

# **ANTISEMITISM AND ITS OPPONENTS IN MODERN POLAND**

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## **Executive Summary**

This paper summarizes the results of a collaborative research project involving fifteen scholars from the United States and Poland, whose work focuses on diverse aspects of Polish-Jewish relations from the late nineteenth century to the present. On the one hand, the work presented here synthesizes an enormous amount of recent scholarship since 1989. On the other, contributors to the project have sought to break entirely new ground in addressing issues that have not been previously featured in the existing scholarship on Polish-Jewish relations. It is our hope that the original research contained in this major collaborative effort, along with its chronological breadth, thematic depth and balanced treatment of actors, will go a long way toward improving our understanding of antisemitism in modern Poland, of the actual extent of its appeal at different moments in time, and of the nature of opposition to it from both Poles and Jews.

## **Introduction**

The following pages summarize the results of a collaborative research project under contract with the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER) that has involved fifteen scholars from the United States and Poland over the last two years. The research team was selected on the basis of past or current research in the topical area of Polish-Jewish relations in the modern era and represents a fairly diverse group of individuals in terms of academic rank, scholarly discipline, methodological approach, specific period of historical interest, state citizenship and sex.

Such diversity was necessary in light of the project's goal of providing chronological breadth, thematic depth and a balanced treatment of actors to this complex subject. On the one hand, the work presented here synthesizes an enormous amount of recent research, both in Poland and the United States, as well as in Israel and Western Europe, since 1989. On the other hand, contributors to the project have sought to break entirely new ground in their discussion of a number of specific issues and topics that have not been previously or prominently featured in the existing scholarship on Polish-Jewish relations.

Most members of the research team presented, shared and discussed preliminary versions of their contributions at a conference held in Morgantown, West Virginia, from June 16-18, 2002. This conference was free and open to the public, which drew in interested parties from the Pittsburgh and Washington, DC areas (including a representative from the Polish embassy) as well as from the University of West Virginia and local communities, who themselves contributed much to our discussions. Those remaining scholars who were unable to attend the conference made separate trips to Morgantown to present their research before and take questions from a mixed academic and public audience. These individual contributions were then extensively critiqued by fellow collaborators on the research team, which led to lively electronic debates.

The most contentious issues revolved around the definition of antisemitism itself and the relationship between traditional Judeophobia and more modern hatreds; the role of Jewish assimilation (or lack thereof) in the deterioration of Polish-Jewish relations; the relative ineffectiveness, if not invisibility, of Polish opposition to antisemitism over most of the modern era; the social range of antisemitic ideology

and of specific images and stereotypes (positive and negative) of Jews; interpretations of causes and meanings of pogroms and other forms of anti-Jewish violence; and the role of the Roman Catholic Church and its clergy to the spread of antisemitism as well as the prospects for success of its recent efforts to deal with that legacy. What emerged from these debates was the general conclusion that in antisemitism we were dealing with a constantly moving target, one that has to be considered in relation to other factors and is very much dependent on a variety of contexts.

The same could be said as well of the opposition to antisemitism since the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the beginning and end of this period, it can be argued that those Poles who opposed antisemitism, at least as it expressed itself in the public realm, constituted a majority. For most of the twentieth century, however, they were in a distinct minority that itself was attacked, certainly outshouted and, in the communist era, suppressed or silenced. That antisemitism has lost legitimacy in Polish public discourse is a recent development, yet it may also mark an important turning point, not only in Polish-Jewish relations, but in the balance of forces between nativist and xenophobic elements and their pluralistic, outward-looking opponents in final favor of the latter. Further cause for optimism is the recent and profound upsurge of interest in Poland in the country's Jewish legacy, represented in the bibliography for this project.

As a result of the aforementioned multilateral discussion and debate, the preliminary research products were revised, refined and amended. They are now in the process of final editing (including five contributions that have been translated from Polish) for submission to an academic publisher. Although significant gaps remain in the study of Polish-Jewish relations in the modern era, it is our hope that the new and original research contained in this major collaborative effort will go a long way toward improving our understanding of antisemitism and its associated phenomena in modern Poland, of the actual extent of its appeal at different moments in time, and of the nature of the opposition to it from both Poles and Jews.

Below is a list of the project's contributors (in alphabetical order), followed by summaries of their research results:

- Robert Blobaum (Project Director) is Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of History at West Virginia University.
- Stephen D. Corrsin is Head of Acquisitions at Wayne State University Libraries.
- William W. Hagen is Professor of History at the University of California at Davis.
- Janine Holc is Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at Loyola College (Maryland).
- Jerzy Jedlicki is Professor of History in the Polish Academy of Sciences and Senior Lecturer in the Graduate School for Social Research.
- Katherine R. Jolluck is Senior Lecturer in History at Stanford University.
- Dariusz Libionka holds dual appointments as a Researcher with the Polish Institute of National Remembrance and the Polish Academy of Sciences
- Antony Polonsky is Albert Abramson Chair of Holocaust Studies at Brandeis University and editor-in-chief of *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies*.
- Brian Porter is Associate Professor of History and Director of Polish Studies at the University of Michigan.
- Szymon Rudnicki is Professor of History at Warsaw University and a former member of the Polish-Israeli Textbook Commission.
- Konrad Sadkowski is Associate Professor of History at the University of Northern Iowa.
- Keely Stauter-Halsted is Associate Professor of History and Director of Jewish Studies at Michigan State University.
- Dariusz Stola is Associate Professor of Political Studies in the Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Bożena Szaynok is Assistant Professor of History at Wrocław University.
- Theodore R. Weeks is Associate Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies at Southern Illinois University.

**Theodore R. Weeks, *Assimilation, Nationalism, Modernization, Antisemitism: Notes on Polish-Jewish Relations, 1855-1905***

In this opening essay to the project, Theodore R. Weeks provides an overview of the complex factors of the late nineteenth century that transformed Polish-Jewish relations. Focusing on the Russian partition, where the majority of Poles lived, Weeks proposes a number of hypotheses to the question “What Went Wrong?” to explain the rupture in the previous relationship between Poles and Jews marked by the coexistence of separate communities. Of these, the rise of modern nationalism among both Poles and Jews, and which has generally been accompanied by feelings of antagonism toward the “national other” in areas of mixed nationality, occurred in the highly unfavorable political circumstances of Russian imperial rule. Weeks argues that, particularly in the politically repressive context that marked the decades following the suppression of the January 1863 insurrection, Weeks argues, the coincidence of Polish perceptions of an existential threat to their own national and cultural development with the logical development of Jewish national self-definition could only serve to complicate Polish-Jewish relations.

By extension, one of the central questions of Weeks’ essay revolves around “the failure of assimilation,” that is, Jewish absorption of a certain level of the surrounding Polish culture—for example, language and modern “European” attire—as “assimilation” was originally defined by Polish liberals. Apart from the “colonial” aspect of assimilationist thinking, which viewed traditional Jewish culture as “Asian” and “backward,” the chances of large numbers of Jews accepting the Polish “offer” of a superior culture were very slim indeed, according to Weeks, particularly when Polish culture itself was in a subordinate position within the imperial Russian state.

Culturally and even economically, Jews who wished to prosper needed to know Russian. This development, coupled with the migration of Russian-speaking Jews from the Pale of Settlement (the so-called *Litwacy*) to the territories of the Polish kingdom (*Królestwo Polskie*), could only be viewed by Poles with suspicion and fear. Thus despite the “blurring of categories” and challenging of traditionally accepted identities brought about by the “modernizing” trends of industrialization and urbanization that affected Poles and Jews alike, the retention by Jews of their identity was met by a Polish reaction first of

surprise, and soon thereafter, anger. Consequently, the “failure of assimilation” helped pave the way for the growth of modern antisemitism, which simultaneously “created an atmosphere where assimilation could not prosper,” an atmosphere that after 1905 made only one kind of “assimilation” still possible, “the unconditional denunciation of one’s [Jewish] roots.”

By the eve of World War I, Weeks argues, “relations between Poles and Jews were extremely strained” and “in a certain sense, they never recovered.” Though he does not see this development as inevitable, long-term factors such as economic change, political and cultural repression and the general intensification of national consciousness had served to “turn up the heat” in Polish-Jewish relations. By the end of the nineteenth century, a large segment of Polish society had already begun to view Jews increasingly as either indifferent to Polish interests or actively conspiring against them. This in turn was accompanied by the self-fulfilling prophecy of modern Polish nationalism that excluded Jews from its definition of the nation. While Weeks warns against the drawing of a direct line between the clearly discernible breach in Polish-Jewish relations before the First World War and the genocide of the Second, the indifferent, hostile and even murderous attitudes of many Poles toward their Jewish neighbors during the Holocaust can be traced in part to the earlier refusal “to recognize for Jews the national rights [Poles] demanded for themselves.”

*Keely Stauter-Halsted, Jews as a Middleman Minority in Rural Poland: Understanding the Galician Pogroms of 1898*

While most discussions of the late nineteenth-century rupture in Polish-Jewish relations are based primarily on analyses of changing attitudes among political elites, Keely Stauter-Halsted examines a similar transitional moment in Polish-Jewish interactions symbolized by an unprecedented wave of anti-Jewish violence that swept the western rural districts of the Austrian Galicia in June 1898. In accounting for the sharp break in previously cooperative relations between lower-class Polish Christians and provincial Jews, Stauter-Halsted argues that growing economic competition, status shifts and frustrations among both Poles and Jews caused by nascent capitalism, exacerbated by an election campaign focused



on the Jews and a general atmosphere of legitimized public violence, created conditions for attacks on Jewish property.

According to Stauter-Halsted, peasant emancipation and the removal of legal restrictions on Jews in the middle of the nineteenth century, followed by a lack of economic options for peasants and Jews alike in the post-emancipation decades, would lead to pressures for cultural and economic mobility and a general competition for scarce rural resources that increased mutual resentments between the two groups. In the process, the Jews' traditional position in Galician society as a "middleman minority" grew increasingly vulnerable. Overpopulation, land hunger, pauperization and near famine conditions among the peasantry on the eve of Galician pogroms, she argues, caused "a reinterpretation of Jewish cultural characteristics and helped convert the status of Galician Jews as a middleman minority into something more threatening and hostile."

As evidence, Stauter-Halsted cites the transformation of peasant perceptions of the Jewish innkeeper. Once serving a vital role in the village community as an informant and advisor to neighboring peasants, the image of the Jewish tavern keeper became associated with the notion of "exploitation," serving often as he did as the only source of local credit and of the few material objects the peasants purchased in the post-emancipation economy. Thus the main targets of anti-Jewish rural violence in 1898—taverns, as well as Jewish-leased or owned estates and distilleries—acquire meaning in their very selection. Equally significant to Stauter-Halsted are the Jewish religious and cultural institutions that were not targeted in the rioting as well as relative absence of physical injury to Jewish residents.

Although Stauter-Halsted focuses on economic and social factors, particularly the perception among Polish rural inhabitants that Jewish attempts at economic survival through "illicit profit" violated an unstated moral code, she does not neglect others that assisted the growing tensions in Polish-Jewish relations. Nascent nationalism, that is, the "unprecedented accommodation [of Galician peasants] with their Polish identity," alongside the campaign of rural political activists against tenacious peasant "backwardness," symbolized again by the tavern, led to open calls for its elimination, along with the influence of the rural Jew, himself deemed an "uncivilized barbarian."

Meanwhile, the heated election campaign for a seat in the Viennese Reichsrat of 1898 defined both candidates and depicted their visions of the future against the presence of rural Jews, and thus created considerable public space for antisemitic rhetoric. Thus while the structures of economic life in Galicia had placed Jews and Catholics "on a sociological collision course," their politicization also helped "position rural Poles on the cusp of a modern era in their expression of antisemitism." Stauter-Halsted concludes that the June days of 1898 marked the emergence in rural Poland of "a more sinister variety of antisemitism based on economic and even racial rationales."

*Jerzy Jedlicki, Resisting the Wave: Intellectuals Against Antisemitism in the Last Years of the "Polish Kingdom"*

From the very beginning of its emergence in the decades before the First World War, antisemitism in modern Poland has encountered resistance and opposition, most obviously among Jews, but also from Poles. Public opposition to antisemitism, in particular, exposed these Polish "defenders of the Jews" to indiscriminate insults and vilification as anti-Polish, anti-patriotic, or anti-Catholic "Judaicized Poles." Jerzy Jedlicki's essay focuses on the opposition of certain Polish intellectuals to antisemitism at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Russian-ruled "Polish Kingdom," as well as the obstacles it faced, external and internal, in confronting the first "wave" of antisemitism in modern Poland. Antisemitism among the Polish intelligentsia manifested itself above all in political terms, according to Jedlicki. It was thus natural that its intellectual opponents gave political expression to their arguments in a "war of words" conducted mainly in the press.

The opposition, however, was hampered by many factors. First, there were few outlets for the expression of opposing opinions as Warsaw's leading dailies and magazines were dominated by either radical nationalists affiliated with the *Endecja* (National Democrats) or liberal nationalists who after the Revolution of 1905 joined the anti-Jewish camp. Secondly, Jedlicki notes that many opponents of early 20<sup>th</sup>-century antisemitism shared several of its stigmatizing categories and stereotypes. Jedlicki also argues that most intellectual opponents of antisemitism were also proponents of assimilation, that is, of

"cultural and socio-psychological homogeneity," and therefore viewed Jewish traditional culture with disdain. This was also true of antisemitism's socialist opponents who, in addition, believed that historical "progress" would resolve the "Jewish question" and eliminate "reactionary" nationalism, whether Polish or Jewish. In this regard, according to Jedlicki, it would be a simplification to reduce the profound division of Polish opinion on the "Jewish question" to a straight "for or against."

Finally, while the "anti-Jewish choir" was fairly monotonous in its accusations, Jedlicki demonstrates that the "soloists" who stood out against it came from across the political spectrum and in some cases didn't ascribe to any specific ideological direction. They were thus guided by various motives, but Jedlicki places special emphasis on personal character over political ideology, since what particularly mattered was "the courage to think and proclaim the truth . . . for themselves and for others who preferred to remain quiet."

Of the early 20<sup>th</sup>-century opponents of antisemitism, Jedlicki highlights the penetrating social analysis of modern nationalism and its hatreds by the left liberal Jozef Lange and, particularly, the ethical individualism of the learned linguist Jan Boudouin de Courtenay, whose tolerant multiculturalism negated the "Jewish question" altogether. By invalidating its issues at their very core, Jedlicki argues, Boudouin de Courtenay provided the era's "most radical, unsentimental deconstruction of antisemitic ideology."

The real tragedy of Lange and Boudouin de Courtenay, Jedlicki maintains, was not their inability to change the minds of their contemporaries, but that their works have been largely forgotten by subsequent generations, and their legacy unshared even by antisemitism's future opponents. The consequence of these and future "memory lapses" in twentieth-century Poland would be "primarily an unconscious continuity" in opposition to antisemitism expressed in a "mechanism of repetition, a codified reflex and not therefore . . . knowledge of predecessors." The absence of such memory and knowledge, Jedlicki hints, would serve as yet another obstacle to the effectiveness of Polish opposition to antisemitism, once it returned with new force following the First World War and the recovery of independence.

*Robert Blobaum, Criminalizing the 'Other': Crime, Ethnicity and Antisemitism in Early Twentieth-Century Poland*

Robert Blobaum's essay explores a principle feature of antisemitism of the first decades of the twentieth century by examining the emergence and evolution of the image of the Jew cast in the role of dangerous criminal. Against the background of a generally exaggerated fear of urban crime among the Polish intelligentsia in what was essentially a "moral panic," Blobaum demonstrates how the criminal Jew was constructed by publicists of the emerging radical right. Demonized images of Jews had always been a defining element of antisemitism, according to Blobaum, and their early twentieth century iteration was in part based on the linking of older assertions of Jews as ritual murderers and poisoners of wells with "modern" anti-Jewish images of sexual predators, white slave traders and poisoners of public morality. At the same time, he argues, the image of prostitution as a Jewish "industry" and the locus of urban crime enabled antisemites to take another leap in logic—that is, to associate crime generally with Jews and to claim that Jewish immorality and criminality were culturally and, eventually, racially derived.

For Blobaum, the implication behind the construction of universalized Jewish criminality was both clear and ominous: to fight the "plague" of crime and its ill effects on Polish society, the Jew, morally perverse and criminal by his very nature, had to be eliminated from that society, the more so once the criminal Jew increasingly assumed political dimensions, particularly in the myth of Judeo-communism, during the interwar period. That the propagation of the image of the criminal Jew in the Polish press coincided with a steady and ultimately dramatic decline in crime rates among Jews in the first decades of the twentieth century Blobaum describes as "merely one of the many magical moments in the history of antisemitism in modern Poland."

Usury and fraud, Blobaum notes, had long formed part of the stereotype of Jews in Polish culture. These images were associated with Jewish commercial activity and, as such, should be considered a means of expressing an agrarian society's cultural opposition first to the idea of trade, and eventually to the encroachments of capitalism. Beyond that, however, the modern images of Jewish criminality as constructed by the radical right failed to take firm root in Polish popular culture. Blobaum argues that

this was in part due to the continued strength of older chimeras, particularly those related to ritual murder, which were not easily supplanted by modern ones in the popular imagination. As the same time, Blobaum demonstrates that Polish culture also contained positive images of "honest" Jews based on interpersonal contacts and everyday experience. Statistically speaking, he argues, the vast majority of Poles were also far more likely to be cheated, accosted, robbed or murdered by members of their own ethno-religious group, a reality that also neutralized modern images of Jewish criminality and moral perversity.

Thus, Blobaum concludes, the range of the image of the criminal Jew was limited, even during the highwater mark of antisemitism in Poland during the 1930s and 1940s. First and foremost, it was embraced by the true believers in the gospel of hatred among the radical right, to a somewhat lesser extent among the urban intelligentsia as a whole, and to an even lesser extent by the industrial working class whose belief system had not been entirely transformed by migration from the village to the city before the Second World War. In the countryside, he argues, the image of the criminal Jew, as an urban creation, failed to penetrate the consciousness of the peasantry to any significant extent and remained confined to the rural intelligentsia and professional groups who comprised the semi-regular readers of antisemitic propaganda. Whether the same may be said of antisemitism in modern Poland more generally, and of cultural resistance to it, is a question open to future research.

#### *Brian Porter, Antisemitism and the Search For a Catholic Identity*

Brian Porter, like other authors in this collection, questions the drawing of sharp distinctions between pre-modern religious Judeophobia and modern secular antisemitism in Poland. Although Porter refrains from claiming that Catholicism *caused* antisemitism, or that the Roman Catholic Church served as an "antechamber to the Holocaust," he does agree with recent scholarship that Catholic Judeophobia in the modern era involved much more than a "traditional antipathy towards the Jews because of their

refusal to convert” and that there was considerable overlap between Catholic antisemitism and the secular racism and conspiracy fixations we frequently associate with “modern” antisemitism.

In looking at the Polish Church, Porter still finds a principled rejection of modern antisemitism in the late nineteenth century. Such resistance, however, would erode first into ambivalence toward and then wide acceptance of the Spencerian rhetoric of racial antisemitism in Polish Catholic circles by the 1930s. As evidence, Porter cites shifting and distrustful attitudes toward Jewish converts so that on the eve of the Second World War conversion could not alter the Jew’s “immutable and irredeemable racial quality.” To be sure, Porter argues, Polish Catholic prelates and publicists would typically try to contain the implications of this rhetoric of hatred and fear, usually by saying that the struggle for survival with the Jews had to be limited to non-violent means. In some cases, such containment worked, as individual Catholics resisted antisemitic violence during the Second World War. In other cases it failed most tragically, for example, at Jedwabne. Both responses, according to Porter, demonstrate the unresolved tensions between Catholic universalism and growing acceptance of biological racial categories.

Those tensions, Porter argues, resulted from Catholicism’s attempts to reconcile itself with the modern world. Although many have viewed the Church as a quintessentially “anti-modern” institution until Vatican II, Porter argues that the expression of overt anti-modern attitudes within the Church gave way to Catholic efforts to engage modernity and find solutions to its challenges already during the pontificates of both Leo XIII and Pius X. Moreover, since the Church’s earlier raging against modernity coincided with a reluctance to embrace modern antisemitism, Porter finds “very little” connection between the old-fashioned Catholic siege mentality and new forms of Judeophobia.

Instead, he argues that the Catholic framework for coming to terms with modernity offered “a Manichean worldview which fit antisemitism nicely,” particularly the “aggressive militant model of Catholicism, according to which the Church should actively enter into the modern world and defeat the enemies of the faith.” Launching this offensive required Catholics “to find a way to describe this battle that would make sense *both* within a traditional Catholic framework *and* the newer frameworks for



perceiving social reality.” The result was a revived imagining of the apocalypse, Porter argues, and from within it “would emerge spaces for talking about modern, racial antisemitism.”

It was thus the refashioned apocalyptic subtext of Catholicism’s supernatural vision that led to the conviction that the satanic enemy had penetrated not only society, but the heart of the Church itself (in the form of the “Catholic modernism” of a handful of intellectuals). Within this vision of apocalyptic warfare, Porter demonstrates, Catholics could find much common ground with antisemites in their epochal struggles for survival against evil and conspiring, open and secret enemies. Catholicism did not “cause” modern antisemitism, Porter concludes, “but it did develop in a way as to negate what had been—and would eventually be again—strong barriers keeping devout Catholics from expressing the more vulgar forms of modern hatred.”

*William W. Hagen, The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwow, November 1918*

The rebirth of the Polish state in the aftermath of the First World War was accompanied by anti-Jewish pogroms, particularly in the former Austrian crownland of Galicia. The most destructive occurred in Lwow from November 22 to 24, 1918, when approximately 150 Jews were murdered and more than 500 shops and businesses ransacked. On the surface the Lwow pogrom was a military sack perpetrated by motley Polish armed forces, recently victorious in recapturing the city from Ukrainian fighters, against Jewish civilians whose boldest gesture was to assert a right to armed neutrality during the Polish-Ukrainian battle.

The recently formed Pilsudski-Paderewski government and the broad coalition of political parties supporting it denied official instigation or toleration of the Lwow and other pogroms, and blamed bandits, criminals, demobilized soldiers and deserters for the anti-Jewish violence. Polish authorities also conceded popular participation by interpreting the pogroms as hunger riots and expressions of war-induced immiseration, which they nonetheless condemned, no doubt with Poland’s reputation in mind on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference.

William Hagen's analysis of the Lwow pogrom is not concerned with the empirical extent of its anti-Jewish violence, nor the social-political triggers or causes that inform most recent scholarly research on East European pogroms, but rather on the "mythic meanings and messages in its perpetrators' eyes." Thus, Hagen's interpretive perspective, based on research of published and unpublished testimonies and depositions, focuses on the pogrom's ritualized *forms* or *stagings*, the social and cultural *scripts* it followed, as well as the messages it conveyed. The evidence he musters from the perpetrators' own words shows that on many occasions the pogromists, as they engaged in plunder and violence, moved within a self-chosen framework of symbolic action which, in carnival-like form, gave expression to a collective sense of celebration, triumph, cruel playfulness and joy at the Jews' dispossession, humiliation and even murder. The enactment of these scripts or scenarios, Hagen argues, by symbolically reversing the perceived social hierarchy and punishing Jewish offenders of Polish cultural codes—particularly the deep-seated insistence that Jews remain passive, powerless and defenseless—held the key to the pogrom's meaning in the eyes of its perpetrators.

Of even greater concern to Hagen, however, is how such brutal behavior and particularly its genocidal overtones could be understood by its perpetrators as justifiable or righteous. The "moral economy" that sanctions such ethical calculus, Hagen argues, was in part contained in the conviction that the Jews *owed* pogromists the goods and even the lives of which, by moral right, they were being dispossessed. At the same time Hagen attributes the "phantasms of mass murder" that stalked on the margins of the anti-Jewish actions to "an apocalyptic imagination" that framed the pogromists' self-understanding as Christians and was fed by the depravations of wartime and the turmoil that followed in its wake.

Thus, according to Hagen, the antisemitism that motivated the pogromists was largely implicit rather than explicit and ideological, and was expressed in the "perpetrators' satisfaction and even joy at taking righteous revenge for the temporal and spiritual faults they ascribed to their victims." Such popularly conceived retributive justice thus marked the emergence of a new and deadly element to



existing Polish hostility toward Jews, one that would be reenacted with even more cruelty at Jedwabne in July 1941.

*Szymon Rudnicki, Anti-Jewish Legislation in Interwar Poland*

Following the First World War independent Poland was established as a parliamentary democratic state that pledged itself to respect the rights of national minorities in international agreements and its own constitution of March 1921. Yet as Szymon Rudnicki's essay demonstrates, it took an entire decade to abrogate all laws and regulations (mainly Russian) from the era of the partitions that discriminated against Jews.

The argument made by Polish parliamentarians against doing so immediately, despite the urgings of Jewish deputies to the contrary, was that it was necessary to determine exactly what those laws and regulations were—and there were hundreds of them scattered in various legal codes and decrees. Thus they were abolished in a piecemeal fashion in a very slow and excruciatingly bureaucratic process until 1931 when under the Sanacja regime guided by Jozef Pilsudski, the remainder was abrogated by a single decree.

In the meantime, laws remained on the books that required Jews to pay a double tax for health care, that banned the use of Yiddish or Hebrew in public, or that prohibited Jews from purchasing land from peasants in certain parts of the country—among other examples cited by Rudnicki. There were also new laws passed during this period—for example, those that made Sunday and other Catholic holidays obligatory days of rest for all citizens—that were particularly harmful to Jewish interests.

Ironically, as Rudnicki notes, once the Jews had finally achieved formal equal rights, they soon found themselves confronted with new legislation that sought to strip them of those rights. As unemployment rose in Poland, peaking in 1935, it did not take long for antisemites to claim that the Jews occupied all places of work and that they should make way for Poles. Consequently, legislation was introduced in 1936 to ban the kosher slaughter of beef on “humanitarian grounds,” which once it went

into effect in January 1939 effectively removed 40,000 Jews from the meat trade. Or, to give another example cited by Rudnicki, legislation was passed in 1938 that effectively eliminated the opportunity of Jewish law school graduates to enter the Polish bar. Moreover, following anti-Jewish strikes and demonstrations of nationalist students, legislation was passed that permitted rectors of institutions of higher education to segregate lecture halls. This development also provided a precedent for other self-governing institutions to segregate public space, whether membership in professional associations, entrance to city parks, setting up stalls in local markets, or participation on local draft boards.

Rudnicki reminds us that none of the legislation passed at the national level in the second half of the 1930s mentioned Jews by name, even if the target was clear—as in the case of the ban on ritual slaughter. Thus it would be a mistake to suggest that interwar Poland passed anything approximate to the Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany. However, as Rudnicki shows, parliamentary deputies did attempt to introduce legislation in the Nuremberg spirit. The most radical bill came in the form of a motion to classify all but 50,000 of interwar Poland's three million Jews as displaced persons, thus effectively stripping the vast majority of the envisioned stateless Jews of their citizenship. Another proposal that failed to pass would have relieved Jews of the obligation of military service. Finally, following Pilsudski's death in 1935, the government itself began to think about projects to sponsor mass Jewish emigration from Poland. The most radical of these, according to Rudnicki, envisioned the emigration of 1.5 million Jews over a ten-year period. Consequently, as Rudnicki argues, Jewish legislators who in the 1920s fought for equal civil rights and the implementation of existing law, by the late 1930s found themselves in a defensive position in confronting an increasingly "eliminationist" antisemitism that threatened the security of persons and property in violation of both Polish law and public morality.

***Konrad Sadkowski, Clerical Nationalism and Antisemitism: Catholic Priests, Jews and Ukrainians in the Lublin Region, 1918-1939***

Whereas Brian Porter's essay discusses Polish Catholicism's relationship with modern antisemitism from the perspective of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century intellectual history,

Konrad Sadkowski's essay concentrates on the institutional and occupational motivations for the steadfast opposition to Jews expressed by the Polish Church and its clergy during the interwar period, with particular reference to the Lublin region as a microcosm of the complex multinational and multi-confessional Polish society. The Lublin region also affords Sadkowski the opportunity to place his discussion of clerical nationalism and antisemitism in a comparative context by expanding it to include the Church's views of Poland's Ukrainian minority.

Sadkowski agrees that the Church's religious mission was transformed by its greater confrontation with "modernity," as were its views toward Jews, who came to represent the "evils" of modernity and its "corruption" of society. Yet, as Sadkowski argues, the Church as an institution in interwar Poland also encountered a secular and pluralistic Polish state that by its very nature defined the nation on the basis of legal equality. The civic nation, although particularly "indispensable" for Jews, threatened the Church's own power and authority in society and drew it ever more visibly into "a politics of cultural construction" that insisted on Catholicism as the central element of Polish identity.

Such politics, which also sought to shape state laws and policies as well as societal attitudes in a pro-Catholic manner, was conducted through "social Catholic" organizational activity, particularly following Pilsudski's coup of 1926, which reduced the possibilities for Church influence through continued support of the National Democrats. In any case, Sadkowski connects the Church's drive to "Catholicize Poland" with motives of institutional self-preservation and power, particularly in light of the Church's financial and other interests "threatened" by a political and societal order that provided for Jewish civic equality.

Even more mundane, Sadkowski argues, were the material interests and social status of the parish clergy as an occupational group, whose choice of political allies and treatment of national minorities reflected those interests. Like other occupational groups who attacked Jews because they perceived them as an impediment to their professional and social advancement, Sadkowski argues, the Catholic clergy also perceived Jews as a threat to its professional and economic interests. From the perspective of priests,

the Jewish “demand” for a secular and civic Poland would erode the ideological and cultural importance of the clergy and therefore their economic and social standing.

Although the Jews obviously did not challenge the clergy by competing with them for their parishes and the Church as a whole did not present the Jews as a direct economic threat to itself but rather to the Polish nation, Sadkowski nevertheless maintains that in condemning the Jews for threatening the nation on economic grounds, parish priests revealed that they needed a Catholic Polish nation to protect their professional and economic status. Sadkowski contrasts such perceptions of the Jewish “threat” with the Church and clergy’s actions and attitudes toward Ukrainians, though while also certainly aggressive in pursuit of the goal of Catholicizing Polish society, were not identical. The Catholic clergy, according to Sadkowski, perceived Ukrainians “as a significantly lower ideological—[and] consequently, economic—‘threat’ to the Church and themselves.” Sadkowski concludes that while the ideological development of Polish Catholicism undeniably made priests nationalistic and antisemitic, so did their economic and professional concerns as the position of the Church and clergy in the interwar Polish state came to rest on a successful cultural presence and politics.

***Antony Polonsky, “Why Did They Hate Tuwim So Much?” Antisemitism and Literary Polemics in the Second Polish Republic***

At the beginning of the twentieth century, hostility toward Jews among the Polish intelligentsia resulted in part from anger over perceived Jewish rejection of the “assimilationist bargain.” By the interwar period, it was Jewish integration and acculturated Jews that became the main targets of antisemitic hostility, according to Antony Polonsky. Despite increasing Jewish adoption of the culture and way of life of the country to whose citizenship they aspired, most antisemites saw this acculturation purely in terms of the advantages it brought to Jews who became “all the more dangerous because they understood the language and customs of the host country and could use this knowledge to advance specific Jewish interests.”

The belief that the consequences of assimilation had been more harmful than beneficial was accompanied by a rejection of what was regarded as the negative Jewish influences on Polish cultural life. Against this background, Polonsky discusses the significant flourishing of Polish-Jewish literature during the interwar period. On the one hand, there were the consciously Jewish writers who made the choice to use Polish as their language of expression to address motifs particular to Jews in the Polish environment. On the other, there appeared a group of writers of "Jewish origin" who saw themselves as primarily a part of the central Polish literary tradition. They were closely associated with the influential literary weekly *Wiadomosci Literackie*, whose leading representatives, Antoni Slonimski and Julian Tuwim, belonged to the *Skamander* group, the dominant literary clique in Poland in the 1920s. Although these writers castigated Jewish national "separatism" and dismissed most aspects of Yiddish culture, it was this group that was most strongly attacked by Polish nationalists and antisemites, none more so than the talented and playful poet, Julian Tuwim.

Polonsky points to a number of reasons why Tuwim became such a bete-noire for the Nationalist right. Polish nationalists were outraged by his liberal humanism, his disregard for conventional pieties, his open exaltation of physicality and sexuality, his desire to bridge high and low culture, his "blasphemy" and "insolence" in relation to Christianity, and especially his merciless ridicule and mockery of the Nationalist right itself. In short, Polonsky argues, Tuwim and his poetry embodied everything the Right hated about the intellectual culture of the big city and who championed instead an art that would stress national, Catholic and rural values as well as sustain group solidarity.

For similar reasons, the Right vilified the Polish writer Tadeusz Boy-Zelenski, who also bitterly opposed and open mocked ethnic nationalism and provincialism, rejected the pietistic way the great literary figures of the past were treated in Polish society, and whose support for women's rights and family planning were equated with "sexual depravity." Indeed the similarities between Tuwim and Boy, as well as in the attacks against them, were reflected in the Right's transformation of Boy into an "artificial Jew." Thus Boy and other Polish writers of the era who shared the cosmopolitanism, irony,

sophistication and eclecticism of Tuwim and Slonimski became “Jewish by osmosis” through what Polonsky refers to as “guilt by association.”

Polonsky concludes that Poland’s interwar cultural wars were part of a wider dispute “between two visions of Poland, one pluralistic, outward-looking and European, the other nativist and hostile to foreign influences.” This conflict is still with us, Polonsky argues, and “its outcome will determine the place of Poland in the twenty-first century.”

*Katherine R. Jolluck, Gender and Antisemitism in Wartime Soviet Exile*

Katherine Jolluck’s essay focuses on Polish-Jewish relations, particularly among female citizens of both groups exiled to the interior of the USSR after the Red Army invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939. By examining women’s testimonies collected by the Anders army following its evacuation from the Soviet Union in 1942, Jolluck is able to analyze the role of gender in Polish depictions of Jews and in the articulation or reception of antisemitic stereotypes in the discrete and calamitous experience of wartime exile. She does so within a comparative framework that looks not only at the Polish women’s depiction of other national “others” (particularly the Russians) in these depositions, but also at similarly-derived testimonies of fellow Polish male and Jewish female exiles.

Although Jolluck reveals that Polish women in these circumstances did not unanimously express anti-Jewish views, two-thirds of them did present negative or hostile depictions of Jews. Moreover, most of the comments by Polish women refer specifically to Jewish women, with whom they shared an experience of exile segregated by gender. Many of the hostile anti-Jewish attitudes inherited from the interwar period persisted in exile, Jolluck notes, and were compounded by the new stereotype of Jews as enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet invasion.

But in comparison with the deadly inflaming of Polish hatred toward Jews during the war in places like Jedwabne, such hostility was somewhat dissipated in exile, Jolluck argues. Poles of both sexes reporting on Jews in the USSR perpetuated old motifs of Jews as disloyal or Communists. But



other, chimerical, stereotypes of Jews—as criminals, sexual perverts, and ritual murderers—seemed to fade in the face of the overwhelming shock of being under the power of the Russians. In other words, she argues, the effects of Polish antisemitic views were mitigated by the fact and character of Russian domination; for the Poles under Soviet rule, in the hierarchy of Poland's enemies, Jews ranked below Russians.

This situation, Jolluck demonstrates, is reflected in the use of gender in Polish women's description of "others." She finds that in creating the stereotype of Jewish women in exile, gender played an indirect role. Their behavior as women-citizens was described only insofar as it was necessary to establish them as unfit and selfish members of the Polish national collective, conceived in terms of the family. Polish women's national identity, Jolluck reminds us, mapped the notion of motherhood over that of citizenship. In this framework, as disloyal citizens who exhibited no solidarity, had put their own interests first, and failed to uphold the morale and hopes of the group, Jewish women fell far short of the Polish ideal for womanhood.

Jolluck finds a striking contrast, however, in the blunt way that gender was used to condemn Russians. While Jewish women, in the Polish depiction, fail as female citizens, Russian ones fail more fundamentally as women. In the Polish view, Russian females are perverted, even "unnatural" women, who signify the profound aberrant nature of their entire nation. This focus on gender norms and specific accusations of gender deviation, Jolluck argues, constituted a direct attack on the essence of the Russian people and expressed deep-seated fears that had been raised in this period of Polish national crisis.

In the context of Soviet exile, Jews were less threatening to Poles and less hated than the Russians. For this reason, Jolluck concludes, Jewish women were not subjected to the intimate, categorical denunciations made of Russian women. Jews were not labeled primitive or Asiatic; unlike the Russians they remained part of the same world of the Poles, just not its inner circles. Above all, Jolluck's study shows that like national identity itself, antisemitic stereotypes are both relational and dependent on context.

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland toward the extermination of Jews during World War II has been and remains an issue of considerable controversy. On the one hand are Jewish accusations of the Polish clergy's near total indifference in face of the Holocaust, and skepticism regarding the motives of those few clergy who assisted Jews. On the other is the paradigm of the Church's very serious involvement in the rescue of Jews, developed in Catholic journalistic and academic literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which, despite recent criticism, continues to influence contemporary Polish discourse. *Dariusz Libionka*, although he does not question the engagement of individual members of the clergy in aiding Jews, provides a deeply contextualized and carefully documented analysis of Catholic actions and motivations during the war that challenges the established Polish paradigm.

According to Libionka, it is indeed the individual cases that have served as the basis for a number "replicating myths" in the Polish literature—that members of the Church hierarchy in Poland repeatedly appealed to the Germans for "the cessation of terror against the Jewish populace;" that the majority of bishops resident in Poland participated in actions to assist the Jews; that most priests called for Polish-Jewish solidarity in the face of the common Nazi enemy and supported the efforts of "Zegota" (the underground Council of Aid to the Jews) to help Jews seeking to hide on the "Aryan side;" and that antisemites among both laymen and clergy experienced a "spiritual transformation" during World War II that led to a profound change in their attitudes toward Jews. Although Libionka is careful to note the dire situation in which the Polish Church and its clergy found itself under German occupation, he clearly refutes claims that the Church and its representatives did everything in their power on behalf of Jews.

According to Libionka, the Church hierarchy's interventions with the German authorities were limited to unsuccessful efforts on behalf of converts. As for the Jewish population as a whole, Libionka argues, after the creation of the ghettos, "Jews and their problems effectively vanished from the field of vision of the Church hierarchy." Although Libionka acknowledges the obvious futility of Church protests



and attempted interventions on behalf of Jews, had they been made, he argues that the bishops in Poland could have at least transmitted information to the Vatican through formal and informal channels about the extermination.

Instead, he finds "a profound gulf separating the Church from the mass crimes perpetrated in its Polish dioceses." The absence of a "moral injunction" regarding Jews from the top, including the hierarchy's failure to endorse the activities of "Zegota," is linked by Libionka to passivity among the diocesan clergy toward efforts to assist the Jews. Although Libionka accepts that several hundred priests, monks and nuns participated in such activities, especially in large urban centers, their assistance to Jews tended to be immediate and specific rather than long-term, and in any case did not exceed a few percent of the clergy as a whole.

Libionka attributes the narrow dimension of the Church's actions on behalf of Jews to the ongoing influence of antisemitism. He discounts "a sudden change of convictions" from the interwar period, when Church representatives generally supported a "solution" to the "Jewish question" through mass emigration, particularly in light of the hierarchy's tendency to place responsibility for postwar anti-Jewish violence in Poland on the Jews themselves. Thus while Libionka finds instances of "authentic compassion" for Jews within the wartime Church, a far larger portion of Church representatives were indifferent to the victims of genocide, an attitude that continued into the postwar period.

#### *Bozena Szaynok, The Role of Antisemitism in Postwar Polish-Jewish Relations*

In her discussion of Polish-Jewish relations in the first two decades following the Second World War, Bozena Szaynok notes the inhibitions imposed on scholarly debate and publication imposed by the communist authorities before 1989. Although a great deal of evidence has since been brought to light, there remain a number of "blank spots" whose discussion has been characterized by powerful passions that posit the primacy of personal experience over careful analysis. In considering the role and range of antisemitism in the immediate postwar period, Szaynok does not downplay its existence or impact, but

cautions against its use as the sole descriptor of Polish attitudes toward Jews or the sole cause of a seemingly final polarization in Polish-Jewish relations.

In this regard, Szaynok considers the circumstances that created an environment where antisemitism could prosper. Among these were the experiences, consequences and legacies of the war that were not shared equally by Poles and Jews, and of imposed wartime segregation that reinforced existing nationalisms and negative constructs of the “other.” Different expectations of the future and different evaluations of the postwar situation also divided Poles and Jews, who were animated by separate issues and pursued separate goals—the Poles to retain a semblance of independence, the Jews to leave a country they considered a cemetery where the continuation of Jewish life was impossible. Thus Szaynok attributes the Jewish desire to emigrate up until 1946 to profound ideological and psychological reasons, rather than to antisemitism, although this would soon change. Nor does it mean that antisemitism was a marginal phenomenon, as seen in the strengthened stereotype of the *Zydokomuna* that implied that Jews were responsible for introducing to Poland the unpopular communist regime.

Anti-Jewish violence grew in intensity during the period of repatriation in the first half of 1946 when tens of thousands of Jews returned from the Soviet Union, a time when the perception of Jews as a threat to Poland combined with concerns that Jews would reclaim property taken over by Poles during the war years. The culmination of this violence and the “turning point” in postwar Polish-Jewish relations, according to Szaynok, was the vicious Kielce pogrom of July 1946 that claimed 42 lives. As a consequence of the pogrom, Jewish emigration from Poland increased dramatically. And for those Jews who had somehow survived the wartime extermination of practically their entire community, they left with the worst possible impression of Poland and the Poles.

Yet both the Kielce pogrom and its aftermath, Szaynok emphasizes, were entangled in Poland’s political conflict between the communist-dominated regime and its legal and illegal opponents, establishing a pattern whereby Jewish issues would become instrumentalized in Polish politics for years to come. The entanglement of Jewish issues and antisemitism with political conflicts, moreover, tended to cut short genuine efforts at Polish-Jewish rapprochement, according to Szaynok. Initiatives like that of

Władysław Bartoszewski and the "League for the Struggle against Racism," the attempts of Leszek Kolakowski and the journal *Po prostu* to counter the revival of antisemitic tendencies in the "Polish October" of 1956, or the efforts of Catholic intellectuals in the 1960s to address various issues of Polish-Jewish history were all effectively co-opted, silenced, or suppressed. Consequently, Szaynok argues, Polish-Jewish relations remained "frozen in time" in the decades following the Kielce pogrom, a situation that can be attributed to antisemitism, but also to the peculiarities of Polish postwar political conflicts that made any kind of rapprochement impossible and would express themselves yet again in 1968.

#### *Dariusz Stola, Fighting against the Shadows: The Anti-Zionist Campaign of 1968*

The infamous events of the spring of 1968 in Poland, the *anti-Zionist* campaign initiated by the Polish communist leadership under Władysław Gomułka, is the subject of Dariusz Stola's essay. Before the campaign originated in 1967 in the aftermath of Arab-Israeli Six Day War, there were approximately 25 to 30 thousand Jews in Poland, a miniscule fraction of the once great Polish Jewry destroyed by the Holocaust and reduced even further by postwar emigration. Despite the increasingly Polish identity of this small community of survivors, Cold War tensions and political subordination to Moscow would lead Gomułka to brand Polish Jews sympathetic to Israel a subversive *Zionist* "fifth column." Yet the main and most dramatic phase of the *anti-Zionist* campaign occurred the following March in reaction to a wave of student protests. The campaign was officially terminated in July 1968, after which a final wave of Jewish emigration from Poland reduced the already statistically insignificant Jewish community by half.

Based on research of newly accessible materials, Stola argues that the campaign served several purposes. First, since the accusation of *Zionism* also fell on individuals not known to be Jewish or not possessing Jewish ancestry whatsoever, the campaign was a handy instrument to fight the student rebellion by portraying its leaders and intellectual supporters as alien and perverse. Second, it also served to prevent the spread of the student revolt beyond the universities to broader social groups, particularly to workers. Third, the campaign changed the political balance in the party leadership and initiated a wider

change of cadres in what Stola refers to as a "preventive strike" against potential followers of the Czech path of the "Prague Spring." Yet despite the cynical and politically multifunctional exploitation of the "Jewish card" in pursuit of "rationally defined interests," Stola also finds in Polish government and party documents an antisemitic paranoia and irrational impulses that are too sincere to be cynical.

Stola's main focus, however, is on the nature and scale of the propaganda campaign and the images of the Jew it construed, exploited and spread. The witch hunt of Jews in 1968, according to Stola, followed tested patterns of behavior from earlier communist "hate campaigns." And although the *anti-Zionist* campaign was accompanied by a nationwide purge of Jews from party and state positions and various fields of employment, Stola argues that the 1968 witch hunt was primarily one of "symbolic aggression" and a "verbal pogrom" against Jews.

As for its scale, Stola points to an immense mobilization of the monopolized mass media and party organizations that "literally showered" the country with tens of millions of antisemitic propaganda messages. The intense "noise," hostility and incited hatreds of the campaign, Stola argues further, intimidated potential opponents into maintaining a low profile and reduced their response to non-participation in the campaign, although inactivity, passivity and silence were also considered politically "suspect."

Finally, Stola analyzes the recycling of old antisemitic chimerical images and their translation into the language of communist "newspeak," which intensified the moral repugnance of the Jewish enemy. Thus in addition to his *Zionism* and his politicized and elitist nature, the *March Jew* was imagined simultaneously as a "Jewish nationalist" and a "rootless cosmopolitan;" by the same token Jewish "Stalinists" could act as "agents of American imperialism."

Faced with student rebellion, dissent of intellectuals, dangerous developments in Czechoslovakia and the prospect of a larger wave of social unrest, Stola concludes, the communist leaders and their propagandists no longer put their hope in historical determinism, class instinct or workers' loyalty to the "people's government," but in phantasmagoric monsters. And although some could ride the chimeras as

cynically detached masters, Stola argues, others “were unable to control the demons they aroused, even in their own minds.”

*Janine P. Holc, Memory Contested: Jewish and Catholic Views of Auschwitz in Present-Day Poland*

Janine Holc analyzes Jewish and Catholic contested memories of the meaning of Auschwitz by focusing on the highly publicized and much-debated “Auschwitz crosses” controversy of 1998-1999. According to Holc, the controversy not only functioned as an enactment of previously unstated tensions over the place of Auschwitz in Polish and Jewish national histories, it also generated new opportunities for revisiting and re-narrating Catholic-Jewish relations in Poland, in directions that at times reinforced antisemitism, and at other times allowed for the voicing of Polish opposition to antisemitism.

In brief, the controversy was sparked in 1998 when Polish nationalist Kazimierz Switon asserted the right to maintain a theologically dubious and recently transplanted “papal cross” on the grounds of the Auschwitz memorial site. For many people inside and outside of Poland, the unique nature of Jewish vulnerability and loss during the Holocaust makes Auschwitz a place where no Christian religious symbols should exist. However, since Polish Catholics comprised ten percent of those killed at Auschwitz, Switon and his supporters claimed that these deaths were insufficiently memorialized, in part due to what they termed “Jewish influences.”

When plans to relocate the “papal cross” were announced, Switon responded by illegally filling the space with eventually hundreds of crosses in what became an explicit counter-memorial to Auschwitz as a uniquely Jewish symbol of the Holocaust, escalating the stakes for both Catholics and Jews. Although Switon himself and the many visual elements surrounding his demonstration were eventually removed from the site, the “papal cross” Switon had “defended” was allowed to remain in place. Many Poles were relieved that the drama had ended, according to Holc, even if they felt that the “papal cross” should stay.

Holc argues that the “crosses controversy” merits careful attention for several reasons. First, it created the opportunity for a number of antisemitic voices to gain at least partial legitimacy in Polish public culture. Second, it forced Polish opponents of antisemitism to grapple more directly than in the past with the link between the Catholic Church and the painful experiences of Jews in Poland, in part because they had to articulate the reasons a cross might be an unwelcome symbol at Auschwitz. Third, Holc views the “crosses controversy” as a reaction not only to an increasingly pluralized Polish culture, but to anxieties about national identity and its disruption by “globalization” and “Europeanization,” particularly at a time when the government was negotiating Poland’s NATO membership and eventual entry into the European Union. Finally, by exposing different interpretations and making explicit the multiplicity of meanings of Auschwitz, the controversy revealed an essentially contested memory of Polish-Jewish relations.

To Holc, the notion of “injured identity” not only helps explain Switon and his supporters’ claims to “equivalent victimization” with Jews during World War II; since this sense of injury is shared by many Poles who themselves considered Switon an “extremist,” it has prevented a more honest engagement with antisemitism by promoting instead a defensive “obsession with innocence.” Moreover, despite the best efforts of several well-known Polish Catholic clergy and intellectuals to listen and respond to Jewish voices on issues like Auschwitz and then Jedwabne, Holc argues that the “supersessionist” basis of Christianity itself—that is, its historical claims to primacy and universality—sets self-imposed limits to a *specifically Catholic* opposition to antisemitism. Therefore, the main challenge to opponents of antisemitism in Poland, according to Holc, is to create a re-visioning of Polish identity based on the reality of Poland’s multicultural history, including experiences of violence and loss, but one that does not misrepresent or privilege those experiences in an injured mode.



**Stephen D. Corrsin, Works on Polish-Jewish Relations Published Since 1989: A Selective Bibliography**

Stephen Corrsin's bibliography for this collection devoted to Polish-Jewish relations in the modern era is drawn from a larger project that has appeared in three installments since 1995, with a fourth soon to appear in the journal *Gal-Ed: On the History of the Jews in Poland*, published by the Diaspora Research Institute of Tel Aviv University. While the larger bibliographical project now consists of a file of approximately 3,500 entries for items published between 1990 and the first months of 2003, the selection of 171 items in this much abbreviated and annotated version has been designed as an informative and useful summary of recent research in the field for a primarily North American audience.

The most striking fact represented by Corrsin's bibliography is the greatly increased volume of publishing in Polish-Jewish studies since the late 1980s. Matters of quantity aside, this wealth of recent work has been at the highest scholarly level and covers a very wide range of topics. Significantly, much of this work has come from Poland, which can be linked to wider trends in Polish society and politics. The enormous upswing in Polish interest in the country's Jewish heritage has been termed "the beginning of a long voyage of [Polish] self-exploration." Since 1989-1990, Poland's Jewish studies infrastructure has developed rapidly and there are now a number of newly founded centers, societies and university departments, as well as two serious scholarly journals, devoted to the field. Developments in Poland, according to Corrsin, have been paralleled by a general upsurge of interest in Polish-Jewish studies in North America, Israel and Western Europe. While taking into account that Polish-Jewish studies remains a relatively small field, Corrsin's bibliography shows that it has unquestionably developed into an important area of scholarship in its own right.

