ORIGINS OF THE STALINIST SUPERIORITY COMPLEX:

Western Intellectuals Inside the USSR

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TITLE VIII PROGRAM
Project Information

Principal Investigator: Michael David-Fox
Council Contract Number: 819-05g
Date: October 25, 2004

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* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.
Executive Summary

This paper explores one little examined shift within Soviet system that can be traced through the reception of Western visitors to the USSR during the 1920s-1930s. During the 1920s, even as restrictions on coveted Western contacts were installed, the new regime assumed it had much to learn from advanced Western modernity; by the Stalinist 1930s, Soviet culture was declared superior in all respects and anti-foreign terror accompanied the purges. The paper traces the dynamics of this transformation through the Soviet tours of American writer Theodore Dreiser in 1928-29, a group of right-wing German intellectuals in 1932, and French fellow-traveler Romain Rolland in 1935. A transnational approach based on new archival materials, it argues, shows how the interwar “pilgrimage to Russia” was about more than just Soviet manipulation and Western utopianism; it was also an episode of intense mutual appraisal in which shifting Western and Soviet assertions of superiority and inferiority clashed.
Introduction

During the 1920s and 1930s over 100,000 foreigners visited the Soviet Union, including several tens of thousands of European and American professionals, scholars, artists, and intellectuals who came to see the Soviet experiment.¹ This interwar “pilgrimage to Russia,” and the intellectuals’ sympathy for Soviet communism through some of its most repressive phases, remains one of the most notorious events in the political and intellectual history of the twentieth century.²

But it is curious that the entire library of books on Western intellectuals and communism makes virtually no contribution to the big questions of Russian and Soviet history. The Soviet side of the equation in what is, after all, one of the greatest cross-cultural encounters of the modern period has remained an enormous black box. The history of the fellow-travelers has been written almost entirely by non-Russianists, and their evidence was largely what the Western visitors themselves said and wrote. Within the Russian field, the writings of early modern European visitors have been central to the historiography of Muscovy, and Russian expressions of proximity and distance from Europe have been crucial to recent landmark studies of imperial Russia.³ But the international dimensions of Soviet history (with the exception of an isolated subfield of foreign policy) were long relegated to the backburner. A kind of tacit internalism has reigned: several generations and schools looked at the development of the Soviet system, whether it was from above or from below, as basically a domestic story. Even so, I would maintain that even the extremes of Stalin-era xenophobia and autarky can be illuminated when interaction between the external and internal features of the Soviet system are better understood.
In this working paper I will explore one great and surprisingly little examined shift within the Soviet system that can be traced through the reception of Western visitors. In the mid-1920s, even as the Bolsheviks touted the achievements of their Revolution it was still widely assumed that the new regime had much to learn from the technologically and culturally advanced West. Travel and contacts abroad were coveted even when they were restricted, and it was assumed that the “semi-Asiatic” Russian masses, as Lenin called them, needed to be enlightened about the best features of bourgeois modernity.4

Barely a decade later, by the mid-1930s, a new orthodoxy held that Soviet socialism and Soviet culture were superior in all respects; during the purges those previously treasured foreign contacts generated waves of xenophobic terror and mass physical annihilation. But even later, under high Stalinism, when it was discovered that not Edison but a Russian inventor created the light bulb, a secretive, elite fascination for and imitation of the West persisted in many realms.5

This remarkable transformation of Soviet attitudes and policies vis-à-vis Western countries obviously has many dimensions and many explanations. It is one problem I have considered in depth in my NCEEER project, “Inside the Great Experiment: Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1939.” My focus is on the cultural, political, and intellectual history of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Western travelers in the interwar period – targeting more specifically visitors from Central/Western Europe and the United States who were treated by the Soviets as members of the “intelligentsia.” I first became attracted to the topic in the mid-1990s, when I learned that a remarkable archival collection was about to be declassified: the secret records of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (known by its Russian acronym, VOKS). In addition to arranging tours for non-communist and non-proletarian foreigners VOKS was part of an array of Soviet institutions I have studied that were involved in
cultural diplomacy and propaganda, as well as analyzing and influencing Western public opinion. In large part, my findings are based on the archival records of these institutions.

In this paper I am going to convey some of the results by examining shifting Western and Soviet calculations of inferiority and superiority through the prism of concrete moments of transnational interaction. The first involves an American in 1927-28, the second a group of Germans in the summer of 1932, and the third a French visitor in 1935-36.

The Dreiser Visit and Soviet Cultural Policy

My first case concerns the American writer Theodore Dreiser’s remarkable three-month odyssey around the USSR. His visit was organized by VOKS, which did for Dreiser what it typically did for honored guests among sympathizers, arranging introductions to the cream of the Soviet cultural elite as well as top political leaders. Unsurprisingly, Dreiser found much to praise; in fact, his book *Dreiser Looks at Russia* relied verbatim on materials VOKS supplied him; on his return, he stepped off the boat in New York and declared to the reporters gathered around him that the United States would be sovietized.6

But Dreiser is especially interesting because of the way he combined political sycophancy with both private doubts and cultural condescension, a combination that was in fact typical but which he took to extremes. In part, he expressed his prejudices more openly because, unlike many of the Western intellectual visitors of the interwar period, he knew almost nothing of Russian culture, Marxism or political philosophy. Even as Dreiser entered his pro-Soviet phase in the mid-1920s, he displayed the imprint of his prewar journalistic immersion into the creed of the self-made man and Social Darwinism. Much of what he approved of in Bolshevism actually came from his enthusiasm for Soviet plans to modernize the slothful, backward Asiatics,
and he faithfully reproduced stereotypes about Russian national character that had been imported to the United States as early as the mid-late 19th century, largely via French scholarship.\(^7\)

Dreiser illustrates a Western counterpart to the radical Soviet shift vis-à-vis the West: in what you might call one of the world’s most extreme image makeovers, Russia went in European and American thought from the backward “gendarme of Europe” to the “future that worked.” What is interesting, though, is how Dreiser on his journey found not only the wave of the future, but Old Russia as well. In complicated ways Dreiser and others combined notions of the USSR as politically and ideologically more advanced but also culturally and economically backward.

This feature of the interwar pilgrimage that goes far beyond the mere condemnation of political naiveté or the utopianism of the intellectuals was so prominent in a certain branch of the literature on the fellow-travelers. For example, Dreiser’s freewheeling, three-month journey exposed him to miserable Soviet conditions that could hardly be hidden, although like many he later engaged in self-censorship to conceal them. If one had to pick adjectives to describe Dreiser, the ones that would probably serve best would be crusty, outspoken, colorful, and curmudgeonly. He raged to the Soviets about food and dirt, the great themes of his Russian diary. To allay his fear of bed-bugs and cockroaches, he wrote, “I find myself turning to Vodka – vodka plain, vodka in tea, vodka in dessert in order that I make a go of things.” His browbeaten handlers were confronted with a strange melange of admiration and arrogance.\(^8\)

On the one hand, Dreiser’s associations about Russia, Asia, Slavs and the East included a not untypical thrill for the exotic that allowed him to disassociate the Soviet Union from aspects of American modernity he disliked. But Dreiser also condemned the Slavic or Russian “temperament” in openly racial terms. He compared the “less developed state” of Russians to that of “Negroes,” since “they prefer to dream & play & talk like children.”\(^9\) In an extraordinary
parting missive to the Soviets after three months on the ground, he repeated the adjective

“Russian” over and over almost like a pejorative:

“The Russian house, the Russian yard, the Russian street, the Russian toilet, the
Russian hotel, the individual Russian’s attitude toward his personal appearance,
are items which convey to the Westerner (and particularly to a traveler from
America), a sense of something which is neither creditable nor wholesome...You
live too many in one room and are even lunatic enough to identify it with a
communistic spirit.”

The Soviet reaction to Dreiser is highly revealing and emerged from broader Soviet
practices of surveillance and evaluation of foreigners which I have analyzed in depth
elsewhere. The Soviet reports are notable for the highly sensitive way they built their own
evaluations around Western reactions and criticisms. They demonstrate a reflexivity typical of
Russian ideologies of Left and Right at least since both nineteenth-century Russian populism and
nationalism made virtues of what Europeans labeled backward and barbarous.

Thus Dreiser’s parting statement was not read as the annoyed griping of a sick and tired
man but as a kind of reciprocal evaluation of the USSR, a document of the utmost importance
that predicted what he would say back home. What was new was the Marxism-Leninist
framework: VOKS reports concluded that Dreiser’s “mood” would “waver” in “relation to the
degree of comfort in which he finds himself.” His “petty-bourgeois spirit could not adjust to a
country in which technology, of course, stands at a lower level of development.”

That little “of course” is significant and typical of the 1920s assumption that in many
ways Soviet society lagged behind on a rigid civilizational hierarchy. But VOKS reports softened
the blow by reducing Dreiser’s barrage of criticisms back down to their material base, namely his
own dependence on luxury. This theme runs like a red thread through Soviet reports on foreigners, and by the 1930s foreign intellectual guests were showered with increasingly lavish perks.

By the time of the next encounter I want to discuss, 1932, momentous changes had altered the superiority-inferiority calculus between USSR and the West. The coincidence of the Great Depression and the Five-Year Plan, images of breadlines versus planned industrialization, for the first time allowed the Soviets and their admirers to claim superiority in the realm of economics. Also, the massive turnover in party-state cadres in this era created a new Stalinist elite with radically lower levels of exposure to the outside world and foreign languages than the Old Bolsheviks and cultural cadres of the 1920s. Even more, a mission to “overtake” the West was an explicit part of Stalinism starting in this first phase: as Stalin declared in his 1929 speech declaring a “Great Break” with the past, “let the worthy capitalists, who boast so much of their ‘civilization,’ try to overtake us! We shall see which countries may then be ‘classified’ as backward and which as advanced.”

Changes in Soviet Cultural Policy: The Arplan Delegation

It was a new trans-ideological respect for Soviet planning and forced industrialization that lay behind one of the strangest, most hybrid of Soviet partner organizations, the German Arplan (a German acronym for Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Studium der Sowjetrussischen Planwirtschaft, or Working Group for the Study of the Soviet-Russian Planned Economy), which arose in 1932 and in the summer of that year sent a delegation to the USSR for a customized tour. It was hybrid because the 50-plus German intellectuals who were Arplan members included not only prominent communists and leftists (Georg Luckacs, Karl Wittfogel, members of the
Frankfurt School), but also a large cohort of extreme-right German nationalists, including figures close to fascism, theorists of the “conservative revolution” such as Ernst Jünger, and, startlingly enough, even some members of the Nazi party. Very little has been known or written about Arplan, and even less about its delegation’s visit to the USSR.\(^{14}\)

Why would far-right German nationalists less than a year before the Nazi seizure of power be interested in meeting with Soviet planning officials in Berlin and collecting a library of Soviet materials on planned economics, not to mention traveling as guests of the Soviet government? There are many answers to this question. A good place to start is with the treaties of Versailles and Rapallo, which turned Weimar Germany and the USSR into international pariahs and convenient bedfellows, and gave rise to the so-called Eastern orientation in Germany that brought nationalists as well as political, business, and scientific elites into pragmatic contact with the USSR and its proxy organizations in Germany.\(^{15}\) Soviet cultural diplomacy, which has usually been associated with leftist sympathizers, actually faced a fundamental dilemma over whether to court ideologically sympathetic allies or influential yet politically distant “bourgeois” figures.

The large pool of German non-leftists ready to cooperate with the USSR before 1933 made Soviet-Weimar relations the formative test case for this dilemma. Secondly, the radical German “new nationalism” and the pre-1933 development of German fascism contained within it a strain of fascination for Soviet communism as an anti-Western, anti-liberal, geopolitical counterweight to Western civilization. Those “national revolutionaries” who wished to convert socialism from a class into a national phenomenon and who saw positive elements in the Soviet Union (quite unlike the conventional hatred of communism on the German Right) were known after 1919 as subscribers to “Nationalbolschewismus,” or National Bolshevism.\(^{16}\)
Perhaps the most important National Bolshevik in Germany was an Arplan member and member of its travel delegation, Ernst Niekisch. Like several other right-wing revolutionaries, he had a background in the socialist movement, including most notably his short-lived chairmanship of the Bavarian Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Soviet in Munich in 1919. Niekisch called for a national mission for German workers, saying that the German Volk should orient toward Soviet Russia, which he envisioned as a “young,” anti-Western ally for Germany. For him, then, the proletarian-communist idea was primarily an anti-Western geopolitical challenge.

Interestingly, one French historian has portrayed Niekisch’s strong opposition to Hitler and the Nazis before and after 1933 as emanating from the furthest extremes of the Right rather than the “left of the Right”: Niekisch actually attacked Nazism as a particularly dangerous creature of the Anglo-Franco-Jewish West!17 If Niekisch had become a congenital irrationalist, his political ally Friedrich Lenz, the founder of Arplan (who also went along on the 1932 trip) was a professor of political economy in Giessen who was more concerned with the Soviet planned economy as a model with which Germany could achieve autarky and emancipate itself from Western economic dependence.18

Now, if the case of Dreiser illustrates confrontations over Russian-Soviet backwardness and the Soviet practices of evaluating foreigners, the case of Arplan adds several other dimensions to the Soviet encounter with Western intellectuals. The first is the tight links among Soviet cultural diplomacy, foreign policy and international communism. For one thing, throughout Weimar, Soviet diplomats in Berlin expressed far more interest in wooing influential non-leftists than cultural officials in Moscow. Second, the opening to far-right intellectuals can be tied to a broader German Communist Party tactic in the early 1930s of injecting nationalist slogans into communist propaganda in order to attract growing support from the Nazis. This
policy, known as the Scheringer line of the KPD, was coordinated by a German Politburo member and approved directly by Stalin; with Arplan, it was extended to intellectuals.\textsuperscript{19}

A third dimension of cultural diplomacy Arplan reveals is an extremely complex institutional politics among various Soviet organizations and the Comintern. In much of the literature on the fellow-travelers, the implication is that the Soviet side easily manipulated naïve Western dupes. Manipulation of the image of the USSR and the nature of Soviet socialism was rampant, to be sure, but there is also much evidence of Soviet fears about failure and ideological contagion. But that begs an important question: what exactly was the Soviet side?

In this case, archives reveal a lengthy, year-long battle over whether to extend Soviet financial support and political energy to an organization that included fascist intellectuals.\textsuperscript{20} The biggest Soviet supporter of Arplan was a diplomat and VOKS representative in Berlin by the name of Aleksandr Girshfel’d. Despite his positions as a diplomat involved with cultural diplomacy, it appears he was specially empowered by the Soviet leadership and secret police to recruit German rightist intellectuals. He thus felt free to act independently and he repeatedly rebuffed VOKS and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, which were both very suspicious about the rightists in Arplan.

Girshfel’d’s relish for courting fascists reveals yet another motivation behind Soviet interaction with Western intellectuals: espionage. There is documentary evidence that Girshfeld had ties to the secret police, for whom he later recruited at least one rightist Arplan member.\textsuperscript{21} In 1932, Girshfeld wrote that the current Soviet “cultural-political line” lay in “deeply penetrating radical…right-oppositionist circles of the intelligentsia, who have political weight, widening sources for our influence and information…”\textsuperscript{22}
Even more interesting, long after this penetration of the radical Right became a policy approved on high for Soviet cultural work in Germany, VOKS and other cultural officials in Moscow fought a rear-guard battle against Girshfel’d and his pro-Arplan backers to minimize Soviet support for Arplan and to keep the emphasis on German left-wing front organizations, such as the Society of Friends of the New Russia (founded in 1923). Bureaucratic and turf issues functioned as surrogates for the political stakes involved, and are indicative of the deep divisions that underlay the official façade of monolithism. Disputes raged right down until the Nazi seizure of power, when the Soviets’ disastrous choice to woo the far Right rather than pursue rapprochement on the Left contributed to the Nazi destruction of the entire German Left.23

The infighting on the Soviet side continued throughout the Arplan delegation’s visit in summer 1932. The Soviet reception was notable for its customized arrangements even for this mixed delegation, for example pairing German industrialists together with Soviet managers and German Marx scholars with Marxist-Leninist theoreticians even at the same dinner. The Soviets displayed confidence in these methods of choreography, leading the delegation through Ukraine at a time when the Ukrainian countryside was racked with mass famine, disease, and starvation.

The arrangements demonstrate another important aspect of the Soviet culture of evaluation: predicting and then tracking Western statements about the USSR upon their return. You can chalk up many failures as well as successes to the elaborate Soviet system for registering foreign visitors as friendly or hostile, but in this case what is interesting is how the foreigners’ activities back in Germany only added fuel to the fire of internal Soviet disunity over Arplan. Soviet supporters of the opening to Arplan nationalists pointed to the fact that at least
some conservative nationalists gave favorable reviews of the planned economy upon their return. Opponents focused on how Lenz and several of the Germans gave brutal public assessments of the failures of the five-year plan and shockingly low standards of living.⁴

If we saw that Dreiser’s starting point was Soviet backwardness, we can observe that this became the conclusion for some Arplan observers—even though it was reached through a radically different set of circumstances. However, the Soviet gamble with the Germans paid off in at least one respect: the formal Arplan report on the visit explicitly repudiated rumors of famine.⁵

**Romain Rolland and Soviet Cultural Presentation**

My third and last case takes us to the height of the Popular Front and to the 1935 visit of perhaps the most distinguished interwar intellectual to become an uncritical apologist for Stalinism, Romain Rolland. Rolland illustrates certain kinds of connections to the USSR that contrast with the distance of both Dreiser and the Arplan rightists: Rolland had been steeped in a non-denominational socialism since the turn of the century. He thought his study of the French Revolution and his leadership in European anti-fascist culture gave him special insight into the Soviet Union, and he had extensive links to the Soviet Union through key intermediaries, including his Russian wife, Mariia Kudasheva, and his correspondent of 20 years, Maxim Gorky, who was arguably the most influential architect of Stalinist culture. Culturally, the 1930s Soviet repudiation of the avant-garde and Socialist Realism’s embrace of classical high culture and didactic mass enlightenment appealed to Rolland, and for a time his own hero-worship of revolutionary men of action was directed toward Stalin.⁶ When he met Stalin in person in 1935 Rolland compared him to Beethoven as the creator of a new humanism.⁷
Again, however, underneath Rolland’s worshipful attitude lay not only constant doubts (expressed only privately, to friends and diary) but a conviction that he understood European public opinion far better than the Soviets. My reading of a previously unknown transcript of his 1935 audience with Stalin, which I found in Stalin’s declassified archive, is that Rolland developed an almost contractual understanding of his status as “friend of the USSR”: in return for unconditional public defense of the Soviets in Europe he wished to have access to privileged information about Soviet policy. He was showered with materials, favors, and contacts, but inside information was of course never forthcoming. When Rolland wrote letters to try to save several figures from the purges, Stalin personally ordered that they go unanswered.28

Another major step toward the Soviet declaration of superiority over the West in these years was the ideological repercussions from the mid-1930s announcement that socialism had been achieved. Rolland’s experiences during his 1935 visit and his many other Soviet contacts, however, led him to suspect that Soviet ignorance about Europe and the world fed a dangerous chauvinism. In one revealing incident in his voluminous correspondence with Soviet citizens and newspapers, Rolland warned about waxing Soviet arrogance by unsuccessfully attempting to publish a response to two Soviet schoolchildren in a Soviet newspaper. He wrote:

It is dangerous to be too proud and self-satisfied…You are right to love the USSR…but you are incorrect to consider that it has overtaken all other countries. (‘In the USSR’, you write, “everything is the best. The best scientists, the best writers, the best musicians, athletes, engineers, artists.”

Rolland ended his letter by pointedly warning that national pride was one of the first phases of fascism.29

Stalinist culture had made such a larger than life icon out of Rolland, however, that when the real Rolland repudiated the script he could simply be filtered out, as he was when no one
published or responded to his repeated queries about this letter. In 1936, Rolland’s 70th birthday was celebrated across the Soviet Union, and this remarkable jubilee points to an appropriation of foreign luminaries within Stalinist culture that has yet to be fully appreciated. When political elites and the leading lights of the intelligentsia filed into the large hall of the Moscow conservatory, they found it draped with portraits of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Rolland. The festival included an exhibition, poems, scholarly talks, and a screening of a special documentary film of Rolland’s 1935 Soviet visit. Factory workers familiar with his works gave testimonials. The scale of the event was underscored by reproductions of the jubilee by Union of Writers’ groups in the major cities around the country and a biography of Rolland mass-produced for the occasion.

This was a way of marking Soviet devotion to high and world culture, as well as anti-fascist internationalism, but there was a subtler cultural-political message as well: the organizers of the celebration conceived its leitmotif as “Romain Rolland’s path to revolution.” The notion of path, of course, affirmed the core conception of a teleological progression toward higher consciousness in the telling of Rolland’s biography. Ultimately, it implicitly affirmed the superiority of the end-point of his path, that is his embrace of the Soviet order.

Conclusions

I have two conclusions. First, the study of Western visitors opens up a range of new transnational dimensions to Soviet history. There is something of a transnational turn in historical studies that has opened up horizons in many fields. In this particular case, the interwar pilgrimage of Western intellectuals to the Soviet Union was all about evaluation; we know a lot about European and American intellectuals’ political and ideological kow-towing, but a lot less
about their assumptions of superiority, especially in cultural and economic terms. The Soviets took a traditionally heightened Russian sensitivity to European opinion and added to it a whole set of new practices of evaluation and reception. The result was an intensive episode of mutual appraisal. It will not do to reduce this to a story of Soviet manipulation and Western utopianism alone. Study of Dreiser and Rolland inside the USSR, for example, shows that they both knew a lot more about the Soviet order than they admitted in public.

The second conclusion is that Soviet techniques of reception themselves cry out for historicization. The study of Western visitors provides an empirical way of interrogating rapidly evolving Soviet practices and attitudes toward the “West” as a central feature of Soviet politics and culture. The Soviet superiority complex I have traced here, once entrenched, had a profound affect on Soviet world-views. For example, when Norman Naimark wrote his book on the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany after World War II, he was clearly a little bit shocked at the depth of arrogance and condescension displayed by Soviet cultural officials and other personnel abroad. The Russian influence on Goethe and Schiller was discussed, and a German communist was lambasted for daring to suggest that Lenin was a pupil of Hegel.

Yet surely it was a sign of insecurities close to the surface when the Soviets seemingly never tired of what Naimark called “effusive, formulaic praise.” I’ve referred to a Stalinist superiority complex precisely because underneath the veneer, doubts and secret inversions of orthodoxy were endemic. The post-Stalin Thaw marked in some ways a recapitulation of the ambiguities vis-à-vis the West present in the 1920s, while the end of the Soviet period launched a process of full-fledged reversal in which the Stalin-era notions of superiority were transformed into a deep-seated inferiority complex.
ENDNOTES

1. A. V. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad. Formirovanie vneshnepoliticheskikh stereotipov v soznaniy rossiiskogo obshchestva pervoi poloviny XX veka (Moscow, 1998), 146.


9. Dreiser’s Russian Diary, entry of 4 December 1927, 182.


13. Quoted in Engerman, 153-154. For significant treatments of this great shift toward the West from the 1920s to 1930s, see Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, and Sergei Zhuravlev, “Malenkie liudi” i “bol’shaia istoriia”. Inostrantsy moskovskogo Elektrozavoda v sovetskom obshchestve 1920-x – 1930-x gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000).


18 The most extensive treatment of Lenz of which I am aware is Dupeux, “National-bolchevisme,” chap. 17, 428-63.


20 Discussed at length in David-Fox, “The Soviet Encounter with German ‘National Bolshevism.’”

21 On this, see Dmitriev, “K istorii.”


23 David-Fox, “Leftists Versus Nationalists.”

24 David-Fox, “The Soviet Encounter with German ‘National Bolshevism.’”

25 Bericht der ‘Arplan’-Delegation über die Reise in der Sowjet-Union vom 23.August bis 12. September 1932,” written by Dr. ing. Kelen, Privatdozent an der Technischen Hochschule, Berlin, GARF f. 5283, op. 6, d. 172, l. 66-121, here l. 119-120.

26 The most significant French biographical work on Rolland is Bernard Duchatelet, Romain Rolland tel qu’en lui-même (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002); the most significant English-language biography of Rolland is David James Fisher, Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

For an in-depth analysis of this transcript and Rolland’s 1935 visit, see Michael David-Fox, “The ‘Heroic Life’ of a Friend of Stalinism: Romain Rolland and Soviet Culture,” forthcoming in *Slavonica*.

Romain Rolland to Galya and Natasha Isaevaia, 26 September 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 74, l. 98-99.


For a new Russian-language treatment that puts the focus, like much of the earlier Western literature on Soviet state control over Western visitors, but with much new archival evidence, see G. B. Kulikova, “Pod kontrolem gosudarstva: Prebyvanie v SSSR inostrannykh pisatelei v 1920-1930-x godakh,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 4 (2003): 43-59.