THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE, 1944-1954:
A Documentary Collection

Leonid Gibianskii
Institute of Slavic Studies – Russian Academy of Sciences

Norman M. Naimark
Stanford University

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research
910 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 300
Washington, D.C.  20006

TITLE VIII PROGRAM
Project Information*

Contractor: Stanford University
Principal Investigator: Norman Naimark
Council Contract Number: 817-16
Date: July 7, 2004

Copyright Information

Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale.

* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.
Executive Summary:

Historical studies of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe after World War II have undergone a radical transformation as a consequence of the fall of communism. This is due in part to the ability of historians from the region itself to ask fresh questions and offer new judgments about their own past free from the strictures of Marxist-Leninist historical orthodoxy, party control, and the strict injunctions of state-sponsored censorship. Even more important is the loosening of state control over archival collections that document the Soviet role in the establishment of communist states, 1944-1956. Restrictions vary from country to country in Eastern Europe. In Russia, the chief repository of materials on Soviet actions in this period, the politics of de-classification has shifted since 1991, from relative openness to selective de-classification. Despite the availability of a plethora of documents to tell the story of Soviet efforts to create communist regimes in postwar Eastern Europe, some archival collections remain closed to scholars both from the region and from the West.

These limitations aside, our understanding of Soviet intentions and actions in Eastern Europe can be deepened and widened as a consequence of a decade of research in these newly available documents. This project – intended to provide a fully annotated translation of nearly two hundred seminal documents – offers the reader the essential materials related to Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. We learn about Stalin’s explicit instructions at the end of the war to destroy the Polish Home Army underground and to cut off the Warsaw Uprising from any outside help. The documents illuminate the direct role of Andrei Vyshinsky in Romania, as he pressured the king to bring the communists to power, despite their weakness and unpopularity in the country. Newly available archives explore Stalin’s intentions in creating the Cominform in
September 1947 and document his explicit instructions to the East European parties about how to deal with the temptations of the Marshall Plan.

Shifting Soviet instructions are matched, in almost every instance, by complete East European compliance. For the first time, we have the complete correspondence between the Soviets and Yugoslavs, amply demonstrating the fundamental causes of the Stalin-Tito split. The integral part played by Soviet “advisors” in the design of the show trials in Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, is matched by their day-to-day involvement in the actual interrogations, prosecutions, sentences, and executions. And we see in the newly available documents the pressures that incomplete de-Stalinization put on the East European party leaders, creating the political crises that resulted in the East German uprising of June 1953, the Polish October, and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

As a consequence of these and other Soviet policies, the face of Eastern Europe was profoundly changed after the Second World War. The Soviets did not invent East European communism, nor did they control many of its aspects. However, the newly accessible documents from previously secreted archives, which are made available often for the first time in English in this volume, demonstrate that Soviet influence, control, and manipulation were at the heart of the creation of communist regimes in the region.

Introduction

The work of the detective is relevant to the historian’s craft, no matter what the field of
inquiry. The past can be viewed as a set of interlocking mystery stories, whose resolutions remain perpetually open to the investigations of new generations of scholars. To complicate matters for the historian-detective, past events are also enshrouded in powerful myths, sometimes created intentionally by governments and peoples to excuse their behaviors and obscure their original motives. This is perhaps nowhere more relevant than in unraveling the history of the Soviet Union and its role in the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.

From the very outset of the process, the creation of what became the “Soviet bloc” was surrounded by mysteries and mythologies, many of which were deliberately concocted by both the Soviets and the East European communists. The mysteries were intended to conceal from observers, as well as from history itself, particularly noxious actions linked to violence, terror, political provocations, deception, and Soviet behind-the-scenes machinations.

Simultaneously, the Soviet and East European regimes created mythologies through their immense propaganda resources, painting a picture of the development of Eastern Europe as the consequence of the genuine political aspirations of the respective peoples and parties. In doing so, communist authorities aspired to attract the allegiance of the local populations and convince the outside world of the legitimacy of their efforts.

Even after the East European communist regimes were firmly in place, the Kremlin and its allies persisted in maintaining the mythologies created in the founding period and keeping their mysteries under lock and key in secret archives. The communist rulers sought to perpetuate
an image of the purity of their politics and ideology; therefore, they constantly referred to the mythologized “glorious past” of their parties and regimes. Those who were later in power in Eastern Europe remained fiercely attached to these idealized images of the origins of their authority as a way to bolster their legitimacy. This version of history included the altruistic role of the Soviet Union, an image that was also very important for the Kremlin. For the Soviets, it bore direct relevance to a positive view of Soviet foreign policy, as well as the justification for the creation of the communist bloc (“the socialist camp”), headed, of course, by the Soviet Union. Thus the mythologized beginnings of the establishment of communist hegemony in Eastern Europe remained crucial to the Soviets’ view of themselves.

Communist regimes used a very simple means to secure past mysteries. The key documents on the most important aspects of the founding and establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe were kept strictly confidential in secret archives, mostly in the Soviet Union, at least until the fall of communist rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Meanwhile, Soviet and East European historians perpetuated a whole series of mythologies that invariably involved deception and prevarication. Not only were historians deprived of the relevant documents for their work, they were also confined by Soviet ideological postulates and restrictive state censorship.

Even if Western historians were not subject to the same demands and restrictions as their East European and Soviet colleagues, they, too, were deprived of indispensable archival materials for their work. They made up for this in part by using newspapers, revelations of defectors, and accounts of Western diplomats, journalists, and travelers in Eastern Europe.
Eventually, some copies or summaries of documents in communist archives made their way to the West, smuggled by emigres and their contacts in the archives. But these were extremely rare occurrences.²

Despite the paucity of evidence, several studies of the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe – those of Hugh Seton-Watson, Adam Ulam, Francois Fejto, and Zbigniew Brzezinski – assumed the status of classics, offering serious social science analysis of the specific cases, as well as the general phenomenon of the “East European revolution,” to use Seton-Watson’s term.³ However, in view of the inaccessibility of important documents, especially those connected with the hidden mechanisms of Soviet influence, control, and manipulation of East European communist leaders, Western historians were unable to reconstruct the crucial processes of decision-making in the Soviet bloc. Despite their sometimes superb instincts and ability to see through the communist mythmaking processes, Western historians also contributed to the making of new mythologies about the establishment of communist regimes.

The situation changed fundamentally with the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. On the one hand, the historiography of these countries was formally emancipated from the former ideological dictates of the communist regimes and the restrictions of their censors. Even more important, historians throughout the region, as well as in the West, experienced for the first time the possibility of reconstructing and analyzing the history of the establishment of communist hegemony in Eastern Europe through the use of relevant documents.

Still, in the decade-and-a-half since the process of declassification of archival documents
was launched in the post-communist states, the unevenness of the process of creating historical openness has become apparent. Declassification has proceeded at a reasonable pace in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and, especially, in the former German Democratic Republic, where the process has been controlled by the new, united Federal Republic of Germany. Later on, other East European communist nations, most notably Bulgaria, joined the effort to declassify documents from the communist period. However in some East European countries, and, most significantly in Russia, which houses the largest Soviet archives of relevant documents, the process of declassification remains sluggish and limited in scope.

The declassification of documents in Russia remains subject to the extreme sensitivities of the Russian government and the Russian archival administrations to the country’s troubled past. Sometimes, documents that have been opened to researchers have subsequently been closed down when these materials produced ostensibly embarrassing results. This especially applies to sources of Soviet foreign policy, including the policy towards East European countries. Within this group of archival documents, those originating in the highest echelons of the Soviet government during the Stalinist years are the least likely to be made available to researchers. This problem seriously impedes any investigation into Soviet political planning and decision-making regarding Eastern Europe.

As a consequence, the historian needs to ask how far one can compensate for the lack of comprehensive archival sources by closer scrutiny of those groups of documents that have become available for research. Since available documents for the most part originate in lower
levels of the Soviet party-governmental hierarchy, one needs to ask whether one can draw conclusions about the aspirations and decisions of the higher USSR authorities with regard to the East European states from mid-level bureaucrats.

This question has already provoked considerable scholarly debate, in particular in connection to Stalin’s intentions toward Eastern Europe at the end of the war, when Soviet troops first entered the countries of Eastern Europe. In this question and others, the debates among scholars remain inconclusive. Every country’s history with Soviet occupation and influence is slightly different. And the problem of access to archival materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive, as well as to the papers of the top leaders of the Stalinist state, complicates ready answers to difficult historical questions.

New Documentary Publications

Despite the myriad limitations to open historical investigation in the archives, the opening of new collections for research and analysis has led to a huge quantitative and qualitative improvement in the data historical available for scholars. An important part of this process that directly serves our understanding of Soviet influence and control in Eastern Europe after the war is the publication of many of these newly available documents. In the majority of cases, the archives themselves have published the documents in collaboration with scholars in various research centers in Moscow or with a number of scholarly journals specializing in document publication. Russian materials comprise the majority of the newly published documents, though there is a significant East European component, especially Czech (former Czechoslovak), Polish, Hungarian, and former Yugoslav (Serbian) publications. The published
documents tend to break down into two categories: those that explore Soviet policy and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe, and those that focus primarily on the individual countries of the region.

In the category of published documents on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, the pride of place belongs to two prominent collections of two volumes each: Eastern Europe in Russian Archival Documents, 1944-1953, and The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe, 1944-1953. Both consist entirely of Russian archival documents on the subject and embrace the period from the inception of the “People’s Democracies” through Stalin’s death and its immediate aftermath. In addition, the Italians published a major joint Russian-Italian volume of materials from the Cominform meetings of 1947-1949; the Russian version, published in 1998, contains a somewhat expanded explanatory apparatus. Most recently, the Moscow publisher Rosspen will put out a three volume set of Khrushchev-era documents from the top Soviet leadership, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The first volume, just off the press, contains, among other materials, several important documents on Soviet policy toward East European states, including those from the first post-Stalinist years (1954-56).

The second category of materials includes a wide variety of document collections pertaining to the history of individual East European countries, many published in Russia, others in the East European nations themselves. The largest number of these are devoted to Soviet policy towards Poland, the most crucial East European state, and specifically to the period of the formation of the Polish “People’s Republic” and its transformation into a communist regime.
Polish historians and teams of Russian and Polish historians have published important collections from both the Polish and Russian archives. Soviet policy towards Romania and the German Democratic Republic also have been the subject of similar document collections.

Special mention should be made of the three volume collection, *The USSR and the German Question*, which is comprised of documents from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. A joint Russian and Yugoslav team of historians produced an important collections of documents, published in both Moscow and Belgrade, on Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the war, 1941-1945. Czech historians have published several collections from their archives, dealing with various facets of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in the first decade after World War II. Important topics having to do with conflict and cooperation in the Soviet bloc are the subject of specialized document collections: the Soviet-Yugoslav confrontation in 1948; the so-called “normalization” of Soviet-Yugoslav relations after Stalin’s death; and Soviet policy towards the Hungarian revolution of 1956, including the two Soviet military interventions of that year.

When considering important published archival materials, one should also mention the diaries of Wilhelm Pieck, the German communist party leader, with various high-placed Soviet representatives in the period 1945-53, and Georgi Dimitrov’s diary, which includes the period from the end of World War II up to his death in 1949. Written contemporaneously with the events they describe, such eyewitness accounts, unlike memoirs that are usually composed much later, belong to the same pool of courses as other archival documents. Clearly, Pieck’s diary has
a great deal to say about the construction of communism in eastern Germany, while Dimitrov’s
diary, especially after his departure from Moscow to Bulgaria in November 1945 to become
leader of the Bulgarian communist party, contains important materials about the Sovietization of
Bulgaria. The Dimitrov diary also covers the period 1944-45, when he headed up the Department
of International Information of the Soviet Central Committee, and therefore is an important
source on the Kremlin’s policy toward various East European nations during the period when
people’s democracies were initially being instituted.

Only a few of the documents mentioned above are available in English. However, for
those Western readers who do not know Russian or other East European languages, The Cold
War International History Project Bulletin, issued by the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars in Washington D.C., has translated and published excerpts of some of the most
important documents.17 Dimitrov’s diary has been published in English by the Yale University
Annals of Communism Series.18 But this present publication of documents will give English-
speaking readers an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a much wider variety of
documents on the politics and influence of the USSR during the establishment of communist
regimes in Eastern Europe.

The Beginnings of the “People’s Democracies”

The initial period of this process, 1944-45, was one of the most important in the entire
history of postwar Eastern Europe. The documents selected to represent this period vary greatly
from country to country. This imbalance stems form the uneven involvement of the USSR in the
initial creation of the people’s democracies in the countries of the region. One can roughly divide
the countries involved into three categories. The first includes Poland, Romania, Hungary, and, to some extent, the GDR (at this time, the SBZ, the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany.) Here Soviet involvement was absolutely central to the factors contributing to the development of people’s democracies. The SBZ was fully occupied by Soviet authorities, but Soviet insistence on the unity of Germany prevented concrete moves in this period towards building a people’s democracy.

Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia belong to a second category, where Soviet involvement played a major role, but was coupled with a significant and sometimes equivalent influence of purely internal social and political factors. Although to a different degree in both countries, the communist parties were able to collaborate with other resistance forces during the collapse of Nazi rule, something that portended a different constellation of political power after the war. Still, it was the entrance of Soviet troops into both of these countries and the support their native communist parties received from Moscow which made possible their eventual Sovietization. The success of the communist-led September 9, 1944 coup in Bulgaria and the subsequent domination of the country by the communist party would not have occurred without Soviet help and encouragement. During the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the communists, urged on by Moscow, promoted Edvard Benes and the left-liberal forces he represented as partners in the formation of a new Czechoslovak government.

The final category of countries consists of Yugoslavia and Albania. Here the creation of people’s democracies took place predominantly due to internal social and political causes. The local Yugoslav and Albanian communist parties successfully resisted the Axis occupation of their countries, leading large, popular, and powerful left-oriented national liberation movements
and, eventually, armies, that freed their respective countries. To be sure, Soviet foreign policy aided their efforts and, in the Yugoslav case, the Red Army provided important, if not essential, military support.

The earliest and most blatant case of Soviet involvement in East European politics occurred in Poland, where the so-called Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) was secretly formed by Stalin from the ranks of former Polish communists living in Moscow. According to plan, the PKWN accompanied Red Army troops as they poured into Poland in late July 1944. Then, the Soviets concocted the spectacle of the PKWN forming a Polish national government, exercising its authority in the country, and receiving formal recognition from the Moscow. Although Polish communists, then organized in the Polish Worker’s Party (the PPR), and other Polish leftists, including the socialists in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), enjoyed the support of only a very small fraction of the Polish population, they were naturally called upon by the Soviets to serve as leading personnel in the PKWN, which increasingly asserted its power over those parts of Polish territory liberated from the Nazis by the Red Army.

Some of the materials published in our collection introduce the reader to Soviet methods and mechanisms in forming a cadre of Polish communists to fill the most important administrative functions of government. At the beginning of 1944, Stalin oversaw the creation of the Central Bureau of Polish Communists from the ranks of the leading Polish emigre communists residing in the USSR. This secret organization became a key instrument in insuring that the Kremlin controlled the political platform of Polish communism in these years. After the liberation of the country from Nazi occupation and the formation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party (PPR) in early September 1944, the Soviets
made sure that the majority of its members belonged previously to the Central Bureau. This way, Stalin was able to insure that the “Muscovite” segment of Central Committee held the upper hand over those “native” PPR members who had emerged from the underground at the end of the war.

Some of the salient features of Soviet control over the new Polish authorities are revealed in such documents as the protocols of the meetings of the Politburo of the PPR’s Central Committee, which describe the Moscow meetings between Stalin and the Poles, September through December 1944, and contain important descriptions of Soviet policy directives and the means for their implementation. The Polish documents are especially valuable since Russian archival materials on these meetings with Stalin have not been made accessible to scholars.

The active involvement of Soviet military forces and special services in the protection of the new postwar Polish government and administration from opponents in the Polish underground can also now be documented from these new collections. Soviet forces attacked and eliminated groups attached to the London Polish Government-in-exile, which had earlier fought against their Nazi occupiers. For example, we now have access to the instructions from the Soviet government, dated August 2, 1944, to Nikolai Bulganin, a prominent official in Stalin’s administration, outlining the tasks associated with his appointment as Soviet representative to the PKWN. On the one hand Bulganin was ordered to provide support for the administration and growing security apparatus of the PKWN; on the other he was charged with the obliteration of the political and military units of the Polish Government-in-exile still active in the country.
Also important in this connection are the orders to the Soviet troops in Poland on August 23, 1944, mandating urgent measures to be taken against the Polish Government-in-exile’s Home Army (Armija Krajowa, AK) units in areas occupied by the Red Army. These units were to be prevented from reaching Warsaw and thus aiding the Warsaw Uprising, and were to be arrested and disarmed. The order is a rare documentary example of the Kremlin’s policy not only not to aid or abet the Warsaw Uprising, but to prevent the insurgents from receiving reinforcements in men or arms. This signifies that Stalin preferred that the uprising, which was organized by the emigre government, be put down by the Nazis, which indeed happened in September-October 1944, rather than be at all successful and serve as an impediment for the imposition of Moscow’s authority in Warsaw.

This evidence is relevant to the question, often discussed in the historiography of the period, whether the halt of the Red Army’s advance at the Vistula in mid-September, 1944, rather than crossing the river and coming to the aid of the Warsaw Uprising, derived from nefarious political calculations on Stalin’s part, or whether logistical and tactical considerations by the Soviet military dictated the need to cease offensive actions. (Available military documents regarding this question are inconclusive.)

Among the newly accessible documents on the communist takeover of Poland are the NKVD reports about their activities on Polish territory occupied by the Red Army. These were sent to Beria in Moscow, who then passed them on to Stalin. The documents belong to Stalin’s so-called “special folders,” which contain materials from the Soviet repressive organizations. To a significant degree, these documents introduce the reader to the methods, mechanisms, and sheer scale of the repressive measures directed by the Soviets against opponents of the new
“people’s democratic” order on Polish territory. For example, one report to Stalin notes that even at the end of October 1945, there will still more than 27,000 Poles interned in NKVD camps, most of whom had been arrested in 1944-45.27

The Kremlin followed a similarly forceful, if somewhat different scenario in Romania. During the breakthrough of Soviet troops into Romania on August 20, 1944, the royal court and a number of Romanian generals staged a coup, removing Antonescu’s regime (August 23) and joining the Allied cause. Even when the country was fully occupied by the Red Army, the king, his military allies, and his administration stayed in power.

However, as early as the fall of 1944, the communist party, at the head of a left coalition – the so-called National Democratic Front (FND) -- unleashed a Soviet-approved campaign to move the government further to the left. The FND went so far as to demand that the government transfer power to themselves, despite the fact that they commanded only minority support among the Romanians. The Soviets were able to exert considerable pressure within the Allied Control Council of Romania and demanded concessions to the “democratic forces” of the country, ostensibly represented by the FND. Growing pressure on the government led to a communist-initiated coup in February-March 1945, which was backed by the Kremlin’s ultimatum to the king. The king had no choice in these circumstances but to appoint a new government on March 6, one that relied on the FND, led primarily by the communists.28

The dramatic political developments in Romania are documented in collections published both in Moscow and Bucharest. Among the documents we have selected for the collection are some of the special services’ secret reports sent by the Soviet control commission (ASS) in Romania back to Moscow during the course of the coup at the end of February, beginning in
March 1945. Similar reports to Moscow were composed by Andrei Vyshinskii, vice-commissar on international affairs of the USSR and special Kremlin emissary in Romania.

These reports make it possible to reconstruct the mechanisms by which the Soviets were able to engineer the coup. They show not only that the demonstrations of the FND adherents under the banner of changing the government, organized at that point by the communist leadership, were given the go-ahead by the Soviet side, but also that in several provincial towns, including the larger ones, the demonstrators seized control of the local government structures by force. Armed efforts by the Romanian police and army to prevent this from happening were blocked by Soviet military commanders and by representatives of the Soviet administration of the Allied Control Council. The Soviets threatened the Romanians with military intervention of their locally-stationed troops if the Romanians tried to use force. In Bucharest, where skirmishes between the FND protesters and the Romanian government forces signaled the beginning of an acute political crisis, the Soviet representatives intervened in a similar fashion.

As a result, the Romanian authorities lost any ability to counter the momentum towards a coup. In contrast to the public statements made by the Soviet authorities and their Romanian cronies, blaming the government for shooting at an unarmed peaceful demonstration of the FND, the Soviet reports back to Moscow admit that both sides engaged in gunplay, even though the Romanian police and military were still blamed for being the instigators. In any case, the reports make clear that during the crisis the Soviet special services in collusion with the Romanian communist party prepared to create an FND government on their own should Vyshinskii fail to coerce the king into proclaiming it himself. In this connection, additional Red Army units were moved towards Bucharest, including, on Stalin’s orders, two divisions of NKVD troops. In the
end, there was no need for the direct application of force. Vyshinskii’s relentless pressure on the
king, documented in this collection by his reports back to Molotov in Moscow, broke his
resistance and the coup was accomplished under the veneer of royal legitimacy.30

In Hungary, the German overlords removed the wartime government of Admiral
Miklos Horthy, who had tried to conclude a last-minute truce with the members of the anti-Hitler
coalition, and replaced it on October 15, 1944, with the marionette regime of the Arrow-Cross
leader, Ferenc Szalasi. Soviet policy was to create a provisional government that would take
power in the wake of the Red Army’s advance into Hungary. Stalin was satisfied with placing
Hungarian communist party members in prominent positions in the new government. The
communists were a minor political force in Hungary and the Soviets sought allies from anti-Nazi
and anti-Szalasi Hungarian parties of the left and center, and even some pro-Horthyite elements
which offered to cooperate with the Soviet side. In the documents we have selected from the
Russian archives, there are a number of Soviet evaluations of policy alternatives in Hungary, as
well as reports by Matyas Rakosi, leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, discussing the
situation on the ground during the early months of 1945.31

The Soviets formed three German communist “initiative groups” in Moscow to follow
the Red Army troops into occupied Germany in April and May of 1945, one led by Walter
Ulbricht, the second by Anton Ackermann, and the third by Gustav Subbotka. Although some
German communists, especially Ulbricht, played an important role in building a pro-Soviet
political base in eastern Germany, this task fell primarily to the Soviet Military Administration in
Germany and, in particular, to the head of its Propaganda Section, Col. Sergei Tiul’panov, and to
its Political Advisor and representative of the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Semenov.

Tiul’panov was responsible for the political development of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ) and, more than any other single Soviet official in Germany, created the new party system in eastern Germany and oversaw the creation of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the spring of 1946. The extent of his and the Soviet Military Administration’s involvement in local German politics can be documented by his reports back to the Central Committee in Moscow in 1945-46. In these documents, the combination of control and restraint demonstrate the Kremlin’s ambivalence towards the future of Germany.

In comparison to Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the SBZ, the body of sources selected on the Soviet role in the 1944-45 formation of “People’s Democracies” in the countries belonging to the other two categories is considerably smaller. As mentioned above, in these countries the Soviets neither directly pressured local governments nor engaged in violence against their noncommunist opponents. This does not mean the Soviets were without influence. The very presence of the Red Army’s entry into Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria changed the situation on the ground. In the case of Bulgaria, the Soviet forces were all the more influential because the Soviets dominated the Allied Control Council. In Yugoslavia, Soviet financial and military support of the locally constructed communist regime was an important part of its legitimacy and political success. Yugoslav influence in Albania was bolstered, at least in the early stages of liberation and building new institutions, by Soviet encouragement.

Among the documents that illustrate the interaction of East European communists and their Soviet mentors in the formation of new postwar governments in this period is a plan for the make-up of the new Czechoslovak government drawn up by the Czechoslovak communists and
sent to the Soviet Central Committee for approval. These plans were developed in the course of the Soviet negotiations with Benes in March 1945 that led to the formation of the first government in the country after its liberation from Nazi occupation.33

Also of interest is the secret correspondence between Molotov and the leaders of the communist party of Yugoslavia after the formation on March 7, 1945, of the joint Tito-Subasic government, which added members of the emigre government-in-exile to the new Yugoslav government. This arrangement was only reluctantly agreed to by the Yugoslav communists. In fact, the Yugoslav communist leadership deviated here and there from the original agreement, and were sharply criticized by the Kremlin as a consequence. When the Yugoslavs tried to explain the motives behind their actions, they were roundly censured by Moscow and forced to own up to their “mistakes.” There were to be no arguments in the command hierarchy between Moscow and the local communists in the newly developing bloc in Eastern Europe.34

Another important topic broached in the recently declassified documents is the reporting of information by East European communist leaders to Moscow about the initial implementation of “people’s democratic” rule after the war. Among the most interesting of these reports include one sent by Traicho Kostov, then leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, to the Department of International Information of the Soviet Central Committee in January 194535; a second sent to the Soviet Central Committee by the Yugoslav communist leader, Edvard Kardelj, in February 194536; and a third, which consists of an account of a meeting of the Czechoslovak communist leader, Rudolf Slansky, with the Soviet ambassador in Prague.37 Such materials reveal not only
how the local communist leaders assessed the situation in their respective countries and what policies they developed and implemented, but also the kind of information that Moscow received and the intensive and extensive character of the reporting responsibilities of the East European communist parties to their Soviet patrons.

The documents in this collection from the early period of Soviet-East European relations also broach a series of important territorial and ethnic (or, better, ethnopolitical) issues. In the period 1944-45, a series of disagreements between Czechoslovakia and Poland over Teschen (Tesin, Cieszyn) threatened to erupt in violence. There were also territorial disagreements over the Transcarpathian Ukraine (in Soviet parlance) or Subcarpathian Rus (in Czechoslovak). The expulsion of Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia also provoked problems with the Soviets. The documents we have selected for publication in this connection include: Stalin’s letter to Benes of January 23, 1945; the transcriptions of Molotov’s conversations with Benes of March 21 and 24 of the same year, and Stalin’s conversations with the Czechoslovak prime-minister Zdenek Fierlinger of June 28, 1945.38

These documents allow the reader to assess the larger international considerations behind Soviet positions on these issues. They also clarify the Kremlin’s objectives and tactics, in particular regarding the annexation of the Transcarpathian Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus). The Yugoslav regime also put forward a series of territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors that prompted Soviet intervention. Both Yugoslav territorial pretensions and Stalin’s way of dealing with territorial and political issues in Europe are illustrated by the Soviet transcription of Stalin’s discussions with Tito’s representative on these issues, Andrija Hebrang, on January 9, 1945.39
The Sovietization of Eastern Europe

After the initial formation of the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe in 1944-45, the next stage of Soviet influence involved the transformation of these countries into ones in which the communist parties held and could enforce their monopoly of power. In different countries, this process, which took up most of the immediate postwar period, varied significantly in its pace. But one could argue the task was completed in all of them by 1947 and 1948. From the documents that have become available during the past decade, one sees that not only the pace was different but that the involvement and intervention of Soviet authorities, much as in the original period of the construction of people’s democracies, varied from country to country.

Several factors influenced the extent and character of direct Soviet involvement in the political transformations of these countries. In the long run, the most consequential factor was the nature of the initial regimes established in 1944-45. In terms of the “Sovietization” or “Bolshevization” of Eastern Europe from 1945-1948, we have divided the countries into three categories.

The first category is comprised of Yugoslavia and Albania. The communists established a defacto monopoly of power already in the early stages of forming people’s democracy. Both parties enjoyed favorable internal political conditions, significant military power, and substantial mass support that only grew stronger in the postwar years. The Yugoslav communists’ authority remained high despite the essentially symbolic introduction of several emigre leaders into the Yugoslav government in March 1945. Only a half year later, they were all forced to resign. In 1945-46, Tito and the Yugoslav communists put an end to the independence of the coalition and opposition parties in the so-called “Popular Front.” They were then completely disbanded. In
both Yugoslavia and Albania, the communists introduced what was essentially a one-party system.

The regimes in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the SBZ constitute a second category of “communization.” Characteristic for them was a mixed system of a dominant communist party, which often amounted to a communist party dictatorship and leeway for a limited multi-party system, which included an opposition and some elements of a coalition government, formed together with non-communist parties. In Bulgaria, the parties that participated in the government were allies of the communists within the left bloc, which was controlled by the Communist Party. Meanwhile, in the Polish and Romanian cases, the allied parties in the left bloc participated in and constituted the overwhelming majority of the government. Some centrist forces also took part in the countries’ political life, but were essentially insignificant minorities in their respective governments. In Poland this was the case of the Polish Peasant Party under Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, which opposed the PPR but was included in the government as a result of an agreement between the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States. In Romania, this centrist force was represented by the National Liberals, headed up by Gheorghe Tatarescu, which, however, abandoned its opposition stance and joined with the FND when it came to power.

In both Romania and Poland, the communist parties and the leftist movements allied with them enjoyed very little popular support. The SBZ was somewhat unique in the sense that it was not allowed to be either an independent country or a People’s Democracy. Its fate was dominated instead by negotiations with the West about the German question. In all of these cases, however, there can be little question that the leftist governments and the leading position of the
communists in them resulted from Soviet military and political domination rather than from internal developments. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, the leadership of the left bloc with the communist party at its head enjoyed much greater national support than in Romania or Poland, even thought the presence of Soviet troops into 1947 was still a key factor in strengthening the regime.

Finally, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian regimes make up a third category. Typical for them was a coalition partnership between the communist parties and their leftist adherents, on the one hand, and the democratic as well as some more conservative movements on the other. This partnership was much more genuine than in the coalitions of the second category and was based on a rough, sometimes fluctuating, parity between communist and non-communist forces and, sometimes, on a slight predominance of the non-communist over the communists and their leftist allies.

In the confidential documents of the Soviet Central Committee devoted to developments in Eastern Europe, the regimes of the first category, Yugoslavia and Albania, receive more favorable treatment than the others. The documents emphasize that the communists already exerted a monopoly of power in these countries in 1945-46 and the governments played the controlling role in their respective economies. In other words, Moscow’s high regard for these two regimes in comparison to the others is connected to the swift Sovietization initiated by their communist parties and enthusiastically supported by the local populations. As a consequence, the Soviets believed there was little need to intervene in the processes already at work. There was little cause for playing a supervisory political role or forcing changes in the course of events. From Moscow’s perspective, the other two categories of countries required much more hands-on
supervision. Their transformations into communist-party dominated states were much more complicated and took longer to accomplish. Subsequently, there are more interesting documents on these categories of countries than on the first, which were seen as accomplished facts.

In the second and third category of countries, the Kremlin and the communist parties it supervised preferred to abstain from the kind of forceful Sovietization that characterized Yugoslavia and Albania. In part this was as a consequence of complex internal problems in the countries involved; in part, the Soviets were anxious not to give offense in blatant ways to the West. Instead, the Soviets chose a more prolonged movement towards what seemed to constitute a socialist order. In the sphere of politics, this course of action manifested itself in efforts aimed at gradually increasing the role played by the communist parties in the national governments, simultaneously ousting (in the second category of countries) or gradually marginalizing (in the third category) those forces which were opposed to the communists either as rivals for power or as temporary fellow travelers.

The communists complemented these policies with the subordination of their partners on the left. Simultaneously, they engaged in parallel efforts in the social and economic spheres, expanding the realm of government-controlled industry, taking over transportation, finance and trade, and implementing radical land reform. A number of “democratic” facades remained. There were political coalitions, multi-party systems, and parliaments, none of which existed in the Soviet Union. This followed Stalin’s ideas at the end of World War II that not only the Soviet system could lead to socialism, but that parliamentary democracies, even constitutional monarchies like Great Britain, could gradually move to a socialist order without the revolutionary upheavals and militarized institutions that characterized the beginnings of the
Soviet system. This thesis, which Stalin articulated in discussions with a number of leaders of East European people’s democracies, shifted after the war into a formula for moving towards socialism without going through the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.  

Stalin was far less specific about the length of time it would take for the East European states to reach the stage of a socialist order by the Moscow-mandated non-Soviet route. Moreover, he did not stipulate how long a multi-party and parliamentary system should be preserved, including a legitimate opposition and elements of genuine coalition politics. We have no documents available that answer these kinds of questions. As a result, the historiography has interpreted Stalin’s statements in a number of ways. They range from those historians who maintain that these statements, repeated by a number of East European leaders late on, were little more than camouflage, and that the transition to socialism was meant to take place as soon as possible, using the Soviet system as a model. Others conclude that the Kremlin was at this point seriously considering the possibility that the region could slowly develop along a more democratic route to socialism, distinct from the Soviet.

The abstract question of Stalin’s long-term intentions aside, the documents made available over the past few years make it apparent that the means by which socialism would be accomplished had little to do with the normal processes of politics and parliaments. On the contrary, the practical execution of socialist policies by the communist parties and their Soviet mentors, from its very inception, relied on administrative pressure, subversion, and direct repression, including attacks on the opposition and leftist allies if they proved too independent or resistant.

These administrative measures were initially somewhat more difficult to undertake in the
countries of the third type, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where before 1947 the communists did not yet have the majority in power. Therefore, these methods were more widely used in regimes of the second type (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the SBZ), where the communists were able to rely on the key positions they had already secured with the government to press hard on non-conformists. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, the Bulgarian government persecuted the leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov-Gemeto, who was not only removed from his post as a result of behind-the-scenes communist pressure but was subsequently arrested and brought to trial. In Bulgaria, as well, Stalin ordered that the Bulgarian Defense Minister and a leader of the “Zveno” (Link) party, Damian Velchev, be removed from power.

Attacks on Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and his Polish Peasant Party (PSL) also belong to this general phenomenon. In 1946, security organs of the Polish state isolated, manipulated, and sometimes dissolved groups within the PSL, which was still formally represented in the Polish government. Many PSL members and supporters were arrested for allegedly maintaining contacts with the Polish underground. Similarly, in Romania, security organs subjected the leaders, local organizations, and the press of Romanian opposition parties, especially the influential National-“tsaranist” Party to restrictions and repression. To these actions in Poland and Romania should be added the blackmail, threats, and falsified results that accompanied the Polish referendum of June 1946 and the parliamentary elections in both Poland in January 1947 and in Romania in November 1946.

Another indication of the extra-legal methods of the building of socialism in Eastern Europe were the measures undertaken by early 1947 to jump-start Sovietization in the countries of the second and third categories. (There was no need for such actions in Yugoslavia and
Having falsified the Polish parliamentary elections of January 1947, communist authorities set out to destroy Mikolajczyk’s PSL using force and repression. This produced a crisis within the party itself, which ended when Mikolajczyk and some other PSL leaders, fearing arrest and trial, fled to the West in October 1947, leaving control of the party to those members who opted to side with the authorities.

In Bulgaria and Romania in June 1947, based on the accusations of plotting against the government, which were fabricated by the secret police, the chief leaders of the opposition were arrested, accused of a variety of crimes in a series of show trials, and sentenced to long prison terms. In Bulgaria, Nikola Petkov, leader of the Agrarian Union was condemned to death. The parliamentary factions of the opposition and coalition parties were deprived of their mandate and, in some cases, banned altogether.\(^47\)

At the turn of 1946-47, the Hungarian communist-controlled secret services initiated a campaign against the leaders of the Smallholder Party, which held significant positions in the government and in the parliament (in the 1945 elections the party received 57 percent of the vote). The Smallholders were accused of fomenting an anti-government conspiracy, and the Hungarian Communist Party used the accusations to put their rivals on the defensive. In their minority position, the communists could not command sufficient political clout to move against the Smallholders. The job was left to the Soviet military authorities in Hungary, who, at the end of February 1947, arrested the party’s General Secretary, Bela Kovacs and, in the course of the investigation, fabricated materials on the alleged participation in the plot of several party leaders, including the Prime Minister, Ferenc Nagy.

The Soviet side transmitted these materials to the Hungarian communist leader Rakosi in
May, and he proceeded to use them to threaten the Smallholders and get them to transfer the party’s leadership and the post of Prime Minister to left-leaning members connected with the communists. As a consequence of splits within the opposition engineered by Rakosi, (his so-called “salami tactics”), in August 1947 new parliamentary elections were held, where, as a result of pressure and manipulation, the leftist bloc collected 60 percent of the vote. Communist party members held officially a third of the positions in the new government, but counting their secret members and sympathizers who nominally represented other parties, they controlled more than half of the government posts. Relying then on their position in the government, the communists used well-tested police methods of accusing opposition parties of engaging in anti-state activities to eradicate political dissidence completely.48

Similar methods were used in Czechoslovakia. During the second half of 1947, the communist-controlled secret police services leveled accusations of anti-government conspiracy against several non-communist parties in the ruling coalition. This offensive concluded with the February 1948 coup, which was orchestrated by the communists themselves and led to the destruction of all of the other parties. In Bulgaria and Romania, remaining groups in the legal opposition were entirely eliminated in 1948; in Hungary this process extended until the beginning of 1949.49

In all of these cases – aside, again, from the Yugoslav and Albanian – the assertion of dominance of the communist parties over their social-democratic “allies” was an important part of achieving total control of their domestic political situations. In the SBZ, this process began already in the spring of 1946, when the forced “unification” of the KPD and SPD resulted in the new, communist-dominated SED. By 1948, this process of eliminating social-democratic parties
by merging them forcibly with the communist parties, often heralded by noisy “unity” campaigns, was completed in all of the countries of the region. The communists reorganized and eliminated the other parties of the “left bloc” during 1947-48, merging some into new formations, splitting others, and leaving some to survive as “stage props,” which unreservedly supported the dominant role of the communist party and building socialism. In essence, those countries could previously be categorized as having regimes of the second and third type, now had unlimited communist one-party systems like Yugoslavia and Albania. This monopoly on political power was combined in all of these countries, including the SBZ, with corresponding measures in the social, economic, and cultural spheres.

Among the most critical documents we have selected to underline the Soviet role in this process are the conversations between Stalin and other Soviet spokesmen with the East European communist and noncommunist leaders. The majority of these are Soviet protocols, for example: Stalin’s conversation with the delegation of the Bulgarian government on January 7, 1946; Stalin’s discussions both with the PPR leaders and their main left-bloc allies, the PPS (the Polish Socialist Party) on May 24, 1946, and with the PPS leaders alone on August 19, 194650; and Vyshinskii’s conversation with the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, Gheorghiu-Dej on January 9, 1946.51 A few of the documents also relate to similar discussions transcribed by the East Europeans: Stalin’s conversations with the Bulgarian communists on June 5, 1946, and his discussions with the East Germans in January 1947.52

In the course of these conversations, topical issues of the political state of affairs in the respective countries were discussed together with the objectives of the communist parties and the left blocs as they embarked on “non-Soviet paths” to socialism. In addition to the obligatory
“exchange of information,” the Soviet side, often Stalin, offered the East European communists Soviet assessments of the state of affairs and recommendations – which, in essence, were directives – for taking practical action to implement their political course in face of opposition in and outside the left bloc.

The protocols of these meetings recorded the content of these meetings held behind closed doors and provide the historian an extremely important source on Soviet positions regarding myriad issues, on the directives and reasoning the Soviet side provided their East European interlocutors, and on the way in which the East Europeans responded to these directives: their questions, objections, or expressions of approval. These documents demonstrate the behind-the-scenes dynamics of Soviet influence and policymaking in connection with the development of East European socialism after the war. The reader can explore the tactical decisions taken by Moscow in various different cases, which always took into account the specific circumstances of the internal political situation of each of the countries as well as their particular place in the postwar international arena.

Soviet involvement in parliamentary elections and the formation of governments is documented by a variety of material sent to the Soviet Union by officials in the respective East European countries. Col. Sergei Tiul’panov’s reports before and after the East German election of the fall of 1946 constitute one such example. The reports sent by the chair of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, Marshall Klement Voroshilov, to Stalin and Molotov before and immediately after the Hungarian parliamentary elections that took place on November 4, 1945 are another.
Both sets of reports make it clear that the Soviet authorities were directly involved in planning pre-election maneuvers, which were discussed by the main parties of the government coalition, including the communists, and then actively interfered in the formation of a new government. These efforts were directed at securing the most important posts for the communist party (in the East German case, for the former members of the KPD versus SPD), especially the post of Ministry of Interior, which controlled the police and secret police. After the Bulgarian elections of October 27, 1946, Georgi Dimitrov sent Andrei Zhdanov a draft of the proposed composition of the Bulgarian government and parliamentary leadership for Stalin’s approval.

Some of the selected documents contain evidence that the Soviet representatives monitored the readiness the various East European parties to engage in deception and fraud during the elections. In the protocol of a late night, three-hour long conversation between Iakovlev, Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Bucharest, with Gheorghiu-Dej, two weeks before the Romanian parliamentary elections of November 19, 1946, the Romanian communist leader assured Iakovlev that the Romanian party would insure the required results of the election with the aid of – in his delicate phrasing – special “technical” measures.

One of the most interesting revelations of Soviet behind-the-scenes machinations is contained in a report of Col. Davydov, a Soviet counselor in the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent by V. S. Abakumov, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, to Stalin, February 14, 1947. This report describes the visit to Poland of a special group sent from the Soviet ministry by Stalin in connection with the Polish elections of January 19, 1947. The leaders of the Polish communist party had requested that the Soviet special services helped the Poles restage what they considered the great success of the referendum, which they won as a consequence of the
falsifying and replacement of voting forms. In contrast to the situation during the referendum, the activities of the Soviet group during the parliamentary elections were limited to providing their Polish colleagues with “technical advice” on the manipulations necessary to achieve the desired results. The Polish secret services had already learned their lessons well from their Soviet instructors. Davydov’s report described the extralegal measures they took before and after the elections.

Especially in the countries of the second type – Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the SBZ – the Soviet security services and the special forces of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs provided crucial support for Moscow’s East European communist allies. In Poland, for example, the Soviet security teams were responsible for the protection of President Bierut, General Secretary of the PPR Gomulka, and Prime-Minister Osobka-Morawski. Only in mid-summer 1945, according to Soviet security ministry reports to Stalin and Beria from Poland, was this function transferred to the Polish special services, who had been specially trained for this purpose by their Soviet counterparts.

Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs forces continued to be stationed in Poland. Along with units from the Red Army, these troops were used for the maintenance of order in the country, including carrying out missions against remnants of the Polish underground. The Polish communists expressed some worry about their security, when, in the latter half of 1946, Moscow decided to remove some of these troops from the country, requesting that at least part of the MVD forces be left until the spring of 1947.

The Soviet stance towards the forced Sovietization of the countries of the region also constitutes a theme of the documents selected for this collection. For example, already at the end
of May 1947, before the attack on the Smallholder Party, the Soviets and Hungarian party chief Rakosi accused Hungarian prime-minister Ferenc Nagy and his close associates in the party of plotting against the government. The protocol of the conversations between Molotov and Rakosi in Moscow broach the subject of using Nagy’s alleged treason to shift the balance of power in favor of the Hungary Communist party at the expense of the Smallholders. In mid-September, 1947, before the decision was reached to execute the leader of the Bulgarian opposition, Nikola Petkov, for a mythological conspiracy like Nagy’s in Hungary, Georgi Dimitrov broached the subject with Stalin and requested his approval. In mid-March 1948, Gomulka sought out permission from Zhdanov to accelerate the “merger” between the PPR and PPS, which in practice meant the dissolution of the PPS. Zhdanov forwarded Gomulka’s request to Stalin, who agreed to the action.

Other documents that enlighten the transition from the stage of a variety of roads to socialism to the enforced Sovietization of the East European countries include informational memoranda about the people’s democracies, composed by the Foreign Policy Department of the Soviet Central Committee at the end of August, beginning of September 1947. These materials were assembled in preparation for the first meeting of the Cominform and discussed both Moscow’s assessment of the contemporaneous state of affairs in Eastern Europe and its views of the future. Typically, the Soviets identified Yugoslavia and Albania as ahead of the other people’s democracies because of the steps they had already taken to Sovietize their countries. The Central Committee authors evaluated the other countries according to the extent to which their communist parties had succeeded in concentrating power in their hands and in
subordinating, displacing, or liquidating other political parties and groups. The mistakes of these communist parties were judged according to the criteria of achieving power or not, and allowing others to share it or not. In each case, the specific communist party was instructed on how best to achieve the political objectives of achieving a monopoly of power in the near future.61

The information in these memoranda is relevant to another important topic, that of Soviet control over the activities of the East European communist parties in the early postwar period. The memoranda reveal how closely the Soviets observed the political lines and specific actions of the communist parties. They assessed their activities in detail, evaluated the performance of their organizations, and criticized their ideological pronouncements. The East European communist leaders were closely watched; their attitudes towards the Soviet Union and its policies and the extent to which they followed Moscow’s recommendations were subjected to painstaking scrutiny. The micro-management of the East European comrades is also evident in the protocols of Stalin’s, Molotov’s, Zhdanov’s, and Suslov’s conversations with the leaders of the countries of the region, as well as in the written recommendations prepared by the Central Committee’s Foreign Policy Department.

In both cases, one sees the detailed criticisms of the East European parties programs and methods and the Kremlin’s directives on a broad range of political, economic, organizational, and staffing questions. One also sees in the documents an almost mechanical response on the part of the East European “partners.” The communist functionaries expected to be instructed and learned to ask their Soviet patrons for permission or directives regarding even some trivial internal or external policy questions, as well as appointments to positions in the party and government.62 Competing factions within the East European communist parties played out their
rivalries in Moscow, providing alternative policy or appointment suggestions to their Kremlin patrons. We see this particularly sharply in the competition between Gheorghiu-Dej and his group in the Romanian party and their rivals Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu. The conflicts between Enver Hoxha and Koci Xoxe in the Albanian Communist Party are similarly exposed in their alternative presentations to Moscow.63

Moscow’s interest in controlling the foreign policies of all of the countries of the region is also made evident in the documents. Particularly instructive in this connection are the documents that disclose the actions the Kremlin took at the end of June, 1947 to insure the desired response of the people’s democracies to the Marshall Plan. In a little over two weeks, the Soviet leadership changed its directives three times in encrypted telegrams sent to the leaders of the East European communist parties. Initially, the instructions stipulated that all the people’s democracies should express interest in the plan. Later, the Soviets suggested that their representatives should participate in the conference of European states convened to discuss the plan, but should express disagreement with the plan and withdraw, trying to persuade the other small European states to leave with them. Finally, Moscow directed the people’s democracies not to participate at all in the conference or in the implementation of the plan. Each directive was accepted by the East European communist leaders without question.

The only complications emerged with the Czechoslovak government, which had a non-Communist majority. Benes and his associates were at a loss how to denounce the Marshall Plan and withdraw their agreement to participate in a European meeting, after they had already
announced that they would do go. At a meeting in Moscow of July 9, 1947, Stalin ruthlessly pressured the Czechoslovak government delegation, which had been called to Moscow for that purpose, forcing them to reject outright the Marshall Plan and refuse participation in the meeting. The communist Prime Minister Klement Gottwald and the non-communist members of the government delegation had no choice but to cave in.64

**Themes and Problems of Soviet-East European Relations in the Stalin period**

We have also have included a number of documents that illuminate interesting thematic issues touching on the relationship between Moscow and its East European “allies.” Among them are a series of documents that explore the topic of the Soviet stance towards the sensitive Jewish question and anti-Semitism, especially in Poland, Romania, and Hungary. In the immediate postwar period, serious anti-Semitic outbreaks by local populations, including pogroms and killings, threatened the establishment of order in Soviet-dominated regions of Eastern Europe. Popular anti-Semitism was politically tied to the extension of communist party authority in the region, because, for a variety of reasons, the leadership of a number of parties was heavily if not overwhelmingly of Jewish origin. By extension, anti-Semitic sentiments targeted the Soviet patron of the communists, as well.

From Moscow’s point of view, the Jewish members of the communist leadership in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, the majority of whom had emigrated to the Soviet Union during the war, were generally the most loyal and trustworthy of the East European cadres. Therefore, despite growing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union itself in the postwar years, East European anti-Semitism was viewed from the Kremlin as a negative phenomenon. Among the documents
that explore the dynamics of anti-Semitism are: the reports of the Soviet Counselor at the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw on anti-Semitism and the Jewish question in Poland in 1945-46; and Stalin’s criticism of Gheorghiu-Dej’s national chauvinism in February 1947, where he criticizes the Romanian communist leader for pandering to nationalist and anti-Semitic sentiments in the country in removing Ana Pauker from the leadership. It is important to point out in this context and others that Stalin’s main concern was not Gheorghiu-Dej’s anti-Semitism, but rather that Pauker was seen by him as a more loyal and pliable ally than Gheorghiu-Dej.

Another specialized series of documents included in this volume encompasses the critically important Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. Documents on the origins of the conflict have long remained inaccessible in the former Yugoslav and Soviet archives, as well as in archives in other countries of Eastern Europe. Numbers of documents were published by the Yugoslav government after the initial confrontation with Moscow, but they were carefully selected and tailored to the interests of official Yugoslav propaganda. This version of events influenced not only the Yugoslavs but also, to a certain extent, a number of Western analysts. A broader range of Yugoslav, Soviet, and other East European archival sources on the conflict between the Kremlin and the Yugoslav leadership, including crucial documents related to the origins of the conflict, became available only in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

These materials demonstrate that problems between Moscow and Belgrade focused primarily on questions involving Yugoslav relations with other Balkan people’s democracies, especially Albania and Bulgaria. Among the documents we have selected to illustrate this question are: the protocols of conversations between the Soviet ambassadors to Yugoslavia and
Albania with Tito and Hoxha; the talks between high officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow in 1946-47; Stalin’s discussions with Tito on May 27-28, 1946; and the Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting in Stalin’s residence on February 10, 1948.69

In the above-mentioned analytical materials prepared by the Central Committee for the inaugural meeting of the Cominform, there is an important memorandum on Yugoslavia that illuminates the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations before the emergence of the conflict.70 Several documents also illustrate the problems between the Soviets and Yugoslavs during the gestational phase of the conflict in the spring of 1948, before it broke out into the open in June. These consist mostly of the secret correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade, which reveals the dynamics and mechanisms of the growing confrontation. A portion of this correspondence was published by the Yugoslavs as early as the second half of 1948, as mentioned above, but the rest was shrouded in secrecy.71 Now, four decades later, a complete version of the correspondence is available for the historian’s use.72

The open period of conflict between the Soviets and Yugoslavs from June 1948 on is also a subject of the documents contained in this volume. Soviet policy toward the rebellious Yugoslavs is illustrated by Cominform materials on the organization of the anti-Tito Yugoslav emigration in the Soviet Union and in the People’s Democracies. Some of these documents discuss Cominform radio propaganda against Tito and anti-Tito written materials illegally smuggled into Yugoslavia.73 The documents also contain descriptions of the internal situation in Yugoslavia, to the extent that the Kremlin was accurately informed by its agents and allies.

For example, there is a interesting note on the domestic situation in Yugoslavia sent to
Molotov by the Cominform at the end of March 1949 and based on information from the Romanian and Italian communist parties. There is also an important document of February 1953, sent by the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs to Stalin, outlining various proposals by the Soviet agent Joseph Grigulevich to organize Tito’s assassination. Pavel Sudoplatov’s memoirs make clear that this was a serious proposal, one discussed with Stalin but delayed for further consideration. Only Stalin’s death brought this planning to an end.

The conflict with the Yugoslavs intensified Stalin’s determination to maximize Soviet control over the other East European countries. With a new level of ruthlessness, the Soviets urged the crushing of opponents of the communists and even of dissonant voices with the communist parties. The “case against Gomulka” constitutes one of the emblematic moments in this struggle. The documents on this case demonstrate that it began earlier than the traditionally accepted starting point of Gomulka’s speech to the Plenum of the PPR Central Committee in June 1948. Already the “Political Letter” of March 10, 1948, sent by the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw to Molotov, hinted strongly at the existence of and struggle between two factions with the PPR leadership. One of the factions held to a pro-Moscow orientation; the other, headed by Gomulka was described as infused with Polish chauvinism and prone to anti-Soviet statements and attacks.

Also in March, the Soviet Central Committee composed a detailed memorandum “On the anti-Marxist ideological orientation of the PPR leadership,” which was presented to Central Committee secretary Suslov on April 5. It stated that the PPR leadership, above all Gomulka, deviated in several crucial respects from the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, held an indifferent attitude toward the Soviet experience, and adopted ever more nationalistic positions.
months later, after Gomulka’s June 1948 speech to the Polish Central Committee Plenum, these same accusations were leveled against Gomulka in a campaign to oust him from the PPR leadership and cleanse the party and government of his followers.

The newly available documents on the Gomulka case reveal a number of previously unknown aspects of the conflict. For example, Gomulka’s correspondence with Stalin, and Stalin and Molotov’s correspondence with his successor, Boleslaw Bierut, at the end of 1948, indicated that Gomulka’s future was integrally tied to the creation of the new United Polish Workers’ Party (PZPR), the name given to the PPR after the PPS was forcibly joined with it. Both the Kremlin and the new party leaders were interested in retaining Gomulka in the Politburo of the new organization in order to bolster its legitimacy and their ability to control Gomulka’s supporters.

Gomulka rejected this plan and counterattacked, using the Jewish issue to taint the qualifications of members of the new leadership (Hilary Minc, Jakob Berman, and Roman Zambrowski). Stalin and Molotov indicated that the Polish leadership should keep a close eye on Gomulka; Bierut responded that he needed to meet with Stalin about Gomulka’s situation.\(^{79}\) Additional documents, which explore Polish government’s attack on Marian Spychalski, a close confederate of Gomulka’s, and indicate that the Poles were interested in the Rajk trial in Budapest, demonstrate that the Polish security services were building a case against Gomulka and Spychalski, both of whom were arrested in 1951.\(^{80}\) Other documents also make clear that Gomulka and Spychalski were lucky to escape with their lives.\(^{81}\) Stalin died before there was
enough evidence (and/or desire) to bring them and their associates to trial.

Communist leaders in other parts of Eastern Europe who fell from favor with Moscow did not fare so well. Everywhere else in the region except for Poland there were show trials, which were meant not only to punish alleged offenders but to anchor the legitimacy of the communist authorities. (In the GDR, analogous trials of Paul Merker and others were held in secret.) The show trials victimized not only communist party leaders, who had fallen from favor, but also non-party government specialists and military leaders. The documents attest to the influence of Soviet “advisors” in the preparation and execution of the trials, at which, ostensibly, they were expert. They sanctioned and controlled the trials’ organization, and in some cases directly participated in arrests and interrogations.

Among the documents that have been selected in this volume to illustrate the role of the Soviets are the direct reports of Soviet officials back to Moscow from the period 1948 to 1953, that is, after the break with Yugoslavia. The primary reporters in this case were employees of the Soviet embassies or Soviet diplomatic missions, Soviet military, police, economic, and cultural advisors, as well as Cominform specialists, who were inspecting local communist parties.

These officials also engaged in direct discussions with local communist functionaries at various levels of the party hierarchy; the protocols of these conversations also provide important information on the influence of the Soviets. The information from these conversations was also often included in the reports back to Moscow, as were the originals of the protocols. Although to a lesser extent, we also have some critical materials on the trials that can be gleaned from the correspondence and the protocols of direct discussions (and correspondence) between the East European communist leaders and Stalin, as well as Molotov.
These materials convincingly document the decisive role of the Soviets in the trials of the East European party elites. The repressions in the people’s democracies were sanctioned by and implemented under the “control” – meaning oversight as well as interference when things were not being done “correctly” – of the Soviet patron. The hierarchical subordination of the parties of Eastern European party leaders, as was their wont, asked for advice and expected directions. The Soviets interest in keeping tabs on East European affairs and garnering information from diverse sources in these countries is also evident in the documents. Central to this effort was the maintenance of regularized “channels” of information from reliable sources within the nomenklatura of the communist party and government institutions in Eastern Europe. Less easy to document is another important channel, and that is the direct orders of Soviet advisors to the local repressive agencies “for help.” Also rare are the direct communications between Stalin, Molotov, and others in the Kremlin and the East European communist leaders.

The unevenness of the available materials derives from limited access to certain categories of sources presently designated by the Russian state as classified. Moreover, the complete inaccessibility of former Soviet secret police archives means that some of the most important of Moscow’s channels of control and manipulation cannot be researched in original sources. Nevertheless, much of the material we were able to select and assemble for this section of the volume sheds considerable light on the mechanisms by which the Soviet leadership exerted influence on their East European comrades.

In particular, newly available materials document the much-debated question of how the Soviet patrons of the people’s democracies interacted with the communist elites of the region during the initial stages of the purges, when party leaders were arrested and interrogated. We
also have good documentation of Soviet actions during the actual trials and sentencing, and
during the execution of the sentences. Soviet preferences in these cases overlapped with the
domestic communist politics, in which one rival group or leader used the processes of political
repression to remove their opponents. The available sources paint a complex picture of Soviet
influence on local party internal politics, which balances the internal and external in different
measures, depending on the country and the time period. We examine this mix in documents that
elucidate the trials of Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, Slansky in Czechoslovakia, and Luca
in Romania.86

Many of the documents selected for this collection illuminate the repressive aspect of
Soviet influence on the consolidation of communist regimes in eastern Europe, on the imposition
of the Soviet model in these countries, and on their subordination to Moscow’s dictates in the
last years of Stalin’s rule. But Moscow also used “soft” means of imposing its will, and these are
documented in the newly accessible archives, as well. For example, Soviet participation in the
organization of the power structures in these countries, in cadre politics, and in implementing
economic, cultural, and social policies – all played an important role in the successful
Sovietization of Eastern Europe.

In this period, as in others the most critical sources for reconstructing the history of the
Soviet-East European relationship are the records of meetings, conversations, and
correspondence between the leaders of the people’s democracies and high Soviet officials,
particularly Stalin. Sometimes, we use Soviet protocols of these meetings, for example, Stalin’s
conversations with Hoxha on March 23, 1949, or with Chervenkov and other Bulgarian leaders
on July 29, 1949.87 Sometimes we use the accounts of meetings in Moscow by East European
leaders to Soviet ambassadors back in their own countries, like those of Gheorghiu-Dej of July 16, 1949, or Bierut of September 25, 1952.88

Because of limitations of access to some Soviet leadership sources for this period, we rely primarily on letters of the communist leaders in Eastern Europe (Bierut, Chervenkov, Rakosi, Gottwald, Pieck) to Moscow, that is, to Stalin and to Suslov in the Soviet Central Committee.99 Only in a few cases, do we have the communications from Stalin, Suslov, and others.90 The protocols and the summaries of the conversations, along with the correspondence, broach many of the political, economic, and ideological problems that were discussed at the highest level between the Soviets and the people’s democracies. They also make clear again the hierarchical nature of the relationship and the ways in which Soviet wishes were made known and implemented. The documents allow the historian to assess the degree of Soviet control and involvement in the reorganizations of the state apparatuses in Eastern Europe, including Soviet involvement in the naming of specific officials to higher posts in the various governments.

Another important series of sources stem from the reporting of Soviet officials in the East European countries themselves: diplomats, advisors, journalists, and others. Information from East European sources was often considered less reliable than the reporting of Soviet comrades who worked in these countries. These reports attest, as do others, to the supreme interest of the Soviet authorities in the make-up, politics, and opinions of the local communist leadership.

The reports sent to Moscow transmitted information on the mood of the ruling elite, their hierarchies and power relationships, their organizational structures and leadership methods. Individual East European leader were evaluated and assessed based primarily on the criteria of
loyalty to the Soviet Union and their ability to implement Soviet-style policies. Such reports often pointed to specific weaknesses in the East European parties and proposals for “correcting the situation.” Ambassadorial reports often noted that Soviet representatives had met with the appropriate officials and had passed on advice, which they expected to be followed.91

Many of the relevant documents point to the importance of Soviet advisors in the East European governments and ministries, whether in the economy, the military, or the secret police services. Soviet advisors were also important when the East Europeans undertook special projects, whether currency reform, the revocation of the rationing system, or the launching of important economic projects or cultural institutions. Since the “Soviet way” was the only right way to do things, the East Europeans often found it easiest to import Soviet specialists to show them how to accomplish concrete tasks. The documents we have selected in this connection demonstrate that all the countries of Eastern Europe, from the most highly developed, like Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the most backward, like Albania, imported Soviet advisors for an astonishingly wide variety of purposes.92 These advisors were often given quite explicit instructions to transform the particular parts of the government apparatus, judicial and police systems, and cultural, education and economic institutions according to the Soviet model.93

Equally important to the penetration of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was the explicit transfer of Marxist-Leninist ideology – as a complete and elaborated system of values and ideas – from Moscow to its East European clients. The documents reveal just how important ideological conformity to the “truths of Marxism-Leninism” was to the Soviets. They closely followed East European ideological developments, whether in local party journals or in the arts, education, and the mass media. Local Soviet representatives sent back home “report cards” on
how well the East Europeans matched up in the field of ideology. They discussed ideological questions with members of the local intelligentsia and nomenklatura, constantly harping on the need for the complete adoption of Soviet cultural norms and political ideas. Reporters from various agencies back home in Moscow, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of the Party, emphasized not only the priority for locals to learn better from their Soviet teachers but the critical need to counter the ideological influence of the West. 94 This included the interception of Western propaganda materials at the borders and the jamming of Western radio. 95

After Stalin

With the changes that ensued in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in March of 1953, both the East European Stalinist regimes and the policies they followed towards the Kremlin were subjected to serious challenges, and, in some cases, to radical transformations. In the majority of countries in the region, serious changes were in the wind; especially in Poland, Hungary, and the GDR, communist regimes were faced with dangerous political crises. In the GDR and even more so in Hungary, the very survival of the regimes were placed in question. In both cases, the Soviet military was used to crush opposition and maintain the communists in power. The final section of our collection is devoted to this cluster of problems and spans the years 1953 to 1956.

One of the most important themes of this period was the effect of the “thaw” in Soviet policy after the death of Stalin on the East European communist parties and states. Among the
documents that illuminate this problem are Central Committee materials from the spring and summer of 1953, which explore the views of the Soviets about the difficult economic and political situation faced by the majority of the people’s democracies, especially problems of declining standards of living and mounting popular discontent that resulted from forced “socialist construction” and disproportionately high military spending. Moscow’s anxiety grew perceptibly when growing popular disillusionment expressed itself in mass demonstrations in Czechoslovakia in early June 1953 and in the even larger protests that broke out in the GDR in mid-June. The documents we have selected – for example, Beria’s memorandum to Malenkov in connection with the Czechoslovak unrest that began on June 1 and Molotov’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Prague on the same subject – testify to the extent of Soviet apprehensions over these events and their possible recurrence in other countries of the region.96

To remedy this situation, the Kremlin decided to adopt a slightly modified course of action and temper the scale and pace of industrialization in the East European countries. As in the Soviet Union, a “New Course” was proclaimed, reducing the forced tempo of heavy industrialization, investing in the development of light industry, agriculture, and the service sector, raising the standard of living, and liberalizing policies towards the peasantry. In addition, at home and in their East European dependencies, the Soviets sought to reduce the overall repression of society in order to alleviate the mounting tensions. The “New Course” reflected some of the changes that were going on the Soviet Union itself. But, typically, the Soviets began in June 1953 to issue a series of special directives to the East European communists to follow their leadership. These are best documented in the protocols of meetings97 and in the correspondence between the Soviets and the leaders of the peoples democracies.98 Through these
documents, the historian can detect the Soviet motivations for reforms, the reactions of the East European leaders, including their disagreements and attempts to modify the Soviet proposals, and the overall state of flux in the Soviet bloc, caused by the effects of sometimes contradictory Soviet needs for order and reform.

Another important topic connected to the post-Stalin transformation was the Soviet initiative to bring the conflict with Yugoslavia to an end. Various categories of documents reproduced below chronicle this set of events: materials from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which assessed the internal and external policies of the Yugoslavs and offered recommendations for a new Soviet posture; selections of the protocols of the Soviet Central Committee meetings in which Soviet-Yugoslav relations were discussed; and excerpts from the secret correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders, which was initiated in 1954. 99

These documents convey important dimensions of the official Soviet line towards Yugoslavia and the way in which both the Soviets and Yugoslavs were able to resuscitate their relationship during the period 1953-56. They also elucidate the positions taken by each side during the rapprochement, including the differences in the Kremlin about how far the Soviets should go to recant the past. The remaining disagreements on both sides are also evident in the exchanges between them in this period. This becomes apparent during the crisis in the Soviet bloc in 1956, in particular during the Hungarian revolution and its suppression by Soviet troops. The Soviets and Yugoslavs were clearly at odds during this period over the fate of Imre Nagy. Several sources selected for publication in this volume, including a number of direct exchanges between the leaders of both countries, broach the problem of the Hungarian crisis for Soviet-Yugoslav relations. 100
The final topic of central importance for the period 1953-56 is Soviet policy towards those countries in which mass demonstrations and political crises threatened the integrity of communist rule: the GDR in 1953 and Poland and Hungary in 1956. In all three cases, Soviet policy helped bring about the crises; at the same time Soviet efforts to defuse popular discontent only exacerbated the situations.

In all three cases, Soviet military intervention was threatened. In Poland, sharp differences between the Polish and Soviet communist leaderships produced a remedy, the return to power of Gomulka. In the GDR and Hungary, Soviet military intervention crushed popular uprisings. Internal Kremlin politics played an especially important role in the mass uprising in the German Democratic Republic from June 17-June 20, 1953. Lavrentii Beria sought to achieve supreme power in the Soviet Union by undertaking a series of striking domestic and foreign policy initiatives, including the supposed abandonment of the socialist project in the GDR. This in turn produced turmoil inside the SED and in East German society, especially when party leader Walter Ulbricht raised work norms, purposely ignoring the mandates of the “New Course.” Beria was arrested at the end of June by his comrades, attacked at the July 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee, tried in secret in December, and executed on December 14, 1953. The transcripts of the Plenum serve as an important source for understanding Beria’s role in East German events.101

In the case of Soviet policy during the crises in Poland and Hungary, our project uses different categories of sources, which have become accessible only during the last decade. The materials of the Presidium of the Soviet Central Committee are especially significant in this respect; they include the recently published working notes and partial protocols of meetings.
where the situations in both Poland and Hungary were discussed.  

For the first time, this group of sources reveals the day-to-day discussions of the top Soviet leadership as these crises matured, and, in the case of Hungary, flared up into open rebellion. The documents clarify the positions taken by the different Soviet leaders in the Presidium and shed light on their motivations and reasoning in coming up with potential solutions.

One learns a lot about the consistency (and lack of consistency) in some Soviet leaders’ views, how they came up with consensus positions in the post-Stalin years, and how they communicated these decisions to the relevant authorities. In short, the documents provide insights into the decision-making of the Soviet leaders during crisis situations.

Another important category of sources are the reports sent from Poland and Hungary to the Soviet leadership: reports from Soviet embassies in these countries; from Soviet military commanders when Soviet troops entered Hungary to suppress the revolution; reports sent back to Moscow by those members of the Presidium and those secretaries of the Central Committee who were dispatched to Hungary to take control of the situation. Containing both factual data and assessments of the events, these documents show the kind of information that was available to the Kremlin’s leaders when they felt they had to act in order to prevent the Soviet Union from losing control over the communist regimes, and, in the Hungarian case, when they took the decisions to oust the reformist Nagy government and restore the former communist regime to power by military means.

As a consequence of Soviet policy – political and military – the face of Eastern Europe was profoundly changed after the Second World War. To be sure, there were problems in the
interwar period that presaged drastic transformations in the region. The Soviets did not invent East European communism, nor did they control all of its many dimensions. However, the newly accessible documents from previously secret archives, which are made available often for the first time in English in this volume, demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that Soviet influence, control, and manipulation were at the heart of the creation of communist regimes in the region.

More than that, the multifarious forms of direct Soviet involvement in postwar East European affairs intensified the hold of Soviet-style socialism on the peoples and countries involved. The process of destroying the Soviet stranglehold on the sovereignty of East European countries began in 1956, but took over thirty years to complete. Despite the release of new archival sources, it will take at least another thirty years for the period of the establishment of communist regimes to be fully historicized and understood.

**ENDNOTES**

1. We use the term “Eastern Europe” here in a geopolitical sense, rather than in a strictly geographical one. The term indicates the group of European countries in which, as a consequence of World War II, communist regimes were established that lasted until 1989-90. Sometimes, this region is referred to as East Central Europe or Central and Southeastern Europe.

2. The most notable of these cases occurred in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Czechoslovak case, which owed much to the inventiveness of Karel Kaplan, materials were smuggled out of Czechoslovakia after the crushing of the “Prague Spring” in 1968 and became the bases of a series of documentary and scholarly publications: Karel Kaplan, _Die Entwicklung des Rates fuer gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe(RWG) in der Zeit von 1949 bis 1957_ (Ebenhausen, 1977); Karel Kaplan, _Dans les archives du Comite central: trente ans de secrets du Bloc sovietique_ (Paris, 1978); Karel Kaplan, _Report on the Murder of the General Secretary_ (Columbus, Ohio, 1990). In the Polish case, materials were smuggled out in the late 1960s and early 1970s and published as a documentary collection: Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, eds., _The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland_ (London, 1980).


10. SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941-1949: Dokumenty iz Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, eds., G.P. Kynin, I.Laufer, vol. II: May 9, 1945-October 3 1946 g. (Moscow, 2000); vol. III, October 6, 1946-June 15, 1948 (Moscow, 2003). These volumes are presently being prepared for publication in German by Jochen Laufer.


21. See, for example, SSSR– Pol’sha, pp. 13-15, 24-25.


25. From the documents it is evident that only from mid-September 1944 on, that is a month-and-a-half after the beginning of the uprising, did the Soviets – under pressure from its allies, the United States and Great Britain – begin to take some limited measures to support the uprising. These lasted for two weeks, until the Warsaw Uprising was crushed by the Germans. Russkii arkhiv, vol. 14 (3-1); SSSR i Pol’sha: pp. 227-229, 230-232, 236-237, 240, 246-249, 254-255, 256, 262, 266-267, 271-275, 277-280, 291-292; Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. I, p. 52; Z archiwow sowieckich, vol. IV: Stalin a Powstanie Warszawskie.

26. The entire collection of Stalin’s “special folders” are held in the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), which has published an annotated catalogue of these documents: Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii, vol. I “Osobaia papka” I.V. Stalin. Iz materialov Sekretariata NKVD – MVD SSSR 1944-1953 gg. Katalog dokumentov, ed. V.A. Kozlov, S.V. Mironenko (Moscow, 1994). A significant portion of this material relating to Poland in the period 1944-1945 has been published in the collection, Iz Varshavy, mentioned above.

27. Iz Varshavy, pp. 274-275.


30. Ibid., pp. 100-101, 105.


32. See SVAG: Upravlenie propaganda (informatsii) i S.I. Tiul’panov.


34. Otnosheniia Rossii (SSSR) s Iugoslaviei, pp. 421, 422-424.


36. Sovetskii faktor, vol. I, pp. 134-138. The editors of this volume incorrectly identify this report sent to Kardelj as one that was written by him in the Soviet Central Committee’s Department of International Information.


40. In part, these conclusions derive from the evaluations of the Foreign Policy Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) at the end of August and beginning of September 1947, during the preparation of the founding meeting of the Cominform. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), fond (f.) 575, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 3, listy (l.) 103-104, 107, 108, d. 9, l. 29, d. 41, ll 9-11, 19, 20. Several excerpts of these documents are published in Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. I, pp. 705-706.


43. From documents now available, we know that already at the end of January 1945, immediately after the forced withdrawal of Dimitrov-Gemeto from his post as leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov, still in Moscow, gave the order for the Bulgarian communists to arrest Dimitrov-Gemeto “if he interferes too much.” Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. I, p. 150.

44. The documentary evidence of Stalin’s initiatives and his behind-the-scenes machinations can be found in: BKP, Komintern’t i makedonskiat vop’s (1917-1946), ed. Tsocho Biliarski, Iva Birilkova, vol. II (Sofia, 1999), pp. 1268-1269; The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, pp. 405, 406-407, 409-410; Tsentralen d’rzheven arkhiv (Sofia), f. 146 b, op. 4, ed. 42, ll. 4-6.


49. The most thorough discussion of the history of the Czech coup, based on a wealth of newly available archival materials, is Karel Kaplan’s, Pet kapitol o unoru (Brno, 997).


51. Ibid., pp. 365-368.


54. Ibid., pp. 539-541.


56. The section of Davydov’s report that we have chosen to publish is in: N.V. Petrov, “Rol’ MGB SSSR v sovietizatsii Pol’shi,” pp. 117-118.

57. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

58. Iz Varshavy, pp. 325, 328-329.

59. A part of the transcript of this conversation was published in: Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. I, pp.613-623.


61. The reports used by our project are sometimes reproduced in whole, sometimes in part. The originals are in RGASPI, f. 575, op. 1, d. 3, 9, 11, 14, 32, 33, 39, 41. Several sections of these reports on Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were published in: Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. I, pp. 704-709; Sovetskii faktor, vol. 1, pp. 496-503.


66. Stalin’s accusations were brought up at the talks between Stalin, Molotov, Mikoian and Gheorghiu-Dej, February

67. Mostly, these were brochures published by the Yugoslav authorities in the second half of 1948, which contained a part of the secret Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence during the initial hidden phase of the conflict between March and May 1948. Pisma CK KPJ i pisma CK SKP(b) (Belgrade, 1948). English translations of these documents were also published in part by the Yugoslavs and in part in the West. The Correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (Belgrade, 1948; The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London, 1948). They were also put out in different editions, including: Robert H. Bass, Elizabeth Marbury, eds., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record (New York, 1959).


70. RGASPI, f. 575, op. 1, d. 41. (See endnote 61 above.)

71. See endnote 67.

72. L.Ia. Gibianskii, “Sekretnaia sovetsko-iugoslavskaiia perpiska 1948 goda,” Voprosy istorii, no. 4/5 (1992), pp. 119-136; no. 6/7, pp. 158-172; no. 10, pp. 141-160. This collection of articles includes twenty-one documents, while in the official Yugoslav publication from 1948 only 6 letters between the Soviet and Yugoslav authorities on the “hidden” phase of the conflict were published.

73. See, for example, Sovetskii faktor, vol. 2, pp. 87-88; Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, pp. 591-595, 734-738, 768.

74. Sovetskii faktor, vol. 2, pp. 82-85.


78. SSSR– Pol’sha, pp. 229-246.


81. In July 1952, for example, the Soviet MGB advisor in Poland sent to his Minister in Moscow, Ignat’ev, documents relating to an alleged military conspiracy in Poland, in which Spychalski figured as a major character and Gomulka was also involved. We know that Ignat’ev forwarded the materials to Stalin. Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, pp. 773-784.

82. Among such materials, are reports addressed to the Soviet side by Enver Hoxha on the “Xoxe Case” (Vostochnaia evropa, vol. II, pp. 122-123); by Matyas Rakosi and Mihai Farkas on the “Rajk Case,” as well as on their plans to arrest Kadar and other leading functionaries (ibid., pp. 178-182, 349, 4978-498); (“Liudiam svoistvenno oshibat’siu”: Iz vospominanii M. Rakoshi,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 3 (1997): 155, note 109); by Rudolf Slansky on the “Klementis Case”; and thereafter Aleksei Chepichka’s attempt to oust Gottwald in the “Slansky Case” (Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, pp. 327-328, 581); and, finally, by Gheorgiu-Dej and his comrades in the case against Luca, Pauker, and Georgescu (Sovetskii faktor, vol. 2, pp. 613-616; Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, pp. 744-746, 872-873).


86. These trials are illuminated by the materials cited in endnotes 83-85.


90. For example, see the note from Stalin to Bierut of May 22, 1952, Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, p. 343.


93. See, for example, the instructions to the Soviet specialists who were tasked to transform the Czechoslovak system of prosecutors and courts. Vostochnaia Evropa, vol. II, pp. 688-689.


97. See, for example, the notes of the GDR’s prime minister Otto Grotewohl during the meetings of the East German and Soviet leaders on June 2-4, 1953, and the Hungarian notes of the meetings between Soviet leaders and the Hungarians on June 13, 1953. Cold War International History Project Bulletin (hereafter CWIHPB), issue 10, pp. 81-86. See also the Soviet record of conversations between the Soviet leaders and Bierut on December 18, 1953.


100. See, for example, Sovetskii soiuz i vengerskii krizis 1956 goda, pp. 481, 484-485, 587-588, 595-596, 608-611, 622-625. Pieces of these documents were published in English in CWIHPB, issue 10, pp. 143-147. See also, Arhiv Jugoslavije (Belgrade), f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-76.

