalin oblast (32.8), Saratov oblast (32.1), and Kirov oblast (30.8). See *Regiony Rossii. Statisticheskii sbornik, tom. 2*, 1999, pp. 134-35.

[10]I am using the terms "titular" and "indigenous" interchangeably, to avoid repeating the same term. Note though that there is some controversy on the question of who should be counted as "indigenous," since many local Russians – and other nationalities – have long-established roots in each region.

[11]A. B. Dzadziev, "Otraslevoi sostav zaniatogo naseleniia Severnoi Osetii (1959-1989 gg.)," in *Voprosy sotsiologii Severnoi Osetii* (Vladikavkaz., 1993), p. 45; and L. K. Gostieva and A. B. Dzadziev, "Ocherki ob etnopoliticheskoi situatsii" in *Severnaia Osetia: etnopoliticheskie protsessy 1990-1994. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Khronika. Tom 1* (Moscow, Institut etnologii i antropologii, 1995), pp. 14-76. Dzadziev and Gostieva calculated representation across economic branches from 1989 census data, by taking the proportion of a nationality group employed in a given branch and dividing it by the proportion of all employed in that branch within the republic.

[12]Viktoria Koroteeva, *Ekonomicheskie interesy i natsionalizm* (Moscow, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2000), p. 151. Roza Musina provides additional data in "The Problems of Sovereignty and Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Tatarstan," in Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, ed., *Culture Incarnate: Native Anthropology from Russia* (Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 113-22.

[13]V. B. Ignat'eva, "Promyshlennoe osvoenie Yakutii i ego vliianie na sotsial'noe razvitie korennykh narodov," in *Natsional'naia politika v regione. Po materialam Respubliki Sakha (Yakutia)* (Yakutsk, Yakutskii nauchnyi tsentr Sibirskogo otdeleniia RAN, 1993), p. 46; and V. B. Ignat'eva, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia Yakutii* (Yakutsk, Yakutskii nauchnyi tsentr Sibirskogo otdeleniia RAN, 1994), p. 99. Ignat'eva's data are calculated in the same way as those by Dzadziev and Gostieva.

[14]Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 10, 4, October 1987, pp. 415-26; see also, Ronald Rogowski, in Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds. *New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation* (Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1985).

[15]Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[16]Milton Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," *Comparative Politics*, 19, 1987, pp. 295 – 318.

[17]Esman, "Ethnic Politics."

[18] Daniel Shapiro and Morton Stelcner, "Language and Earnings in Quebec: Trends over Twenty Years, 1970-1990," *Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques*, 23, 2, 1997, pp. 115-40.

[19]Hugh McRoberts, "Language and Mobility: A Comparison of Three Groups," in Monica Boyd et al., eds. *Ascription and Achievement: Studies in Mobility and Status Attainment in Canada* (Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1985), pp. 335-56; Christopher Taucar, *Canadian Federalism and Quebec Sovereignty* (New York, Peter Lang, 2000); Richard Wanner, "Expansion and Ascription: Trends in Educational Opportunity in Canada, 1920-1994," *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 36, 1999, pp. 409-42.

[20]Esman, "Ethnic Politics."

[21]Goh Ban Lee, "Restructuring Society in Malaysia: Its Impact on Employment and Investment," in S.W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, editors, *Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict* (London, Pinter, 1991), pp. 74-95.

[22]Charles Hirschman, "Political Independence and Educational Opportunity in Peninsular Malaysia," *Sociology of Education*, 52, 1979, pp. 67-83; Su-ling Pong, "Preferential Policies and Secondary School Attainment in Peninsular Malaysia," *Sociology of Education*, 66, 1993, pp. 245-61.

[23]Lee, "Restructuring Society," pp. 80-93;

[24]Leslie Laczko, "Language, Region, Race, Gender and Income: Perceptions of Inequalities in Quebec and English Canada," in Alan Frizzell and Jon Pammett, eds. *Social Inequality in Canada* (Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1996), pp. 107-26.

[25]Lee, "Restructuring Society," pp. 91-2.

[26]Darrell Slider, "Privatization in Russia's Regions" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 10, 1994, pp. 367-96.

[27]Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, "Homelands, Leadership and Self Rule: Observations on Interethnic Relations in the Sakha Republic," *Polar Geography*, 19, 1995, pp. 284-305; Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer and Uliana Alekseevna Vinokurova, "Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and Federalism: the Case of the Sakha Republic," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, 1, 1996, pp. 101-20; Oleg Morozov, "Tatarstanskaia model' sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh reform," in

Ekonomicheskie reformy v regionakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Opyt i perspektivy (Moscow, Institut sovremennoi politiki, 1998), pp. 85-95; Katherine Graney, "Institutionalizing National Communities in Post-Soviet Russia: The Politics of State Symbols, Public Space, and Culture in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan," American Political Science Association annual meeting, 1998.

[28]The strategy is outlined in *Perspektivy razvitiia regionov Rossii: Formula Tatarstana*, (Kazan, Tsentr ekonomicheskikh i sotsial'nykh issledovanii pri Kabinete Ministrov RT, 2001).

[29]*Vremya i den'gi* (Kazan') 22 June 2000, p. 2.

[30]The speaker of the republic parliament, Farid Mukhametshin, noted in a speech to the World Congress of Tatars in 1999 that the republic had avoided the worst fallout of the 1998 financial crisis by retaining golden stakes in enterprises and excluding non-local banks from setting up shop in the republic. (Author's notes, Kazan', June 1999).

[31]Koroteeva, *Ekonomicheskie interesy*, p. 118.

[32]Birch, "Ossetiya." Note that the expulsion of the Ingush created the opportunity to resettle southern refugees in abandoned areas.

[33]*Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 8 July 1992, p. 3. North Ossetia has also faced substantial problems with alcohol smuggling from the South. (Raw alcohol is trucked in for processing and bottling in North Ossetia.) One estimate suggested that bootleggers smuggled in some $600 million in raw alcohol during 1996. See *Obshchaia gazeta*, 31 July- 6 August 1997, p. 2.

[34]Note, though, that the pattern of political indigenization has varied across the republics as a whole. In some, the indigenous nationality actually lost ground in legislative elections. See Robert Kaiser, "Political Indigenization and Homeland-Making in Russia's Republics," Report to the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, March, 2000.

[35]The Tatar share was roughly the same as of 2000 (95 out of 130 seats), according to Lilia Sagitova, "Neravenstvo," unpublished ms., (Kazan', Institut Istorii AN RT, 2001). By unofficial accounts, the Tatar share of the population by then was slightly over 50 percent. Earlier data on public office are more difficult to locate; but one source suggests that the Tatar share of party and government posts had been closer to half just before the onset of perestroika. See K. S. Idiatullina, *Regional'noe politicheskoe liderstvo v Rossii: Put' evoliutsii* (Kazan', Karpol, 1997).

[36]For example, Tatars outnumbered Russians by a factor of two or three to one in councils of the four largest cities in the mid-1990s – including predominantly Russian cities such as Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny. See *Tatarstan: Osnovy politicheskogo ustroistva i kratkaia kharakteristika ekonomiki* (Moscow, Panorama, 1996). (This breakdown by nationality is based on coding of Tatar and Russian names.)

[37]I could not find published information on how the ethnic makeup of the republic population changed, but unofficial data suggest that Russians had dropped from 30 percent in 1989 to 26 percent by 2000.

[38]I.E. Spiridonova, "Aktual'nye problemy etnokul'turnogo vzaimodeistvia v RS (Ya): 90-e gody XX veka," in V. N. Ivanov, ed., *Etnosotsial'noe razvitie respubliki Sakha (Yakutia)* (Novosibirsk, Nauka, 2000), p. 204. Spiridonova puts the Yakut share of the population at 40 percent as of 1996. Another source gives the proportions for 1994 as 39.6 percent Yakut and 45.5 percent Russian. See *Respublika Sakha v tsifrakh. Kratkii statisticheskii sbornik* (Yakutsk, Goskomstat RS, 1998), p. 12.

[39]Explanations for political indigenization vary. Robert Kaiser, in "Political Indigenization," suggests that it may be the product of network and clan politics, and these predictably lead to greater representation for the indigenous nationalities. John Loewenhardt highlights more overt efforts to control public office by manipulating electoral returns, in "The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*

13, 1, March, 1997, pp. 132-44; and "The Village Votes: The December 1999 Elections in Tatarstan's Pestretsy District," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16, 3, September, 2000, pp. 113-22.

[40]Sagitova, "Neravenstvo," and "Osobennosti rynochnoj ekonomiki v RT," *Zvezda povolzh'ia* (Kazan'), 14 June 2000, p. 3.

[41]"Tendentsii etnosotial'nogo razvitia Sakha i Russkikh," in Ivanov, *Etnosotsial'noe razvitie Respubliki Sakha (Yakutiia)*, pp. 135-62.

[42] Koroteeva, *Ekonomicheskie interesy*.

[43]I conducted interviews with public officials, journalists, scholars and others in Tatarstan, each year from 1997 to 2001 and in Sakha in 1997 and 1999-2001. Travel to North Ossetia was ruled out due to the continuing violence there.

[44] To facilitate comparisons, both the republic survey data and the RLMS are weighted here.

[45] Only working-age respondents are included in the analysis, however.

[46]In 1997, for example, the capital city, Yakutsk, had the second highest cost-of-living in the country (lower only than the capital of Chukotka). *RFE/RL Newsline*, 25 August 1997, cited in Eastview Publications Universal Database of Russian Newspapers.

[47]The RLMS also included a question on unpaid leaves in the past year (the data were not included in Table 4 because the corresponding question for the republics focused on the previous 2 years). Among non-Russians, 8.9 percent had been sent on unpaid leave; among Russians, 7.6 percent.

[48]Ian McAllister and Stephen White, "The Legacy of the Nomenklatura: Economic Privilege in Postcommunist Russia," *Coexistence*, 32, 1995, pp. 217-39.

[49]Note that these are not mutually exclusive, since some firms may have a mix of private and government ownership.

[50]The one exception is in North Ossetia, where Russians were significantly more likely to work in government-owned organizations. This may be related to other facets of the CDL not captured in the data here – greater Russian concentration in defense production and in military/police units.

[51]The 1997/98 data are from the republic surveys; the 1989 data, from Dzadziev, "Otraslevoi sostav"; Gostieva and Dzadziev, "Ocherki"; Ignat'eva, "Promyshlennoe osvoenie" and "Natsional'nyi sostav"; and Koroteeva, *Ekonomicheskie interesy*.

[52]The Russian regional statistical handbook lists the percentage of workers employed in "state-owned" or "mixed-ownership" workplaces as 58.4 percent for the Russian Federation in 1997, and 73.5 for Tatarstan, 71.0 for North Ossetia, and 74.8 for Sakha. See *Regiony Rossii. Statisticheskii Sbornik 1999* , tom 2, pp. 86-87.

[53]A statistical handbook for Sakha lists fewer employees, but it appears to include only federal and republic-level government workers and to exclude local government personnel. *Respublika Sakha (Yakutia) za gody suvereniteta (1990-2000 gg.)* (Yakutsk, Goskomstat RS, 2000), p. 10.

[54]*RSE* 2000, pp. 19-21, 26-27.

[55] Spiridonova reports that the share of students of Sakha nationality in higher education was actually lower by the end of the 1990s than it had been in 1989, due to the opening of filiali in predominantly Russian areas such as Mirnyi and Neriungri. See "Aktual'nye problemy," p. 204.

[56]Sakha ranked higher when it came to the proportion of adults with higher education, since many people simply went to universities or institutes outside the republic.

[57]See Balzer and Vinokurova's account of such incidents in "Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and Federalism," pp. 108-111.

[58]And by some accounts, outmigration from Sakha was higher among other nationalities of the former Soviet Union, many of whom returned home to newly independent countries to claim citizenship.

[59] *Ekonomicheskie interesy*, pp. 165-67.

[60]Mikk Titma, Nancy Brandon Tuma and Brian D. Silver, "Winners and Losers in the Postcommunist Transition: New Evidence from Estonia," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12, 2, 1998, pp. 114-36. Aadne Aasland and Tone Flotten find similar evidence of economic differentiation in their surveys of Estonia and Latvia. Slavs were more likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force (net of age, gender, education and rural residence). "Ethnicity and Social Exclusion in Estonia and Latvia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53, 7, 2001, pp. 1023-49.

[61] Esman, "Ethnic Politics."

[62] Lilia Sagitova, *Etnichnost' v sovremennom Tatarstane* (Kazan', Tatpoligraf, 1998).

[63] "Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power Grab?" *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, 1999, pp. 245-74.