INTER-MINORITY XENOPHOBIA IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

THE SECURITY DILEMMA COMPLEX

Mikhail Alexseev
San Diego State University

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research
2601 Fourth Avenue
Suite 310
Seattle, WA 98121

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Principal Investigator:	**Mikhail Alexseev**
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Executive Summary

Having documented a rising wave of hostility, violence, intimidation, and destruction targeting Russia's migrant minorities since the late 1990s, local and international scholars, human rights groups, government agencies, and the media have focused predominantly on the relations between the ethnic Russian majority and the non-Russian ethnic minorities. Much less attention has been paid to another growing, if counterintuitive, problem in Russia's ethnic relations: the emergent xenophobic extremism *among* ethnic minorities, or inter-minority xenophobia. This problem, in part, has been illustrated over the last year by the Chechen-Kalmyk violence in Astrakhan and by the Armenian-Azerbaijani, Chechen-Dagestani, and Chinese-Korean-Vietnamese clashes in Rostov. This is the first systematic study of minority perceptions that potentially fuel these hostile and violent behaviors in Russia. Even though specially designed surveys oversampling five non-Slav minorities across Russia found that these minorities are significantly more tolerant toward migrants than ethnic Russians, they also found anti-migrant hostility to be substantial and to vary widely across individuals and ethnic groups. In this paper, I examine these controversies empirically drawing on the NCEEER-funded surveys in conjunction with my earlier surveys on immigration attitudes and ethnic relations in Russia that were supported by the MacArthur Foundation and the National Science Foundation. As I re-examine the titularity and the Caucasus-Asian findings, I also test alternative explanations rooted in theories of social contact, socialization (media impacts), and the security dilemma (association of other minorities with security threats such as terrorism and territorial claims.

INTRODUCTION

Having documented a rising wave of hostility, violence, intimidation, and destruction targeting Russia's migrant minorities since the late 1990s, local and international scholars, human rights groups, government agencies, and the media have focused predominantly on the relations between the ethnic Russian majority and the non-Russian ethnic minorities (e.g., Moscow Helsinki Group 2002: 25; Gudkov 2003; Kolesov 2004; Konygina 2004; Alexseev 2006; Alexseev and Hofstetter 2006). This attention is justifiable given that most acts of xenophobic hostility and violence—such as skinhead riots and street raids by chain-and-rod wielding toughs, torchlight marches and attacks on mosques and synagogues, murders and beatings of foreign residents and diplomats—have seen ethnic Russians targeting ethnic non-Russians. Much less attention has been paid to another growing, if counterintuitive, problem in Russia's ethnic relations: the emergent xenophobic extremism *among* ethnic minorities, or inter-minority xenophobia.

This problem, in part, has been illustrated over the last year by the Chechen-Kalmyk violence in Astrakhan and by the Armenian-Azerbaijani, Chechen-Dagestani, and Chinese-Korean-Vietnamese clashes in Rostov. What alarmed local observers were not only these particular violent acts that one may discount as idiosyncratic, but the rise of extremist xenophobic gangs among these ethnic minority populations (Krasnov 2006). The nascence of the Armenian, Chechen, Chinese and other inter-minority extremist groups resembling the overtly xenophobic Russian National Unity, Pam'iat, or the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) is especially paradoxical in Russia's southern regions where one would expect minorities to unite against the common threat of discrimination and intimidation by politically influential, popular, and well-organized Slavic nationalist groups such as the Cossacks (Kozhevnikova

2006).

This is the first systematic study of minority perceptions that potentially fuel these hostile and violent behaviors in Russia. Even though specially designed surveys oversampling five non-Slav minorities across Russia found that these minorities are significantly more tolerant toward migrants than ethnic Russians, they also found anti-migrant hostility to be substantial and to vary widely across individuals and ethnic groups. For example, approximately 27 percent of non-Slavs in these surveys completely or partially supported the idea of deporting all migrants, legal or illegal, and their children—essentially meaning they supported ethnic cleansing. Yet, average support varied from 14 percent among Armenians in Krasnodar Krai to 43 percent among the Tatars in the Republic of Tatarstan (Alexseev 2008).

The specific empirical questions in this study are why some members of these minority groups expressed stronger support than others for (a) wholesale deportation of all migrants regardless of their ethnicity; and (b) reducing the number of migrants of specific ethnic groups in a province. These empirical questions are important not only because they may tell us a lot about Russia, but because they expose gaps in theoretical knowledge. Principal sociological explanations of ethnic conflict—"realistic" threat to group status or economic competition (Blumer 1958, Olzak 1992, Quillian 1996, Fetzer 2001) and intergroup differentiation (Tajfel 1970, Dovidio and Gaertner 1998)—offer contradictory predictions about anti-migrant hostility among minorities.

Threat and competition theories imply, on the one hand, that more sizeable or politically privileged minorities should display more hostility toward migrant minorities because they have more privileges to lose. But the same theory also implies that the smaller minorities are going to be more hostile, because they may be outnumbered faster by migrants and slide even further

down the ethnic hierarchy. At the same time, it also follows from the threat theory that smaller minorities can make common cause with migrants to offset the majority group power—and, hence, are going to be more accepting of them.

The intergroup differentiation and bias theories imply, on the one hand, that when migrants share ethnic and cultural background with the "native" minorities, the latter should see them as more acceptable. But on the other hand, the same ethnic and cultural similarities may induce fears that migrants may compete with the native minorities for the same socioeconomic niches. Interethnic, cross-cultural ties may bind, but they may also divide.

In this paper, I examine these controversies empirically drawing on the NCEEER-funded surveys in conjunction with my earlier surveys on immigration attitudes and ethnic relations in Russia that were supported by the MacArthur Foundation and the National Science Foundation. The analysis of descriptive survey statistics (Alexseev 2008) revealed that the strongest differentiation on immigration attitudes was between titular (Adygs, Tatars) and non-titular minorities (Armenians, Kazakhs, and Azerbaijanis). It also suggested that animosities between the Caucasian and Asian ethnics have been stronger than intra-Caucasus, intra-Asian, and Caucasus-Slav negativity. However, these analyses are at best suggestive, because they do not control for important explanatory variables and do not examine the security, economic, and cultural correlates of anti-migrant hostility. This study does both. As I re-examine the titularity and the Caucasus-Asian findings, I also test alternative explanations rooted in theories of social contact, socialization (media impacts), and the security dilemma (association of other minorities with security threats such as terrorism and territorial claims [Alexseev 2006]).

INTER-MINORITY XENOPHOBIA AND ITS MEASURES

This study is based on the surveys of ethnic minorities conducted in five constituent units of the Russian Federation (RF) – 200 settled and 200 migrant Armenians in Krasnodar Krai, 200 Adygs in the Republic of Adygea, 208 Kazakhs in the Volgograd Oblast, 200 Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Dagestan, and 287 Tatars in the Republic of Tatarstan (for a detailed description see "Inter-Minority Xenophobia in the Russian Federation: Ethnic, Religious, and Status Differentials" [Alexseev 2008]). This generates a pooled sample of 1,295 respondents for multivariate analysis. In all regional samples, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with 11 policy responses to migration. Because migration is multiethnic, this implies also a response to increasing ethnic diversification. (See Appendix A.)

My measures of xenophobia assume that tolerance and intolerance are asymmetric and represent two different scales rather than end points on the same scale. The assumption comes from sociological research which strongly suggests that tolerance and intolerance are not symmetric and that intolerant views are typically stronger and more persistent (Gibson 2006). For this purpose I used two "mirror" questions that were included in the NCEEER survey by design (Appendix A, items *a* and *b*). Because my main interest is in views that relate as closely as possible to hostile behavior, I selected support for deportation—a coercive, physical, and often violent behavior toward migrants on the part of the host states and/or societies. Respondents were asked on a four-point scale if they agreed or disagreed with this statement: "All migrants—legal and illegal–and their children should be deported to where they came from." Importantly, this question (asked regularly in the Eurobarometer surveys, but considered too politically incorrect to have ever been asked in the United States) measures support for wholesale, unconditional deportation—which in practice can only be achieved by applying strong coercive

measures, if not brutal force, on a mass scale.

The question probes into hostility to migrants in general—even to those who have obeyed all the rules and came legally. Finally, it identifies those respondents who express a certain sense of primordialism by extending hostility to the children regardless of the latter's immigration status.

A mirror question measures support for unconditional and wholesale acceptance of migrants and their children by granting them residency rights in the host state. Again, respondents were asked on a standard four-point scale if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "All migrants and their children should be granted residency rights where they want to live."

This asymmetry and its complexities are discernible in the distribution of responses to these questions (Table 1).[1] On the one hand, within the margin of sampling error respondents who completely agreed with wholesale deportation of migrants also completely disagreed with granting all migrants permanent residency. On the other hand, those who completely disagreed with deportation did not necessarily completely agree with granting migrants residency. Moreover, exploratory factor analysis showed that support for deportation and residency rights were not always seen as the opposite points on the same exclusion-inclusion scale across survey regions.[2]

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[1] Missing values ("don't knows" and those who refused to answer) are excluded. Non-response rates were substantial, but not disproportionately high to skew the overall response patterns. For the deportation question they were 10.1% among the Tatars, 9.8% among the Armenians, 10% among the Azerbaijanis, 3.8% among the Kazakhs, and 10% among the Adygs. For the permanent residency question they were 12.2% among the Tatars, 10.3% among the Armenians, 12.5% among the Azerbaijanis, 5.8% among the Kazakhs, and 9.5% among the Adygs.

[2] This is because the prevalent substantive meanings of exclusion-inclusion varied by region when other issues were considered in addition to deportation and residency rights. For example, Armenians in Krasnodar saw deportation and residency rights as inversely correlated on the same dimension, but Adygs in Adygea saw them as two separate, uncorrelated dimensions of migration policy. The Adygs saw granting permanent residency not as the opposite of deportation, but as something similar to allowing "shuttle" cross-border trade, lifting restrictions on migrant labor, giving employers of migrants tax breaks, encouraging real estate sales to migrants, and supporting pro-migrant

THE IMMIGRATION SECURITY DILEMMA: INSTITUTIONAL, SOCIOTROPIC, AND PERSONAL THREAT

Following studies of Chinese migration in Russia (Alexseev and Hofstetter 2006) and a comparative analysis of immigration attitudes in Russia, Europe, and the United States (Alexseev 2006), this paper uses the immigration security dilemma theory to identify the predictors of anti-migrant hostility or xenophobia. The unique aspect of this framework is its emphasis on institutional uncertainty—especially with respect to sovereignty, the political status of ethnic groups, and government capacity to sustain economic activity beneficial to host country residents. This emphasis comes from a distinguished line of research that examined the implications of anarchy or diminution of central authority on interstate and intergroup conflict (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999). While acknowledging that individual and group positions matter in their own right, the security dilemma links these positions to perceived weakness of formal and informal institutions within a host state. Thus, it predicts stronger xenophobia not necessarily in a region where more migrants arrive, but where the arrival of these migrants is viewed as a challenge to sovereignty and governance.

The focus on institutions is particularly relevant to this project. The immigration security dilemma advances previous conceptualizations of threat by seeing it as not only *interpersonal* (individuals fearing for their personal security or well-being) vs. *sociotropic* (individuals fearing the deterioration of the security and well-being of their society or social group), but also *institutional* (individuals fearing the weakening of public institutions ensuring their status, security, or well-being). The security dilemma logic also explains theoretically one of the enduring "enigmas" of intolerance identified by Gibson (2006)—i.e., the prevalence of sociotropic over personal threat. In addition, it suggests that institutional threat should affect

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rights' groups. Factor analysis was based on all items of Question 40 (Appendix A). Factors were extracted based on

intolerance at least as much as sociotropic threat does.

To test this speculative judgment empirically, I have developed three hypotheses, each identifying three specific survey items that measure personal, sociotropic, and institutional threat respectively. Each of these items corresponds to specific questions that were asked in the NCEEER-funded minority xenophobia survey in Russia.

Hypothesis 1 (Personal Threat): Respondents who have (a) relatively lower family income, (b) are unemployed or blue collar workers, and (c) feel that it had become more dangerous to return home at night are likely to support wholesale deportation and to oppose permanent residency of migrants. (Questions 50, 47 [recoded], and 22_d, respectively)

Hypothesis 2 (Sociotropic Threat): Respondents who (a) believe migrants are coming in larger numbers, (b) view migration resulting in fewer economic benefits to the natives, and (c) believe life in general is getting increasingly unpredictable are likely to support deportation and oppose residency of migrants. (Questions 2, 19, and 22_c, respectively)

Hypothesis 3 (Institutional Threat): Respondents who (a) belong to titular ethnic groups (nationalities); (b) see government as too weak to resolve ethnic conflicts; and (c) believe that migrants evade taxes (thus undermining the economic capacity of government) are likely to support deportation and oppose residency of migrants. (Ethnic Tatars and Adygs; Questions 24_a and 21_c).

Hypothesis 4 (Security Dilemma): Institutional and sociotropic threats are likely to relate to intergroup hostility and acceptance more strongly and consistently than personal threat. (H3>H1, H2>H1).[3]

Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

[3] These hypotheses were formulated prior to empirical testing with multiple regression. It is also plausible that institutional threat is going to affect hostility more strongly than sociotropic threat; however, the security dilemma

INTERGROUP BIAS AND CONTACT

Seminal studies by Tajfel (1970) and Horowitz (1985) suggest, however, that categorization into groups—the human tendency to "cleave and compare"—is likely to fuel intergroup hostility independently of threat perception. This line of argument rests on psychological experiments in which the most trivial and arbitrary markers separating individuals into groups significantly affected perceptions and behavior of these individuals, producing in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. From this perspective, anti-migrant sentiments would arise not because migrants are threatening the institutions, the society, and the individuals within a host states, but because cultural markers make these groups appear distinct in their appearances, language, behavior, religion, and customs. The specific questions asked in the 2006-2007 NCEEER minority xenophobia survey offer the following test of this theory.

Hypothesis 5 (Intergroup Bias): Support for deportation and opposition to permanent residency rights of migrants is likely to be stronger among respondents who (a) express pride of being a member of their native ethnic group (in-group favoritism); and (b) do not have relatives among migrants. (Questions 7 and 54)

In addition, the minority xenophobia survey makes it possible to test the bias hypothesis using perceptions of specific ethnic groups among migrants. Respondents were asked: "Talking about migrants of the following ethnic groups, would you prefer that the number of each one of them increased, stayed the same, or decreased?"[4] (Question 39) Because only a tiny proportion of respondents supported increasing the number of any non-Russian minority group in their

model theory is underspecified as to how the extent of institutional authority vs. the extent of intergroup balance of power within a society may affect threat perception.

[4] The surveys were designed in such a way that enables us to compare the views of at least two ethnic minorities across at least two regions that differ in terms of their geographic location (Caucasus vs. Central and/or East Asia), titular/non-titular status, ethnic composition and security context. The study design also enables us to investigate

region, this variable is not normally distributed. To partially correct for this skewness, this question was recoded into a dummy variable (where the value of "1" = respondents wanted the number of migrants of a given ethnic group to decrease and "0" = all other responses). Whereas not as strong and comprehensive a measure as support for deportation, preference for reducing the number of migrants does reflect certain hostility and I used it as a supplementary test.

In particular, I examined support for reducing the number of three ethnic groups of migrants—the Chechens, the Chinese, and the Russians from the "near abroad" (former Soviet republics). This choice is based on two criteria that make the tests systematic: (1) they each represent three migrant populations that differ the most from each other on the basis of ethnic and cultural markers—the Caucasus ethnics, the Asians, and the Slavs; and (2) views of these groups were asked in the largest number of regional sub-samples.[5]

Hypothesis 6 (Intergroup Bias): Support for decreasing the number of Chechens, Chinese, and Russians is likely to come from respondents who believe that these ethnic groups differ from them in terms of their customs and behavior (Questions 39_1, 39_4, 39_9 for the dependent variable and Questions 12_1, 12_4, and 12_9 for the independent variables).

Contact across ethnic lines, however, is likely to mitigate negative bias. Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) meta-analytic test with 713 independent samples from 515 studies across a broad range of outgroup targets and contact settings—and controlling for selection and publication biases--found that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice. This meta-analysis also found support for facilitating conditions outlined by Allport (1954)--equal status, common goals (common opponent), intergroup cooperation on common goals, and support for authority,

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which explanations of hostility are significant across specific group dyads (e.g., whether predominantly Muslim groups such as Azerbaijanis view Muslim minorities differently than they view Christian minorities).

[5] Respondents of all five resident minority groups were asked about migrants who are Chechen, Chinese, and ethnic Russian. The only exception was that the Tatars were not asked about the Chinese.

law, or custom.

In fact, sometimes researchers become concerned that tests that take these conditions into account capture the effects of the latter more so than the effects of contact in general. (And as more conditions and caveats are added the contact hypothesis becomes unfalsifiable). These contact spin-offs are unlikely to outweigh the effects of contact itself, however, in the context of migration in Russia. The native-migrant distinction eliminates considerations of equal status and the unifying common opponent is rarely available and commonality of goals is weak or absent. One could, however, conceive of tradition and customs as favoring tolerance and acceptance of migrants—given the tradition of hospitality in the culture of both the Caucasian (Armenian, Adyg, Azerbaijani) and Asian-Turkic (Tatars and Kazakhs) minorities in Russia. Finally, given the Russian government's stated goal of promoting harmonious interethnic relations and the overwhelming dominance of official government sources on Russia's main TV stations (Channel One/*Pervyi Kanal* and *Rossiia)* one may expect respondents who said they received most information from this news source to be less prejudiced.

Hypothesis 7 (Contact): Support for deportation and opposition to residency rights of migrants is likely to come from respondents who (a) report having no contact whatsoever with migrants and (b) who do not list state-run national television channels as primary sources of news on migration and migrants.(Questions 5_7 and 30).

Finally, as it is customary in sociological research, this study controls for respondents' age, sex, education (especially post-secondary/college education), and it also tests the proposition that unemployed males are particularly prone to intergroup hostility.

KEY FINDINGS

The baseline test of these hypotheses relies on standard hierarchical ordinary least squares regression with SPSS 16.0 using the minority xenophobia survey dataset. This procedure estimates the effects of each causal variable listed in the hypotheses on the outcome variables (support for deportation and residency). The effects of each of the causal variables are estimated as if all other variables were controlled (held constant). This aspect of the procedure and multicollinearity diagnostics enables one to rule out spurious correlation and reduce the omitted variable bias. Figures 1-3 graphically represent the findings. In addition, I compiled supplementary descriptive statistics to examine relationships among ethnic dyads featuring one native and one migrant group (Table 2).

General Assessment of Hypotheses

Figure 1 succinctly shows that institutional threat is the strongest and most robust driver of minority xenophobia in the 2006-2007 Russian surveys. In the regression tests, the causal variables related to each hypothesis were entered as a separate group (or block). This procedure makes it possible to estimate how much variation each block of causal variables explained in each of the five outcome variables. The measure of this impact is R Square change (values are listed on the horizontal axis of Figure 1). It shows, that measures of intergroup contact collectively explained from 0.3% to 0.7% of variation in the five dependent variables (support for deportation and residency rights of migrants as well as support for decreasing the number of the Chechens, Chinese, and ethnic Russian migrants in a province). Measures of intergroup bias explained from 0.8% to 3%; sociotropic threat – from 0.1% to 3.6%; personal threat – from 0.2% to 1.7%; and sociodemographic attributes of respondents – from 0.1% to 1.6%. Almost all of the

individual causal variables representing these hypotheses were not statistically significant.

In contrast, institutional threat measures explained from 2.9% to 13.3% of variation in the outcome variables. The upper end of this range is a particularly strong finding for a model consisting of only three variables—especially given the high level of noise in the survey data. Figure 1 also shows that in each regression test the institutional threat block explained more variation in the outcome than any other block of causal variables. This means that Hypothesis 3 received the strongest empirical support in the tests (i.e., most tests failed to falsify it), whereas Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, and 6 received at best episodic support. And importantly, Figure 1 serves as a good illustration that the tests failed to falsify Hypothesis 4 (Security Dilemma). Measures of institutional threat have a significantly stronger association with each indicator of xenophobia than measures of both sociotropic and personal threat.

The Non-Performing Measures

Negative results are important because they confound established theories and conventional intuitive thinking. They identify the likely dead ends in future research. In this study, most variables that one would expect to contribute to xenophobia have not proven statistically significant—in other words, they are not related to xenophobia more strongly than they would by chance. First, none of the five immigration attitude measures related significantly to the following predictors:

- Family income (H1)
- Respondents being unemployed (H1)
- Perception that life is becoming more unpredictable (H2)
- Absence of contact with migrants (ethnic out-groups) (H7)
- Watching government-controlled news (H7)
- Respondent's sex (Control)
- Respondent's age (Control)

Second, the following causal variables were not significantly associated with four out of five measures of xenophobia:

- Perception that getting home at night has become more dangerous (H1)
- Estimated migration rate (percentage of migrants in a province in 10 years) (H2)
- In-group pride (H5)
- Having relatives that come from other ethnic groups (H5)
- College education of a respondent (Control)

The Performing Measures

Notwithstanding the caveats discussed in the next section, the strongest and the most consistent predictor of hostility was the titular political-administrative status of ethnic minorities—a key dimension of the institutional threat concept. According to regression tests, there is less than 0.1% probability that titularity related only by chance to support for deportation and residency rights of migrants and to the support for decreasing the number of the Chechens, the Chinese and the ethnic Russians in a province where minority respondents reside. Figures 2 and 3 show also that titularity had the highest standardized regression coefficients—i.e., it explained more variation in xenophobic views of respondents than any other hypothetical factor. No other explanatory variable significantly related to all five outcome variables. Even though in two tests the direction of the relationship was the opposite of the one predicted, the titular/non-titular split was still significant. (The two anomalies are discussed in detail in the next section).

The second most robust and significant predictor was absence of relatives among migrants. Respondents who said they had no relatives among migrants were likely to support wholesale deportation and oppose residency rights of migrants. They also wanted to reduce the number of Chechen and ethnic Russian migrants in their provinces.

The third and the only other predictor that related to xenophobia in at least three tests was the perception that migrants evade paying taxes. This measure related non-randomly to support

for deportation and opposition to residency rights as well as to support for decreasing the number of Chechen migrants in a province.

Three predictors deserve a notable mention given the general difficulty of finding significant relationships in noise-rich survey data. Perceived intergroup difference was one of them. Because this measure referred to specific ethnic groups among migrants, it was used only in three group-specific tests and was not used in the tests of support for deportation and residency. In two of these three tests it systematically predicted respondents' support for decreasing the number of ethnic Chinese and Russian migrants in a province.

Also in two tests of group-specific xenophobia the perceived capacity of Russia's federal government to resolve conflicts non-randomly predicted support for reducing the number of Chechens and the Chinese. This perceived strength of central authority, however, did not significantly relate to general xenophobia measures. In contrast, estimates of likely economic benefits from migration to respondents' own ethnic groups over a 10-year time horizon systematically predicted support for deportation and residency of all migrants, but not preferences concerning specific ethnic groups in a province.

PROVISOS, ANOMALIES, AND IDEAS: THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

New Threat Typology

Traditionally, social research on intergroup relations has looked at two dimensions of threat—personal and sociotropic. These broad categories have been useful in distinguishing between specific indicators of threat. The cumulative body of evidence in social research suggests that indicators related to sociotropic threat have been stronger and more robust predictors of intergroup hostility than indicators related to personal threat (Gibson 2006).

This study contributes to systematic understanding of the role of threat perception in intergroup relations by introducing a new category of threat—institutional threat. I derived this conceptualization deductively from the immigration security dilemma theory. While to a degree this type of threat is a form of sociotropic threat, it also has a dimension that previous concepts of sociotropic threat did not take into account. That additional dimension has to do with respondents' status and perceptions vis-à-vis government institutions. This is consistent with the core emphasis of the security dilemma on central authority and on the behavioral implications of this authority's weakness or absence.

In this study I tested three indicators of institutional threat. All of them were selected deductively. The first and principal measure was the administrative status of ethnic minorities—titular vs. non-titular. This was selected because titularity provides a direct form of individual self-identification with government institutions as well as a sense of entitlement to political, socioeconomic, and cultural status and privileges of respondents. In part, this choice reflects my reading of Blumer's (1958) seminal work on prejudice as a sense of group position. In addition, the security dilemma theory prompted me to examine the impact of specific administrative status of minorities on intergroup relations.

Finally, titularity is a tangible, non-perceptual measure. It was based not on respondents' self-identification as titular or non-titular, but on the actual administrative status of ethnic groups to which respondents said they belonged. In the context of Russia titularity serves as a proxy for privileged claims of a group to leading positions within local government, education and conduct of affairs in the titular group's language (which also entails preferential hiring), as well as government support for preserving and promoting the titular group's culture and social practices.

This study offers the first systematic examination of the impact of titularity on intergroup

relations. Strong empirical support for titularity—in particular its effect on support for deportation and opposition to residency of migrants--shows that institutional threat is worth a serious further examination in the literature on intergroup relations and conflict. Its conceptualization, operationalization, and testing across diverse social contexts will contribute to a broader understanding of threat perception and its impact on societies.

Importantly, this study identified another indicator of institutional threat—perceived capacity of the state to raise taxes--that systematically predicted xenophobia. This measure conceptually discriminates among personal, sociotropic, and institutional dimensions of economic threat. Each dimension had a specific measure. Income and unemployment status measured personal economic threat and did not come through as significant predictors of xenophobia. Estimates of economic benefits from migration to one's ethnic group measured the sociotropic dimension of economic threat. Respondents' view of whether migrants evade taxation measured the institutional dimension of economic threat. While this variable is not new, using it as a measure of institutional threat is. Like titularity it captures both perceived state capacity and respondents' personal stake in it. It asks respondents not just about their own economic status and not just about the economic situation in a province or country, but about the capacity of government institutions. Implicitly it deals with the government capacity to fund itself and social programs through taxes.

This study's findings are consistent not only with Gibson's (2006) literature review about the prevalence of sociotropic over personal threat, but also with the deduction based on the security dilemma theory that institutional threat would have a stronger impact on xenophobia than both sociotropic and personal threat. This pattern—no significant effects of personal threat, significant effects of sociotropic threat, and more significant effects of institutional threat on

xenophobia—is captured in Figure 2 as one compares the length of the bars for each of these three variables. They get progressively longer both above and below the horizontal axis when one moves from H1 on the left to H3 in the middle of the chart.

The study's findings about the role of institutional threat have two important provisos. First, perceptions of government capacity to resolve conflict were significantly related only to group-specific immigration attitudes (support for decreasing the number of the Chechens and the Chinese), but not to xenophobia in general (support for deportation and opposition to residency). Second, titular minorities showed less support than non-titular minorities for decreasing the number of ethnic Chechens and Chinese in their provinces. Both of these provisos, as other findings indicate, suggest that institutional threat unambiguously and strongly relates only to general, group non-specific, attitudes toward migration and migrants. This general, "blanket" aversion to outsiders is not sufficient to engender exclusionist policy preferences indiscriminately toward any particular out-group. And fundamentally, both provisos suggest that threat and bias have interactive effects on xenophobia which are not captured by regression tests using single-item variables. The next section examines the theoretical significance of this interaction.

General vs. Group-Specific Xenophobia: Threat-Bias Interaction

The social and psychological logic of the immigration security dilemma provides a frame of reference that systematically explains the anomalous findings about the effects of titular status and the selective impact of perceived government capacity on xenophobia. The critical factor is the emphasis on association of specific ethnic groups with threat. This logic takes into account the importance of threat perception and intergroup differentials, but it also goes one step further.

It posits that unless particular out-groups are categorized in terms of threat neither bias nor threat may necessarily generate hostility against particular groups. Since specific groups may be associated with the institutional threat increasing or decreasing, the threat-bias interaction may account for both stronger and weaker xenophobic attitudes with respect to these groups.

This two-tailed outcome would be consistent with the security dilemma logic while confounding hypotheses based exclusively on threat or bias. This is particularly evident for explanatory variables that are attributes rather than perceptions. Titular status is the case in point. Because titular status does not change with perceptions of intergroup differences, it is logical to assume that its effects on xenophobia will also not change regardless of perceived intergroup differentials. The immigration security dilemma logic, however, allows for the possibility that the effect of titular status on xenophobia may reverse if out-groups are perceived as ethnic kin. In particular, the security dilemma logic predicts that titular groups (e.g., the Adygs in Adygea) would support migration of groups viewed as close to them in ethnic and/or cultural terms. Conversely, they would oppose migration of national majority groups (ethnic Slavs or Russians) into their province more so than non-titular ethnics.

This logic explains the seemingly anomalous relationship between titular status and support for decreasing the number of specific groups in a province. According to H3, titular ethnics should have opposed all migrant groups—the Chechens, the Chinese, and the Russians--more strongly than non-titular ethnics. Yet, consistent with the security dilemma frame, the titular minorities supported the Chechens and the Chinese, but opposed ethnic Russians more so than the non-titulars.

Descriptive statistics in Table 2 partially explain this. First, preference for the number of Chechens diverged significantly between the Tatars and the Adygs. The Adygs and the Chechens

share their origins in a common region of the North Caucasus, the cultural traditions of the mountainous peoples, strong Islamic traditions, the history of common resistance to the Russian rule, and concerns about governance in Russia's Southern Federal District. In contrast, the Tatars have their origins in the Volga region of East Central Russia and they represent a distinct, Turkic ethnic group. While both the Adygs and the Tatars are predominantly Muslim, the Tatars see Islam as a less important aspect of their national identity than the Adygs. Most Adyg respondents in the survey believed that the Chechens were similar to them in terms of customs and behavior (with the mean of 3.1 on a 1-to-5 point scale where "5" is "most similar"). Most Tatar respondents saw the Chechens as different in terms of customs and behavior (with the mean of 1.9 on the same scale).

Preferences for the number of Chechens in their provinces diverged accordingly. Only 44% of Adygs wanted the number of Chechens in Adygea to decrease. Nearly 72% of Tatars wanted the number of Chechens in Tatarstan to decrease. An additional factor here that enhances the impact of ethnic proximity is that the Adygs are a minority in their titular homeland, making up around 30% of the Adygea population. The presence of ethnic kin groups would be plausibly seen as strengthening the claim of the Adygs on their titular privileges and as reducing the likelihood of administrative merger of Adygea with the Krasnodar Krai which would take the titular status away from the Adygs.

Such merger proposals have been actively debated in Krasnodar Krai around the time of the survey. In focus groups conducted by this author in Adygeysk in October 2008, concerns about the merger surfaced as one of the strong themes in the group discussion. The participants were especially worried about the official pronouncements favoring the merger combined with the appearance of large billboards in the Krai capital favoring its renaming from Krasnodar to

Yekaterinodar. The latter was the city's name in the imperial Russia when the Adygs had non-titular status. I noted several of these billboards in downtown Krasnodar because they were not there on my previous field trip to the area in mid-2006.

Through supplementary tests I also established that this favorable view of the Adygs made the crucial difference in multiple regression tests of group-specific xenophobia. With the Adyg respondents excluded from the sample, the impact of titular status on perceptions of Chechens was statistically insignificant. This is largely because support for reducing the number of Chechens among the Tatars was not significantly stronger than the average support among non-titular ethnic in the survey (where it ranged from 57% among Armenians to 80% among the Kazakhs, Table 2).

Unfortunately, this study does not provide sufficient data to analyze preferences about the number of Chinese migrants the same way. This is because in Tatarstan the Chinese were not on the list of ethnic groups about which respondents were polled. One cannot compare the Tatar and Adyg perceptions of the Chinese. The more tolerant view of the Chinese by the Adygs is key to the regression findings in Table 3. It may only be partially explained by the fact that Adyg residents in focus groups came out as less concerned about Chinese migration than other ethnic minorities did. This was due to their sense of Adygea's relative remoteness and lack of trading and business opportunities for Chinese migrants.

On the other hand, the survey provides excellent data to compare preferences for the number of Russians among all ethnic minorities. Preferences about the number of ethnic Russians also offer an excellent test of the bias-threat interaction. Respondents of both titular groups wanted to reduce the number of Russians in their provinces—approximately 36% among the Adygs and 36% also among the Tatars—a significantly larger proportion than among the

non-titular ethnics (Table 2). This is consistent with the security dilemma interpretation. As a national ethnic majority the Russians pose the most credible threat to institutional privileges associated with the titular minority status of ethnic non-Russians, including the Adygs and the Tatars.

The effects of perceived government capacity to resolve intergroup conflict provide an additional demonstration of the threat-bias interaction. On the one hand, these perceptions did not relate significantly to general xenophobia measures—support for deportation and opposition to residency. On the other hand, they did relate significantly to support for reducing the number of Chechen and Chinese, but not ethnic Russian migrants. Both findings have plausible contextual explanations linked to institutions and association of groups with security threats. Absence of effects on general xenophobia is likely because of the weak trust in government effectiveness.

The association of government weakness with opposition to the Chechen and Chinese migration, however, is likely because these groups are seen as especially capable of challenging not only governance—however effective or ineffective it may be—but also Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. These two migrant groups have been viewed by most Russian residents as not only and not so much as threatening intergroup relations, but as threatening the government capacity and central authority itself.

Tolerance-Intolerance Asymmetry

This study offers additional evidence supporting the notion that intolerant attitudes are stronger and more persistent than tolerant attitudes (see the literature review in Gibson 2006). This asymmetry is not monotonic across all dimensions of tolerance/intolerance, but it is

unambiguous. Two findings illustrate this particularly well. First, in Table 2 the bars of significant predictors of support for deportation are longer than the bars of significant predictors of support for residency, with the exception of the assessment of economic impact of migration. In plain terms, it means, for example, that it would take more effort to persuade titular ethnics to reduce their support for deportation than it would take to reduce their support for residency rights of migrants. This is consistent with the core notion of the security dilemma that rational individuals would do better preparing for the worst rather than hoping for the best and doing nothing to protect themselves.

Second and striking is the impact of college education on xenophobia. As Figure 2 shows, college educated respondents were significantly less likely to support deportation of migrants. However, college education did not generate extra tolerance. Respondents who went through college were no more likely to support residency rights of migrants than those who did not go to college and had no education beyond high school.

One interesting and potentially informative exception is the impact of economic perceptions. Respondents who saw migration as economically beneficial to their ethnic group supported residency rights of migrants more strongly than they opposed deportation. It means that economic perceptions – and the underlying economic conditions in a province – are likely to be the most important factor in cultivating tolerance (as opposed to reducing intolerance).

Finally, this study shows that contact affects xenophobia asymmetrically. Scholars who have long been interested in the impact of contact on intergroup relations have predominantly focused on specific measures of social contact, but did not explicitly test for the effects of complete absence of contact. This study did that. This was possible because the 2006-2007 xenophobia survey identified respondents who explicitly said they had no contact whatsoever

with migrants. While meta-analysis of contact effects (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) furnished strong evidence that social contact improves interethnic relations and may reduces intolerance, this analysis shows that absence of contact does not necessarily enhance xenophobic attitudes.

POLICY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS

The strong impact of titular status on inter-minority xenophobia suggests that institutional legacies of Soviet ethnofederalism cast a long shadow over interethnic relations in Russia. Yet titular status is not something that can be easily abolished. Moreover, this study indicates that policies perceived by titular minorities as undermining their titular status are likely to fuel interethnic hostility in Russia. It is most likely that titularity translated into stronger anti-immigrant views precisely because titular minorities felt a greater sense of entitlement and privilege wedded to their titular status.

However, if this is the case, then an effective policy approach will be not to undermine or dismantle titular nationalities, but to transform the meaning of titular identity. The key would be to make titular identification less ethnic-based and more civic-based. At present, the ethnic nature of titular identification in Russia is pervasive. The most widely available self-identification category for individuals belonging to titular nationalities is their ethnicity—i.e., Tatars, Bashkirs, Adygs, etc. And the most widely available identification for their titular homelands is derived from the names of the same ethnic groups. In this way, identification with these homelands is consciously and subconsciously ethnicized – Tatarstan is the homeland of the Tatars, Adygea is the homeland of the Adygs, etc.

True, the Russian government and schools have made significant efforts to introduce multiculturalism in the titular republics. Yet, saying that Tatarstan is the homeland of the Tatars,

and also Russians and Bashkirs, still leaves in place the same titular-ethnic binary identification for members of titular minorities. Even if Tatarstan is home also to ethnic Russians, a Tatar would still primarily think of Tatarstan as the *ethnic* Tatar homeland.

A new way to deal with this issue is to establish and promote alternative civic identifiers or markers of residency in the titular republics. In Russia as a whole this approach works through the notion of *rossiiane*—citizens of Russia—in addition to *russkie,* ethnic Russians. Similar concepts, however, have not yet gained currency in the titular republics of the Russian Federation. For example, in Tatarstan the government, the media, and the educational establishment may consider promoting the notion of *tatarstantsy* for residents of that republic. The addition of the *"stantsy"* means that identifier encompasses everyone residing within the administrative boundaries of the Republic of Tatarstan. This study shows that if ethnic Tatars come to identify themselves as *tatarstantsy* first and as *tatary* (ethnic Tatars) second they would become less xenophobic and more inclusive of migrant minorities, including ethnic Russians. In some titular republics it will be easier to develop official residency markers such as this (e.g., *bashkortostantsy)* and in others it may require more creative thinking—particularly the ones that don't have a civic marker such as "stan" in their republic's official title. Yet, Russian civic language offers viable solutions. For the Republic of Adygea, for instance, it may well be *adygeichane*—drawing on the way that residents of non-ethnically marked Russian provinces are identified (e.g., *tverichane* for Tver; *khabarovchane* for Khabarovsk, etc.).

Importantly, this identification policy is not costly, it opens itself for gradual implementation, and it can be used to encourage public debates and deliberations that in and of themselves will force residents of the titular republics to view themselves more in *civic multicultural* terms rather than in *ethnic multicultural* terms. A day may then come sooner than

one may expect when titular ethnics would no longer get surprised if someone identifies themselves in their republics as a “Chechen-Tatarstani” or a “Chinese-Adygeachan” – the same way people in the United States identify themselves as Polish-Americans.

Finally, another important consideration is that this process is also likely to make all non-Russian ethnic populations in Russia feel more comfortable and natural to be identified as *rossiiane.* In this way, building the civic component of titular self-identification will strongly contribute to building the civic nature of citizenship in the Russian Federation—something that will promote state integrity and reduce interethnic tensions.

The second important implication of this study is that government agencies and the media are unlikely to reduce xenophobia significantly by simply calling attention to this phenomenon and saying it is socially unacceptable. While this message has been frequently articulated on main Russian television channels, it has had no statistically significant impact on minority residents. But the government and the media are likely to achieve a lot more by publicizing the positive economic aspects of migration. Comparative immigration studies have established convincingly that migrants deliver net gains to receiving economies in diverse social contexts.

At the same time, these gains are often less apparent than the risks that get more media attention. In the United States, for example, substantial segments of the public, if not public majorities, are unaware that even illegal immigrants contribute more taxes proportionate to their income than the citizens and legal residents do. These gains are particularly important for Russia where natural population decline has generated significant labor deficits which are projected to increase rapidly around 2009-2016. Yet, a comprehensive and balanced accounting of the situation in the official pronouncements and in media reports on the economic impact of migration in Russia is still lacking.

Finally, this study has two implications regarding education policy and xenophobia. On the one hand, it shows that college education, complete or incomplete, and regardless of course content reduces extreme xenophobic attitudes such as support for wholesale deportation of migrants. Investment in college education and increased enrollment will therefore have a positive impact on interethnic relations by default.

On the other hand, the results of the study should not be interpreted to mean that college education is unlikely to contribute to interethnic tolerance. The asymmetry between tolerance and intolerance is most likely only part of the reason why this study found no statistically significant relationship between college education and support for migrant residency rights. And judging by results for other variables, this asymmetry may not contribute to this decisively. Rather, this finding is more likely to reflect the lack of attention in Russia's colleges and university where respondents were educated toward promoting more positive views of ethnic others as well as interethnic collaboration and understanding. The study therefore implies that colleges and universities have the potential to make a positive contribution to inter-minority relations if they develop appropriate practices, curricula, and activities that are currently lacking. It will benefit the Russian government and society to encourage and support such educational initiatives.

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Table 1. Support by select ethnic minorities in Russia* for deportation of migrants

0_a TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE/DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE MIGRANTS' PRESENCE IN RUSSIA : All migrants—legal and illegal–and their children should be deported to where they came from

	completely agree		mostly agree		mostly disagree		completely disagree	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Tatar	50	19.4%	60	23.3%	95	36.8%	53	20.5%
Armenian	23	6.4%	28	7.8%	88	24.4%	222	61.5%
Azerbaijani	20	11.1%	17	9.4%	69	38.3%	74	41.1%
Kazakh	17	8.5%	27	13.5%	116	58.0%	40	20.0%
Adyg	11	6.1%	55	30.6%	88	48.9%	26	14.4%

0_b TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE/DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE MIGRANTS' PRESENCE IN RUSSIA : All migrants and their children should be granted residency rights where they want to live

	completely agree		mostly agree		mostly disagree		completely disagree	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Tatar	28	11.1%	89	35.3%	87	34.5%	48	19.0%
Armenian	112	31.2%	139	38.7%	83	23.1%	25	7.0%
Azerbaijani	46	26.3%	49	28.0%	58	33.1%	22	12.6%
Kazakh	28	14.3%	106	54.1%	51	26.0%	11	5.6%
Adyg	14	7.7%	72	39.8%	85	47.0%	10	5.5%

*Listed in the right-hand column

Table 2. Migration policy preferences of select ethnic minorities toward specific ethnic groups of migrants in Russia

Q39: TALKING ABOUT MIGRANTS OF THE FOLLOWING ETHNIC GROUPS, WOULD YOU PREFER THAT THE NUMBER OF EACH ONE THEM INCREASED, STAYED THE SAME, OR DECREASED?

	Migrant groups:									
	CHECHENS	*ARMENIANS*	*AZERIS*	*ADYGS*	*CHINESE*	*KAZAKHS*	*UZBEKS*	*TATARS*	*CIS RUSSIANS*	MEAN (w/t Russians)
Tatar respondents:										
increased (%)	0.8	1.2	1.2				1.2		5.0	1.1
stayed the same (%)	27.5	30.8	28.7				29.6		58.7	29.2
decreased (%)	71.7	68.0	70.0				69.2		36.4	69.7
N	251	253	247				253		242	251
Armenian respondents:										
increased (%)	2.6		4.2		1.6			2.1	23.9	2.6
stayed the same (%)	40.5		53.9		42.5			59.0	69.6	49.0
decreased (%)	56.8		41.8		55.9			38.9	6.5	48.4
N	380		380		372			373	385	376.25
Azeri respondents:										
increased (%)	3.8	2.2			3.3			5.6	16.9	3.7
stayed the same (%)	28.6	45.3			24.6			62.9	60.1	40.3
decreased (%)	67.6	52.5			72.1			31.5	23.0	55.9
N	182	179			183			178	178	180.5
Kazakh respondents:										
increased (%)	5.8			1.9	1.7		1.1		11.5	2.6
stayed the same (%)	14.7			44.8	35.4		42.4		68.9	34.3
decreased (%)	79.6			53.2	62.9		56.5		19.7	63.1
N	191			154	178		177		183	175
Adyg respondents:										
increased (%)	3.4				4.6	4.1	3.5		6.8	3.9
stayed the same (%)	53.1				40.6	50.6	48.8		57.1	48.3
decreased (%)	43.5				54.9	45.3	47.7		36.2	47.8
N	177				175	170	172		177	173.5

MEAN	*CHECHENS*	*ARMENIANS*	*AZERIS*	*ADYGS*	*CHINESE*	*KAZAKHS*	*UZBEKS*	*TATARS*	*CIS RUSSIANS*
increased (%)	3.3	1.7	2.7	1.9	2.8	4.1	1.9	3.9	12.8
stayed the same (%)	32.9	38.0	41.3	44.8	35.8	50.6	40.3	61.0	62.9
decreased (%)	63.8	60.2	55.9	53.2	61.5	45.3	57.8	35.2	24.3
N	1181.0	432.0	627.0	154.0	908.0	170.0	602.0	551.0	1165.0



Figure 1. Evaluation of hypotheses explaining inter-minority xenophobia in Russia



Figure 2. Regression of support for deportation and residency of migrants on select predictors.

NOTE: Lines indicate levels of statistical significance (p): -- p <.05; -- p<.001; variables are significant if they cross p<.05 line.



Figure 3. Regression of support for decreasing the number of Chechen, Chinese and ethnic Russian migrants in a province on select predictors.

NOTE: Lines indicate levels of statistical significance (p):-- p <.05; -- p<.001; variables are significant if they cross p<.05 line.

Appendix A: Questions about migration and ethnic policy preferences, 2006-2007 Russia Minorities Survey

Q40: To what extent do you agree/disagree with each of the following statements about the problems arising from the migrants' presence in Russia:

a. All migrants—legal and illegal–and their children should be deported to where they came from.
b. All migrants and their children should be granted residency rights where they want to live.
c. Support should be given to armed Cossack detachments and similar patriotic groups and militias that care about protecting Russia's borders.
d. Support should be given to organizations that defend the rights of and help migrants—legal and illegal.
e. "Shuttle" trade should be supported.
f. Hiring restrictions on migrant labor should be lifted.
g. Sales of real estate to migrants should be encouraged.
h. Businesses employing migrants should get tax breaks and have an easier time getting registered.
i. Migrants trading in the markets must wear migration cards so that everyone would know that they are here legally.
j. Newspapers, radio, and TV in the languages of ethnic minorities should be established.
k. Teaching of the main classes in our schools should be not only in Russian, but also in the languages of those ethnic groups that live in the given area.