

TODAY'S TRAVEL THROUGH SEVASTOPOL'S PAST:
Post-Communist Continuity in a 'Ukrainian' Cityscape

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TITLE VIII PROGRAM

Project Information*

Principal Investigator: Karl D. Qualls
Council Contract Number: 820-17g
Date: February 23, 2005

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* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.

Executive Summary

Based on interviews, a review of the press, personal observations, and previous research, this paper seeks to understand how the predominately Russian city of Sevastopol within Ukraine is redefining itself in the post-Soviet period. As the recent Ukrainian presidential elections have shown, Sevastopol, like much of eastern and southern Ukraine, identify more with Moscow than Kiev.

This paper suggests that the relative continuity in Sevastopol's built environment is a result of the deep-seated development of a local identity after World War II that was easily adapted to the post-Soviet transformation. This local identity transcended the Soviet Union and continues to frustrate attempts to develop a Ukrainian identity. Moreover, because the Russian Black Sea Fleet is still based in the city and most of the sites of memory created in the twentieth-century highlighted the contribution of Russians, political affinities tend toward Moscow rather than Kiev.

Introduction

Walking along Soviet Street on the high central hill, the visitor confronts spray-painted graffiti on the yellowed wall of a building that reads: “Sevastopol is Russia.” While graffiti is a common form of self-expression in most cities, it is also a political statement in this seaside Ukrainian port that would likely choose the leadership of Moscow over Kiev. The uninitiated viewer would likely also be confused by the persistence of Soviet Street, which leads to a large statue of Vladimir Lenin that towers over the city. Are residents and city leaders stuck in the communist past, or is there another way to explain this Russian-minded enclave in Sevastopol nearly fifteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union?

Based on interviews, a review of the press, personal observations, and previous research, this paper seeks to understand how the predominately Russian city of Sevastopol within Ukraine is redefining itself in the post-Soviet period. As the recent Ukrainian presidential elections have shown, Sevastopol, like much of eastern and southern Ukraine, identify more with Moscow than Kiev. Unlike many cities in eastern Europe, Sevastopol has seen virtually no renaming of streets and squares to help residents identify with their new status as citizens of independent Ukraine. Likewise, the erection of new sites of identification are rare; the obligatory statue to Ukraine's greatest literary icon--Taras Shevchenko--is the exception. Except for the commercialization of ground-floor store fronts on the central ring road and new dachas, one would notice little change in the cityscape over the last decade. This paper suggests that the relative continuity in Sevastopol's built environment is a result of the deep-seated development of a local identity after World War II that was easily adapted to the post-Soviet transformation. This local identity transcended the Soviet Union and continues to frustrate attempts to develop a Ukrainian identity. Moreover, because the Russian Black Sea Fleet is still based in the city and most of the sites of memory created in the twentieth-century highlighted the contribution of Russians, political affinities tend toward Moscow rather than Kiev.

The Importance of the Past in Sevastopol

Any entity bent on reshaping the identity of Sevastopol over the short term has a Herculean task ahead. For over two hundred years Sevastopol has been first and foremost a Russian naval city. However, when Catherine the Great founded the city in 1784 as an outpost against the Turks she built upon the foundation of earlier inhabitants. The ancient Greeks founded the city of Chersonesus (Khersones to Slavs) 2500 years ago in what is now Sevastopol. Whether Greeks, Turks, or Russians, all powers who held sway in the city realized the commercial and military potential of this spot on the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula.

The physical geography of Sevastopol was important in the many military campaigns it endured in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the Crimean War and World War II (known together as the “two great defenses”) the geography of both land and water played a major role. In the West, the Crimean War is best known from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade.” As all forces fighting on land soon found, the rocky terrain surrounding the city was formidable before airplanes and long range artillery. To take foot soldiers or even cavalry across the vast stretches leading down to the city required an advanced knowledge of the terrain, a great deal of logistical planning, and extraordinary fortitude. The heights surrounding the city center also created an advantageous position for defense. The 150th anniversary of the Crimean War led to a great number of reminiscences in the local press, some of which noted the near impossibility of taking Sevastopol.

For example, when Prince Phillip of England visited the city along with a number of British re-enactors, one newspaper ran the story “150th Anniversary of a Failed Attack.”¹ This was clearly a one-sided presentation of British failure while not giving equal attention to massive Russian foibles throughout the war and the ravages of disease and infection on all forces. In World War II Nazi forces had the airforce and long-range, large-caliber guns to overcome many

¹“150 let neudachnoi atake,” *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta* 44 (28 October 2004): 1, 2.

of the terrain problems faced during the Crimean War; however, Soviet forces had fortified the heights with massive concrete encased pillboxes and turret guns. Thus, just as a century earlier, the invading forces faced great challenges as the terrain slowed their approach.

Water played as important a role as land in the “two great defenses.” Ports were the very first development in the extraordinarily wide and deep bays that delineate the region. In the sail driven era, Sevastopol’s bays that reach far back from the sea and are enveloped by shorelines provided protection from battering waves and high winds. The massive destroyers and battleships of the Soviet navy were less affected by wind, but they benefited from the depth of the bays, which allowed for larger ships to be constructed. Other major Black Sea ports, such as Odessa to the west or Novorossisk to the east, paled in comparison to the advantages of Sevastopol’s mighty bays.

One site of memory--the Monument to Scuttled Ships--stands at the center of Sevastopol’s identity as a naval bastion. Because of the difficulty of attacking from land, British forces during the Crimean War tried to move into the bays that put the city center within range of their guns. In order to prevent what would have resulted in immediate capitulation, the Russian navy chose to sink some of their own ships at the mouth of the bay to prevent the British from entering. This sacrificial act became a defining event for the city; and in World War II soldiers, sailors, and citizens threw themselves under tanks, charged machine gun nests, and threw bombs off burning ships in emulation of the previous century’s sacrifice.²

Despite the “two great defenses,” much of the city’s projected character and identity is derived from its first monument, which honors the brig “Mercury” and its commander Aleksandr Kazarskii. In May 1829, Kazarskii and his crew on the “Mercury” found themselves facing Turkish ships with ten times the number of guns. Rather than flee, Kazarskii skillfully maneuvered his lone ship and harassed the Turkish fleet into retreat. The first of Sevastopol’s over 2000 monuments honored this courageous and creative victory. The inscription on the

²*The Heroic Defense of Sevastopol* (Moscow, 1942); *Sevastopol: November, 1941-July, 1942: Articles, Stories and Eye-Witness Accounts by Soviet War Correspondents* (London, 1943); Karl Qualls, “Imagining Sevastopol: History and Postwar Community Construction, 1942–1953,” *National Identities*, July 2003, 123–39.

pedestal has become a mantra for the city: “An Example for Posterity.” Kazarskii’s victory against all odds inspired the Russian forces facing the British, French, Turks, and Sardinians in the Crimean War.

Likewise, in World War II German, Romanian, and Italian forces initially had a greater quantity and quality of troops and technology in their successful assault on the city. For two years, the residents who were unable to flee the city lived under Nazi occupation. However, an underground movement developed immediately and helped the Red Army to recapture the city in May 1944. For eleven and a half decades the city’s life was devoted to war, preparations for war, or reconstruction after destruction, often against great odds.

Although Soviet officials wanted to highlight the city’s revolutionary history, post-World War II narratives of the city clearly placed the revolutions and Civil War behind the importance of the “two great defenses.”³ Since the end of World War II residents and non-residents alike have been bombarded with a set of images that help to define the city’s identity and role in Russian and Soviet history. Even as World War II raged, newspapers carried stories of the new heroes and linked them to the heroes of a century earlier. Newspapers today continue the tradition of recalling the “two great defenses” for audiences far removed from the events.⁴

Reminders of the Russian naval past are inescapable for residents and visitors. Before World War II Sevastopol had started to become an open-air museum of monuments, memorials, and plaques, but the war catalyzed a resurgence of mythmaking during the second half of the

³ I discuss this in detail in a forthcoming article entitled “Remembering War or Creating Myth: Travel Guides in Sevastopol after World War II.” Travel guidebooks were one of the chief sources for official narratives. See, for example, Zakhar Chebaniuk, *Sevastopol: istoricheskie mesta i pamiatniki* (Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1957); Emiliia Doronina and T. I. Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia: spravochnik* (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1987); Boris Rosseikin and Georgii Semin, *Sevastopol: putevoditel-spravochnik* (Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1961).

⁴ See examples in “9 maia - Den’ Pobedy!” *Slava sevastopolia*, 8 May 2003, 1; “60 let nazad nad okrovavlenym Sevastopolem vzvilis’ pobednye alye flagi,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 7 May 2004; “Znatoki istorii,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 9 September 2004; Mai Babushkin, “Po goriachemu sledu sobytii,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 7 May 2004; Elizaveta Iurzditskaia, “150 let: voina i mir. Sevastopol’skaia strada,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 9 September 2004, 1; Elizaveta Iurzditskaia, “Fil’m ‘Oborona Sevastopolia’ teper’ i na angliiskom iazyke,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 9 September 2004, 1; Vladimir Shalamaev, “Vo imia pavshikh i zhivyykh,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 7 May 2004, 1; Irina Tsiganok, “Slovo docheri legendarnogo komandira 30-i beregovoi batarei,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 14 May 2004, 1.

twentieth century. While Moscow planners wanted to turn the city into a museum to Soviet power and the war victory, local officials were able to divert these plans to honor the city's longer heritage.

When the local architectural team took over rebuilding the 97 percent destroyed city, they emphasized the city's naval heritage and especially its role in the Crimean War. For example, Moscow-based planners wanted to move the beautiful but destroyed panorama and museum to the Crimean War off Historical Boulevard in order to highlight the most recent victory instead. Local planners successfully argued that the Crimean War should not be marginalized, but rather it should remain figuratively and geographically in the heart of the city, which has kept the Crimean War central to the city's identity and urban landscape.⁵

After World War II, toponyms highlighted the foundation of Sevastopol's nineteenth-century legacy, and renaming streets, parks and squares aided urban identification.⁶ Sevastopol's place within Russian and Soviet history, its relationship to the ruling Soviet ideology, and the place of ethnic minorities all found expression in the changing face of urban space. In some cases, the political present came to the fore as when city officials renamed Catherine the Great Street in favor of Lenin Street following the revolution, thus marking the new political order of the Soviet Union. Although many post-Soviet cities have removed all traces of the Bolsheviks, Sevastopol retains street names and has not raised the issue of removing Lenin's statue that looks down over the city from the central hill. In fact, Sevastopol's central district is still called "Leninskii."

The post-revolutionary period also saw the creation of Karl Marx and Mikhail Frunze streets as the other two main conduits around the central hill. Thus, the father of the revolution, the creator of its ideology, and the liberator of Crimea during the Civil War, respectively, all became a part of one's daily life walking about the city center. However, unlike Lenin Street,

⁵ On local initiatives in planning, see Karl D. Qualls, "Local-Outsider Negotiations in Sevastopol's Postwar Reconstruction, 1944–53," in *Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet Power*, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh, 2001), 276–98.

⁶ For an overview of Soviet name changes, see John Murray, *Politics and Place-Names: Changing Names in the Late Soviet Period* (Birmingham: Birmingham Slavonic Monographs, 2000).

Marx and Frunze disappeared as toponyms in the years after World War II. In reverting to the names Bol'shaia Morskaia (Big Naval) Street and Admiral Nakhimov Prospect, urban planners noted a preference for local identity. Residents were now provided with greater historical depth and encouraged to form a national and local pride derived from more than socialist values. Marx had no direct link to Sevastopol and few considered Frunze a "local" hero despite his role in "liberating" Sevastopol from the Germans in the early 1920s. In contrast, Admiral Nakhimov stood atop the pantheon of heroes from the Crimean War, and Bol'shaia Morskaia, much more than Marx, carried the city's image as a naval port.

The squares marking the intersections of the chief ring roads likewise gained new names after World War II. The Square of the Third International became Parade Square and then Nakhimov Square. Novoselskaia became Commune Square after the revolution but took the name of Admiral Ushakov during reconstruction. Even Revolutionary Square disappeared in favor of the eighteenth-century commander of the fleet, M. P. Lazarev. With the navy as the most visible institution in the city and well placed on review boards, and with the cooperation of local civilian leaders, Sevastopol became a city steeped in its pre-revolutionary naval tradition. Honoring living heroes would have been viewed as a direct challenge to the Stalin cult, so instead they chose to honor the dead of World War II and, by linking it to the Crimean War, show that the citizens and sailors had had a long and glorious tradition of defending the Motherland, which served as examples for posterity. Notables who survived the war had to wait for their deaths and the death of Stalin to be honored with a street name.

One could view these name changes as an abandonment of socialist goals, but it was more important to the city's stability and rapid reconstruction to resurrect a unique, local character to which residents could attach their ideals and aspirations. Moreover, as we have already seen, the lessons of the Crimean War were quite instructive and supported more prevalent Soviet tropes of duty, sacrifice, and fighting against all odds for the Motherland.

Therefore, an emphasis on local identity did not necessarily undermine a Soviet identity, but in fact augmented it; and after the Soviet collapse, the definition of Motherland was open to interpretation.

In the rubble of almost complete destruction in the city center, toponyms were not the only new markers of a Russian/Slavic city. But how else does one make a previously heterogeneous city look and feel more ethnically and culturally united? Two non-Slavic groups had left an architectural footprint in the city center that the war erased. Crimean Tatars had been deported en masse for alleged collaboration with the Germans, and Karaite Jews suffered like most European Jews under Hitler. With the decimation of these populations (more on Crimean Tatars below) came the destruction of their places of worship. Thus, postwar planners no longer had to give special consideration to Sevastopol's multi-ethnic heritage in reconstructing the city and its image. Eliminating the remnants of "collaborators" and "anti-Soviet cosmopolitans" (the catch phrase for Jews) became paramount in an era marked by further paranoia about "enemies" and growing anti-Semitism after the establishment of Israel.⁷ The kenasa, a Karaite prayer hall on Bol'shaia Morskaiia, became the "Spartak" sports club; the Tatar mosque just two streets off the ring road became the naval archive after workers removed the minarets and "erased" the façade of Koranic inscriptions.⁸

Purged of its cultural diversity, designers also set about unifying the architectural style that had been an eclectic blend of nineteenth-century neo-classical, constructivist, and early Stalinist functionalist buildings. Late Stalinist architecture, marked in most people's minds by the highly decorative façadism of the "wedding cake" buildings in Moscow, found no place in Sevastopol. Conversely, designers reverted to their understanding of Sevastopol's architectural

⁷ For a brief introduction to postwar anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union see Shimon Redlich, *Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia: The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948*, (Boulder, 1982); Joshua Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939-1953*, (Boston, 1971); G. V. Kostyrchenko, *V plenu u krasnogo faraona: Politicheskie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie: Dokumental'noe issledovanie*, (Moscow, 1994).

⁸ State Archive of the City of Sevastopol (hereafter GAGS) f. R-79, op. 2, d. 131, l. 88.

heritage based on the partially preserved Greek ruins of the Khersones Archaeological Preserve. This allowed architects to preserve and restore some of the city's best neo-classical architecture, such as the 1844 Parthenon-like Peter and Paul Cathedral.⁹

In addition to the neo-classical motifs, architects chose to include balconies and loggias on nearly all of their buildings in order to take advantage of the seaside character of the city. Likewise, most buildings were plastered and painted a yellow-orange color to contrast with the blue-black sea and to take advantage of the bright sunlight. Moreover, new buildings after the war were fashioned with doric, ionic and corinthian columns, massive pediments, and geometric precision. Unlike Moscow variants on older styles, however, all new construction in the historic center was kept between three and five stories high. Architects originally argued this as an aesthetic imperative. But their case was better made after the great 1948 earthquake in Ashkhabad/Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, which revealed that Sevastopol's seismic activity would not permit greater vertical construction.¹⁰ Elimination of cultural diversity presented a more Russian/Slavic aesthetic, and the choice of style, size, and color created a unique look that spoke to its tradition and climate.

Reversion to tradition meant a Russian ethnic identity wrapped in a Greek architectural façade reminiscent of the 2500-year-old ruins at nearby Khersones, yet devoid of all hints of competing identities. The process of renaming and reapportioning buildings also highlighted the historical omissions so important to creating a selective understanding of Sevastopol's history. Local unity demanded visual and historical unity, too.

Post-Soviet Ukrainianization and Resulting Tensions

When the Soviet Union imploded and an independent Ukraine emerged, the overwhelmingly linguistically Russian population of Sevastopol wondered what would become

⁹E. V. Venikeev, *Arkhitektura Sevastopolia: putevoditel* (Simferopol: Tavriia, 1983), 67–70.

¹⁰ The Soviet Union denied the 1948 earthquake until the 1990s. According to the US Geological Survey, it was a magnitude 7.3 with over 100,000 killed, which makes it one of the deadliest on record. See <http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html>. The Directorate for the Reconstruction of Sevastopol SSSR discussed the issue in 1949. See Russian State Archive of the Economy (hereafter RGAE) f. 9432, op. 1, d. 387, ll. 330-335.

of them, the city's "Russianness," and its privileged position vis a vis the state of which it was a part. In addition to its demographic dissimilarity with western Ukraine, Sevastopol had also long had a special distinction as a "city of republic significance."¹¹ Simply put, the city had much more autonomy and a direct relationship with the Soviet capital that often bypassed the regional governments. Because of its military importance it was better provisioned than other Crimean cities and most other Ukrainian cities too. When Soviet largess came to an end, many wondered if independent Ukraine would continue to support Sevastopol in the same manner.

When Iurii Meshkov won the presidency of the Crimean Autonomous Republic in January 1994 he and the pro-separatist parliament soon tried to make good on promises to separate from Ukraine and to join Russia instead. Sevastopol's city council added to the problem when it declared itself a Russian territory.¹² When Meshkov pulled back from pre-election promises and appointed Muscovites to key posts over Crimeans, the parliament voted to curb his powers, which in turn led him to disband parliament. With a parliament-appointed prime minister, Crimea in essence had two governments, neither of which functioned. On 17 March 1995 the Ukrainian Parliament, backed by President Leonid Kuchma, eliminated the presidency of Crimea and revoked its constitution.

Thus, Meshkov was left without power or a position. Kuchma sent Interior Ministry troops to the Crimean capital of Simferopol and they disarmed Meshkov's entourage. Surprisingly to most observers, there was little protest in Crimea. Moreover, Russia, which immediately after the Soviet collapse protested that Sevastopol was still Russian territory, could say little while still fighting its own war against secessionist Chechnya.¹³ Two years later,

¹¹ In 1948 the Council of Ministers ordered that Sevastopol be completed in "3-4 years." To facilitate this, Sevastopol was raised to a "city of republic significance," which meant among other things that its budget and orders came directly from the Russian Federation, not the Crimean Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic. See GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 103, l. 221.

¹²"Crimea: Who's in Charge Today?" *The Economist* 332, no. 7881 (17 September 1994): 56-57.

¹³ For more on the separatist movement and the fall of Meshkov see Vyacheslav Savchenko, "Crimea is Shaken by President-Parliament Clash," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 46, no. 37 (12 October 1994): 5; Nikolai Semena, "Crimea Has Two Governments, but That Isn't Making Things any Easier," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 46, no. 40 (2 November 1994): 23; "Ukraine Moves to Oust Leader of Separatists," *New York Times*, 19 March 1995, 19; "Ukraine: Time to Scratch," *The Economist* 334 (25 March 1995): 58; "Crimea: Guess Who Won," *The Economist* 336 (15 July 1995): 33.

although less serious than what had appeared to be the beginning of a civil war in 1993-1995, President Kuchma demanded that Crimea change to the same time zone as Kiev, not Moscow.¹⁴ With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in 1997, Russia agreed to recognize Ukraine's territorial boundaries, including Crimea. Crimea's privileged position vis a vis the state ended in the late 1990s, which left Sevastopol's residents to wonder if their special role was also at an end. But the internal battle in the Crimean government over its relationship vis a vis Russia and Ukraine continued.¹⁵

For Sevastopol, the disposition of the Soviet Black Sea was clearly the most important Russo-Ukrainian conflict and has dramatically affected the city's vistas. When in 1995 Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma divided the former Soviet fleet, it seemed to promise an end to one of the most persistent and potentially violent divisions between the two countries.¹⁶ Since 1991 the former Soviet fleet flew the flags of both countries, but commanders usually followed orders from Moscow, which paid most salaries. As the Crimean government fought to secede from Ukraine, the issue of the fleet was a powder keg. Although bloody fights between Ukrainian and Russian sailors continued after 1995, they lessened in frequency and intensity after Russia received 82 percent of the fleet and promised to pay rent for the city's naval facilities.¹⁷

For four years the two fleets had looked at each other with contempt, suspicion, and animosity, both blaming the other for poor maintenance, inadequate funding and nationalist pretensions.¹⁸ Provocations were not always one sided. In one famous incident, Ukrainian

¹⁴Tony Barber, "Kiev Tries to Drag Crimea Back in Time," *The Independent*, 28 March 1997, 15.

¹⁵David R. Marples, "Insight Into the News: Kyiv and the Power Struggle in Crimea," *Ukrainian Weekly* 68 (6 August 2000): 2.

¹⁶For an overview of the conflict and treaty see Steven Erlanger, "Russia and Ukraine Settle Dispute Over Black Sea Fleet," *New York Times*, 10 June 1995, A3.

¹⁷The author personally witnessed two Russian sailors bloodying a Ukrainian sailor in 1997. Russian hegemony was also apparent during the military parade celebrating the city's liberation from Nazi Germany when most onlookers left the sidewalks after the Russian forces marched by, leaving near empty streets for the Ukrainian fleet.

¹⁸Richard Boudreaux, "Russia and Ukraine Seek Sea Change in Sevastopol Politics: Control Over City That is Port to Black Sea Fleet and Kiev's Navy is a Sticking Point Between Two Nations," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 April 1995, 4.

commandos stormed a Russian naval base in Odessa and arrested three officers, and Russian authorities said that even the officers' children were beaten. Ukraine said it was retaliating for the theft of \$10 million in navigation equipment aboard the Sevastopol-based ship "Chekelen." When two Ukrainian ships tried to intercept the "Chekelen" on its way back to Sevastopol, the Russian navy sent an attack group from Sevastopol that chased the Ukrainian ships away.¹⁹ Ensuing Ukrainian seizures of former Soviet bases led Moscow to place its warships on full alert.²⁰

When the number of Russian sailors quickly expanded in the 1990s the navy started carving up parts of the city near the port for dacha-style housing, thus making it "home" and not merely a military posting.²¹ New land grabs heightened animosity with Ukraine. In 1997 Moscow Mayor Iurii Luzhkov increased tensions by building an apartment building with Moscow's funds for Russian sailors in Sevastopol. Of course his status with the city's Russian population skyrocketed as the new housing dominated its region's skyline and led one to say, "About this, Luzhkov is right. Sevastopol is a historic military city of Russia. All its major events and achievements are important chapters in Russian history."²² One and a half years later Luzhkov continued to insist that "Crimea must be returned to Russia."²³ On a Moscow television program Rear Admiral Vadim Vasyukov noted that it is "hard to overestimate the contribution of the Moscow municipal government and Iurii Mikhailovich Luzhkov personally to [the Russian

¹⁹Lee Hockstader, "Ukraine Detains Officers After Russia Grabs Ship, as Fleet Conflict Escalates," *The Washington Post*, 12 April 1994, A16.

²⁰Julian Borger, "Moscow Puts Warships on Full Alert," *The Guardian*, 15 April 1994.

²¹Mary Mycio, "Regional Outlook a Dacha Duel in Crimea Between Russia, Ukraine: Under Cover of Political Chaos, a Land Grab Rages in Sevastopol, Home of the Black Sea Fleet," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 May 1994, 6.

²²Carol J. Williams, "Ribbon Cut on a New Crimean War: An Apartment House, Built by Moscow's Mayor, Opens in Sevastopol. And as Russians Move in, So Enters a New Jab at Black Sea Fleet Deal," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 October 1997, 13.

²³Lev Ryabchikov, "Moscow Mayor Insists That Crimea be Returned to Russia," *ITAR-TASS News Wire*, 19 March 1999, 1.

Black Sea Fleet's] general work.”²⁴ Luzhkov continued the Russian presence in the city by signing an agreement to aid Sevastopol in economic, cultural, and technical matters through 2005.²⁵

Will Kiev try to “Ukrainianize” post-Soviet Sevastopol just as the Soviet government “Russianized” it? At the beginning of the new millennium with the Crimean parliament under control and the questions of boundaries and the fleet resolved, a statue to the Ukrainian literary hero Taras Shevchenko appeared in front of the Gagarin regional administration building. Local citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom do not speak Ukrainian, were less than happy about a monument to someone with no connection to the city. Several people explained that this was more than Russophilia or Ukrainophobia because they fully accepted monuments to Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and more who fought and often died defending the city. What they resent, they say, is military heroes figuratively standing alongside a revered Ukrainian artist simply because he has become the one clear symbol of the Ukrainian nation.²⁶

The Shevchenko statue remains the only clear symbol of Ukrainianization in the city, although Ukrainian place names are not uncommon. For example, in 2004 there were twenty streets that carried a clearly Ukrainian surname. Of those twenty, nine were named for heroes of World War II, four for participants in the Civil War, two each for the Crimean War and the 1905 uprising in the city. In short, service to the city and country defined their honorific status, not nationality. Three streets with Ukrainian surnames also were named for writers, although one was the Russian writer Vladimir Korolenko (1853-1921), who used material from his Crimean trips in his work. Lesa Ukrainka Street was named for Larisa Petrovna Kosach's (1871-1913) nom de plume. She visited Sevastopol several times from 1890 to 1908 while recovering from tuberculosis, and she wrote several works while in Crimea.

²⁴“Russian Black Sea Fleet's Flagship Back in Service Thanks to Moscow Mayor,” *BBC Monitoring*, 9 April 2000, 1.

²⁵“Moscow Mayor Signs Cooperation Agreement with Ukrainian Sevastopol,” *BBC Monitoring*, 21 March 2002, 1.

²⁶ Interviews in Sevastopol with Lika Drozdova, 17 October 2004; Iurii Fefer, 23 October 2004; Vladimir Semenov, 23 October 2004. Their sentiments were echoed in the author's casual conversations with commuters at the bus stop in front of the monument.

All twenty streets were named up to the mid-1960s, except one--Taras Shevchenko Street (1987). Shevchenko apparently had no connection to Sevastopol, but his status as a Ukrainian icon garnered him both a street and, fifteen years later, a statue. Sevastopol's encyclopedia discusses each of the namesakes of these streets, and Taras Shevchenko's entry is clearly the briefest at seven lines. In fact, the biography of Taras Shevchenko--“(1814-1861)--great Ukrainian poet, artist, thinker, revolutionary democrat”--is shorter than the description of the street's location.²⁷ No street names have been Ukrainianized since independence, and of those that remain in the city all but three were military heroes, and one of the three exceptions (Korolenko) was Russian.

As with toponyms, preservation trends suggest a deeper connection to Russia while eschewing at least part of the Soviet past. As in cities around the Soviet Union, the 1920s and 1930s brought great destruction to places of worship. Many were torn down while others were given different purposes. Throughout much of Eastern Europe, the end of the Soviet Union signaled the possibility of national revival through religion. In the first fifteen years after the Soviet collapse, Sevastopol has started to restore part of this Orthodox past. The city has two St. Vladimir cathedrals; one sits atop the central hill and the other marks the spot of Vladimir the Great's baptism in the Khersones Archaeological Preserve. Nazi forces inflicted heavy damage on both buildings, and since Ukrainian independence both have undergone restoration. The reconstruction of the church on the central hill symbolizes more than the rebirth of religion; it embodies the sacrifice of war. Large plaques on the facade remind visitors of the Crimean War admirals interred in the basement and the remaining shell damage links the present and the Crimean War through the destruction of World War II.

²⁷M. P. Aposhanskaia, comp. and ed., *Sevastopol: entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik* (Sevastopol: Muzei geroicheskoi oborony i osvobodheniia Sevastopolia, 2000), 592.

The St. Vladimir Cathedral at Khersones, which was rededicated in 2001 with Presidents Putin and Kuchma in attendance, once again dominates the skyline of the architectural preserve after a belated, but rapid, restoration.²⁸ Erected in 1891 by D. I. Grimm on the spot where Vladimir the Great is said to have accepted the Byzantine faith and thus brought Christianity to the Eastern Slavs of his kingdom, it functioned only twenty-three years before the Soviet government closed it. Nazi bombing and local looting of stone rubble for housing left the structure in ruins after World War II. In 1992 the building's remains were returned to the church, and in 2004 Sevastopol's mayor handed this magnificent structure to the Moscow patriarchate because it is the "largest confession in the region."²⁹ The presence of Presidents Putin and Kuchma signaled the importance of the common heritage of the two states, but control by Moscow now suggests that Vladimir the Great and his capital at Kiev are more a part of Russian history than Ukrainian.

Just as religious revivalism could have bridged the chasm between state and society, war remembrance added an opportunity to bring Sevastopol and Ukraine together. In 2004 Sevastopol turned 220 years old, it celebrated the 150th anniversary of the Crimean War, and the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Sevastopol (May) and Ukraine (October). Tourists, including Prince Phillip of Great Britain, flocked to the city to commemorate various events. Buses and trams carried signs that read "Sevastopol - 220 years" and "Hero-city Sevastopol," and banners announcing the 60th anniversary of the "liberation of Ukraine from the German-fascist invaders" adorned utility lines. Newspapers from the communist Sevastopolskaia Pravda to the more mainstream Slava Sevastopolia and popular Sevastopolskaia gazeta carried historical articles about the two mid-century defenses and remembrances from veterans of the latter one.³⁰

²⁸ In addition to the Sevastopol encyclopedia entries for these sites see, Venikeev, *Arkhitektura Sevastopolia: putevoditel* and E. V. Venikeev, *Sevastopol i ego okrestnosti* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1986). *Putevoditel': Sevastopol'* (Simferopol: Svit, 2004), 5 suggests that the reopening of the Cathedral is central to the city's plan to remake its image by 2010 into a tourist center.

²⁹"Vladimirskoi sobor peredan tserkvi," *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, 5 November 2004, 3.

³⁰ For a few examples, see "Chto sluchilos' 150 let nazad?" *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, no. 44 (3 November 2004): 2; "K 60-letiiu osvobozhdeniia ukraina," *Sevastopolskaia pravda*, 18–24 October 2004, 2; "Vse, chto nyzhno znat' o Krymskoi voine," *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, no. 36 (2 September 2004); Mariia Gridasova, "Den' Pobedy: dve sud'by," *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, no. 19 (6 May 2004): 1. Also refer to note 4.

Television also aired brief documentaries and reports on the various celebrations. Posters lined store windows, and publications on the Crimean War and World War II filled bookstore shelves. The interested buyer could even buy multi-lingual postcards celebrating the 150th anniversary of the Crimean War. The fold-out cards had historical images adjacent to the same scene from the present.³¹ Thus, the education of the traveler about Sevastopol's past continues. Whereas the celebration of the Crimean War and World War II were common, only recently has Sevastopol celebrated the anniversary of Ukraine's liberation from the Nazis in any meaningful way. In doing so, it is beginning to blend the image of Sevastopol's liberation with the narrative of Ukraine's struggle.

While tourism and celebrations have started to move Sevastopol and Ukraine closer, local history still dominates. Tourism centered on war remembrance understandably increases in anniversary years, and even children are frequent visitors. For example, in the fifteenth season of what is described as "intellectual games," forty-two teams of students matched wits about ancient and medieval Khersones, the Crimean War, and the region's natural resources.³² Over 700 young students from Donetsk oblast "visited historical and memorial places, [and] placed flowers at the Memorial of hero defenders of Sevastopol in 1941-1942."³³ The naval news program "Reflection" also reported on the visit of a school group from St. Petersburg studying the city as a Russian naval outpost and the birthplace of Orthodox Christianity for the East Slavs.³⁴ Although the city is part of Ukraine, it is not yet a site of "Ukrainian" tourism.

Commercialization of Post-Soviet Space

While ritual space and sites of memory remained relatively unchanged after the end of the Soviet Union, newly commercialized space has created a drastic juxtaposition between old

³¹"Sevastopol: 150-letiiu Krymskoi (Vostochnoi) voiny" (N.d.).

³²"Nachinaiutsia turniry znatokov-kraevedov," *Slava sevastopolia*, 23 October 2004, 1.

³³"Spetspoezd s donetskimi det'mi," *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, 28 October 2004, 3.

³⁴"Otrazhenie," *NTS* (Independent Television of Sevastopol), (22 October 2004).

and new, but there is nothing clearly “Ukrainian” in this development. The twenty-first century has brought commercial store fronts to the ground floor of buildings along the central ring road. Unlike the mid-1990s, Sevastopol today boasts several fashionable restaurants (and unfashionable ones like McDonald's), jewelers, clothing stores and more. Many stores promote foreign products with foreign advertising, but even stores for local Russian and Ukrainian products have transformed the aesthetic of the urban environment.

The contrast between old and new is clear to any observer. While many ground floor shops sport glass display windows and steel entryways with newly painted plaster facades, the upper residential floors show the wear of the years since the buildings rose out of the rubble of the Second World War. On the upper floors, which are primarily residential, yellowed and grayed plaster remains and ferro-concrete balconies and loggias crumble. While residents live in the old Sevastopol, tourists and wealthy residents shop in the new.

Two stores on Bol'shaia Morskaia Street, today the most fashionable shopping area of the city, show the contrast of traditional Soviet use of built space and the new commercialization of post-Soviet space. “Megasport” is the largest sporting goods store in the city center. The large,



heavy, Soviet-era wooden doors greet visitors as they walk beneath the English-language store sign. Brightly colored placards (also in English) promoting Reebok, Nike, Speedo, and Adidas

flank the entryway down the length of the sidewalk. Two large color posters of male athletes hang on either side of the doorway with text in Ukrainian, but the store hours are in Russian. Thus, we have a multi-lingual store front promoting an all foreign line of sporting goods. Moreover, the plaster wall facades have been painted a bright white, offsetting the color of promotional material. Juxtaposed to the bright, colorful lower floor are the essentially untouched upper two floors. The plaster walls have grayed and the faux balustrade immediately above the store looks particularly shabby when set off against the new white paint.

On the opposite side of the street the new women's clothing store "Fete" and its neighboring casino shows an even greater juxtaposition between old and new. A new arched doorway was cut in the stone facade and reinforced with highly polished steel. The glass door and display window were topped by a similar glass arch. Clean, modern lines dominate the interior and exterior. What is most remarkable, however, is the condition of the building on the



floor above. The balcony and the Doric-styled balustrade that serves as a railing are disintegrating. In one section of six balusters, five are missing, which leaves only the one baluster at the far right supporting the section. Much like "Megasport" the newly painted facade

sets off the new commercial floor from the older dilapidated residential floors above. The casino, something strictly forbidden in the Soviet period, beckons a new generation of residents with disposable income and/or desperate hope for a better future.


The juxtaposition of wealth and poverty are also visible in other places along this stretch of street. A broad consumer products store with a painted white facade lurks below a second-floor balcony that has rotted through and shows clear signs that the flat owner has tried to keep it fastened to the building with cement. Directly above this dangerous balcony is a loggia also painted stark white, including its ionic columns, despite the neighboring apartment's unpainted and enclosed loggia. Sevastopol's commercial development has created a wealth gap that has catalyzed urban transformation.



The commercial interests in the city are also embracing the city's traditions and past. The most well known restaurant in the city is called "Traktir." Named for the 1855 battle that attempted to remove the French from the city, this restaurant interior is covered with paintings on nautical and military themes. All the servers, moreover, dress as Imperial Russian sailors. Ironically, the restaurant is known for the best and most authentic Russian cuisine in the city, but its borsch is Ukrainian. This does not seem to matter to the Russian marines and sailors, tourists

from Europe and North America, and civilian residents who frequent the restaurant. Guests and residents, therefore, are brought back into Sevastopol's heroic past (although very superficially) during their tasty and inexpensive meal.

Advertisers have also learned to target the local audience by tying into the city's past. The meat products producer KAMO has placed billboards around the city stating that "There are sausages. And there are KAMO Sausages." The background to this unimaginative slogan, however, is the Monument to Scuttled Ships, the most beloved monument in the entire city. In short, the advertisers are drawing on the city's past but also on residents' sense of local identity. The hope is that KAMO will be associated with the city and create modern brand loyalty. Although this billboard was in Russian, many advertisements throughout the city are now using Ukrainian, something unheard of in the 1990s.



Only one store in the center stands out as unabashedly "western" in every way. Situated at Lazarev Square nearly equidistant from the city's main theater and cinema, Sevastopol's McDonald's, although small, looks like a McDonald's anywhere in the world, save its Russian-language menu. Color, decor, food, and service are completely out of place in Sevastopol. A life-

size Ronald McDonald stands outside and beckons to the passing crowd. Whereas “Fete” and “Megasport” send mixed messages, McDonald's leaves no doubt that it is the symbol of westernization.

Crimean Tatars and the Redefinition of Space

Much of the city's commercial and economic expansion no doubt comes from tourism in part lured by the return of Tatars to Crimea. Tatars are the largest non-Slavic national minority in Crimea and are transforming the peninsula and to a lesser degree Sevastopol. During the 1990s Crimean Tatars repatriated themselves to Crimea and began to assert their rights to ancestral lands. After a harsh decade of dramatic economic decline, some in Sevastopol and Crimea realized that there was money to be made in tourism, and ethno-tourism became one of the new “hooks.” At over ten percent of Crimea's population at the beginning of the twenty-first century, following Russians and Ukrainians, Tatars are poised to become a significant part of the region's economy, politics and culture as they had been for 500 years.³⁵

The Crimean Khanate grew from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century as the dominant force on the peninsula from their capital at Bakhchisarai. However, in 1783 Catherine II began the Slavic conquest of the region. Throughout the nineteenth century to the 1920s, the Crimean Tatars were of great ethnographic interest; however, on 18 May 1944, Stalin ordered that all Crimean Tatars be deported, mostly to Central Asia, for alleged collaboration. While a few thousand Tatars wore Nazi uniforms, tens of thousands fought in the Red Army. The deportation in closed rail cars and the squalor of their new residences killed roughly half of the deportees. When Khrushchev rehabilitated Stalin's “punished peoples,” Crimean Tatars remained one of only three groups (together with Volga Germans and Meskhetian Turks) denied the right to return to their homes.

³⁵Askold Krushelnycky, “Ukraine: Ethnic Tensions in Crimea Bubbling Over,” *RFE/RL*, 11 February 2004.

For the rest of the Soviet period Tatars continued to demonstrate for the right of return, and at the end of the Soviet period their dreams finally were realized.³⁶ But in the wake of the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union, many families were unable to make the long trip back. Moreover, the growing number of Tatars in Crimea has flamed ethnic hatreds, and sporadic attacks against Tatar enclaves and leaders have continued for nearly fifteen years.³⁷ However, public goodwill is also evident. For example, Sevastopol's city administration congratulated the city's Muslims on the holiday of Kurban-Bairam, and the members of the Muslim society "Miunevver" in turn wished health, peace and neighborliness (*dobrososedstvo*) to Muslims and all city residents.³⁸

Crimean Tatar repatriation has not changed the built environment of Sevastopol a great deal. True, women in traditional Muslim dress and the newly reconstructed minaret of the mosque are quite visible, but the greatest change has come in tourist packages that include Bakhchisarai, the former capital of the Crimean Khanate, and thereby stretch the perceived boundaries of the city. The city's military heritage is still the central theme of most Sevastopol tours, but ethno-tourism has become increasingly popular.³⁹ One to five day tour packages always include a walking trip around the central ring road and its monuments, the Crimean War panorama and museum on Historical Boulevard, and for some a trip to the diorama museum of World War II at Sapun Gora. This allows the visitor to quickly "experience" the city's military and naval past.

³⁶David Remnick, "Soviets Say Crimean Tatars May Return to Homeland: Commission Rejects Restoration of Autonomy," *The Washington Post*, 10 June 1988, A1.

³⁷Edward Allworth, ed., *The Tatars of Crimea : Return to the Homeland : Studies and Documents*, 2 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Greta Uehling, "Squatting, Self-Immolation, and the Repatriation of Crimean Tatars," *Nationality Papers* 28, no. 2 (June 2000): 317–42; Brian G. Williams, *The Crimea Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Brian G. Williams, "The Hidden Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in the Soviet Union: The Exile and Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars," *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 3 (July 2002): 323–47; Brian G. Williams, "A Community Reimagined. The Role of 'homeland' in the Forging of National Identity: The Case of the Crimean Tatars," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 17, no. 2 (October 1997): 225–52; "Crimean Tatar Activist Killed in Ukraine," *BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, 23 September 2004, 1.

³⁸"Mira i dobra vam, liudi!" *Slava sevastopolia*, 22 January 2005, 1.

³⁹For a sampling of sites (content available as of December 2004) see <http://www.tourism.crimea.ua/> (the official site of the Ministry of Resorts and Tourism of Crimea); <http://sevtour.by.ru/> (Unforgettable Rest in Crimea); <http://www.dreamland.crimea.ua/>; <http://rest.crimea.ua/>; <http://www.tour-ethno.com>.

For those who can spend more than one day, packages usually include a discussion of the city's Greek heritage at the Khersones Archaeological Preserve. Many longer tours also now include side trips to Bakhchisarai and Chufut-Kale. Located about one hour outside the city center, these latter two sites highlight the region's Tatar and Karaite heritage, respectively. Sandwiched between the two sites is the Russian Orthodox Uspenskii cave monastery. Whereas Khersones takes tourists back 2500 years, Bakhchisarai and Chufut-Kale illustrate the close relationship between Tatars and Karaites since the Middle Ages. The additional attention paid to Orthodox sites like the Uspenskii Monastery, the site of Vladimir the Great's baptism at Khersones, or the various cave monasteries surrounding the city brings a new dimension to Sevastopol tourism that one could not experience in the Soviet era. Thus, heritage tourism is slowly becoming more inclusive and may be redefining the region and city as heterogeneous again. Whether that eases the transition to a Ukrainian identity is hard to predict.

Bakhchisarai and Khersones, unlike the ancient settlement at Chufut-Kale, both have restoration projects and museums. At both there are guided tours available in many languages, maps of the grounds, and plenty of vendors selling books, travel guides, and trinkets. At Bakhchisarai one can tour the palace and its grounds and view both permanent and rotating exhibits of Tatar life, art, and craft work. Many visitors also often leave roses at the fountain that inspired Aleksandr Pushkin's 1822 poem "Fountain of Bakhchisarai."⁴⁰ At Khersones one can walk the ancient streets and through the foundations of what were once homes and stores. The museum contains a staggering array of artifacts from the various groups (Greeks, Romans, Tatars, and Turks) who at one time controlled the area. Walking the former streets of the Chufut-Kale cave city is more treacherous, and archaeological exploration has only just begun.

Tourists who crave trinkets, souvenirs, and kitsch need look no further than Primorskii Boulevard in Sevastopol's center. Alongside the magnificent outdoor art market, dozens of vendors sell traditional knickknacks that represent Sevastopol: sea shells, ceramic dolphins, T-shirts, and more. However, the twenty-first century has also brought a tremendous number of

⁴⁰ My thanks to Lika Drozdova for a long, individual tour of the palace, its grounds, Chufut-Kale, and the Uspenskii Monastery.

Buddha statues, pyramids, incense sticks, and mystical signs, symbols, and jewelry. There are several possible explanations for what appears to be an odd turn to eastern mysticism. Market forces may be driving the supply of these goods at the tourist markets because visitors perceive Sevastopol/Crimea as “the East.”

But this begs the question as to what formed this perception. Perhaps the tour packages to Bakhchisarai and other places have started to create a “non-western” image for the region which tourists find appealing. Lastly, this could be a conscious attempt by vendors (and perhaps other residents) to orient themselves to the East as their defeated political champion and former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich would have liked. An October 2004 survey in one of the local newspapers asked people what the first priority of a new president should be, and not one chose “closer relations with the European Union” or “entrance into NATO.”⁴¹ The latter explanation seems more problematic because Yanukovich’s orientation was to Russia, not East and Southeast Asia. Sevastopol also could be in the throws of yet another attempt to rediscover and promote its “Asiatic” nature, a la Sergei Diaghilev’s *Ballet Russe* a century earlier. It is as if the city is torn between western consumerism and eastern mysticism. However, most of the built space remains largely untouched with World War II monuments still the most important locus of identity.

Sevastopol in the 2004 Presidential Elections

The 2004 presidential election campaign highlighted the juxtaposition of old and new. Traditionally, Nakhimov Square, one of the oldest parts of the city, has been the site of demonstrations and parades. Sevastopol celebrated all major holidays with parades and marches around the ring road that started and ended at Nakhimov Square.⁴² It is not surprising that communist and socialist parties in the 2004 presidential campaign used this area for their

⁴¹Elena Gracheva, “Chto zhe budet posle vyborov,” *Slava sevastopolia*, 20 October 2004, 1.

⁴² Many specialists reviewing the initial reconstruction plans after World War II noted that all redesigns of the square had to account for its central function as an agitational space. See RGAE f. 9432, 1, d. 243, l. 13.

demonstrations with speakers, megaphones, songs, and marches. One communist party held a nearly daily vigil at the entrance of Primorskii Boulevard, the city's traditional and still most popular leisure area, into Nakhimov Square. Along the wrought iron garden fence the communists placed placards decrying capitalism, Ukrainian participation in the occupation of Iraq, and nationalism. This older geographic space became the location for the older residents' political stand.

Viktor Yushchenko's younger "Orange Revolution" was not well received in the overwhelmingly Russian Sevastopol.⁴³ His supporters chose a location that could not be more different from the communists. A lone Yushchenko information tent stood along the central ring road directly in front of Sevastopol's McDonald's fast-food eatery. In talking to the twenty-somethings working for Yushchenko's campaign, none knew if the location was selected for a particular reason. Situated on the ring road, there is a great deal of foot traffic in the area, both by residents and tourists.

Moreover, McDonald's, as in many countries, serves as a meeting place for the city's youth. Because the Yushchenko campaign targeted youth in particular in eastern and southern Ukraine, McDonald's seemed to be a perfect location to bring his message to the youngest voters in the city. The symbolism of this location was also likely intentional. Closer ties to the West and greater economic integration and development formed the base of Yushchenko's campaign; therefore, an information tent in front of one of the largest global corporations based in the West linked Yushchenko with economic vitality and modernization. When juxtaposed to the communist defined space on Nakhimov Square and its statue to the Crimean War admiral P. S. Nakhimov, the contrast between old and new could not have been clearer.

Viktor Yanukovich and his campaign flowed throughout Sevastopol's built space, unlike Yushchenko who rarely ventured past Simferopol's airport, about 100 kilometers from Sevastopol. Yanukovich's overwhelming popularity allowed him and his supporters to roam

⁴³ In the first round he garnered only 5.98 percent of the vote in Sevastopol. "Predvaritel'nye rezultaty vyborov," *Sevastopol'skaia gazeta*, 4 November 2004, 2.

freely. His placards and information kiosks dotted the urban landscape. The most persistent location for Yanukovich's presence was at the newspaper kiosk. In addition to large posters of a smiling Yanukovich in the kiosk windows, local newspapers consistently carried pro-Yanukovich articles and carried scathing exposes of Yushchenko and his policies. Yanukovich was portrayed as the champion of the poor and downtrodden, and Yushchenko (especially during his time as Prime Minister) as taking money from invalids and families with children.⁴⁴

Yushchenko's plans to integrate with the European Union were discussed as the harbingers of "national catastrophe" that would create conflict with Russia, as happened in Georgia after its revolution.⁴⁵ Questions of illegal campaign contributions and US interference on his behalf were also common.⁴⁶ Yanukovich's popularity came in part from his fluent Russian language and the benefits that he could dole out as Prime Minister. In both cases, Yanukovich was careful to play into Sevastopol's existing identity and pledged to support it. He made appearances at war memorials to praise the city and its heroes and promised 10 million hryven from the central Ukrainian budget for a new war memorial and museum.⁴⁷ With Yanukovich's defeat, the fate of the new project and Kiev's financial support for the city is in question.

In short, politics marked the urban environment's continuity. As long as the boundaries of tradition were maintained, the electoral campaign remained civil. Even though communists were a distinct minority, they played a role familiar to the city's past in an area long used for demonstrations. Yushchenko's nationalist, pro-Western campaign, however, violated Sevastopol's identity as a protector of Mother Russia. Although the author saw no physical violence toward Yushchenko supporters in the city, verbal abuse was commonplace in public and

⁴⁴Ia. Stetsenko, "Bor'ba s bednost'iu -- glavnaia zadacha Viktora Ianukovicha," *Slava sevastopolia*, 22 October 2004, 1.

⁴⁵A. Tikhii, "Gruzinskoe ruslo ukrainskoi evrointegratsii," *Slava sevastopolia*, 22 October 2004, 1.

⁴⁶A. Artemenko, "Kriminal'nye avtoritety sobiraiut den'gi na prezidentskuiu kampaniiu 'messii?'," *Slava sevastopolia*, 27 May 2004, 1; P. Ivanits, "Posol SShA Dzhon Kherbst kak agitator kandidata v prezidenty Viktora Iushchenko," *Slava sevastopolia*, 21 July 2004, 1.

⁴⁷"Blagodaren sevastopoltsam za to, chto segodnia veriat vlasti," *Slava sevastopolia*, 29 October 2004, 1.

in private. Abuse of Yushchenko supporters ranged from old women screaming about how a Yushchenko victory would undo all their sacrifices in World War II to scoffs as young men and women tried to distribute campaign literature.

One clever middle-aged man commented that the life-size Ronald McDonald statue directly behind the campaign tent would be a better president than Yushchenko and also wondered if it was Yushchenko's American wife. Had the Yushchenko campaign tried to organize at Russian military sites of memory, local response could have been more violent. By staying in the most commercialized region of the ring road, the campaign aligned Yushchenko with economic progress, although one could clearly read McDonald's as a symbol of the destruction of the past, too. Communists remained true to the past both in the language and location of their political campaign. Yanukovich, who was portrayed as a protector or savior for the city and its residents, roamed freely throughout the city crossing the boundaries of old and new, poor and rich, military and civilian.

Conclusion

Since at least World War II residents and visitors have been bombarded with images of Sevastopol's military heritage in defense of the Motherland. Constant repetition of these ideas in school, tourism, press, and obligatory visits to sites of memory reinforced a belief in the city's "Russianness." Despite recent changes that have introduced Ukrainian language and history into public schools, Sevastopol's pro-Russian orientation will likely continue as long as the Russian Fleet and its economic and military presence remain. This will also help to bolster Russian as the chief language of the city.

Barring dramatic changes, the city council seems hesitant to change street names en masse or to introduce new Ukrainian monuments unconnected to military themes. When Russia's lease of Sevastopol's ports ends, the World War II generation will have passed and the direct connection to the last great defense will cease. At this point there may be an opportunity to inject a Ukrainian identity into Sevastopol. However, it seems implausible that the memory of

the Crimean War and World War II can be fully Ukrainianized in the near future. Unless another catastrophe levels the city and provides a tabula rasa for Ukrainian planners, Sevastopol likely will remain in part a Russian city, even if only in the historical imagination.

Unlike the streets of Tirana, Albania, where in 1991 residents tore down street signs and the government has not yet agreed on new names,⁴⁸ Sevastopol has seen little change in the toponyms of the city since the end of the Soviet Union. The result of returning to the pre-Revolutionary past when Sevastopol stood as a vital outpost of the Russian Empire has remained strong into the twenty-first century. No monuments have been torn down, street names remain the same, some churches have been reconsecrated, and most importantly the Russian Fleet remains at home in the Ukrainian port city. The latter keeps Sevastopol's demographic composition overwhelmingly Russian and makes "Ukrainianization" more difficult.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ "From our own Correspondent," BBC radio, 15 December 2004.

⁴⁹ As of 2001 74 percent of Sevastopol's population was Russian, 21 percent Ukrainian, and 5 percent Belorussians, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Moldovans, Poles, and more. Aleksandr Dobry and Irina Borisova, *Welcome to Sevastopol* (Simferopol: Tavriia, 2001), 5.