**Project Information**

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Executive Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has taken a more active role in promoting democracy abroad. The goals of these interventions have varied. Both the duration and the instruments of intervention have also varied. Finally, American interventions in support of democracy have been both unilateral and multi-lateral, with the latter including, for example, such partners as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization of American States and a variety of non-governmental organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the recent American experience with democracy promotion in divided societies. In particular, the paper will address four questions. First, what is the relationship between democracy and diversity? Second, why has the United States become more involved in democracy promotion—in general and in divided societies in particular? A third issue is whether the United States should be involved in democracy promotion.

Democracy promotion, however, is likely to figure prominently in American foreign policy in the future. This leads to the final question: how should the United States promote democracy abroad? Based upon past experience, what seem to be the best conditions and the best practices?
“We need to approach the Future as a friend, without a wardrobe of excuses.”


“Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures.”


Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has taken a more active role in promoting democracy abroad (Carothers, 1999, 2004; Mandelbaum, 1996; Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000; Rose, 2000/1; Henderson, 2002; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002; Cruz, 2003; Aksartova, 2005; Pevehouse, 2005). The goals of these interventions have varied. Sometimes the purpose has been relatively modest—for example, providing economic assistance and institutional advice to new democracies. In other cases, the motivations for American engagement have been much more ambitious—for instance, restoring a democracy that has broken down, engineering a transition from long-entrenched dictatorship to democracy, or brokering peace agreements in war-torn societies and thereafter constructing democratic polities.

Both the duration and the instruments of intervention have also varied. American involvement has been episodic—as with election monitoring—or longer-term—as with building democracy after civil wars (whether these wars preceded or followed military engagement). At the same time, just as the U.S. has targeted new democracies and provided financial and institutional assistance, so the U.S. has concentrated its efforts on weakening dictatorships—by subjecting them to harsh criticisms, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military action (see Marinov, 2004; Andreas, 2005). Finally, American interventions in support of democracy have been both unilateral and multi-lateral, with the latter including, for example, such partners

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as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization of American States and a variety of non-governmental organizations.

The different motivations, targets, and forms of American democracy promotion, however, should not blind us to some common features of these interventions. One is that all of them have taken place in the developing world. The U.S., in short, does not promote democracy in the West; it does so “in the rest.” The other is that virtually all of these efforts have had to grapple, whether consciously and consistently, or neither, with the enormous difficulties involved in building democracy in societies divided along religious, linguistic and/or ethnic lines.

This is not surprising. Simply in terms of statistical probabilities, democracy promotion abroad is likely to take place in heterogeneous countries. This is because the vast majority of states in the international system—whether rich or poor, democratic or dictatorial—are culturally diverse. Indeed, cultural heterogeneity is the pronounced norm in each of the four political settings where the United States has made democracy promotion a priority—societies emerging from internal wars, new democracies, hybrid regimes that are perched precariously between democracy and dictatorship, and, finally, dictatorships that are believed to threaten American security.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the recent American experience with democracy promotion in divided societies. In particular, the paper will address four questions. First, what is the relationship between democracy and diversity? The puzzle here is that, while in theory democracy is the optimal form of government for managing diversity, in practice democracy and diversity are often at odds with one another. Second, why has the United States become more involved in democracy promotion—in general and in divided societies in particular? Here, there
are two puzzles. One is that American foreign policy has a history of either isolationism or, when fully engaged in international affairs, as during the Cold War, interventions that seek to end, not found democratic politics and to support, not undermine dictatorships. The other is that the United States, like most countries, prefers low-risk to high-risk interventions. Efforts to change the politics of divided societies would seem to fall into the latter category.

A third issue is whether the United States should be involved in democracy promotion. Here, there are both normative and empirical considerations. Does the U.S. have the right to dictate regime forms to other states, given, for example, longstanding international norms against violations of state sovereignty and the distinctive characteristics of American democracy that limit the applicability of the American model to the rest of the world? On the empirical side, one can identify a number of costs attached to American democracy promotion—for example, increased political instability in target states in response to American pressures for regime change and, in other states, increased repression by dictators who are trying to insulate themselves from the virus of American democracy promotion.

Democracy promotion, however, is likely to figure prominently in American foreign policy in the future. This leads to the final question: how should the United States promote democracy abroad? Based upon past experience, what seem to be the best conditions and the best practices?

**Democracy and Diversity**

In theory at least, democracy would seem to be the best type of polity to deal with cultural diversity. This is because democracy is based upon certain principles that maximize inter-group trust and cooperation and, thus, the peaceful resolution of conflict—in particular,
political equality; legal guarantees of political rights and civil liberties; free, fair and competitive elections; and representative and accountable government. Thus, democracy is an approach to governance that has the capacity to empower and reassure majorities and minorities.

Both aspects are critical. In diverse societies, there is a common dynamic, similar to the logic of arms races, that develops when the state is unable or unwilling to protect groups from each other—a security dilemma (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). This is where one cultural community, feeling vulnerable, adopts what it sees as defensive actions, but which are interpreted by other groups as threatening behaviors, thereby prompting them to respond in turn with actions that, while often motivated by defensive concerns as well, are just as easily perceived by outside groups to be offensive in both motivation and consequence. Democracy makes it harder for these spiraling conflicts to start and, if beginning, to continue.

There are also empirical reasons to favor democracy for diverse societies. As a number of studies have shown, democracy is superior to other forms of government in promoting peace and human welfare (Talbott, 1996; Mandelbaum, 1996; Navia and Zweifel, 2003; Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin, 2004; Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein, 2005). At the same time, there are two correlations that make democracy a particularly compelling choice for divided societies. One is between poverty, on the hand hand, an inequality and violent conflict, on the other (Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin, 2004; Eisenstat, Porter and Weinstein, 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003). The other, albeit less robust relationship (though not in the minds of most citizens in heterogeneous contexts), is between cultural cleavages and access to power, money and status (Horowitz, 1985; Sambanis and Zinn, 2004; Toft, 2003).
Diversity Versus Democracy: Historical Considerations

However, it is precisely the second correlation that provides some insights into why diversity poses problems for democratic governance. In most developing, as well as developed societies, cultural differences are not a problem in and of themselves, but, rather, because such differences explain—and, just as importantly, are often widely perceived to explain—variations in political, social and economic outcomes. Simple membership in a particular cultural group, in short, and not individual variations in intelligence and hard work, can play a critical role in determining who wins and who loses. What are these outcomes in societal struggles over political, social and economic benefits so tied to cultural differences—often objectively, but also in the minds of citizens?

To answer this question, we need to go back to the origins of most nations and states in the contemporary international system—a process that involved the division or dissolution of larger, segmented political units, such empires, confederations and federal states, which were usually authoritarian in structure. Empires had often subverted, by accident and design, what is perhaps the foundation of the democratic project: an expansive definition of citizenship, guaranteed by law and based upon a shared understanding of the boundaries, rights and goals of the political community (Rustow, 1970; Roeder, 2005b; Bunce, 2005). It is precisely such a consensus, for example, that gives publics their power and rights to demand democracy from the state, and the state, in turn, the legitimacy to govern effectively and to carry out such difficult and often divisive tasks as providing political order, collecting revenues, redistributing resources, and safeguarding boundaries.

The states of today inherited from their earlier inclusion in larger entities a number of problematic characteristics, including, for example, poor correspondence between state and
national boundaries, with the result that most states are multinational and often multi-religious and multi-linguistic. Nations often straddle state boundaries. Contiguous states often have, as a result of these inconsistencies in national and state boundaries, common origins in the same larger unit. But they also have ample reasons to distrust one another (Manz, 2003).

Moreover, within multinational states, nations tend to be geographically-concentrated (see Bunce, 1999b; Toft, 2003). Spatial “packaging” facilitates intra-group interaction, but at the costs of both alienating the inevitable minorities that share the same space and limiting interactions, whether political, social or economic, with groups outside the cluster that nonetheless share the same state. Local exclusion and “parallel play” have particularly explosive consequences when they are joined, as they often are, with group-based economic specialization, and political incentives for politicians, especially if closed out of politics at the center, to focus their appeals inward rather than outward. Politicians have incentives to stress socio-economic and political inequalities.

When dissatisfied with central policies and resentful of other groups which are perceived as either taxing their progress or having unfair advantages (Horowitz, 1985; Bunce, 2004), such communities find it tempting to press for political changes, ranging from increased cultural, political and economic autonomy to secession from the state. Such demands, especially when the state and regime are weak, invite other groups to do the same; encourage the center to respond violently in order to defend itself. These conditions also radicalize the agenda of leaders of these various communities as a way to hold on to their power and to protect their communities from aggressive actions by both the center and neighboring communities (Bunce, 1999b, 2004; Gagnon, 2004; Sambanis and Zinn, 2004). This is precisely the dynamic, noted earlier, of a security dilemma.
The roots of this dynamic go back to the origins of these states. The key problem was imperial mischief, whether the earlier imperial power was Vienna and Budapest in the Habsburg Empire, London, Paris, Brussels or Lisbon in the overseas empires, or, more recently, Moscow in the case of the Soviet bloc. However, empire is also a perception about the right and capacity of an authoritarian center in heterogeneous states to rule within the existing boundaries of political authority. In this sense, multinational states, even after the age of empire, can become empires in the minds of their citizens and, more importantly, in the calculus of local leaders (Beissinger, 2003).

What, then, do we mean by imperial mischief? Both versions of empire, the national idea—or the claim of a common political community composed largely of strangers that deserves rights and is committed to sovereignty—often took hold prior to the solidification of legitimate and durable borders and integrated economies. At the same time, empires constructed nations, by accident and by design, through such innovations in the organization of political space as the census, the map and the museum (see, especially, Anderson, 1991; also see Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991).

Equally artificial in origins and equally powerful in its spatial and cultural consequences was the construction of international and external administrative boundaries, divisions of economic and political labor, and clustered patterns of social, political and economic interaction. Such segmentation was, of course, hardly accidental. Whether governing empires or authoritarian multinational states, political leaders who controlled large swaths of the developing world used these mechanisms to limit interactions among the nations they had helped construct, while forging supportive coalitions and limiting resistance to their rule through the familiar
policies of divide and rule. However, these practices also undermined their power in the longer-term—by investing in the cultural, political and spatial resources of constituent nations needed to carve out the national agenda of state formation.

The new states that emerged from empire, however, often lacked another precondition for democracy, aside from a common and inclusive definition of the nation and its political project: an ability to define and defend borders and to elicit the cooperation of their citizens. There are three key points here. First, the dissolution of empires was not usually a story of either clean breaks or nationalist movements that united in support of statehood—the myths of decolonization notwithstanding. Rather, the process was often a consequence of wars among empires and/or authoritarian states; political chaos; outside interventions that drew haphazard boundaries (with Iraq a good case in point); and struggles among local elites who had disputed or limited followings.

Second, the norm was the formation of weak states. Weak states invite conflicts, rather than the reverse, and these conflicts are usually both vertical—or between the state and the citizenry—and horizontal—or among the groups that had earlier been organized as nations and that, during empire, had been played off against one another and, yet, with independence, forced to co-habit the same political unit. In addition, the dismantling of the larger imperial or federal unit usually left in its wake contiguous successor states that featured contested boundaries and contested nations, thereby undermining the political stability of the region as a whole. Much has been made of the pronounced tendency of the superpowers during the Cold War to engage in proxy wars by siding with neighboring countries in the developing world. However, the historical origins of many of these states also gave them ample reasons to fear each other. India and Pakistan are an obvious pair in point, as are Rwanda and Burundi.
Finally, the new states that arose from the wreckage of empire, were federal or confederal authoritarian states which took their cues from the Western experience and often defined their primary tasks, as a result, as rapid economic development and nation-building. This usually meant growing socio-economic inequalities that exaggerated the earlier correlation between diversity and access to money, power and status. Favorites were played and existing inequalities gave more advantages to some than others to capitalize on development policy. Policies that either excluded national minorities or pressured them to assimilate.

In this sense, it must be recognized, leaders in the developing world faithfully copied the West—with its history of using education, language policy, forced emigration and even genocide to create more homogeneous nations (Weber, 1976; Rae, 2002; Mann, 2005). The important difference is that the national idea preceded, rather than followed state creation in the developing world—in part because of diffusion and in part because of imperial politics. As a result, state pursuit of homogenization in the states that emerged from empire was often a highly-contested process that was more likely, as a result, to lead to dictatorship and/or encourage secessionist movements.

Thus, if state boundaries in the developing world were less sticky than their Western counterparts, national boundaries were in some ways more sticky. The Western experience with state- and nation-building was altered in another way as well. In the West, external boundaries were hard, but internal boundaries were soft—the ideal combination insofar as maximizing national security, state effectiveness, and a positive relationship between capitalism and democracy are concerned. In the developing world, the situation was often the opposite. This
compromised the security and territorial integrity of many of these states, their ability to tax and provide public goods, their economic performance, and, where even attempted, the sustainability of the democratic experiment.

**Conflict in Diverse Societies**

All of these problems are long-term in nature. They carry three lessons. One is that imperial centers, whether located in formal empires or in authoritarian multinational states that resembled empires in their structure and dynamics, feature a similar strategy of constructing and then politicizing national differences. Second, these legacies constructed states-in-waiting, yet often prevented those states from being effective. As a result, imperial legacies often prevented the creation of a virtuous circle among economic development, political stability, democratic politics and national security. This was particularly problematic where cultural differences were linked not just to political, social and economic benefits, but also to support for democracy and group capacity to take advantage of democratic resources (McDowley and Silver, 2002).

Finally, these dynamics help correct a common misunderstanding. It was not that communism froze nations, that the end of communism melted the ice, or that national conflicts in this part of the world, as a result, increased after communism because of this process. Rather, communism, more than most imperial systems, constructed nations and built proto-states in its midst, especially in the ethnofederations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. When the regime weakened, therefore, so did the state, and proto-states became real ones (Bunce, 1999b).
Regime and state transitions in the communist world, beginning in 1989, remind us, however, of a more general point. At the extreme, the legacies of empire increased the likelihood of internal wars after empire. It is therefore not surprising (as Susan Woodward has argued in her paper) that most violent conflicts since World War II (which is precisely the period when most states in the developing world formed) have been internal, rather than inter-state, and in poor, rather than economically-endowed states (Gurr, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Indeed, this has been a relatively consistent feature of international politics since 1945—the assumption of the singular effects of the end of the Cold War to the contrary.

Moreover, recent estimates by the World Bank suggest that low income countries are fifteen times more likely to face internal conflicts than the richest countries (as quoted in Eizenstat, et.al., 2005). While often not originating in cultural cleavages and, instead, in struggles for power among elites in weak states, these internal conflicts nonetheless have usually played out in heterogeneous cultural settings along religious, linguistic and/or ethnic lines. In comparison with inter-state conflicts, moreover, internal wars have been unusually long-lasting and unusually resistant to durable resolution (Walters, 2001; Stedman, 1997; Licklinder, 1995; Hartzell, Hodie and Rothchild, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Stedman and Cousins, 2002).

In addition, while the causes of intra-state wars vary, their consequences in divided societies are remarkably—and sadly—similar (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Nations co-habiting the same state become more divided from one another—in how they construe their identities, in where they live and work, in their patterns of social and economic interactions, and in their political preferences and affiliations. War also leaves them with widely divergent visions of
what they want in the future. With such divisions, the core traits that define and defend the
democratic experience—that is, high rates of inter-group interaction, common projects, an
inclusive definition of the nation, an expansive definition of equal rights, and inter-group trust—are in tatters.

Political leaders in these settings, moreover, often have political incentives to play up these divisions (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2004; but see Gibson and Guows, 2003; Pickering, 2005). This is particularly the case in democracies, where electoral systems and forms of government do not provide incentives to politicians to reach out to diverse constituencies, and in illiberal regimes, where the exploitation of difference by political leaders serves the purpose of dividing and demobilizing liberal oppositions while diverting popular attention away from issues, such as human rights, jobs and personal security, that would constitute a powerful challenge to their right to rule (Gagnon, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004; Varshney, 2002; Pickering, 2005).

Are these admittedly extreme scenarios inevitable? The answer is no. Just as homogeneity does not necessarily promote either democracy or peace (as the cases of Armenia, Haiti and Somalia, for example, remind us), so heterogeneity does not lead invariably to inter-group conflict. A quick overview of political trajectories in one large region—postcommunist Eurasia since 1989—provides ample evidence that, just as new and highly heterogeneous countries emerging from larger, dictatorial states can be both peaceful and democratic (as in the cases of Latvia, Estonia and, less evenly, Slovakia), so relatively homogeneous countries from a similar point of political departure can be both unstable and undemocratic (Armenia and Russia) (Bunce, 1999a; Bunce and Watts, 2005). Moreover, as the same region reminds us, trajectories are subject to change. Just as the relatively homogeneous Russia has become less democratic
over time, while continuing its war against Chechnya, so much more heterogeneous Serbia and Georgia, after divisive nationalist politics, have become more democratic and more politically inclusive (see Fish, 2005 on the Russian case).

Indeed, cultural conflicts are the *exception*, not the rule—not just in the West, but also in the developing world (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). To explain the outbreak of internal wars as a function of “ancient hatreds,” therefore, is to fall prey to a self-serving and inaccurate explanation of ethnic conflict—self-serving, because it releases the observer from the responsibility of locating more complex causes and the international community from crafting viable solutions—and inaccurate, because national identities are fluid, not fixed, modern and constructed by political authorities, not ancient and natural, and quite variable, not consistent over time in their political impact (see, for example, Mote and Rutherford, 2001; Gagnon, 2005). Moreover, nations do not have to like one another to co-exist. Hatred is one issue, and the breakdown of democracy and the outbreak of actual conflict quite a separate set of issues—as a comparison of the Macedonian and Bosnian cases reminds us and as the South African case illuminates as well (Pickering, 2005; Gibson and Gouws, 2003). Thus, imperial legacies, while rarely helpful, do not by any means consign multinational states to a future of either war or dictatorship. To borrow from Federick Cooper (2005), the politics of divided societies in the developing world, whether in Africa (which is focus of Cooper’s analysis) or elsewhere, is neither a product purely of colonial imposition nor postcolonial political practices. It is a “coproduction.”
**Short-Term Influences**

This leads us to the second set of factors shaping the relationship between democracy and diversity: short-term changes in the environment. These changes can include a variety of developments that re-order winners and losers. They can include, for example: 1) changes in the economy (development projects that by accident or by design privilege some groups over others, the discovery of oil in one ethnic enclave within the state, an economic crisis that, because of culturally- or spatially-linked divisions of labor, targets some groups more than others, or pressures from the international financial community to introduce painful economic reforms that have culturally-differentiated consequences); 2) in the social system (such as when dominant external powers ally with former “bottom dogs” against “top dogs,” or when changes in ruling coalitions, especially in patron-client systems, change status hierarchies); 3) or in the cultural realm (for example, when other states define identity in ways that reach out to nations in neighboring states, when processes of international integration, such as EU accession, pose conflicts between state sovereignty and gains from extra-territorial identities, or when external states challenge ownership of cultural products—as with, say, Israel’s confiscation of the Bruno Schulz murals from northeastern Europe—see Powers, 2003).

Perhaps the most common short-term cause of rising inter-group tensions, however, is political change—for instance, when the constitution is altered in ways that discriminate against certain groups (with Sri Lanka, Croatia and Serbia three cases in point); when electoral outcomes redistribute the representation and power of groups, or when authoritarian leaders, facing international and/or domestic pressures to liberalize the polity, use national differences—in the absence of other available issues that could work in their favor, to stave off challenges to their power) (Petersen, 2002; Esman and Herring, 2001; Bunce and Watts, 2005).
Yet another political scenario is when major changes in the international system play havoc with the legitimacy of states in the periphery, thereby exposing these states to domestic struggles over money, political power, the very design of the regime, and the boundaries of the state. This was a dynamic that was particularly important in the case of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War, as well as in many of the Sub-Saharan African states that had been clients of the Soviet Union (Woodward, 1995).

By the same token, however, short-term changes can also invest in both democracy and inter-group cooperation. For instance, changes in the structure of party support and in the dynamics of political competition can encourage politicians representing one group to broaden their message and to reach out to others; the design (or re-design) of the state can help legitimate difference while making majorities and minorities feel more secure; responsibilities for past injustices can be recognized and cooperation can move forward (see Gibson and Guows, 2003 and Bronwyn Leebow’s paper); and patterns of economic investment can encourage interactions across group boundaries (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly and Reynolds, 1999; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005; Bunce and Watts, 2005). In addition, leaders can in fact make a difference. For every Mugabe, there is a Mandela.

Thus, diversity and democracy are neither inherently in tension nor inherently compatible. Historical legacies can be harmful or helpful, and changes in the environment can move societies and their political leaders toward the poles of either inter-group conflict or cooperation, dictatorship or democracy. The power of short-term changes in influencing inter-group relations in heterogeneous societies leads us to the second set of issues to be discussed in
this paper: American democracy promotion. We will begin with a brief history of its origins and then turn to two key issues—whether such efforts are advisable and under what conditions they are most effective.

**The Surprisingly Long History of American Democracy Promotion**

It is tempting to assume that the current American commitment to democracy promotion originated in the events of 9/11. It was, after all, following the 9/11 attacks that the United States began to pursue a more overt and assertive agenda of confronting dictatorships and sponsoring, if not demanding democratization—for example, by supporting liberal oppositions, expanded voter registration and turnout and free and fair elections in the hybrid regimes of Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, by calling for democratic reform in the Middle East and Russia, and by staging American-led military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The logic behind all of these actions was the same. By replacing dictatorship with democracy, terrorists would be deprived of the kind of political environment in which they thrive.

These reactions to 9/11 notwithstanding, democracy promotion is not a new priority for American foreign policy. Current democracy promotion efforts are of more recent vintage than the Cold War practices. These Cold War practices included opposing leftist parties and movements in many democratic polities in the developing world (and even Western Europe immediately after World War II), providing support to foreign militaries that violated human rights and that were often responsible for ending democratic politics (Bermeo, 2003), and overthrowing democratically-elected officials for reasons of economic interest, national security and even pressures from close, equally “democratic” allies, such as Great Britain, as in the
actions, for instance, in Iran, 1953; Guatemala, 1954; Brazil, 1964; and Chile, 1973 (see Lowenthal 1991; Kinzer, 2003; also see Carothers, 1999, 2004; Pevehouse, 2002, 2005; Watts, 2005; Peceny, 1999; Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, 2000).

However, the seeming hostility of the United States to democracy began to change in the 1970s. Like the third wave of democratization more generally (Huntington 1991), so the commitment to the international promotion of democracy, at least for the United States, started thirty years ago, when then President Jimmy Carter highlighted human rights as the basis for American foreign policy. This led Carter to criticize regimes (particularly in Latin America) for their violations of civil liberties and to carve out an increasingly active role for the United States in monitoring elections in Latin America, with the first case being the Dominican Republic in 1978 (Santa Cruz, 2003; also see Lowenthal, 1991). Following the Carter Presidency and especially beginning with Ronald Reagan’s second term in office, American commitment to democracy promotion came to occupy a central place in American foreign policy. For example, it was during the first Bush Presidency that budgetary support for such activities began to increase sharply (with that amount today now in the billions of dollars), and it was during the Clinton administration that American foreign policy officials began to make the empirical link between democratic governance and the achievement of other important international goals, such as peace and global (and therefore American) prosperity (Carothers 1999, 2004; Talbott, 1996; Mandelbaum, 1996). It was also during the Clinton administration that the United States first ventured in a serious way into the thicket of deposing dictators—for example, the American-led NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 followed by extensive American involvement in strengthening
the Serbian political opposition to the point where they were able (but largely by their own efforts) to defeat Milosevic at the polls and, when he resisted leaving office, soon thereafter in the streets.

The United States, however, was not the only international actor to embrace democracy promotion—though the U.S. does use some distinctive policy instruments (Peceny, 1999; Watts, 2005; Aksartova, 2005). Since the early 1980s in fact, the Organization of American States, like the Helsinki Process and the European Union, has been involved in various aspects of democracy promotion, and the same can be said by the end of the 1980s for non-governmental (or semi-governmental) organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Carter Center, the Open Society Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Relations, and the International Republican Institute.

By the mid-1990s, moreover, international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, also embraced democracy, arguing that this system of governance was more effective than the alternatives in producing economic development and higher standards of human welfare. As a result, both Western states and a wide range of governmental and non-governmental international organizations have become increasingly involved in supporting democratic governance—for example, using economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation to pressure dictatorships to liberalize; investing in the development of civil society, rule of law and, more generally, political institutions in new democracies; providing economic and political incentives to states that are perceived to be making progress in meeting democratic standards; monitoring elections; and using diplomacy and the military to end wars and promote democratic politics (see, for example, Borzell and Risse, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Walter, 2001; Pevehouse, 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Zisk, 2004; Marinov, 2004).
One of the most successful examples of such efforts has been what can be termed the “electoral model,” which involves a multi-pronged effort to strengthen democratic oppositions, register voters, increase voter turnout and provide international election monitoring in countries that have moved in an illiberal direction, but that hold nonetheless competitive elections. It is precisely such activities in hybrid democracies (see Diamond, 2002; but also Ottaway, 2003)—with the actions involving complex collaborations among a variety of domestic, regional and Western actors—that have led to the fall from power of dictators in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan since 2000. These developments have in turn influenced mass demonstrations against dictators in other countries (albeit with varying degrees of success), whether in connection with fraudulent elections or other perceived abuses of power—for instance, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mexico, Togo, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and even Bashkortostan (a republic within the Russian Federation) over the past two years.

**Democracy Promotion as a Popular Policy of Choice**

Why has democracy promotion become such an important priority? There have been a number of trends converging in the same direction. One was the discrediting of the ideas, given the expansion of the number of democracies in the world from 1974 to the present, that dictatorships are somehow “natural” for most of the world, that democracy requires rare and exacting political, social and economic conditions that take a long time to materialize, and that democracy, as a result, cannot be crafted—by domestic elites and citizens and certainly not by the international community (Huntington, 1991; Bunce, 2003; Di Palma, 1991). The global wave of democracy, moreover, has not produced a large number of robust democracies, but,
rather, the proliferation of hybrid regimes marrying elements of dictatorship and democracy (Diamond, 2002; Zakharia, 2003). These hybrid regimes tend to feature a common profile. They are heterogeneous states that are unstable and corrupt—with corruption often denominated in cultural currency (see Hozic, 2004). Because of these problems and the unevenness of repression, they are appealing targets for international interventions that are based upon the assumption that the international community can tip the political balance towards democratic politics.

A third influence has already been noted—mounting empirical evidence that democracy enhances other desirable goals, while weak states, by becoming “mere geographical expressions” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 9), threaten both their citizenry and regional political stability (Finnemore, 2003; Krasner, 2004; Gasiorowski, 2000; Navia and Zweifel, 2003; Powers, 2002; Siegle and Halperin, 2004). The latter concern, combined with a shift in international norms supporting violations of state sovereignty to restore human rights (Finnemore, 2003), led to a remarkable turn-around for the United Nations. As Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali observed in 1992: “The sovereignty of states must be considered under the sovereignty of human rights” (quoted in Santa Cruz, 2003, p. 9). Beginning in 1990, as a result, UN missions to build peace and democracy began to increase sharply. Today, for example, the UN has seventeen missions on four continents (Roberts, 2001; Derrdal and Leiter, 1996).2

Still another factor was the experience of the European Union during the 1990s in negotiating access with the new democracies, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, that had replaced communist regimes in east-central Europe. Democracy, it was

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2 However, all this does not mean that either the United Nations or the United States responds forcefully to every massive violation of human rights. Bosnia is exceptional; Rwanda, the Sudan, and Cambodia are, sadly, the norm (Powers, 2002; Barnet, 2002; Mann, 2005).
discovered in these contexts, could be consolidated, if the EU provided clear standards, operated with an internal political consensus, transferred key institutions, and extended political, social and economic incentives for compliance with their dictates (Vachudova, 2005; Jacoby, 2004). The internal dynamics of EU expansion, in turn, increasingly informed the foreign policy of the EU outside of Europe—though inconsistently, as we see in changing EU willingness to criticize Russia for human rights violations in Chechnya (Sedelmeier, 2005).

The final influence allows us to return to the American case in particular; that is, the impact of the events of 9/11 combined with the unassailable position of the United States as the global hegemon. These influences did not just reinforce earlier trends and lock-in American commitment to democracy promotion abroad; they moved such efforts into newer and riskier realms. In the recent past, the United States had provided economic and political assistance to nascent democracies; sometimes used short-term and limited military force to restore democracy (Nolan, 2003); and, even less commonly, to participate with international allies in brokering peace and building democracy in severely divided societies. However, with 9/11 the United States took the far more radical and historically-unprecedented step of using the concerns about national security to deploy massive military force to end longstanding dictatorships and to build democracy.

**The Debate Over Democracy Promotion**

U.S. engagement in democracy promotion has been accompanied, not surprisingly, by considerable criticisms of these efforts, especially in reaction to the Afghan and Iraqi ventures (for just a sampling, see Dower, 2003; Makiya, 2003, Lawson, 2003; Goodson, 2003, 2005; Nolan, 2003, 2005a,b; Diamond, 2004a,b; Galbraith, 2004; Jabar, 2005; Brown, 2005; Dobbins,
2005). For some analysts, the issue is that the United States has no right to impose its version of the good polity on the rest of the world. As Robert McNamara reflected in his memoirs about American involvement in Vietnam: “We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose” (quoted in Norton, 2004, p. 198). For other analysts, it is the irony of using military interventions in particular to build democracy that is the most disturbing. Democracy, after all, is a system of governance that privileges representative institutions as the locus of conflict-management and that rests on civilian control over the military.

A third problem for many observers is that such interventions are doomed to failure. Thus, American foreign policy has been singled out for being both fickle and short-sighted. Democracy may be “in” one day and “out” the next, with local allies left to pay the price for the short attention span of their American patrons (Jennings, 2003; Zisk, 2004). A recent example of this dynamic—and one that is reminiscent of the Cold War-- was in Uzbekistan in 2005, where violent repression of protesters led the European Union to press for an investigation and the U.S. declined to participate—largely because of the importance of American bases in that country for operations in central and south Asia.

Democracy promotion efforts can also backfire—for a number of reasons. First, even well-meaning and dedicated promoters are often ignorant about local circumstances. Second, the various actors involved can work at cross purposes. Third, a rapid inflow of resources can isolate recipients from their co-nationals, thereby exaggerating local hierarchies of money and power rather than diffusing democratic skills and influence in an equitable manner. Finally, American interventions can settle for superficial political change—for instance, helping oppositions defeat dictators at the polls, but ignoring more laborious tasks, such as demilitarization, building political parties and civil societies, and improving the quality of
economic life. At the extreme, moreover, democracy promotion can be destabilizing, because it threatens incumbent elites, increases the stakes of politics, exposes political resentments left from dictatorial policies, and weakens institutions. Political polarization, rather than moderation, is encouraged, and disorder welcomes terrorist networks (Kegley and Herman, 1997; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

Just as consequential is a legacy from authoritarian rule that is often overlooked. The longer and more invasive the dictatorship, the more likely it is that complex and large networks formed around the dictator, his allies and his political economy. There are, in short, habits and vested interests in dictatorships, whether individuals were active or passive participants.

Finally, democracy promotion in one set of countries can lead dictators in another set of countries, eyeing potential threats to their power, to preempt such pressures by either introducing political reforms. This may be happening today in Kazakhstan and Egypt. However, just as common is another approach to preemption. This is where dictators engage in more repressive political practices. Publics in these countries mount protests, but without the resources required for success—for example, the effectiveness that comes from experience, access to the media, divisions within the ruling circle and neutralization of security forces. As a result, the idea of democracy can diffuse more quickly than the capacity to carry out democratization. Publics and the opposition, therefore, can be sitting ducks.

Indeed, the world rarely offers the ideal conditions for the promotion of democracy—as it did, for instance, in postwar Japan and Germany (Luttwak, 2005; Jennings, 2003; Dower, 2003). These were strong states with homogeneous societies, developed economies and some democratic tradition; they had lost the war (and this was a fact of life for the entire society); they
were fully dependent upon the occupying powers for their economic and political reconstruction; and the occupations were committed to staying as long as necessary and committing as many resources as required in order to build democratic politics.

Moreover, after occupation, the victors in World War II encased Germany in international organizations, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (later the EU) and NATO, while building other types of alliances with Japan. By contrast, the norm today is one where the United States is “helping” to build democracy in poor, heterogeneous societies with weak states, virtually no democratic tradition and often severe divisions among citizens over the value and effectiveness of international engagement in general and over the right of the United States in particular to violate sovereignty. Also unhelpful is the ambivalence on the part of the United States and other international democracy promoters about the appropriate reach, methods and temporal limits on their mission (Krasner, 2004; Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein, 2005; Rotberg, 2004).

Finally, there are built-in constraints on what democracy promotion can accomplish, because democracy, most agree, is largely the product of domestic dynamics. In this sense, the campaign to spread democracy will often fall short of its goals, because international actors cannot “abbreviate historical transformations” (Hobsbawm, 2004, 41). This has led one analyst of recent democratization, eyeing the fragility and illiberal character of many new democracies, to argue that the global wave of democratization has left us with too many, rather than too few democracies (Zakharia, 2003).

Thus, in the absence of the foundations of democratic governance, all of the international support in the world for democratization will not be able to produce a democratic order—and may lead to chaos and political repression. Indeed, this is a major reason why until 2001 (though
Vietnam provides a partial exception) the United States, when supporting democratic governance, tended to do so not by intervening in dictatorships, but, rather, in democracies in disarray—for example, Grenada, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (Peceny, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nolan, 2003; Watts, 2005).

Looking to the Future

All of these criticisms lead to a simple conclusion. Democracy promotion is a high risk enterprise, whether viewed from the vantage point of normative or empirical considerations. However, democracy promotion promises to continue in the future as a vital component of American interactions with the world. This is, in part, because of supply-side considerations. Democracy promotion is linked closely to the war on terror; it has large and embedded constituencies supporting it within the United States government and in American-based non-governmental organizations; it is motivated by persuasive evidence pointing to both the global spread of democracy and its benefits for global publics and American security; and it is premised upon such core American values as the superiority of democracy governance and the American mission, in the Wilsonian tradition, of making the world more stable and more just. Moreover, democracy promotion is a crowded field. The United States hardly stands alone in its commitments to this endeavor.

The demand side also suggests the likelihood of continuing American engagement with democracy promotion. One source of sizeable socio-economic inequalities in the developing world is a democratic deficit—as Evelyne Huber has highlighted in her paper. In addition, most
of the new democracies that have come into being over the past twenty years have retained
significant authoritarian elements. In these contexts, democracy is precarious, and its uncertain
status threatens domestic and regional stability.

At the same time, conflicts in the international system in the future are likely as in the
past to take place primarily in poor, heterogeneous societies with illegitimate regimes and weak
states (Eldabawi and Sambanis, 2002). These conflicts are also as likely as in the past to exploit
cultural cleavages and to contribute to regional instability—for example, through the flight of
refugees, interventions by neighbors who often take sides and supply arms (Saidman, 2002), and
dislocations of regional economies.

Such dynamics invite international engagement, since peacekeeping usually requires third
party enforcement, and longer-term international commitment to democracy, since only
democracy (as Susan Woodward argues in her paper) holds the promise of re-constructing inter-
group trust and stable politics. However, democracy carries no guarantees, as the Bosnian case
in particular reminds us (Pickering, 2004; Woodward, 1999a, 1999b; Bose, 2002; Hayden, 2005;
Joseph, 2005)

If the supply and the demand side both support a continuing commitment to democracy
promotion, then so does a final consideration. There are considerable costs attached to
subtracting democracy promotion from the goals of American foreign policy. In the absence of
this motivation, the United States could easily return to its Cold War practices of buttressing
authoritarian regimes that are corrupt and cruel in the name of national security. Moreover, the
United States would forfeit a key source of its influence: its normative claim to improving
global welfare. If the economic and military components of American foreign policy were forced to stand alone, the global charges of American imperial designs on the world would stick—and for good reasons.

The question, then, is not whether the United States should or will promote democracy in the future—in general and in divided societies. Rather, the issue is how to do so. The record thus far of American democracy promotion provides some clues. While circumstances, of course, vary and a one-size fits all strategy is both impossible and inadvisable, there are, nonetheless, some helpful and broadly applicable guidelines that would enhance American ability to succeed in democracy promotion while minimizing the costs of such interventions.

First, American policy-makers should not confuse the well-known benefits of democracy with the effects of transitions to democracy. It is both naïve and costly to assume that the shift from authoritarian to democratic governance is a process that leads either automatically or immediately to such salutary outcomes as extensive civil liberties and political rights, rule of law, free and fair elections, accountable and effective government, political stability, or improvements in economic growth, income distribution and the socio-economic quality of life.

Democratization is an uneven process; it is easily hijacked by illiberal politicians; it often takes place in states that are unwilling and unable to provide political order; and it is often compromised by weak civil societies, fragmented political parties and a biased media. Democratization, in short, raises the stakes of politics, but often in the absence of political order and institutions that together can facilitate peaceful negotiations over differences of opinion and interests; political power; economic resources; and cultural identities. Rather than lowering conflict and increasing legitimacy, therefore, democratization, especially in the short-term (which is, after all, what politics is primarily about), may have the opposite effects.
Second, the American experience with democracy is both instructive and irrelevant insofar as American democracy promotion is concerned. On the one hand, American foreign policy-makers would do well to remember, when intervening in divided societies, that the history of democracy in this country is a story of continuing struggles, sometimes quite violent (the American Civil War, for example, produced more deaths than any war in the Nineteenth Century), over expanding the political and economic rights of people who live in this country, but who are different from others for cultural and other reasons.

The American experiment with democracy began as an exclusivist political project limited to white male landowners. More than 200 years later, the U.S. is still wrestling with how to broaden the basis of citizenship, participation, influence and governance, while weakening the stubborn, but indefensible ties between class and political power and between cultural identities and access to power, money and status. In the United States, as elsewhere, then, democracy is an ongoing and flawed process that involves using political institutions that are accessible, accountable and trustworthy to empower citizens and to help them negotiate among their divergent values and interests. As the American experience highlights, democracy is not a project that can be finished, a political outcome, or a type of government that is either present or absent. It is an ongoing process that is subjective to twists and turns.

On the other hand, American institutions may not be the best ones for other societies—though there are reasons to favor the American concept of a Supreme Court. It is not advisable, for example, to follow the American precedent of the constitution either being treated as the foundation of democratic politics and or being devised by a handful of political elites who came together in one city for a brief period of time. When constitutions are accorded too much
importance, cultural groups, as well as citizens in general and political leaders, can easily feel that they must get precisely what they want from the constitution or face political extinction.

Their belief that the train might be leaving the station without them, therefore, makes constitutions hard to craft and tempts participants and outsiders alike to use them as a pretext to pursue their own interests and, where marginalized, to defect from the democratic rules of the game. These considerations have led many analysts to argue in recent years that the importance of constitutions for developing societies should be ratcheted downward (an argument that some leaders of the European Union would welcome at this point). As a result, interim constitutions are desirable, as is an understanding of constitutions as documents that cannot achieve harmony for divided societies, but that can encourage a process of “living together without major disagreements” (Hart, 2003; Hughes, 2003). Thus, especially for divided societies, constitutions should be framed not as contracts, but, rather, as “conversations” (Hart, 2003). Some uncertainty, considerable flexibility, and an open-ended understanding of when the constitutional process ends, therefore, are highly desirable for heterogeneous political settings.

Also implied in this version of constitution-making is a preference for widespread discussion. This is particularly important for divided societies, since the less groups feel that they participated in fashioning the rules of politics and the less confident they are that these rules can be changed, the more likely they are to see political outcomes as biased, decisive and durable allocations of political power. Moreover, participatory constitution-making can be a school for democracy—though it may have the consequence of creating a more distrustful, though more discriminating public in the short-term (Moehler, 2003).

Winner-take-all electoral systems, as we have in the United States, are also problematic. They discriminate against minorities, especially when electoral districts are drawn in ways that
over-represent majorities—for example, by dispersing minority votes. Among electoral districts, they also produce a large number of wasted votes, which undermines the important public connection between their votes and political representation.

Finally, presidentialism has the cost of making the stakes of politics exceedingly high, especially when legislatures are dominated by the same party or are very weak in structural terms (see Gerring and Thacker; but see Roeder, 2005a, b). They are also associated with democratic breakdown (Bermeo, 2003), and they do a poor job—in direct contrast to parliamentary systems, especially where governments are broadly representative—of carrying out important, but divisive tasks as painful economic reforms (see Hellman, 1998).

This leads to a third guideline for American democracy promotion. Even with the best of intentions and even through the most carefully-considered interventions, democracy promotion invariably generates costs. For example, embargoes against dictators harm local populations and criminalize local and regional economies; efforts to bring peace to war-torn societies can facilitate the cross-national movement of weapons (as occurred in Kosovo following the Dayton Peace Accords ending the Bosnian war in 1995); and efforts to protect vulnerable minorities can encourage their leaders and some of their followers to take revenge by discriminating against the local communities who leaders and external patrons had once been the aggressors (as happened with international support for the Kosovar Albanians and the subsequent treatment of the Serbian minority). Democracy promotion efforts can also de-stabilize neighboring states (as occurred, again with some members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, in Macedonia in 2001).

At the same time, international campaigns to support democracy can lead dictators to protect their powers by becoming more repressive at home—a dynamic that describes recent developments in Belarus, China, Russia, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. Finally, even minimal
interventions can be costly. For instance, American assistance programs in new democracies have contributed to a widening of inequalities in the power of those who can connect with such aid and those who cannot (Aksartova, 2005; Petrova, 2003; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002; Henderson, 2003).

Democracy promotion is more successful when democratic means are used. This means, in part, taking the time to understand local conditions; in part engaging in an inclusive process that reaches out to diverse groups, including those who are either favored by current elites or who were the allies of earlier regimes; and in part always preferring collaborative to unilateral actions—with collaboration referring not just to partnerships with local groups, but also with other international actors.

This means investing in societal capacity to participate in politics and to inform and constrain government, rather than the all-too-common process of rushing to elections—which tend to cement, rather than diversify existing distributions of political power among socio-economic and cultural groupings and which have the additional problem, for all new democracies, of structuring subsequent political developments (see Harbeson, 1999 and his paper; Lyons, 2002, 2004; Hughes, 2003; Eklit and Reynolds, 2002).

More generally, interventions should expand, rather than narrow political participation. Here, it is important to note that several recent analyses of democratization have provided empirical support for the argument that the most successful cases of both breaking with authoritarian rule and building sustainable democracies thereafter have involved significant mass participation (Bunce, 2003; Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005). The earlier preference in the democratization literature for transitions that were crafted by elites and that involved a demobilization of the public is now open to considerable question—even for some of the very
cases where transitions were assumed to be paced and, because of that, successful. Finally, a
democratic process has an additional benefit. If international interventions fail, the international
community is less likely to be the target of blame and democratic residues from international
interventions are more likely to remain—to be invested in the future, when conditions for
democratization ripen.

Modesty is the best policy. As noted earlier, democratization is largely a domestic
process; the development of democracy is a process of fits and starts and slow in most cases.
International interventions are influential only at the margins. Moreover, neither international
nor domestic democracy promoters in divided societies can “solve” the problem of diversity. At
best, they can develop institutions that facilitate negotiations about difference. Put simply, then,
it is unrealistic to aim for “new Switzerlands” (Watts, 2005).

These insights, plus the earlier discussion of the costs of democracy promotion, suggest
several implications. One is that ambitious interventions are more likely to be costly and
unsuccessful. More ambitious interventions are those that, to take the extremes, deploy the
military rather than provide election monitors, advice about designing political institutions,
including elections, and financial assistance. More ambitious interventions focus on
heterogeneous, not homogeneous societies. They target countries without a democratic tradition,
not those with one. They seek to end dictatorship and/or internal war and introduce democratic
governance, rather than enhance the political capacity of existing democratic orders.

This suggests, in turn, that the U.S. should target either hybrid regimes or new
democracies. In quasi-democratic or fully democratic settings, there are more building blocks
for democratic politics—for example, political parties, an experienced opposition, alternative
political leaders, reasonably accurate readings of public opinion, and pockets of media independence.

Modesty also means a careful reading of domestic support for democracy and for U.S. intervention. Here, it is important to note that in many parts of eastern Europe, the United States is very popular—especially where Soviet rule was unpopular and oppressive, while Western Europe is seen as either too demanding or too hostile (depending upon whether the EU demands strict compliance with the Acquis Communitaire or declares states outside Europe), and where Russia has allied itself with postcommunist authoritarian rulers.

However, by global standards, this is a highly unusual situation, prompted by the experiences of communism and postcommunism in creating polarized likes and dislikes that work to the clear benefit of the United States. As a result, support for American involvement in domestic affairs cannot—and should not—be assumed to be high in other parts of the world. This is particular the case where American political-military, economic, and cultural domination. Some of America’s closest allies (such as Israel), and recent American military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are all deeply resented.

Finally, concrete and decentralized assistance is preferable to large-scale projects. Small grants should be encouraged to groups that have come together to address a local problem and that, with help, can devise solutions, expand participation, increases public stakes in the new order, and link democracy with problem-solving. They sell the benefits of democracy for everyday life. By contrast, large-scale projects that are slow to show results and that remove publics from the process of identifying problems and solutions communicate very different messages. Moreover, because affected parties are disengaged, the results of these ventures are often mixed and often to the benefit of a select circle of local clients.
Small may be beautiful, but ambitious international interventions in support of democracy may be unavoidable—for largely normative reasons. Because the potential for success is low does not mean that the United States should stand aloof when international conflicts, such as in Darfur and Rwanda, generate human misery. A considerable literature has assessed what works best and least well in situations where the goals are ending war and building a democratic polity. To provide a brief summary: the more successful interventions are those where the conflicts are ideological and not cultural, and where the international community succeeds in: 1) reaching out to all parties rather than playing favorites; 2) demilitarizing and restoring public order; 3) maintaining a longterm presence and investing in the economy, civil society and political institutions, rather than adopting a simple formula of holding quick elections and departing, and; 4) legitimating difference, but providing institutions and economic incentives that encourage cooperation among groups (see, for example, Hughes, 2003; Lyons, 2002, 2004; Anderson and Dodd, 2005; Zisk, 2004; Woodward, 1999a, 1999b; Walter, 2001; Van der Borgh, 2003; Stedman, Rothchild and Cousins, 2002).

The case for effective military interventions, however, should not be used to justify the deployment of massive American force in general in dictatorial regimes, whether the society is homogeneous or heterogeneous. Such actions are matters of political choice, not necessity, and their impact, as in Iraq since 2003 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Afghanistan since 2001, can be to cause, rather than reduce domestic turmoil, and to discredit, rather than enhance democracy. That recognized, however, if the deed has been done, many of the preferred strategies noted above for postwar settings can be helpful. However as we have witnessed in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq, such strategies were ignored in the rush to go to war on problematic grounds and to imagine that democratization can be a spontaneous process.
The Afghan and Iraqi missions remind us of a final component of successful interventions—giving good institutional advice. The key insight here is that the successful promotion of democracy in divided societies rests upon two pillars. The first is legitimating and empowering difference—for example, through hard guarantees of civil liberties and political rights. The second is more complex and in potential tension with the first. This is providing incentives for members of diverse groups to share the same general goals, such as democracy, the promotion of public welfare, and acceptance of the need to co-habit the same political space. Members and groups must interact and cooperate with one another in pursuit of personal interests, as well as overarching goals; and to believe that political outcomes are both fair and temporary. The second pillar means, primarily, investing in institutions, because institutions allocate preferences and resources, provide incentives, and thereby influence both political behavior and political outcomes. These institutions, in short, can, if optimally designed, promote democracy and stability, in party by over-ruling or rendering less relevant past biases and tensions.

But which institutions are optimal for divided societies? The answer to this question depends to a significant extent on specific circumstances, such as the relative size and geographical distribution of cultural communities, the structure of the economy, the relationship between cultural and other cleavages, the legacies of the past, and the willingness of neighboring countries, many of whom share cultural communities, to cooperate in the democratizing process.

These details aside, however, there are four recommendations that can be offered. First, the definition of the nation in the constitution should be inclusive. For example, in states named after their majority nation, such as Macedonia, the constitution should base membership in the founding nation and claims to citizenship on residence in the state of Macedonia, rather than,
say, the Macedonian nationality. This may seem trivial, but, in fact, in most of the constitutions that were promulgated in the postcommunist area, the nation was defined in ethnic terms—a decision that, thankfully, is far less common in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Second, there should be constitutional guarantees of individual rights and civil liberties that are backed up by rule of law. Third, electoral systems should be based upon some form of proportional representation. As John Gerring and Strom Thacker (2005: 148) have summarized:

It is generally agreed that list-PR systems have an advantage over majoritarian systems in mediating severe political conflict. Two basic features of list-PR electoral systems make this outcome probable: the proportional distribution of seats and votes, and the capacity to incorporate members from all relevant social groups on a party’s list. List-PR systems thus allow for the representation of important social groups within parties and among parties. This dual or bi-level proportionality has direct and indirect effects on moderating social conflict. (also see Reilly, 2001, 2002; Reilly and Reynolds, 1999).

Unitary Versus Segmented States

The final institutional recommendation addresses the design of the state for divided societies. Here, the discussion must be more detailed—because the issue invites so much controversy and because the recommendation offered goes against common practices.

The choice regarding the institutional design of the state for heterogeneous societies is between a unitary state coupled with strong guarantees of individual rights versus a “divided” state, such as consociational or ethnofederal systems, that organize political institutions or levels of government, respectively, in ways that emphasize group rights and political representation on the basis of membership in specific national or religious communities (see, for example, Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Bunce and Watts, 2005; but see McGarry, 2001 and McGarry and O’Leary, 2002).

At issue in making this choice are several tensions built into the management of diversity in democratic settings. One is how to legitimate and represent difference and thereby reject a
divisive agenda of homogenization without in the process weakening the capacity of
governments to form (given the multiplication of group-based interests and parties and their
resistance to compromise), and, if forming, to make decisions that can be implemented. There
can be a trade-off, in short, between representation of cultural groups in politics and the
effectiveness of governance.

Another tension is how to legitimate and represent difference without locking individuals
into singular and rigid identities that prevent them from assuming a range of roles in the polity,
the economy and the society; adopting diverse preferences that vary according to issues and that
cross group memberships; and locating in the process new friends and business partners, as well
as some overarching commonalities that justify common membership in the same state.
Democracy, in short, needs to celebrate diversity, but at the same time find ways to encourage a
political process in which cleavages can be fluid and not just fixed, overlapping and not simply
reinforced (see the suggestive data on Lebanon reported in Haddad, 2002). Put differently,
stable democracies are nourished by unstable coalitions.

Also problematic in managing diversity and, therefore, in making choices about the
institutional make-up of the state, is the dilemma of guaranteeing the representation of cultural
communities but not in ways that discriminate against unrecognized groups, that privilege
cleavages that could threaten the stability of both the state and the regime, or that encourage
groups to opt out of the state rather than remain within the state. Here, the Indian case is
illuminating. India managed, once it formed its linguistically-based federalism, to balance these
concerns in a relatively effective fashion—especially in the early years of Indian independence,
when it benefited from some unusual conditions, such as a legacy of integration, not
segmentation, a definition of the Indian nation that under-pinned the struggle for independence from Great Britain, one-party dominance, and Nehru’s leadership.

Moreover, the Indian leadership laid out strict guidelines for how claims to form states could be made and created incentives for groups to press for inclusion in the state rather than independence. What was also critical in this process was a rejection of any claim that was based upon religion—which would have been very destabilizing, not just because of Pakistan (which reminds us that the Indian national movement was not as inclusive as it claimed or as consensual at the top as it claimed as well), but also because religion is inherently divisive. One can, for example, be bi-lingual and bi-ethnic, but bi-religious is a far less likely possibility.

No single approach to state design can fully resolve these tensions. That recognized, there are some important considerations that seem to tip the balance away from what the international community has usually championed when confronting the problem of building democracy in divided societies--that is, segmented political structures, such as ethnofederalism and consociationalism. By contrast a unitary political structure is rarely proposed by the international community.

One problem with segmented states is corruption. If power, money and social status are allocated on the basis of membership in specific communities, if there is a strict (albeit periodically negotiable) formula for these allocations, and if community leaders control the distribution of “goodies,” then what often follows is the rise of ethnic political machines that reduce democracy to little more than inefficient allocations by a few people monopolizing scarce rights, influence, goods and services. Thus, while the broad confines of the regime may appear democratic, given elaborate representational schemes and guarantees of group rights, this can obscure what is in practice a set of relatively dictatorial and inefficient local satrapies that share
the same political space, but with limited interaction. Leaders of those satrapies, moreover, are both willing and able to block not just political, but also economic reforms (Manning and Antic, 2003).

A second problem is that segmented institutions, once in place, are unusually resistant to change—a problem in divided societies in particular where flexibility is unusually important, if the regime is to be able to recalibrate in response to erring on either side of the dilemmas noted above. However, if segmented states do change, it is usually in the direction of further decentralization, if not state dissolution.

It is telling, for example, that one of the most purportedly successful experiments in power-sharing—Spain after the death of Franco—is still confronting demands for secession—most recently from some leaders of the Basque country (McLean, 2005). Moreover, while segmented and unitary multinational states may both experience inter-ethnic conflict (though such conflicts are more common in the former context), these disputes seem to last longer and be more resistant to resolution in both consociational and ethnofederal states (Bunce and Watts, 2005). In addition, in the segmented setting, as one statistical study has suggested, there is a much higher probability that conflicts will escalate—a tendency that remains even when a variety of other plausible causes are taken into account (Roeder, 2005b).

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the vast majority of states in the international system since the early nineteenth century (indeed, eighty-six percent by one recent estimate) have arisen from segmented political settings (Roeder, 2005). Segmented states feature unusually high mortality rates, either dissolving or leaking territory, as the cases of Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Nigeria, Norway-Sweden, Pakistan, Rhodesia, the Soviet Union, Tanzania, Uganda and Yugoslavia remind us. States designed along these lines are prone to
constitutional crises, secessionist movements and political fragmentation—all of which are associated with increased levels of political violence and not with democratic governance. Indeed, as one careful study of Lebanon’s long experience with consociational democracy suggests, the survival of segmented political states seems to depend upon the rather unattractive combination of an external power guaranteeing the state, favoring certain groups, and compromising democratic governance (Zahar, 2005). Lebanon is one of the oldest of the consociational systems. As such, the recent protests in Lebanon over Syrian control and perhaps Syrian complicity in the assassination of a former Prime Minister provide a revealing example of the tensions between intervention and sovereignty, dictatorship and democracy, stability and instability.

In addition, both ethnofederal and consociational arrangements tend to spawn—and continue to keep spawning—unusually complex governmental structures. This has been the case, for example, in Bosnia, where one citizen expressed the frustration that: “We don’t live in a country; we live in a project” (quoted in Joseph, 2005: 115; also see Woodward, 1999a, 1999b; Bose, 2002; Manning and Antic, 2003; Pickering, 2004). Complexity distances government from governed; reduces the ability of governments to act and implement; and renders government less transparent while providing niches for leaders of cultural communities to carry out political and economic projects that serve their narrow interests (Hayden, 2005).

Finally, power-sharing after internal wars in particular tends to lock in the wartime institutions that were responsible for creating more spatially-homogeneous population clusters, given victories in battle, public fears, ethnic cleansing and patterns of refugee settlements. As a result, institutional continuity reinforces the wartime culture of fear and the predatory economic and political behavior of self-appointed national leaders (Bunce and Watts, 2005; Zahar, 2005;
Roeder, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Lyons, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Haddad, 2002; Bose, 2002; Pickering, 2004). In the process, to paraphrase Clausewitz’s famous dictum: peace becomes war by other means.

All of these problems seem to suggest that the better institutional approach to the management of diversity, albeit one that also has costs, is to opt for a unitary state. To support democracy and inter-ethnic cooperation, however, that state must be combined with: 1) extensive individually-defined rights guaranteed by law; 2) electoral systems that guarantee minority representation and broad-based governments; 3) inclusive definitions of citizenship, and; 4) significant cultural autonomy for minority communities.3 However, meeting these conditions can still produce a state and regime that engages in discriminatory political practices, especially when minorities are in a poor position to press for inclusion (see Nedelsky, 2003). In addition, civic definitions of citizenship—or ones that prefer residence within the state over, say, cultural foundations as the key—may in fact disguise a homogenizing project on the part of the majority (McGarry, 2001).

Words, in short, can be one thing and political experiences in daily life another. Thus, like democracy promotion in general, designing political institutions to manage diversity can be a helpful, but costly and certainly constrained endeavor.

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3 It must also be recognized that, while the formula above is desirable, it may not be practical—for example, for countries where power-sharing or ethnofederation were already in place prior to conflicts (Bunce and Watts, 2005) or where the international community cannot secure peace without using power-sharing in order to bring conflicting parties to the table. In these circumstances, three equally unattractive options may present themselves: partition (which justifies wartime aggression), the continuing use of third parties to guarantee the state and peaceful coexistence among its inhabitants (assuming those parties cooperate with one another), or a transition from early power-sharing to institutional frameworks that encourage more pan-ethnic interactions (see Kaufman, 1996; Joseph, 2005; Junne and Cross, 2003).
Conclusions

This paper has challenged a number of common assumptions about the relationship between democracy and diversity and about the origins and effectiveness of American efforts at democracy promotion. First, democracy is the best approach to managing diversity, but it is at the same time often devilishly difficult to found and sustain democracy in such contexts. Second, democracy promotion is not a new goal in American foreign policy, and it is a goal that speaks far more to international developments and empirical work on democratic politics than to American ideals or the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Third, the United States is most successful at promoting democracy when it uses democratic methods, when is collaborates with other international actors, and when it focuses on contexts that already feature some elements of democratic politics. In this sense, international democracy promotion works best when it is combined with domestic democracy promotion.

Fourth, democracy promotion can have precisely the opposite effect—for instance, generating chaos, exacerbating domestic inequalities in political skills, rates of participation and influence, and, through poor institutional choices, weakening the state and segmenting the polity and the economy. Also costly is another unintended consequence—pressing dictators to protect their powers and their stranglehold over corrupt economies by tightening up control and driving wedges between the American goals of promoting democracy and enhancing national security. Finally, democracy in divided societies works best when diversity is celebrated, rather than repressed or ignored, and when political institutions provide incentives at the same time for interaction and cooperation across cultural cleavages. This argues for two institutional innovations: proportional representation, which is a common suggestion (though far more
common in practice in postcommunist Eurasia than in Sub-Saharan Africa) and unitary states (which have not been for the most part the design of international choice).

Have these generalizations been internalized by American foreign policy-makers? The answer is mixed. On the one hand, the American-led military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and especially in Iraq in 2003 suggest that little has been learned about both the “best contexts” and the “best practices” for democracy promotion. What we see, for example, is ambitious, not modest goals; undemocratic, not democratic methods; ignorance of local conditions; divisive, not inclusive strategies to build coalitions in support of democracy; institutional choices that weaken the state, while reinforcing cleavages among cultural communities; and a failure to provide the political order and economic improvements that make democracy both doable and attractive. On the other hand, the recent electoral revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine evidence some learning. The contrast between these radically different approaches to the same problem—ousting dictators and building democracy—remind us of perhaps the most important lesson about democracy promotion. The U.S. should nudge, not shove.
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