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IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND REAL VICTIMS:
SELF-DETERMINATION AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN YUGOSLAVIA*

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Executive Summary

From 1945 until the late 1980s, the various Yugoslav peoples were increasingly intertwined and intermarried and living intermingled, not only in cities but in parts of Croatia and Bosnia. Thus, the view that these peoples were incompatible, suffering from "age-old hatreds," was false empirically. However, political movements that succeeded after 1987 were premised on the hostility of these peoples, and on a view that in each republic, the sovereign was not a body of equal citizens, but only those who were of the majority nationality. Others are minorities, tolerated at best, but always, by definition, subordinated to the ethno-national majority.

Examination of the constitutions and citizenship laws of the post-Yugoslav republics reveals the institutionalization of systems premised on inequality, the superiority of the ethnic majority and the permanent subordination of any minorities. Further, the citizenship laws, defining who is a member of the sovereign body, are aimed explicitly at ensuring that minorities are excluded. The citizenship laws amount to bureaucratic ethnic cleansing, denying citizenship, and thus basic rights, to those not members of the majority group.

These constitutional and legal structures are the formal manifestation of the logic of state formation that has lead, in Bosnia and in Croatia, to "ethnic cleansing." Since ethnic homogenization is the basic premise of the dominant political movements in each of these states as well as in Serbia, the exclusion of minorities, by legal or forcible means, is a corollary of the basic principle of the state. Unfortunately, this assessment holds as well for Croatia and for the "Federation of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina" as it does for Serbia and Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia and Croatia. Since the constitution of this Croat-Muslim "Federation" was written under American patronage, the United States has effectively sponsored a discriminatory state structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ultimately, implementation of the logic of ethno-national self-determination in the mixed polity that was the former Yugoslavia had to mean ethnic cleansing. Acceptance of this principle of self-determination by the "international community" meant de facto acceptance of a politics of ethnic homogenization that was bound to be implemented by "ethnic cleansing." Such "ethnic cleansing" has been accomplished by legal-bureaucratic means in those regions where the minority does not have the strength to resist subjugation: Serbia and the parts of Croatia under Croatian government control. Where a minority does have such strength, or where there is no clear majority, military campaigns have determined which group remains sovereign, and which is excluded through expulsion. Thus the logic of self-determination explains the patterning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.
Abstract

The logic of the ideology of "national self-determination," the justification for the separate nationalist political movements that destroyed the Yugoslav federation in 1991/92, requires ethno-national homogenization. The constitutions and citizenship laws of the newly independent Yugoslav republics are based on an ethnic definition of "nation" and serve as justification for legal and bureaucratic as well as military ethnic cleansing. These legal acts transform "the nation" from a mobilizing symbol for political action into the ethnic definition of the sovereign in the new successor states, reducing minorities to second-class status, tolerated at best, facing discrimination at all times, eliminated at worst. In a territory with an ethnically mixed population, the transformation of the political ideology of ethno-national self-determination into the constitutional and legal definitions of the state is the transition that leads to ethnic cleansing, military, legal/bureaucratic or both. Legal/bureaucratic ethnic cleansing is most likely where minorities cannot resist forcibly. Large-scale violence becomes likely in direct proportion to the strength of the minority population to resist reduction to second-class status, which is why the Yugoslav wars have been fought primarily in the most mixed regions. Approaches to nationalism that focus on "nation" as political symbol rather than legal definition stress too much the instability of this construct, seeing the social construction of reality rather than the brutal reconstruction of social reality.

You know, I’m a Hegelian: I know that the suffering of individuals is irrelevant to the greater processes of history.

(High official of the government of the "Republika Srpska," the Serbian secessionist government in Bosnia, otherwise a philosophy professor, in answer to a question about the future for people in or born of mixed marriages, in an interview with the author, March 1994).

Of course, it would be best to resolve problems with the minorities through negotiation, but we should never rule out military force.

(High official of the Committee for Human Rights and Rights of Minorities of the parliament of the Republic of Croatia, otherwise a historian, in an interview with the author, March 1994).
The collapse of Yugoslavia into warfare between separate polities of several of its component peoples presents anthropologists with a disquieting disjunction between the growing wisdom of the field and the increasing practices of the world.\(^1\) While some few writers still hold to the essentialist view that "nationalism" represents the political manifestation of primordial or at least respectably ancient ethnic distinctions (e.g. Smith 1986, Armstrong 1982), most tie it directly to modernity (e.g. Anderson 1991 [1983], Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner 1983). Variations in formerly colonized countries tie polarizing ethnic distinctions to the colonial construction of society (see, e.g., Chandra et al. 1989: 398-413).\(^2\) Verdery (1993a:41) has given a succinct statement describing recent anthropological work, saying that it "sees nation as a construct, whose meaning is never stable but shifts with the changing balance of social forces, and it asks what kind of leverage this construct has afforded certain groups -- and why those groups rather than others."

At one level, it is difficult to argue with the analytical power of the approaches to nationalism that Verdery encapsulates. At another level, however, such analyses frequently seem irrelevant to practice, and thus must be deficient theoretically. If reality is "socially constructed," in Berger and Luckmann's famous phrase (1966), it is nonetheless reality. Often the point of the social constructions is not only to deny any other social reality, but also to implement the social actions and structures needed to ensure that the denial is effective. From this point of view, "nation" may well be a "construct, whose meaning is never stable," but political action may also succeed in rendering some past constructs impossible for the future. Further, such political action may create social structures -- in modern states, legal and bureaucratic ones -- that work to ensure that the social construct is institutionalized as reality. To give a stark example, John Maynard Keynes' dismissal of Poland in 1920 as "an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting" (Keynes 1920: 291) is now dated, since the large Jewish population of Poland is no more, and whatever role "Jew-baiting" may now play in Polish politics, it can never be the "industry" it was before the Holocaust.

The disjunction between anthropological theory and political practice in the world may be stated as follows: academic analyses have largely abandoned essentialist definitions of nation for constructionist ones, at the same time that essentialist definitions have risen to ascendancy in the real world of state formation and destruction. This disjunction can produce cognitive dissonance in anthropologists who recognize cognate logic between essentialist politics and older anthropological views of "culture" (Spencer 1990), and personal anguish for those who see the brutal results of accepting essentialist definitions that are clearly false empirically (e.g., Hammel 1993a). Tambiah (1986: 5) quotes Voltaire in his book on ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy in Sri Lanka: "If we believe in absurdities, we shall commit atrocities." Anthropologists see increasingly that successful political movements in many parts of the world are based on absurdities, while those who believe in them commit atrocities. However, the enactment of the atrocities themselves makes their presuppositions less absurd, in the classic manner of self-fulfilling prophecy, or perhaps self-fulfilling history (see Hayden 1994). Thus it may well be that the various peoples of Bosnia lived well together from 1945 until 1992, or those of Lebanon until 1975 (see Geertz 1973:293-297);\(^3\) yet the success of polarizing political movements means that those real pasts are irrelevant. What now matters is
the history written by the political victors, in blood and in the seemingly bloodless yet socially violent media of constitutions and laws.

In what follows, I do not try to reconnect the disjunction between anthropological theory and the increasing way of the world, but rather to recognize its implications for the analysis of the politics of the (re)construction of the nation-state. The first part of the article shows the falseness of the essentialist definitions of the various Yugoslav nations that came to be accepted in the political turmoil following the end of state socialism. This analysis is more than a matter of catharsis for the personal anguish of a few anthropologists and several (hundreds of?) thousands of the unfortunate residents of the former Yugoslavia who are now called, sarcastically, "Yugo-nostalgics" or "Yugo-zombies" by official circles in Belgrade and Zagreb. Since the discussion is on "the Balkans," a geographical term that has been incorporated into English to indicate chronic divisiveness and inherent hostility (but see Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992, Todorova 1994), the suggestion that the former Yugoslavia was more than a "forced marriage," or botched experiment in the coexistence of inherently incompatible peoples, must be substantiated. However, the analysis moves past this focus on the past to look at the processes now under way to institutionalize the imagined communities that have replaced the former body of citizens of the Land of the South Slavs. The analytical point is not only that belief in absurdities has led to the commitment of atrocities, but rather that the particular form of believed absurdity necessitates processes of implementation not only immediately murderous, but also constitutional and bureaucratic institutionalizations of the new definitions of state and people that do violence to the heterogenous structure of the population. The political goal of those implementing the victorious social construction is indeed to construct reality, and "ethnic cleansing," both military and bureaucratic, is the logical corollary, and thus often political necessity, for bringing this about.

More is involved, however. The wars in Yugoslavia from 1991 until at least mid-1994 have been almost entirely within regions that were the most "mixed," where the various nations of Yugoslavia were most intermingled. The extraordinary violence that has shattered these places was not the "fury of nationalist passions long repressed by communism." as many journalists and politicians would have it. Instead, I argue that the wars have been about the forcible unmixing of peoples whose continuing coexistence was counter to the political ideologies that won in the democratic elections of 1990. Thus extreme nationalism in the former Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of imagining "primordial" communities, but rather of making existing heterogenous ones unimaginable. In formal terms, the point has been to implement an essentialist definition of the nation and its state in regions where the intermingled population formed living disproof of its validity: the brutal negation of social reality in order to reconstruct it.

THE MULTINATIONAL FEDERATION AND ITS DEMISE

Yugoslavia was a creation of the Versailles peace, incorporating Serbia, territories acquired by Serbia as a victor in World War I, and territories of the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire that were inhabited by South Slavic peoples. The Serb-Croat-Slovene state, as it was referred to in the treaties that created it, fit the geopolitical needs of the victors in dismantling the Austo-Hungarian Empire and creating states that would hem in Germany on
the south and east (see Jordan 1943: 218-225, Churchill 1929). At the same time, the South Slav state was the goal of some political and intellectual figures among the Yugoslav peoples themselves, a form of internationalism that was derived from enlightenment and liberal theory (A. Djilas 1991). This Yugoslav idea conflicted with the separate nationalist ideologies of the various Yugoslav peoples themselves (Banac 1984), and the first Yugoslavia (1919-1941) was an unstable state (Banac 1984, A. Djilas 1991). The invasion, dismemberment and occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941 led to four years of war rather than combined resistance to foreign occupation, civil war much like that seen in Bosnia since 1991, and communist revolution (see M. Djilas 1978). The victorious communists promoted the "brotherhood and unity" of the Yugoslav peoples as a key element in the new state, and Yugoslavia was reconstituted after World War II.

The Yugoslavia that existed from 1945 until 1991, a multinational state in which no group comprised a majority, was premised on multiculturalism. While it was composed of republics all but one of which did have a clear majority of the group for which it was named (e.g. Serbs in Serbia, Croats in Croatia), all of these republics also had sizeable populations of minorities. The republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), the exception, had no majority group: in 1981, its population was composed of 39.5% Muslims, 32% Serbs, 18.4% Croats, 7.9% "Yugoslavs," and 2.2% "others and unknown." In the 1991 census, these proportions were, respectively, 43.7%, 31.4%, 17.3%, 5.5% and 2.1% (Petrović 1992:4). At the other end of the spectrum, the most homogenous republic, Slovenia, had a population that was 90.5% Slovene in 1981 and 87.6% Slovene in 1991 (Petrović 1992: 9).

The political geography of the country reflected these territorial concentrations. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1991/92) was a federation of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two "autonomous provinces" within the republic of Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). Each republic or autonomous province was the area of greatest territorial concentration of one of the major national groups that comprised Yugoslavia. Thus in 1991, for example, 99.3% of the Slovenes in Yugoslavia lived in Slovenia while 70.6% of the Montenegrins lived in Montenegro.

Such concentrations of national populations in their respective "home" republics produced a politics of confrontation within the Yugoslav federation that the American political scientist Sabrina Ramet (1992) has likened to international relations between states, and the Yugoslav political scientist Slobodan Samardžić (1990) has called "combatative federalism." This politics tended to define any issue as essentially a zero-sum game between the national groups as represented by their republics. Such political tendencies were reflected in and reinforced by the progressive loosening of the power of the federal government from 1945 through the constitution of 1974, which effectively confederalized Yugoslavia into a league of nearly independent states, bound more by the political power of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia than by the constitutional authority of the central government (see Rusinow 1979). The demise of the political authority of the party coincided -- not coincidentally -- with a challenge to the constitutional authority of the central government in 1989-90, producing a situation in which both disappeared, thus leaving the republics de facto sovereign on their own territories. In the absence of any political power or institution that could mediate between
these states that were both "sovereign" and completely intertwined, the civil war that followed was probably inevitable.\(^5\)

The political forces that produced the breakdown of both the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav federal system were embodied in the rise of nationalist movements and parties in the several republics that frequently adopted the "unreasonable" positions definitional of chauvinism. These nationalist movements were initially sparked by "dissident" intellectuals in Slovenia and Serbia (see Hayden 1991), who devised national programs based on the premise that Yugoslavia had worked to the systematic disadvantage of Slovenia or Serbia, respectively. At a time of protracted economic stagnation and the impending collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, political elites in the various republics were aware of the potential advantages of nationalism for cementing majoritarian support among their own populations. The powerful tool of appealing to local chauvinism was first seized openly by the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević. In openly advocating a nationalist cause Milošević rejected one of the basic pillars of Yugoslav communism. If "dissidents" were all who argued against Yugoslav communism, Milošević thus became the first successful dissident politician in Yugoslavia in 1987-88 (see Djukić 1992; Čavoški 1991).\(^6\) However, in 1989, in part in response to fears that Milošević had designs on becoming another Tito, the Slovenian leadership, still communists, adopted a nationalistic political platform of their own (see Hayden 1992b). The politics of Yugoslavia by late 1989 were thus dominated by a feud between Slovenia and Serbia. Soon the Croatian leadership sided with the Slovenes, a political alliance that destroyed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia when both republican delegations walked out of its last, aptly named 14th Extraordinary Congress, in January of 1990 (see Rusinow 1990).

In the free elections held in 1990, after the collapse of the League of Communists, the winning message in each republic was one of classic nationalism: Serbia for Serbs, Croatia for Croats, Slovenia for Slovenes, Macedonia for Macedonians. In B&H, the vote resembled an ethnic census, with Muslim, Serb and Croat nationalist parties accounting for about 80% of the total, in proportions only slightly less than those of each national group in the population of the republic; the only party standing for a civil state of equal citizens, the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia of the federal prime minister, received only 5.6% of the vote -- less than the 6% received by the "reformed" communists (see Hayden 1993b). While the strength of the nationalist victory was not large in any republic except Serbia,\(^7\) it was enough: the victorious politicians in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia worked independently, and for their own reasons, to disable the federal government, attaining thereby the de facto state sovereignty referred to earlier.\(^8\) Thus each established a true nation-state, based on the sovereignty of the majority national group.

The separate nationalist political movements were all justified on the grounds of "self-determination." However, this famous concept had a specific meaning in Yugoslav politics and popular culture which had grim implications for any concept of a civil state of equal citizens. A reference in the first line of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution to "the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession"\(^9\) referred to the nations --narodi-- of Yugoslavia, ethnically defined, not to the populations or citizens of republics. While these
"nations" were recognized as having their several republics, it was the "nations," not the republics, that were described as having united to form the Yugoslav state. and the Yugoslav republics, unlike those of the Soviet Union, did not have a right to secede.

This seemingly arcane distinction between "nation" and "republic" as the bearer of rights was actually of vital political importance. The essence of the separate nationalist political movements in Yugoslavia after 1989 was to assert the need for "nation," ethnically defined, and "state" to coincide. Although this formulation was hardly new to European history, it did have sinister implications for minorities in states that suddenly defined themselves as the nation-state of the ethnic majority. By definition, anyone not of the majority ethno-nation could be a citizen only of second class. The key to this distinction lay in the concept of sovereignty. As nationalist parties came to power in the various Yugoslav republics after the elections of 1990, they rewrote their several republican constitutions to justify the state on the sovereignty of the ethnically defined nation (narod), in which others may be citizens, but cannot expect to participate in control of the state.

The politics of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s thus turned the territories of concentration of the various national groups into states in which the members of the majority nation were sovereign (see Hayden 1992a). The presumption of the politics was that the various Yugoslav peoples could not, in fact, live together, and that their common state had, therefore, to be divided. The electoral success of this message meant that the "Yugoslav idea" of a common state of the south Slavic peoples, which had been devised as a counter and rival to the separate national ideologies of each of them (see A. Djilas 1991) was defeated. To reverse Benedict Anderson's evocative phrase (1983), the disintegration of Yugoslavia into its warring components in 1991/92 marked the failure of the imagination of a Yugoslav community. This failure of the imagination, however, had real and tragic consequences, for the Yugoslav community that could not be maintained, and thus has become unimaginable, had actually existed in many parts of the country. Indeed, it is my argument that the spatial patterning of the war and its terrible ferocity are due to the fact that in some regions, the various Yugoslav peoples were not only coexisting but becoming increasingly intermingled. In a political situation premised on the incompatibility of their components, these mixed territories were not only anomalous, but threatening, since they served as living disproof of the nationalist ideologies. For this reason, the mixed regions could not be permitted to survive as such, but their populations, which were mixing voluntarily, had to be separated militarily.

INCREASING HETEROGENEITY, MIXED MARRIAGES AND "YUGOSLAVS"

Despite the maintenance of high levels of territorial concentration of the various national groups in their respective republics, the levels of ethnonational heterogeneity throughout most of Yugoslavia were increasing. In Slovenia, for example, the concentration of the Slovene population increased between 1981 and 1991, with 97.7% of Slovenes residing in Slovenia in 1981 and 99.3% in 1991 (Petrović 1992: 15). During this same ten-year period, however, the homogeneity of the population of Slovenia decreased, from being 90.5% Slovene in 1981 to 87.6% in 1991 (Petrović 1992: 9). Nor was Slovenia unusual in this regard. From 1953 until 1981, almost all of the territories of Yugoslavia became increasingly heterogenous (Petrović 1987: 48); that is, in almost all republics and provinces, the percentage of the
population that was made up by the majority national group declined. The exceptions were the
two autonomous provinces in Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. In Vojvodina the Serbian
majority increased, due in part to the low birthrate among the next largest group, the
Hungarians. In Kosovo the Albanian majority increased, due in part to the high Albanian
birthrate and the massive Serbian emigration from the province.\textsuperscript{11} Between 1981 and 1991,
heterogeneity increased in Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia but decreased in
Croatia\textsuperscript{12} and B&H (Petrović 1992).

Accompanying the increasing heterogeneity of most of the republics was an increase in
the rates of intermarriage between members of the different national groups. Intermarriage is
usually thought both to indicate increasing assimilation and to increase integration of social
groups (Blau et al. 1982). From the early 1950s through the 1980s, "mixed" marriages
increased in absolute numbers and in proportion of all marriages throughout most of
Yugoslavia (\textit{Vreme}, 11 March 1991: 31), but were particularly common among Serbs and
Croats, and among Serbs and Muslims in B&H. Not surprisingly, the highest rates of
intermarriage came in the places in which the populations lived most intermingled: the large
cities, the province of Vojvodina, B&H, and the parts of Croatia that had large numbers of
Serbs and Croats.\textsuperscript{13}

Considering the frequency of the claim that Serbs and Croats suffer from "age-old
hatred," it is worth looking more closely at their increasingly close coexistence in Croatia after
1945, despite the terrible massacres of Serbs by the fascist "Independent State of Croatia" from
1941-45.\textsuperscript{14} The 1991 census showed that 12.2% of the population of Croatia were Serbs,
primarily in Zagreb and otherwise concentrated in several parts of the republic, specifically
Slavonija, Banija, Kordun and Lika. In Lika, the population was almost entirely Serb, and
there were few intermarriages. Where Serbs and Croats lived together, however, they
intermarried in large numbers. In the town of Petrinja in Banija, for example, where the
population was about equally divided between Serbs and Croats, about 25% of the marriages
were mixed, while in the major towns of Slavonija the percentages of mixed marriages climbed
to 35% (the town of Pakrac [\textit{Borba}, 30 September 1991: 11]).

Mixed marriages, of course, produce children of mixed background. Already by 1981,
about one-third of the children born in Slavonijan towns such as Osijek were of mixed Serb-
Croat background (\textit{Borba}, 30 September 1991: 11). B&H had the highest percentage of
"mixed" children, 15.9% overall, again concentrated in the most mixed areas. Even the most
concentrated republic, Slovenia, had large numbers of "mixed" or "foreign" births: 7.9% issuing
from mixed marriages, with another 19% from non-Slovene marriages, leaving only
73.1% of children issuing from "purely Slovene" marriages (\textit{Borba}, 30 September 1991: 11).

Another indicator of heterogeneity can be found in the figures on those who identified
themselves in the censes as "Yugoslavs" instead of as Serbs, Croats, Muslims or any other
national group. Between the 1971 and 1981 censes the numbers of "Yugoslavs" increased
dramatically, from 1.3% to 5.4% of the total population (see Burg and Berbaum 1989). The
distribution of these ethnic "Yugoslavs" was not even, however. They were found, in 1981,
primarily in Belgrade and the Vojvodina in Serbia, in the major industrial centers in B&H, and
in Istria and some larger centers in Croatia, as well as in the "mixed" regions of Croatia (Petrović 1987: 152-153; Danas 6 August 1991: 21). The age distribution of these Yugoslavs in 1981 indicated that it was a preferred identity among younger people, which led some researchers to conclude tentatively (and subject to the rise of precisely the type of nationalist politics that destroyed Yugoslavia in the late 1980s) that Yugoslavia was developing an increasing sense of community and that support for the multinational community was likely to increase, as would self-identification as Yugoslavs (Burg and Berbaum 1989).

It is not claimed here that national identity vanished; but it is clear that national identity was not a primary focus of most people's concerns in the early 1980s. Ethnographers from mixed regions have reported consistently that while national differences were recognized, tensions were low in the 1980s until political events from outside of these regions overtook them (Olsen 1993 [Slavonija], Bringa 1993 [Bosnia], Jambrešić 1993 [Banija]).

As it happened, of course, the rise of mutually hostile nationalisms led to a sharp decline in the percentage of Yugoslavs throughout the country, from 5.4% in 1981 to 3%, a drop of 41.25%. Again, the rates of decline were not even. The percentage of Yugoslavs dropped most dramatically in Croatia, from 8.2% to 2.2% (-72.32%), but also declined everywhere else: B&H by 26.5%, Serbia by 28.11%, Slovenia by 53.4% (all figures from Petrović 1992). The percentages of Yugoslavs remained highest, however, in the most mixed regions: B&H (5.5%) and the mixed areas of Croatia, where Yugoslavs had been most numerous in 1981 (Danas, 6 August 1991: 21).

It should be noted that the decline in the number of self-identified "Yugoslavs" may often have represented a calculated decision that continuing to identify oneself as such for official purposes could be hazardous. At the time the census was taken, in April 1991, I was told by a number of people that they would prefer to continue to identify themselves as Yugoslavs but were afraid that doing so could cost them their jobs and perhaps real property in the chauvinist political climates than dominant.

Through the early 1980s, then, most parts of Yugoslavia showed increasing heterogeneity of populations, accompanied by increasing numbers and percentages of mixed marriages, increasing births of children of mixed parentage, and a rise in the number of those who identified themselves as "Yugoslavs" rather than any of the ethnonational categories of the several Yugoslav peoples. The distribution of these factors was not random, however. Instead, they were all concentrated in the central part of the territory of Yugoslavia: the republic of B&H, the parts of Croatia bordering B&H and Vojvodina, Vojvodina itself, and Belgrade. In these parts of Yugoslavia, the idea that the Yugoslav peoples could not live together was empirical nonsense. It is perhaps because these regions constituted living disproof of the nationalist ideologies that became politically dominant after the late 1980s that the territories in which the intermingling of the populations was most complete have been the major theaters of the war.
CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM: FROM STATE SOCIALISM TO STATE CHAUVINISM

Contrary to the official rhetoric of either the winners or of western observers, the free elections of 1990 in Yugoslavia did not replace state socialism with democracy. Instead, the transition was from regimes dedicated to advancing the interests of that part of the population defined as "the working class and all working people" to regimes dedicated to advancing the interests of that part of the population defined as the ethnonational majority. In this sense, the transition was from state socialism to state chauvinism, and the "class enemy" of socialism was replaced by the enemy to the nation of the particular local chauvinism (Hayden 1992a). Not surprisingly, these national enemies were, primarily, the members of the largest minority in the polity, along with any members of the majority who might try to support rights for the minority. Since the leaders of Serbia and Slovenia did not permit elections at the federal level, the contest in each republic was based on ensuring local sovereignty, and the utter dominance of the national group for which the republic served as area of concentration.

Once in power, the victorious nationalists in each republic began to construct systems of constitutional nationalism, meaning constitutional and legal systems devised to ensure the dominance of the majority ethnonational group (see Hayden 1992a). Thus the constitution of Croatia (1990), for example, in its preliminary section gives a capsule history of the efforts of the Croat "nation" (narod) to establish "full state sovereignty". After referring to the "inalienable ... right of the Croat nation to self-determination and state sovereignty," the Republic of Croatia is "established as the national state of the Croat nation and the state of the members of other nations and minorities that live within it." In all of these passages, "Croat nation" (Hrvatski narod) has an ethnic connotation and excludes those not ethnically Croat. This exclusionary definition of the bearer of sovereignty is reinforced by the emblems of the state, a flag and coat-of-arms bearing designs associated only with Croats (Art. 11) and specifying that the official language and script of Croatia are "the Croatian language and Latin script" (Art. 12), thus excluding the Serbian dialects and the Cyrillic alphabet customarily used to write them.

Similar formulations of constitutional nationalism have arisen in other republics (see Hayden 1992a: 658-663). The two where they are least visible constitutionally are also those in which constitutional structures have least practical importance. Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exhibit the fewest forms of nationalism in their constitutions; yet these constitutions are unimportant, since the entire point of the Serbian Constitution of 1990 and the constitution of the new "federal" Yugoslavia of 1992 was to institutionalize the personal rule of Slobodan Milošević and ensure that it could not be challenged (see Čavoški 1991: 107-110; Nikolić 1991: 287-295; Lilić 1993). Thus the statements of the equality of citizens in those documents are about as relevant to state practice as were the provisions for individual rights and freedoms in the Soviet Constitution of 1936 (the "Stalin Constitution"). On the other hand, the Constitution of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (1991), the secessionist Serb republic in Croatia, defines the state as "the national state of the Serbian nation and all citizens living within it" (art. 1), in which "sovereignty belongs to the Serbian nation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and all citizens living within it" (art. 2). These phrases echo those of the Croatian constitution, simply
replacing "Croatian" with "Serbian." In a similar inversion to the Croatian constitution, the Serbian republic in Croatia reinforced the exclusive definition of the bearer of sovereignty by state emblems exclusively Serb (art. 6) and specifying that the official language and script are "the Serbian language and Cyrillic script" (art. 7).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, constitutionalism cannot be said to exist, as the Muslim, Serb and Croat nationalist parties that won the free elections of 1990 could not agree on a new constitutional structure for that stillborn "state" (see generally Bogosavljević et al. 1992; Hayden 1993b). The "Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina" that was put forth by international mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen in October 1992 and as modified thereafter was perhaps the only constitutional document in play in the former Yugoslavia after 1991 that was not based on constitutional nationalism; yet it was also the only such document that was not written or sponsored by elected officials in the former Yugoslavia. The March 1994 Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, drafted by Croats and Muslims with American assistance, is another matter, dealt with below.

When the Croatian, Serbian and Slovene constitutional structures were created they were primarily exercises in symbolic politics, particularly since federal Yugoslavia still existed, and the federal constitution included provisions that guaranteed the equality of citizens "regardless of nationality ... language, [or] religion" (art. 154), stipulated that "the languages of the nations and nationalities and their alphabets shall be equal throughout the territory of Yugoslavia" (art. 246), stated that there would be a single citizenship, that of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that a citizen of any republic would also hold Yugoslav citizenship (art. 249), and that citizens of any republic would "on the territory of another Republic have the same rights and duties of the citizens of that Republic" (art. 249). Granting that this constitutional equality under the socialist state was, to put it mildly, flawed (see, e.g., M. Djilas 1956; Čavoški 1990), overt discrimination on the grounds of nationality was discouraged. The new constitutional orders reversed this presumption of equality by defining the state as that of the majority group and privileging its language and script. Americans may get a feel for the tenor of the change by envisioning a political situation in which the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution was revised to read "We the white, Protestant people of the United States...," and laws regarding minority rights were passed and administered by a government headed by right-wing extremist David Duke. The devastating effects on putatively democratic systems of such "differential incorporation" into a multi-ethnic or multi-national polity are explored by Tambiah (1986, 1987, 1992).

The dire practical implications of state chauvinism are documented in the reports from the various republics of discrimination against minorities. The Serbian rule of the province of Kosovo has led to widespread, systematic discrimination against the Albanian majority there (who form a minority in Serbia as a whole) in regard to jobs, education, information media, provision of medical services and treatment by police (see Mazowiecki 1992a: 29-32 and Mazowiecki 1993: 33-39). In Croatia, on the other hand, it is the Serbs who have been discriminated against by the Croatian nationalist government that was elected in 1990, by means including "the destruction and confiscation of property, arbitrary arrest, the dismissal
from employment and verbal as well as physical abuse" (Mazowiecki 1992:22; see also Mazowiecki 1993: 26-27; Glenny 1992: 12-14).

The transition from state socialism to state chauvinism is seen in the formulations of state identity and purpose contained in the various republican constitutions. Where the socialist constitutions had grounded the state on the dual sovereignty of "the working class and all working people" and "the nations and nationalities" of Yugoslavia, the collapse of socialism left only one sovereign (Samardžić 1990:31). Further, formation of the state of each of these sovereign "nations" was justified by the right of self-determination. This is seen in the preambles or prefatory parts to the various constitutions (emphasis added in each case):

Proceeding from ... the inalienable and inextinguishable right to self-determination and state sovereignty of the Croatian nation, the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens. [1990]

Resting upon the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian nation and upon their centuries' long struggle for national and social freedom, as well as for the creation of their own state ... Macedonia is established as the national state of the Macedonian nation. [1991]

On the basis of the historical right of the Montenegrin nation to its own state, established in centuries of struggle for freedom ... the Parliament of Montenegro .. enacts and proclaims the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro. [1992]

Proceeding from the centuries-long struggle of the Serbian nation for independence ... determined to establish a democratic state of the Serbian nation ... the citizens of Serbia enact the Constitution of the republic of Serbia. [1990]

Proceeding from ... the basic and lasting right of the Slovene nation to self-determination and from the historical fact that Slovenes have, over centuries of struggle for national liberation formed their national identity and established their own statehood, the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia enacts the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. [1991]

Although not internationally recognized, the "Republic of Serbian Krajina," the self-proclaimed Serbian state in Croatia, defines itself in its constitution in much the same terms as the recognized successor states above:

Proceeding from the right of the Serbian nation to self-determination ... and the centuries-long struggle for freedom ..., determined to establish a democratic state of the Serbian nation on its own historical and ethnic space, in which the other citizens are guaranteed the realization of their national rights, a state based on the sovereignty belonging to the Serbian nation and other citizens in it ... the

In each of these preambles, the word "nation" (narod in all of the languages involved) has an ethnic connotation; narod is cognate to the verb roditi (to give birth). When preceded by the ethnic adjective (Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian), the constructions exclude those not of the specified ethnicity. From the excerpts above, and particularly the phrases emphasized, it is clear that the various formerly Yugoslav republics are considered to be manifestations of the right to self-determination—meaning the right to form its own state—of the majority, titular nation (narod), even when some expression is given to the equality of minorities. Again, a contrast can be made with the Preamble of the American Constitution, which provides simply that "We the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution." 24

Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the Yugoslav federation itself, represents the failure of an attempt to define the state in such a way as to recognize the sovereignty of all of its constituent groups without privileging any of them. The last socialist constitution of B&H (1974) had defined the republic as

a socialist democratic state and a socialist self-management democratic community of working people and citizens, the nations [narodi] of Bosnia and Herzegovina--Muslims, Serbs, Croats and members of other nations and nationalities living within it, based on the rule and self-management of the working class and all working people and on the sovereignty and equality of the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the members of the other nations and nationalities that live within it (Art. 1).

As socialism collapsed, this definition was replaced by a constitutional amendment, so that the definition of the state in Art. 1 read: "The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, of the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina--Muslims, Serbs and Croats and members of other nations and nationalities living within it." 25 Yet this definition did not satisfy the aspirations of Serbian and Croatian political figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In part because of problems of defining the state, no new constitution for B&H was ever agreed upon, and as Yugoslavia collapsed the Serb and Croat leaders in Bosnia proclaimed their own self-determining regions within the republic, which quickly became quasi-states, closely linked to Serbia and Croatia, respectively, and independent of the supposed government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo (see Shoup 1994). The war that followed effected the partition of B&H into regions that were meant to be, and are fast becoming, ethnically "pure" (see Hayden 1993b). This partition was inevitable once Yugoslavia collapsed, for the self-determination of the Yugoslav nations (narodi), the political program that succeeded in 1990, meant that the Serbs and Croats of B&H would be drawn inevitably towards union with their ethnic confreres. 26 Thus "self-determination" brought on the civil war that destroyed Bosnia.
The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was signed in Washington by Croats and Muslims in March 1994 and written with the help of American diplomats, is based on constitutional nationalism, this time excluding Serbs from the sovereign peoples of Bosnia. While the Preamble states that "The peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined to establish full national equality, democratic relations, and the highest standard of human rights and freedoms, hereby create a Federation," Article 1 then states that

Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation.  

The term "Bosniac," apparently an Anglicization of Bosnjak, which has a purely Muslim referent and does not equate with "Bosnian" (Bosanac), is a term for ethnic Muslims that avoids the religious load of Muslimani. In any event, this Constitution excludes Serbs from the structure of the Federation, apportioning executive offices to Muslims/Bosniacs and Croats (IV.B.1. arts. 2 - 5) and ensuring veto power in the legislature to Muslim/ Bosniac and Croat delegations, but not to others (IV.A.4, art. 18). The exclusion of Serbs became apparent immediately after the constitutional draft was signed in Washington, when a conference of Serbs in Sarajevo who were loyal to the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state asked to be included in negotiations. They were ignored (Borba March xx, 1994: ).

THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP: NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION

I slowly reached for my passport and handed it to a Slovenian policeman.... It was the old red Yugoslav passport, of course. All of a sudden, I became aware of the absurdity of our situation: I knew that, while he inspected my Yugoslav passport, he must still carry the very same one. There we were, citizens of one country falling apart and two countries-to-be, in front of a border that is not yet a proper border, with passports that are not good any more.... Walls are being erected throughout Europe, new, invisible walls that are much harder to demolish, and this border is one of them. (Slavenka Drakulić [1993:53-54], on her first crossing from independent Croatia into independent Slovenia, January 1992)

In popular speech and in many international documents, the world is composed of nations; but at the levels of law and politics, it is composed of states. Citizens of a state almost always have rights that non-citizens do not share, and this is certainly true in the formerly Yugoslavia republics. As these states attained independence their governments began to write the rules which would determine who can stay and who can not, who can work and who can not, who can vote and who can not, who will receive medical insurance or other benefits and who will not, who may own real property and who may not. In each case, citizens are entitled to the right or benefit and non-citizens are not, or are entitled to them only temporarily. Thus the question of citizenship in the successor states to the former Yugoslavia is one of utmost
importance to the people living in them, since those who do not attain citizenship will be denied the rights essential for any kind of normal life.

It must be stressed that the question of citizenship for many of the people now forced to seek it was new. As noted earlier, the constitution of Yugoslavia had provided for a single, uniform Yugoslav citizenship, and also guaranteed the equality of Yugoslav citizens throughout the country. Suddenly, however, the citizenship of many residents in the newly independent states became questionable. New citizenship laws, written to privilege the members of the sovereign majority in each case, have worked to discriminate against residents not members of that group. In essence, the new citizenship regimes have simultaneously extended citizenship to members of the majority ethnuation who are not resident through easy naturalization for them, while denying citizenship to many residents who are not of the right group. This last process turns residents of a republic who had been equal citizens of federal Yugoslavia into foreigners, a process that we might call denaturalization. Neither of these phenomena is unique to the formerly Yugoslav republics, of course. The easy extension of citizenship to non-resident ethn-national-religious confreres is well known (e.g. Ireland and Israel), while the denial of citizenship to large numbers of people who until then might have been thought to have held it was the purpose of the 1981 British Nationality Act (see Gilroy 1987). In this last case, however, most of the "denaturalized" potential citizens were non-resident in Britain. The combination of easy naturalization of non-residents with the denaturalization of residents seems uncommon, but is manifested now in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union (see Brubaker 1992a and 1993). The power of an imagined community (Anderson 1993) to break up actually existing communities in these post-communist settings is clear.

With the demise of Yugoslavia, the immediate practical question for many citizens of those erstwhile states was citizenship in one of the successor states. Here, laws and policies have varied. At the most inclusive end, the Slovenian Citizenship Act of 1991 offered citizenship to all citizens of another Yugoslav republic who had resided in Slovenia on the day that the plebiscite on independence was held, and most applicants have been granted citizenship (Mazowiecki 1993: 44). Even so, approximately 50,000 citizens of Yugoslavia who were counted in the 1991 census as residing in Slovenia have become foreigners there since the independence of that republic (Vreme, 8 March 1993: 33). Other states have been far less accommodating. The Law on Croatian Citizenship of 1991, unlike the Slovenian law, made no special provision for citizens of other Yugoslav republics, instead rendering all of them "foreigners" who must seek naturalization. Further, Serbs in Croatia have complained that their requests for citizenship or for naturalization have been denied (see Mazowiecki 1992: 22; 1993: 26-28). Although the Croatian authorities have denied discriminating against the Serbs, relatively large numbers of requests for citizenship have been rejected (Vreme, 8 March 1993: 34). Since the Law on Croatian Citizenship (art. 27 §2) permits the authorities there to reject a citizenship application even though the applicant has met all the criteria if they "are of the opinion that there are reasons in the interest of the Republic of Croatia for refusing the request for the acquisition .. of citizenship" and the same article (§3) provides that these authorities need not state their reasons for rejecting an application, the opportunity for discrimination, as complained of by the Serbs, certainly exists.
The laws governing citizenship and naturalization are interesting because they are the mechanisms through which the imagination of an ethnonational community is made manifest and actualized. Specifically, these laws provide the grounds for the acquisition of membership in the community, thus revealing the principles thought to define it. Again, the Law on Croatian Citizenship (1991)\textsuperscript{29} is interesting. Article 8 of this law provides that

A foreign citizen who files a petition for acquiring Croatian citizenship shall acquire Croatian citizenship if he or she meets the following requirements:

1. [age requirement: 18]
2. [omitted]
3. that before the filing of the petition, he or she had a registered place of residence for a period of not less than five years uninterrupted on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
4. that he or she is proficient in the Croatian language and Latin script.
5. that a conclusion can be drawn from his or her conduct that he or she adheres to the laws and customs prevailing in the Republic of Croatia and that he or she accepts Croatian culture.

Sections three and four of this article do not seem at first glance to be overly controversial, but both open wide opportunities for discriminatory application. The residency requirement depends on the interpretation of the qualification "uninterrupted" (neprekidno). More interesting is the language qualification. The dialects of what has until now been known as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian are myriad and intermixed, with some Serbian populations speaking dialects similar to those spoken by some Croats, and some Croat populations speaking dialects similar to those spoken by some Serbs (see Hammel 1993:7-8). Serbs do prefer to use Cyrillic while Croats almost never use it. Thus the language criterium is interesting: is someone who speaks the Belgrade dialect proficient in the "Croatian language?" Who decides, and on what grounds? Would a "Serbian" dialect qualify if the speaker is an ethnic Croat but not otherwise?

Section five, however, is most revealing. What, exactly, does it mean to "accept Croatian culture," and how does one conduct oneself to show such acceptance? Since the primary distinguishing feature of Croatian culture is Roman Catholicism, must one convert to that faith? If not that, what? This provision of the law takes a term that anthropologists have regarded as descriptive and analytical and makes it prescriptive; yet it remains empty of specific content. This emptiness at the formal level is hardly a recognition of indeterminacy, however. To the contrary, one suspects that the authorities who enacted this law have quite specific ideas about what it means to "accept Croatian culture," and that their intent is to draw very rigid lines indeed.

The implications of these basic provisions for naturalization become even more interesting when the special rules for emigrants and their descendants (Art. 11) and for members of the Croatian nation (narod) who do not reside in Croatia (Art. 16) are considered. In regard to both categories, Croatian citizenship can be acquired even though the applicant does not meet the requirements stated in Art. 8, §§ 1-4. However, these candidates must still
meet the requirement of § 5. To an anthropologist, of course, the complete separation thus contemplated between language and culture seems odd; yet it is restated twice, and thus seems not to have been a slip of the drafter's pen. This provision provides a tool for extending citizenship only to ethnic Croats (e.g., the child of Croat emigres from Croatia or of ethnic Croats from Serbia) while denying it to others similarly situated (e.g., the child of Serb emigres from Croatia). Taken together, the naturalization provisions of the Law on Croatian Citizenship may lead to situations in which, for example, a Muslim from Bosnia, long resident in Croatia and a native speaker of a Croatian dialect of what used to be called Serbo-Croatian, is denied citizenship, while an ethnic Croat from the United States, who has never been to Croatia and who doesn't know the language, is granted Croatian citizenship. While numbers of cases in Croatia are not known, it is interesting to note that the Slovenian provisions in regard to naturalization also privilege ethnic Slovenes; and that while 50,000 residents of Slovenia who were citizens of the former Yugoslavia have not acquired Slovenian citizenship, 25,000 ethnic Slovenes from outside of Slovenia have done so (Vreme, 8 March 1993: 34).  

Again the power of the imagined community to break up communities on the ground is apparent. The new citizenship laws provide the legal means for doing so: in essence, bureaucratic ethnic cleansing.

SELF-DETERMINATION, HOMOGENIZATION AND "ETHNIC CLEANSING"

The reference to "ethnic cleansing" in the last sentence is intentionally provocative. The point is indeed that the logic of "national self-determination" in Yugoslavia makes homogenization of the population a necessity. This logic is in fact a pure structuralism of the type analyzed by Mary Douglas (1966). In states defined as the polity of only the sovereign segment of the population, all not in the chosen group are "matter out of place," and may be treated accordingly. "Ethnic cleansing" thus becomes an indicative metaphor indeed.

As a process of homogenization, "ethnic cleansing" can take many forms. Within areas in which the sovereign group is already an overwhelming majority, homogenization can be brought about by legal and bureaucratic means, by denying citizenship to those not of the right group, thus also inducing those members of minorities who can do so to assimilate, and those who cannot or will not assimilate to leave. On the other hand, in more mixed areas, homogenization requires more, the physical expulsion, removal or extermination of the minority population. Although it is only this latter process that has come to be known, since the Yugoslav war began, as "ethnic cleansing," it is important to recognize that legal and bureaucratic discrimination is aimed at bringing about the same results: the elimination of the minority.

Although most of the world's attention has been focussed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is useful to look at the situation in Croatia, precisely because of the extent to which homogenization of the populations has taken place by bureaucratic and legal means as well as through military activity. Serb and Croat activities in this regard have been as similar in intent if inverted in content as the constitutions of the Republic of Croatia and the "Republic of Serbian Krajina," cited above. Thus Croats have been expelled from the parts of Croatia that are under Serb control (Mazewiecki 1993a: 21-23). At the same time, Croatian forces have engaged in the outright military ethnic cleansing of Serbs (Mazewiecki 1993a: 14-15), and the
Croatian government has tolerated or initiated discriminatory treatment of the remaining Serbs (Mazewiecki 1993a: 14-19). The result has been the effective exchange of populations, with formerly mixed areas such as Banija and Slavonija being divided into regions virtually wholly Serb and virtually wholly Croat.

There have not yet been any reliable studies of the results of forced emigration, which has led to complete changes in the ethnonational structures of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia. Since the Croatian government attempts to maintain the form of a state of law, and is more open to international inspection than the Serb authorities in the Krajina regions that they control, the few figures available relate to Croatia, making it easiest to look at the form of these pressures in that Republic. Although many people left their homes in the first few weeks of the war in Croatia in 1991, pressure to induce emigration continues (Mazowiecki 1993a: 21-23). As Mazewiecki notes (1993a: 14-21), Serbs in Croatia have been subjected to arbitrary execution and other violations of the right to life, denied police protection by the Croatian state, subject to arbitrary detention and denied the right to a fair trial, subject to illegal eviction from their homes and confiscation or destruction of their property. As already noted, the Croatian citizenship law provides ample scope for arbitrary and abusive application, which has in fact been documented by Mazewiecki (1993a: 16-18). The result is the continued emigration of the Serbs, as shown in the few available statistics on their distribution in Croatia. At the time of the April 1991 census only 268,642 of the 580,762 Serbs in Croatia (46.2%) lived in areas now under the protection of the United Nations, which includes the Krajina region plus a central zone (UNPA West) partially under Serb control (Crkvenčić and Klemenčić 1993: 19). Thus at least 312,000 Serbs lived in the areas now under control of the Croatian government.31 As of March, 1994, however, Croatian government officials estimated that only 200,000 Serbs remained in parts of Croatia under government control,32 while Serb political figures put the figure at 100,000.33 The effect has been to concentrate the Serbs of Croatia into the regions of that republic and of Bosnia that are under Serb control, and in Serbia itself, which has more than 500,000 refugees.

The fate of Croats in these Serb controlled parts of Croatia is even more grim: virtually all have been expelled. Where the Croatian government gives color of law to discrimination against Serbs, the Serb authorities tend to tolerate or initiate more direct action. The difference is of technique, however, not end result. The Republic of Croatia and the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" are both premised on the principle that minorities do not belong in them, even though the minority populations may have lived there for centuries. Discrimination against minorities in these circumstances is implied in the very definition of the state.

FROM NATION AS MOBILIZING SYMBOL TO NATION AS BRUTALIZING SOVEREIGN

Bette Denich (1994) argues that the "transition from exclusionary metaphor into physical extermination is the transformation of meaning that defines genocide." I would argue that in a territory with an ethnically mixed population, the transformation of the political ideology of ethno-national self-determination into the constitutional and legal definitions of the state is the transition that leads to ethnic cleansing, military, legal - bureaucratic or both. Legal - bureaucratic ethnic cleansing is most likely where minorities cannot resist forcibly. Large-
scale violence becomes likely in direct proportion to the strength of the minority population to resist reduction to second-class status, tolerated at best, facing discrimination at all times, eliminated at worst. Unfortunately, it is precisely in those regions that are most thoroughly mixed that war is thus most apt to come, as local minorities resist the imposition of the state that would turn them from equal citizens into subjugated minorities.

From this perspective, it is not enough to say that "Nation is first of all a political symbol", the meanings of which are "as varied as its multiple histories and as numerous as the social-structural positions from which it can be both utilized and read" (Verdery 1993b: 202-203, emphasis in original). The social-structural position of state chauvinism transforms this symbol in ways strikingly similar, in territories that contain more than one "nation," however defined. Moreover, the transformation of nation from symbol into legal sovereign limits the range of meanings available for the future construction of the paramount symbol. In so far as some portion of the population must thereby be permanently excluded from equal citizenship, the imagination of community produces real victims, which is, of course, what ethnic cleansing is all about.
NOTES

1. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is, of course, far more than a conceptual disjunction for the three million refugees within the territory of the former federation, as well as for many of those who have remained in the shattered, "ethnically pure" ruins of what were thriving multiethnic local communities. The situation analyzed in this paper is a manifestation of human suffering that was knowingly created by political actors within and without the former Yugoslavia. My efforts to analyze this tragedy are in part an attempt to control my own reactions to the destruction by intellectualizing it. Any part of the analysis that appears to trivialize the appalling suffering in the former Yugoslavia is not intended to do so.

2. The terminology of such distinctions remains less than uniform. Indian analysts, for example, refer to "communalism" rather than "nationalism;" but this distinction itself is a manifestation of acceptance of the secular nationalism (as per Nehru's *The Discovery of India* [1946]) that Ashutosh Varshney (1993) has identified as competing with Hindu nationalism and separatist Sikh and Kashmiri nationalisms in independent India. "Communalism" may become "nationalism" when it succeeds, and a state is granted to the "community," as occurred with Pakistan in 1947. Thus Croatian separatist ideology in 1990 was as communalist as Indian Muslim separatist ideology in 1946; or, conversely, Muslim separatist ideology in 1946 was as nationalist as Croatian separatist ideology in 1990. From this perspective, Verdery's argument (1993b: 202), that it is mistaken to assume that "just because something we call 'nationalism' occurs in many places, it is the same phenomenon in all of them" misses the point. Polarizing distinctions driven by images of blood exist widely, and to concentrate on their particularities, as she suggests, even when given a local label different from "nationalism," risks missing the importance of the wider phenomenon.

3. Geertz' 1973 assessment of Lebanon (an addendum to the original early 1960s text of the article), that "to date Lebanon continues to be a proof that although extreme primordial diversity may make political equilibrium permanently precarious, it does not necessarily, in and of itself, make it impossible" echoes comments that many made about Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The point is not that Geertz was wrong; rather, that the optimism many felt about what he termed "the integrative revolution" seems suddenly misplaced. Of course, it is doubtful that Geertz himself would now use the term "primordial," and its appearance in the title and text of the article is itself a sign that the analysis is dated.

4. The primary differences between 1941-45 and 1991-1994 were, first, that in the 1940s, Serbs were the chief victims of genocidal activity carried out primarily by Croats, secondarily by Muslims, while in the 1990s, Muslims have been the chief victims of genocidal activities carried out primarily by Serbs, secondarily by Croats. The second difference is more telling, however: whereas in the 1940s the Communists were a political force strongly in favor of Yugoslav unity, by the 1990s, there is no important political movement in support of a south Slav state.

5. The inevitability of war in these circumstances is made clear from the first ten numbers of the *Federalist Papers* (Madison et al. 1987 [orig. 1787]), the classic discourse on federal structures. Indeed, the collapse of Yugoslavia into war serves as confirmation of the reasoning employed by
the Federalists. The specific political and structural problems of the Yugoslav (con)federation in 1990/91 are discussed in Samardžić (1991).

6. The characterization of Milošević as "the first successful dissident" in Yugoslavia has drawn sharp criticism from anonymous reviewers of this paper and from audiences who have heard it presented. However, one of the most troubling aspects of the post-Communist transition has been the easy transit of former darlings-of-democracy dissidents into totalizing politicians in a political spectrum running from ultra-right to neo-fascist (see Hayden 1992b). In Yugoslavia, such figures include the Serbian fascist leader Vojislav Šešelj, subject of government harassment and imprisonment in the 1980s, his defense attorney at that time, the right-wing Croatian politician Vladimir Šeks, the Croat fascist leader Dobrisav Paraga, once praised by the U.S. Congress as a fighter for human rights, and the President of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, whose books provide a quasi-intellectual underpinning for the politics of ethno-nationalism. In fact, not all dissidents were thereby democrats, and the fact that Milošević adopted a dissident platform as state policy does not detract from that platform's critical stance towards the Yugoslav communist system -- the defining criterium of "dissident" status.

7. In Serbia, the "socialist" leader Slobodan Milošević, a communist until earlier in the year, accomplished a Ceausescou-like transformation, turning an ostensibly communist party into a nationalist one. His lopsided victory in the 1990 elections reflected (apart from the fact that the elections were staged unfairly) his ability to appeal to both nationalist and communist members of the electorate.

8. The leaderships of B&H and Macedonia were caught in the crossfire between the Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. The Macedonians and the Bosnians would clearly have preferred the continuation of Yugoslavia, since the chances of either B&H or Macedonia being a viable state outside of Yugoslavia were minimal. The tragic consequences for B&H of the politics of nationalism are analyzed in Hayden (1993b).


10. Ibid., Art. 1.

11. B&H showed a rather different trend: the Serbian plurality recorded there in 1961 became a Muslim plurality in 1971, after the recognition of "Muslim" as a nationality in 1967 and the subsequent change in the declaration of nationality by many who had called themselves Serbs in 1961 (see Petrović 1987: 47 n. 19).

12. The increase in the percentage of Croats in the census in Croatia in 1991 was apparently the result of a shift by many who had identified themselves as "Yugoslavs" in 1981, to Croat. The number of "Yugoslavs" in Croatia declined by 72% between these two censes, from 8.2% of the population in 1981, to 2.2% in 1991 (Petrović 1992: 7).
13. I am not convinced by the recent argument by Botev and Wagner (1983) that intermarriage did not increase in Yugoslavia, which considers aggregate data on the level of the republic, and thus is not sensitive to regional variations. Further, the symbolic value even of what they refer to as small numbers of intermarriages was great. Contrary to their reasoning, Ivan Šiber of the University of Zagreb has documented a sharp decline of intermarriages in Croatia since 1991, and interprets it as a sign of homogenization of the population (Feral Tribune 11 January 1994).

14. The extent of these massacres became a topic of hot debate in the late 1980s, with Croatian historians attempting to minimize the numbers (see Boban 1991, and its discussion in Hayden 1992c and Boban 1992; also Hayden 1993a). Croatian sensitivity on this topic can be seen in a ferocious attack, far in excess of normal standards of propriety in American scholarship, on Hayden’s comments on Boban by a second Croat writer (Knežević 1993a; and reply by Hayden, forthcoming).

15. The transformation of the people of a mixed Muslim - Croat village from neighbors of different faiths into enemies of different nationalities is seen in Tone Brinja’s stunning ethnographic film, Bosnia: We Are All Neighbors, broadcast in America on PBS in May 1994.

16. Some respondents to the census registered a protest against the whole process by listing themselves as Eskimos, Bantus, American Indians, Citroens and refrigerators, among other fanciful categories. The deadly nature of the categories was brought home to participants at a seminar on "Beyond Genocide" at John Jay College in New York in April 1992, when a human rights group from the town of Zenica in B&H used leftover blank copies of the 1991 census forms as the paper for a book of pictures of atrocities committed on the Muslims of B&H.

17. The republican leaderships refused to permit federal elections because the federal prime minister, Ante Marković, was by far the most popular political figure in all parts of Yugoslavia in 1990-91. Marković was popular precisely because he was seen as trying to preserve Yugoslavia. By denying Marković the opportunity to run, the republican leaderships denied him the opportunity to obtain a democratic mandate. Had federal elections been held before those in the republics, it is very likely that Marković would have obtained a mandate to counter the various separatist political actors in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia, and the Yugoslav tragedy might well have been avoided.

18. In this section of this paper and the one that follows it, a great deal of emphasis is given to the analysis of Croatian constitutional and legal materials. Unfortunately, in the political climate surrounding the demise of the former Yugoslavia, the analysis of Croatian materials is frequently perceived by Croats as "anti-Croat" or even "pro-Serbian," or as "disproportionate" if less space is devoted to the analysis of Serbian materials (see, e.g., Knežević 1993b and Hayden 1993c). Since this article deals primarily with constitutional and legal materials, however, it focuses on those documents that best exemplify the points under discussion, which are Croatian. As noted below, the Serbian materials are less revealing, not because the Serbs manifest the phenomena at issue any less than do Croats, but rather because the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević has put into place constitutional and legal structures that look progressive but that have little bearing on the actions of that authoritarian state (see also Hayden 1992a: 660). The criticism is in any
event misguided, since it is based on the assumption that Croatian materials should be immune to analysis because of the actions of the Serbs, a proposition that is difficult to defend in regard to academic work.

19. To be sure, this same article contains a second clause that permits the use, "in particular local jurisdictions," of another language and script. "under conditions established by statute" (emphasis mine). Both limitations, however, are suspect. If local jurisdictional lines are gerrymandered so that no minority is anywhere a local majority, the constitutional provision becomes meaningless. Further, the subjugation of a supposed constitutional right to ordinary legislation vitiates the right. Thus, for example, a statute providing that one could use the "Serbian language in Cyrillic script" to write to the Minister for Religious Affairs, and only for that purpose, would be constitutional yet serve to deny, in a practical sense, the supposed "right."


22. Indeed, the federal Yugoslav government in the 1980s was frequently condemned for its "oppression" of nationalist political activists in the various republics and provinces, actions which the government justified by saying that the separate (and separatist!) nationalist positions would, if permitted to become dominant, destroy the Yugoslav state and provoke civil war -- a prognosis rather more prescient than those of Amnesty International or Helsinki Watch. The troublesome contrast between the morally unassailable criticisms of the Yugoslav government by human rights activists in the 1980s and the terrible results of the success of the course of action they demanded are explored, if overly polemically, in Hayden (1992c).

23. The problem of minorities who form a local majority is particularly troublesome in regard to minority rights, since the local minority, members of an overall majority, often themselves require protection. This problem is discussed in Varadi 1992: 267-269, an article that is extremely useful in regard to the legal problems of protecting minority rights in the former Yugoslavia.

24. To be sure, the U.S. Constitution as written (1787) did recognize a difference between "free persons" and "all other persons," and excluding "Indians not taxed" (Art. I, § 2). Further, American citizenship was limited by law to only "white persons" until after the Civil War, and even then, naturalization was permitted only to "white persons" and "Africans or persons of African descent" until 1952 (see Gettys 1934). A more appropriate contrast might therefore be the Preamble to the Constitution of India (1950), consciously designed to implement a democratic system in a polity fragmented on lines of caste, religion and language as well as social class: "We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, secular, democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice ... Liberty ... Equality ... Fraternity ... do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution."

26. The Vance-Owen plan, which ostensibly was aimed at preserving a single B&H, recognized this fact of political life by opposing the division of B&H into only three ethnically-determined regions, saying that "a confederation formed of three such States would be inherently unstable, for at least two would surely forge immediate and stronger connections with neighboring states of the former Yugoslavia than they would with the other two units of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, document STC/2/2, Oct. 27, 1992: 5). However, the Vance-Owen plan for dividing B&H into ten completely autonomous regions was unrealistic, since it amounted to proclaiming a house divided to be a condominium despite the demonstrated willingness of many of the residents to raze the edifice (see Hayden 1993b).

27. Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, draft of March 13, 1994, 5 P.M.; obtained from the Embassy of Croatia, Washington, D.C.; in English as one of three (with Croatian and "Bosnian") original languages.

28. As is the case with the constitutional provisions (see above, Note 18), Serbia is less susceptible to analysis because that state, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that contains it, is hardly a legal state at all. In the present instance, there is no new citizenship law in Serbia, and I am not aware of any analysis of Serbian practices in this regard. However, the bureaucratic requirements for obtaining citizenship in the new Yugoslavia (Vreme, 3 August 1992: 16-17) and the general pressure on minorities in that country (see Mazowiecki 1992: 27-36; 1993: 32-42), indicate that the situation there is likely to be manipulated in order to discriminate against non-Serbs.

30. Again it is necessary to state that the situation in regard to the determination of Serbian citizenship is no different (Mazowiecki 1993a: 26-27). At the time this is written (May 1993), however, Serbia is an international pariah under an authoritarian regime, and probably few are clamoring to acquire its citizenship. Indeed, this author has met many Serbs who would like to acquire Croatian, Macedonian or even Bosnian citizenship for purely pragmatic reasons, to facilitate travel and emigration. Most have found this impossible to do, however, even when their parents were from those republics.

31. The number must actually be higher, since part of UNPA West is also under the control of the Croatian government.

32. Interview with Josip Manolič, Speaker of the upper house of the Croatian parliament, Zagreb, 11 March 1994.

33. Interviews with Serb political figures in Zagreb, March 10-12, 1994. Names of informants withheld to avoid possibility of prosecution for "slandering the Croatian state," as has happened at least once in the past.
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